United States Patent (19) 11 Patent Number: 6,061,791 Moreau (45) Date of Patent: May 9, 2000
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US006061791A United States Patent (19) 11 Patent Number: 6,061,791 Moreau (45) Date of Patent: May 9, 2000 54) INITIAL SECRET KEY ESTABLISHMENT Primary Examiner-Gilberto Barron, Jr. INCLUDING FACILITIES FOR Assistant Examiner Anthony DiLorenzo VERIFICATION OF IDENTITY Attorney, Agent, Or Firm-James Anglehart, Swabey, 75 Inventor: Thierry Moreau, Montreal, Canada Ogilvy, Renault 73 Assignee: Connotech Experts-Conseils Inc., 57 ABSTRACT Montreal, Canada An issuer offers any type of Service Secured with a Secret 21 Appl. No.: 09/296,378 cryptographic key assigned to an applicant according to the 22 Filed: Apr. 22, 1999 present invention, which includes a Secret key registration Related U.S. Application Data process. Usually, the Secret key will be loaded on a portable 60 Provisional application No. 60/046,047, May 9, 1997. memory device or other Secret key Store of the applicant. AS 30 Foreign Application Priority Data preliminary Steps, the issuer Sets up its public key for the May 7, 1998 WO WIPO ..................... PCT/CA98/OO431 Probabilistic Encryption Key Exchange (PEKE) (51) Int. Cl." ........................................................ H04L 9/08 cryptosystem, and the applicant obtains a copy of a Secret 52 U.S. Cl. ............................................. 713/171; 380/283 key registration Software, a copy of the issuer's public key, 58 Field of Search ..................................... 380/283, 285; and an uninitialized portable memory device. Once initiated 713/168, 169,171 by the applicant, the registration Software generates an 56) References Cited internal PEKE Secret key. The applicant chooses a registra U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS tion pass query and pass reply that the registration Software MACs and encrypts with a key derived from the PEKE 4,200,770 4/1980 Hellmann et al.. 4,405,829 9/1983 Rivest et al.. Secret key. The registration Software derives the key 4,771,461 9/1988 Matyas. assigned to the applicant from the PEKE Secret key, and 5,020,105 5/1991 Rosen et al.. 5,142.578 8/1992 Matyas et al.. loads it into the Secret key Store. A message is Sent to the 5,179.591 1/1993 Hardy et al. .............................. 380/21 issuer data processing center where the cryptographic pro 5,216,715 6/1993 Markwitz. cessing (PEKE, MAC, encryption) is reversed. Using an 5,288,978 2/1994 Iijima ...................................... 235/380 alternate channel (e.g. telephone conversation) an issuer (List continued on next page.) agent Verifies the identity of the applican6: the agent asks the FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS pass query, the applicant replies with the pass reply, and the 215678O 8/1995 Canada. issuer verifies the applicant's knowledge of Some relevant 2177622 5/1996 Canada. personal data. The issuer agent can approve the applicant's OTHER PUBLICATIONS registration in the issuer database. There is no need for the Telecommunications Industry Associations “Over-the-Air issuer to personalize either the Software or the Secret key Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations in Wideband Store before delivery to the applicant, and there is a Single Spread Spectrum Systems”- TIA/EIA/IS-683, Feb. 1997, personal contact between the applicant and the issuer agent. pp. 1-B2. (List continued on next page.) 15 Claims, 3 Drawing Sheets 22 N Af SEALED BUBECKEY -- - - - - - - - - t FIRST MESSAGE APPLICAN REGISTRATION PROGRA e-H 277 -SECRET KEY DATA COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK PORTABEMEMORY DEVICE SECONOMESSAGE 225--PRIVATE KEYN-04 t -------- ASS ISSUER DATA PROCESSING CENTER o/ 29-SECRETKEY G. f; soPASS REPY->G) A.- . ...-2/f2 EY -/ es REPLY OK if- ACCEPT REGISTRATION-- ()--PASS QUERY f24 ISSUERAGENT 22 6,061,791 Page 2 U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS EFTA, Electronic Fund Transfer Act, Title IX of the Cus 5,375,159 12/1994 Scheidt et al.. tomer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. S.1601 et seq.). 5,386,468 1/1995 Akiyama et al.. 5,535,276 7/1996 Ganesan .................................... 380/25 Regulation E: Electronic Fund Transfers, (12 C.F.R. S.205). 5,539,824 7/1996 Bjorklund et al.. 5,557,679 9/1996 Julin et al.. Harn, Lein, Digital SIgnature for Diffie-Hellman Keys 5,583,939 12/1996 Chang et al.. without using a one-way function, Electronics Letters, 16" 5,680,458 10/1997 Spelman et al.. Jan. 1997, vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 125-126. 5,745,571 4/1998 Zuk. 5,748,739 5/1998 Press ......................................... 380/25 Moreau, Thierry, Probabilistic Encryption Key Exchange, 5,768,373 6/1998 Lohstroh et al. ........................... 380/4 Electronics Letters, vol. 31, No. 25, 7" Dec., pp. 5,784,463 7/1998 Chen et al.. 5,875,394 2/1999 Daly et al. .............................. 455/411 2166-2168. OTHER PUBLICATIONS Moreau, Thierry, Automated Data Protection for telecom munications, Electronic Transactions and Messaging using Telecommunications Industry Associations “Over-the-Air Service Provisioning”, publication version Jun. 19, 1997, PEKE Secret key exchange and Other Cryptographic Algo Source TIA TR-45.2 9Cheryl Blum (Lucent Technolo rithms, Technology Licensing Opportunity, revision 1.1, gies)pp. 1-14. Connotech Experts-Conseils Inc., Montreal, Canada 1996. Anderson, Ross J.: Liability and Computer Security: Nine Principles, in Computer Security-Esorics 94, 3" European Blum, Manuel et al." An efficient Probabilistic Public-Key Symposium on Research in Computer Sec. Nov. 1994, Encryption Scheme which Hides All Partial Information”, in LNCS (Lecture Notes in Computer Sc.) 875, Springer Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto84, Spring Verlag, pp. 231-245. er-Verlag, 1985, pp-289-299. Abadi, Martin, Needham, Roger, Prudent Engineering Prac tice for Cryptographic Protocole, in 1994, IEEE Symposium Montgomery, Peter L. “Modular Multiplication Without on Research in Security and Privacy, IEEE, 1994, pp. Trial Division' Mathematics of Computations, vol. 44, No. 122-136. 170, Apr. 1985, pp. 519–522. Anderson, Ross J, and Needham, Roger, Robutness Prin ciples for Public Key Protocols, in Advances in Cryptology, Dussé.Stephen R. et al. “A Cryptographic Library for the Crypto’95, LNCS (Lecture Notes in Computer Sc)963, Motorola DSP56000, Advances in Cryptology, Euroc Springer Verlag, pp. 236-247. rypt’90, Lecture Notes. In Computer Science No. 473, pp. Accredited Standards Committee X9-Financial Services 230–233, Springer-Verlag, 1990. (ANSI ASC XOWorking Draft ANSI X9.30-199x Public Key Cryptography. Usin Irreversible Algorithms for the Eldridge, S.W. et al, Hardware Implementation of Mont Financial Services Industry: Part 3: Certificate Management gomery's Modular Multiplication Algorithm, IEEE Trans for DSA, Americal Bankers Association, Washington, DC, actions on Computers, vol. 46, No. 6, Jun. 1993, pp. Nov. 19, 1994, (document N24–94). 693-699. U.S. Patent May 9, 2000 Sheet 1 of 3 6,061,791 /(2N. 225 N \ SEALED PUBLIC KEY /(2f - - - - - - - - - !--- FIRST MESSAGE - - APPLICANT REGISTRATION PROGRAM 27/-SECRET KEY DATA COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK SECOND MESSAGE N104 2% 225-PRIVATE KEY PASSQUERY /22 - - - - - - - - - - se SERDA PROCESNG CENER 229 29-SECRET KEY APPLICANT 2 - - - PASS QUERY OK??-- PASS REPLY->GD y /4 RNUERY: ...12// | ACCEPT REGISTRATION? --PASS REPLY OK?? 507/ ()--PASS QUERY 3. ISSUER ACENT 22 FEEF I U.S. Patent May 9, 2000 Sheet 2 of 3 6,061,791 /07 a's SEALED PUBLIC KEY - - - - - INTEGRITY MECHANISM PUBLICKEY Shor DAA repopulcisco Ky HaffFIRST MESSAGE CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCESSING SECON) s 209- SECRETSE 2, /(4 IN sh /29 //7/ PASS QUERY /(22 PASS REPLY APPLICANT Frag U.S. Patent May 9, 2000 Sheet 3 of 3 6,061,791 FIRST MESSAGE -SECON, MSG 50 2-1" || ISSUER DATAh - 1 REVERSED PROCESSING CENTER | | CRYPTOGRAPHC |-J25 06- - 1- PRISINGPROCESSIN | | App SECRET KEY STATUS PASS QUERY PASSREPLY APPLICANT: . PASS QUERY OK??-- QUERY:REPLY: '. 27, 3. PASS REPLY ->G) --PASS REPLY OK? W I ACCEPT REGISTRATION? aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaae2a2atest Yaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa Yaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa APPLICANT ()--PASS QUERY 8 Yaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa ISSUER ACENT f(22 Fras 6,061,791 1 2 INITIAL SECRET KEY ESTABLISHMENT chain of evidence is a two-tiered authentication bind: 1) the INCLUDING FACILITIES FOR logical bind between the account holder (or the account VERIFICATION OF IDENTITY holder agent) and a cryptographic operation performed by a digital apparatus, and 2) the bind between this said crypto The present application claims priority of U.S. provi graphic operation and the transaction historic records of the sional patent application Ser. No. 60/046,047 filed May 9, financial institution. Within its Scope of a registration 1997, and of PCT/CA97/00431 filed May 7, 1998, desig process, the present invention addresses these two aspects of nating the United States and now pending in the interna transaction authentication. tional phase. The distinction between “secret key cryptography” and "public key cryptography is well known in the prior art. In FIELD OF THE INVENTION the present disclosure, we reserve the term "Secret” to data The present invention generally relates to cryptographic shared in confidence between parties in a Secret key cryp key management that is required for the implementation of tography arrangement, and respectively the terms “private' Secure data communications or transaction processing. More and “public' to the private and public components of a Specifically, it addresses the need to establish, or renew (e.g. 15 private/public key pair of the type used for digital signatures after Security breach), the very first shared Secret key or public key encryption from the field of public key between two parties (e.g. a client and a financial institution cryptography. in an on-line banking Service arrangement). This registration The elementary cryptographic operation used in transac proceSS encompasses human activities by the parties agents tion authentication can be DES encryption of a Secret for the verification of identity. The present invention facili Personal Identification Number (PIN) entered at a Point of tates these human activities by a novel and unique arrange Sale terminal (POS terminal), with cryptographic integrity ment of automated operations, notably cryptographic trans protection applied to the whole transaction (typically with a formations.