introduction A Cool Breeze Russia’s resurgence as a strategic actor is a widely noted, but little under- stood feature of international relations. In Russia, it has been met with pride and satisfaction; in Europe and the United States, with barely concealed nervousness. Over the past two decades, Europe and the US have grown accustomed to the idea of Russian internal decline and retreat from the international arena. By the end of 1990s, Russia’s decline and retreat were such enduring features of the international landscape that the closest observers of the country and its evolution had begun to contem- plate ’a world without Russia’.1 Behind this rather provocative phrase lay the notion that Russian weakness was reaching systemic, chronic propor- Downloaded By: [Tufts University] At: 14:47 7 February 2011 tions, such that Russia was becoming ’less and less an actor in world affairs, while running the risk of becoming an object of competition among more advanced and dynamic powers’.2 This clearly is no longer the case, as Russia reasserts itself as a forceful voice on major issues of the day, from the fate of Kosovo to US missile defence in Europe. Inside Russia, the country’s economic and political stabilisation, and return to the firmament of major powers have been widely acknowledged as key accomplishments of President Vladimir Putin’s term in office. Most Russian observers agree that on Putin’s watch, Russia has been restored to a place in the world appropriate to its history, its stature as a nuclear superpower, its seat in all the most important councils of war and peace (the United Nations Security Council, the G8 and the NATO–Russia Council), its wealth, and the geographic expanse and unique position 8 | EugenEugenee B. Rumer on the Eurasian continent that make it both a major European and Asian power. In Europe and the United States, the Russian resurgence in the inter- national arena has been a matter of considerable and growing discomfort partly because Russia’s newly confident voice has resonated with Cold War-like echoes. These echoes, as well as stirring up troubling memories of the past, have raised new, equally troubling, concerns about the present and future. The question of whether the West and Russia are heading into a new Cold War-style confrontation is being asked with increasing frequency on both sides of the Atlantic. Long-standing Western concerns about a Russian retreat from democracy and interference in the internal affairs of former Soviet states have been rekindled by some recent events in partic- ular. These include Moscow’s increasingly strident warnings to Europe not to cooperate with the US deployment of missile defence compo- nents to Eastern Europe; the suspension of Russia’s participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty; and the incident in May 2007 in which Estonia was subjected to virulent verbal, written and cyber attacks, apparently sponsored and coordinated by the Kremlin, in retribu- tion for the Estonian government’s decision to move the graves of Soviet soldiers from the centre of Tallinn to a less prominent position in a military cemetery. Perhaps the most striking such recent development was the murder of renegade KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko in London in November 2006, in which another ex-KGB man was implicated in circumstances that raised questions about the Kremlin’s complicity in the affair. The nature of the crime, which involved a highly controlled radioactive substance, combined Downloaded By: [Tufts University] At: 14:47 7 February 2011 with Russia’s refusal to extradite the key suspect named by British authori- ties and its attempts to cast the Litvinenko affair as an operation sponsored by British intelligence agencies in order to discredit Russia, gave the case strong Cold War overtones, and prompted further questions about the Kremlin’s intentions. In a speech to the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, Putin declared that a new cold war could not be ruled out if the US and its NATO allies continue to meddle in Russia’s internal affairs and make major decisions about international security without consulting Moscow.3 The Russian president criticised the US for trying to create ’a world of one boss, one sovereign’ and for interfering in Russian domestic politics by, for instance, presuming to tell Russia how to be democratic, while behaving itself in a most undemocratic fashion. Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin | 9 A few days after the speech, a senior Russian general publicly warned the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic that if they allowed US missile defence components to be deployed on their territory, they could be targeted by Russian missiles.4 This warning, subsequently reiterated by Putin himself,5 brought back memories of a quarter-century ago, when Soviet spokesmen made similar threats to European countries in the crisis that erupted over US plans to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe in response to Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles. As if to underscore that his Munich speech was not an isolated episode, that Russia was not to be trifled with and that its displeasure with Western security policies was not to be dismissed, Putin delivered equally stark warnings to the West in his annual address to parliament on 27 April 2007. Once again, the Russian president sharply criticised the US and its European allies for their lack of due deference to his country’s interests. Responding to the perceived challenge to Russia posed by the American missile defence deployment plans, Putin made the announcement that Russia would suspend its obligations under the CFE Treaty.6 The treaty, signed in 1990 after more than 15 years of negotiations, had been a land- mark achievement that had appeared to signal the end of East–West military confrontation. Putin could not have picked a more symbolic target for his retaliatory move. Putin went on in May to make remarks at a ceremony commemorating Soviet victory in the Second World War that were harsher still, reminis- cent of the coldest days of the Cold War, when the ‘imperialist’ West was painted in Soviet propaganda as the successor to Nazi Germany. The pres- ident’s message effectively accused the United States of threatening Russia and the rest of the world: Downloaded By: [Tufts University] At: 14:47 7 February 2011 in our days such threats are not fewer. They are merely trans- forming, changing their appearance. And these new threats, as in the times of the Third Reich, [carry] the same contempt for human life, the same claims to global exclusivity and diktat.7 What next? While Cold War echoes from Russia have certainly fuelled anxiety among Americans and Europeans about renewed East–West tensions, it is still not clear to students of Russian foreign policy and policymakers in Western capitals what drives Russian foreign policy. Is Russia, on balance, with the West or against it? What are Russia’s objectives? What is the Kremlin trying to achieve in Europe? In Asia? Vis-à-vis the United States? Vis-à- 10 | EugenEugenee B. Rumer vis its immediate neighbours? Finally, will Russian foreign policy change after 2008, when Putin is scheduled to leave office at the end of his second term? The return of Russia to the firmament of major powers, and foreign policy in general, are projects to which President Putin has devoted a good deal of personal attention. Nobody has done more to determine and artic- ulate the direction of Russian foreign policy in recent years than Putin. His active and highly visible involvement in a variety of foreign-policy activities – bilateral meetings in Russia and abroad; active participation in a variety of international fora, such as the G8, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations regional forum and Russia–EU summits; roundtables with domestic and foreign reporters and academics, as well as general audiences; and numerous speeches dedicated to foreign affairs – leaves no room for doubt that the foreign policy of the Putin era is indeed Putin’s own foreign policy. Accordingly, things could change after the president’s departure. Trying to determine who Putin’s successor might be is a task that is well outside the scope of this study. This study will rather examine the under- lying strategic factors that are likely to shape Russian behaviour in the international arena in the coming years, regardless of who comes to power in 2008. It seems more than likely that at least the broad outlines of Putin’s foreign-policy vision will endure beyond his presidency. Putin is the first Russian leader to articulate a fully fledged foreign policy for his country after what has been a period of protracted turmoil at home and retrench- ment in the international arena. Throughout his tenure, he has enjoyed the firm support of his countrymen; Putin’s high approval ratings, especially in relation to his foreign policy, would suggest that his approach to inter- Downloaded By: [Tufts University] At: 14:47 7 February 2011 national affairs has staying power. It is therefore an approach that deserves close examination. The contention that the core elements of Putin’s foreign-policy vision will endure beyond 2008 is central to this study. However, it is only one part of the argument. The other is that this vision exceeds the means that are likely to be available to the Russian government to implement it. This gap between the vision and the means, combined with changes in the international system, holds out the prospect of another readjustment of Russian foreign policy in the coming years. Putin’s foreign policy and beyond In order to understand Putin’s foreign policy, it is necessary to take a close look, not only at recent developments, but at the policies of the ten years Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin | 11 preceding his presidency.