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Chernobyl' and Glasnost'

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Chernobyl' and Glasnost' Chernobyl' and Glasnost' Ellen Jones and Benjamin L. Woodbury, II n the night of August 31/September 1, 1983, was also a domestic issue, because it threatened Soviet interceptors shot down a South Korean Soviet lives and property, affected popular percep- O commercial jet that had strayed into Soviet terri- tions of the new Gorbachev leadership, and modified tory. When Western officials responded with accusa- elite assessments of Gorbachev's power. The acci- tions and condemnations, Soviet spokesman withdrew dent at Chernobyl' also offers a rare glimpse at the behind a curtain of silence and denial, followed by political and social impact of technological disasters in grudging acknowledgment and, finally, counterat- a socialist state. The reaction of the Soviet population tack.1 On September 9, then Chief of the General Staff to the accident and its aftermath tells us a lot about the Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov gave a televised press con- role of both public opinion and the news media in the ference to present the Soviet side of the story.2 The USSR. It also provides some insight into the changes Soviets charged that the plane had been on an intelli- introduced by General Secretary Gorbachev and the gence mission for the United States, and also accused limits of those changes. the United States of trying to discredit the Soviet Union This article explores the political and social aspects and undermine the chances of success at the arms of the accident. It begins with an examination of Gor- 3 limitation talks about to resume in Geneva. bachev's public relations policy and its application to The Soviet handling of the KAL 007 incident, then, the Chernobyl' disaster. It then examines the implica- was reactive. Only under pressure of adverse interna- tions of the accident for Soviet foreign policy and tional opinion did Soviet spokesmen admit that the closes with an assessment of the domestic repercus- Soviets had shot down an unarmed passenger airliner. sions of the disaster. But in making the admission, they also tried to shift responsibility for the incident from the Soviet Union to the United States. The Glasnost' Policy Three years and two general secretaries later, unit No. 4 of the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant exploded. The accident at Chernobyl' came at a time when For party decision-makers in Moscow, the accident Gorbachev was trying to change Soviet public rela- raised the immediate issue of how to deal with the tions policy. In the past, news of many events, particu- news, both at home and abroad. Like the shooting larly those thought to be embarrassing to the political down of KAL 007, the disaster was an international incident because the emitted radioactivity affected the USSR's neighbors. But unlike KAL 007, Chernobyl' 1On September 2, 1983, a TASS statement acknowledging the disappearance of the Korean airliner appeared in major Soviet newspapers. A subsequent TASS statement, more detailed but still not admitting the Soviet role in the airliner's disappearance, appeared the following day. (See Ellen Jones and Benjamin L Woodbury, II, are ana- Pravda [Moscow], Sept. 2, 1983, and Krasnaya Zvezda [Moscow], Sept. 2 lysts of Soviet political-military affairs with the Defense and 3, 1983.) Finally, on September 7, Krasnaya Zvezda published an account acknowledging that "the interceptor-fighter plane of the Anti-Air Intelligence Agency (Arlington Hall, VA). Ms. Jones is Defenses fulfilled the order of the command post to stop the flight." For author of Red Army and Society (1985). The views Western coverage of Soviet reactions, see Time (New York), Sept. 12, expressed in this article are those of the authors and 1983, pp. 10-18. 2Pravda, Sept. 10, 1983. do not necessarily represent the official position of the 3See, e.g., "So When Will Washington Give Answers," ibid., Sept. 25, US government. 1983. 28 PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Problems of Communism Nov-Dec 1986 leadership, had been suppressed. This was true of There have always been opportunities to express dif- natural disasters, like earthquakes or floods, and of ferences over policy on selected issues in the post- man-made disasters, like industrial or transportation Stalinist period. The new information policy, however, accidents. The Soviets had also been censoring cov- appears to have significantly widened the acceptable erage of negative social trends, such as an increase in range of alternative policies that can be debated pub- infant mortality.4 Soviet efforts to suppress news had licly. In cultural life, too, a much wider range of sub- also extended to international events, as the KAL 007 jects, including some that are politically sensitive, is incident demonstrated. The usual pattern was silence, tolerated in film and literature. Glasnosf also means followed by evasion. Only when the diplomatic costs of that social problems can be discussed more openly. this strategy mounted, did Soviet officials try to reduce The televised admission by Minister of Internal Affairs them by a public relations counterattack. Soviet han- Aleksandr Vlasov that the Soviet Union has a drug dling of the military involvement in Afghanistan fol- problem is a case in point.6 Glasnosf has also led to lowed this pattern, although in that case the shift from fuller and more timely reporting on natural disasters.7 It initial news suppression to fuller reporting appears to has allowed for expanded (although still censored) have been prompted more by domestic than by diplo- coverage of Soviet military activities in Afghanistan, matic considerations. including the first showing on television of Soviet The policy of suppressing negative news has had troops in combat.8 some deleterious side effects, both at home and With regard to international audiences, glasnosf has abroad. At home, it contributed to a widespread mis- meant expanded use of press conferences at which trust of the domestic media, inclining many Soviet Soviet spokesmen have adopted a more informative citizens to turn to alternative sources of information and forthcoming manner in presenting Soviet foreign available from the West, in particular to foreign radio policy positions.9 Gorbachev himself has utilized broadcasts. The controlled nature of the official media press conferences extensively, both inside and out- also heightened the importance of private communica- side the USSR, to publicize his arms control initia- tion, especially by word of mouth.5 There were also tives.10 The Soviets also made special efforts to publi- foreign policy costs. Suppression of information rein- cize the 27th CPSU Congress to foreign audiences.11 forced the image of the Soviet Union as a defensive In short, glasnosf has changed the look and feel of totalitarian regime. This, in turn, undercut Soviet efforts Soviet public behavior in a variety of ways. The policy to foster an image of openness and reasonableness— of glasnosf represents a judgment by a part of the an image necessary for the recurrent Soviet strategy of political elite that heavy-handed censorship is not al- exploiting divisions between Western Europe and the ways the most effective way to mold public opinion in United States. the USSR, that leadership goals can sometimes be To counter such domestic and international quanda- better served by more open public discussion and ries, Gorbachev proclaimed a policy of glasnosf— sophisticated presentation rather than by suppression openness. This has translated into fuller reporting of of the news. It also reflects an effort to reduce the "negative" news at home and more sophisticated pub- influence of information from foreign sources in the lic relations campaigns abroad. In writing for the do- USSR, such as that of foreign radio broadcasts. mestic media, Soviet newsmen have at times begun to This shift in public relations policy reflects the kinds act like Western investigative reporters by running of changes introduced since Gorbachev became gen- stories about mismanagement and corruption. Glas- eral secretary. Although Gorbachev has described his nosf has also affected the way in which Soviet officials domestic programs as a "revolutionary transforma- and analysts can publicly advocate policy changes. tion,"12 most of the changes carried out are fairly 6Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1530 GMT, Nov. 10, 1986. "The Soviets have again resumed giving infant mortality data in 7See. e.g., "No Grounds for Rumor," Sovetskaya Rossiya (Moscow), standard statistical sources after a 10-year lapse. This may be due partly to Jan. 5, 1986. Gorbachev's glasnosf policy and partly to the fact that reported data, "Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1430 GMT, July 11, 1985. which apparently peaked in 1975 at 30.8 deaths per 1,000 births, have 9See, e.g., the televised interview with Col. Gen. Nikolay Chervov on declined to a less embarrassing level—26 per 1,000. See Berlin ARD Television Network in German 2200 GMT, Feb. 12, 1986, trans, in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (Moscow), No. 43, 1986, pp. 6-7; and Narodnoye Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Soviet Union khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 g. Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik (The National (Washington, DC—hereafter FBIS-SOV), Feb. 14, 1986, pp. AA/2-8. Economy of the USSR in 1985—Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, Finansy i 10See the series of press conferences held to promote Gorbachev's Statistika, 1986, p. 547. arms control statement of Jan. 15, 1986, trans, in FBIS-SOV, Feb. 13, 1986, 5Gayle Durham Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments pp. AA/2-5, Feb. 18, 1986, pp. AA/4-5, and Feb. 21, 1986, p. A/2. in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin, New York, Praeger, 1972, "See FBIS-SOV, Mar. 3, 1986, pp. CC/3-4. pp. 113-17, 181-83. "Pravda, Feb. 26, 1986. 29 PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Chernobyl' and Glasnost' A. Krutov, a reporter for Moscow Television's "Vremya" program, interviews Soviet officials on May 10, 1986, in Kiev regarding the Chernobyl' accident.
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