DOCSLIB.ORG

Russia and Belarus

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Russia and Belarus No. 257 23 October 2020 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html RUSSIA AND BELARUS ■ COMMENTARY Russia’s Role in Relation to the Political Protests in Belarus 2 By Margarita M. Balmaceda (Seton Hall University/Harvard University) 2020: Year of the Great Break for Belarusian Statehood 3 By Siarhei Bohdan (Freie Universität Berlin) The Standoff over Constitutional Reform in Belarus Leaves the EU and Russia on Opposite Sides of the Barricades 5 By Fabian Burkhardt (Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg) At a Loss: The Kremlin Has No Winning Belarus Strategy 7 By Arkady Moshes (Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki) Russia vs. the People of Belarus: Towards a Geopolitical Revolution? 9 By Ryhor Nizhnikau (Finnish Institute of International Affairs) Puzzled by Belarus, Russia Struggles to Respond 11 By Oxana Schmies and Joerg Forbrig ■ INTERVIEW Lukashenka’s Waiting Game: How Russia Has Tipped the Balance in Belarus 12 Interview with Lev Gudkov (Levada Center for Public Opinion Research, Moscow) ■ OPINION POLL The Attitude of the Russian Population towards the Presidential Elections of 09 August 2020 and Related Protests in Belarus 17 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies for East European Studies Security Studies Eastern European Studies East European Studies The George Washington University University of Bremen ETH Zurich University of Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 257, 23 October 2020 2 COMMENTARY Russia’s Role in Relation to the Political Protests in Belarus By Margarita M. Balmaceda (Seton Hall University/Harvard University) DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000446834 leksander Lukashenko may have withstood the first of Belarus’s steel production and nearly $1bn exports per Awave of protests, but the writing on the wall does year, or top nitrogen fertilizers producer Hrodno Azot. not bode well for him. Both of these factories depend directly or indirectly on When the demonstrations against fraud in the the energy rents accrued by Belarus as a result of its August 9 presidential elections started, Lukashenko unique energy relationship with Russia—BMZ on low was caught by surprise, showing how much he had lost energy prices needed for the energy-intensive foundry touch with Belarusian society. The apparatus of repres- process, and Hrodno Azot on nitrogen produced on the sion may not have changed much since the 1999 disap- basis of natural gas (production of nitrogen fertilizers pearance of opposition members Viktor Hanchar, Ana- not only depends heavily on gas as a source of energy, tol Krasouski, Yury Zakharanka, and Dzmitry Zavadski, but also as a raw material, as it constitutes 80% of the but Belarusian society had. When, eight days after the material needed for its production). These rents—and beginning of the protests, he made a point of visiting their clever management—have been highly significant the flagship Minsk Tractor Works (MTZ) factory, hop- for the stability of the Belarusian regime since the early ing for a boost of support by provoking the audience, he 2000s (see my 2014 book Living the High Life in Minsk), was shocked by the loud boos and chants of “ukhodi!” but have been substantially reduced in the last years (meaning: “leave!”). Since then, he has redoubled on as a result of changes in international energy markets. repression and also on attempts to secure the loyalty With less rents making their way to the nomenklatura of the security apparatus, such as through bestowing, and trickling down to the population as a whole, the a day later, official state awards on 200 security -offi legitimacy and appeal of the Lukashenko regime has cials related to post-election operations. Since that visit gone down significantly, and, conversely, the need for to the MTZ, Lukashenko has been unable to avoid the raw repression has gone up. The levels of violence used reality of how tenuous his control over the country (and by the security apparatus in the last weeks are unprece- also over the country’s nomenklatura) is. With pressure dented. They may hold the regime in place in the short from below, local majors are quietly facing the choice of term, perhaps even for a few years, but the entire edi- the extent to which they should enforce repressive mea- fice of Lukashenko’s power is becoming increasingly sures ordered from above. Lukashenko’s September 24 feeble, hence the need for increased repression. Next inauguration to a new presidential term, conducted in time around, it may give up right away. Within this back- secrecy and without previous public announcement, is ground of increased repression, Lukashenko’s agreement an example of his growing awareness of the tenuous- meeting with jailed opposition leaders, including former ness of his power. presidential candidate Viktar Babaryka on October 10, Another significant development visible already from is an example of how tenuous the situation is, and how the first days after the elections has been the strikes at desperately he is holding on to power. important export-oriented factories, such as the Bylo- russian Steel Works (BMZ) in Zhlobin, home to 80% About the Author Margarita M. Balmaceda is Professor of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University and asso- ciate at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 257, 23 October 2020 3 2020: Year of the Great Break for Belarusian Statehood By Siarhei Bohdan (Freie Universität Berlin) DOI: 10.3929/ethz-b-000446834 t seems obvious that Belarus–Russian relations and sional life in the finance structures of the Russian Gaz- Iintegration should be considered as a dynamic proc- prom empire and until very recently remained the head ess rather than some static construct, yet too frequently of Belgazprombank1—entered the presidential election analyses handle them exactly so, for example by con- campaign. Although he soon got arrested, the staff and sidering the framework of the Union State of Belarus network of activists he managed to organise contin- and Russia as the basis for describing the current links ued working and became the basis for an innovative between Minsk and Moscow. After almost two decades and brilliant campaign which included the merger of of Russia’s dominance over Belarus slowly diminishing, the three candidates’ staffs and featured three women this year saw a radical change of the dynamics. Never as alleged leaders of the campaign to replace Lukash- before in the history of the Republic of Belarus have we enka as president2. witnessed such active Kremlin intervention into Bela- Second, a detachment of Russian mercenaries rusian politics as today. This can be said with respect to was detained near Minsk a week before the election. the Belarusian government and its opponents. A series of explanations was offered by the Russian side, Considering the position of the Belarusian regime, for instance that they were travelling through Belarus one sees something which resembles an incremental to Turkey, Sudan or Venezuela, yet all of them seem capitulation. Politically, Lukashenka made a U-turn and implausible. Two aspects of this incident are remark- switched from lashing out at Russia before the election able—whatever formal work contracts these mercenaries to calling for Russia’s help and verbally attacking the had concluded at the time of the arrest, most of them West, NATO and all neighbour states. Militarily, Minsk had participated in the wars in Syria and the Donbas and launched in mid-August extensive and provocative mili- were affiliated with the so-called ‘Wagner’ private mili- tary exercises on NATO borders and increased the scale tary company. Neither ‘Wagner’ nor other such groups of joint manoeuvres with Russia. Economically, it has are known to use Belarus as a transit route for their threatened to boycott the ports of the Baltic republics deployments. and reduce or stop transit from the Baltics and Poland Needless to say, both Gazprom and ‘Wagner’ are via Belarus. All these moves correspond to the wishes fully integrated into Putin’s regime and, therefore, these of the Putin regime—both articulated (e.g., it publicly cases are no operations of some rogue or marginal actors. demanded that Minsk join its plan to boycott the ports Moreover, the public statements of Babariko only added of the Baltic republics for about three years) and pre- new questions regarding his affiliations and depend- sumed (provocative drills on the border with Lithua- encies. For instance, he quite positively described the sce- nia and Poland near the so called “Suwalki Gap” were nario of Belarus being incorporated into Russia3. Con- never proposed openly, but they surely correspond to cerning the controversial package of Belarus–Russia the wishes of Putin’s generals). integration measures focused on introduction of a com- Lukashenka suddenly moved to undertake the steps mon currency with Russia (i.e., the Russian rouble) in cited in the by-far-not-exhaustive list above some days exchange for continued preferences in the gas and oil after the manipulated election which saw unprece- sphere, which had been fiercely opposed by the Belaru- dented incidents of probable involvement of Russian sian government because of its harmful consequences actors, some of whom are not known to act without for the country despite the Kremlin’s pressure, Babariko Putin’s sanction. Let’s remember two outstanding cases. made
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Baltic Sea Region the Baltic Sea Region
    TTHEHE BBALALTTICIC SSEAEA RREGIONEGION Cultures,Cultures, Politics,Politics, SocietiesSocieties EditorEditor WitoldWitold MaciejewskiMaciejewski A Baltic University Publication Case Chapter 2 Constructing Karelia: Myths and Symbols in the Multiethnic Reality Ilja Solomeshch 1. Power of symbols Specialists in the field of semiotics note that in times of social and political crises, at Political symbolism is known to have three the stage of ideological and moral disintegra- major functions – nominative, informative tion, some forms of the most archaic kinds of and communicative. In this sense a symbol in political symbolism reactivate in what is called political life plays one of the key roles in struc- the archaic syndrome. This notion is used, for turing society, organising interrelations within example, to evaluate the situation in pre- and the community and between people and the post-revolutionary (1917) Russia, as well as various institutions of state. Karelia Karelia is a border area between Finland and Russia. Majority of its territory belongs to Russian Republic of Karelia, with a capital in Petrozavodsk. The Sovjet Union gained the marked area from Finland as the outcome of war 1944. Karelia can be compared with similar border areas in the Baltic Region, like Schleswig-Holstein, Oppeln (Opole) Silesia in Poland, Kaliningrad region in Russia. Probably the best known case of such an area in Europe is Alsace- -Lorraine. Map 13. Karelia. Ill.: Radosław Przebitkowski The Soviet semioticity When trying to understand historical and cultural developments in the Russian/Soviet/Post-Soviet spatial area, especially in terms of Centre-Peripheries and Break-Continuity paradigms, one can easily notice the semioticity of the Soviet system, starting with its ideology.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia: CHRONOLOGY DECEMBER 1993 to FEBRUARY 1995
    Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets file:///C:/Documents and Settings/brendelt/Desktop/temp rir/CHRONO... Français Home Contact Us Help Search canada.gc.ca Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets Home Issue Paper RUSSIA CHRONOLOGY DECEMBER 1993 TO FEBRUARY 1995 July 1995 Disclaimer This document was prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All sources are cited. This document is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed or conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. For further information on current developments, please contact the Research Directorate. Table of Contents GLOSSARY Political Organizations and Government Structures Political Leaders 1. INTRODUCTION 2. CHRONOLOGY 1993 1994 1995 3. APPENDICES TABLE 1: SEAT DISTRIBUTION IN THE STATE DUMA TABLE 2: REPUBLICS AND REGIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION MAP 1: RUSSIA 1 of 58 9/17/2013 9:13 AM Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets file:///C:/Documents and Settings/brendelt/Desktop/temp rir/CHRONO... MAP 2: THE NORTH CAUCASUS NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES REFERENCES GLOSSARY Political Organizations and Government Structures [This glossary is included for easy reference to organizations which either appear more than once in the text of the chronology or which are known to have been formed in the period covered by the chronology. The list is not exhaustive.] All-Russia Democratic Alternative Party. Established in February 1995 by Grigorii Yavlinsky.( OMRI 15 Feb.
    [Show full text]
  • Izhorians: a Disappearing Ethnic Group Indigenous to the Leningrad Region
    Acta Baltico-Slavica, 43 Warszawa 2019 DOI: 10.11649/abs.2019.010 Elena Fell Tomsk Polytechnic University Tomsk [email protected] https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7606-7696 Izhorians: A disappearing ethnic group indigenous to the Leningrad region This review article presents a concise overview of selected research findings rela- ted to various issues concerning the study of Izhorians, including works by A. I. Kir′ianen, A. V. Labudin and A. A. Samodurov (Кирьянен et al., 2017); A. I. Kir′ianen, (Кирьянен, 2016); N. Kuznetsova, E. Markus and M. Muslimov (Kuznetsova, Markus, & Muslimov, 2015); M. Muslimov (Муслимов, 2005); A. P. Chush′′ialova (Чушъялова, 2010); F. I. Rozhanskiĭ and E. B. Markus (Рожанский & Маркус, 2013); and V. I. Mirenkov (Миренков, 2000). The evolution of the term Izhorians The earliest confirmed record of Izhorians (also known as Ingrians), a Finno-Ugrian ethnic group native to the Leningrad region,1 appears in thirteenth-century Russian 1 Whilst the city of Leningrad became the city of Saint Petersburg in 1991, reverting to its pre-So- viet name, the Leningrad region (also known as the Leningrad oblast) retained its Soviet name after the collapse of the USSR. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 PL License (creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/pl/), which permits redistribution, commercial and non- -commercial, provided that the article is properly cited. © The Author(s) 2019. Publisher: Institute of Slavic Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences [Wydawca: Instytut Slawistyki Polskiej Akademii Nauk] Elena Fell Izhorians: A disappearing ethnic group indigenous to the Leningrad region chronicles, where, according to Chistiakov (Чистяков, 2006), “Izhora” people were mentioned as early as 1228.
    [Show full text]
  • No. 21 TRONDHEIM STUDIES on EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES
    No. 21 TRONDHEIM STUDIES ON EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES & SOCIETIES David R. Marples THE LUKASHENKA PHENOMENON Elections, Propaganda, and the Foundations of Political Authority in Belarus August 2007 David R. Marples is University Professor at the Department of History & Classics, and Director of the Stasiuk Program for the Study of Contemporary Ukraine of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. His recent books include Heroes and Villains. Constructing National History in Contemporary Ukraine (2007), Prospects for Democracy in Belarus, co-edited with Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demes (2006), The Collapse of the Soviet Union, 1985-1991(2004), and Motherland: Russia in the 20th Century (2002). © 2007 David R Marples and the Program on East European Cultures and Societies, a program of the Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. ISSN 1501-6684 ISBN 978-82-995792-1-6 Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies Editors: György Péteri and Sabrina P. Ramet Editorial Board: Trond Berge, Tanja Ellingsen, Knut Andreas Grimstad, Arne Halvorsen We encourage submissions to the Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies. Inclusion in the series will be based on anonymous review. Manuscripts are expected to be in English (exception is made for Norwegian Master’s and PhD theses) and not to exceed 150 double spaced pages in length. Postal address for submissions: Editor, Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies, Department of History, NTNU, NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway. For more information on PEECS and TSEECS, visit our web-site at http://www.hf.ntnu.no/peecs/home/ The photo on the cover is a copy of an item included in the photo chronicle of the demonstration of 21 July 2004 and made accessible by the Charter ’97 at http://www.charter97.org/index.phtml?sid=4&did=july21&lang=3 TRONDHEIM STUDIES ON EAST EUROPEAN CULTURES & SOCIETIES No.
    [Show full text]
  • Annual-Report-2018 Eng.Pdf
    Russian International Affairs Council CONTENTS /01 GENERAL INFORMATION 4 /02 RIAC PROGRAM ACTIVITIES 16 /03 RIAC IN THE MEDIA 58 /04 RIAC WEBSITE 60 /05 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 62 3 Russian International ANNUAL REPORT 2018 Affairs Council The General Meeting of RIAC members is the The main task of the RIAC Scientific Council is to ABOUT THE COUNCIL supreme governing body of the Partnership. The formulate sound recommendations for strategic key function of the General Meeting is to ensure decisions in RIAC expert, research, and publishing The non-profit partnership Russian compliance with the goals of the Partnership. The activities. General Meeting includes 160 members of the International Affairs Council (NP RIAC) is Council. The Vice-Presidency was introduced to achieve 01 the goals of the Partnership in cooperation with a Russian membership-based non-profit The RIAC Board of Trustees is a supervisory body government bodies and local authorities of the organization. The partnership was established of the Partnership that monitors the activities of Russian Federation and foreign states, the Partnership and their compliance with the international organizations, and Russian and by the resolution of its founders pursuant statutory goals. foreign legal entities. The candidate for Vice- President is approved by the RIAC Presidium for a to Decree No. 59-rp of the President of the The Presidium of the Partnership is a permanent one-year term. Russian Federation “On the Establishment collegial governing body of the Partnership that consists of not less than five and no more than RIAC Corporate Members of the Non-Profit Partnership Russian fifteen members, including the President and According to the Charter, legal citizens of the the Director General of the Partnership, who Russian Federation or entities established in International Affairs Council” dated February 2, have a vote in the decision-making process.
    [Show full text]
  • BELARUS: the Struggle for Press Freedom
    International Federation of Journalists BELARUS: The Struggle for Press Freedom Belarus: The Struggle for Press Freedoom 1 1. A Brief Introduction to Belarus Widely regarded as the last true dictatorship in Europe, Belarus has been run by President Alexander Lukashenka since 1994. Belarus is bordered to the north by Latvia 2004 to allow him to stand for a third term. and Lithuania, to the east by Russia, to the International observers have consistently south by Ukraine, and to the west by Poland. raised doubts about the validity of Belarus A declining population of less than 10 million elections, and many opposition candidates inhabits its 207,595 square kilometres. were disbarred from standing in the flawed Presidential elections of March 2006. Absorbed into the Russian Empire in the Widespread protests about the outcome, middle of the 19th century, Belarus declared including the creation of a ‘tent city’ in the itself a republic in 1918 before becoming part capital Minsk, were crushed. of the Soviet Union in 1922. Its current borders were established after World War II when Under the policy of ‘market socialism’ Belarus was occupied by the Nazis from 1941- Lukashenka has reversed privatisation and 44 and over 2 million of its people, including imposed controls on prices and currency most of the Jewish population, perished. rates. Although the economy has grown and trade with European countries has increased, Belarus achieved independence from the there is minimal foreign investment and the Soviet Union on 25 August 1991. However private sector is virtually non-existent. In 2005 it retained closer political and economic ties unemployment was officially listed at only 1.6% to Russia than any of the other former Soviet of a workforce of 4.3 million.
    [Show full text]
  • European Parliament
    EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 2004 2009 Session document 13.9.2004 B6-0053/2004 MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION further to the Commission statement pursuant to Rule 103(2) of the Rules of Procedure by Konrad Krzysztof Szymański, Rolandas Pavilionis and Anna Elzbieta Fotyga on behalf of the Union for Europe of the Nations Group on Belarus RE\541355EN.doc PE 347.467 EN EN B6-0053/2004 European Parliament resolution on Belarus The European Parliament, – having regard to the forthcoming elections and referendum on further extending the Presidential term of office in Belarus, – having regard to the resolutions adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights on Belarus in April 2003 and 2004 and the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly's Resolution No 1371/2004 on disappeared persons, – having regard to the decision of the UN Commission on Human Rights to appoint a special rapporteur on the situation in Belarus, – having regard to Rule 103(2) of the Rules of Procedure, A. whereas the situation as regards human rights, citizens’ rights and fundamental freedoms has reached a critical stage in Belarus, B. whereas the Belarusian authorities continue to demonstrate their unwillingness to tolerate any form of political opposition, C. alarmed at the numerous cases of opposition activists and independent journalists being detained, imprisoned, fined and expelled from universities, D. concerned at the continuing repression of the independent media and NGOs, E. deeply concerned at the reports of 'disappeared' persons in Belarus, 1. Calls on the Belarusian authorities to immediately guarantee the holding of free and fair elections by inviting the representatives of the opposition parties to play a full role as members and observers at every level of the work of electoral commissions; 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Laura Stark Peasants, Pilgrims, and Sacred Promises Ritual and the Supernatural in Orthodox Karelian Folk Religion
    laura stark Peasants, Pilgrims, and Sacred Promises Ritual and the Supernatural in Orthodox Karelian Folk Religion Studia Fennica Folkloristica The Finnish Literature Society (SKS) was founded in 1831 and has, from the very beginning, engaged in publishing operations. It nowadays publishes literature in the fields of ethnology and folkloristics, linguistics, literary research and cultural history. The first volume of the Studia Fennica series appeared in 1933. Since 1992, the series has been divided into three thematic subseries: Ethnologica, Folkloristica and Linguistica. Two additional subseries were formed in 2002, Historica and Litteraria. The subseries Anthropologica was formed in 2007. In addition to its publishing activities, the Finnish Literature Society maintains research activities and infrastructures, an archive containing folklore and literary collections, a research library and promotes Finnish literature abroad. Studia fennica editorial board Anna-Leena Siikala Rauno Endén Teppo Korhonen Pentti Leino Auli Viikari Kristiina Näyhö Editorial Office SKS P.O. Box 259 FI-00171 Helsinki www.finlit.fi Laura Stark Peasants, Pilgrims, and Sacred Promises Ritual and the Supernatural in Orthodox Karelian Folk Religion Finnish Literature Society • Helsinki 3 Studia Fennica Folkloristica 11 The publication has undergone a peer review. The open access publication of this volume has received part funding via Helsinki University Library. © 2002 Laura Stark and SKS License CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International. A digital edition of a printed book first published in 2002 by the Finnish Literature Society. Cover Design: Timo Numminen EPUB: eLibris Media Oy ISBN 978-951-746-366-9 (Print) ISBN 978-951-746-578-6 (PDF) ISBN 978-952-222-766-9 (EPUB) ISSN 0085-6835 (Studia Fennica) ISSN 1235-1946 (Studia Fennica Folkloristica) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21435/sff.11 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International License.
    [Show full text]
  • General Conclusions and Basic Tendencies 1. System of Human Rights Violations
    REVIEW-CHRONICLE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BELARUS IN 2003 2 REVIEW-CHRONICLE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BELARUS IN 2003 INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND BASIC TENDENCIES 1. SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS The year 2003 was marked by deterioration of the human rights situation in Belarus. While the general human rights situation in the country did not improve, in its certain spheres it significantly changed for the worse. Disrespect for and regular violations of the basic constitutional civic rights became an unavoidable and permanent factor of the Belarusian reality. In 2003 the Belarusian authorities did not even hide their intention to maximally limit the freedom of speech, freedom of association, religious freedom, and human rights in general. These intentions of the ruling regime were declared publicly. It was a conscious and open choice of the state bodies constituting one of the strategic elements of their policy. This political process became most visible in formation and forced intrusion of state ideology upon the citizens. Even leaving aside the question of the ideology contents, the very existence of an ideology, compulsory for all citizens of the country, imposed through propaganda media and educational establishments, and fraught with punitive sanctions for any deviation from it, is a phenomenon, incompatible with the fundamental human right to have a personal opinion. Thus, the state policy of the ruling government aims to create ideological grounds for consistent undermining of civic freedoms in Belarus. The new ideology is introduced despite the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus which puts a direct ban on that.
    [Show full text]
  • RUSSIA and NATO Theses of Lhe Russian Council Ol! Foreign and Defense Policy
    RUSSIA AND NATO Theses of lhe Russian Council Ol! Foreign and Defense Policy o presente artigo foi seleccionado para publicação, com a concordância do autor, a quem é devida uma palavra de reconhecimento, nomeadamente, pela tradução para inglês que elaborou a partir do seu comentário em língua alemã, expressamente para a revista Nação e Defesa. Resumo: Na primeira parte do artigo faz-se uma análise e comentam-se as teses que foram objecto de discussão por um grupo de altas entidades russas - políticos, investigadores e jornalistas - que se reuniu no «Council on Foreign and Defense Policy», em Maio do corrente ano. Na segunda parte do artigo são as referidas teses apresentadas em detalhe incluindo-se, no seu final, a relação das entidades presentes e os cargos que desempenham. Fundamentalmente, aponta-se a discordância quanto ao alargamento da NATO no senlido da Europa Central e de Leste, e a intenção de estabelecer o diálogo com os Estados membros da Aliança, a fim de evitar uma nova confrontação no relacionamento com a Rússia. Dr. Christoph Royen Sliflung Wissenschaft und Politik 0-82067 EbenhausenlIsartal RUSSIAAND NATO Theses ofthe Russian Council 011 Foreigll and Defense Policy - Comments by Christoph Royen - (Prepared for «Nação e Defesa», November 15, 1995J(I) The enlargement of NATO with regard to Eastern Central Europe, even more so to the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithunia, encounters, by now, a broad front af resistance in Moscow. However, the theses «Russia and NATO», published in June 1995(') by the «Council on Foreign and Defense Policy» (Sovet po vneshney i oboronnoy politike [SVOPj), merit particular attention.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia Party Wins Parliamentary Victories, but Many Criticize Timeline It As Neither Free Nor Democratic
    Russia party wins parliamentary victories, but many criticize Timeline it as neither free nor democratic. 1917 - The Russian revolution begins as Vladimir Lenin 2008 - Dmitry Medvedev is elected president and Putin leads the Bolsheviks in overthrowing the government. becomes Prime Minister. Russia invades Georgia after 1918 - Russia ends participation in WWI. Finland and Poland Georgia attacks separatists in South Ossetia. Parliament cede. The empire collapses, leading to civil war between the extends presidential terms from four to six years. Red Army (Bolsheviks) and White Army (anti-communists). 2009 - Medvedev ends “counterterrorism operation” in 1918-1921 - Red terror campaign occurs in which remote Chechnya. Opposition denounces local elections after camps with notoriously poor conditions are used to imprison United Russia party overwhelmingly wins every poll. North those deemed enemies of the state. Caucasus Muslim extremists are blamed for a series of 1922 - Civil war ends. Bolsheviks establish the Union of bomb blasts on Moscow’s train and metro systems. Russia Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.); a single-party state 2010 - Yuri Luzhkov, long time Mayor of Moscow, is fired by governed by the Communist Party with Moscow as its capital. President Medvedev. 1922-91 - Cold War between the US and the USSR occurs. 2011 - Chechen rebel leader Doku Umarov claims 1936–1938 - Mass arrests and executions are coupled with responsibility for a suicide bombing at Moscow's airport that an increasing Gulag population as Stalin consolidates power. kills at least 35 people and injures 110 others. Putin gains 1985 - Mikhail Gorbachev takes power and initiates a policy confirmation as the 2012 ruling party's candidate for the of openness (glasnost) and restructuring (perestroika).
    [Show full text]
  • A Cool Breeze
    introduction A Cool Breeze Russia’s resurgence as a strategic actor is a widely noted, but little under- stood feature of international relations. In Russia, it has been met with pride and satisfaction; in Europe and the United States, with barely concealed nervousness. Over the past two decades, Europe and the US have grown accustomed to the idea of Russian internal decline and retreat from the international arena. By the end of 1990s, Russia’s decline and retreat were such enduring features of the international landscape that the closest observers of the country and its evolution had begun to contem- plate ’a world without Russia’.1 Behind this rather provocative phrase lay the notion that Russian weakness was reaching systemic, chronic propor- Downloaded By: [Tufts University] At: 14:47 7 February 2011 tions, such that Russia was becoming ’less and less an actor in world affairs, while running the risk of becoming an object of competition among more advanced and dynamic powers’.2 This clearly is no longer the case, as Russia reasserts itself as a forceful voice on major issues of the day, from the fate of Kosovo to US missile defence in Europe. Inside Russia, the country’s economic and political stabilisation, and return to the firmament of major powers have been widely acknowledged as key accomplishments of President Vladimir Putin’s term in office. Most Russian observers agree that on Putin’s watch, Russia has been restored to a place in the world appropriate to its history, its stature as a nuclear superpower, its seat in all the most important councils of war and peace (the United Nations Security Council, the G8 and the NATO–Russia Council), its wealth, and the geographic expanse and unique position 8 | EugenEugenee B.
    [Show full text]