Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Influences of Non-Western External Actors

Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Influences of Non-Western External Actors Barbora Chrzová, Anja Grabovac, Martin Hála, Jan Lalić (Eds.) Editors: Barbora Chrzová, Anja Grabovac, Martin Hála, Jan Lalić Authors: Vesa Bashota, Maja Bjeloš, Barbora Chrzová, Jan Lalić, Srećko Latal, Martin Naunov, Hana Semanić Proofreading: Alyssa Wilson, Zack Kramer Published by the Prague Security Studies Institute, May 2019, Prague The publication is written within the framework of the project ti- tled “Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Non-Democratic External Influence Activities“ led by the Prague Security Studies Institute with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy. About the project The project “Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Assessing Non-Democratic External Influence Activities“ has sought to identi- fy, analyse and publicise Russian, Chinese, Turkish, and Gulf State and Iranian influence activities and engagements in the five post-Yugo- slav and non-EU member countries: Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo. The project team has consisted of four Prague-based experts –Barbora Chrzová, Martin Hála, Jan Lalić and Anja Grabovac– and five researchers from each of the Balkan countries in focus – Vesa Bashota (Kosovo), Maja Bjeloš (Serbia), Srećko Latal (BiH), Martin Naunov (North Macedonia) and Hana Semanić (Montenegro). It has presented its findings and recom- mendations to local and international experts, civil society, the media, and the public through six thematic briefs, a series of blog posts and case study articles, and at the concluding conference held in April 2019 in Prague. The publication concisely presents the major project’s findings and observations. ISBN: 978-80-903792-7-5 © PSSI 2019 The Prague Security Studies Institute, Pohořelec 6 118 00 Prague 1, Czech Republic www.pssi.cz Contents Executive Summary 1 Introduction 7 Author: Barbora Chrzová Country Report 1 – Serbia 13 Author: Maja Bjeloš Country Report 2 – Bosnia and Herzegovina 31 Author: Srećko Latal Country Report 3 – North Macedonia 48 Author: Martin Naunov Country Report 4 – Montenegro 64 Author: Hana Semanić Country Report 5 – Kosovo 76 Author: Vesa Bashota Conclusion 88 Author: Jan Lalić About the authors 91 Executive Summary Five of the seven states born out of the violent di- exerting economic, political, cultural and religious ssolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of leverage. However, the scope and nature of their en- Yugoslavia (SFRY)–Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, gagements differ significantly–their interests are -of Montenegro, North Macedonia and Kosovo–repre- ten conflicting and their influence, especially in the sent one of the last regions of Europe not yet integra- economic domain, tends to be exaggerated. Despite ted into the European Union nor, with the exception often being viewed positively by the local populati- of Montenegro, into NATO. Since the Balkans has al- on, none of them is perceived as or provides a real ways been a zone of great-power rivalry, diminishing alternative to the “European path” of the Western US involvement in the region and the EU’s failure to Balkans. Nevertheless, since regional and global ten- replace it, along with EU enlargement fatigue and sions feed into each other and non-Western actors shifts in the global geopolitical balance of power, can skillfully exploit local vulnerabilities, many of have created a space for non-Western actors to step their activities have the potential to slow down Euro- in and strengthen their presence in the region. Atlantic integration or jeopardize the stability of the region. To limit their field of action, the West needs Russia, Turkey, China and the Gulf States have incre- to take a more active approach, with more tangible ased their influence and challenged the pro-Wes- and clearly-presented incentives for the countries of tern orientation of the region with a variety of tools, the region. WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: EXECUTIVE ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS SUMMARY Serbia Russia Turkey Russia has well developed historical, cultural, and religious Turkey has recently become one of Serbia’s most import- ties with Serbia. Their proximity, however, sometimes tends ant trading partners, despite old animosities and the coun- to be exaggerated. Russia’s foreign policy towards Serbia try’s strong support for Kosovo’s independence. Since 2009, has become more resolute after Kosovo’s independence in Ankara has worked ambitiously to strengthen its political 2008, yet, Russia has no resources or long-term vision ex- influence in the country through investments, cultural ex- cept to compete with the West. Its main political leverage changes, humanitarian aid, religious contacts with Bosniaks stems from strong diplomatic support over the non-recog- in Serbian Sandžak, and Ankara-mediated talks between BiH nition of Kosovo, using its seat in the UN Security Council and Serbia. Thanks to Turkish investments and an increase and other international bodies to push its agenda. As a in foreign trade, as well as the promotion of the idealized trade-off, Russia gained underpriced a strong presence in contemporary “Turkish model” of lifestyle, the popularity of Serbia’s energy sector. It also amplifies its commercial and Erdoğan and Turkey is growing among certain segments of political influence through a network of local players, in- the Serbian population, including ruling politicians who em- cluding nationalist right-wing groups who advocate Russia- braced Erdoğan’s authoritative style. Turkish interference be- friendly or anti-Western narratives, the Orthodox Church, came more visible after the attempted military coup in 2016, repeated high-level visits, robust information campaigns, when Ankara began to pressure local leaders in Belgrade partnerships with local media outlets and the Kremlin me- and Novi Pazar to close down Gülenist organisations and dia (mainly the Serbian branch of Sputnik). Yet, while Putin swiftly extradite Kurdish political asylum seekers. This led to and Russia enjoy great popularity among the Serbian pop- growing criticism against Erdoğan’s politics in Serbia, and re- ulation, the country’s general cultural appeal remains mar- sulted in Erdoğan losing some Bosniaks’ (from the Serbian ginal compared to the appeal of the European Union. Sandžak) support for the 2018 presidential election. China The Gulf States and Iran China, as another permanent UN Security Council mem- The Gulf States, especially the UAE, have been portrayed as ber, is, similarly to Russia, considered an undeniable ally of important investors in Serbia since 2012. As in the case of Serbia‘s sovereignty by rejecting Kosovo’s independence. Turkey, economic cooperation has developed despite old For China, Serbia has become a strategic partner thanks to hostilities due to the Islamic states’ siding with the Muslim its location at the main transport corridor from Southeast population against Serbia during the conflicts of the 1990s, Europe to the EU. Both countries deploy a narrative of or their support of Kosovo’s independence. Close political ties “steely friendship” that is reflected in a series of large-scale between the ruling elites, Aleksandar Vučić and Mohammed economic projects and securing loans under the ‘16+1’ bin Zayed, have opened the door for investments from the summit, and the One Belt One Road Initiative. Compared UAE, which came as an important boost to Serbia’s difficult to Russian investment, Chinese investments in Serbia are economic situation. Although the UAE has invested in avi- well-diversified and range from the metal and energy in- ation, urban construction, and agriculture, it is believed that dustry to technology and culture. Moreover, China has the backbone of cooperation with the Gulf States is the ex- successfully created a sphere of influence by supporting a port of Serbian ammunition and weapons. Also, most of the diverse network of government and non-government ac- announced projects and investments have never actual- tors, such as Confucius institutes and cultural cooperation ly been implemented. Another concerning development as- or student exchanges. sociated with the Islamic countries’ presence in Serbia is the spread of radical Salafism and the recruitment of tens of Serbian citizens from the Sandžak region to jihadi groups in Iraq and Syria. Iran’s ties to Serbia have recently increased as well, as the two countries resumed diplomatic relations in 2015 after nearly 30 years. Yet, despite the existence of the Cultural Center of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Belgrade, or the recent moderate spread of Shia Islam in the Sandžak region, Iran’s involvement and influence still remains marginal. 2 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: EXECUTIVE ASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS SUMMARY Bosnia and Herzegovina Russia Turkey Russian influence in BiH in the last decade has centered Building on deep historical ties and cultural affinities, Turkey around close ties between the Kremlin and Milorad Dodik, has maintained close and well developed relations with the current Serb member of BiH‘s tripartite presidency, BiH, especially with Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). Similarly and the undisputed leader of the ruling party of the Serb- to Russia, it has relied on close ties to the political leaders, dominated entity Republika Srpska (RS). Both sides have namely between President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the benefited from this connection; while Russian support has founder of the

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