The End of the Beginning
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The End of the Beginning Bracknell Paper No 3 A Symposium on the Land/Air Co-operation in The Mediterranean War 1940-43 20 March 1992 Sponsored jointly by the Royal Air Force Historical Society and the Royal Air Force Staff College, Bracknell ii THE END OF THE BEGINNING Copyright ©1992 by the Royal Air Force Historical Society First Published in the UK in 1992 ISBN 0951982419 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without the permission from the Publisher in writing. Printed by Hastings Printing Company Ltd Royal Air Force Historical Society THE END OF THE BEGINNING iii Contents Preface Quotation 1. Opening Remarks: Air Commodore R H Gould 2. Chairman’s Introduction: Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage 3. Land/Air Co-operation: Mr John Terraine 4. The Shape and Course of the Mediterranean War: Major General John Strawson 5. The RAF in the Mediterranean Theatre: Mr Humphrey Wynn 6. How the Joint System Worked: (i) Sir Frederick Rosier and (ii) Sir Kenneth Cross 7. The Commanders and the Command System: Dr Vincent Orange 8. Digest of Group Discussions: A to G 9. Closing Address: Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage 10. Closing Remarks by the Deputy Commandant Air Commodore Gould and the Chairman of the RAF Historical Society Air Marshal Sir Frederick Sowrey Biographical Notes on the Main Speakers The Royal Air Force Historical Society Acknowledgement iv THE END OF THE BEGINNING Senior Air Commanders Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder Air Vice Marshal Coningham Acting Air Commodore Harry Broadhurst THE END OF THE BEGINNING v Preface Land/Air Co-operation in the Mediterranean War 1940-43 is the title of the third of the on-going series of seminars entitled the Bracknell Papers. The seminar was convened jointly by the RAF Historical Society and the RAF Staff College on 20 March 1992 at Bracknell. The capacity audience consisted of members of the RAF Historical Association and the Bracknell Directing staff and students. Contributions were made by former RAF and Army officers, including historians with a variety of origins. The day’s proceedings were presided over by Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage and a similar pattern to the two previous symposia was maintained. The morning was devoted to a series of six talks on various campaign aspects, while in the afternoon the symposium was divided into discussion groups in which issues raised were debated in more detail. These provided an opportunity for Middle East veterans and others to offer recollections and for historians to comment further on a variety of questions and controversies. The volume contains the edited texts of the main talks and a digest of what was said in the discussion groups. Derek Wood Editor vi THE END OF THE BEGINNING ‘It is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is perhaps the end of the beginning.’ Winston S Churchill 10 November 1942 Speech to the House of Commons on the victory at El Alamein. ‘The main thing with air superiority is not only getting it but even more important knowing when you have it.’ A desert air commander 1942 Air Chief Marshal Sir Harry Broadhurst ‘The lesson that I have learnt today is that there are no new lessons to be learnt, only lessons to be remembered.’ A Staff College student 1992 Squadron Leader A J Stewart THE END OF THE BEGINNING 1 1. Opening Remarks The Deputy Commandant Air Commodore R H Gould It is my great pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the Commandant. This is the third such seminar that we have co-hosted at Bracknell with the RAF Historical Society. Two years ago the subject was the Battle of Britain; the day was enormously successful and proved the value of the joint forum of historians, those who had fought in the campaign, and current members of the RAF Historical Society and the Advanced Staff Course. Last year the subject was the Battle of the Atlantic and it comes as no surprise to me as a maritime aviator that somewhat fewer lessons could be learned in this esoteric and by now highly formalised area of joint military endeavour. Today we return to more fertile ground in our study of the Mediterranean war. This was where many of the lessons of joint land/air operations were learned, and sometimes re-learned, for application in other campaigns both during World War II and subsequently. Most recently many members of the Advanced Staff Course and the RAF Historical Society contributed to operations GRANBY and DESERT STORM and I feel confident they will play a full role in today’s proceedings, perhaps offering the historians and old campaigners some new perspectives on joint warfare. Without further ado and in anticipation of a fascinating and memorable day, may I now hand over to your Chairman for the day Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage. 2 THE END OF THE BEGINNING 2. Chairman’s Introduction Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage KCB CBE Our first speaker is one of the most distinguished – if not the most distinguished – military historians in this country today, John Terraine. I first came across his writings in his ten books about the First World War and his five or so other books on a variety of military topics. He became well known to a much wider public through his many contributions to television programmes on military history and, not least, that famous series on the Great War. But he is perhaps best known to this audience for his works on the U-boat wars and above all for that classic of RAF history, The Right of the Line. As you will hear from John, air power played a vital part in operations on the Western Front in the First World War but not in what we would now call direct support of the armies. Contrary to popular belief the dominant weapon in that conflict was not the machine gun but the artillery piece and it was largely in support of those weapons during the trench warfare of that conflict that land/air co-operation first developed. The Second World War was not about trench warfare and it was therefore not about air support for artillery. John is going to talk about those changes and where they left us by the end of 1940. THE END OF THE BEGINNING 3 3. Land/Air Co-operation Mr John Terraine The Gospel tell us, ‘In the beginning was the Word ... and the Word was God.’ That is a gratifying message for historians and helpful to one and al inasmuch as it leads one to look for key words in a variety of subjects. I am here today to tell you that in the beginning of Air Power was Co-operation – but alas! the word got somewhat garbled in the gospels of the Royal Air Force. It is my task now to take us back to the beginning of the subject, which is (for us) exactly 80 years ago. In January 1912 a newly- formed Air Committee was discussing the formation of a British Aeronautical Service, and the chairman of its technical sub- committee, Colonel J E B Seely, said at one of its meetings, ‘At the present time in this country we have, as far as I know, of actually flying men in the Army about eleven, and of actual flying men in the Navy about eight, and France has about two hundred and sixty-three, so we are what you might call behind.’ As it turned out, this was not a bad thing to be – but I would hesitate to offer the lesson that being behind is necessarily a good thing. They moved pretty fast in 1912; a Royal Flying Corps was quickly formed, and it received a Royal Warrant on April 12; it had an Army Wing and a Navy Wing and a Central Flying School. On 1 July 1914 the Naval Wing separated off to form the Royal Naval Air Service under the Admiralty, and that was how the Air Services went to war a month later – as parts of the Navy and of the Army. So there wasn’t much doubt that there would be some degree of co-operation between Air and Sea, and Air and Land. When war came, in August 1914, the Royal Flying Corps had no fewer than 179 aircraft on its books, but we should not become over- excited by that figure. What rather spoils its impact is the fact that quite a few of them wouldn’t really fly, and quite a few more wouldn’t 4 THE END OF THE BEGINNING fly very well; so it was only with difficulty that the RFC put four squadrons into the air with twelve aircraft each on initial establishment. Just to fill the picture, our French allies were credited with 136 serviceable aircraft, and the Germans could put up about 180, as well as nine Army airships – the famous Zeppelins. The question then promptly arose; what did all this new aerial armament exist for? How was it to be used? As regards France and Britain, the answer is supplied by two pre-war annual Army manoeuvres, in 1911 and 1912. In the French manoeuvres in 1911, air reconnaissance in conjunction with cavalry was tried, but not very much is said about it; it certainly doesn’t sound very promising. The significant feature of the French exercises was air co-operation with artillery and, according to British observers, even at that early date the progress made was impressive.