CENTRAL AMERICA A Workshop Abandoned: WikiLeaks, U.S. Empire, and Central America By KIRSTEN WELD entral AMERICA has long SERvEd AS the WORk- 20th century, gunboat diplomacy in the circum- Caribbean shop of U.S. empire.1 The tiny isthmus has gave way to dollar diplomacy and the Good Neighbor Cbeen made to function as a bustling laboratory Policy, when the United States realized that its aims could where the United States has experimented with regime be realized on the cheap. In the early 21st century, the change, economic restructuring, unsavory yet pragmatic United States may grumble about the electoral victories of alliances, electoral sleight-of-hand, and imperial sorties Mauricio Funes in El Salvador or Daniel Ortega in Nicara- designed as test runs for longer-term interventions in gua, but it will not send in the troops to depose them. Is the Middle East. But what happens to the workshop this the stench of a decadent, lordly rot or the high-octane when the work is done or when it moves overseas? fumes of a sleek, supercharged imperium? The U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks in November 2010 answer that question, painting a picture S late AS 2003, WHEN the leakEd CAbles bE- of diplomatic distraction, neglect, and half-heartedness. gin, U.S. priorities were crystal clear: to se- The cables, which range from late 2003 through 2010, A cure passage of the Central American Free reveal that the U.S. government maintained the same Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR); to obtain local approval hostile, Cold War–steeped attitudes toward Nicaragua’s for the extension of Central Skies, the joint regional Sandinistas (FSLN) and El Salvador’s Farabundo Martí counter- drug military operation; and to finalize Article Liberation Front (FMLN) as in decades past. But what 98 agreements, the heavily Bush-promoted bilateral emerges from an examination of the cables is a sense of immunity accords aimed to protect U.S. citizens from the fading and erosion, not the forward-looking expan- prosecution in the International Criminal Court.4 These sion, of U.S. engagement in the region. were concrete, pre-9/11 objectives, and as 20th-century George W. Bush took office in 2001 having promised U.S.–Latin American history shows, defined objectives deep involvement with Latin America, articulating bold have met with defined results more often than not. plans for the continent—and in Spanish, no less.2 But the The United States was largely able to accomplish this events of 9/11 derailed the president’s journey down the narrow agenda, since it remained willing to exercise sig- Pan-American Highway, and in the ensuing years—which nificant diplomatic pressure in matters that directly af- were exceedingly busy for Central Americans, featuring a fected its own economy. CAFTA-DR was approved over coup, an escalating drug war, a new regional free trade the protests of local labor federations, which rightly agreement, and controversial presidential elections—U.S. doubted their governments’ ability and willingness to policy toward Central America sunk largely into decay. enforce the agreement’s labor provisions. And in what This is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it might well has thus far proved largely a vain effort to curtail the be an opportunity for Central Americans to put a little activities of narcotraffickers, isthmian governments em- more distance between the sardines and the shark, to use braced the counter-drug funding and training pushed the metaphor of former Guatemalan president Juan José by the United States. Voices of dissent did emerge—for Arévalo.3 But on the other hand, it may mean that the in- example, in Guatemala, surrounding the renewal of its stitutionalization of a Pax Neoliberal has simply replaced branch of Central Skies. But when left-leaning parties the need for ugly, costly military intervention. In the early questioned the military appropriation in Guatemala’s Congress, “close, last-minute Embassy coordination” Kirsten Weld teaches Latin American history at Brandeis with key members of the Guatemalan Republican Front University. She is currently writing two books about Guatemala. (FRG) party, including the daughter of former dictator SPRING 2012 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 73 Efraín Ríos Montt, “saved the day.” As the Embassy for a reform-minded, democratic candidate to win the crowed in its report back to the State Department, these elections.”6 The Embassy also created “rap sheets” on loyal deputies “fed our arguments directly onto the floor Ortega and the Sandinista party, “highlighting their sys- of the Congress.”5 That Guatemalan conservatives should tematic crimes and abuses,” for use with domestic and “feed” U.S. positions into the country’s legislature, at the international interlocutors.7 This was what “democracy U.S. Embassy’s behest, was certainly a mark of continu- promotion” looked like on the ground. ity or fealty to old friends, rather than of change. But while the United States threatened to reconsider But local embassies could not rely on such pliant aid programs in the event of a Sandinista victory, there local auxiliaries tipping the scales unless the scales al- was no risk of a Contra-style invasion—no will to effect ready favored pro-U.S. leaders and parties. In the first regime change as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. As The years covered by the WikiLeaks cables, this was not a Christian Science Monitor noted, “some Nicaraguan ana- problem; presidents like El Salvador’s Tony Saca, of the lysts claim that the reporting in the leaked cables reads far-right ARENA party, and Guatemala’s Óscar Berger, a too much like a Facebook post to embarrass Ortega, pro-business technocrat, were willing partners in trade who’s heard it all before and developed a thick hide in liberalization and security cooperation. the process. If anything, pundits say, the US diplomatic The year 2006, however, saw Latin America’s electoral mission could find itself in a tight spot for having its landscape shaken up, as viable, left-leaning presidential cards tipped and exposing the limits of their hand.”8 candidates emerged from Nicaragua to Argentina and Even in El Salvador, which Embassy officials considered Latin Americans throughout the hemisphere cast their “our closest friend in the Western Hemisphere,” the Unit- votes for new approaches to achieving social and eco- ed States did not move to prevent the democratic election nomic justice. In the U.S. diplomatic imagination, the of FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes.9 South America’s left- influence of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez—not the rejec- ward turn had heightened El Salvador’s strategic impor- tion of the Washington Consensus—loomed large in tance—Ecuadoran president Rafael Correa had pushed to this paradigm shift. In a previous era, the United States close the U.S. Southern Command base at Manta, thus might have sent military advisers to direct counter- increasing the role of Comalapa, SouthCom’s Cooperative campaigns or at least weapons to the defenders of the Security Location in El Salvador—but still, the Embassy friendly status quo. But, constrained by more modern more or less sat back while Salvadorans rejected the hard- expectations and their own congressional restrictions right ARENA status quo by a slim margin. on harder-nosed projections of U.S. influence, the of- This was all the more surprising because the Embassy, ficials consigned to the imperial backwaters of Central and the Bush administration in particular, had enjoyed America did little more than issue boilerplate threats an uncommonly close relationship with Saca. Saca was to cut off remittances and aid, fume about the “Com- so virulent in his anti-Communism that he boasted of munists,” and watch as both El Salvador and Nicara- smoking “only Padrón cigars, made by Miami Cubans, gua elected presidents deeply distasteful to the United and would never smoke a Cohiba.”10 It was Saca who States, knowing that those presidents still needed U.S. led his military into Bush’s Coalition of the Willing, dollars in order to manage their struggling economies. despite polls indicating that more than 80% of Salva- In Nicaragua, where FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega dorans opposed participating.11 And as municipal and competed successfully for the presidency, the Embas- legislative elections approached in 2006, the Embassy sy cables show that the United States continued to go very much hoped to prevent gains at the polls by the through the motions of the 1980s, remaining obsessed FMLN, which it characterized as “mired in disarray and with destroying the Sandinistas. As Ambassador Paul obsolete 1970s-era revolutionary rhetoric.”12 Trivelli wrote, “Mission personnel were very clear about Given all this, one would imagine that the United the dangers of an FSLN victory in the 2006 Presiden- States would do everything in its power to head off tial elections.” Imagining Nicaragua as another Cuba, an FMLN victory. And for a moment, it seemed that it Trivelli speculated that “a Sandinista win would like- would. Once Funes, perceived as an electable moderate, ly result in capital flight, a setback in open markets, was named presidential candidate for the FMLN, U.S. an anti-US foreign policy and an immigration crisis, officials began meeting with Salvadoran business lead- as many Nicaraguans would likely seek sanctuary in ers who, in 2008, sought to “develop a ‘Plan B’ in order the United States.” For these reasons, the ambassador to ‘save El Salvador’ should Funes win the election.” concluded, “timing is crucial for the receipt of elec- “The fact that they are taking a long view and attempt- tion and other financial assistance to bolster chances ing to fireproof El Salvador from feared FMLN mischief 74 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS VOL.