CHAPTER SIX

THE SULLAN VETERANS AND CATILINE’S CONSPIRACY

Unfortunately, there is no literary evidence for what happened in Etru- ria between the revolt of 78 and Catiline’s conspiracy. It remains un- clear, first of all, what happened at Faesulae after Lepidus and the rebels were defeated.1 No doubt, a considerable group of Sullan set- tlers did not leave the area, as Cicero refers twice to the presence of colonists from Faesulae in Catiline’s army.2 It is likely that their position remained difficult, and was further complicated by the losses suffered in the attack. It would be useful to know what measures, if any, were taken by Rome to protect the colonists and avoid further attacks, or even to restore some of them on the allotments reoccupied by the Faesulans. The incidents at Faesulae suggest that something about the Sullan settlement plans in Etruria was flawed. Soon after the arrival of the veterans, the local population managed to react successfully.3 This was, to our knowledge, unparalleled in the rest of Italy. It is impossible to establish what triggered the offensive, or rather what led the inhabitants to believe that an attack could be successful. The riots were possibly related to contemporary events in other areas of Etruria. As we have seen, the land assignments at Volaterrae and Arretium were stopped after the death of Sulla. However, the strongest element suggesting that Sullan colonisation in Etruria was not a success is the participation of a contingent of veterans in the conspiracy of Catiline. This may be explained both by local factors and by the impact of wider processes that involved Italy as a whole. It is significant that the bulk of the Sullan colonists who followed Catiline was from Arretium and Faesulae, where the settlement pro- gramme knew some significant drawbacks. They had endured hostility,

1 Harris 1971, 268 argues that the land given up by the veterans was a “temporary concession”, and that it was recovered after Lepidus’ revolt. 2 See Cic. Cat. 3.6.14; Mur. 24.49. 3 Harris 1971, 267–271 is too optimistic about the success of the Sullan settlement in the area. 184part ii – sulla and the administration of the empire open attacks, and isolation. They were prevented from increasing the size of their properties by adding unoccupied land (like that which had been publicata,butnotdiuisa) to the allotments they already had. There is every reason to believe that these scattered groups of veterans, posted on a hostile territory, still communicated with each other. Figures like Gaius Manlius and Publius Furius, both mentioned in Cicero’s Catili- narian speeches, promoted adhesion to the conspiracy.4 Cicero’s rhetor- ical reference to a colonorum Arretinorum et Faesulanorum exercitus cannot be lightly dismissed.5 The typical accusation launched against the sup- porters of Catiline is that they tried to revive the licentia of the Sullan age after squandering the fortunes earned by the proscriptions and the mass murders.6 Indeed, this may be true of Catiline and of other lead- ing figures of the conspiracy. The main reason why Catiline was so successful among the Sul- lan veterans, however, is that many of them had become considerably poorer in less than two decades after the Sullan colonisation. A sat- isfactory explanation for this development is still to be provided, and it probably is not within reach. It would be far-fetched, for instance, to view it as a consequence of the scarce talent of the Sullan veter- ans for agriculture, as has often been claimed. There is no reason to believe that they were less skilled than most Italian peasants. Most of them certainly had a rural background before joining the army, and it is conceivable that they were prepared to return to their earlier condi- tion after Sulla’s victory.7 It is true that many Sullan veterans tried to sell their properties soon after the land was assigned, and not just in

4 Cic. Cat. 2.6.14 (Manlius iste centurio, qui in agro Faesulano castra posuit, bellum populo Romano suo nomine indixit—“this centurion Manlius, who set up a camp in the territory of Faesulae and declared war against the Roman people in his own name”); 2.9.20 (quo ex genere iste est Manlius, cui nunc Catilina succedit. hi sunt homines ex eis coloniis quas Sulla constituit—“Manlius, from whom Catiline has now taken up the command, belongs in this class. These are men from those colonies that were founded by Sulla”); 3.6.14 (in P. Furium, qui est ex eis colonis quos Faesulas L. Sulla deduxit—“against Publius Furius, who is one of the colonists that Lucius Sulla settled at Faesulae”). On Manlius, also cf. Dio 37.30. 5 Cic. Mur. 24.49. 6 Cf. Sall. Cat. 16.4 (plerique Sullani milites, largius suo usi, rapinarum et uictoriae ueteris memores ciuile bellum exoptabant—“most of the Sullan soldiers, who had spent more than they actually had, longed for a civil war, mindful of their old victory”); Cat. 28.4.Onthe role of the accumulation of debt in Sallust’s general interpretation of the late Republic, see Shaw 1975. 7 Brunt 1971, 309–310.