The Soldier and the Street: East African CIMIC in Somalia and Beyond
BY MARIE BESANÇON AND STEPHEN DALZELL1
he African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a watershed in African security – a truly multinational, all African, peace support operation.2 While there will be many stra- T tegic, operational, and tactical lessons to be drawn from this experience, one that is already yielding changes within African military forces is the awareness of the need for effective civil- military operations (CMO) to complement other components of the campaign. Not only are the AMISOM leaders and units adapting on the ground, the troop-contributing countries (TCC) are implementing changes in their organizations and training programs at home. For the “tactician” in global security, this poses interesting questions regarding the operational role of CMO and its impact on regional security; strategically, it is important to evaluate how this increased awareness of CMO is driving changes in East African armed forces and the implications for civil-military relations in all the countries involved. The AMISOM Experience with CMO
A 2012 Africa Union Commission Report estimates that it will be 2020 before Somalia is stable enough for AMISOM troops to entirely withdraw.3 Between now and then, the daunting task for the Somalis is to solidify professional military and police institutions to secure the internal and external safety of the population. In the meantime, how long will it be before the local population begins to view the AMISOM forces as an occupying army, if they don’t already?4 What can the TCCs and the soldiers on the ground do to promote positive relations with the Somali people, government, and civil society? What should the role of the American military be in this endeavor? As the AMISOM troops slowly encroach upon the Islamic insurgents’ (al-Shabaab) territory militarily, what can appease the local population while the Somali government stabilizes and embeds its brand of African/Muslim consensual democracy politically?5 Western military doctrine
Dr. Marie Besançon was head of the Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Team for the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa from 2010-2013. She is a Senior Fellow at the TransResearch Consortium. Dr. Stephen Dalzell is a professorial lecturer in the School of International Service, American University.
PRISM 5, no. 2 FEATURES | 11 7 BESANÇON & DALZELL suggests effective CMO planned and con- 1999; then re-formed in 2004, and expanded ducted by the AMISOM forces could help this to include the opposition in 2008 with the process; this is occurring to a certain degree Djibouti Peace Agreement.7 already. As the population grows restless and The advent of the Islamic Courts Union in al-Shabaab is not yet defeated, there is little the mid-2000s, fairly strict Islamic law, and doubt that the presence of the AMISOM forces militias hired by wealthy businessmen together in Somalia may be needed for quite some rendered some stability to the otherwise vola- time.6 tile country. However, Ethiopia and the U.S. had concerns about Somali collaboration with Somali Backdrop to AMISOM terrorists, and Ethiopia invaded in late 2006, In a country divided by complex clan ties, in staying through 2009. Somalis tended to back the past 40 years Somalia’s attempts at gover- the Islamic militias (al-Shabaab being the nance have included nine years of democracy, major faction evolving after the invasion) in a dictator (General Siad Barre), warlords, the face of foreign invaders.9 The Islamic insur- UN/U.S. troops, three transitional govern- gents have varying goals, ranging from uniting ments, an Islamic ruling structure (Islamic Somalia under an Islamic regime to worldwide Courts Union), Ethiopian troop occupiers, al- jihad.10 These insurgents are still in control of Shabaab insurgents, and AMISOM. The forma- large parts of southern Somalia and are present tion of the temporary governments with the throughout the country in a diffused form, help of the international community began in which makes them difficult to defeat, causing Courtesy of UPDF PAO
Ugandan forces interacting with Somali civilians, 2013
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concern to Somalia’s neighbors and the U.S.11 AMISOM and Somali National Army (SMA) The current government (Federal Government soldiers, securing the territory is challenging.14 of Somalia– FGS) was formed through a rep- In a recent interview leading Somalia resentative parliament in 2012, which then expert Roland Marchal discussed al-Shabaab’s voted for the president.12 The FGS, with all of short- and medium-term strategies.15 its flaws, has managed to reach fragile agree- “Shabaab will get weaker, will be less numer- ments with the “clan-states” of Jubbaland and ous, but will survive and will try to capitalize Puntland, and to make some progress with on any political crisis that may take place in plans for services badly needed by Somalis. Somalia and elsewhere.”16 Other experts like Additionally the Rahanweyn have formed a Andre Le Sage have similar opinions on the separate state backed by the FGS.13 AMISOM ability of al-Shabaab to regroup, remain strong forces can both limit further violence and help and continue operations in other regions, fill some of the roles in providing services nor- again indicating the need for a strong support mally provided by a government until the cur- force while Somalia builds.17 Al-Shabaab rent government matures. might not control people and territory, but it can terrorize, so it remains a force to contend The Conflict Continues with Pockets of Ceasefire with. The coordinated and planned attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in News reports and military situation reports September 2013 demonstrated an interna- indicate that the only real peace in southern tional capability.18 As AMISOM has increased Somalia is in areas controlled by African and reclaimed territory from al-Shabaab, so Union (AU) peacekeepers – peace enforcers. have al-Shabaab’s ties to al-Qaeda increased. Areas in and around the airport in Mogadishu, Le Sage contends al-Shabaab is doing the where foreign aid and military groups have same thing it did in 2007 following Ethiopia’s bases and compounds, are fairly secure, but invasion, it is re-forming the mugawama/muqa- the growing force of Somali police and soldiers wama (resistance), using assassinations, attacks have training and corruption issues as well as and intimidation.19 While some al-Shabaab supply issues. Monthly attacks by al-Shabaab fighters are retreating to Puntland and others have not diminished over the past few years, are disappearing into their clan families, they and in fact spiked somewhat during the latest are leaving weapons stashes and secret safe Ramadan season and have been on the houses in their wake.20 In the format of cell increase since the end of 2013 and most of groups, they depart from the district, but leave 2014. There are weekly news reports of attacks appointed al-Shabaab emirs. In Galgala, the al- against government officials, IEDs (improvised Shabaab strategy was to recruit some of the explosive devices), assassinations, rocket-pro- smaller, discontented clans, then take over pelled grenades, and even suicide bombers, their districts. They promote destabilization in and attacks by al-Shabaab and others by an area, and follow up by offering themselves groups wanting to affect politics. With as the security provider.21 In summary, Somalia Somalia’s large geographical area, a relatively remains insecure, poor and without a strong small population, and the small number of central government providing services, justice, and voice to the people.
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CIMIC and the AMISOM Forces black, Christian troops from countries that are Somalia’s traditional enemies has invaded a The African Union Commission’s strategic xenophobic Muslim country infamous for its review of AMISOM in 2013 says; violent tribal politics.24 Problems regularly follow military troops Since the deployment of a civil affairs deployed in populated areas for extended capacity, the mission has contributed in the lengths of time: discipline, insubordination, reinvigoration of local governance institu- human rights abuses and corruption among tions, especially in Mogadishu. AMISOM’s others. The locals tolerate this as little from mandate includes the facilitation of foreign troops as from domestic soldiers. humanitarian assistance, and the mission AMISOM troops were alleged to have commit- has contributed to enhanced coordination ted gang rape in the fall of 2013 and even ear- with humanitarian agencies, NGOs and lier.25 Furthermore, certain TCC forces (and the the FGS. In addition, AMISOM has, Somalis) claim that other TCC forces only through its Humanitarian Affairs section remain because of the huge income from the and the Civil-Military Coordination UN/AU, and that they do not attack or pursue (CIMIC) branch of the Force (as a last al-Shabaab, but simply occupy space already resort) provided access to free medical care, secured. Lynch says that as of late 2012, free potable water supply and, in some Kenyan soldiers were not running patrols into instances, basic food items to civilians. Kismayo, but staying inside their bases rather AMISOM hosted its first CIMIC confer- than interacting with civilians, understanding ence in Mogadishu September 19, 2013, where their environment and running a counterin- CIMIC officers in Somalia came together to surgency campaign. Some reports claim that share their experiences on implementing the AMISOM runs “evasion tactics” rather than mission’s mandate and enhanced cooperation integration, and that AMISOM forces want the with civilians. The AU Special Representative conflict to continue.26 Nevertheless, if for Somalia, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh AMISOM troops can provide certain services Annadif, said “this initiative comes at a time and security that no one else can, their accep- when increasing interactions with civilians is tance can be secured while Somalia rebuilds. crucial to consolidate peace dividends recently CMO, CIMIC, CAO: Distinction with a gained in Somalia. Although security improve- Difference? ments have been observed, civilian popula- tions continue to be vulnerable.”22 Within the doctrine of the U.S., NATO, and CMO is particularly challenging because other Western militaries, the preferred way to the individual AU countries – particularly improve relations with the local populace is Kenya and Ethiopia – historically have had through conducting Civil Affairs Operations ulterior motives for intervening in Somalia, (CAO) or similar activities. Reflecting its roots increasing Somali suspicion of all foreigners.23 in the occupation of the former Axis countries Meservey summarizes the challenges for the following World War II, U.S. joint doctrine foreign forces intervening in Somalia by saying includes both “coordination” tasks and the that a foreign force composed primarily of “hard CMO” of assuming roles of civil
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government as needed. This doctrine defines In practice, all of these terms are used in civil affairs as the “forces and units organized, connection with AMISOM training and opera- trained, and equipped specifically to conduct tions, partly because of the wide range of mil- civil affairs operations and to support civil- itary traditions in Africa and the variety of military operations,” and then (circularly) international actors who support training and defines CAO as the “military operations con- operations, each using their own doctrine as ducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the standard. Regardless of the label applied the relationship between military forces and on the ground, there is clearly a demand for civil authorities in localities where military this kind of activity, and an expectation that forces are present; (2) require coordination AMISOM will provide it. One UN report with other interagency organizations, intergov- stated, “No apology or amount of compensa- ernmental organizations, nongovernmental tion can give back what Somali war victims organizations, indigenous populations and and their families have lost. But our findings institutions, and the private sector; and (3) clearly show that an attempt to respond to involve application of functional specialty their suffering in this conflict can mitigate skills that normally are the responsibility of some of the consequences and return a sense civil government to enhance the conduct of of dignity to the victims and their communi- civil-military operations.” ties.”29 The Ugandans, Kenyans, Burundians CMO, a broader field, comprises all “activ- and Djiboutians now see the need for certain ities of a commander that establish, maintain, skills to deal with the civilian populations. influence, or exploit relations between military American forces contribute to CMO/CIMIC forces, governmental and nongovernmental training, probably more so in the last three civilian organizations and authorities, and the years than in prior years, when they focused on civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hos- conducting CMO in Africa (though not in tile operational area in order to facilitate mili- Somalia) – a strategy that brought its own tary operations, to consolidate and achieve challenges.30 As AMISOM began more aggres- operational U.S. objectives.” Most significantly, sively moving outside Mogadishu and these “may be performed by designated civil expanded the number of troops and troop affairs, by other military forces, or by a combi- contributing countries (TCCs) in 2012 and nation of civil affairs and other forces.”27 2013, CA forces from the Combined Joint Task These terms are closely related to CIMIC Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) conducted (Civil Military Cooperation/Coordination), multiple training events (some with field the preferred construct of most Western applications) with the Kenyans and Ugandans. European armies, which NATO doctrine The American forces conducted high-level defines as, “The co-ordination and co-opera- leadership training on CIMIC/CMO with most tion, in support of the mission, between the of the AMISOM TCCs (Burundi, Kenya, NATO Commander and civil actors, including Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda) in 2012 and national population and local authorities, as 2013. well as international, national and non-gov- ernmental organizations and agencies.”28
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The Way Ahead in Somalia Unfortunately bad behavior by the “occu- pying” and Somali forces has already aided In one of his first media interviews, Somali recruitment into al-Shabaab. “A former al-Sha- President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud said that baab fighter described how he yearned for the top three priorities in Somalia are “secu- revenge after Transitional Federal Government rity, security and security.”31 However, if citi- (TFG) soldiers behaved like animals by harass- zens do not receive jobs and services, as well ing Somalis and inappropriately touching as security, conflict will remain. Insurgent women at checkpoints. Other former fighters groups provide some of the key needs for the cited AMISOM’s bombing of towns, a practice local populace in marginalized societies, that built intense hatred toward the interna- including three areas identified by Africans in tional force, while the corruption and misbe- a 2010 conference on preventing terrorism: 1) havior of the transitional government was one justice, 2) voice, and 3) inclusion.32 Injustices of the jihadi group’s biggest recruiting tools.”35 such as land taken from minority and Regardless of the veracity of the reports, the Rahaweyn clans in southern Somalia have yet insurgents can use them as a propaganda tool to be addressed, from Siad Barre’s time until against any foreign actors in the arena. It is the today.33 If basic grievances (such as human daunting task of AMISOM and the SNA to rights abuses) and other urgent needs are not reverse these impressions. addressed, the central government will not Long-term Development of Civil Affairs have legitimacy. Former Prime Minister Abdi Forces in East Africa Farah Shirdon noted that the government has learned that winning hearts and minds will be If there were a region ripe for the development more important than bullets.34 of CA forces and CMO capabilities, it is Africa. The continent remains the most “conflicted” Voice, Services, Justice, and Inclusion in the world, in terms of ongoing conflicts, UN The most promising U.S. military contribution and regional peacekeeping operations, or most in the short run would be to enable the other metrics. Most importantly, many African Ugandans, Burundians, Djiboutians, Kenyans, militaries face a combination of internal chal- and Ethiopians to provide services to the locals lengers, external threats, and regional respon- after they secure territories, and ensure that the sibilities, all likely to have civilians on the local justice systems are empowered to render ground alongside military operations. justice on the local level while the central gov- When the U.S. military began operations ernment builds its own national justice system. in East Africa after September 11, 2001, it faced This is in addition to the other defense train- a strategic challenge. In Somalia there was a ing projects for the Somali National Army/ Salafist movement that seemed sympathetic to, Somali National Security Forces (SNA/SNSF). if not formally linked with, al-Qaeda. But the The presence of “foreign occupiers” can actu- U.S. had neither the available forces nor the ally give the local populace the “voice” they political will to put “boots on the ground” in desire if they feel their needs are being made a country that already symbolized many ways known to the international community, and military intervention can go wrong.36 The delay discontent with the occupiers over time. neighboring countries generally had stable
122 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 THE SOLDIER AND THE STREET leaders, competent militaries and cordial rela- and how these developments might impact tions with the U.S. – but some also had their broader civil-military relations in these coun- own Muslim extremists to worry about, as well tries and in international combat zones (like as challenges in sustaining the rule of law, Somalia). human rights, and democratic norms. A con- Kenya: CMO without CA tainment strategy might check the southward spread of Islamic extremism while the U.S.-led Although the Kenyans have a longstanding coalition cleaned up Afghanistan and Iraq, but Combat Engineer Brigade and a Combat only if the African partners remained a positive Engineering School, they (like most African force in the Horn of Africa and did not pour militaries) have historically considered Civil fuel on the fire with poorly executed opera- Affairs activities to be “un-military” and their tions. The U.S. solution included a range of initial interest was accordingly minimal.37 activities, including direct action, information After Kenya began operations in Somalia in operations, intelligence support, and train- October 2011 and encountered challenges in and-equip programs, but one of the pillars conducting this new type of operation, their remained the use of American CA personnel to focus broadened.38 The Kenyans began to both conduct CAO and support the develop- more fully understand the need for services on ment of African CA capabilities. The latter in the ground in combat arenas and the benefi- turn leads to questions about how these part- cial effects that the combat engineers have for ners are developing CMO doctrine and forces the populace. Kenyan clerics were specific in Courtesy of UPDF PAO
Medical Assistance Provided by UPDF Forces to Somali Civilians, 2013
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their warning that there is a risk extremist ide- the inauguration of the Kenya Army Engineers ology will return if AMISOM forces don’t take Civil Affairs Course on November 1, 2010, U.S. care of Somalia’s needs.39 Deputy Chief of Mission Lee Brudvig recog- The Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) use nized the purpose of the training was to “pre- Civil-Military Operations (abbreviated to pare the Kenyan Army Engineers in Civil “CMOPS”) as their term-of-choice in referring Affairs which will assist them in on-going to CMO/CA capacity. According to Brigadier reconstruction and development efforts across George Owino, Commander of the Kenyan the country as well as prepare them to respond Army Engineer Brigade, these are defined as quickly to inevitable disasters.”41 This would “those operations that use non-combat func- seem to fit into the country’s overall disaster tions of the military to deal with civilian func- management model, which includes local tions, or that involve the military taking on military commanders in the “District Disaster tasks typically performed by civilian authori- Management Committee,” in a subordinate ties, NGOs, or international humanitarian position to the civilian leadership.42 organizations.”40 It is important to note that By 2012, this approach had expanded to this explicitly goes beyond simple coordina- such a point that the KDF concept for CMOPS tion to encompass civilian functions. training included three pillars: 1) Building Starting around 2009, Kenya began devel- CMOPS capacity within the Engineer Corps, 2) oping a civil affairs capability focused on engi- Enhancing knowledge of how to respond to neers supporting domestic requirements. At disasters, and 3) Linking the KDF’s normal Courtesy of UPDF PAO
Militia Allied to Transitional Federal Government Mans a Sentry in Mogadishu
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humanitarian civil activities to the CA forces, with the aid of the Kenyan forces had approach through needs assessment and anal- completed more than three community proj- ysis, project identification, budgeting, interac- ects, 56 missions, 14 project assessments, and tion with affected communities, media han- 85 key leader engagements in various areas of dling and project execution.43 For the first Kenya. pillar, by 2011 the KDF had created specific Domestically, the KDF’s periodic misbe- engineer-based CA forces, as is evident from havior and inability to win the support of civil- news accounts of their activities within ians have impaired their missions. During the Kenya.44 The intent is for all KDF personnel to 2007 election violence and in areas such as receive CMOPS training, ranging from a five- Garissa and the refugee camps (e.g. Dadaab), day basic course for enlisted soldiers and a six- the media and the population criticized the week course for all officers to a ten-day plan- performance of the KDF. Human Rights Watch ning course for commanders and staff officers reported in 2012 that in Kenya; at the operational and strategic levels.45 Both the military and the police are impli- Key to these developments is the close cated in the abuses. Not only do the violent relationship developed with the U.S. CA forces and indiscriminate responses of the Kenyan based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, under security forces constitute serious human CJTF-HOA, and deployed to the Kenya Coast, rights violations, the abuses are also serving Rift Valley, and Garissa regions. Among the to alienate Kenyans of Somali origin at the first operational activities by the new Kenyan very moment when the security forces most CA forces were projects in coastal areas, with need the trust and confidence of the local Maritime CA forces from CJTF-HOA providing population in order to help identify the support and mentoring. Initially Kenyan sol- militants behind the grenade and IED diers accompanied some of the U.S. CA mis- attacks and ensure public safety.48 sions, but found them slow and irrelevant, and eventually dropped out of the missions. Kenyan troops were accused of looting in Kenyan soldiers, working out of their base in Nairobi after the terrorist attack on Westgate Manda Bay, independently conducted several Mall in 2013, a blight that the KDF will need projects helping repair churches and schools.46 to work hard to eradicate.49 The Kenyan forces The Kenyan Engineers also worked closely with are concerned about their public image and the American teams in the Rift Valley. behavior, and are working to improve training Following the 2007 Kenyan national elections, and adapting to different norms. the U.S. embassy requested that the U.S. mili- Ethics is only one area requiring both tary help rebuild the Eldoret, Rift Valley, an training and field experience. One Kenyan area that had been seriously affected by the brigadier emphasized the need for metrics in election violence. The U.S. worked closely with the centers of excellence and training such as the Kenyan engineers on these projects. This the International Peace Support Training was not a priority in the U.S. campaign to Center (IPSTC) in Kenya to make sure the stu- counter violent extremism, nor one for the dents “achieved something rather than just Kenyans, but it was an opportunity for close attended the courses.”50 Training should also cooperation.47 By the end of 2012, the U.S. cover good governance and leadership in
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addition to peacekeeping. Programs such as the first choice for regional and international the U.S. International Military Education and headquarters and training centers, which in Training (IMET) could also be used to send turn provide venues for regional sharing of Kenyan military leaders to U.S. senior corpo- best practices and new concepts. In January rate internships to learn core civilian values, as 2012 and September 2013, CJTF-HOA con- suggested by a former U.S. ambassador to ducted CMO Symposiums in Karen, Kenya, at Kenya. the IPSTC. Senior military leaders from Kenya, Several 2013 interviews with Kenyan mili- Ethiopia, Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda and tary officials and clerics yielded suggestions for mid-level military leaders from Djibouti overcoming various civil-military challenges in attended. One of the Kenyan generals who Somalia and developing closer ties with local attended the seminar in 2012 subsequently and regional organizations such as the served as Chief of Operations in Kismayo, Intergovernmental Authority on Development Somalia (and head of CA).53 Kenyan Military (IGAD), East African Standby Force (EASF), Engineers and the U.S. military planned mul- the Horn of Africa Peace Advocates, and the tiple training/sharing best practices courses for Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims.51 They 2013 and 2014, and beyond.54 also suggested each of the AMISOM units Uganda: Building CA could have an imbedded ethnic Somali, either from Somalia, or from Kenya, Djibouti or Where the Kenyan Defense Forces have Ethiopia, to overcome ethnic, language, and focused on the engineering side of CMO, the cultural differences within AMISOM and Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) has between AMISOM and the Somalis. Most of taken a broader view of CA capabilities. This all, the TCCs should take precautions to avoid may be due to a longer and more varied his- the impression of a takeover, or displacement tory of CMO, including UPDF support to relo- of Somalis. cating large numbers of civilians from areas Lastly, in order to lessen the discontent taken over by Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance over outsiders’ presence in Somalia, CMO Army (LRA) into Internally Displaced Persons could introduce quick impact projects (as have (IDP) camps and their subsequent repatriation already been planned) such as wells, dispensa- after Kony’s departure from Uganda. ries, and schools. The local population needs Additionally, the Ugandan military has par- to see tangible and useful projects. While nei- ticipated in the United Nations-African Union ther the Somalis nor the AMISOM TCCs would Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), a mission likely agree to an enduring American military focused on cooperation and coordination due presence in Somalia, short deployments of to the existence of a functioning government U.S. Functional Specialty Units for medical in Khartoum and the large number of interna- treatment would help fill the shortage of med- tional organizations and NGOs.55 Lastly, the ical treatment and evacuation facilities.52 UPDF is one of the earliest and largest troop One effect of this evolution in Kenyan contributors to AMISOM. policy and doctrine toward CMOPs training is U.S. CA teams from CJTF-HOA have been the demonstration effect it has on the region. working with the UPDF in the Karamoja For a variety of reasons, Kenya has often been Region of eastern Uganda since June 2009,
126 | FEATURES PRISM 5, no. 2 THE SOLDIER AND THE STREET aiming to help the UPDF gain the acceptance signs of UPDF buy-in on local CIMIC work, and trust of the civilian population and and CIMIC offices in Karamoja typically had a enhance security. Prior to Karamoja, U.S. single army private manning the station and teams conducted projects in Kitgum and Gulu. no funds with which to conduct operations.57 These domestic CMOs, were complemented by They usually sent one private for the regional, the increasing demand for CIMIC skills the on-site CMO training conducted by the U.S. Ugandans found in Somalia. CA teams, though CIMIC cells officially had News reports in the Karamoja region one officer and one NCO.58 CIMIC itself con- intermittently reported bad behavior by UPDF tinued to lack credibility and prestige in the soldiers towards civilians, but some NGOs UPDF, and if the U.S. military were not there, claimed that the U.S. military teams working the UPDF would likely have marginalized the with the UPDF helped add credibility and Civil Military Operation Commands legitimacy to the UPDF teams in the home- (CMOCs). By 2011, most of the CIMIC person- land.56 The Ugandans, much as the Kenyans, nel in the Karamoja region were field-grade are showing considerable proactive concern for officers and the UPDF participated in most of training and improving their track record and the projects done by the U.S. CA teams.59 The image, and learning from the international U.S. teams advocated CMO training for the community UPDF CIMIC, and indicated that the greater Ugandan CA institutions have gradually utility was in having a U.S. presence, being developed as well. In 2009-10 there were few around the UPDF, and working with them on Courtesy of UPDF PAO
Female UPDF Soldier Interacting with Somalis, 2013
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a daily basis, an approach that worked in courses agreed upon by the U.S./Ugandan Djibouti as well.60 Because of the Somalia group. The U.S. CA team conducted an exten- operations, CIMIC’s prestige grew to the point sive joint course with the UPDF at Jinja (the that the UPDF created a separate department Engineering School training center) in mid- dedicated to CIMIC and a fully operating 2013 and U.S. teams have planned training for Public Affairs Office reporting on CMO in the UPDF for the next two years. Somalia. The UPDF named Colonel Moses Ddiba At the institutional level, the UPDF had Ssentongo the first head of the new Chieftaincy begun incorporating CMO training into larger of Civil Military Cooperation, which reports efforts by 2010, and the U.S. had developed a directly to the Joint Chief of Staff. The UPDF multi-year training plan. The training base at are in the process of streamlining and crafting Kasenyi, which had focused on training “com- the structure, but are hampered by budget mando” tasks and other high-end combat restraints and implications. They are carrying activities, added a multiple-week CA course, out training at operational and tactical levels taught by CA personnel from CJTF-HOA.61 which has reportedly already improved their Later, the multi-year plan to conduct training forces and operations in the Somalia mission at Kasenyi was cut short by the UPDF – some as well as in the Central African Republic, postulated financial reasons, others personnel where the UPDF is pursuing the LRA, all in issues, and yet others cited lack of U.S. coordi- addition to the CIMIC operations in Karamoja nation with the new UPDF Chief of Operations where the UPDF are continuing their “disar- and Training. mament operations.” The CIMIC Chieftaincy Efforts to renew the training partnership collaborates currently with the Engineering led to a meeting between the U.S. CMO team Brigade and the Medical Departments in the and the UPDF in the winter of 2013 to plan UPDF.62 The proposed “CIMIC Support Unit” multiple CMO/CIMIC training seminars for would be composed of the following elements: the Uganda Battle Groups (UGABAGs) going a command post team, a CIMIC reconnais- to Somalia. With the introduction of the UPDF sance team, a CIMIC liaison team, a project CIMIC “Chieftaincy” in 2013, all planned management team, a CIMIC center team, func- UPDF courses will have a CIMIC focus and tional specialists (either military or civilian include staff officers and enlisted soldiers. The medical or similar personnel), a staff of experts 2013 meeting outlined a plan of action for the in civil administration and infrastructure, and courses covering leadership and administrative teams for disasters, emergencies, and military skills, as well as practical training in and information support operations. around Singo and Kampala, Uganda. Topics The UPDF Act of 2005 designates the such as CIMIC doctrine, coordination with CIMIC teams and functions as: (a) to preserve non-governmental and international organiza- and defend the sovereignty and interior integ- tions, introductory counter-insurgency, rules rity of Uganda; b) to cooperate with the civil- of engagement (ROE), scenario-based practical ian authority in emergency situations in cases exercises, key leader and female engagements, of natural disaster; c) to foster harmony and human rights training, CMOC structures, and understanding between the defense forces and civil reconnaissance training were among the civilians; and d) to engage in productive
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activities for the development of Uganda. At it has conducted training and seminars in the time of the 2012 East Africa CMO Burundi, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. The Symposium, Ugandan CIMIC forces had been Burundians participated at high levels (general developed up to the brigade level. Participants officer) in the IPSTC symposiums; the U.S. has noted, however, that “there is a lack of female also done course work with Ethiopian well- officers,” a significant capability for many drillers and has courses planned for Burundi. kinds of CA tasks.63 This has been reversed The Djiboutians resisted joining the somewhat with the inclusion of females in the AMISOM coalition for more than a year, in medical corps and even in the tank corps. spite of urging from the international commu- Bancroft (a civilian contractor) provides nity. Hesitation came from two directions: 1) CIMIC training in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and there was apprehension at joining a peace- Afgoya and Out Patient Departments in Baidoa enforcement campaign (which inherently and Burhakaba, which include female involves taking sides in a conflict) when AMISOM medical personnel. Djibouti prides itself as the peace-broker of the In the past decade, the UPDF and the region; and 2) concerns over threats coming KDF’s emphases were primarily on domestic from al-Shabaab to the Djiboutian population missions, though this is changing rapidly due through the Internet and Twitter.66 UN and to the Somalia mission. Prior to the creation French trainers deemed the Djiboutian troops of the CIMIC Chieftaincy, Uganda’s 2005 unprepared to join combat/peace-enforcement defense reform law gave the UPDF four mis- operations, but so far they have achieved con- sions, two of which were explicitly domestic.64 siderable success. Among all of the AMISOM Importantly, the law provided none of the forces, Djiboutian troops received the highest posse comitatus restrictions so cherished in the approval ratings from the Somalis in the early United States In fact, the 2005 law allowed 2012/13 UN/IST poll for their work in that officers and soldiers (enlisted personnel) Beledweyne.67 needed no further authority to execute “all the Prior to Djibouti’s entrance into AMISOM, powers and duties of a police officer,” and that the U.S. military worked with some of the they would be only liable to obey their supe- Djiboutian Special Forces at their outpost near rior officers, who would act “in collaboration” the Ethiopian border (Karabti San). This was with the civilian authorities, not under them.65 learning by observing and participating rather Somalia operations now include CIMIC than by formal training, and took place over mostly in the medical realm with training more than two years. The Djiboutian military from the UN, Bancroft, the United States, and hosted and worked with several U.S. CA teams the UK, among others. Additionally the UPDF who guided the local civilians through a build- and the KDF have engineering capability to ing project for their village. It was a long-term move from the domestic realm to interna- operation, which probably could not be dupli- tional operations. cated in short-term classroom training. Two of those Special Forces platoons subsequently Other TCCs deployed to Somalia. Though the United States has worked most The years of interaction with U.S. forces at extensively with Kenya and Uganda with CMO, home, as well as their own Somali customs
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and relative similarity to the Somalis, prepared The Kenyan and Uganda experience in creating the Djiboutians for CMO in Somalia. Lt. CA/CMO-capable forces illustrates numerous General Andrew Gutti, the AMISOM Force challenges and decision-points confronted in Commander, visited the Djiboutian troops other militaries attempting such a transforma- who took over from the Ethiopians in tion. One of the challenges all countries have Beledweyne, Somalia – some of whom worked in creating CA forces is the inevitable obstacle with the U.S. military in Karabti San – and of “reprogramming” military minds. After a commended the troops for their efforts to help career focused on following a chain of com- the local population by providing humanitar- mand to achieve direct results, many officers ian assistance in response to a recent flooding, and NCOs find it difficult to work within the ensuring their security. The same report said ambiguity, indirectness, and collaborative that the Djiboutian soldiers also engaged in environment of a multidimensional develop- local reconciliation efforts as well as regroup- ment or humanitarian relief mission. ing and training various militias and integrat- At a more fundamental level, even defin- ing them into the Somali National Army.68 ing what CA/CIMIC missions actually entail is The Djiboutians were instrumental in bringing a constantly evolving challenge. Since assistance to the civilians during a cholera out- September 11, 2001, and the coalition mis- break in addition to flood relief efforts. Thus, sions in Iraq and Afghanistan, CAO by coali- in spite of little formal training, the tion and U.S. militaries were frequently about Djiboutians have excelled in CIMIC. They are sponsoring projects and distributing goods also reported to move outside their safe bases and services. U.S. CA teams deployed to Africa and to actually chase down al-Shabaab com- with the CJTF-HOA mission generally followed batants. that agenda – however East Africa (apart from Somalia) is not a combat arena, and is subject A New Model for CA? to different rules and circumstances than the Courtesy of UPDF PAO
Somali Police Force During Crowd Control Training Provided by AMISOM
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combat and post-conflict zones. These opera- development and employment of CA in the tions have generated questions from East U.S. has been an assumption that it was Africans on the definition of CA/CIMIC mis- intended for use in foreign operations, not for sions, and highlighted the tension between CA domestic operations. This is grounded both in as the coordination of resources and informa- posse comitatus and other constructs that limit tion, on one hand, and the provision of goods the military’s domestic role, and in the con- on the other hand.69 scious development of civilian agencies (e.g., Significantly, in a 2012 symposium at the Federal Emergency Management Agency) IPSTC, the East African CA delegates recom- to do the planning and coordination done by mended removing two sections from the draft CA forces in certain overseas operations. In East African manual on CA: 1) Populace and general “U.S. military power is projected across resource control (PRC) and 2) Dislocated the globe but is barely noticeable at home,” Civilians (DC) operations. Their logic was that according to Hill, Wong and Gerras, who argue “this is not a core function of the military.”70 that is one of three primary reasons for the Yet both are critical areas for CMO conducted high levels of trust American citizens have in in a foreign country during wartime, and in the military.72 fact are implied tasks for the military com- Other countries have asked their militaries mander under international law. Removing to conduct extensive domestic missions, with them from the menu of doctrinal tasks rein- mixed effects on civil-military relations. The forces the understanding that the African con- Colombian Army conducted a series of suc- cept focuses on the more generic CIMIC and cessful rural “civic-military action” programs less CA-intense role of coordination. in the context of counter-insurgency cam- The AU CIMIC concept for military sup- paigns between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s. port to the civilian element in conflict situa- As a result, military leaders developed beliefs tions focused on two things: security and on the country’s situation at odds with those resources.71 Implied in these are related areas of the political leadership, leading the former like public affairs. Again, note that these are to speak out on the need for deeper social and core military operations and “soft support,” political reforms; this phenomenon became respectively, not the “hard CA” of conducting serious enough that three different presidents operations for the civilians. This also high- removed senior military leaders for their dis- lights the continuing difference in concepts sent.73 That this could be done without pro- from the U.S. approach, in which the military voking a coup d’état is a credit to the generally is explicitly taking on mission outside its “core successful professionalization of the functions.” Colombian military – and something that would be unlikely in many African countries. From CMO to Civil-Military Relations Looking from the perspective of countries The most significant tendency from a civil- with a history of military rule, Koonings and military relations standpoint is an East African Kruijt have argued that many cases of military tendency toward planning and preparing CA politicization include the “competence prin- forces for domestic operations. While it is ciple,” according to which military officers per- rarely stated explicitly, underlying the ceive themselves as better trained and
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organized than their civilian peers. De Kadt these countries actually did mitigate the risks argues, “such problems around governance of domestic military missions, or how others have probably now become the central issues can hope to mitigate such risks. that impel military men to interfere with gov- A potential positive effect of CA develop- ernment.”74 While considering the possibility ment is to promote better behavior within the military forces could be given new missions to military. To the degree CA personnel adopt the occupy soldiers and keep them out of explicit desired values of respect for civilian authority, political roles, they conclude that, “A strong human rights, and social development, they emphasis on civic-military action and other can become advocates within military circles local development activities does not justify for plans and strategies that reflect such values. the existence of the armed forces and weakens The U.S. military did exert some influence on the functioning of the public sector and civil- the UPDF with their work in Karamoja over ian authorities in the process.”75 time. Unfortunately, recent history would sug- The Kenyan and Ugandan militaries are gest that this “change agent” affect is limited clearly trying to succeed where others have in most countries. Even in the U.S. Army, CA “failed” at sustaining both domestic CMO and leaders are regularly relegated to secondary civilian control of the military, so it is surpris- staff roles. It is hard to foresee African CA lead- ing how little public debate has been gener- ers faring better. ated by this effort. One exception is a recent In the end, history may not repeat itself. article by Senegalese Colonel Birame Diop, The fact that the East African armies are choos- who recognized three risks in “mobilizing the ing to build military forces specifically trained, military” for domestic missions: 1) Detracting and often designed, to work with civilians from their primary mission of national comes at a particular juncture in their histori- defense, 2) The militarization of society, and cal development. They not only have the ben- 3) The politicization of the military, as efit of their own experience in Somalia and increased power over domestic outcomes other foreign operations, they have already brings the allure of corruption and manipula- been engaged for decades in their own coun- tion of domestic politics.76 Diop’s response to tries’ political and social development. these concerns is to first restate the need for Additionally, they can draw on the experience improved development by any means, and and analysis derived from U.S. and coalition then to suggest safeguards to minimize the risk operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, all of of the three negative outcomes. He stops at the which relied heavily on the CA/CMO/CIMIC generalities of building trust between the mil- component. Whether this prologue allows itary and the populace, clearly defining the them to play the appropriate role in the future limits and timetable for military missions, and remains to be seen. PRISM creating a legal framework for this to occur. His examples are limited to Kenya’s develop- ment of the “environmental soldier” and vari- ous other engineering and civic education pro- grams, including those in Senegal. None of these cases go deep enough to explain how
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Notes 11 Somalia’s history is complex and has been documented by multiple historians and current academics including I.M. Lewis, Gerard Prunier, 1 Brianna Musselman of the School of Kenneth Menkhaus, Alex De Waal, Roland Marshall, International Service provided invaluable assistance and Andre Le Sage, among many. to this project. Dr. Ladan Affi, a post doctoral fellow 12 Also known as the Somali Federal at Qatar University, provided input and editorial com- Government of Somalia (SFG) and the Somali ments on Somalia. National Government SNG 2 AMISOM was created by the African Union’s 13 Central Somalia and the FGS still consider Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with Somaliland, a self -declared separate nation, an initial six-month mandate, which has been unrecognized by the rest of the world, as part of extended. The current troop-contributing countries greater Somalia. (TCCs) are Uganda, Djibouti, Burundi, Sierra Leone, 14 UN Security Council Resolution, 2124: Kenya and Ethiopia (Amisom-au.org). Uganda, AMISOM is authorized to deploy 21, 586 soldiers into Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Ghana are police Somalia as well as 540 police officers. CIA Factbook contributing countries (PCCs) places the population of Somalia at approximately 10 3 Report of the African Union Commission on ½ million and the area as 647,657 square kilometers. the Strategic Review of the African Union Mission in https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ Somalia, January 2013. Ibrahim Gambari: “A geos/so.html, last accessed 13 July 2014. significant portion of Somalia remains under the 15 ‘Approximately two of every five local or control of Al Shabaab and the liberation of Somalia regional reports on or related to al-Shabaab argue still requires a significant sustained effort.” that “al Shabaab’s quasi-state in southern and central 4 In a 2013 interview with Dr. Besançon, a Somalia has been progressively reduced over the past prominent Kenyan imam said: “Kenya should be out thirteen months” (AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring of Somalia yesterday.” website) as the result of “multi-pronged military 5 Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin - HSM or operations” by Somalia government forces, AMISOM simply Al Shabaab or AS—is the radical Islamic peacekeepers, ENDF, and allied militias.’ CUBIC military movement in Somalia with domestic and Media Analysis Report 26 November 2012. foreign ‘terrorist’ support. Somalis is majority 16 Toni Weis. May 30 2012. ‘The War is Muslim, but mainly Sufi. Changing, not Over:’ Roland Marchal on Somalia 6 A senior U.N. official disclosed that 3,000 after Afgooye. http://focusonthehorn.wordpress. AMISOM personnel have been killed during its com/2012/05/30/the-war-is-changing-not-over-roland-marchal- seven-year mission (Source (Mombasa RMS): Taifa on-somalia-after-afgooye-part-two/ Leo (Independent newspaper and generally unbi- 17 Presentation in November 2013 by Dr. Le ased), in Kiswahili, 11 May 13) Sage to US troops deploying to Africa. 7 Ken Menkhaus in Robert Rotberg. 2005. 18 Jeffrey Gettleman. 2013. “Ominous Signs, Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa & Markus Then a Cruel Attack: Making Sense of Kenya’s Hoehne. 2009 ‘Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: How Westgate Mall Massacre.” New York Times September external interference helped to produce militant 27. Islamism.’ http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/ 19 Andre Le Sage, November 2012. Norfolk, VA. Repository%20UNPOS/080818%20-%20Djibouti%20 20 Scholar at Tufts University. November 2012. Agreement. Also, on 08 November 2012, a cache of firearms and 8 Somali Scholar’s comment 2014: the Islamic ammunition thought to belong to al-Shabaab Courts have been around since the early 1990s but militants was recovered by Somali and African Union they were not cohesive until 2004/2005 when the CIA forces in the port city of Kismayo after they carried began to fund the warlords to go against the Islamic out a major joint operation to the west of the town. Courts. Source: Ethiopian Radio (Pro-government), in 9 Somali Scholar’s comment 2014: by the time Amharic, 09 Nov 12; Ethiopian Television (Pro- Ethiopia invaded Somalia, the Islamic Courts had government), in Amharic, 09 Nov 12; Addis Zemen scattered, later on coalescing in Eritrea. (Pro-government), in Amharic, 10 Nov 12. The 10 Jihad was the minority view from al Shabaab Economist. October 2012. “The Shabab, who have until the Ethiopian invasion dispersed their communications equipment men and
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weapons, can again be expected to play a waiting 34 April 15 Burundi (Prime Minister Sharidon game.” http://www.economist.com/node/21564258 was replaced in December 2013 by Abdiweli Sheikh 21 Andre Le Sage, November 2012. BBC January Ahmed) 8, 2014 - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25651249 35 Muhsim Hassan. 2012. “Understanding 22 http://amisom-au.org/2013/09/amisom-ends-a-three- Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab day-civil-military-coordination-conference/ and Somali Youth.” Combating Terrorism Center at West 23 The Somalis believe the Kenyans want the Point, August 23. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ coastal territory of Kismayo and the natural resources, understanding- drivers-of-violent-extremism-the-case-of- but the Kenyans particularly felt the need for a buffer al-shabab-and-somali-youth. Menkhaus (September zone to secure their coastline from attacks and protect 24, 2012). Mesevey 2013 Some studies also report AS their tourism industry. The Ethiopians and Somalis fighters joining to ‘avenge indignities visited on their have long had border and territory ownership issues female relatives. – marked by the Somali invasion in 1977. 36 Note, for example, that the phrase “Black 24 Joshua Meservey. 2013. “The Somalia Hawk Down” has evolved from a succinct title for a Insurgency: The growing threat of al Shabaab’s U.S. newspaper story to a book, a film, and finally resurgence,” pp. 87-88. shorthand for the entire “Battle of Mogadishu” or any 25 Nicholas Kulish. 2013. “African Union and similar urban combat operation. Somalia to Investigate Rape Accusation.” New York 37 Harvard Africa expert opinion 2009, Harvard Times August 15. University. & Swiss Africa expert opinion, 2013. 26 Colum Lynch. 2013. “Soldier of Misfortune.” Nairobi, Kenya. Foreign Policy. August. Quoted by Josh Meservey 2013. 38 Kenya officially joined AMISOM in June 2012 27 Both definitions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, – months after invading Somalia. Joint Publication 1-01, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ 39 Kenyan Muslim cleric, interview with Dr. new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf, accessed 4 September 2013. Besançon, 2013 28 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied 40 Proceedings of the East Africa Civil-Military Joint Publication (AJP)-9, “NATO Civil-Military Operations Symposium (henceforth, “EACMOSP”), Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003. held January 30 – 10 February 2012, p. 115 29 Nikolaus Grubeck, “Civilian Harm in 41 “The Kenya Army Engineers Civil Affairs Somalia: Creating an Appropriate Response,” Training,” http://www.mod.go.ke/?page_link=engineers, last Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), accessed 25 Sep 2013. Quotation is from Kenyan 2011, online at http://civiliansinconflict.org/uploads/files/ website, and may not reflect his actual wording. The publications/Somalia_Civilian_Harm_2011.pdf, last accessed course was a joint effort of the Kenyans supported by 1 October 2013. the US military. 30 Jessica Lee and Maureen Farrell. 2011. ‘Civil 42 EACMOSP, p. 73. Military Operations in Kenya’s Rift Valley: Socio- 43 Brig Owino, comments summarized in cultural Impacts at the Local Level. PRISM (2) 2. EACMOSP, p. 118. Marie Besançon. 2011. Uganda Karamoja VETCAP: 44 See for example, US Fed News Service, “Kenya, Partnering with UPDF and NGOs. CJTF-HOA/SCRAT U.S. Military Partner to Build Crucial Civil-Military Report. Operations Capability,” 8 March 2011. Contrary to 31 “President of Somalia Sets Top Three the title, the article focuses on the combined effort to Priorities: Security, Security, Security,” New Statesman construct a new roof, install windows, and make http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/politics/2012/09/ other improvements to a local school. president-somalia-sets-top-three-priorities-security-security- 45 Brig Owino, comments summarized in security EACMOSP, pp. 119-22 32 ACSS Conference (Africa Center for Strategic 46 Interview with Kenyan Officer at Manda Bay Studies). April 2012. Senegal. ‘Preventing Terrorism.’ by Dr. Besançon. January 2013. 33 Alex De Waal. 2007. ‘Class and Power in a 47 Lee and Farrell. 2011. Stateless Somalia.’ Roland Marchal. November 2012 48 Human Rights Watch, Criminal Reprisals: Tufts University Workshop. Ken Menhaus. 2012. Kenyan Police and Military Abuses against Ethnic ‘Stabilization Transitions, Then and Now: Lessons Somalis, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012, p.3. from the UNOSOM Experience for 2012-13 Post Transition Somalia.’ ODNI.
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49 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/10/ 66 The first post Somalia deployment suicide kenyan-army-admits-soldiers-looted- bombing occurred in Djibouti City May 2014. http:// mall-2013103082648752523.html www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/27/uk-djibouti-attacks-idUSK- 50 Partner nations need to solve the certification/ BN0E72AA20140527 validation issue with schools/centers/training – the 67 UN/Information Support Team-IST, training is free and the students get per diem, so there Information Paper: Somalia Polling Summary, Nov/Dec is no incentive to participate or perform. They get a 2012. certificate without any testing mechanism. 68 “AMISOM Commander visits Hiiraan, says 51 Muslim clerics, Kenyan Army and Navy Somali Army will be trained,” Sudan Tribune. 28 officers, US officials, city leaders, and contractors, November 2012. 20 May 2013. Soldiers from Djibouti interviews with Dr. Besançon, 2013. serving under the African Union Mission in Somalia 52 Suggestions by Bancroft – a leading training (AMISOM), provide security, water, and other services and mentoring contracting organization. to the residents of Beletweyne. Residents fondly refer 53 Kenyan Brigadier General interviewed by Dr. to the Djiboutian soldiers as brothers and helpmates Besançon in 2013 for their role in repelling attacks, resolving clan 54 AGCAP-Agricultural Civil Action Project disputes, and supporting commercial activity. – Kenyan Engineers/military will join US CA team (AMISOM - via You Tube)
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