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Shabaab Weekly Insite Nov 12-24

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Shabaab Weekly Insite Nov 12-24 4938 Hampden Lane, Suite 156 Bethesda, MD 20814 301-841-7740 [email protected] Weekly inSITE on the Shabaab al- Mujahideen Movement in Somalia Thursday, November 12 - Tuesday, November 24, 2015 The SITE Intelligence Group’s Weekly inSITE reports provide periodical macro-analyses of extremist groups based on official communiques, online chatter, media reports, and existing SITE research. Key Points - The Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement continued to target AMISOM and Somali troops in the southernmost regions of Somalia, with clashes also extending farther north into central Somalia as well as into Kenya. - Confrontations continue between Shabaab, which remains loyal to al-Qaeda (AQ), and Islamic State (IS) supporters, both in the ranks and defected to IS. - Shabaab reportedly took over the Kismayo military academy on Nov. 13 and killed 25 Somali soldiers. - Shabaab retook the city Fido from Burundi AMISOM troops on Nov. 12. - Shabaab killed the leader of a pro-IS Shabaab faction in an ambush on Nov. 22. - According to chatter on Twitter, drone strikes killed a high-ranking Shabaab leader, Sheikh Mohamed Abdalla, and at least 8 militants on Nov. 22. - A Shabaab media group released a statement of approval in response to the Paris attacks on Nov. 13. - Shabaab-affiliated users on Twitter reacted in outrage to an interview in the latest issue of the Islamic State's (IS) Dabiq magazine, in which Shabaab was criticized for not fully exercising a ban on Qat. - A Somali-focused jihadi media group released a report on Shabaab’s military activities on Nov. 13-14, which most prominently featured the taking of the Kismayo military academy and retaking of the city Fido. - Pro/anti-IS users on Twitter continued debates regarding the intensity of Shabaab’s reactionary arrests of IS pledges. The following materials are for information purposes only and may not be copied, reproduced, or transmitted without the explicit permission of SITE Intelligence Group and specific attribution to SITE Intelligence Group. Following are news and chatter by Shabaab-affiliated users on social media between Nov. 12 and Nov. 24. Media Releases • The Islamic State (IS) released the twelfth issue of its magazine “Dabiq” on Nov. 18, which included an interview with a Somali fighter. According to the fighter, not only have two Shabaab factions pledged to IS (one in northern Somalia and one in central Somalia), but several others in the south have pledged and more will follow when it’s safe to do so. The fighter also confirmed the reports that the Shabaab is using methods to “deter, oppress, and terrorize” IS supporters, “includ[ing] imprisoning the Khilāfah supporters, raiding their houses to cause them fear, isolating them, and using financial punishments such as cutting allowances for their families as a pressure tactic to force them to compromise.” The fighter ended the interview advising Somali Muslims in the West to leave for IS-held territories, and if they are unable to do so, to mount attacks at home. • A Somali-focused jihadi media group, Shahada News Agency, reported on several military activities between Nov. 13-14, including the takeover of the military academy at Kismayo, the retake of Fido, and clashes with the Jamal-Daq Administration. • Radio Andalus, a Shabaab media group, applauded the Paris attacks on Nov. 14, describing the attackers as “heroic mujahideen” • A Shabaab official release on Nov. 12 claimed the assassination attempt on the head of the interim administration of southwestern Somalia, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, in Mogadishu on Nov. 11. General Chatter Paris Attacks • Pro-Shabaab jihadis in Somalia rejoiced in the Paris attacks. One Shabaab user, who tweeted IS’ claim for the attacks, stated of IS, “you healed our hearts even though we disagree with you.” Drone Strikes/Killing of a Shabaab Leader • Shabaab-affiliated fighters responded to drone attacks in Somalia, with claims that the attacks are only hitting civilians. Multiple users assume strikes are coming from the United States, although the source of the attacks has not yet been confirmed. Sheikh Mohamed Abdalla, Shabaab • Multiple Twitter accounts claimed that Sheikh “governor” of Lower Shabelle region The following materials are for information purposes only and may not be copied, reproduced, or transmitted without the explicit permission of SITE Intelligence Group and specific attribution to SITE Intelligence Group. Mohamed Abdalla, Shabaab “governor” of the Lower Shabelle region, was killed in one of these strikes. Release of Dabiq 12 • Pro-IS users on Twitter rejoiced in an interview that aimed to expose Shabaab’s struggle with its pro-IS members. Meanwhile, pro-Shabaab members were horrified that the Somali fighter interviewed accused Shabaab of not fully banning the smuggling and use of Qat, a plant commonly chewed in the area that produces drug-like effects. Twitter users speculated whether IS will next place takfir (excommunication) on Shabaab, or if Shabaab will retaliate. Ban on Qat Smuggling • In response to the IS magazine release of Dabiq 12, in which an alleged Somali fighter criticizes Shabaab for not fully banning Qat, arguments arose over Twitter as to whether or not Shabaab took appropriate action to ban the drug, with alleged Shabaab fighters responding angrily to the claim. One Somali jihadi on Twitter, who usually expresses support for IS, responded ominously, “ISIS Example picture posted by a Twitter [made a] big mistake this time.” user, stating: “AlShabab banned Qat… in 2010” Shabaab’s Oppressive Tactics to Retain Loyalty • The discussion surrounding breakaway IS pledges and their effect on Shabaab continue on Twitter after several weeks of reported arrests of suspected pro-IS members. A pro-IS fighter allegedly residing in Somalia tweeted a series of statements about Shabaab’s oppressive tactics in the aftermath of the pledges, saying “they kill any1 who disagrees with them” and “The days of the shabab are numbered.” Furthermore, he claimed that Shabaab has imprisoned the chief editor of Shabaab’s press, Abu Ahmed Al-Amriki, “for refusing to contribute to it’s official media lies.” • Reports of the killing of a senior pro-IS leader, Sheikh Hussein Abdi Gedi, of Shabaab were circulated on Twitter, with pro-IS users reacting in outrage. One pro- IS user speculated that soon Shabaab will “declare full-out war against the Islamic State.” Gossip About Shabaab’s Greed and Lust for Power • In response to chatter on Twitter, a pro-IS Shabaab supporter defended Shabaab against users that claimed Shabaab is power-hungry and greedy. The user refuted these claims, arguing that if this were the case, Shabaab would work with the Somali government or pledge to IS. The following materials are for information purposes only and may not be copied, reproduced, or transmitted without the explicit permission of SITE Intelligence Group and specific attribution to SITE Intelligence Group. Military Activities • At least 50 armed Shabaab militants invaded Bulagolol village in Kenya and preached to the residents (Nov. 24). • Explosion claimed by Shabaab wounded at least 3 KDF soldiers in Garissa county, Kenya (Nov. 24). • An ambush on an army training camp outside Kismayo left 15 Shabaab militants and four Interim Jubba Administration (IJA) soldiers dead (Nov. 23). • Drone strikes from a yet unknown source allegedly killed Sheikh Mohamed Abdalla, the Shabaab leader of the Lower Shabelle region, along with two other senior commanders and at least 8 militants (Nov. 22). • Shabaab reportedly killed the leader of a pro-IS faction in Shabaab, Sheikh Hussein Abdi Gedi, in an ambush in the Lower Jubba region in Gadudey village (Nov. 22). • Clashes between IS supporters and Shabaab militants in Hagar town in Lower Jubba region (Nov. 21). • 6 Shabaab camps reportedly destroyed in Boni Forest in Garissa County, Kenya by a multi-security agency operation (Nov. 21). • Shabaab claimed killing 21 Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) soldiers including a senior commander in two ambushes this week (Nov. 20). • Suspected Shabaab fighter shot and wounded in a gun battle after trying to raid a KDF camp in Garissa, Kenya (Nov. 17). • Clashes between AMISOM and Shabaab near Bula Marer town in Lower Shabelle region (Nov. 16). • Shabaab overran the Somali military academy in Kismayo in the Juba region, killing 25 Somali soldiers (Nov. 13). • Shabaab clashed with militiamen of the local Jamal-Daq Administration in Mudug region, killing 5 (Nov. 13). • Clashes near Adaado town killed several including two senior officers of Shabaab and Galmudug State (Nov. 13). • Shabaab ambushed AMISOM troops between Golweyn and Bula Marer towns in Lower Shabelle region, after which clashes broke out with at least 10 casualties (Nov. 12) and allegedly killed a senior officer of the Ugandan army. • Shabaab took the town of Fido from Burundi AMISOM troops (Nov. 12). U.S., French, and AMISON troops captured Fido from Shabaab in Aug. of least year. • The pro-IS commander killed, along with eight pro-IS fighters, by Shabaab on Nov. 11 near Sakow was identified as Sheikh Bashir Abu Numan, who was in charge of up to 80 fighters. They were allegedly ambushed near Sakow (Nov. 12). The following materials are for information purposes only and may not be copied, reproduced, or transmitted without the explicit permission of SITE Intelligence Group and specific attribution to SITE Intelligence Group. The following materials are for information purposes only and may not be copied, reproduced, or transmitted without the explicit permission of SITE Intelligence Group and specific attribution to SITE Intelligence Group..
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