Issue 2 November 2016

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

‘International community’ and the limits of external intervention ZAGREB BEOGRAD

Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung

Fostering democracy and upholding human rights, taking action to prevent the destruction of the global ecosystem, advancing equality between women and men, securing peace through conflict prevention in crisis zones, and defending the freedom of individuals against excessive state and economic power – these are the objectives that drive the ideas and actions of the Heinrich Böll Foundation. We maintain close ties to the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) and as a think tank for green visions and projects, we are part of an international net­work encompassing well over 100 partner projects in approxi­mately 60 countries. The Heinrich Böll Foundation works independently and nurtures a spirit of intellectual openness. We maintain a world­ wide network with currently 30 international offices. Our work in Bosnia and concentrates on the democratization process, political education, and environmental protection and sustainable development. We support and open public fora about topical and marginalized social-political issues and we enable networking of local and international actors close to the Green values. Contents

2 Introductory note Srđan Dvornik

Aiding Democracy from Abroad 4 Talking the Talk and Walking the "Unlocked Path" Walk: EU, BiH and the Quality of Democracy Tijana Cvjetićanin 9 The Macedonian Political Crisis – EU Mechanisms Tested Malinka Ristevska Jordanova 13 The EU’s Bosnia Initiative, the Reform Agenda and the Problem with Transparency Bodo Weber 18 ’s Tiresome Transition Story: Euro-Atlantic Integration Nano Ružin

International Involvement and the Rule of Law 23 (Mis)rule of Law Nina Kisić 26 Bosnia: A Constitution in Distress Vedran Džihić 29 Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy! Bojan Marichikj 39 Istanbul Convention: Serbia and Jovana Gligorijević

Expectations and Disillusion 42 Misty Gains from Outside: Economic Enterprises and their Magic Ildiko Erdei 45 Misunderstood Reality and Missed Opportunities Zlatko Dizdarević 49 Skin-deep Reforms vs. Thick-skinned Structures Vedran Horvat 52 Waiting for Houdini: The International Community and Miroslav Živanović

Normalisation with/out the International Community 55 Media System in B&H: How the International Community Intervention has Failed Lejla Turčilo 59 Remembering the Expulsions from Krajina 1991-1995 Vesna Teršelič 63 Environmental Protection in Albania Lavdosh Ferruni 2 Introductory note

Introductory note

Srđan Dvornik

For a long time now, the active presence However, the impact which the ‘inter- of the so-called international community national community’ has had, and has been has been inextricably interwoven with the asked to exercise, in the countries which life of each contemporary nation. One way underwent various kinds of violent tran- or another, they participate in the interna- sition was of a special kind. Slovenia and tional markets; they are exposed to cultural Croatia depended on international actors to influences, and if they are lucky, they actively negotiate the cessation of military violence; contribute to such exchanges; they are par- furthermore, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina ties to a plethora of international treaties, and the rump Yugoslavia (subsequently, agreements and other arrangements; they Serbia) had to accept a prolonged presence are also members of various international of UN troops to maintain the status quo; associations, ranging from ‘extensive’ ones even when the military occupation of major like the UN, to ‘intensive’ ones like the EU. parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina by When countries undergo deep systemic the Yugoslav/Serbian and Croatian para/ changes to their political, economic, and/ military troops was put to an end through or ideological orders, their (inter)depend- military operations, the support and tacit ence with the international environment approval of the international community may become much more intensive. That is, was decisive. Kosovo underwent a direct of course, what happened to almost all post- military intervention from outside, while communist countries a quarter of a century Macedonia managed to avoid military con- ago. The drive to use internationally estab- flicts throughout the 90-ies thanks to the lished models in developing systems of international monitoring mission under political pluralism and democracy and solu- the auspices of the UN. Again, after the tions for a workable rule of law, as well as military operations, the continued, politi- the general opening which comes with the cally produced ethnic tensions were kept ideal of freedom, led to a deliberate open- at a low intensity level by internationally ness to foreign influences. The ideological brokered arrangements between parties to decline from the ancien régime was no less the conflict, such as the Dayton and Ohrid important, brought about by the uncritical agreements, which pacified the relations, adoption of a sort of free-market fundamen- but perpetuated the structures built from talism and abandonment of the tenets of the the conflict, which has kept the respective welfare state, distorted as it might have been countries dependent on a long-term inter- under the non-democratic regimes. national presence and occasional interven- tions. Introductory note 3

Even on the eve of a post-conflict nor- coextensive with "the developed democra- malisation, the only prospect for the coun- cies" – and the reality on the ground, where tries in question is joining the EU, where the many social and political factors that are international integration appears not just together considered to constitute ‘democ- as a subject of change, but also as its means. racy’ display apparently intractable undem- These changes, driven by the conditional- ocratic characteristics. They stem not only ity of accession to the EU, have occurred in from ill-conceived international actions, legislation and institutional arrangements. but first and foremost from the power and What they have achieved could be summa- weaknesses of the societies themselves. rised as improvements on the formal level, When facing the limits of their capacity but without a change in the power rela- for intervention, the international agents tions between the societies and their states. may insist on conditionality and principles, Therein lie the crucial limits of any inter- or they may become implicated in local national intervention: It can change the political games and compromises. Or they rules of the game, it can partly assist in their could look further to broaden their scope implementation, but it cannot empower of potential partners and go beyond deals local players. with national elites, opening more space for That is why the external intervening active civic participation. Such processes factors (the so-called international com- are perhaps just starting in countries like munity) can to some extent further the rule Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. of law, but not democracy, understood as The articles collected in this issue of the self-government of the people, because Perspectives tell different stories about the the people or demos is in reality the society, current challenges of international inter- with all its inequalities of wealth and power, vention in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which may or may not have developed pro- Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. ductive relations that make it autonomous and powerful enough to counter the politi- cal structure in the democratic game. It has long been established that there is a dis- crepancy between the fostering of emerging democracies as envisaged by various actors (both political and academic) on the inter- national level – international here being 4 Aiding Democracy from Abroad Talking the Talk and Walking the "Unlocked Path" Walk: EU, BiH and the Quality of Democracy

Aiding Democracy from Abroad Talking the Talk and Walking the "Unlocked Path" Walk: EU, BiH and the Quality of Democracy

Tijana Cvjetićanin

highest representatives were congratulat- The political class in BiH is notoriously unaccountable ing BiH on the "impressive achievements to both its citizens and its international obligations, so of the country’s leadership who delivered reports on things not getting done and compromises not on its citizens’ needs"1? And how has talk of being reached have been a constant in BiH’s political a "new spirit"2 and "historical moments"3 life for a long time. But what about the EU? If this is been replaced by increasingly nervous urg- ing of the BiH authorities to actually ful- where we are now, once again talking about deadlocks, fill the obligations they have taken upon broken deadlines and political blackmail – how come themselves?4 that just four months ago, the EU’s highest repre- There are two possible answers – either sentatives were congratulating BiH on the "impressive something essential has changed since Feb- achievements of the country’s leadership who delivered ruary, when BiH applied for EU member- on its citizens’ needs"? ship; or there never were any "impressive achievements" to begin with. To anyone liv- ing in BiH the answer is clear: no, there has The latest developments in Bosnia and Her- never been a significant change of BiH poli- zegovina’s political life have, once again, ticians’ ways; and yes, the EU has been over- been painful to watch. The formally adopted selling the progress of BiH on its accession coordination mechanism on EU matters was path, ignoring numerous transgressions of "in negotiation" for months, negotiation democratic processes which marked every which didn’t seem to be progressing. The step of BiH’s unlocked path, leading to the necessary adaptation of the Stabilisation and situation we’re in today. Association Agreement is currently blocked by the Serb member of BiH Presidency, pos- sibly reflecting a deeper crisis within the ruling coalition, which could effectively 1 Joint statement by HR/VP Mogherini and Commis- halt any possibility that BiH’s membership sioner Hahn on the occasion of BiH submitting a application will be considered by the end of membership application, 15.2.2016, http://europa. Slovakia’s EU Presidency. The (non)publish- ba/?p=40160 2 Transcript of the press conference held in the Foreign ing of the 2013 Census results reflects the Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Johannes condition in which the country is. Hahn, Commissioner for the European Neighbourhood The political class in BiH is notoriously Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, 8 May 2015, http://europa.ba/?p=16871 unaccountable to both its citizens and its 3 Speech by HR/VP Federica Mogherini at the BiH international obligations, so reports on Parliamentary Assembly following the adoption of the joint statement on reform commitment in the things not getting done and compromises EU accession process, 23.2.2015, http://europa. not being reached have been a constant in ba/?p=17108 BiH’s political life for a long time. But what 4 See for example: International Monitoring Operation: Tijana Cvjetićanin BiH to finalise and publish Census results urgently 26 Sociologist, organization Zašto about the EU? If this is where we are now, May 2016, http://europa.ba/?p=42762; Wigemark: ne?, Sarajevo; member of the once again talking about deadlocks, bro- Ukoliko se ne ispune zahtjevi neće biti rasprave o bh. Initiative for the Monitoring aplikaciji, Akta.ba, 15 June 2016, http://www.akta. of the European Integration of ken deadlines and political blackmail – how ba/bs/Vijest/vijesti/wigermarkukoliko-se-ne-ispune- Bosnia and Herzegovina come that just four months ago, the EU’s zahtjevi-nece-biti-rasprave-o-bh-aplikaciji/66704 Talking the Talk and Walking the "Unlocked Path" Walk: EU, BiH and the Quality of Democracy Aiding Democracy from Abroad 5

Mixed messages and their consequences

In July 2015, a new Labor law was passed in the Federation of BiH, with protests from the trade unions and the opposition’s outrage at the irregular procedure.5 In December, followed suit, managing not just to match the chaos seen in FBiH (the parliament was also surrounded by police as the workers protested outside; the "Democracy" by jellybeanz, CC-BY-NC 2.0 procedure was also expedited and the law was passed in the middle of the night, in laws have to be passed – seemed like a sub- true state-of-emergency fashion), but even tle addition of insult to the injury. upstage it when it comes to the mistreat- The EU Delegation didn’t make any ment of social partners. While the president statements about the meeting, nor had it of the RS Confederation of Trade Unions previously reacted to the shameful events was trying to voice her disagreement in the which took place in NARS. So their only National Assembly of RS (NARS), she was message – of support – came indirectly, ordered to leave the hall and, having refused through a press release from Dodik’s cabi- to comply, she was physically removed by net. The incident wasn’t addressed, but the parliament security.6 The images of it likely did have an effect on the (lack of) Mišić being dragged across the floor and reaction by the Delegation to RS passing the carried out of the assembly were among the Labour law. In comparison, on the day when ugliest seen in the country’s post-war par- the law in FBiH was passed, the Delegation liamentary life.7 issued a statement in full support, ending in Twenty days later, the RS Labour law an implicit comment on the unions’ protest: appeared in the headlines yet again, this "Active participation by citizens is essential time paired with a far less intense image – for a healthy democracy, whether in elec- that of Lars-Gunnar Wigemark and Milorad tions or other democratic actions, and is Dodik in luxurious golden chairs in Dodik’s also vital for the EU integration process. Eve- office, smiling at each other. A brief press ryone has the right to freedom of peaceful release stated that The RS President and the assembly, with the aim to publicly express Head of EU Delegation in BiH "have agreed certain opinions and disagreements."9. today that the adoption of the Labour law, Had this statement been published which was recently passed by the National before the law was adopted, it could have Assembly of RS, is a significant step towards been interpreted as a reminder to the activating reform packages which will authorities that they need to keep the pro- expedite BiH’s path towards the European cess open and democratic.10 Or, had it been Union."8 The explicit mention of NARS – phrased as criticism of the untransparent quite redundant, since that’s where all the and irregular procedure, it could’ve been a demonstration of the EU upholding its own 5 The Government drafted the law on 23 July 2015, sent principles, particularly those on the role of it into urgent procedure on July 27 and the sessions of 11 the two houses of the Parliament of the Federation of civil society. This way, it seemed detached BiH (PFBiH) were scheduled for July 30 and 31. In from reality at best and offensive at worst. addition to breaking even the rules of urgent legisla- The citizens had no insight into what the tive procedure, the delegates in the House of Peoples were not allowed to introduce any amendments to the new law will bring, let alone a chance to law. 17 of them appealed to the Constitutional court "actively participate"; the social partners of FBiH with a claim that the procedure was unconsti- tutional, which the court confirmed in February 2016. were treated as a mere nuisance and the 6 Ranka Mišić izbačena iz sale Narodne skupštine RS, parliamentarians were humiliated by voting N1, 28 December 2015, http://ba.n1info.com/a75439/ Vijesti/Vijesti/VIDEO-Ranka-Misic-izbacena-iz-sale- 9 Statement on new Federation BiH Labour Law, 31 Narodne-skupstine-RS.html July 2015, http://europa.ba/?p=35673 7 For a detailed overview of how the Labour law was 10 It would, however, have had to be published signifi- passed in both entities, see: http://istinomjer.ba/kako- cantly earlier, as the FBiH Government had been keep- smo-i-za-koga-usvajali-zakone-o-radu/ (in BHS) ing the draft law secret for months. 8 Dodik i Wigemark složni: Usvajanje zakona o radu 11 See: Interview with Ambassador Peter Sørensen for u RS ubrzat će evropski put BiH, Klix, 18 January EWB, 4 July 2014, http://europa.ba/?p=11651; In- 2016, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/dodik-i-wigemark- terview with HR/VP Federica Mogherini for the daily slozni-usvajanje-zakona-o-radu-u-rs-ubrzat-ce-evrop- Nezavisne Novine, 23 February 2015, http://europa. ski-put-bih/160118105 ba/?p=17114 6 Aiding Democracy from Abroad Talking the Talk and Walking the "Unlocked Path" Walk: EU, BiH and the Quality of Democracy

One of the state ministers described the The message to the local authorities was that going against whole farce quite bluntly: "Dragan Čović legal procedures, disregarding social dialogue and mislead- had to go to Brussels and take something ing the public is quite acceptable if it checks another box with him if we wanted our application to be accepted. He had to go there and say on the "reform agenda", and completely irrelevant when ‘We adopted the coordination mechanism’, assessing the value and success of any political process although we are aware of all the loopholes in that mechanism. If Čović hadn’t said that on the law they barely had time to read. The (...), they would probably had told him he whole thing couldn’t have been further from needn’t bother to come to Brussels. Our cred- healthy democracy. ible application was accepted, but they also The fake adoption of the coordination knew that, so to speak, these were all tricks mechanism was another recent example of and this mechanism was adopted without such practice. On 9 February 2016, a local being fully coordinated with the entities."15 news portal published an article with the This open confession, of everyone headline "The Council of Ministers secretly accepting a pro forma document just for the adopted the coordination mechanism, application to be submitted, shows just how already published in the Official Gazette of comfortable BiH politicians have become BiH"12 It was not an exaggeration – the CoM with token acts, done merely in order to tick did hold an unannounced and undocu- some box on the "EU path". And rightfully mented session on 26 January 2016, mak- so – they’ve been rewarded for such actions ing no public statement on the adopted before. After all, the SAA entered into force document afterwards. Moreover, the CoM on the basis of a mere promise,16 that BiH Chairman had been openly deceiving both will fulfil the conditions it should have the public and the Parliamentary Assembly already met for the SAA to be activated: BiH on the issue for weeks and then, after "The Council welcomes, in the context the news was published, claimed that the of its conclusions of 15 December 2014, the session wasn’t secret, in the face of clear evi- adoption of the Written Commitment by dence to the contrary.13 The RS Government BiH Presidency on 29 January, its signature immediately stated that it won’t recognize by leaders of political parties and subse- a unilaterally and secretly adopted mecha- quent endorsement in the Bosnia and Her- nism, so the process of consultations and zegovina Parliament on 23 February 2015 negotiations was reopened, making the ini- during the visit of HR Mogherini to Sarajevo. tial adoption of the document meaningless. Having regard to the commitments thus However, it did serve its short-term pur- undertaken by Bosnia and Herzegovina, pose. It was one of the preconditions for the and in accordance with its conclusions of membership application to the EU, which 15 December 2014, the Council notes that was submitted – and happily accepted – the necessary conditions contained therein only a few weeks later, despite the scandal. have been met and agrees to proceed with The issue of the uncoordinated coordina- the conclusion and entry into force of the tion mechanism was treated by both BiH Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the EU as a "Schrödinger’s cat": it was with Bosnia and Herzegovina."17 both adopted and not adopted, on a both secret and non-secret session, making the application both credible and not credible, Instances of EU-BiH and so on.14 deja vu

12 Vijeće ministara BiH tajno usvojilo mehanizam koor- In both of the cases described above, the dinacije, već objavljen u Službenom listu BiH, Klix.ba, message to the local authorities was that 9 February 2016, http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/vijece- ministara-bih-tajno-usvojilo-mehanizam-koordinacije- vec-objavljen-u-sluzbenom-listu-bih/160209130 15 Mirko Šarović: "Neki su se potrudili da nestane 123 13 Zvizdic: Poorly coordinated story on coordination miliona KM i dobili kućni pritvor, a ja sam zbog 250 mechanism, Istinomjer, 9May 2016. Available at: hiljada KM bio godinu dana u pritvoru!, 22 April http://istinomjer.ba/zvizdic-poorly-coordinated-story- 2016, http://usk24.ba/bosna-i-hercegovina/mirko- coordination-mechanism/ sarovic-neki-su-se-potrudili-da-nestane-123-miliona- 14 For example, the EP Resolution on the 2015 Report km-dobili-kucni-pritvor-ja-sam-zbog-250-hiljada-km- on BiH welcomes the adoption "of a decision establish- bio-godinu-dana-u-pritvoru/ ing a coordination mechanism on EU matters", but 16 The Written Commitment of Bosnia and Herzegovina, calls for its improvement by harmonizing "the entities’ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/ position on the adopted coordination mechanism" – documents/dsee/dv/0507_11/0507_11en.pdf although without the "harmonized positions" there is 17 Council conclusions on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Coun- essentially no coordination mechanism. cil of the European Union, 16 March 2015, Talking the Talk and Walking the "Unlocked Path" Walk: EU, BiH and the Quality of Democracy Aiding Democracy from Abroad 7

going against legal procedures, disregarding potential" – a leverage it used to steer the social dialogue and misleading the public is talks from implementing the ECHR deci- quite acceptable if it checks another box on sion, to resolving "the Croat question."21 The the "reform agenda", and completely irrel- civil society continuously (and fruitlessly) evant when assessing the value and success warned against the EU legitimizing these of any political process. After all, the reform non-transparent, party-interest driven agenda itself was created in closed sessions negotiations, particularly after it became between BiH, EU, IMF and World Bank rep- obvious that their primary focus wasn’t on resentatives; never discussed with either the ending constitutional discrimination, but civil society or the parliament and unavail- on finding a model that could satisfy the able to the public until after it was adopted. ambitions of HDZ’s Dragan Čović without But such messages were neither new, jeopardizing other parties’ (ethno)political nor characteristic only of the latest phase agendas.22 of BiH-EU relations. Moreover, it’s a con- During the negotiations, the EU main- tinuation of a disturbing pattern of EU’s tained that "Sejdić & Finci" is a neces- indifference to the demise of democratic sary requirement for the SAA to enter into processes in BiH. One of the more notable force; even announcing that the results of examples from the previous term was the the October 2014 elections won’t be recog- EU’s engagement in the famous "Sejdić and nized if the condition isn’t met.23 In Febru- Finci" case,18 i.e. the constitutional reform ary 2014, Füle stated that the latest meeting required to ensure the implementation of in Brussels was his last effort of that kind, the ECHR decision (2009) in the case. expressing resignation at the debacle of the Implementing the decision was BiH’s negotiations.24 However, there was no more obligation under the SAA and a condition talk of sanctions. Instead, the EU adopted a for a credible membership application. In diametrically different approach, and took 2012, the question of how to amend the "Sejdić & Finci" off the table, announc- Constitution became a thing to be decided ing that it will be "temporarily replaced" by six men, as all the negotiations were led with new conditions based on economic between the presidents of the major political reforms (the draft of which was presented in parties.19 Instead of urging for the process the Compact for Growth and Jobs in BiH).25 to return to the appropriate institutions, None of the participants in the "high level the EU joined in, with Štefan Füle, then a dialogue" were faced with any repercus- Commissioner for Enlargement, and Peter sions for its failure; however, the one who Sørensen, former Head of the EU Delega- undermined it the most was, ironically, par- tion and EU Special Representative (EUSR) ticularly well rewarded. Croatia joined the to BiH, facilitating a series of party leaders’ EU in 2013, and its representatives in the meetings. For over a year, the citizens of BiH European Parliament generated a striking observed as they met in different cities to discuss their future Constitution, not even 21 The premise that Croats’ political rights are not respected, the "evidence" for which is primarily found knowing what it might look like, as none of in the fact of Željko Komšić’s (formerly SDP, now DF) the discussed models were ever made pub- two terms as the Croat member of BiH Presidency, lic.20 The negotiations were mainly driven by to which HDZ claimed that he was "elected with the Bosniak vote". complex and intense inter-party dynamics, 22 See, for example: Written contribution to the 2014 since the ruling coalitions on both the FBiH Progress report: Ethnically based discrimination in BiH constitutional system, http://eu-monitoring.ba/ and state level were in constant turmoil. site/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Written-Submis- This gave HDZ BiH significant "coalition sion_EU-Progress-Report-2014_Ethnic-based-dis- crimination_Coalition-Jednakost.pdf and Comparative overview of the 2014 Progress Report for Bosnia 18 The Constitution of BiH recognizes "Bosniacs, Croats, and Herzegovina by the European Commission and and Serbs as constituent peoples (along with Others), the 2014 Alternative Progress Report for Bosnia and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina" as its deter- and Herzegovina by the Initiative for monitoring the miners. The court has ruled that the provisions that EU integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http:// limit passive voting rights to the constituent peoples eu-monitoring.ba/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ are in breach of the European Convention of Human EC-report-2014._ENG1.pdf Rights. 23 Fuele: Ukoliko se ne provede presuda Sejdić-Finci, 19 The BiH Parliamentary Assembly formed a joint com- naredni izbori neće biti priznati, Klix, 11 April 2013, mittee to find the solution for implementing the ECHR http://www.klix.ba/vijesti/bih/fuele-ukoliko-se-ne- decision, but at the end of 2011, it discontinued ses- provede-presuda-sejdic-finci-naredni-izbori-nece-biti- sions and announced it can’t reach an agreement. priznati/130411042 20 The only exception was the model agreed between 24 Press Conference of the European Commissioner for SDP and HDZ in 2012, before the EU stepped in as a Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Štefan Füle, facilitator. It was met with outrage from civil society, during his visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18.2.2014, as it proposed a discriminatory ethnically based "vote http://europa.ba/?p=18383 value" in the cantons in FBiH. 25 http://europa.ba/?p=17720 8 Aiding Democracy from Abroad Talking the Talk and Walking the "Unlocked Path" Walk: EU, BiH and the Quality of Democracy

"Democracy" by Brett Davis, CC-BY-NC 2.0 If reforms have to be done it is not change of discourse on the "Sejdić & Finci" because Brussels asks, but because the issue: in the European Parliament’s resolu- people of the country ask for them. So, tion on Progress reports on BiH, previously full ownership, no paternalizing approach unapologetic demands to ensure equality of at all. I don’t know how it was done in "others" were replaced with terms straight the past, but this is for sure for now. out of Čović’s repertoire, such as the rights of And again, this is something very serious, the constituent peoples, obstructionist cen- because we have seen not only this tempta- tralist forces and commendable principles of tion for this path with countries that are 26 federalism and legitimate representation. in the EU perspective but also countries In February 2015, the EU High Repre- inside the European Union, whenever there sentative for Foreign Affairs and VP of the is a tough reform to pass, tough or even not European Commission, Federica Mogher- too tough, to justify this because ‘Brussels ini, held a press conference upon the sign- is asking’. And this is a sort of blame game ing of BiH’s Written Commitment. One part that leads to a certain unpopularity of the of her speech is particularly striking: European Union."27

"The key element of the relationship If the conduct of EU representatives between Bosnia and Herzegovina, or any towards BiH held up to any part of that other country, and the European Union, is statement, we would certainly have received not that of pupil and teacher. We do not far fewer accolades from them in the past give homework, we do not give marks. The year, but perhaps there would’ve been more reforms that country will decide to under- actual accomplishments on the part of BiH take will be determined only by the political authorities. Perhaps we would even have will and political decisions of the institu- a process where the people of the country tions, with indications of the needs of the would play some part, other than that of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and if passive observers of untransparent pro- reforms, if, when and what kind of reforms cesses. Unfortunately, all that we’ve seen so will be taken, will depend only on the needs far has been to the contrary. The question and interests of the people of the country. remains what the next step will look like, since those we’ve been talking about mostly resembled walking in place.

26 See more in: "Having an EU neighbour: How does it affect human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina?", 27 Transcript of the press conference held in Sarajevo by Tijana Cvjetićanin, Novi pogledi, 2014, https://www. HR/VP Mogherini, 23 February 2015, http://europa. scribd.com/doc/299554426/Novi-Pogledi p: 19-38 ba/?p=17102 The Macedonian Political Crisis – EU Mechanisms Tested Aiding Democracy from Abroad 9

The Macedonian Political Crisis – EU Mechanisms Tested

Malinka Ristevska Jordanova

The behaviour of the Government can easily be explained by the rational choice theory. Its perspective of remaining in power based on its national- ist policies, nurtured by the blocked EU perspective, was a huge benefit gained at a low cost, compared to costly reforms needed for a non-ex- istent EU perspective, which would bring no political gain (in an election timeframe), but would come at a high political cost.

The focus of EU foreign policy has for long efit gained at a low cost, compared to costly slid away from Macedonia. This is due to reforms needed for a non-existent EU per- several key reasons. The first one is com- spective, which would bring no political gain mon to all the countries of the region that (in an election timeframe), but would come are not already EU members – enlargement at a high political cost.1 policy is no longer a priority of the EU. The In this article, we are exploring the effec- second is that Macedonia can no longer be tiveness of the mechanisms of involvement presented as a successful case of the key pil- of the international community in address- lar of the EU’s "fundamentals first" enlarge- ing the current political crisis in Macedonia, ment strategy – democracy and rule of law. in contrast to the key political messages sent. Macedonia, the former frontrunner, has For the purpose of this article, we shall become a laggard. Finally, even if it were focus on the current Macedonian political (and when it actually was) delivering pre- crisis in the timeframe from December 2012 cisely in the area of democracy and rule of until today, although its roots are traced ear- law – it could not move a step forward in lier – to the rejection of Macedonia’s NATO its Euro-Atlantic path, because it is being bid in 2008. In brief, the crises escalated blocked by Greece, on the basis of the irra- when the main MPs from the main opposi- tional "name dispute". tion party, the Social Democratic Union of The objective of this article is not to put Macedonia (SDUM), and the media were forward evidence that the EU conditionality forcefully thrown out of a parliamentary policy has been compromised in the case of sitting in December 2012, following an inci- Macedonia. This is a rather clear-cut case: dent related to a debate on the Budget. Since there was no carrot, the EU was reluctant then, Macedonia has entered a perpetual to use the stick, and its leverage was falling. political crisis, with the opposition parties The Government embraced the opportunity SDUM and DPA boycotting Parliament on to use the inconsistent blocking by Greece – several occasions, including on the basis of and thus by the EU, to spurr nationalism and non-acceptance of the results of the April populism. The behaviour of the Government 1 The main parties in the Government are the predomi- can easily be explained by the rational choice nantly ethnic Macedonian VMRO-DPMNE (Internal theory. Its perspective of remaining in power Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, and the pre- Malinka Ristevska Jordanova based on its nationalist policies, nurtured by dominantly ethnic Albanian DUI – Democratic Union Director at European Policy the blocked EU perspective, was a huge ben- for Integration. Institute, 10 Aiding Democracy from Abroad The Macedonian Political Crisis – EU Mechanisms Tested

2014 presidential and local elections. In already evident backsliding in political cri- 2015, the SDUM revealed a huge wiretap- teria. The focus of the benchmarking exer- ping scandal, indicating massive corruption, cise collected in a Blueprint was on media election fraud, misuse of official authority freedom, the judiciary, anti-corruption, and a number of other serious crimes. interception of communications, inter-eth- nic relations, public administration reform, electoral reform, and some elements of the Mechanisms of EU economic criteria. The Government had presented it as an introduction to launch- involvement – evolving or ing the accession negotiations, which the challenged? Commission denied outright. It was initially an attempt to ensure the Commission’s lev- Until early 2015, the international commu- erage on reforms, thus compensating for nity was reluctant to engage more deeply in the absence of accession negotiations. The the Macedonian crisis. final aim was to keep the recommendation By 2012, when the crisis burst out, the for accession negotiations alive, while in European Commission had been employing parallel the Commissioner(s) attempted to the mechanisms established up until that revive negotiations on the name issue with moment – the dialogue within the Stabilisa- Greece. The HLAD obviously did not fulfil tion and Association Process and the previ- its objectives, as the backsliding in political ously newly-invented "High level accession criteria only kept intensifying, while there dialogue". was no breakthrough on the name issue. The dialogue within the institutional On the contrary, the coupling of these two structure of the Stabilisation and Asso- issues led to even further compromising the ciation Agreement (Council, Committee, political criteria. subcommittees), went on as "business as Following the December 2012 crisis, the usual", with a low profile in the public and HLAD started to serve as an umbrella for practically no specific role in addressing the direct involvement of the Enlargement the crisis. The Council press releases in the Commissioner – both Füle and Hahn – in midst of summer have not had a specific negotiations with the Macedonian politi- impact either on the Government, the other cal parties in an effort to reverse the already political actors, or the wider public. sharp backsliding in political criteria. In The new mechanism that the Commis- addition, an EU mediator was engaged sion was heavily relying on was the so-called (as an expert) to facilitate the negotiations "High level accession dialogue" (HLAD), between political parties. which had been put in place in 2010. It con- The "game" was changed when the sisted of meetings of the Enlargement Com- opposition party published the wiretapping missioner/DG Enlargement (later DG NEAR) materials (the so-called "bombs") in the representatives with the Prime Minister/ beginning of 2015. In addition to a massive Government representatives, and a bench- breach of the right to privacy, the "bombs" marking exercise, intended to address the indicated huge corruption, election fraud and other serious crimes by the government nomenclature. Domestic pressure towards the international community increased, appealing for more intense involvement by the EU and more effective mechanisms. The proposals included the appointment of a special representative of the EU, which the EU avoided as it had in 2011 terminated the mandate of the SR who had been active in Macedonia since 2002. The EU opted for a two-tier approach: heavier engagement and pressure on the political actors in Macedo- nia, including involvement of more facilita- tors/mediators, and a new benchmarking "exercise".2 Vanco Dzambaski, Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 2 In addition to the Commissioner and his expert- mediator, a group of three MEPs was engaged in the negotiations with the political parties. The Macedonian Political Crisis – EU Mechanisms Tested Aiding Democracy from Abroad 11

elections and the media. The implementa- The Macedonian political situa- tion of the Urgent reform priorities was inte- tion is a part of the downward grated in the Przino Agreement. trend toward the so-called The results of the Przino agreement almost one year later are far from a success. "illiberal democracy" or, more The early parliamentary elections were precisely – reversal to hybrid cancelled, as the international commu- regimes in Europe. In fact, the nity assessed that the conditions for free, Macedonian case is a test for fair and credible elections have not been the capacity of the EU to act on met. The Urgent Reform Priorities have not been implemented.4 The Government con- issues of democracy and rule of sistently obstructs the work of the Special law that arise within itself. As Prosecutor, including through amnesty by for the candidate countries, the the President of 56 persons involved in the Macedonian case is pointing to wiretapping scandals.5 The Government has the constraints of the "funda- managed to always put new issues on the mentals first" approach of the agenda and obstruct the implementation of the Agreement. Enlargement strategy. In addition, in April this year Germany decided to appoint a special envoy for the The final result of the negotiations, Macedonian political crisis, thus confirming which the EC and US representatives bro- the EU institutions’ lack of success so far to kered in two rounds with heavy pressure, deal with the Macedonian crisis and indi- was the so-called Przino Agreement (or cating cracks in the EU foreign policy. June/July Agreement). The political deal put Protesters of the so-called "colourful the focus on early parliamentary elections revolution" have been on the streets of the (which were to be held in April 2016) and Macedonian cities for more than 40 days, a "transitional government" to prepare for fighting essentially to free the captive state elections. The Agreement managed to bring and requesting accountability from those in the opposition back into the Parliament. Its power for the massive infringements of the significant achievement was the establish- rule of law. ment of the Special Prosecutor to deal with The newly voiced requests by civil soci- the crimes indicated in the wiretapping ety organisations also include the formation scandal. of a technical or expert government, as well The benchmarking exercise also as targeted sanctions against corrupt gov- changed. In an effort to make the EC engage- ernment officials by the EU and US. ment more objective, the Commissioner for neighbourhood policy and accession nego- The flaws in substance tiations Hahn engaged independent experts to produce a specific report on the state of What has been largely overlooked in the the rule of law following the wiretapping reviews of the involvement of the EU and scandal.3 The "situation" Report published in the international community in the current June 2015, along with the Urgent Reform Pri- Macedonian political crisis is related to the orities issued by the Commission on the basis substance of the political messages, in com- of the Report gave hope to the (already disil- bination with the mechanisms employed. lusioned) EU-reform oriented forces in Mac- 1. The coupling of EU political condi- edonia that the approach of the Commission tionality with the solution of the name might change and be stricter towards the dispute with Greece led to compro- political elite in power. The Urgent Reform mising the political criteria. As it is Priorities focused on interception of com- largely believed that the EU can have munications, the judiciary and prosecution, leverage only in time of accession ne- external oversight of independent bodies, 4 The status of the implementation of the Przino agree- ment and the Urgent Reform Priorities are available 3 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Recom- at the CSO’s Network 23 website: http://www.merc. mendations of the Senior Experts’ Group on systemic org.mk/en/level-of-realization-of-the-june-july-politi- Rule of Law issues relating to the communications cal-agreement ; http://www.merc.org.mk/en/status-on- interception revealed in Spring 2015, Brussels, 8 June the-implementation-of-the-urgent-reform-priorities 2015; available at: 5 He withdrew the amnesty for 26 "politically exposed" http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/news_corner/news/ persons, but not for others that were indicted or under news-files/20150619_recommendations_of_the_sen- investigation, thus further obstructing the Special ior_experts_group.pdf Public Prosecutor’s proceedings. 12 Aiding Democracy from Abroad The Macedonian Political Crisis – EU Mechanisms Tested

gotiations, then even crucial issues of its story on "external and internal backsliding in democratic standards enemies against the patriots fighting are overlooked (or just presented in a for the Name". On the other hand, the "softer" language) and postponed for EU is not embarking on targeted sanc- later – when negotiation accessions tions for individuals, as some EU MS are launched. In this manner, the anti- (such as Hungary) would oppose this reformists’ practices are legitimised. measure, which requires unanimity. At this point, sustainability is not even 3. The focus of the EU on the role of the considered. Western Balkans in the migration cri- 2. The key political messages sent by the sis has re-iterated the "stability before EU have been largely inconsistent and democracy" message, which was then sometimes counter-productive. exploited even further by the Mac- An important political message refers edonian ruling parties in their public to the assessment of the responsibil- campaigns by presenting it as implicit ity of domestic political actors. The support to the Government. official messages of the EU, even if 4. The inconsistency of the very repre- their substance contained harsh criti- sentation of the EU in Macedonia has cism, target all the political parties/ contributed to confusion in terms of actors, thus blurring their responsi- the actual distribution of competenc- bility, especially that of the parties in es and power within the EU in dealing power. The EU General Affairs Council with a political crisis in a candidate conclusions have consistently called country. This is even more striking on "all political parties to...".6 Con- when compared to the portraying of sequently, the Government has been the Macedonian case as an example of able to manipulate these messages to the success of the EU foreign policy in the public, especially as it controls a Macedonia in the period 2002-2006. large part of the media spectrum. 5. Last, but not the least, the potential for In addition, the key political party in civil society involvement has not been the Government – VMRO-DPMNE fulfilled. The current efforts to struc- – has largely exploited its associate ture the involvement of the civil soci- membership of the European People’s ety critically tested both the internal Party (EPP) to claim that the EPP has actors and the international commu- been its firm supporter in the nego- nity as to the level of will and capac- tiations on the political crisis. On the ity to articulate the involvement of the other hand, the EPP has taken no vis- civil society in solving the crisis. ible steps to disassociate from this kind of exploitation of VMRO-DPMNE’s associate membership in this Euro- The Macedonian case – pean political alliance. alarm, not to be ignored Statements by representatives of the EU (EC and Member States) constantly Treating the Macedonian case as an isolated call on the political parties to keep the one would be a grave mistake. The Mac- European perspective of their country edonian political situation is a part of the open. The fact is that the Macedonian downward trend toward the so-called "illib- EU accession perspective has been eral democracy" or, more precisely – rever- closed since 2008. The message actu- sal to hybrid regimes in Europe. In fact, the ally threatens that the Commission Macedonian case is a test for the capacity could withdraw its recommendation of the EU to act on issues of democracy and for accession negotiations, which can- rule of law that arise within itself. As for the not be effectuated anyway due to the candidate countries, the Macedonian case blockage by Greece. This would be a is pointing to the constraints of the "funda- punishment for the Macedonian soci- mentals first" approach of the Enlargement ety at large, but not for the key party in strategy. It is very likely that the political power – VMRO-DPMNE, which could elites of other Western Balkan countries, use this fact to even further magnify aware of their countries’ longterm EU perspective, will exploit the Macedonian 6 E.g. Council conclusions on the Republic of Macedo- "rational choice model", which would ulti- nia, 23/06/2015; available at: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/23-gac- mately result in backsliding in democratic conclusions-former-yugoslav-republic-macedonia/ standards and the rule of law. The EU’s Bosnia Initiative, the Reform Agenda and the Problem with Transparency Aiding Democracy from Abroad 13

The EU’s Bosnia Initiative, the Reform Agenda and the Problem with Transparency Substantial change on the horizon or more of the same?

Bodo Weber

On March 21, the European Union Com- From the UK-German missioner for Enlargement Negotiations initiative to the Reform Johannes Hahn visited Sarajevo, only Agenda five weeks after Bosnia-Herzegovina had applied for EU membership. In a press conference with the head of the country’s In November 2014, the two EU member Council of Ministers, Denis Zvizdić, Hahn states, whose dispute over the right Bos- listed a number of reform conditions for the nia policy had blocked any meaningful EU country to meet before the European Com- policy since 2010, published a joint initia- mission would forward the membership tive that was soon inherited by the EU as application to the EU Council. With this list, its official new policy. The UK-German ini- Hahn became the first EU official to con- tiative centred around two core elements: firm, though indirectly, what had been dis- First, to unblock the country’s EU integra- cussed in the BH public in the weeks before tion by leaving the previous main condi- – that on February 15, Dragan Čović, then tion – implementation of the so-called President of the BH Presidency, had in fact Sejdić-Finci ruling of the European Court handed in a non-credible application. This of Human Rights – for some later stage of presented a remarkable turn in the country’s the process, and second, to shift the reform most recent relationship with the EU, which focus away from BH’s core structural prob- had been characterized by mutual opti- lem, its dysfunctional constitutional struc- mism. BH authorities had received much ture, to socio-economic issues. The latter praise in 2015 for de-blocking the country’s was a reaction to the social unrest of Febru- EU integration process in the framework ary 2014, to citizens’ demands for economic of the Union’s new Bosnia approach that prosperity, social security and a functioning kicked off in late 2014 and that was based rule of law. The focus on socio-economic on a joint UK-German initiative. Hahn’s issues, the Berlin- and London-based indirect admittance that BH authorities authors of the initiative argued, would were lagging behind in reforms marked the prevent political elites from applying their first crisis in the new initiative and a source standard tool of heightened inter-ethnic of confusion. In a way, this leap from praise rhetoric to block structural reforms. The to critique by EU officials regarding the BH new initiative foresaw three steps of reforms authorities’ fulfilment of reform conditions that would be rewarded with progress in EU mirrors political observers’ and BH citizens’ integration: 1. A written commitment by BH perception of a total lack of transparency in political leaders to reforms that included an what is happening under the new EU initia- "initial reform agenda" focused on struc- tive, especially in the implementation of its tural economic reforms – to be rewarded by centrepiece – the so-called Reform Agenda. the enactment of the country’s Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA); 2. Invit- ing BH to submit a membership application Bodo Weber after "some initial progress" on implement- Senior Associate, Democratiza- ing the reform agenda; and 3. Following tion Policy Council (DPC) Berlin 14 Aiding Democracy from Abroad The EU’s Bosnia Initiative, the Reform Agenda and the Problem with Transparency

conditionality and that they would finally make use of their strongest tool, financial conditionality, starting a "new initiative" with the easing of conditionality (Sejdić- Finci) presented a potentially dangerous signal. Nevertheless, BH authorities have so far managed to move along several steps on the UK-German initiative’s schedule: In February 2015, BH political leaders signed a written commitment and on June 1, the country’s SAA with the EU finally entered into force. During summer and autumn that year, the so-called Reform Agenda and action plans at state and entities level were adopted. On July 31, the Federation parlia- ment passed a new labour law, the main point of the EU’s praise for the BH authori- "Bundestag" by Michał Mikulicz, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 full implementation of the initial reform ties’ reform policy dynamic in the 2015 agenda, the EU Council will request the (progress) report; end of December, the Commission’s opinion on the membership Republika Srpska (RS) followed with a new application, the so-called avis. labour law. In February this year Bosnia- This approach, however, provoked Herzegovina accomplished what is so far doubts among some Western political the latest step in the process, the handing actors and analysts about the logic of the in of its membership application. On that new policy, doubts based on several ana- occasion, the Council of Ministers (CoM) lytical observations: The new policy initia- declared that the last condition has been tive was surely based on the realization that met – an agreement among the ruling par- domestic elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina are ties and the various levels of governance in genuinely not interested in serious reforms BH on a so-called coordination mechanism. because the Dayton system of patronage Yet the RS government immediately denied and fear works (only) for them. And there is that such an agreement had been reached, surely some reason to shifting reform condi- raising doubts about the credibility of the tions to an area where it is harder to exploit application, that were only reinforced by the fear factor. Yet structural economic Commissioner Hahn’s remarks at the Sara- reforms target the core of the elites’ power jevo press conference in March. system – their control over public (and These developments raise two funda- partly private) resources. They won’t give mental questions: How serious are the polit- this up without combined pressure from the ical elites in their commitment to reforms? outside and from below, from BH citizens. And will the EU really be tough on condi- Yet the EU is traditionally weak on serious tionality this time? political cooperation with citizens beyond the standard PR-campaigns. At the same time, what Berlin and London completely Are BH political elites ready neglected, or rather suppressed in their for reforms? "new" initiative was the fact that for almost a decade, the EU itself had contributed to The Reform Agenda lists a number of key the obstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s structural socio-economic reform areas: reform and EU-integration path through its fiscal sustainability & stabilization of pub- weak enforcement of conditionality. Politi- lic finances, improvement of business cli- cally unwilling to pick a fight with the politi- mate & competitiveness, the restructuring cal elites’ resistance to structural reforms, of public companies, reform of the ailing the Union’s policy was marked by continu- healthcare and pension systems, public ous backing down on its own reform con- administration reform and the establish- ditions, thus teaching the elites the lesson ment of a strong rule of law. Taken together, that the EU is weak and that resistance to if all these reforms were to be thoroughly reform in the end pays off. Thus, despite the implemented, it would fundamentally alter fact that Berlin and London assured sceptics the political mode of operation in Bosnia- that this time the EU would stand strong on Herzegovina and eliminate the political The EU’s Bosnia Initiative, the Reform Agenda and the Problem with Transparency Aiding Democracy from Abroad 15

unions, was labelled as backward-looking The new policy initiative was resistance to reform. In the Federation, surely based on the realization Prime Minister Fadil Novalić explained that that domestic elites in Bosnia- the new law would also remove the privi- leged position of employees in the public Herzegovina are genuinely not sector vis-à-vis those in the private sector. In interested in serious reforms BiH, the "labour market" is highly distorted because the Dayton system of by the domination of the public sector. patronage and fear works (only) An analysis of the provisions of the two for them. And there is surely labour laws, however, confirms none of these political announcements, but shows some reason to shifting reform a rather mixed bag. The laws do indeed add conditions to an area where it is some flexibility to the labour market, but harder to exploit the fear fac- whether they will have the promised effects toring. Yet structural economic or not does not depend on the labour laws reforms target the core of the as such, but on other remaining structural elites’ power system – their problems that cannot be solved through labour legislation: There exist no market control over public (and partly economic conditions and no function- private) resources. ing rule of law in most segments of the BH economy. There is only a limited segment elites’ current power basis. Yet as this reform of the private economy that functions and package was agreed between the political successfully operates independently of the elites and the EU, the BH public and wider political sphere, more in the Federation EU audience have not been explained what than the RS. The public sector dominates the individual reform measures are and the economy and the labour market, with what the sequencing of the implementation higher salaries in public administration of the individual reform elements would be, and public companies than in the private based on which BH citizens would be ena- sector, further supported by various privi- bled to judge whether BH authorities are leges for public employees. It is not the seriously implementing the Reform Agenda labour laws that guarantee the status of or not. As implementation in most of the public employees, but certain other laws, reform areas is still in an early stage, the as well as the collective branch agreements passing of the two labour laws has been sin- between the governments and public sector gled out by both domestic authorities and trade unions. Employment in that sector is EU officials as the most important reform traditionally based on the employees’ party step taken so far. The labour laws of the two membership or their family relations. In the entities in BiH form the legal basis for labour private sector, those companies that operate relations in the country. It forms the foun- independently grant their workers higher dation for a range of key aspects like work salaries and greater rights than legally guar- contracts, rights and duties of workers and anteed, while most other employers widely employers, salaries, non-discrimination, violate labour rights. Due to the inefficient the establishment of trade unions or col- and politicized judiciary, workers have little lective bargaining. Reform of the legislation chance to fight for their labour rights, while aimed at better adjusting the labour market public servants regularly manage to suc- to market economic conditions had long cessfully enforce their rights through the been a demand of the International Finan- courts. Against that background, the tradi- cial Institutions (IFIs) like the Worldbank or tional role of the trade unions and employ- the IMF. ers’ associations is highly distorted, as is the Yet a detailed analysis of the two entity nature of the social dialogue. Trade union laws and their potential future impact offers associations, for example, are dominated a much more differentiated picture. The by members from the public sector, and entity governments announced the need are thus de facto closely linked to the ruling for new laws that would bring more flex- political parties. ibility to the labour market by removing old The adoption of the new labour laws laws still rooted in the socialist tradition of therefore does not provide any answer to the labour relations, thus making an important question whether the ruling elites in Bosnia- contribution towards a functioning market economy. Resistance, especially from trade 16 Aiding Democracy from Abroad The EU’s Bosnia Initiative, the Reform Agenda and the Problem with Transparency

With this entire lack of transparency in the implementation of the Reform Agenda, BH citizens are de facto prevented from becoming an active player. Yet without a partnership with the citizens of Bosnia and Herzego- vina, the European Union will hardly have enough leverage to forcefully push the country’s political elites towards a substantial and sustainable reform course.

Herzegovina have really shifted towards a So are we back to point zero in the path of substantial reforms. The effects of EU-BH relations, with an EU reluctant to the new labour laws can both move in a pos- persist on strict conditionality and lack- itive and a negative direction, depending ing readiness to pick a fight with domestic on other structural reforms such as public elites, and the elites imitating readiness for administration reform or the strengthening substantial reforms by exploiting the sensed of the rule of law. Yet these reforms are still EU weakness? It is still too early to make a in an early stage at best. judgement. But what can already be iden- Yet neither the entity governments tified are some serious flaws in the EU’s nor EU representatives have provided BH definition of its role in the reform process, citizens with such a realistic analysis of which bear the seeds of potential failure: the labour laws. Instead, both sides have 1) In the drafting process of laws that are praised the passing of the laws as a major to be a part of the Reform Agenda, the reform step, proof of the ruling elites’ will- EU, as well as the IMF and the World ingness to reform and a confirmation of the Bank, put forward a set of conditions new EU approach. to the BH authorities concerning el- ements they want to see made part of the law. Yet as these negotiations The EU: strict conditionality proceed behind closed doors, those conditions remain unknown to the or back to point zero? public. As a consequence, a differ- entiated assessment of the law once Has the EU thus fallen back to its old, bad it is approved in relation to the set of practice of compromising over condition- conditions likewise remains beyond ality? The case of the membership appli- the public sphere. Instead, public cation seems to confirm such fears. By the reaction by the EU and the other in- end of 2015, already late in the process, EU ternational actors gets reduced to a officials shifted from exaggerated praise general approval or disapproval. In of BH authorities’ reform steps to careful, addition, the completely intranspar- behind-closed-doors warnings against the ent negotiations between BH au- announced handing in of the member- thorities and ruling parties and the ship application without the fulfilment of EU and the international financial all conditions. BH officials ignored these institutions promote the use of un- warnings, just as they ignored later, more democratic expedited procedures to direct warnings. In the end, in February, in push laws through parliament, with the last days of his term as President of the tacit approval from the EU. In the case BH Presidency, Dragan Čović handed in the of the entity labour law, the Federa- application to the Dutch foreign minister, tion Constitutional Court judged that whose country was then presiding over the the ruling coalition in the parliament EU. According to the EU’s Bosnia initiative, had breached the constitution and the foreseen procedure would have been the principles of democratic legisla- for the EU Council to invite Bosnia-Herze- tive process, and returned the law to govina to apply for membership after "some parliament for renewed approval. This initial progress" in the implementation of whole approach leaves both the par- the Reform Agenda. In reality, neither had liamentary opposition as well as the this progress taken off, nor had there been wider public in BH without a correc- an invitation from the Council – BH authori- tive role. ties had invited themselves to hand in the application, and the EU had given in. The EU’s Bosnia Initiative, the Reform Agenda and the Problem with Transparency Aiding Democracy from Abroad 17

2) Within the framework of the set of One example of what such a partnership reforms listed in the Reform Agenda, could look like is the reform of health care the EU leaves the sequencing of im- system. BiH’s health care system is plagued plementation of the individual re- with chronic underfinancing and bad ser- form elements and areas largely to vice delivery. While this is partly due to a the domestic authorities and parties, low employment rate and a weak discipline arguing for the Union’s role as a "fa- of employers in paying social contributions, cilitator" and the principle of "local it is for the larger part the consequence of ownership." Yet leaving the sequenc- systemic corruption that lies behind a non- ing of reforms to the domestic elites rational network of health care institutions enables them to do what they’ve al- and an overstaffing in non-medical staff ready done in the past – pick the re- employed along party lines. The negative form steps that hurt them the least, effects affect BH citizens as a whole. Reform then use these reforms as a basis to of the health care system is on the list of the obtain credit agreements with the reform agenda – again, as it is an issue the IMF. These credit agreements will lend Worldbank has dealt with in BiH for many them the funds needed to survive the years – with limited success. There is limited next election cycle, after which their prospect the political elites are this time will- reform readiness ends. Without defin- ing to undertake serious structural reforms, ing the sequencing of reforms, the EU as they would thus directly cut into their thus remains without an instrument patronage system. If willing, the EU Delega- to assess whether the elites are seri- tion in BiH could easily design an outreach ous with their reform commitments and advocacy strategy to BH citizens, laying or whether they are simply pulling the out details of reform conditionality in a way wool over their eyes until pretty late in that directly links it with citizens’ negative the implementation process. experiences in the health care system and 3) Finally, with this entire lack of trans- that breaks down the effects of a reform to parency in the implementation of the the benefit the individual user of the health Reform Agenda, BH citizens are de care system would have. This would put facto prevented from becoming an the ruling elites on the spot and create an active player. Yet without a partner- enormous bottom-up pressure without the ship with the citizens of Bosnia and EU interfering into ownership of domestic Herzegovina, the European Union will officials and policymakers. hardly have enough leverage to force- fully push the country’s political elites towards a substantial and sustainable reform course. That is, unless the po- litical class experiences a complete change of mind – a highly unlikely scenario. 18 Aiding Democracy from Abroad Macedonia’s Tiresome Transition Story: Euro-Atlantic Integration

Macedonia’s Tiresome Transition Story: Euro-Atlantic Integration

Nano Ružin

These issues blocked RM’s membership During the ten-year-long rule of the rightwing VMRO- in the UN until 1993, and in 1995, Macedo- DPMNE, its leader Nikola Gruevski, assisted by the nia and Greece signed an Interim Accord nepotism of his powerful relatives, cronies and friends that regulated all the issues concerned, that he had appointed to ministerial positions in key except for the issue of the name. During the ministries, conscientiously used the mistake of the nineties, while war was raging in regions of former Yugoslavia, Macedonia became – international community, which paid more attention to according to the metaphor of the first presi- the stability and security of the country at the expense dent of the country – the only of democracy. The young technocrat Gruevski became post-Yugoslav oasis of peace, regardless of a top national populist, practising a soft authoritarian- a number of pessimistic scenarios by ana- ism with full control of the media, the judiciary and lysts, contact groups or foreign politicians. administration. The lessons learned from the Croatian and Bosnian crises motivated the international community, especially the United Nations. Since gaining its independence, Macedonia The UN, with the aid of its representative has been the subject of numerous obser- Henry Sokalski, promoted preventive diplo- vations, mediations and speculations by macy as a model for crisis prevention. different diplomats, foreign analysts and When the rightwing VMRO-DPMNE institutions. Immediately after gaining inde- (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary pendence, the Republic of Macedonia faced Organization-Democratic Party for Mac- the phenomenon of unpredictability and edonian National Unity) won the elections indecisiveness of the international com- in 1998 together with its coalition partner munity, whose hesitation created chang- Demokratska Altermativa (Democratic ing and unfavourable perceptions within Alternative), they decided to take a very the Macedonian political and intellectual risky step in the international arena and rec- elite. The essential question related to the ognised the independence of Taiwan. This international recognition of the Republic Dollar diplomacy caused rage in Beijing. of Macedonia (RM) was brought about by China referred to its right of veto in the Secu- the conservative mood of the international rity Council with regard to the extension of community that was heavily influenced by the UN mission within the framework of Greek diplomacy, irrespective of the positive preventive diplomacy. Some authors believe report by the Badinter commission. In this that this action made possible the domino context, RM was advised to provide consti- effect of the destabilisation of Macedonia tutional and political guarantees that there that came from Kosovo. There is no doubt were no territorial claims towards Greece and that, by believing that the main dangers to change its constitutional name and the were of an external nature, the Macedonian symbols on its flag, which Athens considered political elite underestimated the signifi- its historical and cultural heritage. cance of inter-ethnic relations as a destabi-

Nano Ružin lising factor. Rector, FON University, Skopje Macedonia’s Tiresome Transition Story: Euro-Atlantic Integration Aiding Democracy from Abroad 19

received Membership Action Plan status, NATO and EU as which meant that it obtained candidate sta- tus for NATO membership. At the Summit guarantors of security, in Istanbul, when the big-bang enlargement stability and economic took place, RM did not receive invitation to balance NATO membership, but it was among the three Adriatic group countries aspiring to After NATO’s airborne intervention in the join (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia). At SRY and the withdrawal of Serbian security the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Greece blocked forces from Kosovo in 1999, the Albanian its membership invitation and it was stated community in RM, that constitutes around that a Summit is not required for Macedo- 23% of the total population, was encour- nia’s accession to NATO, but only a regular aged by the success of the Kosovo Libera- North Atlantic Council meeting, once Greece tion Army (KLA) in Kosovo and, dissatisfied and Macedonia have reached an agreement with its social, political and educational sta- on a mutually acceptable name for RM. tus in Macedonia, decided to rebel in order Parallel to the Atlantic agenda, Macedo- to influence the Macedonian and interna- nia was also embarking on its EU integration tional political community so as to realise path. Within its Western Balkans strategy, several important claims.1 Brussels paid more attention to security The result of this miniature inter-ethnic and stability issues and less to the process civil war was the signing of the Ohrid Frame- of democratisation and reforms. Such dip- work Agreement (13 August 2001). This lomatic logic is understandable considering agreement was Macedonia’s first step on the the Balkans’ poor reputation. However, on path of the construction of a multi-ethnic the other hand, this was counterproductive democracy. The country was turned into a from the point of view of adhering to Euro- reform workshop with respect to the numer- pean values. In this way, the political elites ous constitutional and legal changes and were given an opportunity to game the amendments. (Veton Latifi – "Pregovorite democratic flows, to usurp the Constitution za postignuvanje na Ohridskiot dogovor".2 and laws, to control the media and to bring One can claim that it was at this stage that the judiciary and administration under the the international community started to play control of parties. a more significant role in Macedonia. Sev- The EU made effort to reward and eral special representatives, such as Francois stimulate Macedonia for its honest coop- Leothar on behalf of the EU, James Perdew eration in reforms and development of on behalf of the USA and General Secre- multiethnicism, as the first country in the tary of NATO George Robertson himself on Western Balkan to sign a Stabilisation and behalf of the Alliance, became the personi- Association Agreement as the crisis was still fication of the international community as a going on (9 April 2001), which entered into factor of crisis management and the estab- force on 1 April 2004. This way, RM, which lishment of peace in Macedonia. became a candidate for using PHARE pro- At the same time, the international com- gramme funds of the then-European Com- munity contributed to the improvement of munity as early as 1996, seven years later, at its own image in Macedonian public opin- the 2003 Thessaloniki EU Summit, received ion, the more so as nationalist milieu started collective support for its future EU integra- to develop various conspiracy theories, that tion, together with other Western Balkan the international community supposedly countries. This made Macedonia a leading organised the KLA rebels in Macedonia. An country in the process of Euro-Atlantic inte- official of the NATO International Secretar- gration in the Western Balkans region. Dur- iat, Mark Laity, was appointed to the work ing 2004, the Government submitted the with the President Boris Trajkovski as a pub- Questionnaire and in 2005, the country was lic relations advisor. The situation was all the awarded candidate status by the EU Com- more complex because in 1999 – when the mission and the Council. Finally, in 2009, 50th anniversary summit of the NATO Alli- the EU Commission recommended that RM ance was held in Washington – Macedonia start membership negotiations, which are still today being systematically blocked by 1 John Phillips – "Makedonija – gospodari na vojnata i Greece due to the unresolved dispute con- buntovnici na Balkanot" [Warlords and Rebels in the cerning the name of the country. Balkans], Fondacija Institut otvoreno opstestvo, 2009. 2 The Ohrid Framework Agreement Negotiations], Regardless of the slow Euro-Atlantic Skopje: Fondacija Otvoreno opstestvo, 2008. process, in the last 15 years, the mood on 20 Aiding Democracy from Abroad Macedonia’s Tiresome Transition Story: Euro-Atlantic Integration

the Euro-Atlantic integration in Macedo- nian public opinion ranged from 85 to 90% in favour of membership in EU and NATO. The three most significant international players in Macedonia were the USA, EU and NATO, assisted by the OSCE and other inter- national institutions. In the perception of Macedonian citizens, these actors – which at the same time comprise the greatest part of the international community – are able to change governments, bring down the sys- tem, and determine citizens’ fate – in politics Vanco Dzambaski, Foundation Open Society Institute as in everyday life. A regular citizen of Mac- Macedonia, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 edonia shares the characterisation of Ameri- cans and Europeans found in Robert Kagan’s attention to the stability and security of the well-known metaphor, that Americans act country at the expense of democracy. At the as if they were from Mars, named after the same time, the young technocrat Gruevski god of war, and Europeans act as if they became a top national populist, practising a were from Venus, named after the goddess soft authoritarianism with full control of the of love. Americans are direct, brutal and effi- media, the judiciary and administration. cient. Europeans are soft, unstable and inef- The crisis started after the eavesdrop- ficient.3 One gets the impression that people ping scandal had been uncovered, when trust Americans more than Europeans. the opposition obtained millions of files on citizens who have been eavesdropped on, mostly those belonging to the opposition. The 2014 crisis – the role of However, Gruevski eavesdropped on his the international community ministers too, even on conversations with other ministers. This scandal uncovered the Fifteen years after the implementation of depth of his party’s coalescence with the the EU and NATO crisis management in the state, flooding of judiciary institutions with Macedonian crisis, when the ‘Berlin Plus’ party cadres, control over the media, rigging agreement on mutual military cooperation of elections, political arrests and trials, cover- Brussels institutions was first implemented, ing up murders, etc. the international community faced a new The opposition left the Sobranie [the challenge in Macedonia. The political crisis National Parliament], and the Colourful between the leading and opposition parties Revolution started in the streets when the reached its peak during the great migration virtual and real streets united. The disap- movements through the Balkan corridor, pointed and frustrated youth raised its voice which could have destabilised the country. against wasting the state budget on neoclas- Unlike in 2001, when the problem had a sical and baroque façades, quasi-antique multi-ethnic character, this time it was about and other kitsch monuments in the period the clash between a corrupt governing elite in which the unemployment rate reached led by VMRO-DPMNE and the Albanian coa- 30%, 70% of which were young people lition partner DUI on one side and the oppo- below the age of 27. In such a tense context, sition block supported by the wide alliance despite the sluggishness and a great deal of of civic initiatives that championed respect hesitation on the part of the EU ambassa- for the rule of law, democratisation, freedom dor to Skopje (Aivo Orav), the international of the media, control of the government by community, aided by the Assistant Secretary means of checks and balances. During the of State for European and Eurasian Affairs ten-year-long rule of the VMRO-DPMNE, Victoria Nuland, managed to effectuate the its leader Nikola Gruevski, assisted by the signing of the Przino political agreement at nepotism of his powerful relatives, cronies the EU residence (located at Przino neigh- and friends that he had appointed to minis- bourhood). It was signed by the governing terial positions in key ministries, conscien- coalition consisting of VMRO-DPMNE and tiously used the mechanical mistake of the DUI, and the opposition parties SDSM and international community, which paid more the Albanian DPA. The four major political parties agreed to

3 Robert Kagan, La puissance et la faiblesse, Paris: implement all recommendations of the EU Hachettes Littératures, 2006. Commission related to systemic rule of law Macedonia’s Tiresome Transition Story: Euro-Atlantic Integration Aiding Democracy from Abroad 21

issues, after the publication of the Recom- mendations for systemic Rule of Law issues In practice it turned out that the realisation of the relating to the communications interception Agreement mostly depended on the representatives of revealed in spring 2015, a report by the Sen- the international community applying tremendous diplo- ior Experts Group, led by Reinhard Priebe.4 matic pressure at each critical moment of the negotia- tions and during their implementation. The International munity applying tremendous diplomatic Community and the Przino pressure at each critical moment of the Agreement negotiations and during their implementa- tion. The European Union was involved in The Przino Agreement consists of the Basic the resolution of the crisis through Johannes Text (2 June 2015), the Annex to the Agreement Hahn, the Commissioner for European (19 June 2015) and the Agreement Protocol neighbourhood policy and enlargement (2-15 July 2015). Due to the failure on June 2 negotiations. This eurocrat visited Mac- to achieve agreement related to the compo- edonia on four occasions between June and sition of the new government in the transi- October 2015. On the occasion of each visit tion period, the Annex to the agreement only a certain solution anticipated by the Agree- confirmed the continuation of negotiations ment was found. The European Commis- between the leaders of the four parties, with sion appointed experts as mediators for the the mediation of the EU and US ambassa- implementation of the Przino Agreement. dors to RM, Aivo Orav and Jess Bailey, set the Occasionally MEPs Eduard Kukan, Richard condition that the opposition must return to Howitt and Ivo Vajgl were involved in the Sobranie and that an agreement concern- negotiations usually as a kind of advance ing the composition of the new government guard for Commissioner Hahn. In addition must be reached. Finally, the Agreement Pro- to Ambassador Bailey, the State Secretary tocol resolves the most controversial issues Assistant Victoria Nuland was also involved related to the composition of the Govern- in the negotiations on behalf of the USA. ment in the transition period. In practice, the fundamental burden of The significant role played by the interna- the implementation of the Agreement by tional community in achieving and enforcing the international community was borne the Agreement does not show in its provi- by the mediator Peter Vanhaute. Mediation sions. The representatives of the EU, USA and included direct interference in formulat- EU member states describe their contribution ing laws envisaged in the Przino Agreement. as help or support in overcoming the politi- This Belgian diplomat became the most rel- cal crisis. "Macedonia has won", was a short evant source for the flow of the negotiations comment made by Jess Bailey, who then con- and the implementation of the Agreement. gratulated the signatories to the Agreement. Although the Agreement itself does not have This relationship may be interpreted through a particular structure and subheadings, the the semi-sluggishness that characterised the content makes it clear that its principles and international community up until the bloody aims are defined in the first four points, as events in Kumanovo on 9 and 10 May 2015, well as the last point of the Protocol. These when they took active engagement in resolv- are the following: acting in the interest of ing the crisis. There were rumours about the all citizens and communities; commitment events in Kumanovo that this raid of an Alba- to Euro-Atlantic processes and democratic nian gang from Kosovo was organised by the principles; respect for the democratic prin- Macedonian Ministry of Internal Affairs with ciples of political responsibility; inclusion of the aim of diverting public opinion and spin- all main political parties through a consulta- ning the disorder of the inter-ethnic relations tion and coordination process; respect for the and the need for Macedonians to unite against agreements and overall good will, and avoid- Albanians. ing new obstacles to early elections. On the In practice it turned out that the realisa- whole, the main aim of this Agreement was to tion of the Agreement mostly depended on bring the country on to the Euro-Atlantic path. the representatives of the international com- As the agreement was the result of a compro- mise, numerous weaknesses of the deficient 4 http://www.balkanalysis.com/ Macedonian democracy remained obscured. files/2016/06/20150608_recommendations_of_the_ senior_experts_group.pdf; http://telma.com.mk/vesti/ One of the most obvious weaknesses of the shto-sodrzhi-izveshtajot-na-pribe-celosen-tekst. Macedonian legal and political system is the 22 Aiding Democracy from Abroad Macedonia’s Tiresome Transition Story: Euro-Atlantic Integration

non-functional constitutional order of RM. edonia, just like in 2001, when the security This weakness also hides other dangers, such crisis was taking place. The actions of the as the emergence of an even bigger crisis, international community were aimed at inter-ethnic tensions and clashes. the establishment of the rule of law, con- As a therapeutic medicine, the Agree- trol of the system of checks and balances ment provided for early parliamentary elec- and implementation of other Copenhagen tions and a "transition period" that should criteria. The ten-year authoritarian rule of secure the conditions for fair and free elections Gruevski and its elaborate state-party sys- in accordance with European standards. In tem of control and clientelism, accompa- this sense, in the first phase, the opposition nied by massive media support of state and enters the Government with two ministers paid-for private media, created animos- and two deputy ministers, while the second ity towards the international community phase envisaged that Prime Minister Gruevski in members and supporters of the leading step down and be replaced as prime minister VMRO-DPMNE. Moreover, former Prime by another from the governing party. At the Minister Gruevski and President Ivanov same time, additional changes and reforms stated on several occasions that centres of were envisaged, such as changes in the func- foreign power acting against VMRO-DPMNE tioning of the State Election Committee, and Macedonia are behind the Special Pub- revision of the electoral roll according to the lic Prosecutor’s Office. Media barons on the recommendations of OSCE/ODIHR, reforms payroll of the leading party went even fur- in the sphere of the media in terms of both ther by making open statements against financing and the operation of the State pub- Euro-Atlantic integration, against Washing- lic broadcasting service, which had become ton and Brussels and in favour of greater the main media tool of the leading parties. cooperation with Moscow. The establishment of the Special Public In this moment, when the negotiations Prosecutor’s Office as the most positive part have entered a blocked phase, all hopes of of the implementation of the Przino Agree- civil society and the opposition are directed ment is a new feature in the Macedonian towards the international community. In legal system because this step finally showed the eyes of the young people, the only way courage and logical reasoning in introducing out from the political crisis lies in interven- a system inspired by the principle of the rule tion by the international community. The of law. USA are more efficient than members of the However, beside the fact that this insti- EU, which, even after Brexit, has 27 member tution was elected by all the deputies in states without a uniform foreign political Sobranie, the governing party asked the Con- position. Maybe the European foreign policy stitutional Court to give its ruling on the con- will become more consistent and efficient stitutionality of the Law, which established after Brexit, especially when it comes to mas- the Special Public Prosecutor’s Office. Other sive deviations of candidate states and mem- Przino Agreement provisions were contested ber states from the liberal democracy model. in a similar way. Different deadlines failed to For now, Gruevski stands firm even after be met, such as for media reforms, removal numerous arguments regarding his involve- of party cadres and influence from judicial ment in many criminal affairs and scandals. institutions and independence of the judici- It is believed that Hungary, , Spain ary, electoral roll revision, acting on the deci- and several other EU member states sup- sions of the Special Public Prosecutor’s Office port Gruevski for his rightwing orientation, by the judicial authorities, separation of the irrespective of his populist, anti-democratic executive power from the governing party. actions and criminal record. They justify An additional crisis factor was the decision their position by successful management of of President Ivanov to grant pardons to some the migrant crisis that has swept the Balkan fifty incriminated politicians after the previ- corridor. Are the rule of law and democracy ous amendments to the law were nullified by going to continue to suffer in favour of safety the Constitutional Court, which gave Presi- and security? Justice may be slow, but it is dent Ivanov the right to do so. clear that after this crisis, Macedonia will never again be as it used to be during the Epilogue absolute rule of Gruevski’s clan.

During 2015 and 2016, the international community applied strong pressure in the area of political crisis management in Mac- (Mis)rule of Law International Involvement and the Rule of Law 23

International Involvement and the Rule of Law (Mis)rule of Law

Nina Kisić

We now have laws ensuring equality of the parties (defence and prosecu- tion) before a (presumably) independent court, laws guaranteeing fair prosecutions and trials. However, real-life equality of the parties, fairness of prosecution and trial are not characteristic of any of these countries’ judiciaries. In addition, the guilty are occasionally acquitted. What went wrong?

In the past 10 years (and in some cases truth, meaning that the point of criminal slightly more), all the countries of the region trial is not for judges to uncover the truth, of former Yugoslavia have undergone a but only to rule on the evidence and argu- thorough change of legal system regarding ments the parties present to them. This is criminal procedural law. The main change not a correct understanding, as judges are was that investigation in criminal cases no entitled to ask for more evidence if some longer lies within the purview of the investi- matter relevant to the case remains unclear, gating judge (as it had for over 50 years), but thus according them the power to clarify the in the hands of the prosecution. matter independent of the parties. Addi- The guinea pig in this process was Bos- tionally, prosecution has a duty to investi- nia and Herzegovina, where in 2003, the gate both the circumstances that are to the Office of the High Representative, in accord- detriment of the accused and those that ance with its powers, imposed a new Crimi- favour them. nal Procedure Act of BiH. This law has since So, we now have laws ensuring equal- been adopted by the BiH Parliament. Croatia ity of the parties (defence and prosecution) and Serbia were next to adopt such an act, before a (presumably) independent court, soon followed by Macedonia, Montenegro laws guaranteeing fair prosecutions and and Kosovo. In all these countries, the inter- trials. However, real-life equality of the par- national community drove the changes to ties, fairness of prosecution and trial are not the legal system, whether through imposing characteristic of any of these countries’ judi- it (as in BiH) or lobbying (other countries). ciaries. In addition, the guilty are occasion- The main idea of this reform, that is ally acquitted. What went wrong? occasionally described as changing a civil Several things did: laws were merely law system into an anglo-saxon one, is to imposed/amended (in fact, dumped on) ensure equality of the parties before the legal professionals without preparation; court. Criminal Procedure Codes of the laws contained provisions that logistically countries of the region are extremely well could not be applied immediately (facilities, written (it is impossible to write a perfect equipment); at the time, countries had an law or an all-encompassing law, as any legal incredible amount of criminal cases going professional will agree – law cannot predict into trial; law schools in all these countries life). Some say that so-called material truth failed magnificently to train new legal pro- Nina Kisić was abandoned in favour of procedural fessionals. attorney at law, Sarajevo 24 International Involvement and the Rule of Law (Mis)rule of Law

What happened is that prosecutors and defence attorneys had to start playing Most of the corruption and an extremely active role in criminal trials high-level organized crime cases – something they were neither trained for are connected with high-level nor used to. In addition, prosecutors had politicians. Countries have taken to start conducting criminal investigations for the first time. In contrast, judges, who different approaches – Serbia used to play an extremely active role in the and Croatia seem to prefer to courtroom, were reduced to imposing pro- wait until someone loses power cedural rules and were expected to make a to begin prosecutions, as op- factual and legal finding at the end of the posed to BiH and Montenegro, trial. Obviously, no-one was ready for this and it showed then, as it does now. which seem to prosecute politi- Examples include prosecutors simply cians regardless of their current ignoring certain procedural aspects of the position. In both cases, there are investigations (for example opening and claims that the prosecutions are inspection of seized objects and docu- political, but none of these have ments), which then leads to acquittal, as evi- dence obtained in this way is found illegal. so far been proved. Judges order special investigative measures without adhering to the letter of the law (no of all, judges find themselves in a situation explanation of the grounds for suspicion where they make significant mistakes that and proof that obtaining the evidence in influence the outcome of the trial. The most any other way would either be impossible common mistake is the refusal to make a or accompanied by disproportional diffi- decision on objections regarding the legal- culties), and evidence collected by the use ity of evidence as soon as such an objection of these measures is proclaimed illegal (with is made, including instead such a decision luck, that is done by the court during trial, in a "decision on the main issue", which is but it can also be done by the European actually a ruling. Court of Human Rights – the unfortunate Newly introduced laws foresee certain thing here are the costs and embarrassment procedures that require equipment that brought on the country due to the mistake countries simply do not have and/or do of a judge). not have personnel trained to use it (this Although prosecutors are somewhat is mostly true for certain types of cyber- improving in this sense, the root of this analysis). Additionally, many provisions of problem seems to be that for years, judges the new laws require rulebooks that do not used to cover for prosecutors’ mistakes, try- exist (for example, on chain of custody and ing to be understanding of the (admittedly) safekeeping of seized objects and docu- difficult role prosecutors found themselves mentation). Some provisions required new in – having to carry out whole investigations institutions to be formed which, in most for the first time in their carriers, and with- cases, took years (for example, agencies to out any training or practice. This led some deal with Forfeiture of property obtained by prosecutors to stop trying, presuming the commission of a criminal offence). In some judges will find a way to legalise their mis- countries of the region (Croatia, for exam- takes. Practice has started to show that this ple), application of such provisions of the presumption was a costly mistake. new law was suspended until procedures Direct and cross-examination of wit- and institutions were established, and in nesses was introduced into a legal system some countries (BiH and Serbia for exam- where such forms of examination were ple) such provisions were simply ignored unknown. This was linked to an additional until procedures and institutions were new courtroom technique – objections. established (still ongoing in some cases). Law schools do not teach their students These laws were changed at a time of Advocacy, and apart from occasional and extreme significance for these countries inconsistent trainings, there is no sustain- – these are countries recovering from war able system of teaching legal professionals (BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Serbia), sanctions these new and essential skills. Additionally, (Serbia), highly undemocratic political defence attorneys have shown tenacious systems (all of them), high-level political resistance towards learning new skills. This murders (BiH, Serbia and Montenegro), leads to improper examinations and, worst mafia wars (all of them), high-level cor- (Mis)rule of Law International Involvement and the Rule of Law 25

ruption cases (all of them). All these prob- Of all countries in the region, the guinea lems (which, in the case of BiH, include an pig (BiH) is proving to be a successful incredible number of war crimes cases) had experiment. To an untrained eye and read- to be investigated and brought to trial. This ing media reports, it would appear that BiH is a task that is close to impossible. has an extreme problem with unfair trials. In addition, in all of the countries, most This is only a matter of perception. To para- of the corruption and high-level organized phrase Plato, fairness is in the eyes of the crime cases are connected with high-level affected. BiH does have the lowest number politicians. Countries have taken different of ECHR judgments against it, and almost approaches – Serbia and Croatia seem to none regarding the fair trials. The Consti- prefer to wait until someone loses power tutional Court of BiH "catches" most viola- to begin prosecutions, as opposed to BiH tions and deals with them itself, within the and Montenegro, which seem to prosecute country. Obviously, there is a great deal of politicians regardless of their current posi- space for improvement. Many bylaws are tion. In both cases, there are claims that the missing, more training is necessary (law prosecutions are political, but none of these schools in particular need to immediately have so far been proved. adjust their curricula to reality), and, most What has this led to? This has led to importantly, courts need to start building cases of acquittals of evidently guilty indi- respect in the general public. viduals due to illegally obtained evidence. As can be seen, there are many prob- Obviously, any such case causes embarrass- lems in the countries in the region regard- ment to the court and prosecution, high ing change in the legal system. However, costs paid by taxpayers, and the general what must be taken into account is that this public losing trust in institutions. In other system is now fairer. The system is working. cases, courts decided to ignore blatantly Prosecution is getting better in conduct- illegally obtained evidence, which has led ing legal investigations, defence attorneys to serious human rights violations, noted are getting better at protecting the rights of by the ECHR, and countries having to pay the accused, and judges are getting better compensation to the victims of violations at ensuring fair trials. This means that an and in some cases amend the relevant laws ordinary citizen of the region stands a fairer (most of these situations concerned Croa- chance should she ever face criminal pro- tia – Lisica, Dragojević, Ajdarić, Petrina, ceedings. Horvatić). 26 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Bosnia: A Constitution in Distress

Bosnia: A Constitution in Distress A constitution born from distress will continue to be in distress – Bosnia as a never-ending story of perpetual crisis

Vedran Džihić

The recent conflict in Bosnia and Her- Translated into real language, it is obvious that zegovina, revolving around the referendum the long-standing passivity and reactive behaviour in the Republika Srpska (RS) is only one in of the international community and the EU have a series of many situations of distress and fed ethno-politics as a central means for mobili- difficulties which Bosnia and Herzegovina sation and the securing of power. New geopoli- has experienced since the end of the war. In this most recent conflict, the main actors are tics, with a weakened EU, a passive USA and a the Bosnian Constitution and the Constitu- strengthened Russia, and Turkey with the respec- tional Court. In November 2015, the Consti- tive authoritarian rollback, makes a reaction of tutional Court of BiH ruled that celebrating the international community to the most recent the National Day of Republika Srpska on an conflict almost impossible. Orthodox holiday is discriminatory against non-Serbs in the RS. Thereupon, the RS National Assembly, presided by RS Presi- Before the eyes of US President Bill Clinton dent , announced a refer- and his counterparts from Russia, Germany, endum. It was* held on September 25. One France, Great Britain and Spain, in Paris in thing is clear and unmistakable – the refer- December 1995, then-Presidents of Bos- endum in the RS is a direct affront against nia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia, the rulings of the Constitutional Court and Izetbegović, Milošević and Tuđman, signed thereby represents an attack on the BiH the Dayton Peace Accord and thus ended Constitution. Before we come to the politi- the bloody war. This historical image has cal consequences of this decision of the RS, burned itself into the collective conscious- a short discussion of the Constitution itself ness of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, on is necessary. account of the contradictory nature of Day- ton, is still putting a deep strain on the Bos- nian psyche, even 21 years after it has come Against the Constitution, to pass. against the country The Peace Accord and the Bosnian Con- stitution contained in it, guaranteed by the By establishing both entities invested with war commanders from the neighbouring high-level competencies – the Federation of countries, born thousands of kilometres Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika away from Bosnian borders, not asked for Srpska, the compromise reached in Day- by anyone in this form – Dayton indeed was ton, Ohio – which no side had wanted in not a good start to the post-war period. As this form – created an unusual institutional the past 21 years have painfully shown, a framework.

Vedran Džihić Constitution born in distress shall continu- Lecturer at the University of ally be in distress, and with it inevitably the Vienna; senior researcher at whole state. the Austrian Institute for International Affairs; co-director * the article was submitted before the referendum took of CAS. place (editor’s note) Bosnia: A Constitution in Distress International Involvement and the Rule of Law 27

Yes, the Dayton Constitution is unusual, inconsistent, and has shortcomings1. Along- Whoever Questions the side the state structure, what is especially problematic is the part of the Preamble that Constitution, Questions the explicitly lists Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats State as constituent peoples. Thus, the citizen (citoyen) as a political subject was replaced Despite all the weaknesses and inconsisten- for the most part by the ethno-nationally cies of the Dayton Constitution, it remains defined person, which thus indirectly the central legal document of the state of replaced civic society with the respective Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the top of the ethno-national collectives (the Serbs, the hierarchy of the legal system. Thus, regard- Croats, and the Bosniaks) as the central ing the recent debate concerning the refer- political subjects. Such an explicitly ethnic endum in the RS, there is not much room concordance system leads to various kinds for interpretation; the equation is simple: If of discrimination based on ethnic origin, as one deliberately, for political reasons, does was confirmed, not for the last time, by the not accept a decision of the Constitutional decision of the European Court of Human Court, one also does not accept the Consti- Rights in Strasbourg in the Sejdić-Finci tution itself. If one questions the Constitu- case. Thus, the Constitution as a legal norm tion, one questions the whole state. At the violating other legal norms (Human Rights same time, by questioning the Constitution Conventions) is already highly problematic one is also questioning the constitutionally on its own. But even more problematic are guaranteed existence of the RS, and thereby the real political circumstances originat- possibly might – in this case consciously – ing from the Constitution, which form the open Pandora’s box. Against the Constitu- constitutional reality. Ethnic proportionality tion, against the country. on all state levels exacerbated the political Back again to the current conflict. Yes, competition based on ethnic and national local elections are to be held this fall, Dodik criteria, and initiated the rule of ethno-pol- and his SNSD would never win, what with itics that has been keeping the country in a the disastrous results of their long-running stranglehold. The essence of ethno-politics rule over the RS, were it not for the ethno- is the continuous perpetuation of a state national card that can be played again this of crisis in post-Dayton Bosnia, based on time. The decision of the Constitutional an unrestricted dominance of the ethno- Court on the National Day of the RS came in national approach as a tested, and, in the handy for Dodik and became the life jacket eyes of ethno-national elites, highly efficient he can cling to doggedly. His political fate governance technique. and the fate of those clientelistic and cor- The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and rupt circles within the economy and politics Herzegovina, as the central institution for that he has established during the last ten upholding the Constitution, has been on years as a parallel universe of power in the shaky ground since the beginning given the RS, hang by a thread. Stricken, he is fighting paradoxes and especially the (ethno)politi- even more eagerly and is ready to accept any cisation of the Constitution. It was politi- form of conflict. cised not least because of its composition. To this day, the Constitutional Court has Internationals as Specta- comprised nine members; the positions are tors equally divided based on the ethnic princi- ple, similar to other state institutions, with As we know from all the years that have the addition of international community passed since Dayton, ethno-political esca- representatives. Four members are from the lation in Bosnia only warms up when the Federation (two Bosniaks and two Croats), demonised counterpart, in this case the two from the RS, and three members are Bosniaks, also jumps on the bandwagon. appointed by the European Court of Human Just like Dodik and Silajdžić acted as the Rights. communicating counterparts prior to the elections in 2006, today it is Dodik and Izet- 1 An exceptional analysis of the Dayton Constitution, begovic firing their rhetoric at each other in characterised by a density and analytical precision that was unavailable anywhere else as of the time this order to catch more votes. While the political text was published, can be found in the opus magnum performers are presenting daring manoeu- of Bosnian constitutional lawyer Edin Šarčević, who is teaching in Leipzig (Ustav iz nužde [A Constitution of vres high above on the rope, the spectators Necessity], Sarajevo 2010). are breathless. In the meantime, the inter- 28 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Bosnia: A Constitution in Distress

As unusual and inconsistent the Bosnian state Playing with fire with con- construction and political reality have been since sequences Dayton, a last – normative and real – frontline Either way, playing with fire regarding the of this fragile statehood needs to be found. This referendum has served its purpose once can ultimately only be the Constitution. It needs more. The mobilisation prior to the local to evolve, to further develop. Should the Consti- elections has once more been successfully tution be capriciously given up, and should the executed according to a rhetorical-nation- new geopolitical constellation with a weakened alistic pattern. The counterpart on the other side, the Bosniak SDA, will also profit from EU and an increasingly strong Russia and Turkey this new episode of aggressive skirmish- leave Bosnia in a geopolitical vacuum, a break-up ing with Dodik and gather the majority of of the country is no longer ruled out. Bosniak votes behind them. The victims will likely remain the same: On the struc- tural level, the damage can already be seen national community and the EU have been clearly – the already dysfunctional political banished from administrating the circus to system of Bosnia and Herzegovina keeps on the spectators’ seats, and look on, as if para- eroding and is in danger of coming close lysed. Translated into real language, it is to an absolute standstill. And the people of obvious that the long-standing passivity and Bosnia and Herzegovina will be the great- reactive behaviour of the international com- est victims, kept as hostages by politics and munity and the EU have fed ethno-politics only losing from day to day. as a central means for mobilisation and the To come back to the Constitution once securing of power. New geopolitics, with a more: As unusual and inconsistent as the weakened EU, a passive USA and a strength- Bosnian state construction and political ened Russia, and Turkey with its respective reality have been since Dayton, a final – authoritarian rollback, makes a reaction of normative and real – frontline of this fragile the international community to the most statehood needs to be found. This can ulti- recent conflict almost impossible. What mately only be the Constitution. It needs remains are warnings, appeals to reason, to evolve, to further develop. Should the and lastly the hope that this time, things will Constitution be capriciously given up, and once again turn out well. However, thereby should the new geopolitical constellation Bosnia becomes more and more a collateral with a weakened EU and an increasingly victim of the passivity of the international strong Russia and Turkey leave Bosnia in community of states. a geopolitical vacuum, a break-up of the The ethno-political game, which has country is no longer out of the question. been played so frequently since Dayton, It could backfire on Europe to for- and which has been recently played with the get Bosnia once more after failing in the referendum, will unfortunately continue. 1990ies. Fast strategies for rhetorical dis- After the referendum has taken place, this armament are needed. This can only take ammunition will have been used up for the place if the EU takes Bosnia and its prob- moment. In the future, the stakes will have lems seriously. The increasingly meaning- to be raised. This would therefore mean that less EU perspective needs to be revitalised; what is striven for is a separation from Bos- Bosnia needs to become the core of a nia and Herzegovina, and that a further ref- new, aggressive enlargement policy in the erendum would be held with that objective. Balkans. In times when Turkey appears That would be the last level of escalation, to be increasingly lost as a candidate, all but would ultimately be too risky. Even with resources should be focused on the Bal- Russia’s support, resistance to this would kans, where the intervention should be be too large. Serbia led by Vučić could not harder and more consistent if necessary. afford this on any account and would prob- The long-neglected constitutional order in ably finally have to restrain Dodik. Bosnia can only be saved with an offensive Europeanisation of the country by the EU and the international community that have themselves created it. Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy! International Involvement and the Rule of Law 29

Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy!

Bojan Marichikj

The main features of the implementation of the Przino Agreement have been unreasonable delays and constant obstructions by the biggest and most powerful political party, VMRO-DPMNE. The reason for this is sim- ple: incremental but unstoppable dismantlement of the power system es- tablished by this party in the institutions and the establishment of a system of legal accountability for the wrongdoings registered in the wiretapped conversations.

transformed over the last two years by the Introduction increasing retrogression of the democratic political culture, undermined rule of law and In the midst of the crisis of the EU Enlarge- autocratic trends established by the right- ment Policy, both the effectiveness and the wing conservative incumbent (since 2006) principles of the EU diplomacy are being political party VMRO-DPMNE, assisted by tested. This time, it is once again in (and the ethnic Albanian political party DUI, a across) the Western Balkans, and again in major actor despite being relatively smaller Macedonia. After the success of the dip- in terms of parliamentary seats, in coalition lomatic efforts of the EU and US back in with which it has governed since 20081. 2001, when the country was on the edge These trends brought the country into a of another large-scale inter-ethnic conflict continuous two-year political crisis marked between the Macedonian majority and by a dysfunctional Parliament, often boy- Albanian minority, the country was put at cotted by the opposition Social-Democrats an EU accession track, receiving substantial and their coalition partners, unceasing mass impetus from its EU candidate status along- civic protests of various dissatisfied groups side Croatia in 2005 and from the European of citizens, the revelation of a wire-tapping Commission’s recommendation for opening scandal by the leader of the opposition who the accession negotiations – granted in 2009 published nearly 400 recordings of phone but never actually effectuated. Since 2008, conversations, most probably produced by Macedonia has been officially impeded by the State Secret Service, revealing an entire Greece on its way to opening the pre-acces- 1 Indicated in the MCET’s public opinion poll Eurom- sion talks, saddled with the condition of the eter 2015: In spite of the government’s propaganda prior resolution of the bilateral ‘name issue’ and the rhetoric that Macedonia cannot join the EU because of the "Name Issue" and the Greek veto, and over the right of the country to use the term that the country should look for other alternatives, ‘Macedonia’ and under what conditions. more than 50% of the surveyed citizens see the Eu- However, the long-standing perception ropean Union as the best alternative that Macedonia has, while nearly 44% of the surveyed citizens don’t built by the EU, that the only impediment see eye-to-eye with the Government on its rhetoric to Macedonia’s bright European future and think that it is using the name issue with Greece only as an excuse. The detailed results are available at Bojan Marichikj is the unreasonable Greek conditionality http://mcet.org.mk/documents/RNa7scXWHFMqG- Executive Director at Macedonian over an unreasonable dispute, has been WRpA Centre for European Training 30 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy!

First and foremost, the Priebe Report and the Urgent Reform Priorities must transform into an Urgent "Rule of law" Blueprint for Macedonia with specific tasks, duties and datelines. The implementation of this "Rule of Law" Blueprint should be treated as part of the new Approach of the European Commission for the early opening of the Pre-Accession Negotia- tions

system of corruption and repression under the ruling Government. In the period from No space left under the February to June 2015, the opposition held carpet! a total of 36 press conferences as part of its project titled "Truth about Macedonia". The changing trends in the approach of In these press conferences they presented the IC towards the ‘democracy and rule of materials and evidence showing abuses law’ issues in Macedonia started in Febru- and crimes perpetrated by the governing ary 2015, after the Opposition Leader Zoran authorities. Disclosed materials inter alia Zaev started to publish a series of wiretapped represent a direct attack on authorities conversations on10 February 2015. Seven in order to completely and utterly expose days after the announcement of bombshell and unmask the aura of honesty, human- no. 2, on 17 February 2015, Johannes Hahn ity, frankness, closeness to the people, etc., paid his first visit to the Republic of Mac- which VMRO-DPMNE ever so ardently used edonia in his capacity as EU Commissioner for their own promotion during the last for European Neighbourhood and Enlarge- nine years2. As a response, the Ministry of ment Negotiations.3 On meetings held with the Interior opened a case, entitled "Coup", President Ivanov, Prime Minister Gruevski, convicting the opposition leader Zaev and Foreign Minister Poposki and SDSM’s leader three former Secret Service officers for a Zaev, Commissioner Hahn expressed seri- grave violation of the constitutional order. ous concern on the part of the EU with the Such escalation warranted a more ongoing political situation in the country serious and organized involvement of the (see the statement issued on the occasion International Community (IC) represented of Johannes Hahn’s first visit to Macedonia). by EU Member States, EU Institutions and The key message conveyed at meetings with the US State Department. In this text I ana- all representatives concerned the proposal lyse the transformation of the approach of for mediation on the part of the European the IC towards the issues in Macedonia, Parliament to address the political crisis.4 the model of political crisis resolution they The first signs of diplomatic protest adhered to, and the outcome of the entire occurred very soon afterwards. First, as part crisis management process. In addition, I of this visit, he had meetings with represent- will try to assess the achievements as much atives from the government and the opposi- as the challenges throughout the process. tion, as well as with representatives of civil These challenges should serve as lessons society organizations and Member States’ learned for the future stages of negotiations representatives in the country. Hahn’s meet- given that the political crisis is very far from ing with Prime Minister Gruevski did not a viable solution. Moreover, these learned take place in the government’s building, lessons could be useful for other countries because in the aftermath of video footage in the Western Balkans region that are deal- leaked to related to the "Coup" ing with deteriorated democracy and politi- case, this building became known in public cal culture, impaired system of rule of law as the place where collocutors of the Prime and unstable institutions. Minister are being filmed. Second, the very first meeting between Gruevski and the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, was scheduled for 26 Febru- ary 2015. Three days earlier, on 23 February

3 http://www.makdenes.org/archive/ news/20150217/428/428.html?id=26853507 4 http://kapital.mk/han-evropratenitsi-da-ja-reshat- 2 http://mcet.org.mk/documents/dXxfX5zfYdNE3MX7k krizata-vo-makedonija/ Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy! International Involvement and the Rule of Law 31

2015, Juncker’s deputy spokesperson Marina to persons under surveillance. Within one Andreeva announced5 that this meeting will month, EU Ambassador Aivo Orav submit- be cancelled due to ongoing developments ted a demarche to the Ministry of Foreign in the Republic of Macedonia, adding that Affairs (MFA) on the disregard for the Vienna the time is not yet ripe for such a meeting Convention.8 This demarche confirms that to take place. the wiretaps presented to ambassadors in During his official visit to NATO head- Macedonia were authentic and that they quarters in Brussels on 11 March 2015, have been captured by the surveillance pro- Prime Minister Gruevski met NATO Secre- gram as well. tary General Jens Stoltenberg. The Gruevski- All developments referred to above Stoltenberg meeting can be assessed as were merely an announcement for the EU’s public pressure to resolve the political crisis, enhanced presence as facilitator in finding a with clear expectations regarding respect solution to the political crisis in the Repub- for democratic processes in the state, which lic of Macedonia, although the political level should be guaranteed by the government no and method of brokering such a solution matter what. remained to be determined. In parallel with the Prime Minister’s visit to Brussels, on 11 March 2015, at its plenary session in Strasbourg, the European Parlia- Paving the way for ment discussed the resolution on the pro- negotiations gress of the Republic of Macedonia in 2014. At this session, the European Parliament In the period between 30 March 2015 and (EP) adopted the Resolution on the Progress 31 May 2015, six negotiating sessions took of Republic of Macedonia and, for the ninth place in Brussels, Strasbourg and Skopje consecutive time, invited the EU Council under the auspices of EU Commissioner to set a date for the start of accession nego- Hahn and three MEPs: Richard Howitt (S&D, tiations. Quite expectedly, the resolution UK), Eduard Kukan (EPP, Slovakia) and Ivo also referred to recent events in relation to Vajgl (ALDE, Slovenia).9 These negotiations the "Coup" case, the wiretapping program encompassed representatives of the VMRO- and the political crisis in Macedonia. As DPMNE (the senior party in the ruling part of its resolution, the Parliament con- coalition), the SDSM (the main opposition demned any illegal surveillance and called party), the DUI (the junior ruling party and for all allegations to be published and freely the major Albanian party) and the DPA (the reported and for an independent investi- minor Albanian party). The US Embassy in gation to be carried out into all allegations Macedonia also took part in these talks in and illegal surveillance, with full respect for support of the EU efforts. the principles of transparency, impartiality The negotiations, held behind closed and presumption of innocence. Further- doors, started with separate meetings more, concerns are expressed in relation between delegations of both political par- to deteriorated media freedoms, frequently ties and the EU politicians. After each del- practised self-censorship and political defa- egation presented their starting positions, a mation in the media, as well as the media’s joint meeting between both delegations and dependence on budget funds.6 the facilitators was organized. According In the period during which he was regu- to information presented in the aftermath larly announcing bombshells within the of these meetings, both sides remained on project "Truth about Macedonia", in a pub- their initial positions. These six meetings did lic appearance on a debate show, Zoran Zaev not result in any specific success, although revealed that six ambassadors of influential after each of the meetings the participants states have also been wiretapped.7 In that announced some degree of progress. same debate, careful about the sensitivity US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of such information, Zaev briefly replied to for Europe and Eurasia Hoyt Brian Yee vis- a question that he would personally deliver ited Macedonia on 16 April 201510 and met the folders with wiretapped conversations with the highest political actors from both the government and the opposition. After

5 http://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/ juncker-cancels-meeting-with-macedonian-pm-over- 8 http://goo.gl/Zft4fh tensions/ 9 http://24vesti.mk/brisel-dijalog-megju-vmro-dpmne-i- 6 http://goo.gl/0Bvb0p sdsm 7 http://plusinfo.mk/vest/16396/rse-prislushuvani-i- 10 http://www.makdenes.org/archive/ stranski-diplomati-vo-makedonija news/20150416/428/428.html?id=26958686 32 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy!

his meetings, Hoyt Yee stated to the press not made progress towards accounting for that the international community is will- the many allegations of wrongdoing arising ing to help the Republic of Macedonia in from the disclosures. This continued inaction establishing dialogue and encourage the casts serious doubt on the Government of authorities to find a way out, but that it does Macedonia’s commitment to the democratic not have ready-made solutions to the politi- principles and values of the Euro-Atlantic cal crisis and that it is now therefore of the community".13 utmost importance for the opposition and Ultimately, the message sent by the the government to sit around the table and ambassadors to the incumbent government reach an agreement on a solution, in par- concerned the fact that failure to deliver on ticular because Macedonia does not have these commitments would move Macedo- the luxury of time as regards the country’s nia further away from its integration in the Euro-Atlantic integration.11 EU and NATO. The same evening, Gruevs- In the round table debate held on 27 ki’s closest collaborators in the Government April 2015 at the Faculty of Law in Skopje, resigned: the Minister of the Interior – Gor- organized by the Konrad Adenauer Founda- dana Jankuloska, the Minister of Transport tion, Ambassador of the Federal Republic – Mile Janakieski and the Director of the of Germany Christine Althauser expressed Secret Service – Sasho Mijalkov. her views about the overall political situa- tion in Macedonia and directed harsh criti- cism at the government, not only in terms of Przino Agreement – the the manner in which it handled the current way out from the deepest political crisis, but also concerning numer- political crisis in Macedonia ous problems in the state, such as: control over the judiciary, politicization of insti- since 2001! tutions and media independence. In her opinion: "According to Western European The Przino Agreement is the outcome of standards, political consequences are inevi- three months of painstaking negotiations table taking into consideration the propor- to find an exit route from the political crisis tions and nature of these allegations. I will be that was becoming more intense with each as clear as my colleague from the US was last "bombshell"14 disclosed, revealing new week: bearing political consequences means systemic irregularities and corruption. The tendering resignations, as a precondition signing of the so-called Przino Agreement for launching transparent and impartial took place at the seventh interparty meeting investigations".12 held on 2 June 2015 at the Przino-based resi- Immediately after the events of 9 May dence of the EU Ambassador Aivo Orav. The in Kumanovo, where a massive police first, more serious breakthrough in nego- intervention took place in an Albanian tiations was achieved on 2 June 2015, after neighbourhood to crush a criminal group eight hours of negotiations, when Commis- under mysterious circumstances, and dur- sioner Johannes Hahn announced that the ing which eight police officers were killed, leaders of the four biggest political parties four ambassadors from influential EU have agreed to hold early parliamentary Member States (Germany, UK, France and elections in April 2016, preceded by a so- Italy), accompanied by the head of the EU called transition period. This breakthrough Mission in Macedonia and the US Ambas- in negotiations heralded the contours of sador, held a meeting with Prime Minister a solution which, at that moment, was far Gruevski. Topics discussed behind closed from being sufficient, but most certainly doors remained secret from the public, but marked a starting point. The final form of the joint statement given once they left the the Przino Agreement was reached on 15 meeting contained harsh criticism for the July 2015, with two meetings taking place Government of Republic of Macedonia: "We in the meantime: one held on June 19 and have specifically reiterated our concerns to 13 http://goo.gl/auKZEM the Prime Minister that his government has 14 "Bombs" is the popular name given to wiretapped conversations disclosed by the opposition, reveal- ing numerous abuses and wrongdoings on the part 11 https://www.facebook.com/perma- of high government officials. Detailed overview of link.php?id=119869762156&story_ all wiretapped conversations is given as part of the fbid=10152827520152157 Twenty Fifth Accession Watch Report titled "Tick- 12 http://novatv.mk/index. Tack: In the Nick of Time", published in June 2015 php?navig=8&cat=2&vest=21929 and available at: http://mcet.org.mk/gridfs/data/id/ http://micnews.com.mk/node/43127 (English) bdbb52448e57471e95d49351 Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy! International Involvement and the Rule of Law 33

another on June 29. On 15 July 2015, in the 16. Appointment of a new Prime Minister, presence of Commissioner Hahn, the Przino nominated by the VMRO-DPMNE. Agreement was finalized. It regulates key 17. Holding fair and democratic parlia- issues related to early parliamentary elec- mentary elections. tions scheduled for 24 April 2016. The commitments assumed under the Przino Agreement include: Priebe Report and the 1. Parties to agree on the exact organiza- tion of the government preparing the Urgent Reform Priorities as elections. an impetus for the Przino 2. Revision and modification of the Agreement composition of the State Election Commission (SEC). Several days after the Przino Agreement was 3. Return of the opposition to the Parlia- signed (2 June 2015) and once it became ment. clear that its contents do not regulate all 4. Discontinuation of further disclosures open issues, interparty negotiations arrived of any materials arising from inter- at the turning point. Although announced ception of communications. as a special report with benchmarks for the 5. SDSM to hand over all materials from transition period15 and qualified by Deputy intercepted communications to the Prime Minister for European Integration competent public prosecutor. Fatmir Besimi16 as one in a series of reports 6. Enhanced competences and authori- complementing the Przino Agreement, the zations for the SEC to ensure free and publication of the so-called Priebe Report fair elections, with a level playing field proved to be the actual turning point. for all political parties. Published on 8 June 2015, the Senior 7. Appointment of a new Special Public Experts Group Report on Systemic Rule Prosecutor granted full autonomy to of Law Issues Relating to the Interception lead investigations into, and arising of Communications, known as the Priebe from intercepted communications. Report,17 completely shifted the pressure 8. The parliamentary committee in negotiations and outlined a final format (chaired by representative of SDSM) for the Przino Agreement. This report was overseeing the work of the Directorate drafted by a group of experts contracted by for Security and Counter-intelligence the European Commission that included (UBK) and interception of communi- noted individuals, such as the former Presi- cations to begin work and publish its dent of the European Commission and for- first report. mer chief of the anti-mafia department in 9. Facilitated negotiations between Italy and Reinhard Priebe, in capacity of stakeholders to ensure greater media team leader. It was developed on the basis freedoms. of several expert missions to Macedonia, 10. Appointment of a new Minister of numerous interviews and insight into pre- the Interior (upon nomination by the viously drafted documents and documents SDSM); drafted for the purpose of this expert mis- 11. Appointment of a new Minister of La- sion. Within a period of almost two months, bour and Social Policy (upon nomina- from the third week in April until early tion by the SDSM). June 2015, three expert missions had taken 12. Appointment of a new Deputy Minis- place as fact-finding efforts for this report. ter of Finance with veto rights (upon The underlying message of this report was: nomination by the SDSM). "Macedonian parties need to find a lasting 13. Appointment of a new Deputy Minis- political compromise translated into an ter of Agriculture, Forestry and Water agreement to be signed in Skopje on June Economy with veto rights (upon nom- 2."18 ination by the SDSM). 14. Appointment of a new Deputy Minis- ter of Information Society and Admin-

istration with veto rights (upon nomi- 15 http://www.libertas.mk/video-brisel-podgotvuva-spetsi- nation by SDSM). jalen-i/ 15. Submission of formal resignation by 16 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aenMjf5W9qs 17 http://telma.com.mk/vesti/shto-sodrzhi-izveshtajot-na- the incumbent government to the pribe-celosen-tekst Parliament. 18 http://goo.gl/gGv6iy 34 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy!

The Priebe Report offered a detailed all the monitoring actors noted delays of at overview of the state of affairs relating to least three months. For example, the man- the rule of law in the Republic of Macedo- date and the composition of the State Elec- nia, especially concerning interception of toral Commission, the institution critical for communications, and found "significant organizing free and fair elections, were sup- shortcomings"19 in five main areas of con- posed to be determined by 31 July 2015. This cern: task was completed on 16 December 2015. 1. interception of communications; The ruling party was only keen to observe a 2. judiciary and the prosecution servic- single dateline – the election day scheduled es; for 24 April 2016. Therefore, they started 3. external oversight by independent to take the Agreement seriously 100 days bodies; before 24 April 2016, the day when Gruevski 4. elections; and was supposed to resign and assign a techni- 5. the media. cal Prime Minister to organize the elections. Among the many remarks, one emerged On 14 January 2016, one day prior to as crucial for the resolution of the political meetings scheduled between Commissioner crisis in Macedonia and can be subsumed Hahn and four party leaders to discuss the in one sentence: "The considerable gap date of the elections and their possible post- between legislation and practice has to be ponement, as he was leaving the meeting of urgently addressed and overcome",20 addi- his party’s executive and central commit- tionally explained later in the report: "Only tee, Prime Minister Gruevski announced a few recommendations refer to necessary that on 15 January 2016, he would present changes in legislation; most of them con- Parliament Speaker Trajko Veljanoski with cern actions and choices within the existing his written resignation, thus complying constitutional and legal framework."21 with the Przino Agreement wherein it was stipulated that the Prime Minister should withdraw from his office 100 days before Przino Agreement Derailed elections. Quickly! According to Nikola Gruevski, his political party respected all deadlines and Once the Przino Agreement was broadly obligations: the appointment of a special distributed, the Belgian expert and former prosecutor; new composition of the State politician Peter Vanhoutte joined the inter- Electoral Commission, which he claimed party negotiations in the capacity of media- is favourable for the opposition; appoint- tor appointed by the European Commission ment of opposition-nominated ministers and mandated to facilitate the implementa- in the government; new laws and reforms. tion of said agreement. Vanhoutte is tasked Within one day of Nikola Gruevski’s condi- to chair working groups on the implementa- tional resignation, on 15 January 2016, the tion of the Przino Agreement, which com- Enlargement Commissioner Hahn arrived prise members nominated by the signatory to Macedonia to gain insight into the parties. implementation of the Przino Agreement. The main features of the implementa- As anticipated, he first organized bilateral tion of the Przino Agreement have been meetings with leaders of the four main unreasonable delays and constant obstruc- political parties, followed by a joint meet- tions by the biggest and most powerful ing with all signatory parties to the Przino political party, VMRO-DPMNE. The reason Agreement. for this is simple. This Agreement entailed Although this meeting extended well incremental but unstoppable dismantle- into early morning hours, agreement was ment of the power system established by not reached among the four party lead- this party in the institutions and the estab- ers. SDSM representatives requested the lishment of a system of legal accountabil- postponement of elections scheduled for ity for the wrongdoings registered in the 24 April 2016 on the grounds of insuffi- wiretapped conversations. Thus, in nearly cient time to revise the electoral register all the categories of the Przino Agreement and reach agreement on media regulation, as anticipated under the Przino Agree- 19 Report of the Senior Experts’ Group on Systemic Rule ment. This was considered unacceptable by of Law Issues Relating to the Interception of Com- VMRO-DPMNE representatives.22 munications 20 Ibid., 16 21 Ibid., 16 22 http://www.24vesti.mk/izjava-na-johanes-han Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy! International Involvement and the Rule of Law 35

and democratic elections, which inevitably The pressure by the civil implies the postponement of the date for society on the EU worked! elections, they would have no other option but to call for a boycott of the elections During Commissioner Hahn’s visit of 15 scheduled for April and for mass protests January 2016, a total of 74 CSOs (including against the regime.24 MCET) presented him with a letter in which they argued that by that point in time, cru- cial conditions have not been secured and a Poor Implementation favourable atmosphere has not been created for the organization of fair, free and demo- of Przino Agreement cratic parliamentary elections that would acknowledged! restore citizens’ trust that free decision- making in Macedonia is possible and that On 29 January 2015, for the first time after the electorate’s decision would be respected having assumed office, the Prime Minister by institutions and by all political parties. In of the Republic of Macedonia held a meet- that, as part of their open letter, CSOs reit- ing with US Ambassador Jess Bailey and erated that the full implementation of the EU Ambassador Aivo Orav. At the meeting, Przino Agreement should mark the exit from the ambassadors presented him with a let- the deepest political crisis in the state since ter25 listing criteria across three points that 2001 and result in the organization of fair, should be fulfilled for elections to be fair free and democratic elections. In their opin- and democratic, as anticipated in the Przino ion, failure to update the electoral register Agreement. and the absence of an agreement on media The first criterion defined by the United reforms were the main arguments why elec- States and the EU concerns the fact that the tions scheduled for April 2016 needed to be State Electoral Commission must be fully postponed. Civil activists indicated that rul- staffed and funded by 19 February 2016. ing parties are the main culprits for the cur- As regards the electoral register, an initial rent situation, as they have obstructed the cross-check of all relevant databases must implementation of the agreement.23 be completed to obtain a good picture In the aftermath of the failed negotia- about the scope of the process for consoli- tions held on 15 January 2016, the unilateral dating it, including field checks. Further- decision of the ruling parties to hold the more, it was listed that the SEC must have a elections on 24 April 2016, reached at the credible program, as well as sufficient time Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia in and resources to investigate and adjudi- the absence of opposition MPs, disturbed cate anomalies found during cross-checks. the spirit of consensus and agreement that There must be a clear legal framework for had been insisted upon by the Przino Agree- the timely removal of names that do not ment. On this account, 78 CSOs published belong on the electoral register, and an ade- a second letter which was addressed to EU quate mechanism needs to be established Commissioner Hahn, as well as the broader for flagging names that cannot be removed international community, demanding their but require extra scrutiny. support for organizing fair, democratic and The second criterion concerns the fact free elections, and calling on the IC to: (a) that political leaders must reach an agree- adhere to fundamental values upheld by the ment on media reforms for the purpose of EU (Urgent Reform Priorities and the Priebe enabling objective and unbiased reporting Report), (b) remain consistent in insisting on and equal treatment of political parties. the implementation of true reforms for fair Another important and mandatory and free elections. (c) clearly condemn the criterion listed in this letter concerned unilateral, frivolous and unconstitutional measures necessary to ensure sufficient decision to hold the elections on 24 April separation of the state and party. Accord- 2016, made by the Parliament of the Repub- ing to this criterion, senior public officials lic of Macedonia without the participation of must make clear statements and issue writ- a large part of the opposition. ten instructions that no pressure on public In the opinion of the CSOs, without administration workers would be tolerated the fulfilment of conditions for free, fair 24 http://www.fosm.mk/mk/Home/NewsAndActivity?news ID=5060&catID=7 23 http://www.fosm.mk/mk/Home/NewsAndActivity?news 25 http://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2016/01/29/joint- ID=5056&catID=7 eu-us-letter-to-prime-minister-dimitriev/ 36 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy!

and that no public administration worker replaced the Interior Minister and the Min- or citizen should fear for their jobs or social ister of Labour and Social Policy, appointed benefits as a result of supporting or not sup- by the Opposition, and returned the duo porting any political party. that were serving as ministers before the Przino Agreement was implemented. New Date for Elections The road to Przino 2 On 21 February 2016, Ambassadors Bailey and Orav addressed a new letter26 to Prime Though we can argue what was the moment Minister Dimitriev, indicating that sufficient the ruling party finally abandoned the conditions are not in place to hold elections Przino Accord, for many it was the moment on 24 April 2016. In continuation, we pre- when President Ivanov came to a press- sent the highlights of this letter: conference announcing that he has person- "We note that the work of the State Elec- ally decided to pardon all politicians and toral Commission to date and the findings of other citizens involved in cases stemming all relevant experts indicate that at this stage from the released wiretapped conversations the necessary conditions for organising and the investigations initiated by the Spe- credible elections on 24 April are currently cial Public Prosecutor. With protests being not in place, although some progress has organised independently from any of the been achieved. Equally, an arrangement has political parties, by many civic movements not yet been reached on media freedoms, to through the use of social media, and threat- ensure a more level playing field. We are also ening to escalate, the eventual boycott of the concerned at initial reports on pressure and opposition, and the need for a new Przino intimidation of voters and others. Accord grows bigger by the moment. How- All this is very much regrettable. ever, this time, the negotiations cannot have We strongly encourage all political lead- the format of a political dialogue, but of ers, majority and opposition alike, and insti- actual negotiations with the involvement/ tutions to remain fully committed to the participation of the civil society. Civil soci- June/July Agreement including the steps ety involvement/participation will not only taken under the Agreement so far. If elec- serve to let off steam from the rather emo- tions cannot be held at the foreseen date, tional "Colourful Revolution"28 but also as a political parties are expected to work to guarantee for the full implementation of the take the necessary measures to allow hold- new Accord that is to be reached. ing credible elections at the earliest possible date, and with full respect to the responsi- bilities and ongoing preparatory work of Stability Through the State Electoral Commission. We under- Democracy stand that the party leaders have mentioned 5 June as a possible alternative. Serious The negotiations leading to Przino 2 have to efforts by all stakeholders are now required start with all participants being on an equal to ensure the conditions conductive to a footing; thus, meeting some preconditions credible electoral process in which all citi- is a reasonable and understandable request. zens and parties should freely participate."27 The following three should be seen as such Several minutes before midnight on 24 foundations for the new negotiations: February 2016, the Parliament of the Repub- 1. The decision granting blanket pardon lic of Macedonia voted to change the deci- to all persons that are under inves- sion on the dissolution of the Parliament, tigation and facing criminal charges thus indicating that the Parliament would by the Special Public Prosecutor to be dissolve on 7 April 2016, which means that immediately withdrawn; early parliamentary elections would be 2. to immediately submit held on 5 June 2016. These elections never his irrevocable resignation from the took place, as in May 2016 the Parliament office of the President of the Republic convened and cancelled the election date. of Macedonia; However, simultaneously the Parliament

28 For 60 days in a row, thousands of people on the 26 http://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2016/02/22/new- streets of Skopje and 20 other towns across Macedonia joint-eu-us-letter-to-prime-minister-dimitriev/ protested against the decision of President Ivanov. As 27 http://photos.state.gov/libraries/macedonia/8573/ an expression of the protest, they painted most public ArchivePDFs_feb2016/orav-baily-letter-to- institutions in various colours, hence the title "Colourful pm02212016eng.pdf Revolution" as this cycle of protests became known. Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy! International Involvement and the Rule of Law 37

tablished and tasked with complete implementation of the urgent reform priorities listed in the Priebe Report.

Who will set the table and how?

One of the main issues is how to make irre- sponsible partners (political actors) honour their agreements and stick to the deadlines and obligations brokered by the EU. The EU must not refrain from both individual pres- sure and broader, country-wide pressure in order to make the partners take their obliga- tions seriously. Vanco Dzambaski, Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 Targeted sanctions and political isola- tion of the irresponsible partners should be a final step to pressure the actors that 3. The decision on holding parliamen- breach agreements, undermine democratic tary elections on June 5, 2016, to be principles and the principle of the rule of immediately withdrawn. law, and endorse corruptive behaviour. The Furthermore, as we were able to read wide range of targeted sanctions must put above and witness on so many occasions, direct and personal pressure on the specific the ruling party has successfully trans- actors and their associates. These sanctions formed many of the political agreements might encompass travel restrictions to the reached into "toilet paper"29. Therefore, the EU Member States, asset restrictions or civil society believes that none of the politi- asset freezes within the EU Member States cal leaders has the right to negotiate democ- and firm political isolation from regional racy or rule of law. Democracy and Rule of and EU-level summits relevant to the West- Law are absolutely non-negotiable; they are ern Balkans and meetings of the European the foundation of modern society and core party families. value of the European Union. However, Sanctions affecting the country as a seeking to resolve the crisis and reinstitute whole might involve withdrawal of the these core values in the country, the Civil negotiation recommendation that has any- Society believes that any negotiation spon- way been frozen for seven years now, exclu- sored by the EU should include the follow- sion of the political representatives from ing five conditions defined by the protesters the EU-Western Balkans Paris Summit, sus- of the "Colourful Revolution": pension of some of the IPA funds (except 1. The Constitutional Court to deliver its the contracted funds). These measures will opinion and decision on the petition affect the country as a whole and are not challenging the Special Public Pros- very much advisable as their effect might ecutor’s (SPP’s) constitutionality; negatively reflect on the popularity of the 2. A Special Judicial Unit to be estab- EU efforts. lished within the Criminal Court Such political isolation, economic whose remit will coincide with the pressure, targeted sanctions for the politi- SPP’s jurisdiction; cians blocking the agreements, as well as 3. Independent representatives of the the organization of free and fair elections civil society to be statutorily included would change the current approach30 by in the process of crisis resolution; the EU, which James Ker-Lindsay called 4. The process of crisis resolution to take "softly-softly", that completely undermined place on the territory of the Republic its credibility in delivering results in media- of Macedonia; tion efforts. 5. A Transitional Government to be es- On the other hand, what is crucial for the leverage of the EU as a mediator is cre- 29 As the political crisis of Black Monday, December 24, ating a set of benefits and incentives that 2012, was being resolved, participant in the Inter- will be open to Macedonia if the crisis is Party Committee and MP for VMRO-DPMNE Ilija Dimovski called the report toilet paper: http://goo. gl/4wKFVv 30 Ibid 28 38 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Macedonia: Stability Through Democracy!

resolved according to the agreed principles Service (EEAS) might be explained by the and duties, with free and fair elections as a deterioration of the situation, the potential crown of the process. for explosiveness and for the involvement First and foremost, the Priebe Report of other countries from the region, as well and the Urgent Reform Priorities must trans- as the impact that the refugee crisis and the form into an Urgent "Rule of law" Blueprint fight against terror have and could have if for Macedonia with specific tasks, duties the political crisis in Macedonia continues. and datelines. The implementation of this In addition, the European Parliament needs "Rule of Law" Blueprint should be treated to be involved through its MEPs Vajgl, How- as part of the new Approach of the Euro- itt and Kukan, for the purpose of creating a pean Commission for the early opening of political climate agreeable to the negotia- the Pre-Accession Negotiations for Chapter tion format. 23 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights) and Having in mind the fact that in the case Chapter 24 (Justice, Freedom and Security) of Macedonia the Member States can do for Macedonia. This would only endorse the more, and did do more in the implemen- long-standing position of the EC to open the tation of Przino 1 through their national accession talks with Macedonia in a paral- influence, the most influential EU Member lel process with the name issue resolution, States need to be involved. As a result, the instead of imposing the latter as a precon- most influential EU member States agreed dition for opening these talks. The "Rule of on a Special Envoy model. Namely, in the Law" Blueprint might affect the program- beginning of May 2016, Germany appointed ming of the IPA II financial framework for Johannes Haindl, German Ambassador to assistance in Macedonia’s EU accession Vienna, as Special Envoy for the Macedo- and direct the assistance towards the pri- nian political crisis31. This experienced dip- orities established by Priebe and the Urgent lomat is tasked with overseeing the work Reform Priorities. of the Ambassadors of Germany, UK, Italy, New mediation or Przino 2 should be France and the Netherlands. To complete facilitated by several actors holding rel- the group, a representative of the United evant influence and credibility in terms of States of America should be added. At the addressing the political crisis in Macedonia. moment, it seems it could be the US Ambas- Hence, perhaps it is proper that the High sador to Macedonia, Jess Bailey. Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu- Civil Society Organizations should also rity Policy, Federica Mogherini, is involved have a place at the negotiation table as they as sponsor to the new Accord. It is exactly have demonstrated leverage (through the her involvement that will give greater civic protests and the ‘Colourful Revolu- political weight to the overall process, and tion’) and expertise (many organizations, through her the negotiations will include especially those writing open letters and two EU institutions (the Council of the EU analyses conducted non-stop monitoring and the European Commission). In her of the crisis resolution process and con- capacity as High Representative, she plays sistently analysed it). Moreover, a group of a specific double role as Vice-President of relevant CSOs have drafted a Blueprint for the European Commission and Chair of the Urgent Reform Priorities as an impetus for Foreign Affairs Council, which is a standing some new transitional government to take formation of the Council where she chairs over the organization of elections in the meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of upcoming period. CSOs cannot participate EU Member States. on an equal footing with political parties, This is a logical order of the involvement but rather as monitors and experts who will of EU institutions, having in mind that pre- offer solutions and exert civic pressure over vious DG NEAR sponsorship has failed both the politicians and the International expectations and allowed the process to Community to place the public interest deteriorate and go in reverse. Furthermore, before the personal or partisan interests, as the transfer of the "Macedonian Case" from usually occurs DG NEAR to the European External Action

31 http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/germany-ap- points-special-envoy-to-macedonia-crisis-05-05-2016 Istanbul Convention: Serbia and Croatia International Involvement and the Rule of Law 39

Istanbul Convention: Serbia and Croatia Obligation that no one cares for

Jovana Gligorijević

The Istanbul Convention is the colloquial The impression is that decision-makers entirely lack name for the ‘’Convention on preventing and combating violence against women will to set in motion a proper implementation of and domestic violence’’. It has been signed the Istanbul Convention, or even that they wish the by 36 European countries, including Serbia implementation. The battle for the implementation of and Croatia. Ever since August 2014, when the Istanbul Convention is fought by women’s rights the Convention entered into force, it has organizations and small groups of self-organized pros- been ratified by all fifteen members of the Council of Europe: Albania, Andorra, Aus- ecutors and lawyers. For the decision-makers in the tria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Balkans, they are just "noise-making women." In the the Czech Republic, Italy, Portugal, Serbia, meantime, the victims in whose name ‘’noise is being Spain, Turkey, France, Malta and Sweden. made" are still beaten, raped and killed only because In March 2016, the European Commis- they are women. sion ratified the Convention on the level of the entire European Union, which could be considered a big step, but only if coun- On the practical level, this means that tries committed to the implementation of each state that has committed itself has to the Convention were to show a little more adjust its legislation, as well as regulations enthusiasm in the process. and protocols on dealing with cases of acts In the case of Serbia and Croatia how- of violence for all officials — from police and ever, there is no such enthusiasm. Serbia medical workers to social welfare centres. only ratified the Convention pro forma, and Likewise, it is envisaged that each country adopted the Action Plan of accession to the establish a financial compensation fund for EU, which anticipated the implementation victims of violence. Serbia has vetoed this of the Convention into national legislation part of the Convention. This step is under- in 2016. The Croatian Parliament has never standable considering the difficult eco- formally completed the ratification, but nomic situation in the country, but Serbia given the Croatian membership in the EU, has not yet implemented even a single word certain steps were made in the direction of of the Istanbul Convention. changes to existing legislation. However, it To begin with, it is necessary to intro- was done in a very distorted way. duce a category of "victim" into the crimi- But we’ll deal with this later. To begin nal justice system. For now, whether it is with, it is necessary to explain how and why the case of minor theft or murder, Serbian this convention will be crucial for combat- courts categorize the victim only as the ing violence against women and domestic "injured party". It is necessary to change violence. The Convention requires states to the definition of rape in the Criminal Code be guided by the standard of due diligence so that it reads: "Rape is any sexual act / complete dedication to the prevention of, without consent." This would be benefi- protection from, and the prosecution and cial to numerous victims in the process of punishment of acts of violence. receiving justice and would facilitate the Jovana Gligorijević evidentiary procedure. For the time being, Journalist, Belgrade 40 International Involvement and the Rule of Law Istanbul Convention: Serbia and Croatia

Things get even worse when you add It is necessary to change the that if the offender is unknown to the vic- definition of rape in the Criminal tim, her health insurance will cover the cost Code so that it reads: "Rape is of the medical exam. However, if a woman is raped by someone she knows, she will any sexual act without consent." have to pay the amount of about 100 Euros This would be beneficial to herself. This fact betrays the attitude of the numerous victims in the pro- state towards marital rape, which it does not cess of receiving justice, and recognize as a criminal offence, while such would facilitate the evidentiary recognition is exactly what the Istanbul Convention requires from Member States. procedure. For the time be- Apart from the introduction of the cat- ing, in Serbia rapists can get a egory of victim, the second most important conviction only if the victim has thing that is required by the Convention is a grievous bodily injuries. Regular redefinition of rape in criminal law. In that practice in Serbian courts is that respect, Serbia has done nothing. Croatia judges ask victims whether they did, but it would be better if it hadn’t. Instead of changing the definition of rape, this coun- resisted, and if their answer is try’s Criminal Code (Article 152) has added "No", they are faced with another a new criminal offence, defined exactly the question: "Why not?" same way that the Convention requires rape to be defined, but the sentences prescribed for this offence (six months to five years in the situation in Serbia is as follows: rapists prison) are more lenient than for rape (from can get a conviction only if the victim has one to ten years in prison). Rape, defined as grievous bodily injuries. Regular practice it had been before, remained in the Crimi- in Serbian courts is that judges ask victims nal Code as Article 153. So to speak, Croatia whether they resisted, and if their answer is didn’t implement the Istanbul Convention, "No", they are faced with another question: thus improving its legislation, but merely "Why not?" affixed this document to its Criminal Code, Let us remind that every piece of advice only adding to the confusion. and self-defence manual states that it is Apart from the new definition of rape, advisable for women not to resist, so that signatory countries are also required to rede- they might avoid additional injuries or save fine the concept of family, so that prosecu- their life. The Belgrade Autonomous Wom- tors can run cases even if the victim changes en’s Center once had a case in which the vic- her mind and decides to withdraw her com- tim resisted, the rapist hit her head against plaint (which is very common in cases of the wall, and the woman died a few weeks domestic violence). This is the way to over- later due to head injuries. The possibility come the problem which results from the that the victim simply might freeze with fear fact that spouses are not obliged to testify is not recognized in the Serbian judiciary. against each other. If the Istanbul Conven- If the victim remains calm and capa- tion was implemented, further presence and ble to go to the police immediately, which engagement of victims after having reported rarely happens, she will undergo medi- violence wouldn’t be necessary. This would cal examination in order to take evidence. reduce the pressure on her, she would avoid Sounds great, but in reality this means that secondary traumatization, and in cases of the victim is escorted by the police to one of domestic violence the victim would be pro- the few authorized medical institutions and tected even if for reasons of a psychological waits for her turn while doctors are examin- nature she decides to return to the perpetra- ing women with earlier appointments. The tor. The Convention makes this very clear in waiting can last for as much as ten or more Article 43 (Application of criminal offences): hours. Meanwhile, injuries usually disap- "The offences established in accordance pear or recede, swellings subside, and in with this Convention shall apply irrespective case the offender left biological traces on of the nature of the relationship between vic- the victim’s body, they would be insufficient tim and perpetrator." to constitute evidence. Istanbul Convention: Serbia and Croatia International Involvement and the Rule of Law 41

Key problems in both Croatia and Ser- tion. Public prosecutors rely heavily on bia are: the testimony of victims as a source of evi- Lack of legislation on harassment. dence whilst ignoring other evidence, so if There are differences in the definition the victim changes her story they get angry of a family member in the Criminal with her, even though it is a common result Code and the Family Law. of abuse. Prosecutors and judges usually Intimate partners who don’t live to- refuse to attend special training on domes- gether are not considered family tic violence and violence against women. members. Most criminal sanctions for domestic Urgent action is not required in crimi- violence consist of fines or suspended sen- nal proceedings in cases of domestic tences, most of which do not have much of violence. an effect. The court practice is mainly deter- The legislation does not recognize mined by the judges themselves, since there programs for the rehabilitation of vio- is no mechanism to harmonize the applica- lent men. tion of the law. Prejudice and lack of knowl- There are no specific regulations that edge about domestic violence are still quite would stipulate taking into account widespread among police officers, prosecu- the impact of violence against wom- tors and judges. Judges and expert witnesses en in cases where women commit a lack knowledge about the battered wife syn- criminal offence. drome. In cases of violence against women, Croatia and Serbia share an almost iden- there is no effective mechanism for tical statistic—one in three women has suf- protecting the victims in a situation fered or suffers some form of violence, and where a state official fails to report it more than 300 women were killed in domes- or take appropriate measures. tic violence in the last ten years. Emergency In terms of procedures, criminal prose- measures stipulated by the Convention in cution is undertaken only in cases involving Serbia were ignored last year when the new serious bodily injuries, criminal proceed- Police Act was passed. An amendment was ings are drawn out, there is a lack of free submitted in accordance with the Con- legal, psychological, social and medical vention: in cases of domestic violence, the assistance for the victims. Moreover, for 16 police have to remove the perpetrator from years now Serbia has been unable to pass the household immediately, even if he is the a law on free legal aid not only for victims owner of the house or apartment. The Ser- of violence, but in general. The lack of coor- bian Parliament rejected this amendment dination can be noticed in the fact that simply because it was filed by an opposition sometimes a number of various procedures M P. are undertaken in a single case of domestic All things considered, the impression violence. Domestic violence is treated as an is that decision-makers entirely lack will to isolated event, without being linked to pre- set in motion a proper implementation of vious behaviour or to a broader context of the Istanbul Convention, or even that they violence, so proceedings against the perpe- wish the implementation, and any changes trator and against the victim who defended it may bring, to be merely illusory — the herself against violence are conducted sepa- law may contain some novelties, but in rately. reality everything remains the same. The Measures of protection against domes- voices against such depravedness are few tic violence are rarely imposed, they are and weak. The battle for the implementa- generally not effective, and there is no ade- tion of the Istanbul Convention is fought quate monitoring of their implementation. by women’s rights organizations and small The victims are protected neither when they groups of self-organized prosecutors and report domestic violence nor later during lawyers. For the decision-makers in the Bal- criminal proceedings. Although the pros- kans, they are just "noise-making women." ecution of domestic violence is undertaken In the meantime, the victims in whose name ex officio, the public prosecutor is asking ‘’noise is being made" are still beaten, raped the victim to support or join the prosecu- and killed only because they are women. 42 Expectations and Disillusion Misty Gains from Outside: Economic Enterprises and their Magic

Expectations and Disillusion Misty Gains from Outside: Economic Enterprises and their Magic

Ildiko Erdei

We all know too well where cheap labor is Seen from the periphery or semi-periphery, the "inter- situated, which are the favorite destinations national community" too often seems as something that for investment capital and development is "outside", that is "not Us", but is to be called upon projects, and also which are the usual tra- in cases of need or emergency, to respond with sup- jectories of financial capital gains. In spite port, help or direct action. This "outside" is sometimes of growing connectedness brought about by the contemporary political economy, the imagined as a hostile environment beyond the borders idea that a stimulating influence or input (be of "our country", at other times as a horizon of possibili- it in the form of IMF or WB loans or invest- ties within our reach. ment policies of corporations) is coming from outside the national or regional com- munity is still alive. Furthermore, it is used Although it is widely used, the phrase "inter- as a ground for many economic policies and national community" is not easy to define. endeavors. This counts for the majority of Its colloquial meaning refers to all the developing countries, including those that countries of the world united around the underwent post-socialist transformation. same cause or action. In a more politically charged definition, international commu- * * * nity encompasses all countries with inter- national influence, while a radical political The idea that wealth and prosperity understanding of the international com- come from outside the community has a munity equates it with the geo-political and very well-documented history in anthropol- economic West, thus excluding a large part ogy, in numerous writings about millenar- of the world from this notion. Seen from the ian movements and cargo cults. Mythical periphery or semi-periphery, the "inter- narratives about the tremendous change national community" too often seems as of the society and about the ancestors who something that is "outside", that is "not Us", will return bringing wealth and prosperity, but is to be called upon in cases of need or are part of the colonial experience. The most emergency, to respond with support, help or elaborate stories and rituals of the expected direct action. This "outside" is sometimes "cargo" of goods originate from Melanesia, imagined as a hostile environment beyond and coincide with periods of rapid decline the borders of "our country", at other times and a sense of loss that accompanies a as a horizon of possibilities within our weakening or disruption of the old social reach. This is true both of the political and order. Beliefs in a new world that is about to the economic realm. come through a supernatural act have flour- Contrary to expectations, in an increas- ished in these rituals. The conviction that ingly globalized, interconnected and frustration and despair, born out of feelings Ildiko Erdei transnational world, it is evident that the of neglect and marginalization, would dis- Professor, Department of (presumably neutral) constant flow of peo- appear once a strong man – a hero – comes Ethnology and Anthropol- ogy, Faculty of Philosophy ple, objects and money still takes place in a and offers hope and prosperity, was strong. – University of Belgrade geographic, economic and political context. According to Melanesian myths, "the mil- Misty Gains from Outside: Economic Enterprises and their Magic Expectations and Disillusion 43

lennium would occur when the ancestors The art of conjuring is what we are deal- return in steamships or airplanes bringing ing with in the "Belgrade Waterfront" pro- European goods (the cargo), thus initiating ject, announced as the one that will bring a reversal of the social order". We can sense to Serbia investments worth several billion the echo of these beliefs in the specters of dollars, open thousands of jobs and give contemporary capitalism, in its promises many local construction companies oppor- of unprecedented abundance and its gos- tunity to win contracts. Of course, as the pels of prosperity. Similarities between the authorities preach, it will also thoroughly feelings of those who are waiting for good change the urban landscape of Belgrade, government, prosperous life and lost "nor- creating a spectacular "new city", with lux- malcy" now and those who did almost a urious condos, attractive business spaces century ago are striking. The same could and places for entertainment and shopping, be said about the role of culture, symbol- that will become a regional hub. So far, the ism and ritual in initiating and propelling economy of appearances has a strong hold economic events and projects. For, as much on this project. The real construction site is as we are aware of the factual, material flow carefully hidden from the public eye, and of all sorts of financial capital investments represented only through controlled media, and transactions that come from "outside", which insist on a narrative about the pros- "entering" the new or yet-unexplored mar- pects of the project and feature next to no ket, we tend to overlook the conditions of actual pictures from the site. The concept of their cultural and symbolic enactments the project is performed by employing of a – the creation of stories which use the old few key objects that represent and evoke it tropes, deeply embedded in tradition, folk- in the popular perception: the beautiful art lore and mythology. The role of the imagi- nouveau building of the historical Belgrade nary, narrative, symbolic, expressive, in the Stock Exchange, which was renovated to economic endeavors of contemporary, mil- become the exhibition space for a model of lennial capitalism, is profound. the Belgrade Waterfront, numerous gigan- Sometimes creating and staging the tic billboards with an image of its panorama story precedes the actual economic pro- and affirmative mottos, signposts on the ject; at other times the story could boost way from Belgrade airport that indicate how a plethora of collateral gains, even if the much of a landmark this urban project will main project were never to be actually real- be. The ubiquitousness of its imagery has ized. With their carefully constructed sets, been secured by extensive media coverage well-chosen casting, skillful directors, disci- in state controlled media, through the use of plined crew, and above all efficient PR and a background graphic in a morning show on media services, some of the greatest eco- the extremely popular TV "Pink", to a special nomic projects that advertise themselves show covering the project on the "Studio B" as deeply transformative and decisive for TV station in Belgrade. This keeps the image the economic and social destiny of the soci- of a future urban transformation alive in the ety/nation, are very much like a Hollywood imagination, in spite of growing accusations set. Anna Tsing, an anthropologist working from all sides of the political spectrum, civil in Indonesia, has named this feature of the society and professional associations, of economy, founded on a search for financial intransparent and illegal procedures that capital, the "economy of appearances". This have accompanied this development pro- means that before the investment is to hap- ject from the very beginning, when it was pen, its possibilities have to be "dramatically introduced as the brilliant idea of an inves- exposed", performed. Tsing continues: "Per- tor from the UAE, who is "a great friend" of formance here is simultaneously economic Serbia’s PM, Aleksandar Vučić. performance and dramatic. The ‘economy of Stories about investment were intro- appearances’ I describe depends on the rele- duced into other circulating narratives of vance of this pun; the self-conscious making wealth, power, modernity, growth and pros- of a spectacle is a necessary aid to gathering perity. On the "Belgrade Waterfront" website investment funds. (...) In speculative enter- you can find various hints of these narra- prises, profit must be imagined before it can tives, that are further elaborated through be extracted; the possibility of economic speeches, announcements, comments by performance must be conjured like a spirit the main actors, and a wide circulation of to draw an audience of potential investors." images through electronic media and the press. The project is represented as a fan- * * * tastic business opportunity, written into 44 Expectations and Disillusion Misty Gains from Outside: Economic Enterprises and their Magic

As much as we are aware of the factual, material flow of all sorts of financial capital investments and transactions that come from "outside", we tend to overlook the conditions of their cultural and symbolic enactments – the creation of stories which use the old tropes, deeply embedded in tra- dition, folklore and mythology. The role of the imaginary, narrative, symbolic, expressive, in the economic endeavors of contemporary, millennial capitalism, is profound.

the centuries-old position of Belgrade as a The art of conjuring thus operates on dif- "place where East and West meet in a won- ferent scales, from the global/international derful collision of culture and beauty". It is arena, to the national and local, doing its said that it will bring "a wave of new life", and share of producing the specters of contem- become "a hub for businesses of all kinds, porary capitalism. It helps the investor to with a focus on technology and design"; a prove that the financial investments of the "magnet" for shopping, entertainment and globally operating firm are still economi- tourism, it will "usher in a new era of pros- cally viable and able to continue their pro- perity for the Serbian capital". It is not only ject of "invigorating nations" and "helping financial capital that comes from outside, countries raise their global profiles to new but also the images of urban modernity heights" by cooperating with a pro-Euro- that are associated with the "Waterfront" pean government. project: its green area "borrowing from the On the national level, it helps the gov- character of London’s historic Georgian ernment to secure its political power by Garden Square", and the old railway bridge fuelling the collective fantasy of "prosper- across the Sava river that will be refurbished ity" by creating a place "where families is "highly inspired by New York’s famous flourish and businesses grow", and simulta- High Line Park (...), and will be an attrac- neously maintaining the space in which the tion in itself with its dramatic lightning allocation of resources from public funds to and spectacular views over the river". "The private accounts takes place. In exchange Manhattan of Belgrade", as PM Vučić called for promised investments, the government the "Belgrade Waterfront" in his address offers extremely favorable conditions for to the Serbian Parliament, was conceived the business operation, fast-tracking many by the same investment conjurer who was laws and avoiding public hearings. Together, involved in the controversial building of the they can "conjure the funds that allow the Burj Khalifa in the UAE. Hence the circulat- nation-state to produce itself as what one ing images of modernity, coming both from might call a ‘miracle nation’: a nation in the East and the West, with a touch of a "dis- which foreign funds support the authori- tinctive southern European flavor". tarian rule that keeps the funds safe." Tsing "Arabian mists on Sava river" is yet calls this "franchise cronyism". another article headline in Serbian newspa- On the local level, the economy of pers that points to the obscurity of the "Bel- appearances makes it possible to give privi- grade Waterfront", offering to the interested leges to close associates, family members reader a glimpse into a variety of collateral or party affiliates. This is a space in which gains, already won while the core of the political influence and access to the deci- business enterprise is still an empty shell. sion-making process have been traded for As Tsing has learned from her Indonesian the economic empowerment of the few, case, companies are not "alone in the con- who will, in return, support the political juring business in these times". Countries, establishment. Therefore, whether the spec- regions, and towns follow their example and tacular vision of the Belgrade for a new Mil- join in dramatizing their potential as places lennium ever becomes concrete, or remains for investment. "It seems likely", concludes a model in an exhibition space and an Tsing, "that successfully conjuring the globe advertising image, it is still producing some is possible, at least now, only in thick collab- economic activity, backed by, as Tsing put it, orations with regional and national conjur- fabulous dreams. Until the bubble bursts, ings; certainly financial conjuring has been and the pot at the end of the rainbow dis- deeply implicated in promises of making solves into a devastated landscape and mud regional and national dreams come true."1 as if after a flood.

1 Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Friction: An Ethnography of Global Connection, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 2005., p. 59. Misunderstood Reality and Missed Opportunities Expectations and Disillusion 45

Misunderstood Reality and Missed Opportunities

Zlatko Dizdarević

Immediately after the war, none of the positive experiences of post- Second World War Germany were applied: extreme nationalist political parties and ideologies were not eliminated, criminals were not quickly and efficiently brought to justice, crucial influences on the shaping of educa- tion, media and state institutions, especially justice, were not made, elec- tions were not postponed until institutions were established, resulting in artificial "democratic elections" (without a democratic reality and institu- tions) that legalised further deep division of both society and state.

There are many people in Bosnia and Her- still-active "remembering" generation. The zegovina these days who are, to put it mildly, local population has gone through the pre- restless. Just like they used to be in the nine- war "naiveté and surprise" at the war when ties, before the war. Many are silent in their it broke out, followed by the horrors of war discomfort, waiting for "someone from the and a time of hope and promises regard- outside" to put an end to the obvious pro- ing the peace to come. For many years now duction of tensions and hatred, refusing they have been living through a period of to believe that this can and will be done by great traumas caused by feelings of betrayal local leaders. The media usually take sides and abandonment, both for what was hap- between the divided parties, thus contrib- pening at home and for the lost trust in the uting to raising the tensions. There are also international community. Today, a feeling quite a few of those who claim that they do remains that the crucial years between opti- not want to continue waiting "to see what mism and the beginning of the "fall" were would happen next" and that, at the first 2004 and 2005. dramatic signal, they are ready to pack and The situation in BiH, on the verge of leave for anywhere in the world. Another exploding due to issues that, in normal question is who would receive them now as circumstances, would not be even close to they did "back then". Back then, there was being crucial for the destiny of a country, no Syria, Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan. The has its roots in the aftermath of the war and Union was powerful and compact, looking the Dayton Peace Agreement (we will now towards the future, rather than traumatised leave aside the reasons for this and for the by itself and its surroundings. After the end breakup of Yugoslavia). This is why the cur- of the Cold War, the geostrategic context was rent crisis regarding the referendum in the much simpler than it is today. RS, in many ways artificial, may not be suc- Of course, in detecting the reasons cessfully or permanently resolved by a deci- for fear over growing radical political ten- sion of the Peace Implementation Council sions, one has to take into consideration (PIC) or through partial agreements in Bel- Zlatko Dizdarević the fact that the greatest part of the popu- grade, Sarajevo or anywhere else. Postpon- Writer, diplomat and journalist, lation in BiH and the region belong to the ing the crisis is not a "solution for BiH". Sarajevo 46 Expectations and Disillusion Misunderstood Reality and Missed Opportunities

Every time they were postponed the crises not more decisively and energetically would become more difficult and more invited to the Union and NATO, even if dangerous, because they are produced con- it meant turning a blind eye to the many sciously, with a plan and on the grounds of aspects in which it was unprepared for the the real situation in the country. If the poli- EU. The belief that such a decomposed BiH tics of the international community fail or could be left in an empty space, a wind- refuse to acknowledge where the causes swept geostrategic wasteland, was shown for this situation lie, among those who had to be devastating. Everyone in the region created BIH, and the political actors in the joined the EU before BiH, or at least started country who have already raised a new the accession process. This created an generation that will continue the project additional feeling of the "abandonment" of destruction, this will result in a very seri- of a state that had undergone the greatest ous internal conflict with inevitable conse- hardships during the war and it stimulated quences for regional security and stability. the dysfunctionality of the state and a com- What are the key mistakes (if that is all plete lack of a basic nation-building spirit. they are) of the international community? Growing influences from the outside have been given free space in the zones that are Capital mistakes significant to these interests, from a num- ber of extremist ideologies to the influence The war did not end with a clear of special, "non-European" politics. In the international identification of the perpetra- geo-strategy of such areas there should be tors and victims, in fear of establishing col- no empty space whatsoever, but it was pre- lective guilt, which the "conciliators" were cisely into such "empty space" in BiH that afraid of for long-term reasons. The Hague many have entered uninvited. Tribunal did not correct this mistake. On the The so-called privatisation, imple- contrary, the time and the concept that were mented under strong pressure from abroad lost have re-established the greatest war (in order to abandon the previous, "ideo- criminals as heroes and national idols. In logical" system as soon as possible), turned the long run, such policies have destroyed into massive theft of state and social prop- the feeling of responsibility for crimes on erty, with a complete destruction of those the collective level, and led to frustrations parts of the economy that have survived among the victims. History and politics and are functioning well. Dramatic social built on this could not be the ground for divisions were brought about that defied the establishment of an integral state on the all logic. Whole segments of society were basis of separate national collectives that destroyed, especially its capable, productive were imposed upon Bosnia and Herzego- part, with the educated middle class – the vina. intellectual substance of the future state on Immediately after the war, none the superstructure level, in education, cul- of the positive experiences of post-Second ture... World War Germany were applied: the The Dayton Peace Agreement has extreme nationalist political parties and ide- formally preserved the common external ologies were not eliminated; the criminals borders and international sovereignty of were not quickly and efficiently brought to BiH, but internal sovereignty, as the basis justice; crucial influences on the shaping of a common state identity, was completely of education, media and state institutions, neglected (whether consciously or due to a especially justice, were not made; elections lack of understanding of the internal logics were not postponed until the establishment of a pluri-nation society). In the absence of institutions, resulting in artificial "dem- of a project of strengthening the state and ocratic elections" (without a democratic its unitary sovereignty, which respects and reality and institutions) that legalised fur- supports specific aspects of its ethnic com- ther deep division of both society and state. ponents in every sense, what emerged was Leaders of division were established, instead a separate glorification of the exclusively of leaders of the integral state. Finally, noth- ethnic, resulting in the constitution of gov- ing similar to the Marshall Plan was offered ernments that openly strive to create states to protect the surviving production, open out of each of the three nations. The logic the process of efficient reconstruction and of longing for "victory in supremacy" in thus maintain a social perspective. the relations between the three exclusively A cardinal mistake was made national subjects overpowered the logic of immediately after the war in that BiH was a need for a state. Of course, the psychology Misunderstood Reality and Missed Opportunities Expectations and Disillusion 47

"one with the greatest number of votes", In accordance with so-called regardless of their politics, was the second Realpolitik, the international element that gave wings to the glorification community legalised such a divi- of leaders in power "because they represent their nation". sion of BiH even at the formal The tendency within PIC to aban- level, the level of protocol – lo- don the policy of "sticks and carrots" in cal partners to all officials who order to strengthen local leaders’ feeling came from Brussels were usually of responsibility has proven counterpro- the leaders of the three ethno- ductive in this region. This did not lead to a conclusion that efforts to develop an effi- national parties, irrespective of cient state need to be increased, but to a their positions, rather than the realisation that even actions in the field of parliaments, institutions and dissolving the country on behalf of the inter- state executive authorities. This ests of power, interests that are personal and practice was perceived in BiH as corrupt, would not be sanctioned, and can a message recognising "national therefore be freely continued. The interna- tional community has never understood sovereignty" as key in creating that in the local undemocratic practice and and implementing policies in BiH. system, the electorate is definitely divided three-way and thus splintered. It was placed of the "defeated" was the source of a new under institutional and interest control of internal aggression. A special place was the three ethno-national centres, which given to the search for external footholds in prevents it from acting as a democratic cor- this rivalry. "Special connections" became rective of the state, expected in normal con- important on one hand with Zagreb and ditions to positively react to the real state of Belgrade, but lately also in the aspirations affairs. to install Istanbul as the missing third link All these mistakes have led to today’s in BiH. We will leave aside the fact that for serious crisis within BiH where, for the first Bosniaks to seek identity in Turkey, beyond time in twenty years, there is talk of war, war religious aspects, is absolutely misplaced veterans’ associations announce "military and ungrounded. drills", requesting from the Armed Forces of BiH "the latest weapons that the veterans are familiar with", but also "live ammuni- The lack of a democratic tion". In the sphere of politics, creation of corrective of the state animosity and hatred is promoted as the most efficient method for the preserva- The leaders of the three ethnic- tion of power. Religious institutions have national parties in BIH have become estab- become strongly, and often extremely lished as leaders of separate collectives and destructively, involved in the glorification of politics. Their overall "task" is to defend and sovereignty of the "people and the nation", promote exclusively the sovereignty of their set against the "others". Political games own ethnos in the "state" that is only a state created the "either-or" atmosphere, clos- in the field of what was "imposed" as com- ing the door to compromise, dialogue and mon by the Dayton Peace Agreement. In common interests. Key political agreements accordance with so-called Realpolitik, the are made in cafés and entirely outside insti- international community legalised such a tutions, which thoroughly degrades even a division of BiH even at the formal level, the basic sense of statehood. The emphasis on level of protocol – local partners to all offi- the affiliation to the "capitals" outside BiH cials who came from Brussels were usually has intensified. This is turning BIH into the leaders of the three ethno-national par- the touchpaper of regional destabilisation. ties, irrespective of their positions, rather The issues of survival, economy, growth, than the parliaments, institutions and state modernity, etc. have been completely set executive authorities. This practice was aside, because the situation in these spheres perceived in BiH as a message recognising is depressing, and no election points can "national sovereignty" as key in creating and be gained there. Only hatred and fear are implementing policies in BiH. At the same proven to be effective. The old EU dilemma time, the American logic of the "democratic – is there any sense in further enlargement form", legitimised at all costs only by the in such a situation – further encourages 48 Expectations and Disillusion Misunderstood Reality and Missed Opportunities

the creators of the current policies. Few are cials, despite all the obligations Zagreb has courageous enough to publicly state that towards them here (along with the right of the preservation of the current "status quo" the constitutive people of one state to vote is actually a political project of a part of the in another!?). And why should they, if there local oligarchy that detect great danger for are ever more direct calls among the Bos- themselves and their position in any serious niaks to align with the flag of – Istanbul. To progress of the common state and demo- someone observing from the sidelines, from cratic institutions. Parallel to this, there is the EU, this looks ridiculous. Here, it is not also pronounced scepticism towards the ridiculous at all. leaders when they praise the "European Relations with the country across the path". There is also disbelief that the EU Drina river are special, even with the use of enthusiastically supports those who block helicopters, armoured cars and parachut- the European path by creating crises, no ists in joint police drills for the fight against matter how strongly they praised it in words. potential terrorists, "because for them the This is why the thesis of the Faculty of Drina is not a border". This is why the Amer- Political Science professor Nerzuk Ćurak is ican "Fox News" has published the news in often repeated in Sarajevo: "BiH exists only the context of the cooperation of the Ser- because it cannot fall apart..." Of course, it bian police and the "little Serb state in BiH". cannot exist like this forever. A state with- Why are we then surprised when meet- out internal sovereignty is a mission impos- ings between Vučić and Dodik in Belgrade sible. In a politically emancipated society are seen as crucial? The EU is existentially this might be resolved with a peaceful dis- necessary to Vučić, so there is good reason solution. However, political civilisation was to expect Vučić to pacify Dodik. It is getting eliminated here in the past two decades. more difficult to explain this to the popula- What would be the result if BiH fell apart tion on both sides of the Drina. (let us not even speculate how)? Greater Ser- In essence, the current tensions sur- bia, greater Croatia or small Muslimania? In rounding the referendum as one of a series the middle of Europe. And what about the of crises show that many things were done Badinter and Osimo agreements... nobody belatedly in BiH and many things, seen cares of the impossibility of changing the from the Western perspective, were not even borders without consent. As it is, borders understood. There is no apparent readiness are being opened by force. What then about to open the key issues regarding the essen- the greater "Muslimania" that quietly lurks tially wrong internal construction of BiH, on the margins of plans that hypotheti- which may only have been possible as an cally include Sandžak, parts of Macedonia, argument for ending the war, but is abso- greater Albania... The perennially unimagi- lutely impossible for any kind of normal life native and self-absorbed EU bureaucrats and preservation of BiH today. The interna- will be politely and diplomatically horrified tional community is paralysed by the notion by all this. Many felt such touching aston- that – in its own interests – BiH may not fall ishment during the Nineties as well. apart, yet it has also failed to show even a An important factor in all this are the minimum of capacity and courage to take larger neighbours and their role in BiH. steps that would set the country on a posi- Since the break-up of Yugoslavia, Bosnia, tive course. At the current stage of the crisis, and especially Herzegovina, have been a it is utterly misplaced and politically imma- special preoccupation for Croatia. Dur- ture to expect this to be done by those back ing the war this was both individually, but home in BiH, who have systematically and also jointly displayed by Milošević and deliberately produced the crisis in their own Tuđman. After the war, the intensity and interests only, with varying degrees of intel- character of Croatia’s interest towards BiH ligence and knowledge. No wonder the old has varied. Recently, however, the EU was proverb: "Once bitten, twice shy" is being also inclined to suggest to Zagreb its pre- brought up more and more often. Ordinary ferred course of action towards BiH. Stjepan people read signs around them in different Mesić’s somewhat mythical message that ways, except for those who think that this "The Croats’ capital in BiH is Sarajevo" was was just the usual pre-election game. That never expressed by any of the Croatian offi- is why they are afraid. Skin-deep Reforms vs. Thick-skinned Structures Expectations and Disillusion 49

Skin-deep Reforms vs. Thick-skinned Structures

Vedran Horvat

While the constitutional values of the European Union were expected to diminish nationalism and exclusion, and liberalisation was expected to destroy and end the state monopolies captured by clientelist networks, moving us further to a modern – and modernised – society, it was out of our sight that the EU as our destination has fundamentally changed, losing the attributes we expected to find once we became a member.

After Slovenia, Croatia is the second ex- crisis of 2008, all these components were Yugoslav state which has become a full gradually eroding. In the moment of acces- member of the European Union. Croatia’s sion, Europe had for long been not a house integration journey toward the European of solidarity but rather a continent of old Union has resulted in full membership on nations being revived again, stretched by the 1st of July 2013, a decade after it started. disintegrative and disruptive social forces Although all Croatian governments have which introduced economic violence and proclaimed membership in the European new hegemonies on one side, and xenopho- Union as a strategic interest throughout bia and racism on the other. These last few that period (and justified by the official ref- years prior to the accession have revealed erendum results), a noisy and joyful celebra- another face of Europe, probably one that tion was surprisingly absent in the moment was unknown even to the older inhabitants Croatia joined the European family. Croatia of the EU 27. has already been a full member for a few Obviously, for Croatia, one of the most years now, but direct positive impacts on the evident and weakest points of the Euro- country’s economy are still pending, while pean accession process was the fact that it there is still a considerable pool of accession was an elite-driven process – precisely the losers, which doesn’t show signs of shrink- component which was presented at times ing. as the most advantageous: "enlightened" Unfortunately, Croatia was not only the and modernised progressive economic last country to join the European Union (the and political elites had a special mission to next round of accession is not on the hori- take the country into the European Union. zon at all), but its upwards trajectory ran in Although the democratising potential of the opposite direction to the downwards the EU accession process had been over- developments in the EU. While at the begin- estimated throughout the period (due to ning of the journey, the European Union the fact that, at any rate, democracy in the seemed an almost ideal political commu- EU had already been deteriorated), citi- nity to be part of, based on values of solidar- zen participation in different stages of EU ity and equity, even with the possibility of development was seriously neglected and creating a transnational demos from Europe treated as an obstacle or brake in order to Vedran Horvat as a political project, parallel to Croatia’s create an impression of a successful fast- Director, Institute for Political accession to the EU, and with the economic track negotiation process. Although it took Ecology (IPE), Zagreb. 50 Expectations and Disillusion Skin-deep Reforms vs. Thick-skinned Structures

much longer time than initially expected, protagonists of the EU accession process elites on both sides were engaged in a pre- were prosecuted for (the widespread) cor- dominantly technocratic and prescriptive ruption in order to demonstrate that the negotiation process that reduced most of country is not only punishing nationalism, the changes in the country to the issue of but that it is also committed to bringing an compliance with EU standards and to so- end to corruption in high-level state struc- called normative optimism. The latter has tures. Only in the last few months, when it by far overstretched the implications of the became evident that these ghosts would be rule of law to compensate for the lack of a released almost immediately after Croatia social dimension of the accession. Accord- gained membership, have civil society and ingly, agreement between the elites to join some progressive political parties suggested the EU has fostered the creation of an artifi- an introduction of monitoring mechanisms cial arena where laws and policies are nego- in order to maintain a level of the EU con- tiated, while substantial aspects of political ditionality. However, both the EC and the debate about the country’s place and per- predominantly conservative political forces spective within the EU were avoided or that were in power at the time have rejected pushed away. This was only leveraged by the the proposal, giving green light to Croatia to overarching narrative about EU member- join the European family as the 28th member ship as a civilisational achievement while country. most important debates on transformation To those who carefully followed the of the European Union and the prevail- accession process and later developments, ing economic logic of its integration were it wasn’t a surprise that after its accession, absent or sporadic. While the constitutional Croatia experienced a severe backlash. Epi- values of the European Union were expected sodes of war veterans campaigning in the to diminish nationalism and exclusion, and street (and threatening with violence) and liberalisation was expected to destroy and the neoconservative referendum against end the state monopolies captured by clien- homosexual marriage were only the first telist networks, moving us further to a mod- signs of this regressive comeback. Not only ern – and modernised – society, it was out of that the first attacks against human rights, our sight that the EU as our destination has independent media and civil society fund- fundamentally changed, losing the attrib- ing occurred, but a repressive and revision- utes we expected to find once our country ist agenda also started to establish itself as a became a member. Already in 2010 and 2011 new normality. Developments in Hungary, it was clear that the EU as a political project France or Poland were only encouraging was in a deep crisis and that emerging iden- this trend, whereas European values stood tity politics as a manifestation of discontent for a vague and empty term. with establishment politics and combined What could be done differently and by with austerity measures against the poorest whom? Unfortunately, Europe as such, deep across the continent threatened Europe’s in crisis, was not there to help, as it might further development around its core and have been earlier. Already in the early 2000’s constitutional values. it had gradually abandoned most of the val- However, on the fringe of the develop- ues it stood for, and therefore lost the power ments on the European level, Croatia’s EU of conditionality, as well as the legitimacy accession and negotiations have continued to demand and expect deeper reforms. The in the same manner, whereas Croatia man- economic impact was appreciated more aged to play the role of the best student in the than the social, which required more time classroom (region) and – unlike its neigh- and attention. Secondly, reforms as such bours – successfully (hypocritically) control were predominantly led by the economic its ghosts from the past (nationalism, war logic, which was more and more evident crimes, fascist history). Moreover, even the as the backbone and driving force of the

To those who carefully followed the accession process and later develop- ments, it wasn’t a surprise that after its accession, Croatia experienced a severe backlash. Episodes of war veterans campaigning in the street (and threatening violence) and the neoconservative referendum against homo- sexual marriage were only the announcements of this regressive comeback. Skin-deep Reforms vs. Thick-skinned Structures Expectations and Disillusion 51

"No EU" by Mike, CC-BY-SA 2.0 accession process. The substance of the Today, Europe is at a crossroads, and political project whose aim was a transna- when it looks into its future, one of the tional demos that lives in an open, plural images it can see is the Other – the Balkans. and democratic society was lagging behind In its ambivalence, the Balkans can symbol- the ambitions of economic integration. That ise the time of disintegration, uncertainty is why it is no surprise that across Eastern and turmoil where nationalism survives and Europe, countries are sliding back towards demos fails. But it can also be the last stage nationalism and authoritarianism, since of the integration and consolidation of the reforms were insufficiently deep to break European project and a chance for its sur- down the thick-skinned structures that vival. In the Balkans, integration has to be resisted modernisation and liberalisation. done in a different way, with all the lessons Insofar as the latter two spell an increase learnt, or it will never happen... in public debt and more inequality for the poorest in Europe, the price to be paid for the new European future, they again are not too popular. 52 Expectations and Disillusion Waiting for Houdini: The International Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Waiting for Houdini: The International Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Miroslav Živanović

that in our case, the straitjacket was applied The constitutionally protected by the international community, as was the "ethnocracy" creates a kind of therapy that followed. The fact that twenty vicious circle which is decorated years after Dayton, I can still picture my with the widespread political country as a person in a straitjacket sends patronage and clientelism, cover- a serious and somewhat disturbing mes- sage that the therapy was wrong or, even ing both the public and, to a worse, that we didn’t receive therapy at all. certain degree, the private sec- To go further with the deconstruction of this tor, having disastrous effects on picture, I will, quite expectedly, say that the the economic performance and straitjacket is the Constitution of Bosnia and international competitiveness Herzegovina, or the famous Annex IV of the of the country, perpetuating the Dayton Peace Agreement. Let’s stay for a moment with our Consti- poverty and social exclusion of tution. The Dayton Peace Agreement set up the majority of citizens. a constitutional stage where collective rights – usually interpreted by ethno-national Being a former student of comparative lit- political elites as anything they decide to erature, I always have an inclination toward be of vital national interest, from the size using figures of language in attempts to of the letters on the passport cover to pub- define and describe realities of our society lic broadcasting in certain languages – are and life in Bosnia and Herzegovina. One dominating over individual rights. From that very often comes to my mind, is that that point, the constitutionally protected which compares Bosnia and Herzegovina "ethnocracy" creates a kind of vicious cir- with a person immobilized in a straitjacket. cle which is decorated with the widespread Now, this upsetting picture implies several political patronage and clientelism, cover- things. First of all, it implies some kind of ing both the public and, to a certain degree, insanity of the person, which created a situ- the private sector, having disastrous effects ation where applying a straitjacket was inev- on the economic performance and interna- itable. Secondly, it took somebody to apply tional competitiveness of the country, per- and tighten that straitjacket. Thirdly, unless petuating the poverty and social exclusion the entire thing is not the performance of a of the majority of citizens. In such a social magician with the skills and talent of Hou- context, nationalist rhetoric and conflicts dini, somebody is needed to apply a certain over so-called "vital national interests", therapy, which will eventually lead to an false in their nature, proved to be more improvement in the mental condition of the than useful as a method of political survival person in question, and, finally, the removal for ethno-nationalists, truly committed to Miroslav Živanović of the straitjacket. defend every inch of Dayton constitutional Head of the Library and If this picture is appealing for the pur- territory. Without any reasonable doubt, Documentation Department, Human Rights Centre of the pose of describing contemporary Bosnia one can say that ethno-national political University of Sarajevo and Herzegovina, then I would dare to say structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina have Waiting for Houdini: The International Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina Expectations and Disillusion 53

no interest in moving beyond Dayton or, in expectations, while the social dimension of other words, getting out of the straitjacket. the Agenda is far more vague and general. What is the position of the international Again, the Reform Agenda promotes a num- community in the given circumstances? The ber of interventions which directly affect the Crisis Group calls it the pattern of interna- positions of power of those who committed tionally-sponsored state building without themselves to implement the Agenda, and local buy-in. Officially, it is committed to it is really hard to believe that issues such Bosnia and Herzegovina’s development as anti-corruption will be addressed prop- and transition in line with the highest erly in the foreseeable future in Bosnia and European standards of human rights, rule Herzegovina by those who are the main of law, good governance, etc. In practice, proponents and beneficiaries of political it is heavily engaged in negotiations with patronage and clientelism. almost irremovable ethno-national political Again, the challenge ahead is to learn elites over reforms which go directly against from past experiences and to ensure that the obvious political and other interests domestic holders of political power and of these elites. And usually they fail! From efforts of the international community 2005 to 2007, the police reform, followed work for the benefit and development of by the notorious "five + two" condition and the entire society and its citizens. Usually, failed attempt to negotiate constitutional it is the lack of political will that is blamed changes, to the latest effort to¸reach an when domestic actors fail to act in line with agreement on amending the Constitution the international conditions and expecta- and ensure compliance with the decision tions. It is time for the international com- of the European Court of Human Rights in munity to rethink the concept of political the case of "Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and will in the specific context of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Finally, Sejdić and Finci are Herzegovina. For the beginning, it must be moved aside and the name of the game is acknowledged that political will is a rather currently the Reform Agenda. complex concept, in which the political The Reform Agenda was an impor- leaders’ will, no matter how powerful they tant political achievement from the start are, is just a part of the broader structure of of 2016. Fully titled the "Reform Agenda will, required to implement certain policies. for Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period The key recommendation is that equal, or at 2015 – 2018", it contains an overview of least balanced, attention is to be paid to the socio-economic and related measures to transformation of all constitutive elements be implemented by governments on all of the existing political will in the direc- administrative levels and used as key indi- tion of real political commitment to politi- cators for assessing BiH progress in the EU cal reform. The constitutive elements in integration process, especially its applica- question are those which Carmen Malena, tion for membership. The Agenda covers six an experienced advocate of participative key areas of intervention: public finances, government, is referring to as the politi- taxation and fiscal sustainability; the busi- cal will, political can and political must. ness environment and competitiveness; the These three are mutually reinforcing ele- labour market; reform of social protection ments of political will and can be observed and pensions; rule of law and good govern- in ideal situations when power holders are ance; and public administration reform. able to commit to act and to really act, and Even a brief review of the document suf- because they want to do so, they will be fices to show that it is more elaborate when confident that they can (they possess abil- it comes to the economy and economic ity and capacity) and understand that they

The short history of international engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is showing that the focus on political negotiations with political leaders on key socio-political and economic issues will not contribute to long-term and sustainable changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is needed is a community-building approach and strong commitment of the international community to facilitate true policy-making processes in which due atten- tion will be paid to efforts of mobilizing public support, articulating public interests, and incorporating experts. 54 Expectations and Disillusion Waiting for Houdini: The International Community and Bosnia and Herzegovina

must undertake a certain action. The pres- for getting out of the straitjacket is widely ence of all three elements can be detected known, it is possible to google it with no if individual actors connected to certain trouble at all. The Houdini tutorial on how policies possess a sense of duty, knowledge to escape from a straitjacket will advise you and skills, but also certain values and pri- thus: orities which are in line with the policy or While you’re being buckled up, use activity in question. Furthermore, political one of your hands to inconspicuous- will is strongly determined by the involve- ly pinch the front, giving you about ment of institutional actors. In this regard, three inches of slack. Take a deep it is important that organizations, both gov- breath and tighten your muscles in ernmental and non-governmental, dealing order to make your upper body as big with certain policies are acting in line with as you possibly can. As your sleeves their own rules and regulations, with suffi- are pulled behind you, try to make cient resources and tools and surrounded sure your stronger arm is over your with the positive structure of incentives and weaker arm. rewards for success in delivering policies. Loosen up. Once the straitjacket is On the level of general relations, political secured, relax your upper body and will always relies on binding partnership breathe out. Make your upper body agreements, constructive relations between as small as possible, and let go of the the civil society and the state, and their pro- slack you created in the previous step. ductive partnerships. Also, political will has The straitjacket should feel looser to be viewed in the general social context, now. paying special attention to an enabling legal Push your strong arm forcefully to- framework, existing public support and wards the opposite shoulder. This will even public pressure for certain policies. move the slack to where you need it The short history of international for the next step. engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is Bring your strong arm up and over showing that the focus on political nego- your head. Keep your weak arm tiations with political leaders on key socio- down. Once you’ve done this, you’ll be political and economic issues will not able to move your arms around. contribute to long-term and sustainable Unbuckle the sleeve buckle with your changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What is teeth. needed is a community-building approach In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I and strong commitment of the international will say that our "three inches of slack" are community to facilitate true policy-making the human rights provisions of the Dayton processes in which due attention will be Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, paid to efforts of mobilizing public support, placed there thanks to the "deep breath" articulating public interests, consulting and of the actual authors of the Dayton con- incorporating experts’ inputs in the form of stitutional text. Twenty years of peaceful clear and sound policies resolving key social post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina is priorities of the country. In other words, the our "breath out" and our "strong arm" will international therapy for Bosnia and Herze- be represented through the new human govina’s straitjacket situation should be real, rights community and grass-roots human not declarative, facilitation of participative rights movement yet to be established in the governance. country and its strong and resolute claim for If, by any chance, something like this equality between the constitutional prin- were to occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina, ciple of constituent peoples and the con- it would be naïve to expect that political stitutional principle of human rights. This elites will peacefully watch the changing of demand will stand for pushing the stronger the governance paradigm. The concept of arm and bringing it up and over head and, participative governance will be strongly therefore, making a crucial move for get- opposed and therapy applied by the inter- ting out of the straitjacket. In this particular national community could be insufficient. situation, the role of the international com- Even in this scenario, the struggle for getting munity will be to make sure that nobody out of a straitjacket is not lost, because there sabotages the process, and Houdini will do is always a Houdini approach. The trick the rest! Media System in B&H: How the International Community Intervention has Failed Normalisation with/out International Community 55

Normalisation with/out the International Community Media System in B&H: How the International Community Intervention has Failed

Lejla Turčilo

At first, the international actors believed that increasing the number of channels available to citizens will, consequently, result in an increased amount of high-quality information, which in turn will contribute to democ- racy, since the well-informed citizens will better participate in political and social life. Unfortunately, that has not happened.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a post-war and tran- first step in the intervention of the interna- sitional country, has experienced very com- tional community in the media sector in plicated and turbulent media reforms and Bosnia-Herzegovina. changes in the media scene in the past 25 In general, international support for years. First of all, transition in this country B&H media was enormously strong during (from the former communist regime, which the war and the immediate aftermath, and treated the media as a political institution it has continued until nowadays. Dona- serving the party and elite, into a democracy tions in equipment, money, consulting, in which the media is a pillar of the demo- education etc. were given by many interna- cratic society, with a specific social role and tional media (BBC, Deutsche Welle, Voice of responsibility) has happened in parallel America etc), NGOs and foundations (Open with the war. That meant that after a long Society Fund etc) and governments (the period of non-democratic environment, in US government for example). At the very which there were only a few media outlets beginning, the support was given for media in the country (most of them state-owned; infrastructure (in terms of equipment and the first private radio station was Radio M money) and journalists’ education (in terms in 1990), there was an "explosion" of media of their additional education), but not for outlets. Many of these media were estab- media management training (that is why lished with the strong support of interna- many managers of these media failed to tional organizations and the international make their media survive in the market after community, which promoted the idea that donations expired). In later years, it appears media in B&H should be the pillars of devel- that the intervention has focused on several oping democracy (some well-known exam- fields: ples were Radio ZID, Radio FERN and OBN Media regulation TV). However, most of these media failed to Media organizations cope with a market-oriented environment Media content once the international support stopped and Media training and education of me- did not survive in the media market (highly dia professionals dependent on external support, the local Media literacy media institutions and media outlets often The best intervention by the interna- Lejla Turčilo labelled as "independent" became vulner- tional community in B&H media was in the Professor, University of Sarajevo, Faculty of able to political manipulations once donor field of media laws and regulations, so we Political Science support decreased). However, they were the may say that, thanks to the efforts of the [email protected] 56 Normalisation with/out International Community Media System in B&H: How the International Community Intervention has Failed

"Media" by Justien Van Zele, CC BY 2.0

international community and local actors, and is now facing one of the biggest crises B&H has the very best laws and regulations in its history. On the other hand, the US when it comes to media (for example the money was mainly aimed at private media, Defamation Law, the Law on Free Access by means of various grants, chiefly imple- to Information), as well as the best basis (in mented via the USAID mission in B&H. The terms of legal documents) for the efficient latest intervention of this kind from the US functioning of the regulatory institutions Government was through the Strengthening (the Communication Regulatory Agency) Independent Media Program. and self-regulation (the Press Council). At first, as mentioned above, the inter- However, with time the efficiency of the national community supported the media regulator and self-regulator has weakened, in B&H, since international actors believed and in many aspects they have not managed that increasing the number of channels to achieve their original mission (the Com- available to citizens will, consequently, munication Regulatory Agency is under result in an increased amount of high-qual- strong political pressure and influence, and ity information, which in turn will contrib- for a very long time has not been efficient ute to democracy, since the well-informed in fulfilling its mission; the Press Council is citizens will better participate in political doing some excellent work on lobbying for and social life. Unfortunately, that has not and promoting media responsibility, but its happened. Once the international dona- original mission of being an instrument for tions stopped, most of these media either improving the quality of print media con- failed to cope with the market and closed, or tent through citizens’ complaints mecha- adopted a strictly business model, no longer nism has not been entirely fulfilled, since operating as institutions of public inter- there are not that many people who view est. So we may say that one of the (many) the Press Council as such an instrument and reasons why the intervention by the inter- use it to register their complaints). national community in the media sphere When it comes to intervention in in B&H failed was that this intervention the field of media organizations, differ- actually promoted completely the opposite ent international donors have spent sig- idea: that media are (and in B&H should be) nificant amounts of money on supporting public institutions and pillars of democracy. media outlets, especially those which are But, instead, media owners soon accepted not mainstream profit-oriented, but rather the other global trend: "profit over people", small alternative media. Of course, strong as Noam Chomsky says. Media populism, intervention by the – mostly European – trivialization of content, together with polit- funds was aimed at establishing a Public ical clientelism and corruption in the media, Broadcasting System, and may represent resulted in a situation where media, instead the biggest failure of international com- of becoming an instrument of democracy, munity intervention in the media scene. became an instrument of "reducing democ- The PBS of B&H never became a functional racy", as Samuel Huntington calls them. and successful provider of quality informa- As for media content, most support has tion; until now it remains ethnically divided, been oriented towards supporting inves- Media System in B&H: How the International Community Intervention has Failed Normalisation with/out International Community 57

tigative reporting and diversity reporting. Numerous small grants for media support, At the very beginning, the as well as project-oriented grants of big scale support was given for media have been alocated to media outlets that infrastructure (in terms of equip- were trying to produce investigative stories ment and money) and journal- and stories about minorities. Some of the successful examples of these media are the ists’ education (in terms of their Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, the additional education), but not Center for Investigative Journalism (CIN), for media management train- as well as web portals http://www.man- ing (that is why many managers jine.ba, http://www.diskriminacija.ba and of these media failed to make http://www.zurnal.info. However, one of the obstacles regarding this media content their media survive in the market is that mainstream media are not very inter- after donations expired). ested in airing such content, although these media quite often offer it for free (Žurnal, particularly interested in raising standards for example, offers its content for free, but and further investing in training and educa- a very limited number of stories featured tion of their staff (sometimes not even will- there are aired in other media). This makes ing to allow journalists leave to participate such content less available and less visible in training at no cost to the media what- to citizens and, consequently, makes citi- soever), since after all, a skilled and well- zens less aware of problems addressed by trained professional simply costs more, and such media stories. many B&H media are unfortunately just Regarding media training and educa- looking for cheap labor force rather than tion, different forms of training were offered high-level professionals. to journalists and students of journalism. One of the new concepts that has been Support was provided for formal and infor- promoted recently and in which some inter- mal institutions and training centers. One national organizations (such as Internews, of the first grants for formal education insti- that is, USAID) have invested some money is tutions has been allocated to the Faculty of media literacy, that is, training the audience Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo. Its for better interaction with the media. This Journalism Department has implemented concept is based on the assumption that a a project of improving study programs in competent audience would put pressure on cooperation with the School of Communi- media to be more professional and to pro- cation, Information and Library Studies of vide better quality content. Several train- the Rutgers University, supported by the ings of trainers for media literacy have been US Government grant. Two informal media organized, some books and other materi- schools have received strong international als published (one of the most important support: the Media Center had a School of ones is Lea Tajić’s book Medijska pismenost Journalism based on BBC standards and u BiH (Media Literacy in B&H); another is the Media Plan Institute had a School for the Media and Information Literacy Policy Journalists in cooperation with the Gradu- Report for B&H, which systematically dis- ate School of Journalism [École supérieure cussed how media literacy is developed in de journalisme] from Lille, France. Both B&H and what can be done more and bet- schools offered very good programs and ter), some audiences trained as well. How- trained some excellent journalists that are ever, since this is just the beginning of the working in the media scene today, but after development of such a concept, it is difficult the support of their partners expired, these to assess how successful it has been so far. schools were unable to become self-sustain- In general, we may say that the inter- ing, although both the Media Center and the vention of the international donors into the Media Plan Institute still do offer short-term media field has been only party successful. media training. In addition, many media The two biggest failures were definitely the professionals have participated in various development of the Public Broadcasting short-term training programs organized System and OBN TV. There are several rea- both in B&H and abroad, with international sons why international intervention has not donors’ support. This has contributed to been such a success in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their professionalism, and resulted in some but two of the most important ones seem to excellent media professionals on the media be the fact that projects were mainly devel- scene. However, media in general were not oped ad hoc, lacking strategic approach 58 Normalisation with/out International Community Media System in B&H: How the International Community Intervention has Failed

and coordination between various actors. Finally, donor coordination has The assistance lacked a coherent design, proved to be an important factor in as donors of various orientations, aims and media reforms. There were signifi- agendas failed to coordinate. International cant conceptual differences in the ap- support achieved many tangible results, proaches to media assistance among but, due to the lack of interplay with and donors – especially between Euro- support from local decision-makers, these peans and Americans. Donors made results are continuously challenged. some attempts to coordinate their As Tarik Jusić and Nidžara Ahmetašević activities, but it was not an easy task (2013) notice, there were several shortcom- to implement as they were largely ings of external assistance: unable to achieve a consensus on Imported models that were used as models of mutual cooperation (Jusić, a blueprint for institutional reforms Ahmetašević, 2013). sometimes did not correspond to the In the past few years we have been wit- local setting; nessing a decrease in the interest of the Much attention has been given to the international community in the media in issue of media dependence on donors B&H and a decrease of international support and the importance of the financial in terms of funds. However, the media sector sustainability of recipient media out- and media professionals still do need sup- lets and institutions; port. The key question is: what kind of sup- To a certain extent, international ac- port do the media in B&H need in order to tors attempted to establish coop- become more efficient as pillars of democ- eration with local politicians and racy and tools for defending public interest the media community, although the in Bosnia-Herzegovina? How can the inter- combined effects of a post-conflict national community in the future contribute society along with ethnic divisions to a more professional media scene in this and a slow democratic transition left country? In other words: what do we need a very limited window of opportunity and what can the international community for substantial cooperation with local offer in the future? If one were to search for a decision-makers; key word for future media reform and inter- Scholars emphasize the importance vention of the international community in of international actors monitoring re- Bosnia-Herzegovina, then the key word cipient governments, criticizing them, would without a doubt be: a strategy. exerting pressure on them, and using sanctions. This is confirmed by the ex- perience of media assistance in B&H;

Sources: Jusić T., Ahmetašević N. (2013). International Media Assistance in Bosnia and Her- zegovina: Lessons Learned. Policy Brief No. 10, Sarajevo: Analitika – Center for Social Research. Tajić L. (2013). Medijska pismenost u BiH. Sarajevo: Internews, available also on: http://www.internews.ba/sites/default/files/resursi/Medijska%20pismenost%20 u%20BiH_0.pdf Tajić L., Turčilo L. (2014). Media and Information Literacy Policies in B&H. avail- able at: http://ppemi.ens-cachan.fr/data/media/colloque140528/rapports/BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA_2014.pdf Turčilo L. (2011). Zaradi pa vladaj: politika-mediji-biznis u globalnom društvu i u Bosni i Hercegovini. Sarajevo: Vlastita naklada. Remembering the Expulsions from Krajina 1991-1995 Normalisation with/out International Community 59

Remembering the Expulsions from Krajina 1991-1995 The Croatian and Serbian experience

Vesna Teršelič

More than 20 years since the beginning of It takes great effort to promote the wars between, and subsequently within then-Yugoslav republics, as well as since the a multi-perspective approach establishment of the International Criminal instead of a simplified war Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), narration. Celebration of the the peace process remains unfinished. The victors should be supplemented question of how to remember more than with serious historical research 130,000 persons killed in the wars from 1991 to 2001 and how to finally clarify the showing a more nuanced and fate of 13,000 persons who are still missing, complex picture of war events. becomes more and more pressing with the Unfortunately, the post-Yugoslav passing of time. Instead of recognition, the countries remain among the politics of memory recently became even far-too-numerous states that are more confrontational. The scapegoating of independent journalists and human rights still struggling to deal with their activists reinforces the fear of challenging violent past. the dominant narrative of war. Only part of the several millions of refu- hostilities many wanted to return, but faced gees who have had to flee from their homes very serious obstacles. Thousands of them in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Kosovo still live in Serbia as refugees1. returned to their towns. Most are still scat- This text focuses on the fate of the dis- tered in different countries and continents, placed from Krajina and their continued gradually giving up hope of ever returning to plight of displacement, in the context of their homelands. the still-tense relationship between Croa- The War in Croatia, which started in tia and Serbia. The returnees have mostly 1991 with the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs been elderly farmers whose houses were (mostly Croats) from approximately 30% of not destroyed or occupied and who receive the territory; followed by the destruction of modest pensions from the government. The the town of Vukovar by the fire of the Yugo- slavian People’s Army and Serb units, and 1 Most of the 700 collection centers that offered shelter artillery attacks by the Yugoslavian Army and to refugees in 1996 were supposed to be closed by the Montenegrin units that seriously damaged end of 2016. Currently, 9 centers in Central Serbia and 8 in Kosovo are still the only home for several Dubrovnik, ended in mid-1995, following hundred refugees, often living in appalling conditions. the Operation Flash and Operation Storm. Besides hundreds in collection centers, 17,000 refugee families live in Serbia in private accommodation. At the end of these operations, Croatia had Some of the collection centers now also host asylum reclaimed all of its territory except the UNPA seekers. The most visited collective center, and the one Sector East, i.e. a portion of Slavonia border- closest to the newsrooms, is in "Ivan Milutinović", a former factory 10 km from the Belgrade city center; ing Serbia. Most of the Serb population in in Kolektivni izbjeglički centar Krnjača a few hun- the reclaimed areas (around 200,000) were dred refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia and Vesna Teršelič Kosovo have lived for more than 20 years. Now it is Director of Documenta forced to leave, moving to to Bosnia-Her- also a temporary shelter for refugees from Syria (Al – Centre for Dealing with cegovina and Serbia. After the cessation of Jazeera Balkans, June 20, 2016). the Past, Zagreb. 60 Normalisation with/out International Community Remembering the Expulsions from Krajina 1991-1995

lack of employment opportunities still pre- platform6. Among them is the interview vents young and middle-aged refugees from with Nada Bodiroga, who is still searching returning to either urban or rural areas. for her missing parents; she is asking her- The still insufficiently efficient prosecu- self: "Do they know how many years have tion of war crimes and the ongoing search passed since Operation Storm?". She spent for the missing, accompanied by a failure her childhood and youth in Croatia. In 1993, to acknowledge the suffering of victims and she started her studies in Belgrade. Her par- survivors, keeps the wounds of war open. Of ents remained in Croatia, in their home in the 677 deaths of civilians during and after Slavsko Polje. At the outbreak of the war in the military operation Storm that were doc- the 1990s, she was in Inđija, whilst most of umented by human rights organizations,2 her family spent the war in the area of SAO which kept warning of the consequences Krajina. Following Operation Storm, her of this action, epitomized by arson, loot- elderly parents decided to remain in their ing and numerous killings of civilians that home, hoping that no one would bother remain unpunished, even systematically them since they had not participated in the covered up,3 only two cases have been pros- war in any way. Very quickly, as the columns ecuted by the Croatian Judiciary.4 of refugees were arriving to Serbia, Nada Of all the ICTY judgments rendered Bodiroga gathered from the contradictory in cases of crimes in Croatia, the Opera- information she received that there was tion Storm judgment is undoubtedly the a possibility that her parents might have most controversial. Generals Gotovina and been killed. Her search for her parents went Markač were unanimously convicted in trial on for years until one day in 2000, when she and sentenced to 24 and 18 years in prison saw an article in the Politika daily newspa- respectively, only to be acquitted on appeal per, which mentioned the murder of her by a three-two majority of Judges Meron, parents on the doorstep of their house in Güney and Robinson against Judges Pocar Slavsko Polje. During her efforts to find her and Agius. In the two judgments – relying parents, with all the accompanying misfor- on the same facts and the same law – the tune, she became ill with multiple sclerosis. Trial and Appeals Chambers judges came to Based on the information that she got from diametrically opposite conclusions on key the newspaper, she started the search for issues contested in trial by both the Pros- her parents’ remains. Thanks to her persis- ecution and Defence5. tence, an exhumation was carried out, but How is the exodus from Krajina remem- the remains were burnt to such an extent bered? How are the survivors’ stories told that it made identification impossible. She and retold in Croatia and Serbia? In Serbia, is a member of the Association of Families of the narrative is focused on the suffering of Missing and Killed Persons, ‘Suza’, and she families of refugees, and in Croatia on its still hopes that one day she will be able to victory. bury her parents and mark their grave. Some of the personal memories of the Marina Maglov, who was fired after the violent 20th century, including memories war, said: "I had to suffer twice, first during of Operation Storm and its aftermath, are the war because I was a Croat, and then after accessible on the Croatian Memories web the war because I was a Croat who stayed and lived with the Serbs." She lived in a mixed marriage; her husband is of Ortho- dox faith. At the beginning of the war in the 1990s, they decided not to leave their home 2 See more on the killings in: Hrvatski helsinški odbor and to remain in Knin. In the period from za ljudska prava (2001), Vojna operacija "Oluja" i poslije. Izvještaj. Zagreb: HHO. 1991 to 1995, she lived with her husband 3 Press release on unprosecuted crimes committed and children in the area of SAO Krajina and during and immediately after the military operation witnessed changing economic and social "Storm", 13 April 2011: http://www.documenta.hr/ assets/files/pdf%20za%20priopcenja/366_Press_Re- trends. At the same time, a part of her fam- lease_Non-prosecuted_Crimes_operation_Storm.pdf ily lived in western Slavonia. During the war, 4 Two cases processed by the Croatian judiciary which were monitored by human rights organizations were Serb paramilitary units killed two of her the crime in Prokljan and Mandići: http://www.docu- uncles. At the time of Operation Storm, she menta.hr/en/crime-in-prokljan-and-mandi%C4%87i. was in Belgrade for medical treatment. Not html and the crime in Grubori: http://www.documenta. hr/en/crime-in-grubori.html 5 See more on ICTY proceedings related to the Military 6 Video memories recorded by Documenta are published Operation Storm in the internet narration by the Sense on the web and can be searched by key words. More Agency called Storm in the Hague: http://snv.hr/oluja- than 80 narrators talk about the Storm. http://www. u-haagu/oluja-en.html croatianmemories.org/en/video-search/ Remembering the Expulsions from Krajina 1991-1995 Normalisation with/out International Community 61

knowing about the newly developed situ- ation, she tried to return to Knin exactly at Instead of searching for ways to the time when Operation Storm was being represent the complex nature carried out. She ended up in refuge in Inđija, of the war, in which images where she spent two months before return- of military struggle would be ing to Knin with her children. Her husband returned to Knin in 1997. Today she lives in complemented with images of Knin and is unemployed. the suffering of civilian popula- Memories like theirs are not often pub- tion, the usual political manipula- licly presented in Croatia. The mainstream tion prevailed. Besides, neither narrative in Croatia was framed in the "offi- Croatia nor Serbia have legally cial interpretation" of the war events in the Declaration on the Homeland War passed recognized the suffering of the by the Croatian Parliament in 20007 and a victims. separate declaration on Operation Storm8 in 2006, underlining the heroic victory in the picture of war events as soon as possible. liberation struggle as its main characteristic. Unfortunately, the post-Yugoslav countries There is significant political and social pres- remain among the far-too-numerous states sure to stick to that interpretation. In the that are still struggling to deal with their vio- very intense memory wars between defend- lent past. ers of freedom of expression and would-be A telling example of the memory wars censors, some even go as far as the Zagreb linked to the public representation of County Court judge Turudić, who publicly the military operation Storm is the failed proposed penalizing the public expression attempt to introduce a more complex, of opinions which differ from those set multi-layered representation of the War of down in the Parliamentary Declarations9. the 90’s in the history textbooks. An attempt The social and political pressure to stick was made to reform history teaching after to only one acceptable interpretation of the expiration of the Moratorium on history historical events, framed as the only truth, teaching on the history of former Yugoslavia is nothing new. Dominant narratives, which and its republics in between 1989-1997, pro- revolved around veterans who defended hibiting history teaching in Eastern Croatia the country from a powerful enemy, were (UNTAES)10 from the school year 1997/98 to characteristic of the aftermath of the WWI 2002/03. To this purpose, the Addendum to in the first Yugoslavia, with the heroism of Textbook for newer History was prepared by mostly Serbian veterans who fought on the a group of historians and history teachers. Solun (Thessaloniki) Front in its centre. Two photos, of victory and exodus, con- After WWII, the official narrative in Social- trasting images of Croatian soldiers being ist Yugoslavia was focused on the Partisans, welcomed in Zagreb and the Serb popula- who won the liberation war as part of the tion leaving Croatia after Operation Storm, Anti-Nazi coalition. Finally, in the Republic followed by proposed questions for discus- of Croatia, the dominant war narrative has sion with pupils, that were published on the Croatian soldiers in its centre. This is not same page of the Addendum, have caused all that different from the simplified his- such fierce public debate fraught with ver- torical narratives of many other countries, bal violence towards the authors of the with heroes as their cornerstone. It takes Addendum, that it was never published by great effort to promote a multi-perspective the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education approach instead of a simplified war nar- and Sports, which had ordered its prepara- ration. Although the need to celebrate the tion. It was later published by Documenta11. victors is understandable in the immedi- ate aftermath of the war, it should be sup- 10 The United Nations Transitional Administration for plemented with serious historical research Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium showing a more nuanced and complex (UNTAES) was a UN peacekeeping mission in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, the eastern parts of Croatia, between 1996 and 1998, established 7 Deklaracija o Domovinskom ratu, http://narodne- by the United Nations Security Council Resolution novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/274008.html 1037 of January 15, 1996. 8 Deklaracija o Oluji, http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/ 11 See Koren, Snježana; Najbar-Agičić, Magdalena; sluzbeni/127530.html Jakovina, Tvrtko (2007) Dodatak udžbenicima za 9 Croatian Law should penalise attacks on War, Judge najnoviju povijest. U: Jedna povijest, više historija. Says, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/ Dodatak udžbenicima s kronikom objavljivanja croatian-judge-advocates-legal-definition-of-1990s- (2007) Zagreb: Documenta – Centar za suočavanje s war/1431/5 prošlošću. 62 Normalisation with/out International Community Remembering the Expulsions from Krajina 1991-1995

Any hope to see a more inclusive atti- The crucial questions that remain: tude in the media coverage and remem- "Does the Croatian public want to know brance events organized in July, August and what happened to the victims? Does the September each year in Croatia and Serbia, Serbian public want to come to grips with is gradually fading away. Since the year 2015, the military victory of the Croatian forces? separate official events, attended by the Do we all want to know how the refugees live highest political representatives, have been now? Are we aware of their suffering? Are organized in Knin and Belgrade. On the 20th Croatia and other post-Yugoslav countries anniversary of the Victory, a military parade doing enough to support them? So far the held in the Croatian capital Zagreb was answer is sound: "Not yet." added to the ceremonies, even further sepa- Unfortunately, the absence of interest in rating the public representations of the mili- dealing with the legacy of Operation Storm tary operation Storm. Instead of searching "at home" in an inclusive manner will not for ways to represent the complex nature of be seriously questioned by international the war, in which images of military struggle organisations, as long as the European would be complemented with images of the Union lacks a clear institutional commit- suffering of civilian population, the usual ment to the right to know and the right to political manipulation prevailed. Besides, justice. neither Croatia nor Serbia have legally rec- ognized the suffering of the victims.

Literature: Bužinkić, Emina (ed.) (2013) Working on Dealing with the Past. Handbook for Civil Society Organizations, Zagreb: Documenta – Centar za suočavanje s prošlošću. Hrvatski helsinški odbor za ljudska prava (2001) Vojna operacija "Oluja" i poslije. Izvje- štaj. Zagreb: HHO. Kardov, Kruno; Lalić, Dražen; Teršelič, Vesna (2010) Suočavanje s prošlošću u Hrvat- skoj: Stavovi i mišljenja aktera i javnosti u poraću, Zagreb: Documenta – Centar za suočavanje s prošlošću. Koren, Snježana; Najbar-Agičić, Magdalena; Jakovina, Tvrtko (2007) Dodatak udžbe- nicima za najnoviju povijest. U: Jedna povijest, više historija. Dodatak udžbenicima s kronikom objavljivanja (2007), Zagreb: Documenta – Centar za suočavanje s prošlo- šću. Žunec, Ozren (2007) Goli život. Socijetalne dimenzije pobune Srba u Hrvatskoj. t. I and II. Zagreb: Demetra. Environmental Protection in Albania Normalisation with/out International Community 63

Environmental Protection in Albania Decision Makers, the International Community and the Role of Civil Society

Lavdosh Ferruni

Two years ago, the European Council Clientelism is always camouflaged by the needs granted Albania candidate status for mem- bership in the European Union. An abso- for the development of the economy and welfare lute majority of Albanian citizens, as well as of communities. The actors in clientelist deals 100% of politicians, welcome membership might not be only businesspeople or national in the EU despite the problems the EU itself politicians, but also leaders of other states, faces nowadays. To express that will, a lot of international financial institutions and so on. work has been done on adopting EU legisla- tion in Albania, often simply by copying it. Decision making in Albania has failed to respect Another interesting thing is that in these 25 EU recommendations, even now that it has the years, Albania has ratified each and every status of an EU candidate, as well as interna- international convention proposed. So on tional institutions’ standards and internationals paper there is good progress, in terms of the conventions. EU reports, but in terms of decision making, Albania is far from applying and reflecting good practice coming from the interna- civil society has played an important role, tional community. The most fitting explana- particularly these last 15 years, and this role tion is that decision-making is simply highly is becoming more and more important. biased and clientelist. Although corruption is not the topic of this article, it is evident that clientelist The case of the waste decision making is always associated with a incinerator outside Tirana long-term negative impact on environment. Clientelism of course is always camouflaged In 2004, it was secretly decided to import by the needs for the development of the garbage in huge quantities from Italy, to be economy and welfare of communities. The burned in the outskirts of Tirana. The con- actors in clientelist deals might not be only tract was signed by two ministers, and was businesspeople or national politicians, but ready for the final signatures to be added. also leaders of other states, international The Italian contractor was Francesco Bec- financial institutions and so on. It is proven chetti, who had previously also got a con- that decision making in Albania has failed cession for a hydro-power plant on the Vjosa to respect EU recommendations, even now river, whose construction was started and that it has the status of an EU candidate, then stopped several years ago, but he is still as well as international institutions’ stand- in the game. Now this contractor is under ards and internationals conventions. In investigation for money laundering. The approaching the most adequate decision affair was detected and an immediate cam- making according to good practices and paign was organized by a group of NGOs the most environmentally friendly devel- and stakeholders. Civil society organisa- opment processes, in addition to the role tions were joined by the media and eventu- Lavdosh Ferruni played by international actors, the Albanian ally the contract was not signed. Executive Director, Organic Agriculture in Albania 64 Normalisation with/out International Community Environmental Protection in Albania

"The colorful buildings of Tirana" by Charles Roffey, CC-BY-NC-SA 2.0

The case of the Thermal the Pindus Mountains to the Adriatic Sea – it Power Plant in Vlora flows freely without any artificial obstacles. In mid-April this year, the European In the EU progress report ten years ago it Parliament criticized the Albanian govern- was written that the Thermal Power Plant ment for planning hydro-power projects of Vlora should not be constructed, because and called upon them to be more consider- it would not be economically viable. Thou- ate of protected areas and other sensitive sands of citizens organized many protests nature areas, especially national parks. In against the TPP in Vlora, but the Govern- the current Enlargement Report that was ment continued with the wrong decision adopted by the parliament in Brussels, the of building it. The TPP of Vlora was finished Vjosa river is specifically mentioned. The in 2009, but is still not operational. It seems European Parliament "Calls on the Albanian that just to justify the spectacular failure it is government to control the development of planned to construct a 30 km pipeline from hydropower plants in environmentally sen- Fier to the Vlora TPP. Indeed, up to now there sitive areas such as around Vjosa River as has been no agreement confirming that the well as in protected areas and to maintain Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which is going to the integrity of existing national parks; rec- connect Albania and Italy, passing through ommends improving the quality of environ- the coast of Fier, but not before 2019, might mental impact assessments, which would have to branch to Vlora. So besides the 100 allow account to be taken of EU standards million EUR spent on construction, there as established by the Birds and Habitats has been a lot of money spent on the main- Directives and the Water Framework Direc- tenance, without knowing what the final tive; encourages the Albanian Government outcome would be. to increase transparency through public participation and consultation on planned projects." (No. 23 in the EU Enlargement The recent case of the Report). However, in contrast to this request, the government under Prime Minster Edi "epidemic" of hydro power Rama has only recently invited tenders for plants in Albania and the a large hydropower plant on the Vjosa. Con- Vjosa case struction companies from all over the world were encouraged to apply for a concession An unprecedented positive case happened before March 17, 2016. The Turkish com- when the European Parliament discussed pany Ayen, together with construction com- an environmental issue in Albania, which pany Cinar-San, won a tender to construct shows that the environment cannot be the 99.5 MW Poçem hydropower plant on neglected in Albania any more; the debate Vjosa River. was clearly focused on a specific issue, the "Albania is an EU candidate state and protection of the Vjosa river. The Vjosa is it would be disastrous if the most valuable Europe’s last big wild river outside Russia. natural treasures the country has to offer Along its course of 270 kilometres – from would be lost beforehand. At the very least, Environmental Protection in Albania Normalisation with/out International Community 65

All the environmental organisations in Albania are in full consensus that there is unjustified ignoring of solar and wind energy by the government on one side, and the epidemic of building dams wherever there is a stream of water in the country on the other side. The common attitude of the civil society is that the epidemic development of HPP plants should be stopped, and particularly in the protected areas.

the government must assess the project of development of hydropower should take Poçem according to EU standards before place in conformity with EU environmen- issuing a license for its construction", Ulrike tal legislation. The law on energy efficiency Lunacek, Vice-President of the European in buildings has not yet been adopted by parliament has said. And the further com- the parliament. Albania missed its Energy ment is that choosing a Turkish company Community deadline to align its law with means avoiding EU standards and not com- the 2006 Directive on Energy End-Use Effi- plying with EU directives. ciency and Energy Services. More generally, as it is mentioned in All the environmental organisations the key findings of the 2015 report Albania, in Albania are in full consensus that there the country should continue work on the is unjustified ignoring of solar and wind development of its energy network within energy by the government on one side, and the framework of the regional connectivity the epidemic of building dams wherever agenda. Stepping up the diversification of there is a stream of water in the country on energy sources and the functioning of the the other side. The common attitude of the electricity market are vital for economic civil society is that the epidemic develop- development. Since Albania is a country ment of HPP plants should be stopped, and where 100% of electricity is generated from particularly in the protected areas. Some hydropower, there is a need for solar and organisations are quite active. The cam- wind energy to help in diversifying energy paign to have the Vjosa and Valbona rivers sources. Practically, 0 KWh are produced free of dams is intense. It is important that from these renewable energy sources. At local communities are seriously involved to the same time, Kosovo generates almost protect the environment and their rights. 100% of its energy from fossil fuels, which The movement is strengthened by the fact precludes the need to further develop such that it is in line with EU directives, as well energy sources. Because of that, the Energy as the international community in general. community sent a reasoned request in Although civil society in Albania May in 2015 on Albania’s failure to submit remains fragmented and overly dependent a renewable energy action plan, in spite of on donor funding, in many important situ- the fact that Albania is considered to be a ations in the country it has been an agent renewable energy based country, due to in the development processes in this long the fact 100% of its electricity generation transition period. comes from hydro sources. So, any further WHO WE ARE

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Publication information Publisher Heinrich Böll Foundation, Office for BiH On behalf of the publisher: Marion Kraske Publication Date November 2016 Editor-in-Chief Srđan Dvornik Language editing Hana Dvornik Proofreading Srđan Dvornik Cover Page Photo Vanco Džambaski, Foundation Open Society Institute Macedonia, CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 Layout / Typesetting TRIPTIH Printed by Amos Graf do.o.o. Sarajevo Opinions expressed in the articles are those of their authors and not Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung. All articles in this publication are subject to Creative Commons License CC BY-NC-ND 3.0