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GT Oct 2020 300920 Low 01-2 October 2020 ISSN 1864-3973 Into the future with one foot in the past: Why so many eastern Germans feel at odds with the West thirty years after reunification DPA-ZENTRALBILD/ KALLEJIPP/SHOTSHOP/PICTURE ALLIANCE/MONTAGE GT IN THIS ISSUE In 1990, the US and USSR supported German reunifi- Forging ahead cation, but for different rea- sons. Today, Brussels and A call for European leadership in times of turmoil Berlin are butting heads with Washington and Moscow, again for different to destabilize the Brussels commu- Together with 1,100 German Given the darkening horizons, lion) economic recovery program, reasons. Michael Thumann BY THEO SOMMER nity – a target shared by US Presi- soldiers, central African forces it is hardly surprising that calls they see a “Hamiltonian moment” sorts out the EU’s trouble dent Donald Trump; and Turkey and 15,000 UN Blue Helmets, for making Europe capable of – a point in history when joint with Russia while Juliane o one looking back on with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s neo- 5,000 French troops are battling global politics, weltpolitiktfähig in debt policy becomes the first Schäuble examines how the the past decade can do Ottoman imperialism. in Mali against Islamist terror- German, have been raised ever chapter of a federal playbook. The world could improve with Nso with satisfaction, let At the same time, the Europe- ism. The recent coup – at the more insistently. Ursula von der deal allows the EU to borrow, tax a President Joe Biden alone complacency. The world ans see a plethora of threats and hands of Malian forces trained Leyen, before assuming the presi- and spend like an actual state. Page 3-4 has become unstable. The inter- crises coming ever closer. The by the French and Germans – dency of the European Commis- It is indeed an important inno- national order created after World Syrian civil war has swept mil- sent ripples across the Sahel and sion, put it quite bluntly: “Soft vation enabling a strong eco- When the GDR went bust in War II is breaking down; the lions of refugees west. Rising beyond. power alone won’t suffice today if nomic convalescence and a more 1989, Chancellor Kohl promi- global institutions established as tensions over Ankara’s predatory In the Far East, China’s on- we Europeans want to assert our- prosperous future. It does not, sed “blossoming meadows.” part of that order are frail and inef- hunt for undersea oil and gas in slaught on the freedoms of Hong selves in the world. Europe must however, spell more unity among While much has improved, fective. The COVID-19 pandemic the Mediterranean conjure up the Kong and its saber rattling over also learn the language of power.” the 27 member states in foreign the country has not really has turned previously existing dire specter of a war between the Taiwan could, like Washington’s Macron chimed in: “We must and security policy. The much grown together, and East fault lines into frontlines. Troubles two NATO members Turkey and elevation of the People’s Repub- use the grammar of today, a touted strategic autonomy of the Germans are now asking: are piling up everywhere. In many Greece. lic to an adversarial rogue state, grammar of the language of sov- European Union remains hob- Why should we even want places, cooperation is morphing ereignty”; he wants to “revive bled by widely varying national to become like the West? into confrontation. US-China ten- Europe as a political and strategic stances on most foreign issues. Martin Machowecz, Sabine sions have become the main axis of power.” Many others agree that There is no agreement on how to Rennefanz, Wolfgang Engler global politics; the rivalry between Europe can no longer bank only in a united Europe can our deal with Russia, China, Turkey, and Stephan Kaufmann ex- the two great powers will domi- several nations be strong. Africa or even the US. And the plore the eastern mindset nate the near future, regardless on the United States to Learning the language of principle of unanimity regularly Pages 11 - 13 who is in the White House next power, von der Leyen explained, prevents joint action. January. provide global guidance “for one thing means building As long as the unanimity rule There is still more to lay The European Union will have up our muscles, where hitherto prevails and any small state can bare about the somewhat to adjust to the shifting geopo- and military protection we were able to rely on others, veto collective action, Europe awkward German habit of litical dispensation. No longer for example in security policy. will not be taken seriously in stripping down in public; can it bank on the United States Furthermore, it means using the global politics. To be respected, read Irish-born Killian to provide global guidance and Another flash point touching set off an explosion in the South existing power more purpose- it must speak with one voice – as Lannister's “exposé” in our military protection. And it has to Europe’s interest is Libya, riven China Sea – a waterway of utmost fully where European interests it does in trade politics. series on Zee Germans recognize that China, its primary by internal conflict, in which the importance to EU commerce. are concerned.” Josep Borrell, the EU High Page 14 economic partner, has grown into UN-recognized government in Nearer to home, the fraudulent What has become of all these Representative for Foreign an assertive, some would say, Tripoli is supported by Turkey, elections in Belarus triggered striking statements? Regretta- Affairs and Security Policy, Our special section The aggressive challenger aspiring to while Russian mercenaries assist a popular uprising against the bly, they have not moved beyond is not alone in calling for the Berlin Times features the world leadership. General Khalifa Haftar’s regime callous tyranny of Alexander mere sound bites. abandonment of the unanimity decades-long drama of Several states are testing in the east. French President Lukashenko. Its violent suppres- Optimists speak of Europe’s principle and the introduction the capital city’s attempt Europe’s unity: China with Xi Emmanuel Macron is trying to sion by OMON police and the geopolitical awakening in the of qualified majority voting. “It to build an airport. Hannes Jinping’s Silk Road Initiative and protect Total’s oil interest in the possibility that Russian troops course of the COVID-19 pan- would be better,” he argues, “to Koch gives an overview from the “17+1” cooperation scheme in desert country. He is also push- might join the crackdown con- demic. Europe is stirring, they adopt a strong and substantial 30,000 feet while Lorenz Eastern Europe and the Balkans; ing the Lebanese toward mean- fronted the EU with another say, recalling Jean Monet’s dictum: position by a majority rather Maroldt lands a few zingers. Russia with Vladimir Putin’s ingful reforms of their collapsed sticky problem, this one at its “Europe will be forged in crises.” Page 23 assault on Ukraine and his attempt political system. very border. In the EU’s €750 billion ($885 bil- continued on page 3 the best option for Putin,” argues At the same time, however, BY GEMMA PÖRZGEN the Belarusian political scien- Putin also announced in late Éminence grise tist Yauheni Preiherman from August that he had organized fter the disputed presi- the Minsk Dialogue Council on a standby security force that dential election in Putin has not yet chosen a course vis-à-vis Belarus, International Relations. He is could intervene in Belarus if the ABelarus on Aug. 9, Vladi- but all signs point to his continued support for Lukashenko convinced that “Putin is the king- situation got out of control. Most mir Putin was one of the first to maker of the Belarusian political experts nevertheless consider congratulate Alexander Lukash- crisis.” military intervention by Moscow enko on his landslide win. Yet the Duma Foreign Affairs Commit- entire country. Results included And yet Lukashenko remains in Russia’s president appears to be to be highly unlikely. For the Russian president was cautious tee, called it a lost election rather strikes at large state-operated place as head of state in Belarus. keeping all of his options open. Kremlin, such a move would at first, pursuing more of a wait- than a victory. Coverage of the companies and a genuinely pop- He seems to be waiting out the While Lukashenko refuses to take involve an incalculable risk of and-see approach as to which protests in Belarus was surpris- ular people’s movement against protests while wearing them any phone calls from European triggering a wave of anti-Russian position the Kremlin should take. ingly fair and was even debated Lukashenko. down through violent actions by politicians such as German Chan- resentment in Belarus. An inva- “Putin congratulated Lukash- in Russian state media. This clearly made an impres- the police. It seems that he can cellor Angela Merkel and French sion would not be welcome. enko on his victory, but the Leaders in Moscow were most sion in Moscow, too, especially continue to count on the support President Emmanuel Macron, The foreign policy damage tone of his remarks was cool certainly surprised that the anti- since the protests involved no of his security forces. His central- Putin has picked up the phone would also be significant and and formal,” noted the Moscow- Lukashenko protests continued anti-Russian sentiments, in con- ized power apparatus is showing and signaled his readiness for dia- further isolate the Russian lead- based sociologist Lev Gudkov. peacefully for weeks rather than trast to the situation in Ukraine no tangible cracks, and only a few logue.
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