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Home , Bailundo, Cuando Cubango Province, Luanda, Mucusso, Munhango, Rivungo

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

08/2000

Angola: Jaw-Jaw or War-War? Three questions currently stand out over : First, what is the military situation? Second, what are the possible options for both UNITA and the government MPLA? Third, what can be done to make a political solution more likely? Regional and international policy shifts, including re-opening contact with UNITA, may help to steer both the Angolan rebels and the MPLA towards peace and compromise. The Status Quo peace very difficult in that country but, at best, The following recent trends and events in the Angolan complicates both the search for stability in the Congo political and security situation should be noted: and also the regional integration project in southern • There has been a significant deterioration in the . It also illustrates the split between two regional security environment along the border area camps: that headed by involving between and Angola. and favouring diplomatic • Fighting between FAA and UNITA guerrilla engagement; and that involving Angola and Laurent elements in the has Kabila's Congo along with Namibia and , intensified. the latter two which have committed forces in support • There have been renewed efforts by the Namibian of Kabila. government to establish contact with the UNITA leadership in order to discuss the security situation Angola's war has, of course, now sucked in Namibia in northern Namibia. (fighting on the side of the MPLA government), and • The third session of the MPLA Central Committee Zambia which has become a sanctuary for UNITA as took place between 24-26 well as around 30,000 of the 1.2 February in . Anti-UNITA "far from being a million Angolans fleeing the fighting. sentiments were reportedly very defeated force, Overall, the number of people evident, and the meeting felt that currently receiving humanitarian the military option remained the UNITA appears to I assistance from the World Food only possible solution to the stepping up its Programme (WFP) in Angola totals ongoing crisis. There was activities" 1,135,594. The WFP is supporting apparently consensus that neither approximately 250,000 internally Luanda nor should bow to international displaced persons in , 205,000 in , pressure to enter into negotiations with UNITA. and more than 200,000 people in Bie. • On 26 February 2000, a special meeting of the so-called 'Strategic Cabinet' (the inner circle of Despite recent Angolan government military President Jose Eduardo dos Santos) occurred in successes, the absence of a political solution means Luanda for the purposes of assessing and the war looks set to drag on. Why? discussing the security situation, especially in the Cuando Cubango province, and Namibia's First, although much was made during 1999 of possible discussions with UNITA. Here the UNITA's conventional capabilities, including the activation of a second front was agreed upon, with alleged possession of Mig-23 fighters and helicopters, a FAA force to advance from towards it is now clear that this was either propaganda on the via Luenge in addition to the forces part of 's rebel forces or, more likely, currently in the vicinity of north of Jamba. by Luanda as a way to justify its arms build-up and An effort would also be made to advance FAA military offensive. units southwards towards Mavinga from Lucusse via Lumbala Nguimba (Gago Coutinho), and Indeed, given the relatively small income that UNITA deploy additional FAA units to the Cuando has had to operate with since 1994 (no more than Cubango. US$250 million per annum from sales with • Afresh FAA military offensive is due to commence the high premiums payable to middle-men) and the in late May or early June. substantial costs of running its army in terms of fuel and food costs, it is likely that only a modest upgrade The failure to find a long-term political solution to to its war-fighting capability happened during this end the conflict in Angola not only makes a lasting time. This is substantiated by the fact that the MPLA

Please note that these views do not necessarily reflect those of the SAIIA has, despite its successes, captured little in the way Possible Options for Peace of conventional arms. No more than 15 UNITA T- Under the circumstances, three options stand out: 54/55 tanks and eight D-30 cannons plus quantities of small arms and ammunition (mainly from the dump Negotiate with UNITA and Savimbi: The MPLA outside ) have reportedly been captured. The refuses to consider this on the grounds of Savimbi's most devastating seizure by the MPLA was of past record of breaking agreements. In this, they have computers and documentation from UNITA bunkers been supported by the international community outside Andulo. UNITA did not put up a conventional- despite South Africa, most notably, calling for an type fight which, if it possessed the capability, it inclusive political process. SA Foreign Minister Dr certainly would have done over Andulo/ Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is reported in February and, subsequently, Jamba. calling for negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA, and rejected Luanda's US-backed stance that Second, despite recent military setbacks, there are it would talk to the rebels only if Savimbi was indications that UNITA is preparing for another of its sidelined. She noted that the MPLA 'has not won the guerrilla campaigns to which Savimbi and his soldiers war for 30 years and is not about to win it now'. In are no strangers. UNITA has apparently completed February, Minister Zuma, SA Defence Minister the restructuring and redeployment of its forces, Mosiuoa Lekota and former president Nelson including units in the Cuando Cubango Province, and Mandela issued a warning against seeking a military a significant part of its conventional forces north of solution in Angola. Zuma said 'Irrespective of who the Kwanza River in the area northeast of wins the war, peace will not thereby be created in and southeast of Malange. Following a special Angola.' planning session in mid-December 1999 attended by most of the regional commanders, the UNITA Negotiate with UNITA without Savimbi: The leadership has given the local military commands question here is with whom and on whose authority carte blanche to initiate a guerrilla war. will they be operating? As the MPLA refuses to negotiate with the Angolan rebel Indeed, far from being a defeated "the issue of leader, can a peace deal be force, UNITA appears to be succession to brokered without him given his stepping up its activities. apparently continued support Savimbi remains a within UNITA. If he insists on There are reports of continuous major stumbling being a part of a negotiated UNITA operations in the provinces block" solution, three alternative of Uige, Cuanza Norte, Cuanza scenarios emerge: Sul, Bi'e, Huambo, , Huila, Cuando Cubango and Cunene. In the latter case, on 24 February U NITA • First, the MPLA accepts his participation perhaps elements attacked and captured the town of Chiede, with the guarantee that he will step aside once an 50km north of the Namibian border and 40km agreement is negotiated. This, however, is southeast of Ongiva. The aim of this is apparently to unlikely. threaten the strategic route from to Namibia • Second, he is killed. Although the pressure on htm via Ongiva, Xangongo and . at this time is reportedly very great, the MPLA has been trying this option for some time and the signs Moreover, the FAA movement towards Likua and are that, bad luck notwithstanding, Savimbi will Mavinga is experiencing difficulties and progress is continue to evade capture or assassination by slow. The extensive use by UNITA of mines and its government forces. This does not, however, totally guerrilla actions along with other problems such as discount renegade UNITA elements turning logistical shortages, high personnel losses from against O Mais Velho (The Eldest One) as Savimbi fighting and disease (especially malaria), and heavy is known. rains are all impeding the advance. • Third, a place of exile is found for him.

However, critical to the current phase of the Will Savimbi accept exile or even a negotiated operations is control of the area between withdrawal from the political stage? (the birthplace of Savimbi) and , a traditional UNITA stronghold. Between these two towns and east This is apparently unlikely for two reasons: of Cuito Bfe is the town of , known to the old First, itwill be difficult to find a suitable secure place South African Defence Force (SADF) as 'the gate' — for him either inside or outside Angola, especially a strategically vital resupply point for air drops to now that King Hassan of , one of his great UNITA. UNITA's loss of control of this area could supporters, has passed on. More positively, South have major, negative ramifications for its military Africa may not be such an improbable choice, capability. however, if this option becomes a reality: it could provide the-security necessary-for Savimbi-and this gesture may even serve to warm relations1 with bona fides, and there is no pressure on the Luanda. government to strike a political bargain. • Third, there is no reason (nor record) to suggest Second, the issue of succession to Savimbt, who turns that Luanda will deliver on rhetorical 69 this August, remains a major stumbling block. Of commitments to reform its governance structures, the most likely contenders, the UNITA Vice-President even in the unlikelihood of the military campaign Antonio Dembo is geographically dislocated in the successfully ending the conflict. north among the Bakongo; the Chief of Staff General • Fourth, despite President Dos Santos' promise to Altino Sapalalo Bock and Secretary-General Paulo hold elections in 2001, these will be meaningless Lukamba Gato have a great personal dislike which without political accommodation. could threaten to tear the movement apart; Isaias Samakuva is in exile in ; and Abel Chivukuvuku In summary three questions stand out: remains isolated from the centre of power in the UNITA parliamentary faction in Luanda. • First, how can the parties be encouraged to negotiate — with whom and through whom? • Second, what are the mechanics of this process? A Military victory: This, as suggested above, is not Will this include, for example, a time frame for only unlikely but probably undesirable given that another internationally-supervised election? political accommodation has to be found for those • Third, what is the role for the international who have in the past supported Savimbi, particularly community and, especially, the Southern African among the . A total military collapse by Development Community (SADQ? UNITA will probably make Luanda less likely to accommodate alternative political views. A number of policy shifts by regional and international actors could be used to steer both UNITA and the Making a Political Solution More Likely MPLA towards peace and compromise. Put crudely, In the light of the above, the debate must turn to how in both cases there is a need to retain both elements to make a political solution stick. of the carrot and stick. Currently the latter is being A number of issues are clear: used against UNITA in the form of sanctions and • First, while the two-pronged pressure on UNITA international isolation; the former almost exclusively via the international sanctions campaign and the with the MPLA in the (vain) hope that Luanda will FAA military initiative has succeeded in placing see the light and enter into political negotiations and UNITA in what is arguably its worst military ultimately reform its governance structures. position since 1976, there is a danger that the political opportunity created will be lost. Here, contact with the UNITA hierarchy, as was International (especially American) support for the demonstrated by the South African transition, could MPLA and measures against UNITA have played be a relatively cost-free means of steering the course into the hands of the hardliners on both sides. of events and in encouraging moderate behaviour. • Second, the Angolan situation cannot be reduced There may also be a need to explore the possibilities to a simple morality play between the MPLA and of a permanent place of exile for Savimbi with the the transgressors UNITA. Currently there is no way necessary guarantees that UNITA will, in his absence, for Savimbi to prove his or his party's political be a part of the political process.

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