Turkey and Armenia Post-Protocols: FOREIGN POLICY Back to Square One? PROGRAMME D. Nigar Göksel Beginning with a football game in Yerevan societies of the two countries enwrapped in between the Turkish and Armenian teams on 6 heated debate about the process, but September 2008, a high-level diplomatic Washington, Brussels and Moscow were normalization process between Turkey and engaged, as were other interested parties such Armenia came under the spotlight. Following as the Armenian diaspora and the Azerbaijani intense diplomatic traffic, including the public and government. Analyzing various announcement in April 2009 that a roadmap dimensions of this attempt to normalization had been agreed upon, the public release of can therefore shed light on the contours of the two initialized protocols took place in August challenges, as well as the incentives of the 2009: “Protocol on establishment of diplomatic drivers and the spoilers. Developing this relations” and “Protocol on development of understanding can subsequently help build a mutual relations.” After six weeks of heated more solid and realistic sense of how the debate, the documents were signed by the two existing divides between the peoples and the countries’ foreign ministers on 10 October 2009 capitals might be bridged in the future. in Zurich. Besides opening the border and Though people-to-people ties have been establishing diplomatic relations, these intensifying among various segments of both protocols laid out plans to establish an nations, the state of relations in general is still intergovernmental bilateral commission with characterized by closed borders, the absence of seven sub-commissions to “develop” relations diplomatic relations, as well as deep distrust - one being an “impartial scientific examination and antagonism playing out at societal, of the historical records and archives” political and international levels. The two main (commonly referred to as the history sub- causes of this situation are the shared history commission). While the disintegration of the of Turks and Armenians, in particular the process had already begun in the spring and events of 1915, and the Nagorno-Karabakh summer months of 2009, the more explicit conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. fizzle began after the signing ceremony. There are also related problems involving D. Nigar Goksel has been compensation expectations, and tensions Editor-in-Chief of Turkish This was not the first attempt to normalize Policy Quarterly (TPQ) for related to the (non) recognition of the joint relations (the term typically used to refer to the ten years. Her research border. The protocol framework aimed to and analysis specializes on opening of the common border and the Turkey and the South directly and indirectly address these establishment of diplomatic relations) between Caucasus, including interwoven problems. dimensions such as EU Turkey and Armenia, but it was the initiative policies towards these most in the public eye since Armenia’s Highlighting political expediency calculations countries and European integration of the wider independence in 1991. Not only were the for the Ankara leadership and the social Black Sea region. outlook in Turkey more generally, this paper decades, the stripping of much of present-day will assess the logic of the formulas sought by Turkey of its Armenian communities has been the protocols for overcoming differences on taken up by the Turkish bureaucracy with history, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and denialist and defensive approaches, reflecting border recognition, examining why the process as such in public discourse and official broke down. The paper will also attempt to publications. The response from segments of stimulate thought about the various the active Armenian diaspora, has been dimensions relevant to both sides, that need to indiscriminate anti-Turkish propaganda. A be taken into account in future attempts to vicious cycle of mutual antagonism has address these complex issues. The final section become entrenched. emphasizes the need for a deeper, more consistent and holistic long term reconciliation The involvement of third party politicians, between the two nations, in a fashion that through genocide recognition resolutions that does not exclude Azerbaijan, to unlock the attempt to describe what happened in 1915 and stalemate of the region, and unleash its reach legal conclusions, has contributed to the cooperative potential. reduction of historical reflection to whether or not the word genocide applies, and the consequences thereof. This has created a Over the decades, the stripping of much of present-day Turkey cauldron of not only legal and historical of its Armenian communities has been taken up by the dispute but also political and material interest, Turkish bureaucracy with denialist and defensive approaches, as well as international strategic power games, reflecting as such in public discourse and official publications. turning the word genocide into a litmus test of The response from segments of the active Armenian diaspora, “patriotic credentials” for a sizeable has been indiscriminate anti-Turkish propaganda. A vicious proportion of Turks and Armenians. cycle of mutual antagonism has become entrenched. The effort, in particular by organized hardline Armenian diaspora groups, to pressure Turkey HISTORy – nOT GOING AWAY into recognition, restitution, and reparation has been countered with significant resources as The underlying problem between the two well as political and diplomatic capital by the nations is the clashing narratives about the Turkish state. This course of events has at history of Armenians in the final years of the times severely limited Turkey’s diplomatic Ottoman-Turkish state during World War I. manoeuvre space on other strategic questions, Wrapped up succinctly by the report of the and hardened public opinion and political International Center for Transitional Justice, space in both countries. The fact that Barack there is “disagreement as to the magnitude Obama, elected as US president in November and scope of these events, their context and 2008, was known to support the term genocide intended effect, and the identities and to qualify the ethnic cleansing of Armenians in affiliations of their perpetrators.”1 Over the during the early twentieth century”, International 1 “The applicability of the United Nations Center for Transitional Justice report, February 2 convention on the prevention and punishment of 2003, http://www1.american.edu/cgp/TARC/ictj. the crime of genocide to events which occurred htm Anatolia, increased the concern and pressure genocide recognition in Armenia’s foreign on Turkey. Meanwhile, partially as a factor of policy or its policy regarding the normalization the intensification of official apologies for of relations between the two countries. historical wrongs in Western democracies, and However, when Robert Kocharian came to as a result of campaigns of Armenian diaspora power as president in 1998 and raised the lobbies, genocide recognition by parliaments question of genocide recognition to the level of of third countries had gained momentum in the state policy - both as a weapon against Turkey 1990s and continued into the first decade of the and to stimulate diaspora support to his 21st century.2 administration - “history” once again rose to the forefront of the official bilateral agenda. Lightening the burden of “genocide diplomacy” was one of the expectations of the Turkish side The first publicized expression of the idea of a in venturing into normalization with Armenia history commission (to study archives and in 2008. There was an assumption in Ankara historical records) to be agreed on between - supposedly generated by US officials, that Ankara and Yerevan, was proposed by Turkish Washington would hold off with recognition, if Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 10 Turkey normalized (or took serious steps in the April 2005. The Armenian response (arguably direction of normalizing) relations with not delivered explicitly as a response to Armenia. Whether specified clearly as such by Turkey’s offer), was that relations should first US authorities or not, the fact that this be normalized and borders opened, before conditionality was widely believed in Ankara, history, as well as “other issues of mutual became one of the driving forces for Turkey interest” could be taken up. Capturing the venturing into the protocol process. thinking of the Armenian government at the time, a wire from the US embassy in Yerevan, “History” has been on the agenda of bilateral released by Wikileaks, explains that the talks between Ankara and Yerevan for over 20 perception in Yerevan is that Turkey’s offer of a years. In 1991, when Ankara first started talks history commission is a “stall tactic” and “the with Armenian counterparts to establish Turkish side is uninterested in serious dialogue relations, an expectation that the Armenian with Armenia but hopes to create the diaspora end genocide-recognition campaigns impression of reaching out to Armenia as a was on its agenda. However, Yerevan clearly tactic to relieve European pressure”.3 The wire and consistently held that it was not the continues: “The GOAM [Government of interlocutor of this issue. History as an agenda Armenia] certainly has no desire to help Turkey item somewhat faded out of state-to-state ‘off the hook’ in the court of European opinion, negotiation, especially as it became clear to Armenia’s only real leverage in the Turkish Turkey