The Pedagogy of Security

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The Pedagogy of Security THE PEDAGOGY OF SECURITY: Police assistance and liberal governmentality in American foreign policy Daniel Pinéu Department of International Politics 1 To my family, who opened all the doors. And to Andrea, who walked through them with me. 2 Table of Contents Acknowledgements 8 Abbreviations 14 INTRODUCTION 1. The empire strikes back? Liberal imperialism and imperial policing 16 1.1 Imperial policing, some key themes 19 1.2.Contemporary policebuilding in the context of U.S. Intervention 24 2. Theoretical framework and methodology 32 2.1. Theoretical framework, some considerations 32 2.2. Methodological remarks 39 3. Chapter outline 42 Part I CHAPTER I – THE SHIFTING WOR(L)DS OF SECURITY 1. Rethinking the security field 46 1.1. Deepening the meaning of security 47 1.2. Widening the concept of threat 48 1.3 The rise of human security 49 2. Globalisation and shifting practices of security 51 2.1. The erosion of the inside/outside divide 52 2.2. New forms of agency, new practices 54 3 3. Security governance 56 3.1 Orthodox approaches - the governance of security 57 3.2. A new approach - governance through security 60 CHAPTER II – SECURITY, GOVERNANCE, POLICE 1. Thinking about liberal governmentality 68 1.1. The arts of government 68 2. Welfare, security, population - thinking about the police 72 3. Making people up 78 3.1. Liberalism and its Others 79 4. Globalising logics 83 4.1. Globalising crime, criminalising the global 83 4.2. Globalising police? Early dimensions 85 Foucault on inter-national aspects of “police” in Europe “International social defence” – the origins of international police co- operation 4.3. The globalisation of policing in U.S. foreign policy - between pastorate and pedagogy 89 Part II CHAPTER III – FROM CONSTABULARY TO CONSULTANT - THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICEBUILDING REGIMES, 1880S-1980S 1. A new security frontier? Early U.S. policebuilding abroad 91 2. Early efforts (1898-1945) 93 4 2.1. Caribbean blues 94 2.2. World War II police assistance and reform 102 2.3. The gradual retreat from a constabulary strategy 106 3. 'Foreign internal security assistance' – the Cold War years 108 3.1. Policebuilding as anticommunism – the Office of Public Safety (1962-1974) 108 3.2. An exceptional decade (1975-1985) 113 4. Building law enforcement institutions worldwide since 1986 – enter the ICITAP 116 4.1. The ICITAP in its own words 116 4.2. Promise and problems with the ICITAP 120 CHAPTER IV - MODULATING DOMAINS OF INSECURITY - THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. POLICEBUILDING REGIMES FROM CLINTON TO BUSH 1. The Clinton legacy 124 1.1. Shifting the national security agenda 125 1.2. Confronting new threats, creating new institutions 127 1.3. Brave new world – U.S. intervention & policebuilding in the 1990s 130 Somalia and Operations Restore Hope Transition to UNOSOM II and the Somali Police Summary - lessons learned from Somalia 1.4. Lessons learned - PDD-71 and the future of policebuilding under Clinton 139 Looking back, looking forward - justifications for PDD-71 Local ownership of police development 2. The Bush transition 149 2.1. Modulating a new insecurity domain – state-failure and 'ungoverned spaces' as security problems 149 2.2. Back to the drawing board? Bush administration policebuilding strategies 156 The death of PDD-71? The military loves metrics! Developing expert knowledge about post- 5 conflict policebuilding Conclusions 164 CHAPTER V – THE PRACTICES OF POLICEBUILDING - AMERICAN POLICE ASSISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2008 1. New beginnings – U.S. policebuilding efforts in Afghanistan 167 1.1. Plugging the security gap 171 2. Early days – 2002-2006 173 2.1. The Geneva process, SSR and 'lead nations' 173 2.2. The INL steps in – the Afghan Police Program 175 3. New developments - 2005-2008 177 3.1. The Pentagon steps in – DoD directive 3000.05 177 3.2. CSTC-A and the Police Reform Directorate 180 The initial curricula 3.3. Focused District Development – the way forward? 189 3.4. “The Afghan government gave them the authority, the U.S. military gave them the skill” – FDD and the pedagogy of security 192 Screening, vetting and biometrics Mentoring 4. The thinning blue line? 202 4.1. The militarisation of ANP training and deployments 203 Training Deployment of the ANP in militarised settings 4.2. Concluding remarks 210 CONCLUSION 212 6 APPENDIX 1 229 REFERENCES 240 7 Acknowledgements Writing a doctoral dissertation, I am now acutely aware, is considerably less than I expected about inspiration, and considerably more than I was told about perspiration. Several people who have preceded me in such a journey have repeatedly used the metaphor of giving birth - and I must say, albeit from the clueless side of the gender divide, that it strikes me as an excellent metaphor. As with pregnancy, the initial joys are inevitably followed by ever-increasing discomfort, and the final moments are as painful as they are rewarding. A PhD, much like I child I guess, is all your dreams and hopes after life’s circumstances are done with them. It’s the best you could do, given the constraints. And in the end, the hardest thing is knowing when to let go. The present work would not have been possible without the generous funding from the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) through a doctoral grant. Beyond this institutional debt, in going through such a journey, I have inevitably incurred in many other personal and intellectual debts of gratitude. I am standing on the shoulder of giants, whom I would like to warmly acknowledge. At the Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth, Richard Wyn Jones’ friendly support was instrumental in getting me started, keeping me on track and getting me the best supervision I could have hoped for - Richard, thanks for making me jump through the hoops! Dr. Ayla Gol and Dr. Peter Jackson have been extremely supportive in their interim supervisory roles, and Peter in particular read through several drafts. For enduring my poor style and my obscure passages, and for his detailed and extremely helpful suggestions, I am very grateful to him indeed. Since my arrival at the department, I have benefited from Andrew Linklater’s intellectual acumen, but most importantly from his personal warmth - and many a bibliophile 8 conversation. He is generous with his time and his knowledge to a fault, and a master at making you feel that his great suggestions were actually your great ideas. Both as a critical scholar, and as a human being, he sets the bar very high indeed for the rest of us. The Department has provided me with the most congenial intellectual environment I have so far experienced. I am grateful to the immensely talented staff, and my brilliant postgraduate colleagues, from whom I have learned a lot - I hope some of their wisdom has rubbed off on me. Finally, the departmental administrative staff were always exceptially helpful in all matter sbureaucratic and logistic. To Donia and Vicky in particular I would like to thank for making the last steps as painless and uncomplicated as possible. In Washington, Peter Mandaville proved an indefatigale host at the Center for Global Studies, in George Mason University. Not only did he open his door for me, and offered sage advice on conducting my interviews in Washington, he actually went out of his way to arrange some of those interviews. Being his usual generous self, he has also graciously offered to take time from his insanely busy schedule to read my final draft. For all his support and his knindness I am extremely thankful. Also at GMU, the staff at the Center for Global Studies - and especially Andrea Zizak and Vanessa Noel - were instrumental in guiding me through the administrative hurdles, and making my stay there a great experience. At the Peace Operations Policy Program, David Davies and Allison Frendak opened their doors to me and my incessant questions, and pointed me in the right direction. Roger Carstens is the embodiement of the phrase “an officer and a gentleman”, and I am glad to acknowledge his friendship. Not only did he provide many an hour of thoughtful engagement with my views of American foreign policy, he also opened many doors for me in Washington. That he got me some of my most crucial high-level interviews at the Pentagon shows both his generosity and his skill as a D.C. operator. Finally, I am indebted to everyone who made time 9 to sit with me and answer my questions. They made this critique of American foreign policy possible, all the while making it more difficult by challenging all my stereotypes. Travelling to Pakistan and Afghanistan was a wonderful experience that had an enormous impact on this project, and also on myself. The hospitality of my many hosts in both countries was nothing short of epic - and they were instrumental in starting my love affair with those two countries. In Pakistan, I benefited from the hospitality of the Department of Sociology at the University of Punjab, Lahore. Dr. Muhammad Hafeez was a very gracious host. Riffat Munawar, Rahla Rahat, and Dr. Ashraf Kayani were wonderfully hospitable to me and my wife, and were the best guides to the vibrant culture and life of Lahore. In Islamabad, I am indebedt to Aazar and Fouzia Yazdani and their beautiful family, as well as Sajid and Ibtizam Qasrani, for their hospitality and their friendship. Norewigian Ambassador Janis Kanavis gave generously of his time, and provided me with a wealth of information of European efforts in terms of policing, access to justice and rule of law initiatives in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kabul has now become a sort of home away from home.
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