proceedings

The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue Canberra, 10–11 December 2007

Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Australia–Japan Commerce Agreement (1957)

Session 1: Possible future strategic shocks in East Asia

A maritime coalition centred on the Japan–Australia–US trilateral alliance: aiming for a regional maritime coalition in the southwestern Pacific 2 VADM (ret) Hideaki Kaneda, The Okazaki Institute

Possible strategic ‘shocks’ in Asia 14 Dr Rod Lyon, Australian Strategic Policy Institute

Session 2: New regional security architecture in the Asia Pacific and the role of Australia and Japan

Emerging Asia–Pacific security architectures: the Australia–Japan factor 22 Professor William T Tow, Australian National University

The Japanese approach to an East Asian Community and Japan–Australia partnership 39 Dr Yoshihide Soeya, Keio University

Session 3: The rise of China (PRC) and its implications for the region

China rising: the view from ‘down under’ 47 Dr Brendan Taylor, SDSC, Australian National University

The impacts of China’s rise on the Asian international system 55 Dr Seiichiro Takagi, Aoyama Gakuin University

Session 4: Review and prospects for the Australia–Japan strategic relationship

Review and prospects for the bilateral strategic relationship between Japan and Australia 64 Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi, Aoyama Gakuin University

The Japan–Australia strategic relationship: an Australian perspective 78 Dr Mark Thomson, Australian Strategic Policy Institute  Proceedings

A maritime coalition centred have made some progress, such as the on the Japan–Australia–US agreement to disable nuclear facilities within trilateral alliance: aiming for a this year. This has been possible due to the advancement in US–North Korea bilateral regional maritime coalition in talks, backed by a more compromising posture the southwestern Pacific taken by the Bush administration. However, VADM (ret) Hideaki Kaneda the future prospects for the talks are unclear, Director, The Okazaki Institute as North Korea still practices brinkmanship diplomacy to win further concessions from 1 The rising importance of sea lane the US. With other issues (such as ballistic security missile development and unlawful activities, including the abduction of foreign nationals) One of the constant and continued anxieties still unsolved, North Korea remains a source of in the Asia–Pacific region is sea lane security. concern at least in the short term. It is the source of concerns not only in the region, but also in the adjacent regions In the Taiwan Strait, political tension is still of the Indian Ocean, Oceania and the high, providing another source of concern South Pacific, and the East Pacific. All the sea in the medium to long term. The tension is lanes connecting these regions have faced due to political, military and psychological and will face risks of attacks by international pressures from mainland China, Taiwan’s terrorist groups and by pirates (possibly democratisation and pursuit of independence, with connections to terrorist groups). This is the expected shift in the military balance especially evident at major choke points, such between China and Taiwan in the near as the northwest Indian Ocean (including the future, and change in the delicate balance Strait of Hormuz), India’s southern coasts, and of the US–China relationship in the current the Malacca–Singapore Strait. situation. If any emergency occurs in this area, it will undoubtedly cut off the vital sea lanes Risks to security in the Asia–Pacific passing near Taiwan. region Overall, the region embraces several instability factors, including China’s To assess the security situation in the aggressive advance toward the oceans and its Asia–Pacific region, let us first consider the intensive build‑up of maritime and air power, potential for the manifestation of threats in developments in politically unstable nations the region. of Southeast Asia, and the delicate balance of On the Korean Peninsula, where military strategic relationships among major powers, confrontation continues in principle, the including the US, China, Japan and Russia. relationship between the US and South The safety of sea lanes in the region is no Korea is becoming more distant due to the exception—it is also subject to the effects of emergence of more receptive feelings toward regional instability factors. North Korea among South Koreans, based on In the current security situation, there are their ethnic identity and the current South eight notable instability factors that threaten Korean Government’s policy of promoting regional security. They can be classified into more independent national defence. two major categories: conventional and The Six‑Party Talks, initiated by the nuclear nonconventional factors. development program of North Korea, The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 

Of the four conventional factors, the first is Our examination of these instability factors confrontational structures that are remnants reveals some common key words, such of the Cold War era, such as those in the as ‘safety of sea lanes’. Sea lane security Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, which is not only important for the security still cast shadows of instability, uncertainty, of the Asia–Pacific region, but for most and unpredictability in the region. The second other regions. factor is the rapid build‑up of Chinese military power, mostly in naval and air forces, which Significance of sea lanes today has the potential to disrupt the regional military power balance. The third factor The significance of sea lanes today can be involves territorial, religious and ethnic analysed from two perspectives: ‘maritime disputes founded on historical controversies transportation’ and ‘marine usage.’ The (territorial disputes over islands have a economies of the Asia–Pacific region, particular potential to develop into armed including Japan’s economy, are far more clashes). The fourth factor is confrontations dependent on oceans than are economies in over maritime interests, which are closely any other region. Therefore, the oceans have related to territorial disputes over islands. extreme strategic significance in this region. All these factors are likely to create serious Moreover, the dynamism of economic growth impacts on the safety and stability of the seen in the Asia–Pacific region recently has region as a whole, as they can reduce the made sea lane security even more vital for safety of sea lanes. the continued growth and development of the region as a whole, as sea lanes are Nonconventional factors, on the other the communication medium of regional hand, are those new factors that became economies (‘maritime transportation’), while apparent after the end of the Cold War. The the oceans provide vast resources that can fifth factor is the proliferation of weapons secure the economic development of coastal of mass destruction and ballistic missiles countries in the region (‘marine usage’). from Northeast Asia to Pakistan and other These two aspects are essential for regional regions, mainly through regional sea lanes. economic development. The sixth factor is the increased vigour of terrorist activities such as bomb attacks, as In terms of ‘maritime transportation,’ the international terrorist groups strengthen ties global economy today enjoys smoother with other relevant groups in and out of the distribution of materials and information region, mainly targeting nations with weaker than in the past. This is due to the extensive governance, islandal seas and remote islands and rapid development and deployment (this became especially apparent after the 9/11 of transportation infrastructures with terrorist attacks). The seventh factor is the information technologies. Also, mutual trend to globalisation and reorganisation of exchanges between nations have increased as unlawful maritime activities, such as piracy, the ideological confrontation of the Cold War drug smuggling, and human trafficking in the era has dissipated and the barriers distancing region. The eighth factor is China’s long-term nations from one another have dissolved. In ambition to secure maritime hegemony, addition, the transition of formerly socialist demonstrated by its efforts to build strategic nations to market economies and the rapid bases along the vast major sea lanes economic development of developing connecting the Middle East and Northeast countries have led to the development of Asia, in a way that confronts the existing varied forms of economic cooperation among marine powers, such as the US, or Japan. nations, and the further deepening of mutual  Proceedings

dependencies in the global economy. To to the rapid and significant increase in the maintain and develop such relationships, the volume of oil imports by other East Asian transport sector has become more important countries, such as NIE (newly industrialised than ever. This is especially true in the case economy) countries like South Korea and of maritime transportation, as it enables Taiwan, and China (which is experiencing economical and massive transport of cargo. remarkable economic growth), the coastal This means that securing sea lane safety has countries have increased the number of become much more important. oil refineries along the strait, resulting in a significant increase in the volume of oil In particular, Japan’s economy and lifestyle are products shipped in the region. Growth in largely dependent on maritime transportation regional economies has also led to increases using safe sea lanes. Its past economic in shipments of products and raw materials development would not have been possible other than oil through the strait. without such security. Oil resources from the Middle East are essential materials to Furthermore, the coastal countries have sustain the Japanese economy, and their changed the nature of their dependency on shipment is entirely dependent on the broad the strait significantly, from being ‘provider’ sea lane from the Middle East, through the nations in the past to being ‘user’ nations, as Indian Ocean, Malacca–Singapore Strait and they continue to develop container shipment South China Sea, to the East China Sea. It is hub ports, such as Singapore Harbor and the no exaggeration to call these sea lanes the port of Tanjun Pelapas in Malaysia, and to lifeline of the Japanese economy. Moreover, exert effort for industrial development along the Malacca–Singapore Strait is also part of the coasts. the lifeline of other Northeast Asian countries, As clearly demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War, such as China and South Korea—making during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 when it, in a sense, the Achilles’ heel of the global China fired ballistic missiles into waters off economy. About 50,000 vessels navigate Taiwan, during the 9/11 terrorist attacks and through the strait, carrying more than a the Afghanistan War to control and contain quarter of the world’s maritime transport the terrorist groups in 2001, and during the volume and about half of the trade volumes Iraq War from 2003, if there is any direct or of Japan, China, and South Korea. About indirect disruption to the security of these 50% of global oil tanker volume, and about major sea lanes, it will seriously and adversely 85% of oil tankers from the Middle East to affect the international economy as well as Northeast Asia, pass through the strait. the security of the surrounding regions and As the major user of the Malacca–Singapore coastal countries. Because of the extent of Strait until very recently, Japan provided sea lanes, however, it is not possible for any many beneficial projects in the area to coastal nation on its own to secure the safety develop and maintain safe navigation routes of the sea lanes. There is a growing realisation through the strait in coordination with the that cooperative and coordinated efforts by coastal countries—Singapore, Indonesia, and the coastal nations are required. Malaysia. The projects, delivered mainly by the Typical examples of cooperative programs private sector, such as the Japan Foundation, around the Malacca–Singapore Strait include and backed up by the Japanese Government, MalSinDo and Eyes in the Sky, which are were highly appreciated. Recently, however, structured to fight international terrorist the situation around the Malacca–Singapore groups and piracy around the strait using Strait has changed drastically. In addition multilateral coastal naval forces, and ReCAAP, The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 

which is a coalition among the strait user ‘resource-greedy’ and ‘marine environment countries backed up by Japan. Another polluter’ nation. example is OEF–MIO (Operation Enduring The rise of nationalism in such countries Freedom Maritime Interdiction Operation), invites an explosion of effort to steal the the maritime terrorism prevention activity vested rights of developed countries. Proof in the northwest Indian Ocean started of this is the serious strife and struggles immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks at international forums negotiating the and continued ever since by multilateral protection and development of fishery naval forces. resources or intergovernmental discussions From the perspective of ‘marine usage,’ on the jurisdiction of deep seabed resources the UN Convention on the Law of the upon the entry into force of UNCLOS. This fact Sea (UNCLOS) allows coastal countries to highlights the growing need for cooperative hold sovereign rights over internal waters, measures for marine usage among relevant territorial seas and connecting waterways, countries. Such measures should take and to have jurisdiction over their exclusive into account the management of limited economic zone (EEZ) as well as the use of resources and the conservation of the global marine resources and the right to protect environment under established international the environment on the continental shelf. and regional rules. With the establishment of EEZs by coastal countries, almost half of the world’s seas are Increasing importance of broad now under the jurisdiction of one country sea lanes and the roles of Japan or another. and Australia

In the original definition of EEZs, based on Securing the safety of sea lanes in the the fundamental philosophy of UNCLOS, Asia–Pacific region is certainly important for the coastal countries’ jurisdiction over their the regional economy and regional security, EEZs gives them the right to manage and but sea lanes do not end in one single region. control marine resources and to execute The major sea lanes, which are the lifeline of their resource control obligations, but does Japan, extend far beyond the regional seas, not imply the right to monopolise use of into the Indian Ocean, Oceania–South Pacific, the resources. In reality, however, efforts and East Pacific regions. to determine national borders between The need to ensure the safety of broad sea coastal countries do not always lead to lanes is not likely to diminish in the future, but amicable settlements, because of conflicts will grow. At the same time, various factors over marine interests and historical disputes that obstruct sea lane safety are becoming over territories. Typical of such disputes more evident everywhere in the region and is the Japan–China mid‑line issue in the in the world. In this sense, it is important East China Sea. to ensure that the world can benefit from With the prospect of terrestrial resource ‘managed maritime freedom’ under known depletion in the future, there is growing rules built by consensus among relevant interest in abundant marine resources, countries. This is easy to understand, but such as fisheries and seabed resources. This difficult to realise. Because sea lanes connect has led to the rise of extreme nationalism one region to another through oceans, it among developing countries, especially in is urgently necessary to build a consensus China, which is now acting as an unruly among broader regional beneficiary countries  Proceedings

to seek common benefits and to cooperate to India has the population of more than one ensure sea lane safety. billion—the world’s second largest next to China. With a variety of ethnic groups with Among major sea lanes adjacent to Japan, different religions, languages and cultures, those in the Oceania, South Pacific, and it is the world’s biggest democratic country East Pacific regions are relatively stable, with governed by an administration elected no significant threats. In those regions, the through free multiparty elections. Moreover, US maintains overwhelming influence from India shares many common basic values bases in Hawaii, Guam, and the west coast and systems with Japan and other major of the US. The presence of other major sea developed countries, such as freedom, power allies, such as Australia and Canada, democracy, and a market economy. also ensures the stability of these sea lanes. If there is any potential threat in these Having promoted liberalisation and economic regions, it may be China’s aggressive military reforms since the 1990s, India maintains advancement toward the Pacific Ocean as a high economic growth rate through the it continues its rise as a major world power. development of information technologies China’s activities will require continued and IT industries. Supported by its robust attention. In this sense, the alliance among economic growth, India is exercising active major Pacific sea powers (Japan, Australia, and multifaceted diplomacy, enhancing its and Canada), with the world’s largest and presence in the international community. strongest sea power, the US, at the centre will However, the land route connecting the be significant in securing the safety of sea northern Indian Ocean region and the lanes in the pan‑Pacific region. Asia–Pacific region is not yet fully developed, The alliance with Australia will be inevitably increasing dependence on the especially significant, as it maintains strong vast sea lanes passing through the region. relationships with Asian nations, including Moreover, in both regions, ‘marine usage’ (the Japan, not only in the area of sea lane security exploitation of maritime resources, such as but also in the overall area of regional security. fisheries and seabed resources) is a key for Considering the recent international economic their future development. Because of these and security situation, Australia is one of the factors, any disturbance or disruption of the most important allies in the ‘expanded Asia,’ safety of these sea lanes would likely cause extending from south to north. severe adverse effects on the economy and security of both regions. Impact of India’s emergence The northern Indian Ocean is in a strategically In the context described in this paper, India is and geopolitically important location, as a one of the most important countries in the corridor connecting the Asia–Pacific region ‘expanded Asia,’ extending from east to west. with the Middle East and Europe. It also forms part of the ‘arc of instability’—an The Indian Ocean region used to receive expression that first appeared in the US’s relatively less attention from Asia–Pacific 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, released countries from economic and security immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. perspectives. Recently, however, there is The region provides potential bases for growing recognition in the importance of the international terrorist group activities, northern Indian Ocean region, and of India’s as well as a stage for state‑to-state and predominant power in the region. within‑state confrontations. The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 

Considering these factors, the vast sea 2 Development of bilateral and lanes connecting the Indian Ocean and the trilateral relationships among three Pacific Ocean should be recognised as the countries major economic and strategic artery to run Japan, Australia and the US are all sea through the ‘arc of inseparability,’ rather than powers. The Japan–US alliance has been and the ‘arc of instability’. In other words, they will continue to be, in principle, a maritime create an inseparable and integrated region in alliance at least for the foreseeable future. The which coordination and cooperation efforts US has allied relationships with other major connect the Asia–Pacific region and northern powers, including Australia, and because Indian Ocean. of the two countries’ geopolitical situation, In August 2007, Japan’s then Prime Minister the US–Australia alliance also has the Abe and India’s Prime Minister Shinh held characteristics of a maritime alliance. the India–Japan Summit, and agreed on Although Japan and Australia have not the recognition that ‘strong India is Japan’s entered into a formal alliance, the agreement benefits, and strong Japan is India’s benefits.’ made in March 2007 enabled them to begin a The Japanese side welcomed the emergence ‘semi‑alliance’ relationship. Because of Japan’s of India as a major power, and emphasised its and Australia’s geopolitical relationship, intention to provide support for India’s further the semi‑alliance between them is also economic development, and to promote more basically a maritime one. The development mutual exchange efforts at every level. of Japan–Australia bilateral relationships in Prime Minister Abe stated that Japan the security area may provide a foundation and India, as two major sea powers and for its development into a trilateral maritime democratic countries that share basic values alliance that includes the US. and interests, should address measures to ensure the safety of the sea lanes, in Japan–US alliance cooperation with other countries. In his speech on ‘the exchange between two After World War II, the US took on the vital oceans’ delivered to the Indian Parliament, he ‘keystone’ role in global and regional security. reflected on the long history of ties between Since the end of the Cold War, and especially Japan and India, and stated that the newly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has emerging ‘expanded Asia’ would integrate used much of its energy responding to new East Asia and South Asia through exchanges dangers, such as state‑to-state confrontations between the ‘two great oceans’—the Pacific based on religious and ethnic conflicts, and the Indian. Those links could grow into an the unrelenting activities of international open and transparent network that covers the terrorist groups, and the links between entire Pacific Ocean region, including the US Islamic radical groups and their expanding and Australia. influence. Especially important have been the Current Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda US responses in Iraq and Afghanistan, where is to fully and actively continue the basic massive deployments of armed forces have Asian diplomacy policy launched by not made any progress, and Washington’s Prime Minister Abe. responses to Iran and North Korea, which half‑openly pursue the development of nuclear weapons. Another vital issue for the US is how to build constructive  Proceedings

relationships with China and India, which have defending the sea lanes in order to respond the potential to develop into powerful rivals in against terrorist attacks and other unlawful the future. activities in the Malacca–Singapore Strait and Southeast Asian islandal seas. In such a situation, the US considers Japan to be the core of its new military strategy in Furthermore, if the situation calls for it, there Asia, and plans to strengthen the position will be increased opportunities to engage of US forces in Japan as ‘Beyond Far East in global joint actions through multilateral Regional Forces,’ with their bases literally the forces and coalitions based on UN resolutions ‘core military bases’. Needless to say, Japan or regional agreements, as in the OEF–MIO, is a sovereign nation, so the Japanese side which Japan and other countries are will decide whether the positioning of US implementing in the northwest Indian Ocean. bases and US forces in Japan is appropriate In such situations, the US Navy and Japan’s to the national situation and interests of Maritime Self Defense Force are expected Japan, although the alliance with the US is to to take more active roles in international be maintained. cooperative actions. As seen here, broad sea lane defence will have greater weight in the In the medium to long term, however, Japan future of the Japan–US maritime alliance. and the US need to seek greater mutuality in the operation of the US–Japan alliance from US–Australia alliance the global and regional perspectives. Even today, Japan has implemented cooperation in In September 1951, Australia, New Zealand and regional and global operations, including the the US signed the ANZUS Treaty. New Zealand development of a framework for cooperation withdrew from the treaty in 1985 as a gesture with the US forces under the Law Concerning to oppose the US’s nuclear policies, and the Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of US cancelled the alliance commitment to New Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Zealand in 1986. Instead of the three-nation Japan; international cooperative activities alliance, the US and Australia started the under the Anti‑Terrorism Special Measures US–Australia Ministerial Meeting on Security Law and the Specials Measures Law for (AUSMIN), which has been held annually Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance ever since. in Iraq. These kinds of activities will likely increase in importance in the future. Since the start of AUSMIN, Australia has become a major ally of the US and actively The fight against international terrorism, on participated in the Gulf War and military the other hand, requires more comprehensive sanctions against Iraq. Australia’s cooperation measures for a much longer period of time. with the US is not limited to military As international terrorist groups will likely cooperation in the field and in joint drills and develop more complex and sophisticated exercises. The very foundation of the alliance tactics, there will be greater opportunity to is joint military information centres in many use international cooperation in activities to places on Australian territory. These include prevent terrorist attacks. Analyses of terrorist ground stations to receive early warning activities indicate greater associations and information from satellites that provides linkages between international terrorist the basis for ballistic missile defence, and groups and existing terrorist organisations the communication centre to monitor the in Southeast Asia. This means that there navigation of vessels in the Oceania–South will be a greater need to develop regional Pacific region. The sharing of military maritime security cooperation with an aim of information between the US and Australia The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 

is a ‘tie that binds’, and is considered to be and to seek more effective cooperation and one of the most important functions of the coordination. Such efforts will certainly be US–Australia alliance. beneficial for the peace and stability of the Asia–Pacific region. The recent promotion and After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Australia expansion of defence exchanges between decided to apply Article 4 of the ANZUS Treaty, the two countries, such as cooperation in Iraq which stipulates the exercise of the right and humanitarian aid after natural disasters, of collective self‑defence, and dispatched have demonstrated steady progress in the vessels, aircraft and Special Forces to support development of a cooperative relationship in the anti‑terrorist activities of the US forces. the security field. When the military operation against Iraq began in March 2003, Australia also sent Based on the current situation, Japan agreed vessels, airplanes and Special Forces. By with Australia in March 2007 to promote May 2007, there were about 1600 Australian security cooperation between Japan and troops stationed in Iraq. Australia as a ‘semi‑alliance’ in order to further reinforce bilateral security cooperation In addition, Australia is making efforts under a comprehensive framework, and to strengthen its defence policies and concluded the Joint Declaration of Japan equipment. Although the actual form of and Australia on Security Cooperation. This participation is still debated domestically, was the first time Japan had entered such an Australia decided to participate in the US‑led alliance, other than its alliance with the US. Missile Defense Plan in December 2003. A In June 2007, the ministers of defence and decision to introduce the Aegis system as the foreign affairs of both countries held their combat system for Australia’s new air‑defence first regular security talks (so‑called ‘2+2 talks’) destroyers was made in August 2004, and the in Tokyo. The agenda included missile defence Australian Defence Force is making efforts to cooperation and joint drills between the improve interoperability with the US through Japan Self Defense Forces and the Australian the development of US–Australia joint drill Defence Force. facilities in Australia. The March 2007 joint declaration set a Australia is also implementing joint drills with framework for reinforcing and expanding Malaysia, Singapore, the United Kingdom bilateral cooperation in the security field. The and New Zealand under the Five Party declaration selected for cooperation the areas Defence Agreement. of national border security; anti‑terrorism; Japan–Australia semi-alliance arms reduction and anti‑proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their carrier Australia is a valuable and important partner tools; peacekeeping activities; exchanges in the Asia–Pacific region and shares common of strategic information; maritime security basic values with Japan, such as respect for and air security; disaster relief and other human rights, freedom, and democracy. In humanitarian support activities; and others. the security aspect as well, Australia and Based on the joint declaration, Japan and Japan have common strategic interests as Australia conducted bilateral joint drills off the allies of the US and share similar interests in east coast of Japan in April 2007, a five‑navy national defence. From such a perspective, joint drill with the US, India and Singapore in it is vital for both countries to develop a the Bay of Bengal in September 2007, and a base of bilateral cooperation through the trilateral naval joint drill with the US at Naha, promotion of defence and security exchanges, Japan, the following month. 10 Proceedings

The Japan–Australia semi‑alliance will not As democratic nations, one of their main remain at the level of promoting bilateral aims would be to attempt the dissemination cooperation in security fields, but may and solidification of their common concepts develop into a trilateral relationship with and values—that is, democracy. Since a more emphasis on maritime alliances. regional maritime coalition would inevitably Furthermore, it could move toward the involve countries with different traditions building of a regional maritime coalition that and governance systems, asking for the embraces other major democratic sea powers cooperation of those countries in maintaining in ‘extended Asia.’ security and order would be a big challenge for the three allies. 3 A Japan–Australia–US regional In addition, Japan, Australia and the US maritime coalition themselves have fundamental differences in Japan, Australia and the US should constitute their geopolitical, environmental, historical, a maritime alliance covering the Asia–Pacific cultural, linguistic, and religious backgrounds, region, Oceania and the South Pacific. They although they share democratic values. need to create a ‘Southwestern Pacific Their national concepts are not entirely the Maritime Coalition’ with other democratic same, and there are some differences in their sea powers in the region to ensure the safety political systems. However, they undoubtedly of sea lanes. At the same time, Japan and share basic concepts as mature, developed, Australia need to make efforts to realise democratic countries, and their history for the broader regional maritime coalitions under past sixty years since the end of World War II the leadership of the US in the Indian Ocean clearly demonstrates those shared concepts. and the East Pacific, in cooperation with As sea powers, the three allies must maintain other democratic sea powers in neighbouring ‘properly managed maritime freedom’ in waters, such as India and Canada, and to order to survive and prosper as nations. work on the development of more organic For this, they need to find logical solutions coordination between these regional to problems in determining EEZs and the coalitions in order to promote the safety of extent of continental shelves, which have broad sea lanes. Ultimately, both countries been the source of serious state‑to-state need to take on roles and responsibilities disputes between nations with common appropriate for their national powers and national borders, even after UNCLOS entered situations, as major actors in a ‘global into effect. maritime coalition’ that gathers all the world’s democratic sea powers. As is well known, Japan and China have several disputes, including territorial disputes Japan–Australia–US maritime alliance over the Senkaku Islands, and the issue of the Japan–China mid‑line and Oki‑no-Torishima The maritime alliance of Japan, Australia and Island in relation to determining their EEZs. the US in the southwestern Pacific should play Although these matters might look like simple a major part in building the regional maritime questions of determining territorial rights coalition for broader sea areas, taking over remote islands, or deciding the scope advantage of benefits arising from their of economic interests over the oceans, they relationships in alliances and semi‑alliances, are—in reality and more importantly—about their characteristics as sea powers, their China’s military challenge in the West Pacific democratic systems, and their modernised and its military advancement toward the military forces. The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 11

‘Second Islandal Defense Line’ from the ‘First humanitarian aid, it is still vivid in our memory Islandal Defense Line,’ and that fact should that Japan, Australia, and the US swiftly sent be thoroughly realised. In other words, these troops for the relief and recovery support issues should be considered not only from activities after the tsunami disaster of 2004, the viewpoint of Japan’s territorial disputes, and their efforts were welcomed by the but also in view of security issues the US local people. and Australia cannot overlook. Considering these factors, ensuring ‘maritime security’ A regional maritime coalition in the and ‘control of marine interests’ will become southwestern Pacific important for the three countries as a way to effectively deter aggressive and unlawful The maritime alliance of Japan, Australia and advances by China. the US should take responsibilities appropriate to the three countries’ national power as the On the other hand, it is possible to find major responsible stakeholders of a regional common interests with regional countries, maritime coalition in the southwestern including China, in ‘maintaining the maritime Pacific, which links the Asia–Pacific region order’. This is because it is in the interests of with Oceania and the South Pacific. all the countries and people in the region to maintain regional maritime order, for example Here, ‘maritime coalition’ is defined as a to prevent terrorist attacks (including ‘global or broader regional nation‑to-nation maritime terrorism) by international terrorist coalition with the objective to maintain groups in association with local groups, and secure safe and free use of oceans in and to address the problems of piracy, drug peacetime.’ This kind of coalition does not smuggling, and people trafficking. There is necessarily require the entry into force of an no reason for other countries to refuse to international agreement or convention, but cooperate in such responses. can be a multinational network based on mutual confidence with common concepts. Finally, there is the three allies’ third common feature: they all manage modern military Therefore, it is possible to enter into a forces. The region includes some countries coalition relationship with any coastal with many islands and broad areas to countries as long as they share common patrol, but quantitatively and qualitatively objectives. In building such a maritime inadequate maritime military and police coalition, each member nation is required to forces. For example, the media has reported take a responsible role proportionate to the that North Korea was able to supply features of the nation or the region. How weapons (small arms and mini‑submarines) countries take responsibility may differ from to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the a country to a country and each country can Philippines. Therefore, the allies will be decide on what it can contribute. responsible for providing capacity-building For example, Japan has a vital interest in the and other support acceptable to local people. maintenance of sea lanes extending from The three countries could address such south of the Suez Canal (or east of the Cape of problems in cooperation with other Good Hope) to Northeast Asia. Considering countries, not only under the Proliferation its national situation and national power, Security Initiative to control weapons of however, the extent of the area for which mass destruction, but also through aid for Japan can actively take a responsible role will the control of other weapons. In terms of remain from the Northeast Asian seas to the Malacca–Singapore Strait and surrounding 12 Proceedings

areas. In the Indian Ocean, west of the strait, that have those interests and abide by the the responsible role can be assigned to the action principle of service to others, and democratic maritime nations in East Asia, eventually expand the coalition to include led by the major power, India. India will thus other nations. For the moment, Japan, make a more positive contribution to security Australia, and the US can build the core of the cooperation with other maritime democratic coalition in the southwestern Pacific. countries, such as Japan, Australia and the US, and to the global and broader regional Development into a global maritime nation‑to-nation coalition to secure free and coalition safe use of the oceans. The Japan–Australia–US maritime alliance One precondition for accession to such a should take the initiative to build the regional maritime coalition will be whether a Southwestern Pacific Maritime Coalition nation shares three basic maritime interests and cooperate with the creation of other with other countries: regional maritime coalitions in the Indian • existence—to cooperate in maintaining Ocean (involving India) and in the East Pacific the security of the region in peacetime as (involving Canada). For Japan, Australia, well as in emergency or crisis and the US, it will be especially important • prosperity—to cooperate and to prosper to ensure the association with India, a key together in commerce and trade, as well country in the ‘arc of inseparability’. as in marine resource development Thinking more globally, France and Italy in the • value—to sincerely pursue the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom in the conservation and development of various North Atlantic, and Germany in Europe could benefits the seas can provide, in terms become major members of US‑led regional of marine environment protection and maritime coalitions, founded on the free and marine resource control. democratic concept and sharing the common pursuit of existence, prosperity, and value. In short, the basic requirement to join the coalition is that the nation has no Ultimately, this could lead to the building serious dispute over maritime interests or of a global maritime coalition. From Japan’s territories, economic conflicts, or objections perspective, the initiative for a global to environmental conservation or the maritime coalition coincides with the development of marine resources. Even ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ proposed if there is a seed of dispute, building a by former Foreign Minister Aso, and the coalition that allows fair and democratic ‘coalition of nations based on common values’ ways of solving disputes is essential for referred to by former Prime Minister Abe the maintenance of the coalition. More and by current Prime Minister Fukuda, who importantly, the coalition needs to be built promised to promote Abe’s concept in his on the action principle of ‘service to others,’ diplomatic policies. which is based on the concept of diplomacy. The challenge of security cooperation in Considering all these factors, it will be the the coastal sea lanes best to create a coalition among the US allies (in other words, among the democratic Finally, one important question for global countries that share the same three interests or regional maritime coalitions is how to in the coalition’s existence, prosperity, and secure the safety of the sea lanes at their value), then add friendly maritime nations points of convergence on the coasts, even if The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 13

regional maritime coalitions can be formed confidence—even between countries with in those areas. Such areas have been the disputes—and to cooperate with each other stages for historic confrontations over the to attain the common target. land territories and marine interests of coastal nations, as demonstrated in the relationships 4 Conclusion between Japan, China, Korea, and Russia. In What Japan and Australia need to do is, first, those areas, the national interests of multiple to take an initiative with the US to develop countries are intertwined, and it is extremely cooperative relationships on the security difficult to form a cooperative system. of ocean sea lanes in the southwest Pacific, It is not so easy to build a coalition system while solidifying cooperative systems with in Northeast Asia or Southeast Asia, as the coastal countries of major sea lanes such as coastal sea lanes in those regions involve the Malacca–Singapore Strait. Moreover, the many seeds of confrontation. For example, two countries need to develop stronger ties Russia has recently unilaterally declared its with countries in the neighbouring Indian interests in the Arctic Ocean, motivated by Ocean and East Pacific, as they can form the abundant seabed resources there and the axes of regional maritime coalitions to by the increased possibility of year-round protect oceanic sea lanes. The Southwestern navigation due to global warming. In the East Pacific Maritime Coalition can promote China Sea and South China Sea, China has more efforts to conduct policy dialogue coerced and aggressively advanced toward and joint drills between countries. It will be oceans, which has led to more confrontations especially important for economic prosperity over territories and marine interests such as and maritime security to build a stronger sea‑bottom resources. For Japan, Australia relationship with India. and the US, coordination with the three Nonetheless, it is also necessary to take coastal countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and every opportunity and use every channel of Singapore along the Malacca–Singapore Strait diplomacy and defence connecting regional will be the most important. countries, such as direct intergovernmental Other areas have similar and even more dialogues, to realise all these objectives. complicated problems. Around the coasts It will be important to continue regional of the Arabian Peninsula there are religious security talks (such as the ASEAN Regional confrontations centred on Islam, conflicts Forum), the naval dialogue framework (such over oil rights and concessions, and a hotbed as the International Sea Power Symposium of international terrorism and piracy. Some and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium) or all of those factors are also in play along and forums for dialogue between private East African coasts and in the eastern and public sectors (such as those involving Mediterranean. However, it is possible major maritime think‑tanks and institutes). to develop opportunities to resolve such In the meantime, both governments should problems in the future if we aim for regional actively use the outcome of those forums and maritime coalitions among the relevant make efforts at every possible opportunity coastal countries. to develop mutual confidence between the navies or other maritime forces of regional In this sense, it is essential to form regional coastal countries. maritime coalitions in the oceans first. During the development of such coalitions, there will be many opportunities to develop mutual 14 Proceedings

Possible strategic ‘shocks’ in Asia North Korea’s transformation to a liberal, engaged democracy would be a shock; a Dr Rod Lyon pleasant shock, perhaps, but certainly a shock, Australian Strategic Policy Institute a ‘radical discontinuity’ in the genuine sense Strategic ‘shocks’ in Asia might come in a of the term. variety of forms, and in the somewhat gloomy I would also argue that a focus on paper that follows I explore a number of discontinuities actually captures most of them. Of course, much of how we think about what interests us about where the region the possible range of shocks depends upon might be going. Discontinuities often have an how we define the key term, ‘shock’. It would explanatory power in international relations be tiresome merely to revisit the traditional at least as profound as that provided by regional ‘flashpoints’ of The Democratic historical continuities. In the discipline of People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Taiwan international relations, such a claim might and South Asia. Those flashpoints still pose well be disputed. After all, much of the dangers; indeed, they pose serious dangers. discipline emphasises the slow, grinding Any one of them might precipitate a conflict nature of change in the international system. in which the casualties numbered in the The natural inclination of any analyst millions. But here we hit the definitional attempting to forecast the future is to look for problem: would it really be much of a ‘shock’ the existing trends and then to assume that if one of the well-known flashpoints were those trends will continue. to pose more intense problems for the region? Moreover, if we are happy merely But over the past years, for example, the to rehearse the traditional flashpoints, trends from the world of 1987 have probably aren’t we in danger of overlooking the been less influential in shaping where we are ‘alternative strategic futures’ of Asia? In short, today than have the major discontinuities of focusing remorselessly on the well-known the intervening years: the end of the Cold War, flashpoints might well serve to diminish our the Asian Financial Crisis, and 9/11 perhaps understanding of what might go seriously most prominent amongst them. An analyst wrong in our region. projecting forward from 1987’s trends would now be sadly astray, for even the end of the What is a ‘shock’? Cold War by 1990 was largely invisible to the bulk of strategic analysts in the mid-1980s. In this paper I will interpret the term ‘shock’ to mean a radical discontinuity. By that By comparison, an analyst who had made definition, North Korea’s continuing to be better allowance in 1987 for possible a problem wouldn’t be a shock to anyone. discontinuities in global and regional patterns North Korea’s penchant for abrupt, bizarre might be closer to the mark. I say ‘might’ be and often self-destructive policy initiatives closer to the mark, because here we hit the is so well known that a wide range of primary snag of forecasting on the basis of behaviour is now tolerated by the region possible strategic shocks: there are many under the rubric that it is merely typical of more potential discontinuities than ever the regime’s eccentricities. True, it might come true. After all, just about all patterns choose to behave even more bizarrely, but of stable behaviour might shift. How do we the difference would essentially be one of know which ones will? The brutal answer is degree. Even a more erratic, more threatening that we don’t know. Even the usual metrics North Korea wouldn’t be a ‘shock’. Rather, of likelihood and importance seem to offer The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 15

poor guidance. There was scarcely a better • a coup in Thailand, the Philippines, case during most of the 1980s for arguing or Pakistan. that the Soviet Union was likely to collapse Not all of those possibilities seem—to my than for claiming that Western alliances were. mind, at least—entirely in line with the Similarly, there was barely a better case for category definitions of a Black Swan outlined believing that a major catastrophic terrorist earlier. Some events on the list, a coup in the attack would be the most important potential Philippines, for example, or a naval incident discontinuity of 2001 rather than the souring at sea, seem unlikely to have extreme impact; of US–China relations earlier that same year. others, a shooting war in the Taiwan Straits, Despite those methodological hurdles, there’s would in certain conditions seem entirely a new bout of interest in spotting possible predictable. In terms of the definitions of strategic discontinuities in Asia. Pentagon Black Swans originally provided by Taleb, official, James Shinn, delivered a paper at it is possible that Mr Shinn’s examples the IISS’s 2007 Geneva conference in which actually include numerous ‘gray swans’.2 he explored possible ‘Black Swan’ events in Gray swans represent our attempt to think Asia.1 The term ‘Black Swan’ comes from a our way down paths that are unlikely rather recently published book by Nassim Nicholas than unpredictable. Taleb, called The Black Swan: The Impact of the Taleb’s thesis, of course, is that the Highly Improbable. The ‘Black Swan’ category world—and not merely Asia—is headed for describes events with three key features: the ungentle terrain of ‘Extremistan’, a place rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective where events are shaped disturbingly by a (though not prospective) predictability. process of fractal randomness. To be a Black (This essentially means that in hindsight Swan, an event does not have to be merely people believe that what occurred was rare, or wild, ‘it has to be unexpected, has entirely predictable!) to lie outside our tunnel of possibilities.’3 In Shinn’s list contained a mixed bag of mathematical terms, many of Taleb’s Black possibilities, including: Swans occur more than twenty standard • another tsunami in Southeast Asia, deviations from the mean. In a world where somewhere along the Belt of Fire a measure of three standard deviations is usually taken to suggest statistical • human to human avian flu breaks out on improbability, it is in this sense that Black Sumatra or Java Swan events are genuinely unforeseeable. • another EP-3-type military accident, in the air, afloat, or even under the sea—perhaps Unfortunately, that means Taleb’s thesis a Chinese submarine surfaces under a US doesn’t help us much in identifying the aircraft carrier, rather than just astern emerging Black Swans. If such events are genuinely unforeseeable, what point in trying • a shooting war starts across the Taiwan to foresee them? We may have no option but Straits to settle for an analysis of events that are • a nuclear warhead is mounted on a predictable to some extent, and which might Taepodong missile on a launch pad in ‘shock’ or reverse the currently rather benign North Korea patterns of Asia–Pacific security. This might • a nuclear device appears to be on board a happen in a number of ways. If we imagine merchant ship in the Pacific headed who certain future scenarios is which we ask ‘What knows where happened to make the good Asia–Pacific go 16 Proceedings

bad?’ then it seems to me there are several some Black Swans might emerge within that possible discontinuities that could have a broader arena. profoundly destabilising effect on the region. All five shocks are about things that generate I propose to look briefly at five such futuristic big waves in the region and possibly beyond historical plots: it. Generating big waves is not easy to do: 1. the Asia in which a ‘stew’ Asia is a large region, so large that we have of non‑traditional security traditionally seen it as a set of regional issues—everything from environmental security sub-complexes. In this sense, I have pressures, to high sex-ratio imbalances, not attempted to include ‘single-state’ to pandemics, ageing populations and a failures on this list of shocks. Undoubtedly, failure of urbanisation—combined to drive some single-state failures—China’s failure, the region into protracted crisis for example—could be profoundly disturbing. 2. the Asia in which domestic modernisation But in general, I have tried to concentrate here derailed in key Asian countries on broader patterns of change that might 3. the Asia in which economic be shocking. interdependence gave way to economic competition First shock: the stew of non‑traditional security pressures 4. the Asia that slid into nuclear proliferation and a world of nuclear hazard Asia is the world’s great region of successful 5. the Asia that followed the historical modernisation. The success of development trajectory of Europe’s past and fell into strategies across broad swathes of the region great-power conflict. has enhanced levels of human security for hundreds of millions of people. It has Of those five ‘shocked’ Asias, the last two are also eased perceptions that security is a the result of tensions typical of traditional zero‑sum game. Modernisation has depended conflict paths, but the first three emerge prominently upon strategies of urbanisation from failures in the broader agenda of and industrialisation. Urbanisation assists the domestic development patterns, economics accumulation of both capital and labour and and non-traditional security. I think the so is central to the development path. relative balance between the different sorts of failures—the narrow, traditional and the But it might be worth thinking about an broad, non-traditional—is actually about Asia where those strategies were subject right. The traditional security pressures to sudden reversal. In that Asia, high are relatively well managed in Asia, largely economic dynamism ‘eats’ the environment, because of the security structure put in place and environmental outcomes become after the Second World War, the comparative suddenly acute: a scenario that is not strategic weakness of the main Asian players entirely fanciful given what we know from over the decades since, and the fact that previous environmental shift patterns. We the theatre was a ‘second front’ during the do know that great powers can ruin their Cold War. Of course, that security structure own environment: the USSR did so, so there is decaying, so some ‘shocked’ Asias can be is, sadly, nothing to suggest that Asian foreseen down that path. But Asian security great powers will automatically be blessed has for some decades had something of a with the wisdom to avoid such outcomes. broader ‘developmental’ pattern to it, and it Moreover, we need to consider this possible would be entirely reasonable to suppose that outcome in the light of human ignorance The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 17

about the environment overall: we know problems for the emerging demographic less about the global environment than a profiles in the region. nineteenth-century physician knew about the In fact, this first ‘shocked’ Asia, an Asia human body. We simply don’t understand its beset by a stew of non-traditional security workings well enough to know what actions pressures is actually a relatively easy one to cause what effects. In those circumstances, envisage. It is one that Dr Alan Dupont, for rapid growth strategies for a large fraction example, has explored in his book, East Asia of the world’s population might easily induce Imperilled.6 Dupont argues that a new class environmental crises. of transnational, non-military threats has Urbanisation itself may break down in many the potential to reverse decades of hard-won parts of Asia. As a world, we are long past development across the region. It is a scenario the time when large cities were thought to we should take seriously. represent the pinnacle of national greatness. Many of the mega-cities of the world today Second shock: domestic failures are no longer like the London and Paris across Asia of yesteryear. In many parts of the world, The importance of domestic politics in Asian cities attest to national weakness: Lagos is security is the theme behind the latest a prime example. When Robert Kaplan was National Bureau of Asian Research’s volume writing of ‘the coming anarchy’, he drew in its Strategic Asia series.7 Asia’s strategic prominently upon the West African urban stability has been largely based upon a set condition as a metaphor for the future of of domestic success stories: stories that—in the world: ‘because the demographic reality turn—are essentially based upon general of West Africa is a countryside draining into patterns of regional good governance and dense slums by the coast, ultimately the national transformation. Regional dynamism region’s rulers will come to reflect the values is based at the micro-level upon an interlinked of these shanty-towns.’4 pattern of national dynamism. Asia’s future success story depends upon So, we must look at what might constitute the linked strategies of urbanisation and a set of national discontinuities. Almost all modernisation working. Asia, simply the major Asian countries are in some kind of because of its population, will have multiple political transitions, even Japan and Australia. mega‑cities, but global experience in For some of those countries, the transitions designing, constructing and managing will be deeply transformative. Overall, we mega-cities is still relatively limited. are witnessing a mix of leadership change, Asia is also beset by looming demographic institutional alteration and important societal problems: ageing populations, the ‘bare change across the region. It is unclear where branches’5 of high sex-ratios because of the most of those developments are headed. preference for male offspring, and actual Thomas Carothers in an important article for population contraction are driving several the Journal of Democracy in 2002 argued that Asian countries into unfamiliar demographic we were witnessing ‘the end of the transition terrain. A regional or global pandemic which, paradigm’.8 Most of the regimes experiencing like the 1918 Spanish flu, naturally targeted transitional modernisation pressures would, the younger members of a population (those Carothers argued, fail to become mature with lower exposure to a variety of flu strains democracies and would live for the long term during their lives) might well pose serious in a political ‘gray zone’. 18 Proceedings

Australia’s former Secretary of Defence, Mr Ric of interdependence where everybody makes Smith, presented a paper in Singapore which money. Economic relationships have easily investigated some potential challenges for outpaced security relationships. Trade the Asian security environment.9 His range has been a driver of economic growth, of possible risks included risks of ‘domestic and, in many cases, a driver of political political management’, because agendas of modernisation as well. The region as a economic reform have in many countries whole has been ‘driven by growth’, to use easily outpaced the domestic political reforms James Morley’s phrase.10 that typically accompany them. In China, The main effect of that increasing Vietnam, Pakistan and Burma, for example, interdependence has been, principally, those risks are most easily seen; and in those to soften a set of unresolved historical countries it is not at all apparent how political antagonisms. But this has not been the case systems can evolve in stabilising ways. Beyond across the board: just to look briefly at Japan’s those cases, there is a much broader swathe own case, for example, Japan’s economic of countries where political transitions have integration with its neighbours has increased not yet been consolidated: Thailand, the but Japan’s level of security seems to have Philippines and Indonesia, for example. worsened as its neighbours’ economic power Recent academic research on international has increased. Geopolitical outcomes have security has led us to place an increased long been about more than interdependence emphasis on regime types as a key and this remains true in Asia today. determinant of conflict patterns. So how But just as trade and interdependence can Asian domestic politics flex and adjust over have positive outcomes, they can also spur coming years is important to security in negative policy outcomes, which also ripple a broad regional sense, and not merely a into the security area. So far the region has localised, national one. In Asia, domestic side-stepped a fear about relative gains, priorities often shape foreign and strategic because of its preference for absolute gains policies. China, for example, has built a foreign (a policy preference typical of countries at a policy to sustain its domestic priorities of low level on the development trajectory). But growth and stability. In a region which has can that preference last? Much would seem often embraced a non-intervention principle to depend on the condition of great-power in relation to issues of domestic politics, relationships. Under what circumstances can we are all steadily becoming more engaged some regional powers remain indifferent in precisely those sorts of issues. Regional to the rapid escalation of others in terms of security could not help but be affected were power assets? Christopher Layne once wrote several regional countries to slide backwards that economic growth rates would be the into older-style authoritarian regimes. basis for undoing unipolarity at the global level. They will almost certainly be the basis Third shock: economic for a new regional security order in Asia. competition?; a new wave of protectionism? So perceptions of economic outcomes must become sharper as those growth So far the pace of economic development rates begin to suggest a more fundamental in Asia has been a clear positive factor for rearrangement of the regional security Asian security. Putting it somewhat crudely, order. In that rearrangement, perceptions of the region has been ready to agree to forms The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 19

economic growth as a ‘win-win’ outcome will • A breakdown of the NPT regime, in start to decline as perceptions of a shifting particular by the move of status-quo order suggest a more definite set of ‘winners’ powers towards the development of and ‘losers’ in Asia. indigenous nuclear arsenals

That suggest the current condition, where – such proliferation is most likely to occur regional tensions about differential growth initially outside the region (e.g. in the rates are muted, can’t last. It is already Middle East), but would probably not apparent that the key US–China trade link remain isolated there. is under stress. The US Treasury Secretary, The Asia Pacific is already a multipolar Henry Paulson has described the link as nuclear region (with US, Russia, China, India, characterised by three dynamics: deepening Pakistan, and, perhaps, DPRK all ranked as interdependence, a strained policy consensus, nuclear-weapon states). Indeed, only Britain 11 and the rise of economic protectionism. and France and Israel stand as NWS outside He noted that ‘the tectonic plates’ of the the region. Of the current Asian powers, only US–China economic relationship were the US has ever ‘extended’ nuclear deterrence shifting, as perceptions of outcomes to others, and that system was devised for became sharper. The same dynamic a different world. New strategic pressures already characterises many of the bilateral are flowing through Asia, the result of a economic relationships between the region’s much more complex security landscape. great powers. Nuclear proliferation is a worry and its effects uncertain; to echo William Walker’s judgment, Fourth ‘shock’: nuclear proliferation it might reflect a breakdown in the strategic The Asia–Pacific region has grown vigorously order as well as in the nuclear one. It might in an environment where the pressures also generate a new security order so complex of nuclear dynamism have been relatively as to undo any prospects for great power contained: contained by what Mitchell Reiss cooperation on regional public order goods. would call the ‘bridled ambitions’ of most Nuclear proliferation might have some 12 regional states. Those bridled ambitions have stabilising effects. It’s possible that some been augmented by two particularly useful strategic rivalries might be ‘contained’ by mechanisms: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation the sobering prospects that those rivalries Treaty (NPT) and the associated elements of might escalate into costly contests. But that regime; and the US doctrine of extended there would be an obvious edginess to nuclear deterrence (END). But what would it international politics in Asia were the take for the ambitions to become unbridled? region to host perhaps double the number A breakdown in the current pattern is most of nuclear-weapon states that it currently likely to be driven by a failure in one or does. Variations in arsenal sizes, different both of the key mechanisms outlined in the levels of vulnerability to preemptive preceding paragraph: strikes, asymmetries in conventional force capabilities, and uncertainties about national • A breakdown of the extended nuclear red-lines, nuclear thresholds and targeting deterrence system, either through US strategies would all make for a more disengagement (highly unlikely) or dangerous Asia Pacific. That Asia would be a an erosion of the credibility of the US region replete with nuclear hazard. guarantee (more likely). 20 Proceedings

Fifth ‘shock’: great power conflict in Nuclear weapons I have spoken about earlier. Asia The OECD ‘system’ seems to presuppose the broad continuance of the world order I think this ‘shock’ has long been a concern in its current shape. World orders are slow of academics and international relations to change, but not immune from change. scholars. In particular it calls to mind Aaron At a time when global power is in any Friedberg’s scenario, that Asia’s future might event shifting to Asia, it is entirely possible be Europe’s past.13 Such a future would be that we are witnessing the transition to profoundly shaped by the unreconciled a new global order, one less coloured by great-power tensions in Asia. The region Western preferences. has no historical experience of all the great powers being strong simultaneously, and Great power conflict is a relatively rare thing, no experience of systematised security especially if we talk in particular about those cooperation between those powers. great power conflicts that draw others in (see Jack Levy’s identification of nine such ‘world We are inclined to think of discontinuities wars’ in the international system since 1475).15 as abrupt events, much like the suddenness But while great-power conflict is generically of the terrorist attacks on 9/11. But in rare, it is a relatively common thing at times of this scenario, I think the fundamental major power transitions. And such transitions discontinuities would reflect shifts in the now loom in Asia. deep, slower-moving layers of international relations. It might plausibly be argued that Implications for Australia and Japan a discontinuity could still be fundamentally important even though it assumed a more None of the shocks sketched above are within protracted form. In this sense, for example, the control of Australia or Japan, although the gradual breakdown of Robert Ross’s each country, singly and together, can and do bipolar Asian security ‘structure’ (a structure pursue policies intended to ease some of the characterised by a dominant maritime power shocks. We already do some things to offset and a dominant continental power14) can the non-traditional security challenges around be thought of as a particularly important the region, and the bilateral security pact discontinuity. The move by the continental concluded in 2007 provides a framework for power into the maritime domain is certainly doing more. Similarly, both countries work to a profound strategic development, raising as deflect pressures for nuclear breakout and to it does a host of issues about possible conflict reinforce the current set of non-proliferation and cooperation. norms across the region. We both work to ease the coming ‘great-power transition’ It is certainly true that the Asia of great-power that looms in the next twenty years, and so conflict is not destined to arise. On the other work to reduce the prospects for great-power side of the balance to the forces outlined conflict in the region. On the other hand, above, we need to place the two factors we have little scope to affect the internal that John Ikenberry would typically identify political dynamics of key players, regardless as constraining great-power conflict across of whether those dynamics concern political the globe: adjustment to the pressures of modernisation • nuclear weapons or emerging demographic profiles. • the existence of an OECD ‘system’ Some of the Asias depicted above are well that is more than the prominence of a beyond our ability to shape. But it will remain single power. important for our two countries to work The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 21

together in a region that promises to be a Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male more turbulent one than what we have been Population (Cambridge, MA: The used to. MIT Press).

6 Alan Dupont (2001) East Asia Conclusion Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to The Asian security environment does Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge have a downside as well as an upside. I’ve University Press). concentrated here on ‘things that might 7 Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (2007) (eds.) go wrong’, rather than ‘things that might Strategic Asia 2007-08: Domestic Political go right’. The latter would clearly be the Change and Grand Strategy (Seattle: NBR). subject of a different paper. I’ve concentrated here on two different sorts of ‘shocks’: the 8 Thomas Carothers (2002) ‘The end of shocks of modernisation as it were, and the the transition paradigm’, Journal of shocks of interstate rivalry. They are not Democracy. 13,1: 5-21 entirely disconnected, though neither do 9 Ric Smith (2007) ‘Australia and Asia: they necessarily cascade into each other. As Managing Change, Managing Risk’, a direct strategic problem, managing the RSIS Distinguished Lecture, Singapore, complex power transitions in Asia look likely 26 November. to be one of the key problems of our time. But we will have to manage those transitions 10 James Morley (1998) (ed.) Driven by as part of an even more complex tapestry Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific of problems at both the regional and the Region (M.E. Sharpe). global levels. 11 Henry Paulson (2007) ‘Remarks on Managing Complexity and Establishing Endnotes New Habits of Cooperation in US-China 1 James Shinn (2007) ‘Tracking Asia’s Black Economic Relations’, 2007 George Swans’, Remarks prepared for the IISS Bush US-China Relations Conference, Global Strategic Review, “Managing Global 23 October. Available at http://treasury. Security and Risk”, Geneva 7-9 September. gov/press/releases/hp633.htm Copy available at http://www.iiss. 12 Mitchell Reiss Bridled Ambition: Why org/conferences/global-strategic-review/ Countries Constrain their Nuclear plenary-sessions/plenary-session-2 Capabilities (Washington: Woodrow 2 Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2007) The Wilson Center). Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly 13 Aaron Friedberg (2000) ‘Will Europe’s past Improbable (New York: Random House). be Asia’s future?’ Survival, 42,3: 147-160 For a treatment of the ‘gray swan’ phenomenon, see Chapters 14 ff. 14 See Robert Ross (1999) ‘The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first 3 Taleb, p.213. Century’, International Security, 23,4: 81-118 4 Robert Kaplan (2000) The Coming Anarchy: 15 Jack Levy (1983) War in the Modern Great Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: (New York: Vintage Books) p.12 University Press of Kentucky). 5 Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer (2005) Bare Branches: The Security 22 Proceedings

Emerging Asia–Pacific security Asian Financial Crisis.2 Some Asian states architectures:the Australia– (i.e. Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea) Japan factor resented the IMF view that this crisis was largely precipitated by the inefficiencies and Professor William T Tow inflexibility of various market-state processes Australian National University for wealth creation and management that characterise much of East Asia’s Historical shifts in international security economic growth. relations often occur unexpectedly and ambiguously. Lord Grey’s famous warning at As a result, a question arose among regional the outset of the First World War that ‘the policy-planners as to whether it was ‘possible lights were going out all over Europe’ hardly to create a regional political architecture anticipated monumental change evoked by which would allow regional elites to promote the demise of that continent’s century-old their preferred visions of transnational concert system of order-building. Nor has cooperation while simultaneously preserving the end of the Cold War—contrary to the regional autonomy?’3 In addressing that expectations of many observers—spelled question, the APT gradually evolved into the the end of the American-led Eurasian East Asian Summit, which initially convened network of security alliances.1 Instead, NATO in December 2005, in Kuala Lumpur and has expanded eastward to underwrite the included the thirteen APT states plus emergence of a ‘new Europe’ forged from the Australia, New Zealand and India. China and old Soviet empire. The US postwar system Malaysia spearheaded an ‘East Asian-centric’ of bilateral Pacific alliances, meanwhile, formula for establishing the EAS as an has been renovated to hedge against a exclusivist organisation, reflecting a ‘bloc rising People’s Republic of China (PRC) and politics’ approach to regional politico-security to confront terrorism, nuclear proliferation identity. This proved to be unsuccessful; Japan, and other ‘asymmetrical threats’. Nearly Singapore and Indonesia fought effectively for two decades after the fall of the USSR, the US the adoption of a more inclusive, ‘pan‑Asian’ alliance system remains the most cohesive model for EAS development.4 Japan’s Prime regional security mechanism operating in Minister Koizumi had already proposed the Asia Pacific, with Japan and Australia (in January 2002) his idea for an ‘Asian constituting its two key components. Community’ that would employ the APT for ‘secur(ing) prosperity and stability’ in East Asia Pressures are intensifying within the region, and apply ‘open, transparent and inclusive however, to complement and eventually processes’ for institutional development.5 to supplant this alliance system with more Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, further regionally indigenous organisations or refined Koizumi’s vision of open regionalism ‘architectures’. The East Asian Summit (EAS) by adding a distinctly ideological component has perhaps captured the most attention to it. His advocacy for creating a Eurasian ‘arc as a likely instrument for shaping such of freedom and prosperity’ directly challenged change. The ‘ASEAN + 3’ (APT) process was proponents of ‘Asian values’, and proscribed initially a response by the Association of the conscious ascendancy of ‘emerging and Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China, mature democracies’.6 Japan and South Korea to perceived economic barriers imposed by the United States, the The Abe government’s zero-sum outlook on European Community and the International regional organisation, embracing state-centric Monetary Fund (IMF) that led to the 1997–98 ideological orientation as a predominant The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 23

component for security organisation, politics and to what extent that pursuit has contests ASEAN’s (and, more recently, been successful. The chapter’s conclusion China’s) traditional blueprint for regional offers policy recommendations that security. Strengthening security ties with Canberra and Tokyo could ponder regarding both Australia and India, moreover, were future collaboration in regional security deemed as integral by the Abe government, community building without undermining and led to Japanese efforts to forge a their still highly valued bilateral alliance ties ‘quadrilateral’ security coalition involving with the United States. Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, the Japanese expectation that the Architectural dynamics: background other proposed affiliates would embrace and challenges this formula proved to be incorrect. Only Disagreement prevails over what actually the United States seriously contemplated constitutes ‘security architecture’. When operationalising Abe’s vision; Australia and proposing a Conference on Security India were wary of it. The Abe government’s Cooperation in Asia (CSCA) in July 1990, passing in September 2007 was a benchmark Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans in Japanese regional security diplomacy. By envisioned ‘a wholly new institutional process late November, Japan’s new Prime Minister, that might be capable of evolving, in Asia just Yasuo Fukukda was strongly endorsing a as in Europe, as a framework for addressing ten-year ‘ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work and resolving security problems.’9 However, Plan’ that would underwrite the creation of what specific organising principles should an ASEAN Community by 2015 and promote be applied to realise such a process remains security community-building through both contested. Evans’ vision of incorporating a the APT and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).7 European model (the Conference for Security The vestiges of any Japanese ‘containment Cooperation in Europe, CSCE) to address revisited’ strategy directed toward China were Asian security problems was not received clearly buried when Fukuda visited China favourably by many within Asia. Many Asian in late December. He supported what he elites continued adherence to realist thought, termed a ‘strategically reciprocal partnership’ comfortable with their existing notions between China and Japan. He also posited of international hierarchy and convinced that the US–Japan alliance best worked that new power blocs or tacit great power as a ‘contributor to peace and stability in concerts would prevail over norm-based the region, which means cordial and open regional institutions in the post-Cold War relations with all nations in the region.’8 Asian security environment. ASEAN’s vision of This chapter will initially identify and assess Asian institutionalism, allegedly predicated on those policy interests and questions that both regionally indigenous values, never fully took currently unite and potentially complicate hold as Southeast Asian elites instead hedged Australian–Japanese interaction on regional between accommodating and balancing security architectures. The two countries’ Chinese and American power.10 respective alliances with the United States, While a precise definition of ‘architectures’ their relations with China, and selected has continued to elude regional policy-makers ‘transnational’ or ‘alternative security’ issues and analysts, debate over how to shape are assessed. It will then briefly evaluate how and refine them has intensified. By 2007, and why Australia and Japan have pursued Southeast Asian policy leaders were referring multilateral security and economic-security to architecture-building as embodying ‘…a 24 Proceedings

loose, overlapping pattern of partnerships warned that they would ‘not tolerate formed around functional areas of interest any moves to obstruct our research with varying memberships and varying whaling program’ before backing down to agendas’.11 Critics of this view argue that international pressure and promising to a preoccupation with crafting new and suspend its killing of humpback whales.14 increasingly complicated ‘architectures’ Also, in a move perceived as a refutation of merely obfuscates the task of integrating the Bush administration’s Middle East policy, the many instrumentalities and mechanisms Rudd has served notice that Australia will already established in ways that would be withdrawing its combat forces from Iraq better ensure regional stability.12 No real during 2008. consensus has yet materialised, however, on The Fukuda government’s softer line what strategy can best serve that purpose. on the PRC relative to the Koizumi–Abe As integral participants at both the bilateral administrations has already been noted. This and multilateral levels of Asia–Pacific security modified Japanese posture towards China— politics, however, Japan and Australia can the country that most observers view to be play a key role in reconciling the region’s the burgeoning ‘peer competitor’ to American various perspectives of appropriate security power and influence in Asia—renders policy infrastructure. doubtful any prospect for ‘threat oriented’, Intra-alliance management multilateral security arrangements such as the quadrilateral coalition of democracies, A first step is to identify areas of potential initially envisioned by Abe and strongly complementarity between the traditional US supported by key Bush administration bilateral ‘hub and spokes’ regional alliance officials such as Vice-President Dick Cheney. network and the region’s burgeoning Japanese domestic political infighting has multilateral security forums. This will not also spilled over to impede Fukuda’s ability be easy as challenges related to shifting to sustain Japanese naval refuelling support national security interests and traditional to US military operations in Afghanistan. US resistance to multilateral security politics Although legislation was eventually passed in in the region must be overcome. Both mid-January 2008 to revive this operation, the Australia and Japan, moreover, have new episode highlighted Japan’s growing internal national leaderships (the Rudd and Fukuda political divisions over supporting US global governments, respectively) while the United strategy relative to Japanese constitutional 15 States is now immersed in a national election restraints on defence policy. process that renders the Bush administration Intra-alliance policy management is thus less effective in formulating long-term US becoming a more difficult undertaking for national security policy for the remainder of all three governments. Ongoing, ‘functional’, its term. alliance collaboration continues among the Although in power only a short time, three allies in such areas as missile defence the new Australian Government led by research and testing, maritime patrolling Kevin Rudd has already demonstrated its of key sea lanes of communication and zeal for environmental politics. It has ratified intelligence-sharing. Without widespread the Kyoto accord and, of more symbolic consensus over what constitutes the ‘general consequence to Japan, is monitoring interest’ of alliance affiliation, however, the adherence to international anti-whaling task confronting policy-makers in Australia, accords in the Antarctic.13 Japanese officials Japan and the United States of ‘bridging’ The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 25

existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks to induce acceptable North Korean nuclear in ways that can produce robust approaches policy behaviour, for example, clearly swayed to shaping regional stability becomes the George W Bush administration to reject more difficult.16 President Clinton’s growing reliance on multilateral Asian security dialogues. More Traditional US resistance to multilateral recent American perceptions that China has security politics in the region compounds employed multilateral security diplomacy such ‘bridging’ difficulties. This was via its ‘New Security Concept’ to contest initially illustrated by George H W Bush’s US strategic influence in the region, and administration’s strong opposition to China’s initiative with Russia and various Gareth Evans’ CSCA proposal. Worried that it Central Asian states to form the Shanghai would focus on arms control measures that Cooperation Organization as a counter to could limit US naval power in the Pacific, and NATO activities in Afghanistan are illustrative disillusioned by the Southeast Asia Treaty of US concerns.19 Organization’s (SEATO’s) failure to replicate NATO’s brand of American-dominated Both the Clinton and George W Bush multilateralism in Europe, US Secretary of administrations have been less reluctant State James Baker requested that Australia to explore a variant of multilateral security withdraw its proposal. Baker’s request was cooperation in Asia known as ‘minilateralism’. supported by the then Japanese government, As defined here, ‘minilateral’ arrangements concerned that any intensification of are ‘ad hoc’ policy coalitions, usually involving multilateral security politics would weaken three or four core states, who may be but the US commitment to its bilateral security are not always, allied formally but who treaty with Japan.17 affiliate to resolve a specific issue or issues. Minilaterals may differ from classical alliances Little has since changed. George W Bush’s because they are not always ‘threat-centric’ administration has strongly signalled its and indeed often underwrite or perpetuate preference for maintaining a hub and strategic reassurance or confidence-building spokes alliance strategy in Asia as part of arrangements.20 They are frequently its broader campaign to balance potential regarded, however, as useful mechanisms contenders for hegemony in the Asia Pacific for coordinating mutual interests ‘beyond (e.g. containing China or collaborating bilateralism’ when such coordination promises selectively with India). US Deputy Secretary to maximise their collective strategic position of State John Negroponte insisted in May within a regional or global balance of power. 2007 testimony before the US House of Minilateral security cooperation is most likely Representatives’ Committee on Foreign to occur when potential rivals to minilateralist Affairs that the ongoing US strategic presence partners are not yet so threatening as to and its bilateral alliances remained the preclude confidence-building and other forms ‘bedrock’ of its Asia policy.18 of cooperative security behaviour.21 US skepticism of ‘cooperative multilateralism’ Early post-Cold War ‘minilaterals’ in Asia were stems from Washington’s past problems mainly designed under such circumstances. in addressing key Asia–Pacific regional They included KEDO, the US–Japan–South security crises in the post-Cold War era. Korea Trilateral and Oversight Group (TCOG) The 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis and to coordinate diplomacy toward Pyongyang the subsequent failure of the Korea Energy following the North Korean Taepodong Development Organization (KEDO) regime 26 Proceedings

missile test in 1998, the Four Powers Talks on Australia, its alliances and the ‘China stabilising the Korean Peninsula and ‘Jakarta factor’ Workshop’ participants (China and ASEAN claimants) to address territorial disputes in For Australian national security planners, the South China Sea. The Trilateral Strategic reconciling ongoing American and Japanese Dialogue (TSD), created in 2002 and upgraded propensities to apply minilateralism as a to the ministerial level in 2005, is another means of strengthening alliance politics example. Represented by Australia, Japan with China’s obvious apprehensions over and the United States as a mechanism for this trend is essential. One analyst has strengthening the exchange and coordination recently and aptly outlined this problem: of their approaches to ‘non-traditional’ as well bilateral Australia–Japan security links can as threat-centric regional and international develop in parallel with these two countries security problems, the TSD is nevertheless existing bilateral security alliances with the ‘threat-centric’ to the extent that Chinese US only if all three states share perceptions power and the North Korean threat are and interests of regional security, and if inevitably discussed in this forum. The Washington does not promote a ‘miniature question of to what extent this dialogue will NATO-type organisation’ designed to mature beyond the ‘talking shop’ stage of contain China.23 Australia does not view its ministers or their immediate subordinates American alliance, or its increasingly robust to develop a concrete general purpose and bilateral security relationship with Japan, corresponding organisational attributes is still as components of a containment posture an open one.22 directed toward China. Australia’s trading relationship with the PRC is expanding Minilateralism arguably replicates the dramatically. Thus, the ‘China factor’ is a exclusivist and hierarchical characteristics of key dimension of the new Australian Labor the US-led bilateral alliance network in the government’s effort to remain ‘a good US ally’ Asia Pacific. The ‘senior’ or most powerful but a ‘more independent one.’ Kevin Rudd ally usually initiates a security coalition signalled consistently during his October/ in response to an issue or crisis that is of November 2007 election campaign that he direct concern to itself. There is usually no will be less prone to endorse nearly every US independent secretariat or other executive position on international security than was his component established to represent or immediate predecessor.24 negotiate possible differences that may arise among minilateral affiliates. The possible From the Trilateral Security Dialogue’s transformation of the Six Party Talks format outset in 2002, Chinese officials and into a more permanent Northeast Asian analysts have directed low-key criticism Regional Peace and Security Structure may, towards it as a potential instrument of however, constitute a test of how well anti-China containment.25 They became minilateral groupings formed to manage a especially concerned when TSD consultations particular security issue—in this case the were scheduled to convene during the North Korean nuclear problem—can evolve September 2007 Asia Pacific Economic into a brand of multilateralsm capable of Cooperation (APEC) summit and by the addressing a wider range of Asia–Pacific prospect that those discussions would security issues. endorse an initiative to expand the TSD into a quadrilateral alliance involving India. Chinese President Hu Jintao had already expressed his personal displeasure over ‘exploratory The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 27

sidetalks’ held between India and the TSD will prevail over classical power balancing states during the ASEAN Regional Forum scenarios such as a Sino–American war (ARF) security policy meeting in Manila exploding in the Taiwan Strait. This reality on 24–25 May 2007.26 He subsequently has been increasingly self-evident over the engineered a diplomatic counter-initiative past few months and years. In February 2005, to neutralise the TSD by persuading the Japan incurred Beijing’s wrath by agreeing Howard government to announce a bilateral to an explicit reference to the stability of the Sino–Australian strategic dialogue at APEC.27 Taiwan Strait as a ‘common [Japanese and Although this initiative was launched with American] strategic objective.’28 some fanfare, it should be noted that Japan US basing operations in Japan (and especially and the United States have long maintained at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa) constitute the separate bilateral dialogues with the PRC. nearest concentration of US military power to The timing and effect of the announcement the Strait (approximately 350 nautical miles, was, however, assigned greater emphasis by 3 1/2 sailing days, from the Strait) and are the the PRC than whatever actual substance such primary staging post for moving US carrier Sino–Australian dialogue might yield. forces into the East China Sea. Despite the As key regional US allies, how Japan and Fukuda government’s recent efforts to repair Australia relate to Asian crisis spots or Sino–Japanese tensions which intensified ‘flashpoints’ is carefully observed by and, under the Koizumi/Abe governments, it when possible, influenced by Washington. is highly unlikely that it would defy US Taiwan and North Korea remain the two expectations that Japan provide transit major unresolved regional security issues facilities and logistical support in any future emanating from the Cold War. Accessible Sino–American war over Taiwan.29 sea lanes of communication are also a main Major Australian ports and bases (except concern, as are nuclear proliferation and Darwin) are more than 4,000 miles from regional links to international terrorism. Taiwan. This distance, combined with the Due largely to uncompromising Chinese fact that Australia’s geopolitical orientation insistence that Taiwan remains a strictly is more with Japan, the US and the wider internal affair; the fate of that island polity Pacific than with China, would initially has not been incorporated into regional appear to preclude Australian forces playing multilateral security agendas. China has a major role in support of any US military worked assiduously, for example, to preclude operations.30 The most fundamental concern any discussion of the Taiwan Strait at APEC’s regarding Australian involvement in a Taiwan Heads-of-State summits. contingency, however, is how intense US The question of what Japan and Australia pressure would be for Australia to provide would actually do if the PRC were to attack military support. While visiting Beijing in Taiwan, however, is very much alive as a August 2004, Australian Foreign Minister central issue of American alliance politics Alexander Downer publicly surmised that the in the Pacific. This issue draws attention to Australian–American alliance or ‘ANZUS’ did the overriding relevance of the US bilateral not necessarily cover situations apart from alliance network over nascent multilateral direct attacks on the signatories’ homelands. security groupings in the region. The latter He was immediately ‘corrected’ by American have not thus far been able to generate officials and by Prime Minister John Howard sufficiently robust mechanisms to ensure on this interpretation. This episode illustrated that confidence-building and crisis resolution the extent to which Washington insists that 28 Proceedings

an attack on its own forces in the Pacific the 26 December 2004 South Asian tsunami, triggers a commitment for allied response.31 US military officials spearheaded the creation The landslide victory of the Taiwan Nationalist of the ‘Core Group’, initially comprising Party in Taiwan’s January 2008 legislative the US, Australia, Canada, Japan, India and elections and the strong prospect of a similar the Netherlands, to establish military and victory in that island’s presidential election in civilian assistance programs to the victims of late March could at least temporarily defuse that natural disaster.34 Various geopolitical the Sino–Taiwanese tensions precipitated by rationales accompanied this genuinely the arguably separatist postures championed humanitarian response. Australia and the by Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party United States were given the opportunity (DDP) government. US pressure on Australia’s to ‘make a major anti-terrorism and own ‘hedging’ strategy could likewise relationship-building investment in Indonesia, be educed. a country indispensable to regional security and the global war on terrorism.’35 A truce Multilateralism and transnational imposed over the protracted insurgency security conflict in Aceh was a short-term byproduct of the Indonesian Government wishing to The ascension of international terrorism and appear commensurately benign. Japan and other ‘asymmetrical threats’ as a leading India both entertained calculations that concern of strategic policy-planners has their prominence in tsunami disaster relief been accompanied by an interest in how operations would translate into greater multilateral frameworks can be employed to support for permanent UN Security Council neutralise them. As one observer has recently membership.36 The fundamental outcome noted, the Bush administration has engaged of this relief effort, however, was more in such multilateral security initiatives as normative than material. It posited a common the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), idealism shared by Australia, Japan and the the Six Party Talks, and the ARF and has United States as ‘like-minded states’ defined, proposed others such as the (unsuccessful) as Thomas Wilkins put it, ‘by what they Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). stand for…’.37 Washington’s multilateral commitments and interactions, however, have been largely Normative preferences are also reflected in and correctly viewed by other Asia–Pacific the text of the March 2007 Australia–Japan 38 states as ‘US-centric.’32 A major question Declaration on Security Cooperation. Most which confronts the US and its regional ‘areas of cooperation’ in the Declaration and allies is whether they are prepared to modify the ‘Action Plan’ that has emanated from it the United States’ historical insistence on are related to transnational security concerns: managing key regional security issues.33 law enforcement against transnational ‘Traditional’ or state-centric security issues are crime, border security, peace operations, still marked by high degrees of tension and humanitarian operations and coordination mistrust; ‘non-traditional’ or asymmetrical against pandemics. Counter-terrorism and problems could provide the basis for counter-proliferation against weapons of developing precedents for greater security mass destruction are arguably transnational cooperation in multilateral forums. in context, involving diplomatic action, institutional support and technical capabilities Evidence is growing that such is gradually that are not exclusively state-centric in becoming the case. Within a week following character but require expanded multilateral The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 29

coordination. The language of the Declaration on the Malayan Peninsula, initially through was hardly coincidental in this regard. the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, the Anglo–Malayan Defense Agreement and, Recent patterns of Australia–Japan since 1971, through the Five Power Defense security cooperation have assumed a Arrangements.41 As its postwar economic distinctly transnational flavour, including capabilities grew, Japan intermittently peacekeeping and peace building operations launched multilateral security-related in Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor; aid to diplomacy initiatives that were received with South Pacific microstates, pollution control, varying degrees of success: Prime Minister environmental assistance to Indonesia, Takeo Fukuda’s ‘heart-to-heart diplomacy’ climate change and energy security, joint initiative toward ASEAN states in 1977 pre-deployment training for peace operations designed to strengthen ASEAN resilience in and mutual participation in urban search and the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War; rescue training exercises.39 Recent Australian– Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama’s proposal Japanese differences over Japan’s ‘scientific’ to promote regional multilateral security whaling operations in the Southern Ocean dialogues in July 1991 within the ASEAN constitute a major challenge for both Post-Ministerial framework, and cooperative countries’ leaderships. This challenge must security diplomacy emanating from the be finessed to assure respective electorates’ Higuchi Report in August 1994.42 support for continued or intensified security collaboration in these areas of transnational Neither Australia nor Japan was prone to security policy. supplanting their core bilateral alliance relationships with the United States. However, Responding to Asia–Pacific both countries were intent not to be shut out multilateral security politics from whatever indigenous regional security community-building processes might emerge Despite their fundamental involvement in as the Cold War drew to a close. Nor did the US Cold War alliance system, cooperation they wish to see their senior American ally between Australia and Japan in multilateral marginalised from Asia because, as maritime security arenas clearly preceded the end of powers situated on the peripheries of that that struggle. Both countries were, from 1965 continent, any such development would to 1975, members of the Asian Pacific Council decrease their own strategic leverage within (ASPAC) formed to promote democratic it.43 This reflected what could be viewed as values and greater socio-economic cohesion a brutal policy dilemma confronting both in the region. Japan was a less enthusiastic Australian and Japanese policy-makers. participant than Australia in this grouping Both Australia and Japan were obvious due to its apprehensions that it would forge beneficiaries of the largely hierarchical into a military organisation (an ‘Asian NATO). ‘hub-and-spokes’ alliance system maintained Both states perceived little utility, however, in by Washington during the Cold War, sustaining ASPAC following the enunciation extracting greater regional influence by virtue of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, and the of their close affiliation with American power. United States rapprochement with the PRC Precisely due to that affinity, however, both in 1971–1972, that isolated Taiwan (an ASPAC continued to be regarded as regional proxies member) and defused the tacit containment for US interests on such issues as East Timor, rationales that had previously shaped much the China–Taiwan dispute, ethnic and religious of ASPAC’s strategic purpose.40 Australia has grievances and Asian institution-building. maintained long-standing defence contacts 30 Proceedings

This made it harder for these two American by the Howard government in its efforts to allies to be viewed as genuine participants in ‘reinvigorate’ the American alliance. It argued building Asia’s regionalist identity and shaping during the 1996 election campaign that the its processes. Their early post-Cold War alliance had been neglected by Labor, and efforts to sell their regional neighbours on the Australia must rectify what it perceived to benefits of ‘open regionalism’ by nominating be an ‘imbalanced’ diplomatic and national an American-endorsed APEC as the preferred security posture too weighted toward Asia. community-building mechanism fell on If Australia has attempted to reconcile alliance largely deaf ears, particularly in the aftermath politics and multilateral security diplomacy of the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis. The by pursuing diverse approaches for becoming saving grace to date is that more exclusivist a more credible Asia–Pacific actor, Japan has models pursued by China, Malaysia and other assigned greater predominance to ‘hedging’ states favouring the ‘East Asian’ model over its alliance with the United States against an the ‘Pan-Asian’ vision have arguably been no increasingly powerful Asia. Richard Samuels more successful in fostering their own, often has characterised this as Japan’s ‘new grand disparate visions of what an Asian security strategy’: building up its defence capabilities community actually should be.44 only to the extent required to warrant a Compounding Australia’s and Japan’s sustained US commitment to Japanese difficulties ‘fitting into the region’ have security, while simultaneously ‘building been their recent efforts to reconstitute an East Asian Community that resembles their politico-security agendas in ways the stable, prosperous, economically that accommodate their geography integrated Western Europe and that is built without compromising their respective on a Japanese commitment to the values of alliances with the US. Australian Foreign democracy and freedom’.46 Minister Gareth Evans spearheaded the Tokyo’s preferred vision of multilateral Hawke/Keating Labor government’s efforts security and economic cooperation is a during the early 1990s to apply a ‘middle pan-Asian community that would enmesh power’ strategy to link Australian diplomatic US politico-economic interests in the and security interests with regional region within norms and institutions multilateral security initiatives. His CSCA tailored to safeguard Japanese trading proposal for a multilateral security dialogue interests throughout Asia and beyond. was very similar to the aforementioned Chinese, American and European marketing Nakayama initiative. It was clearly intended competition would be regulated under as a regional coalition‑building strategy that a regional architecture underwriting would establish Australia as a ‘competent’ what could be viewed as Japanese yet independent member of a burgeoning quasi‑mercantilist strategy promoted under Asia–Pacific security community. Critics the guise of ‘regional community-building’. argued that ‘middle power policy’ limited A resuscitated APEC or a pan-Asian version Australia’s influence within and beyond the of an East Asian Community that cultivates region. Instead, they asserted Australia should ‘open regionalism’ by actually tolerating play the role of a ‘pivotal’ power between ‘soft’ forms of trade protectionism (selected developed and underdeveloped countries and and intermittent bilateral or regional trade not merely be satisfied with staking a claim as preference agreements) would conform to a legitimate or ‘acceptable’ regional security this Japanese vision in ways that may be player.45 This criticism was taken to heart more palatable to the US and Australian The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 31

policy-makers. An Asian Regional Bank under elusive balance between being a loyal and Tokyo’s leadership would be a more overt and valued American ally and establishing a more therefore less acceptable form of Japanese committed ‘regionalist’ posture through neo-mercantilism, generating Western middle power diplomacy. However, Prime fears that it would coordinate the rise of an Minister John Howard’s extraordinary economic protectionist bloc under Japanese personal relationship with US President or joint Japanese–Chinese leadership. George Bush that intensified after 9/11 undermined any chance of that balance This latter prospect was embodied in the being perceived as credible by Asian states ‘Miyazawa Plan’, named after Japan’s then and leaders.48 Despite the explosive growth foreign minister who proposed different of Sino–American trade ties and Australia’s versions of it during and following the Asian accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Financial Crisis. The Plan was rejected because Cooperation (TAC) as a precondition for it Washington (through the International winning a seat at the EAS table, the overall Monetary Fund or IMF) developed tangible trends in Australian foreign policy did not apprehensions about an Asian initiative to reflect prioritisation of Asian multilateralism defect from the existing system of global within Canberra’s decision-making councils. economic management during that time. Australian military personnel were quickly Japan, absorbing the hard lessons about dispatched to Afghanistan after 9/11 and to exerting its interests independently of its Iraq as part of the March 2003 US-led invasion senior security ally, prevented a similar of that country in the context of Australia Chinese blueprint for the EAS from emerging pursuing a more ‘globalist’ strategic posture at that grouping’s inaugural meeting in Kuala as a required component of alliance politics.49 Lumpur in December 2005.47 Asia–Pacific community-building processes, from Japan’s Japan’s policy undulations on multilateral perspective, must strike a delicate balance. security politics have been at least as They should ensure that US cooperation and pronounced, with its visible enthusiasm for support for Japan’s security and prosperity is this approach in the early 1990s giving way not undermined. Simultaneously, however, to a more nuanced (at best) or even skeptical they must also counterbalance the prospect outlook following the 1997–98 Asian Financial that the US will exploit Asian economic Crisis. US apprehensions about Japanese weakness to develop comparative advantages motives in shifting toward more regionalist in regional trade and excessive geopolitical postures following that crisis, and how hubris (at Japan’s expense). They must such a shift could affect Japanese defence curb the potential hegemonic threat now burden-sharing within an alliance context represented by Chinese economic growth to and international peacekeeping contributions long-standing Japan’s economic prosperity as part of American-led ‘coalitions of the and its political influence with both the willing’ was a key factor. So too was Japan’s United States and its regional neighbours. growing disillusionment with the ARF’s ability to implement effectively its announced As can be discerned from the above regional confidence-building and preventive discussion, both Australia and Japan have defence initiatives in the face of perceived oscillated between embracing multilateral Chinese intransigence. A growing mood of security and distancing themselves from conservatism in Japanese domestic politics that approach in pursuit of regional security. reflected in the election of Junichiro Koizumi Australia has attempted to reconcile alliance and Shinzo Abe as successive prime ministers, and multilateral politics by cultivating an 32 Proceedings

and the evolution of new asymmetric threats Australia’s pivotal power strategy and Japan’s such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation ‘Goldilocks consensus’ have compounded in North Korea, were all significant factors in both Australian and Japanese policy discouraging Japan’s expenditure of political ambiguity and regional marginalisation. support and national resources toward What policy directions should be pursued multilateral cooperative security in Asia. While now? At least three approaches warrant Japan has not lost all interest or confidence in mutual exploration by the new Australian the politics of multilateral security, it cannot and Japanese governments: (1) renewing pursue it apart from calibrating its effects on multilateralism’s complementarity to existing the US bilateral alliance.50 bilateral or minilateral arrangements by concentrating on strengthening just one Conclusion: policy major multilateral security architecture in the recommendations region; (2) encouraging confidence-building If the above trends are taken into account, between Japan and China; and (3) helping the the appeal of the TSD as an alternative to United States define what inevitably will be multilateralism is easier to understand. For a new American security posture in Asia as Australian and Japanese policy-makers to that region experiences intensified regional develop cooperative multilateral security multipolarity. Each of these steps deserves ventures with little history of regional success separate and extensive analyses which are far is truly a daunting task. The challenge is beyond the scope of this paper. Only limited made even more overwhelming as China’s discussion of the basic rationales that justify and India’s ascents to great power status their policy consideration can be offered further complicate the Asia–Pacific’s strategic within the limited space available here. environment. How much easier it must be First, Australia and Japan should move jointly for Australia and Japan, as longstanding to designate their preference for which of US alliance partners, to build on their the several burgeoning multilateral security existing alliance framework by expanding architectures will command the bulk of intra-alliance ties in designated traditional their attention and resources. The criteria and transnational security policy sectors and by which existing multilateral architectures to label it multilateral security behaviour! can be evaluated have been recently spelled The appeal of ‘competitive geometry’ in out by Allan Gyngell: (a) facilitating regional the form of TSD or other variants is that it trade and investment in ways that enable is relatively clear-cut and incorporates the the Asia–Pacific’s regional economies to best assets of alliance affiliation such as respond more effectively to natural disasters, state-of-the-art military technology transfers, pandemics, climate change, energy security force interoperability and constant dialogue and other transnational security issues; and planning. That appeal, however, must (b) guaranteeing that regional be balanced by the prospects that other community‑building strengthens linkages regional powers invariably regard such between the Asia–Pacific’s sub-regional arrangements as directed against themselves, sectors, including Northeast Asia, Southeast thus intensifying regional tensions and Asia, South Asia and the ‘wider Pacific’; undercutting any real prospects of building a (c) promoting common regional security genuine and more stable regional cooperative interests through addressing core regional security network. In such a case, moreover, security issues (i.e., the Taiwan Strait, the ‘truth is not somewhere in between.’ North Korea, etc.); and (d) ensuring that key The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 33

pan-regional heads of government convene counterproductive and only intensify what regularly and systematically to discuss ‘the full is already the region’s most serious security range of regional security issues’.51 As Gyngell dilemma. In a similar vein, regional security admits, no one security architecture will be may be best served by quietly shelving the able to fulfill all of these functions equally 2005 US–Japan Consultative Committee’s well over the short-term. APEC, however, reference to the Taiwan Strait, and by US looms as the one existing architecture that policy officials exercising greater restraint fulfills most of these requirements at least toward conveying their ‘expectations’ about temporarily. A gradual integration of APEC Australia’s alliance behaviour during a future and the EAS into a new regional security Taiwan Strait crisis. China is well aware of organisation spearheaded by an annual regional concerns about its own intermittent Heads of Government (along the lines of bellicosity directed toward Taiwan. It is less NATO’s annual summit) and incorporating likely to adopt policies of moderation if it both foreign and economic ministers into its perceives that the TSD powers are eager to framework might be considered one possible use a future such episode to neutralise by model for future Asia–Pacific order-building. force what they see as a growing military Any such body needs to be regionally inclusive imbalance in China’s favour. Beijing, however, (pan-Asian), not exclusive; ecumenical will need to strengthen its transparency through incorporation of broader security on the nature and intent of its ongoing perspectives rather than merely focusing on military buildup as a quid pro quo for greater military or other types of ‘material power’, TSD constraint. Japan could also advance and sufficiently authoritative to work confidence-building proposals for preventing regularly with the United Nations, the IMF conflict escalation over Taiwan in ongoing and other organs of international governance Sino–Japanese strategic dialogues, while to address core problems of regional security Australia could propose similar discussions and development. as part of its new bilateral strategic dialogue with China. Both Japan and Australia could Second, the intractable Sino–Japanese also consider establishing separate crisis security dilemma must be modified over hotlines with Beijing, a precedent that the next few years if prospects for a stable could be emulated by the secretariat of any Asia–Pacific security order are to be realised. overarching regional security organisation Implementing viable confidence-building that may emerge in Asia.52 and preventive diplomacy mechanisms at both the bilateral and multilateral levels Third, both Australia and Japan must continue will be integral to overcoming lingering improving their own defence capabilities historical, cultural and strategic animosities to face independent contingencies that the between Northeast Asia’s two powerhouse US believes may not justify direct military economies. Reiterating and respecting intervention on their behalf. The possibility of international norms are probably appropriate the Rudd government resurrecting elements for defusing tensions in the East China Sea of the ‘Defence of Australia’ (DOA) posture (rights of maritime passage) while China and which prevailed during the Hawke/Keating Taiwan finesse ‘Chinese solutions’ to their years is strong; although Australia’s present long-standing differences over irredentism. commitment to supporting coalition efforts Any effort by a TSD mechanism to force the against insurgents in Afghanistan appears Taiwan issue, short of an unprovoked military to be an enduring one. Increasingly, Australia invasion of Taiwan by the PRC, would be will be required to deploy its forces along 34 Proceedings

the ‘arc of instability’ that includes its between sustaining the best of bilateralism northern approaches, Melanesia and other and applying a more sophisticated brand South Pacific venues without anticipating of multilateralism is crucial for shaping the even those moderate levels of US logistical Asia–Pacific’s future security order. As allies support that were available during the 1999 long accustomed to cultivating strategic trust East Timor operation. Japan’s historical legacy with each other, Australia and Japan would and its constitution still act as constraints now be well served by extending that legacy against projecting its Self-Defense Force in to those surrounding them. independent military operations. In this sense, the US–Japan alliance will remain the primary Endnotes catalyst for constraining future Japanese 1 A recent exposition of this argument military operations. Within the bilateral is Rajan Menon’s The End of Alliances alliance framework, however, Japan will (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007). gradually be compelled to raise its defence burden-sharing to increasingly significant 2 Background is provided by C. Randall levels as the costs and political impediments Henning, East Asian Financial Cooperation. associated with the United States maintaining Policy Analysis in International Economics defence expenditures higher than most of 68 (Washington, DC: Institute for the world’s other great powers combined International Economics, October 2002), eventually take their toll. The United States pp. 11-31. will remain a superpower for some time to 3 Mark Beeson, ‘ASEAN Plus Three and come. However, it will inevitably become a the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism ‘, ‘more ordinary’ great power as it prioritises Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 its commitments in the Middle East, to (August 2003), p. 261. More skeptical homeland security and to its ability to assessments include David Hund, ‘ASEAN project significant rather than overwhelming Plus Three: towards a new age of pan-East levels of offshore power along the Eurasian Asian Regionalism? A skeptic’s appraisal’ peripheries. China, India, and Russia will The Pacific Review 16, no. 3 (September continue to close the military capabilities gap 2003), pp. 383-417 and David Martin Jones between the US and themselves. Australia and Martin L.R. Smith, ‘Making Process, and Japan can render a great service to their Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving American partner and to global stability by East Asian Regional Security Order,’ becoming more effective than was the case International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer immediately after 9/11, by reasoning with 2007), pp. 148-184. For a recent update, Washington which of its commitments calls consult Shaun Breslin, ‘Supplying Demand for military responses. or Demanding Supply? An Alternative Australia and Japan together face a historical Look at the Forces Driving East Asian crossroads in international relations not Community Building,’ Policy Analysis unlike that recognised by Lord Grey. Unlike Brief, The Stanley Foundation, November that venerable and somewhat tragic figure 2007 at http://www.stanleyfoundation. who confronted an exhausted European org/publications/pab/Breslin_07_PAB.pdf. concert on the verge of war, however, their Accessed on 6 January 2008. prospects for helping to keep the lights 4 The Japanese position and diplomatic burning bright in the Asia–Pacific region are role leading up to the EAS is covered infinitely better. Striking an effective balance by Michael Auslin and Michael Green, The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 35

‘Japan’s Security Policy in East Asia,’ Asian iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la- Economic Policy Review 2, no. 2 (December dialogue/plenary-session-speeches- 2007), pp. 217-218. Also see Edwin Cody, 2007/fifth-plenary-session--teo-chee- ‘East Asian Summit Marked by Discord,’ hean. Accessed on 6 January 2008. The Washington Post, December 14, 2005 12 Richard Smith, ‘Regional Security: Is and Mohan Malik, ‘The East Asia Summit,’ ‘Architecture’ All We Need?’ Policy Analysis Australian Journal of International Affairs Brief , The Stanley Foundation, December 60, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 207-211. 2007 at http://www.stanleyfoundation. 5 Takashi Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian org/publications/pab/SmithPAB07.pdf. Community: A Site for Japan–China Power Accessed on 6 January 2008. Struggles,’ Japanese Studies 26, no. 1 (May 13 In mid-December 2007, Australian 2006), p. 5. Foreign Minister Stephen Smith warned 6 Auslin and Green, pp. 217-218. that ‘Australia is determined to play a leading role in international efforts to 7 A text of the Cooperative Work Plan is stop Japan’s whaling practices,’ serving at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- notice that ‘Australia strongly believes paci/asean/conference/asean3/plan0711. that there is no credible scientific pdf. Accessed on 5 January 2008. justification for the hunting of whales, 8 As cited at the blog site, ‘He came, and is opposed to all commercial and they talked, what next?’ Observing ‘scientific’ whaling.’ See ‘Total secrecy Japan, November 17, 2007. See also ‘The on whaler watching,’ The Australian, bankruptcy of the China hawks,’ ibid., 1 January 2008. January 1, 2008. Both at http://www. 14 ‘Australian opposition leader warns observingjapan.com/ and both accessed of diplomatic rift over whaling on 5 January 2008. crackdown,’ International Herald Tribune, 9 As cited in David Dewitt, ‘Common, 14 December 2007. Comprehensive and Cooperative Security,’ 15 The Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Pacific Review 7, no. 1 (1994), p. 5. refueling mission in the Indian Ocean on 10 Evelyn Goh, ‘Meeting the China Nov. 1 was terminated when a ‘special Challenge: The US in Southeast Asian law’ authorising the mission expired after Regional Security Strategies,’ Policy the government and the upper house of Studies, no. 16 (Washington, D.C.: East the Diet controlled by opposition parties West Center 2005 and Evan Medeiros, failed to reach an agreement to extend ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of the law. See Hisane Misaki, ‘Japan’s Fukuda Asia–Pacific Stability,’ The Washington in fight for his life,’ Asia Times Online, Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005-06), December 22, 2007 at http://www. pp. 145-167. atimes.com/atimes/Japan/IL22Dh01. html. Accessed on 8 January 2008. On 11 11 Address by Teo Chee Hean, Minister January 2008, Fukuda’s ruling coalition for Defence, Singapore on ‘Security government, under strong pressure from Cooperation in Asia: Managing Alliances the US, forced enabling legislation through and Partnerships,’ at the Sixth IISS Asian the lower house of Japanese government Security Summit Shangri-la Dialogue, after the upper house had previously Singapore, 3 June 2007 at http://www. vetoed previous efforts to do so. 36 Proceedings

16 The concept of ‘general interest’ in alliance Trilateralism’: Applications for the Trilateral politics was initially developed by Glenn H. Security Dialogue,’ in William T. Tow, Mark Snyder, ‘the Security Dilemma in Alliance J. Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Politics,’ World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984), Satu Limaye, eds., Asia–Pacific Security: U.S, pp. 461-495. See Eric Talmadge, ‘Japan Australia and Japan and the New Security to Resume Its Mission in Indian Ocean,’ Triangle (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 27. Washington Post, January 12, 2008, A-11. 22 Extensive background on the TSD is 17 Akiko Fukushima, ‘Multilateral Confidence- provided in various chapters of Tow, Building Measures in Northeast Asia: et. al., Asia-Pacific Security… (London: Receding or Emerging?’ in Benjamin L. Self Routledge, 2007). and Yuki Tatsumi, ed., Confidence-Building 23 Purnendra Jain, ‘Japan–Australia security Measures and Security Issues in Northeast ties and the United States: the evolution Asia (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson of the trilateral dialogue process and Center 2000), p. 44 and Goh, ‘The ASEAN its challenges,’ Australian Journal of Regional Forum in United States East International Affairs 60, no. 4 (December Asian Strategy,’ The Pacific Review 17, no. 1 2006), pp. 521-535. (March 2004), p. 51. 24 Andrew Symon, ‘Australia’s new PM is old 18 Negroponte, ‘The Future of Political, Asia hand,’ Asia Times Online, November Economic and Security Relations 27, 2007 at http://www.atimes.com/ with China’ at http://www.state. atimes/Southeast_Asia/IK27Ae01.html. gov/s/d/2007/84118.htm. Accessed on Accessed on 13 January 2008. 8 January 2008. 25 See, for example, Yan Wei, ‘A Broader 19 David M. Finkelstein, ‘The People’s Asia Without China?’ Beijing Review No. Liberation Army and China in Transition,’ 38, September 20, 2007 at http://www. in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. bjreview.com/quotes/txt/2007-09/25/ Marti (eds.), The People’s Liberation Army content_77617_2.htm. Accessed on and China in Transition (Washington, D.C.: 8 January 2008. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2002), 26 See a critical but thorough account of pp. 197-210. Accessed at http://www. the quadrilateral initiative’s evolution by globalsecurity.org/military/library/ Brig. Gen. Shafaat Ahmad (Ret.), ‘Joint report/2003/pla-china_transition_14_ naval exercise: SEATO in new format?’ The ch10.htm on 8 January 2008. Daily Star, October 6, 2007at http://www. thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=6809. 20 An American perspective of the minilateral Accessed on 13 January 2008. factor in Asia–Pacific security politics is offered by Michael J. Green, ‘ The United 27 ‘Aust, China agree to annual security States and East Asia in a unipolar Era,’ in talks,’ Australian Defence Report, 6 Quansheng Zhao, ed., Future Trends in East September 2007 at http://www. Asian International Relations (London and australiandefencereport.com.au/9- Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 36. 07/10-09-2007/aust_china_agree_to_ annual_secur.htm and ‘Foreign Ministry 21 This theoretical approach is developed Spokesperson Jiang Yu’s regular press in the context of trilateral alliance conference on 6 September 2007 at relations by William T. Tow, ‘’Contingent http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cemy/ The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 37

eng/fyrth/t359857.htm. Accessed on http://209.85.173.104/search?q=cache: 8 January 2008. QoES2dLg7iIJ:rspas.anu.edu.au/gssd/ analysis/Taylor_Fulbright_2006%2520_ 28 Anthony Faiola, ‘Japan to Join US Policy final.pdf+brendan+taylor+multilateral on Taiwan; Growth of China Seen behind ism+transnational+security+Asia&hl= Shift,’ Washington Post, 18 February 2005, en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=au. Accessed on p. A-1 14 January 2008. 29 Inter-related US basing operations in the 33 Michael J. Green, ‘The United States Pacific involving Japan and other US allies and East Asia in the Unipolar Era,’ in are weighed in a widely debated RAND Quansheng Zhao, ed., Future Trends in Corporation report released in May 2001. East Asian International Relations (London: See Zalmay Khalilzad, Abram N. Shulsky Routledge 2002), pp. 36-38. and others, The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force 34 ‘Bush announces int’l coalition to Posture (MR-1315-AF) Santa Monica: RAND, coordinate relief,’ IndiaInfo.Com December May 2001 and summarised at http://www. 30, 2004 at http://news.indiainfo. rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB68/ com/2004/12/30/3012tsunamibush.html. index1.html. Accessed on 13 January Accessed on 14 January 2008. 2008. Also see Col. Lawrence M. Martin, 35 Soeren Kern, ‘The Geopolitics of Tsunami Jr., ‘Countering a Strategic Gambit: Relief,’ Real Instituto Elcano, August 2005 Keeping US Air Power Employable in at http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/ a China–Taiwan Conflict,’ Air & Space wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_ Power Journal XIX, no. 3 (Fall 2005) at GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ Asia-Pacific/ARI+8-2005. Accessed on airchronicles/apj/apj05/fal05/martin.html. 14 January 2008. Accessed on 13 January 2008. 36 Ibid. and Tim Huxley, ‘The tsunami and 30 This point is discussed by William T. Tow security: Asia’s 9/11?’ Survival 47, no. 1 and Chen-Shen Yen, ‘Australia–Taiwan (March 2005), pp. 125-127. Relations: The Evolving Geopolitical Setting,’ Australian Journal of International 37 Thomas S. Wilkins, ‘Towards a ‘Trilateral Affairs 61, no. 3 (September 2007), Alliance?’ Understanding the Roles of especially pp. 338-339. Expediency and Values in American– Japanese–Australian Relations’, Asian 31 ‘US spells out ANZUS conditions’, Security3, no. 3 (2007), p. 266. ABC radio transcript, August 20, 2004 at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/ 38 A text of this document can be found on content/2004/s1181620.htm. Accessed on Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs web site 14 January 2008. at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- paci/australia/joint0703.html. Accessed on 32 Brendan Taylor, ‘The Bush Administration 16 January 2008. and Asia–Pacific Multilateralism – Unrequited Love?’ Paper for 39 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Major Fulbright Symposium on Maritime elements of the Action Plan to implement Governance and Security: Australian the Japan–Australia Joint Declaration on and American Perspectives, University Security Cooperation’, at http://www. of Tasmania, Hobart, 28-29 June 2006 at mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/australia/ 38 Proceedings

action0709.html and Japan Ministry of 45 See Carl Ungerer, ‘The ‘Middle Power’ Foreign Affairs, Japan–Australia Relations’, Concept in Australian Foreign Policy,’ http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, paci/australia/index.html. Both sources no. 4 (2007), especially pp. 546-550. accessed on 16 January 2008. 46 Samuels, ‘Japan’s Goldilocks Strategy,’ The 40 C W Braddick, ‘Japan, Australia and Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (Autumn ASPAC,’ in Brad Williams and Andrew 2006), p. 121. Newman, eds., Japan, Australia and 47 C Johnstone, ‘Strained Alliance: US–Japan Asia–Pacific Security (London and New Diplomacy in the Asian financial crisis,’ York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 30-46. Nine Survival 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999), pp. 121-138 Asia–Pacific countries were represented and Mohan Malik, ‘The East Asia Summit,’ in ASPAC: Australia, the ‘Republic of Australian Journal of International Affairs China’ (ROC Taiwan), Japan, the Republic 60, no. 2 (June 2006), pp. 107-111. of Korea (ROK), Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the Republic 48 W Tow, ‘ Deputy sheriff or independent of Vietnam (ROV). Delegates from ally? Evolving Australian–American ties Laos usually attended meetings with in an ambiguous world order,’ The Pacific ‘observer’ status. Review 17, no. 2 (June 2004), pp. 271-290.

41 The classic study on this remains Chin 49 For in-depth analysis, see William Tow, Kin Wah’s The Defence of Malaysia and ‘ANZUS: Regional versus Global Security Singapore: The Transformation of a Security in Asia,’ International Relations of the System 1957-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge Asia–Pacific 5, no. 2 (2005), pp. 197-216. University Press, 2001). 50 A definitive analysis of recent trends is 42 Paul Midford, ‘Japan’s leadership role by Takeshi Yuzawa, ‘Japan’s changing in East Asian Security multilateralism: conception of the ASEAN Regional Forum: the Nakayama proposal and the logic of from an optimistic liberal to a pessimistic reassurance,’ The Pacific Review 13, no. 3 realist perspective,’ Pacific Review 18, no. 4 (September 2000), pp. 367–97 and G. John (December 2005), pp. 463-497. Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, ‘Between 51 Gyngell, ‘Design Faults: The Asia Pacific’s balance of power and community: the Regional Architecture,’ Policy Brief (Sydney: future of multilateral cooperation in the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Asia–Pacific,’ International Relations of the July 2007). Asia–Pacific Vol. 2 (2002), pp. 69-94. 52 Reports surfaced at the end of August 43 Mark Beeson and Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, 2007 that China and Japan have discussed ‘Asia’s odd men out: Australia, Japan, and the establishment of crises hotlines. See the politics of regionalism,’ International Chisa Fujioka, ‘China military vexes Japan Relations of the Asia–Pacific 7, no. 23 (2007), despite minister’s visit,’ Reuters, August pp. 227-250. 31, 2007 at http://in.reuters.com/article/ 44 As contended by David Martin Jones worldNews/idINIndia-29265520070831. and Michael L.R. Smith, ‘Making Process, Accessed on 18 January 2008. Not Progress...’ The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 39

The Japanese approach to an The goal, as well as a conceptual basis, of East Asian Community and a security community is the elimination of Japan–Australia partnership war or the use of force as means of settling inter‑state conflict, sustained by the norm of Yoshihide Soeya peaceful settlement of political differences Keio University as well as the common values of democracy. As such, it can be argued that expectations 1 Introduction relevant for a security community already exist among democracies in East Asia. Japan and Australia are natural partners in the regional process toward building an In the East Asian context, this East Asian Community. They share basic conceptualisation of a community would values as the foundation of a regional naturally invite some resistance from China, architecture, and above all are well situated particularly its central government and the to cultivate the middle ground, so to speak, People’s Liberation Army. And there are in between the US and China—the two several cases where the actual evolution of major powers constituting the basic strategic security issues indicates tendencies contrary and geopolitical parameter for East Asia. to the development of a security community, The role of Japan and Australia therein is even including overbearing behaviours by intrinsically premised on the alliance with the the US Administration. These two major US, but this does not exclude the possibility powers will be critical in their own rights in of Japan and Australia jointly constructing a the evolution of an East Asian Community in sound infrastructure as a core element of an years ahead, but the process could and should East Asian order that the US and China will be led primarily by countries that can cultivate have to take into serious account as they deal the middle ground in the US–China strategic with each other, as well as with the region as relationship, including Japan and Australia (as a whole. well as ASEAN and South Korea).

I would like to conceptualise a community Japanese involvement in this process should as a process—perhaps an everlasting also provide an important framework within process—toward the creation of a security which Japan would continue to debate community. There should be no disagreement and implement necessary changes in its that community-building efforts in East Asia regional and security policies in the years have just begun. No matter how embryonic ahead. Australia is a natural partner as Japan they are, however, they can and should be continues to grope for a new regional role and seen as the critical beginning of a long‑term diplomacy, which was amply demonstrated process of community building, which will in the proposal by Prime Minister certainly have repeated ups and downs, but Junichiro Koizumi in January 2002 to invite which will also continue to move toward the Australia and New Zealand as core members final goal of a security community. Even if we of an East Asian Community. accept the likely prospect that the goal will This paper will give an overview to the not be achieved for a long time, continuing evolution of Japanese policies toward East to move toward the goal is feasible and Asia since the end of the Cold War, and will important: hence my conceptualisation of a examine the central Japanese thinking and community as a process. approach leading to the Koizumi proposal, and concerning the US and China factors. 40 Proceedings

2 Japan’s initial efforts in play a leadership role in multilateral security multilateral security cooperation, and that Japan and the US should promote broad and close cooperation, Soon after the end of the Cold War, based on the institutional settings of the there arose an awareness among central US–Japan security treaty, toward effective policymakers in Japan that the predominance multilateral security cooperation.1 of the alliance relationship with the US in Japan’s post‑Cold War responses is deeply This process invited intervention by the related to the lack of effective multilateral US, which feared that the emphasis on forums for Japanese security policy. Facing multilateral security cooperation would the end of the Cold War, therefore, it was weaken the foundation of the US–Japan natural for the Japanese strategic thinkers to alliance. In fact, in 1994 (exactly at the time opt for multilateral security cooperation, not when the Japanese advisory panel called for necessarily as an alternative to the US–Japan greater participation in multilateral security), alliance, but as a new tool to cope with new the North Korean crisis verged on military security challenges. conflict between the US and North Korea. The situation was saved by Jimmy Carter’s The initial attempt in this direction was taken visit at the last minute, leading to the Geneva by Yukio Sato, then Director-General of the agreement which established the Korea Information and Intelligence Bureau of the Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Specifically, Sato exchange for North Korea’s commitment to played a critical role in the early 1990s as a freeze its nuclear programs.2 This crisis led to bridge between Japan and ASEAN in the initial the subsequent revision of the 1978 Guidelines exchange and sharing of ideas at the track II for Japan–US Defense Cooperation, which level, eventually leading to the establishment occurred in 1997. of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994. As indicated by the discussion at the defense At about the time the ASEAN Regional advisory panel, however, Japan’s primary Forum was created, the Japanese defence concern in this period had to do with the establishment was also groping for a path general fluidity of the uncertain security to multilateral security cooperation. In environment, which required a new approach February 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa toward multilateral security cooperation in created an advisory panel on post‑Cold tandem with the alliance with the US. War security and defense policy. Hosokawa resigned in April, and the advisory panel’s 3 From Fukuda Doctrine to Koizumi report was presented in August to the Proposal Murayama government, which succeeded the shortlived Hata government. The report In retrospect, the longstanding policy of characterised the post‑Cold War security Japan toward Southeast Asia since the late environment as opaque and uncertain, 1970s was represented by the so‑called and placed the promotion of multilateral Fukuda Doctrine. Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda security cooperation on top of the priority list, announced a three-point policy toward followed by the effective management of the Southeast Asia in Manila in August 1977: US–Japan security relationship and Japanese • First, Japan is committed to peace and defence capability. is determined not to become a military power. The report specifically argued that the critical issue was whether the US would be able to The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 41

• Second, Japan will establish a relations with external powers, turned the ‘heart‑to‑heart’ relationship of mutual Hashimoto proposal into its own initiative trust with Southeast Asia beyond leading to the establishment of ASEAN+3 at economics and politics. the end of 1997.

• Third, Japan will cooperate with ASEAN’s These developments have ushered in efforts to strengthen solidarity and a new momentum toward deepening resilience, nurture relations of mutual regional integration. Singapore took an understanding with the Indochinese important initiative to officially propose a states, and thus contribute to the peace free trade agreement (FTA) with Japan in and prosperity of the entire Southeast December 1999 when Prime Minister Goh Asian region. Chok Tong visited Japan. Japan, which had The political essence of the Fukuda Doctrine already started to study such arrangements had to do with the message in the third with several countries, including South Korea, point—to serve as a bridge between ASEAN responded positively and the negotiations and Indochina for the peace and prosperity gained momentum. of all Southeast Asia as an equal partner. This In the meantime, observing the momentum principle remained to form the core thinking of a series of bilateral FTA initiatives and of Japan’s Southeast Asia policy during the achieving its goal of joining the World Trade subsequent years, which was revitalised at Organization, China also came up with the time of the Cambodian peace process in its own FTA initiative, most symbolically the early 1990s, when Japan actively sought indicated by the Chinese proposal of an FTA 3 to play a political role. with ASEAN at the occasion of the ASEAN+3 Arguably, with the realisation of ASEAN–10 summit meeting in November 2000. In the in 1997, the expressed political goal of the following year, Chinese and ASEAN leaders Fukuda Doctrine was about to be achieved reached a basic agreement that they would on ASEAN’s own initiative, with much achieve a free trade area within the coming economic backing provided by Japanese ten years. This was quickly followed up in official development assistance, private November 2002, when the leaders signed trade and foreign direct investment. In early a comprehensive framework agreement to 1997, anticipating the birth of ASEAN–10, carry out the plan. Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto These China–ASEAN initiatives have proposed the Japan–ASEAN summit to prompted the Koizumi government to further accelerate the integration of ASEAN develop its own regional strategy built on the and to further Japan’s relations with the ongoing process of FTA negotiations. In Prime ASEAN countries. Minister Koizumi’s policy speech delivered in 4 The realisation of ASEAN–10, however, Singapore in January 2002, Koizumi proposed coincided with the Asian financial crisis, an ‘Initiative for Japan–ASEAN Comprehensive forcing ASEAN countries to go through a Economic Partnership,’ built upon the set of restructuring efforts in domestic Japan–Singapore Economic Agreement economies, politics, and regional for a New Age Partnership (the so‑called arrangements. Also, at about the same Japan–Singapore FTA), which Koizumi signed time, China shifted its main strategic focus prior to the speech. from ‘high’ politics to ‘low’ politics. ASEAN, More importantly, the Koizumi proposal following its usual instinct to carefully balance included an ambitious reference to an East 42 Proceedings

Asian Community. Koizumi said to the and the ASEAN+6 formula (involving Australia, audience in Singapore that ‘our goal should New Zealand and India) for the East Asian be the creation of a community that acts Summit—lies this conceptual competition, together and advances together.’ Koizumi if not a geopolitical rivalry, between Japan expressed his expectation that, starting from and China. Japan–ASEAN cooperation, ‘the countries of ASEAN, Japan, China, the Republic of Korea, 4 The US and an East Asian Australia and New Zealand will be core Community members of such a community.’ With the end of the Cold War, coping with To substantiate such a partnership with the predominant power of the US at a time ASEAN, the Koizumi speech advanced a new of transition became a central component approach to Japanese diplomacy with ASEAN. of many nations’ strategies. The US itself While stating his basic stance to promote the has been fundamental readjusting its global policies of the Fukuda Doctrine, Koizumi in strategy, with a primary focus on how effect made clear a comprehensive design for best to use its predominant power, and for Japan’s regional engagement. Following this what purposes. Koizumi initiative, the Japanese Government In these major US efforts of strategic hosted a bilateral ASEAN–Japan summit readjustment, there has always been a strong meeting in Tokyo in December 2003. This temptation to resort to unilateralism, both was the very first occasion when the ASEAN in agenda setting and in the execution of its countries agreed to hold such a meeting power. While the tendency to unilateralism outside Southeast Asia. has become quite apparent with the advent The proposal for an East Asian Community of the George W Bush administration, in the Koizumi speech has ignited a process particularly in the aftermath of 9/11, it has of conceptual competition between China never ceased to be an American trait—even and Japan. Particularly, the inclusion of in previous years, including the time of the Australia and New Zealand embodied the Clinton administration. line of division between the two. In the Simultaneously, however, there has always Japanese thinking, there still remains a existed an inclination for US administrations concern about the China-centered process to work with the international community of community building possibly developing whenever it is possible and beneficial for the into a closed region, particularly vis‑a‑vis the US. One could argue that the intention behind US. In the Japanese conception, the inclusion the willingness to resort to multilateralism of Australia and New Zealand has a double is still unilateralist, but this is true of the function. First, they provide a venting channel so‑called great powers, including China, leading to the US as a security anchor in East almost by definition. The question is about Asia. Second, the membership of Australia and the relative weight Washington gives to New Zealand is also important from the point unilateralism and to the multilateral approach of view of the values that will sustain the as means of its foreign policy. foundation of an East Asian Community and keep it open to the rest of the world. Arguably, US strategic objectives have been constant since the end of the Cold War. The From the Japanese point of view, behind maintenance of a new global order after the competition over the membership the Cold War has been of primary concern, composition—between the ASEAN+3 formula and Washington’s determination not to The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 43

allow any rising power to challenge the US, an East Asian Community. In the process of either regionally or globally, has been strong. community building, however, the US power The 1991 Gulf War represented the first needs to be accommodated rather than manifestation of such US global strategy alienated or antagonised. East Asia also needs in the post‑Cold War era. Since the end to be able to speak in a common language of the Cold War, the US has also regarded about the benefits and disturbances the US terrorism and the proliferation of weapons might bring to community-building efforts. In of mass destruction as main sources of a nutshell, an East Asian Community should threat to global stability as well as to its be able to coexist with the US. Japan and national security. Throughout the 1990s, the Australia should have a special role to play in US forward-deployed military presence has this respect. often become a target of terrorist attacks, many of which have allegedly been by 5 The rise of China and an East al‑Qaeda. And yet, 9/11 proved to be a historic Asian Community turning point because it gave the Bush Coping with the rise of China has also been administration a clear goal and a mission an important component of the strategic in a war against terrorism and those who readjustment of many nations after the harbor terrorists. This war is likely to continue end of the Cold War. In the process toward for a few decades, even with the change building a security community, China would of administrations, but with a somewhat also have to be accommodated, so that adjusted approach gravitating toward it would commit itself to the principle of multilateral cooperation. peaceful management of differences. There A preferable scenario for the rest of us in now exist a few circumstantial conditions in East Asia is to integrate the US power into the which efforts toward these goals are worth process of building a security community, in making. The most favourable factor is China’s one way or another. Here, the US inclination unmistakable commitment to a new strategy to use force unilaterally stands against sustained by a ‘New Security Concept.’ the norm of a security community. Also, a The strategic focus on economic matters strongly value-oriented approach by the by China is now fully demonstrated by the US administration could also constitute an composition of its central leadership as well obstacle in the triggering phase of the process as its policy substance. Accordingly, this to build a security community, if not to the strategy has now shifted Chinese attention final objective. There are still undemocratic away from traditional hard security issues or democratically developing countries into the management of economic and social in East Asia, and a strong missionary zeal problems domestically, as well as multilateral supported by a deep commitment to values diplomacy with its neighbours. Perhaps the could only discourage those countries from external environment is now better than joining the efforts to build the community. at any time since the end of the Cold War The security landscape in East Asia, however, to reach out to China to develop a common is complex, involving China, Russia, Japan security agenda. and the Korean Peninsula; this makes the likelihood of US unilateralism dominating the Skeptics would argue that economic growth security scene very slim. would simply increase People’s Liberation Army’s portion of the pie. However, the In all likelihood and almost by definition, outcome of the race between possible the US will not become a formal member of 44 Proceedings

Chinese participation in security community Having noted all this, however, one should not building, on the one hand, and the likelihood overlook the fact that in Chinese long‑term of its traditional military thinking regaining thinking there remains an inclination to think control, on the other, is uncertain at best. of the relationship with the US in competitive What is certain is that China’s current terms. These basic urges in the Chinese emphasis on coexistence reflects its psyche are often revealed in the Chinese long‑term strategy, and that there are many conceptualisation of East Asian regionalism. factors capable of affecting the turn of events Many political thinkers, for instance, see in in this critical race. the Chinese FTA initiatives toward East Asian countries the value of breaking the possible This shift in Chinese strategies, on top of encirclement of China by the US‑centred Washington’s preoccupation with the war groupings of democracies, and even the merit against terrorism and nonproliferation in of isolating Taiwan. the Middle East as well as East Asia, is an important source of stability in the US–China This indicates that a China-centred East relationship in recent years. This indicates Asian Community would give rise to some that the motivation on the part of China for elements of concern regarding its openness, a better relationship with the US dates well particularly in relation to US power and some back, to the pre‑9/11 context. of the value dimensions, which also lead ultimately to the US factor. As we have seen, In effect, China has stopped challenging US central in the Japanese conceptualisation and predominance in the Asia–Pacific region approach to an East Asian Community is this and the world since the late 1990s. This has concern about the possible closed nature of basically been the bottom line of Chinese a community associated with deep-seated regional strategy since after the Taiwan Chinese imperatives. crises in 1995 and 1996, when both Beijing and Washington sought to restore the 6 Japanese internationalism and relationship with mutual visits by Jiang Zemin nationalism, and the case for a and Bill Clinton in 1997 and 1998. There is Japan–Australia partnership reasonable evidence to believe that China also readjusted its policy toward Japan with the I have argued elsewhere that the Yoshida same strategic considerations in the summer Line embracing the postwar Constitution of 1999, perhaps upon re‑examining the and the US–Japan alliance has eloquently effect of Jiang Zemin’s trip to Japan in 1998. expressed Japan’s ‘postwar consensus,’ built on a determination to step down from the The Taiwan question is now an object of stage of politics among major powers and the strategic coexistence between the US to follow a de facto middle power strategy.5 and China. In principle, the Taiwan question Japan was born anew and embarked on still remains a wild card for US–China a fresh start with the 1951 signing of the relations and could upset their strategic San Francisco Peace Treaty. Japan’s ‘postwar coexistence. Now, however, the Chinese regime,’ embracing the Yoshida Line, became economy-centered strategy appears to be an integral part of the postwar ‘San Francisco working. Taiwan’s economic dependence on regime’ that contributed to Japan’s postwar China is ever-deepening, which in turn gives peace and prosperity. confidence to Beijing in advancing its ‘united front’ policy toward ‘comrades’ in Taiwan. In essence, Japan’s security policy after the end of the Cold War represents an extension The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 45

of that post‑World War II Japanese consensus. That said, there must also be recognition First and foremost, the new security of the fact that the misunderstandings environment after the end of the Cold and distortions may have been fueled by War has spurred the transformation of the revisionist political statements by political isolationist pacifism Japan maintained during leaders amid changing Japanese discourses the Cold War into a more proactive and on security policies and issues. What these internationalist pacifism. Japan now seeks statements really reveal is frustration with participation in United Nations peacekeeping various aspects of the postwar set‑up. operations or, more broadly, the domain of Such frustrations are increasingly being international security. vented haphazardly, out of resentment toward attacks from China and Korea and It is within this context that the public is dissatisfaction over the ‘postwar consensus’ showing greater support for a revision of the of Japan. Paradoxically, such isolated postwar Constitution, particularly the total expressions have gained a degree of public renunciation of military potential in Article 9. support precisely because of the lack of a For example, one of the recent opinion polls strategy on the part of their proponents. Were conducted by the Yomiuri Shinbun6 reveals a desire to revive Japan’s prewar aspirations that, while 56% of respondents favour actually articulated clearly as a strategy, the constitutional revision, 70% do so because Japanese public would be the first to reject they believe the present Constitution does it—as amply implied by the opinion polls. not clearly justify the existence of the Self Defense Forces, and 47% support the Upon examining Japan’s strategic context, revision because they feel that the current comprising institutional inertia, the dynamics Constitution cannot adequately deal of democratic competition, pragmatism, with new issues, such as contributions to concern about the future of US power, and multilateral security. This is in line with the the shifting regional balances of power, results of many other opinion polls, indicating Richard Samuels concludes that they that constitutional revision is far from being ‘converge to make the discontinuation of an issue of nationalism for the majority of Japan’s revisionist course seem likely.’7 Indeed, the Japanese public. After all, the emphasis in the current revisionist, nationalistic mood Ichiro Ozawa’s theory of Japan as a ‘normal in Japanese politics and society is in essence state’ was also placed more on Japan’s an excessive reaction to the rather extreme participation in international peacekeeping pacifist premises of the postwar Japanese efforts than on anything else. defence and security policies, and thus would turn out to be a transitional phenomenon. Despite these deep realities in Japanese society, since the end of the Cold War Japan True, in this dynamic process of transition, has been perceived by its Asian neighbours somewhat naive nationalism has propelled and many other countries to be seeking a the changes. These changes, however, return to its former major-power status. have not gone beyond the premises of Particularly among its Asian neighbours, Japan’s overall postwar consensus. Even domestic calls for Japan to become a ‘normal in the event (although unlikely in the near state’ have been equated with a swing to future) that Japan recognises the right of the right and a desire to exert its military collective self‑defence and collective security, will on others. Simply put, this is a gross the outcome should be a much tighter misunderstanding and distortion of Japan’s alliance with the US and full participation in foreign policy. 46 Proceedings

multilateral security cooperation rather than long‑term strategy of ‘peaceful rise,’ without anything else. contradicting the ultimate logic of the alliance with the US and its role as a security anchor The Japanese conception and approach to for the region. an East Asian Community, based on an equal partnership with Australia and New Zealand, Endnotes and in fact with Korea and ASEAN as well, should be regarded as a manifestation of 1 Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on the internationalism of post‑Cold War Japan Defense Issues, The Modality of the rather than as an expression of nationalism. Security and Defense Capability of Japan, Some of the political discourse in Japan, August 12, 1994. particularly because of its anti-China tone, 2 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A might give the impression that nationalism is Contemporary History, Basic Books, New being expressed. In reality, however, elements York, 1997. of competition with China, if any, are carefully embraced in Japan’s broader multilateral 3 Yoshihide Soeya, ‘Vietnam in Japan’s approach toward East Asian regionalism, regional policy,’ in James Morley and which is nothing but a manifestation of Masashi Nishihara (eds), Vietnam Joins the Japan’s de facto middle-power diplomacy. World, ME Sharpe, New York, 1997.

This is the conceptual foundation upon which 4 Speech by Prime Minister of Japan a genuine partnership between Japan and Junichiro Koizumi, ‘Japan and ASEAN in Australia could and should be realised in a East Asia: a sincere and open partnership,’ real world. The signing of the Japan–Australia January 14, 2002. Available at http://www. Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation on mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0201/ March 13, 2007 is the most recent testimony speech.html to this.8 The areas of cooperation and the 5 Yoshihide Soeya, Nihon-no Middle Power methods of practical cooperation signify Gaiko [Japan’s Middle Power Diplomacy], typical middle-power cooperation between Chikuma-shobo, Tokyo, 2005). Korean Japan and Australia, including humanitarian translation is also available from the Orum relief operations, peace operations, and publishers. regional capacity building.9 6 Daily Yomiuri, April 4, 2006. This clearly indicates that, in the overall context discussed in this paper, the 7 Richard J Samuels, ‘Japan’s Goldilocks relationship between Japan and Australia has strategy,’ The Washington Quarterly the potential to lead community-building (Autumn 2006), p. 121. efforts from the middle ground, between 8 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/ the US and China. In this sense, Japan and australia/joint0703.html Australia are natural partners who can Accessed on 23 January 2008. cooperate on an equal basis, in the true sense of the term (that is, not as a political 9 The joint declaration specifically mentions slogan), for the stability and prosperity of the the following items under the subheading region and the world. If the Japan–Australia of ‘areas of cooperation.’ partnership evolves on the basis of this The scope of security cooperation conceptual foundation, its role may between Japan and Australia will include, eventually become acceptable to the Chinese but not be limited to the following: The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 47

(i) law enforcement on combating China rising: the view from transnational crime, including trafficking ‘down under’ in illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting Dr Brendan Taylor currency and arms smuggling Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australian National University (ii) border security Australia is affectionately known as the (iii) counter-terrorism ‘lucky country.’ It is also known, however, as (iv) disarmament and counter-proliferation the ‘frightened country’—to borrow from of weapons of mass destruction and their the title of a classic text published in 1979 by means of delivery Alan Renouf, a former Head of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs.1 In this paper, (v) peace operations I argue that these two notions capture well (vi) exchange of strategic assessments and the approach that Australia, over the past related information decade under the Howard government, has taken towards the (re)emergence of China. (vii) maritime and aviation security On the one hand, Canberra’s perceptions of (viii)humanitarian relief operations, including China’s rise are more sanguine and generally disaster relief more optimistic than those espoused in Tokyo and Washington. Like many of its Southeast (ix) contingency planning, including for Asian neighbours, however, Australia also pandemics. harbours some apprehensions about the As part of the abovementioned possible ramifications of China’s growing cooperation, Japan and Australia will, regional influence. For this reason, I will argue, as appropriate, strengthen practical Canberra during the Howard years pursued cooperation between their respective what might loosely be termed a ‘hedging defence forces and other security-related strategy’ combining elements of engagement agencies, including through: with a rising China and ‘soft balancing’ against it. Contrary to recent speculation of a (i) exchange of personnel new tilt toward China (and away from Japan) (ii) joint exercises and training to further under the new Rudd government, I conclude increase effectiveness of cooperation, the paper by predicting a continuation of this including in the area of humanitarian relief ‘hedging’ approach. operations The lucky country? (iii) coordinated activities including those in the areas of law enforcement, peace Canberra’s optimism vis-à-vis China’s operations, and regional capacity building. (re)emergence was apparent in the statements of senior figures throughout the Howard years. Prime Minister Howard himself famously stated during an address at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in March 2005 that ‘Australia does not believe that there is anything inevitable about escalating strategic competition between China and the United States.’2 48 Proceedings

Likewise, during a visit to China in June 2005, foreign policy poll conducted by the Lowy the then Australian Defence Minister Institute for International Policy.8 Robert Hill indicated that he saw China’s Second, and relatedly, domestic political expanding military expenditure as a process factors have also proven conducive to of ‘modernisation, not destabilisation.’3 In Australia’s more optimistic take on rising July 2005, and in a rare public disagreement China. Canberra is not shackled by the same with President Bush, Howard suggested deep-seated nationalist sentiment that while standing on the White House lawn today we see throughout Northeast Asia, that the Sino–Australian relationship was fuelled in the Japanese case by the fact ‘mature enough’ to ride through ‘temporary that it has fought several major wars with arguments’ over human rights and that China. Indeed, recent polling indicates that he remained ‘unashamed’ in developing the Australian public has generally positive Australia’s relations with China.4 Likewise, feelings towards China. In the 2007 version of in January 2006 the Australian Ambassador the aforementioned Lowy poll, for instance, to the United States, Dennis Richardson, 56% of Australians expressed positive feelings asserted that ‘the question for Australia is toward China.9 An identical result was not whether China’s growth is innately good recorded in another recent poll conducted or bad; Australia made up its mind long ago under the auspices of Sydney University’s that is was a good thing. China’s growth United States Studies Centre. Here 56% also is unambiguously good for Asia and the expressed a favourable opinion of China and, United States.’5 interestingly, a whopping 75% said the same Three factors, in my view, have contributed of Japan.10 towards Australia’s optimistic view of China’s Third, Australia’s geographic distance from the (re)emergence. The first, and most obvious, great power machinations of Northeast Asia is economic. Last year, for instance, China can also be seen to have contributed towards overtook Japan to officially become Australia’s the sense of optimism attending China’s leading trading partner.6 A large proportion of rise. To be sure, with the bulk of Australia’s this trade consists of resource exports, which economic interests concentrated in the are set to increase still further following Northeast Asian sub-region, our desire for the resumption of LNG shipments from the continued strategic stability in this part of North West Shelf to Guangdong in May 2006. the world is especially acute. Indeed, for China is also Australia’s second largest export this reason alone the prospect—however destination for agricultural goods and its unlikely—of Sino–Japanese tensions ever largest market for international student spiralling into open conflict is one that would enrolments. As the disposable incomes of keep most Australian policy-makers awake many Chinese continue to increase, a tourism at night. boom is also well underway.7 Taken together, this has led to a situation where China’s rise is At the same time, however, Australia’s seen as nothing short of an economic blessing fortuitous geographical positioning reduces for Australia which, incidentally, was largely apprehensions surrounding China’s military responsible for funding significant tax cuts modernisation in a way that would simply not under the Howard government. Consistent be possible for Japan. Canberra recognises, with this, Australians ranked China as the of course, that Beijing is moving beyond an economy most important to their country exclusive focus on Taiwan Strait scenarios (both now and into the future) in a recent and that China’s capacity to deploy forces The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 49

along its maritime periphery is increasing into the original fabric of Australian national in a fairly rapid and significant way.11 Yet attitudes.’16 Most recently, that same ‘vague China’s capacity to project power beyond its sense’ of alarm was reflected beautifully in immediate neighbourhood remains limited the 2007 Defence Update: and is likely to remain so into the foreseeable China’s emergence as a major market and driver future. As the respected American defence of economic activity both regionally and globally analyst Phillip Saunders has recently observed has benefited the expansion of economic growth ‘China’s ambitious military modernisation in the Asia–Pacific and globally. But the pace and efforts are likely to improve the PLA’s scope of its military modernisation, particularly capability to project power globally, but this the development of new and disruptive will be a gradual, long-term process.’12 This, capabilities such as the anti-satellite (ASAT) of course, augurs well for a geographically missile (tested in January 2007) could create distant Australia. misunderstandings and instability in the region.17 Added to this, China presently does not In its most recent manifestation, this lingering have access to military bases in Australia’s apprehension vis-à-vis China is driven by two immediate neighbourhood, while Canberra factors. First, by a sense of uncertainty about is of the view that any serious Chinese what the region would look like and how it attempt to project power into this part of would operate were China to unambiguously the world would, in the current strategic become the dominant power in this part of environment, be strongly resisted by other the world. As Hugh White, a prominent figure major powers (namely the US).13 To be sure, in the Australian debate puts it, ‘None of us Beijing’s long-range ballistic missiles already know how a strong and unrestrained China give it the capacity to strike at Australia and would behave, but it might seek to dominate it is continuing to modernise its strategic the region politically, economically and even nuclear forces. However, this modernisation militarily in ways that would impinge upon process continues to be a relatively slow one our interests.’18 On the one hand, Beijing’s and China’s strategic nuclear force remains leadership capacity has been called into very small.14 Against that backdrop, it remains question following the repeated cover-up difficult to conceive of circumstances in which of disease outbreaks (such as SARS), the China would chose to expend this relatively almost non-existent Chinese response to limited arsenal against Australian targets. the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and due to the continued opacity of domestic politics The frightened country? in China.19 At the same time, the experience However remote the prospect of a major of Nazi Germany has embedded deep in Chinese attack against Australia might the Western psyche a belief that states currently seem, it is still one which has undertaking military modernisation programs certainly not been dismissed altogether in who also display a flagrant regard for human Australia’s defence planning.15 Hence, while rights of their own subjects are more prone Canberra’s view of China’s (re)emergence to behaving aggressively in their foreign has tended to be more sanguine than that relations than those which do not exhibit held in Tokyo and Washington, it would be a these characteristics. mistake to characterise Australia’s position The second, equally deep-seated source on this issue as one of complete comfort. As of Australia’s latent apprehension comes Coral Bell wrote in 1964, ‘a vague sense of from our longstanding sense that we are China as a distinctly alarming force is woven 50 Proceedings

essentially regarded as ‘outsiders’ in Asia. become a priority area here, as demonstrated Renouf touched upon this insecurity in his by the establishment of an Australia–China characterisation of Australia as a ‘frightened Joint Coordination Group on Clean Coal country’; a country that literally lives in fear of Technology in January 2007.24 Interestingly, its own neighbourhood, that is unable to see however, Australia’s strategic engagement the opportunities in the Asian region clearly with China has thus far remained and that also exhibits a strong penchant rather limited.25 for seeking out a great and powerful friend. Juxtaposed against this deepening However, it was the American political engagement, however, Australia during scientist Samuel Huntington who probably the Howard years also seemed to indirectly captured it best when referring to Australia balance against China’s growing power as a ‘torn country’—a society divided and influence. The centerpiece of this ‘soft over whether or not it belongs to Asia.20 balancing’ approach was, of course, Australia’s Interestingly, Beijing has at times been alliance with the US. Interestingly, however, responsible for reinforcing this sense of Canberra was always careful to avoid vulnerability, such as in mid-2005 when it creating the impression that its single most reportedly opposed Australian membership of important strategic relationship was ever the inaugural East Asia Summit.21 being used as an instrument with which to During the Howard years, Australia ‘hard balance’ or ‘contain’ China. From an early compensated for these perceived stage, for instance, Canberra refused to join vulnerabilities by adopting what might loosely Washington in lobbying for a continuation be termed a ‘hedging strategy’. ‘Hedging’, of of the European Union (EU) arms embargo course, is an imprecise term whose usage can against China.26 In August 2004, Foreign sometimes confuse as much as it clarifies. Minister Alexander Downer famously and In all of its manifestations, however, the controversially questioned whether Australia’s concept of ‘hedging’ would appear to involve ANZUS commitments would apply in the a combination of engagement and indirect case of a Taiwan Straits contingency.27 In (or soft) balancing behaviour. Not unlike early 2005, Australia initially refused to join an ‘insurance’ policy, hedging strategies, the so‑called ‘Halibut Group’—a multilateral as Evelyn Goh has recently observed, forum led by US officials and designed to ‘cultivate a middle position that forestalls facilitate private dialogue amongst selected or avoids having to choose one side (or one American allies regarding China.28 Again in straightforward policy stance) at the obvious March 2006, prior to the inaugural gathering expense of another’.22 of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) to be held at Ministerial Level in Sydney, Downer Australia and China have certainly deepened publicly stated that ‘a policy of containment their engagement in a number of areas of China would be a very big mistake.’ His since normalising relations 35 years ago. purpose in so doing appears to have been At that time, bilateral trade stood at to publicly distance himself from earlier A$100 million, whereas by 2006 it had comments made by US Secretary of State reached $A33 billion.23 Beijing and Canberra Condoleezza Rice during media interviews are currently in the process of negotiating a where she indicated that the US, Japan and Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Their cooperation Australia needed to be mindful of the pace on environmental issues is becoming and reach of Beijing’s military buildup and an increasingly important facet of the also raised the prospect of China becoming ‘a relationship. The issue of climate change has negative force’.29 The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 51

The TSD itself can certainly be regarded as seen in a similar way.32 Indeed, so too can the one of the key ‘soft balancing’ components Australia–Japan security declaration which of Canberra’s ‘hedging’ strategy. The official was signed in March 2007. As Aurelia George Australian rationale, of course, is that this Mulgan has observed: three-way initiative is in no way directed Australia is now figuring much larger in Japan’s at China. A raft of other justifications have strategic calculations as well as in its economic been advanced: America, Australia and Japan, and trade vision for the region. These are for instance, are each liberal democracies, pre-eminently China-focused rather than centring espousing broadly similar economic and on the value of the Australia–Japan relationship political values; they are each regarded— for its own sake.33 albeit to varying degrees—essentially as ‘outsiders’ in Asia; and they share increasingly The Rudd government and Asian common security concerns, such as security: time for a cool change? terrorism and WMD proliferation. Why, so the official line goes, should these three Speculation is presently rife, however, that ‘natural allies’ not cooperate? The objectives a significant recalibration of Australia’s of facilitating Japan’s ‘normalisation’ or of ‘hedging’ approach is set to occur under the checking America’s unilateralist tendencies Rudd government. China is said to be the in foreign affairs have also been posited at major beneficiary of this anticipated policy various junctures.30 shift and Japan the biggest loser. The Straits Times of Singapore, for instance, reports that: Any evidence suggesting an absence of the ‘China factor’ from the strategy and politics Mr Rudd has a deeper understanding of China. surrounding the TSD, however, remains far He will recognise that to keep the Australian from compelling. The repeated emphasis economy going, ties with China would have to given to the democratic credentials of the be very close. He might seek more cooperation TSD members automatically and implicitly and dialogue with China on economic as well as targets China—a sense of ostracism that security issues.34 was reinforced by subsequent suggestions In similar vein, an editorial printed in the that the TSD might be expanded to include Japan Times suggests that: India. The fact that the statement resulting from the March 2006 meeting of the TSD Under Mr Rudd, who has a strong affinity also made explicit mention of China does with China, Australia’s approach towards its make it difficult to sustain the argument relations with China may change. He was that Beijing is not a focus of discussion at stationed in Beijing for two years in the 1980s these gatherings.31 and speaks fluent Chinese … If Mr Rudd moves to accommodate China’s growing influence, Japan It has certainly not escaped Beijing’s attention should seriously consider how to use it as leverage that the TSD is comprised of members who in lessening conflict and friction with China and each harbor (albeit differing) apprehensions getting the country to play a constructive role regarding China’s rise. Notwithstanding in Asia.35 assurances that it is being undertaken to counter the growing threat posed The Yomiuri Shimbun is less up beat, however, by terrorist and rogue state actors, the observing that: intensification of missile defence research There are views there could be a setback in collaboration between the US, Japan and Australia–Japan relations under the new Rudd Australia announced in June 2007 can be Administration.36 52 Proceedings

While such sentiments are understandable, Second, while the depth of Australia’s my view is that they are also misplaced. economic engagement with China can hardly Indeed, for at least three reasons I would be called into question, its engagement at argue that, when it comes to Australian other levels remains relatively shallow and approaches to Asian security, the subtle underdeveloped. Engagement, of course, is changes which may occur under the Rudd a multi-layered, multi-dimensional process government should not obscure the fact that that also encompasses a wide spectrum of much will remain the same as it was during people‑to-people contacts and personal the Howard period. linkages. Yet Australia and China remain very different societies: we speak a different First, Rudd has made no secret of his language, our cultures are diametrically continued commitment to the American opposed and our values are fundamentally alliance. Indeed, Rudd’s first words on foreign in conflict. Trying to develop the same level policy during his election night victory speech of trust and intimacy that currently exists indicated that the alliance would remain in the Australia–US or, for that matter, the central under his watch.37 This, of course, is Australia–Japan relationship is therefore likely entirely consistent with the Labor Party’s to be a long-term project and one that will longstanding commitment to the alliance, almost certainly encounter a good deal more notwithstanding the aberration of the trials and tribulations than has thus far been Mark Latham candidacy. acknowledged in either Beijing or Canberra. To be sure, Rudd’s approach to the alliance Indeed, two areas of potential difficulty are will certainly not be identical to Howard’s. already apparent. The first is in relation to the Michael Fullilove, for instance, has recently proposed FTA between Australia and China. speculated that Canberra will now be Where negotiations were notoriously slow less likely to participate in any future US during the Howard years, they have virtually unilateral adventures. In his terms ‘Australia ground to a halt under Rudd’s watch. The new will remain a robust and familiar ally to Prime Minister has already controversially cut America, but it may no longer be the best resources allocated to these FTA negotiations. redoubt for outlaws.’ He also suggests that Added to this, China is increasingly a Rudd government will more actively seek focused upon growing its own domestic to influence Washington’s attitudes and consumption and on ‘going global’ in the area behaviours, in sharp contrast to the often of investment. Trade is thus becoming less unswerving loyalty of the Howard years. of a priority in this environment—a factor Nevertheless, Fullilove also goes on to posit which does not augur particularly well for that Rudd may actually move Australia the future progress of the FTA.39 The second closer to the US.38 While this, from Rudd’s area of potential difficulty is human rights. perspective, ought not to preclude Australia Despite Rudd’s pro-China credentials, he has from simultaneously developing more previously criticised China in this area. He is intimate ties with Beijing, the reverse may also likely to face pressure from the left-wing not necessarily be true. The Chinese, who of his own Labor Party to press Beijing remain intent upon further softening US on this front. Hence, where the Howard alliance relationships throughout the region, government was able to largely insulate the continue to view the America–Australia Sino–Australian relationship from difficulties tie as a fundamental impediment to their over human rights issues by conducting developing any genuine strategic relationship discussions regarding these matters in the with Canberra. The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 53

context of a private bilateral dialogue, Rudd are many of them, will find that Kevin Rudd is may not have this luxury.40 someone who can understand and speak their language. They will find, in short, that Rudd is Third, and most importantly in the context of fluent in much more than mandarin.’42 this discussion, is the continued importance of Japan to Australia. Japan remains Australia’s Endnotes second largest trading partner and there is very little to suggest that its economic 1 Alan Renouf, The Frightened Country, centrality to this country will soon diminish. (Melbourne: MacMillan, 1979). The longevity of the Australia–Japan security 2 Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard relationship should not be underestimated MP, address at the opening of the Lowy either. Greater strategic collaboration Institute for International Policy, Sydney, between our two countries, we should 31 March 2005. recall, began during the 1970s and has been expanded substantially from the 1990s 3 Cited in Paul Dibb, ‘Don’t Get Too Close to onwards.41 To be sure, some rebalancing of the Beijing’, The Australian, 2 August 2005. Australia–Japan relationship is likely to occur 4 Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon. following Howard’s noticeable tilt towards John Howard MP, Joint Press Conference Tokyo which took place at the beginning with the President of the United States of 2007. In my view, that tilt was driven of America George W. Bush, The White primarily by domestic political considerations House, Washington DC, 19 July 2005. and was an attempt on the part of Howard to differentiate himself from Rudd in an 5 Geoff Elliott, ‘Stay cool on China, election year. Ambassador tells US’, The Australian, 30 January 2006. Against that backdrop, rather than executing any fundamental re-ordering of Australia’s 6 Jessica Irvine, ‘China now biggest partner’, approach to Asian security, my view is that Sydney Morning Herald, 1 September 2007. we will see the new Rudd government revert 7 See Australian Department of Foreign to the delicate ‘balancing act’ that was such Affairs and Trade, ‘People’s Republic of a defining feature of Australian foreign China Country Brief – December 2007’. policy throughout most of the Howard years. Available from the world wide web: (www. America and Japan will remain central here, dfat.gov.au/geo/china/cb_index.html). in my view, as Canberra continues to ‘hedge’ [accessed 9 December 2007]. against some of the less savoury potentialities associated with China’s (re)emergence. In 8 Allan Gyngell, Australia and the World; the words of my colleague Robert Ayson, public opinion and foreign policy, (Sydney, ‘the countries of Asia will find that the Rudd NSW: Lowy Institute for International government, and especially its leader, is Policy, 2007), p.13. committed to regional engagement and to 9 Ibid, p.5. positioning Australia wisely in the emerging great power picture … But Australia’s 26th 10 See Alan Dupont, ‘Benefits offset costs prime minister will be under no illusion that of US alliance’, Sydney Morning Herald, old-fashioned relations of power between 3 October 2007. states are being sidelined in the region or that 11 For further reading see Michael D. Swaine, Asia is destined for increasing peace as well ‘China’s Regional Military Posture’, in as prosperity. The region’s realists, and there David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China 54 Proceedings

and Asia’s New Dynamics, (Berkeley, CA: the Remaking of World Order, (New York: University of California Press, 2005), Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp.151-154. pp.266-285. 21 Patrick Walters, ‘Beijing plays spoiler on 12 Phillip C. Saunders, ‘China’s Global Asia summit’, The Australian, 6 April 2005. Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools’, 22 Evelyn Goh, ‘Understanding ‘hedging’ in Occasional Paper 4, Institute for National Asia-Pacific security’, PacNet Newsletter Strategic Studies, National Defense No. 43, Pacfic Forum CSIS, Honolulu, University, Washington DC, October 2006, Hawaii, 31 August 2006. p.18. 23 See Malcolm Cook, ‘Building on 13 See Hugh White, Beyond the Defence of Strong Foundations: The Future of the Australia, Lowy Institute Paper 16, (Sydney, China-Australia Relationship: Outcomes NSW: Lowy Institute for International Report’, Perspectives, Lowy Institute for Policy), pp.34-35. International Policy, Sydney, July 2007. 14 For further reading see US Department 24 See Australian Department of Foreign of Defense, Annual Report of the Military Affairs and Trade, ‘People’s Republic of Power of the People’s Republic of China, (US China Country Brief – December 2007’. Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 2007), pp.18-20. 25 See Australian Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence 15 See, for example, Commonwealth of Update 2007, p.35. Australia, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, (Canberra: Department of 26 See Michael Wesley, ‘Australia-China’ Defence, 2000), p.23. in Brendan Taylor, ed., Australia as an Asia-Pacific Regional Power: Friendships in 16 Coral Bell, ‘Australia and China: Power Flux?, (London: Routledge, 2007), p.72. Balance and Policy’, in A.M. Halperin, ed., Policies Toward China: Views from Six 27 Hamish McDonald and Tom Allard, ‘ANZUS Continents, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965). loyalties fall under China’s shadow’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 August 2004. 17 Australian Department of Defence, Australia’s National Security: A Defence 28 See William T. Tow, ‘Sino-American Update 2007, (Canberra: Commonwealth relations and the ‘Australia factor’: of Australia, 2007), p.19. inflated expectations or discriminate engagement?’, Australian Journal 18 Hugh White, ‘The limits to optimism: of International Affairs, vol.59, no.4, Australia and the rise of China’, Australian December 2005, p.454. Journal of International Affairs, vol.59, no.4, December 2005, p.476. 29 Patrick Walters, ‘Containing China a Big Mistake: Downer’, The Australian, 19 See, for example, Joshua Kurlantzick 16 March 2006. and Devin Stewart, ‘Hu’s on First?’, The National Interest, No.92, November/ 30 For further reading on the TSD and its December 2007, pp.63-67. objectives see William T Tow, Mark J Thomson, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Satu 20 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of P. Limaye, Asia-Pacific Security: US, Australia Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, vol.72, and Japan and the New Security Triangle, no.3, Summer 1993, p.42; and Samuel P. (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 55

31 See Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Australia– The impacts of China’s rise on Japan relations: New directions’, Strategic the Asian international system Insights, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 2007, p.2. Seiichiro Takagi Aoyama Gakuin University1 32 Patrick Walters, ‘Possibility of a bigger role in security architecture’, The Australian, Introduction 9 June 2007. At the end of 1978, China departed from 33 Mulgan, ‘Australia–Japan relations: New the path of revolution and switched to directions’, p.2. a policy of reform and opening up, with 34 William Choong and Sim Chi Yin, ‘Rudd economic development as the fundamental govt expected to be closer to China’, goal of the state. The economic and social Straits Times, 26 November 2007. development which China has attained to date has brought about various changes 35 ‘Australia with a new face’, The Japan on the international scene. Clearly, the Times, 28 November 2007. most striking is China’s huge newfound 36 Cited in Choong and Yin, ‘Rudd govt economic presence within the international expected to be closer to China’. community. According to statistics published by the Chinese Government in January 2006, 37 Available from the world wide web: (www. China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has alp.org.au/media/1107/spepme240.php). risen to US$2.26 trillion, making it the fourth [Accessed 9 December 2007]. largest in the world. There is also a view that 38 Michael Fullilove, ‘Ally with a new attitude; China’s GDP is already effectively the third Australia’s prime minister, the staunchest largest in the world, given the undervaluation of Bush supporters, is ousted’, Los Angeles of its currency (the yuan) and China’s low Times, 29 November 2007. domestic prices.

39 For further reading see Rowan Callick, This rapid economic growth was ‘China Free Trade agreement shapes up as accomplished through export-oriented an early challenge for Rudd’, industrialisation and the active introduction The Australian, 3 December 2007. of foreign capital. As a result, China’s global trade presence has also grown rapidly— 40 For further reading see Steve Lewis and according to World Trade Organization Cath Hart, ‘Left to create China crisis for statistics, by 2004 China was already the third Rudd’, The Australian, 12 April, 2007. largest trading nation in the world. China is 41 For further reading see Brendan Taylor now Japan’s number one trade partner. In and Desmond Ball, ‘Australia–Japan’, terms of other indices as well, such as inward in Brendan Taylor, ed., Australia as an direct investment and foreign exchange Asia–Pacific Regional Power: Friendships in reserves, China is now a leading economic Flux?, (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.50-59. player on the world stage.

42 Robert Ayson, ‘Kevin Rudd and Asia’s Although this in itself is a significant enough Security’, PacNet Newsletter No.49, change, the consequences of China’s Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii, dramatic economic growth are not limited 29 November 2007. to the expansion of its economic presence in the world. This paper tries to examine the consequences of China’s rapid economic 56 Proceedings

growth in terms of the international capability. According to official Chinese political system. statistics, China’s military expenditure has increased by over 10% almost every year since 1 The influence of China’s 1989. However, an annual report on Chinese economic growth on its military power issued by the US Department international behaviour of Defense states that those official figures account for no more than a third to a half of In view of the rapid and sustained growth of China’s actual military spending. China has its economy, China’s presence is in various been using this huge military expenditure ways a desirable one for the international to import advanced weaponry from Russia, community. Having become the factory improve military training standards, enhance to the world, China is now for many the computerisation of its military, and countries a vital source of supply of low rapidly modernise its military capability, priced consumer goods. Also, the steady with particular emphasis on naval and air expansion of the middle class over the course forces. This rapid modernisation of China’s of approximately a quarter of a century of military capability—coupled with the serious economic growth has created an enormous lack of transparency that surrounds it—has market. The recovery of the Japanese come to be a major source of anxiety for economy—long mired in stagnation after many countries. the burst of the bubble at the start of the 1990s—has been heavily reliant on China, Second, as has been evident since the later both as an investment destination and as an half of the 1990s, demand by China for export market. natural resources (especially for energy resources) is rising rapidly in tandem with its From a broader perspective, it should be rapid economic growth. The fact that China pointed out that as China has realised its has to seek supplies of those resources from economic growth by integrating itself with abroad is exerting a major influence on its international institutions such as the World conduct towards other nations. In particular, Trade Organization, it has become an actor the rapid rise in China’s level of dependence that is not likely to benefit from disrupting on oil from other nations since it became a the existing international order. As advocates net oil importer in 1993 has contributed to of the theory of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ point the soaring oil prices of recent years. The fact out, irrespective of China’s massive presence that China has strengthened its relations with in terms of macroeconomic indicators, the ‘problem states’ such as Iran, Venezuela, and nation ranks lower than one hundredth in the Sudan, with a view to ensuring sources of the world in per capita GDP and, as it requires supply for oil, has also become a major cause continuous long term growth, this trend can of international concern. be expected to continue in the future. Furthermore, there is also major cause for It is undeniable, however, that the various apprehension about the domestic social changes accompanying China’s rapid consequences of China’s rapid economic economic growth have aroused major growth. First, as has often been pointed out, concern in the international community. growth has broken down the old ‘equality Foremost among these, as many of poverty’ and brought about various acute commentators have observed, is the fact disparities. According to a 2005 report by the that China’s rapid economic growth has United Nations Development Programme, enabled it to swiftly modernise its military disparity in income levels is such that the The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 57

ratio of income in urban areas to income in However, there are limits to the ability of the rural areas is 6 to 1, and over the past twenty current regime to counter these problems, years the national Gini index has increased and it is conceivable that suppression of by 50% to 0.46.2 Although the latter figure discontent (coupled with unremitting is lower than in several Latin American corruption among officialdom and the and African countries, the urban income inadequacies of the social security system) disparity is seemingly the worst in the world. could jeopardise the very survival of the Against this background there has been a regime. Notably, the theory of the ‘revolution sharp rise in the number of cases of social of rising expectations’ suggests that, in the unrest. In January 2006 the Public Security event of a significant slowdown in economic Department announced that in 2005 there growth (even if negative growth were had been more than 87,000 instances of avoided), this danger would rapidly loom. ‘offenses of disturbing social order,’ such Under such circumstances, the leadership as public disturbances and incidents of might succumb to the temptation to inflame group violence—an increase of 6.6% over tensions with other nations in order to the previous year.3 Notably, there have been displace domestic discontent and avert a reports of cases in which conflict over issues crisis. Even if it did not go to such lengths, it such as the forceful appropriation of land is likely that it would not make any effective and irregular charges have led to violent efforts to contain demonstrations of mass disputes in agricultural communities. As discontent directed at foreign nations. noted by Elizabeth Economy, an expert on It is possible that the rise of nationalism that China’s environmental problems, there are accompanies rapid economic development also frequent protest movements sparked by will further intensify these trends. As a the ongoing aggravation of environmental Chinese researcher told me a few years ago, problems such as air and water pollution and in the initial stages of reform and opening desertification—the pursuit of economic up, nationalism was a friend of reform and development having led to a disregard for the opening up because it was essential to burden placed on the environment.4 overcome China’s low level of development, It appears that these kinds of situation— but now nationalism turned against any especially incidents of violence on a larger opening up to the outside world, due to scale—are currently confined to the level a rise in self confidence resulting from of regional disputes, and that there is no economic growth.6 nationwide coordination. The Hu Jintao–Wen This trend is being spurred on by the recent Jiabao regime seems to be fully aware of the exceptionally rapid spread of the internet. gravity of these problems, as demonstrated According to a survey by the China Internet by slogans such as ‘putting people first,’ Information Center, the total number of ‘constructing a harmonious society,’ and internet users in China was 620,000 in 1997, ‘the theory of scientific development.’ 22.5 million in 2000, and 111 million in 2005. Furthermore, the advocates of the ‘peaceful The 2005 figure is nearly five times the rise’ theory assert that, because China will 2000 figure, and 179 times the 1997 total.7 have to respond appropriately to this kind Against this backdrop, the anti‑Japanese of domestic situation over a long period, demonstrations that took place in many China will need a peaceful international Chinese cities in April 2005 were organised environment, and that its continuing over the internet through email and development will thus inevitably be peaceful.5 chat rooms, and rapidly assumed major 58 Proceedings

proportions. Even after the activities on the The same is true (although to a lesser extent) streets were brought under control in May, of the spread of yellow dust caused by the criticism of Japan continued unabated on advance of desertification. In fact, some of the internet. It is said that on July 1, activists China’s environmental problems now assume sent UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan a a global dimension. According to a study by letter, with 46 million electronic signatures the International Energy Agency published attached, opposing Japan’s accession in November 2006, China is now the second to permanent membership of the UN largest emitter of carbon dioxide, accounting Security Council.8 for 18% of the global total (after the US, with 22%), and is expected to overtake the US How should we deal with such problematic within four years.9 behaviour on the part of China, stemming from its economic and social development? Elizabeth Economy points out regional As well as devising ways to alleviate and avoid disparities in China’s response to the damage which that behaviour entails (the environmental pollution, and cites the natural response), we should probably also support of leaders for protecting the work towards a pre-emptive response and environment, the existence of the necessary wherever possible assist China as much as we resources to do so, and the strong backing can in its efforts to mitigate and dispel the of the international community as the causes of the behaviour. common features in those regions that are succeeding in this regard.10 In this case, For example, the rapid rise in Chinese energy the international community includes not demand is not the result of China’s rapid only the governments of environmentally economic growth alone—it is also partly due advanced nations but also non-government to China’s inefficient use of energy. According organisations, which play a key role. It is also to some assessments, China’s energy possible that China might witness a replay of consumption per unit GDP (oil equivalent the pattern seen in Eastern Europe and the conversion) is approximately ten times that of former Soviet Union, where demonstrations Japan and four times that of the US. Although of discontent by local residents over those assessments may be biased by the environmental problems proved to be a vital conversion of GDP into dollars at the market first step towards government reform and rate, China definitely has significant room for democratisation. Hence, assistance with the improvement in energy efficiency—and an environment could transform into low key improvement in efficiency would certainly backing for democratisation. slow down the increase in demand. Assisting China to improve its energy efficiency would It is really up to China alone to make efforts not simply be in China’s interests—it is a task to reduce the disparities and eliminate that ought to be performed in the interests of corruption. Although there is little scope for the entire international community. participation by the international community, there may be times when it will need to China’s environmental pollution is also not exercise prudence so as not to become solely a domestic problem, but is also a huge part of the problem. With regard to China’s problem for Japan and South Korea, which modernisation of its military capability, are downwind in the jetstream. According to the international community must take a Japanese study on sulfur dioxide that fell measures to avoid risks and demand increased on Japan in January 1999, in all regions but transparency, while taking care not to fall one over 50% of it originated in China, with into the trap of the security dilemma. China the proportion reaching 75% in one region. The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 59

formerly concealed all information regarding regional organisations, attending the ASEAN its military capabilities. It was international post ministerial meeting in July 1991 as a persuasion at the ASEAN Regional Forum guest of the chair nation, and at the end of and other venues that led China to publish that year becoming a member of APEC, along at least a national defence white paper. with Taiwan and Hong Kong. A few years Although it was highly unsatisfactory by after the Tiananmen Square incident, China international standards, it is a welcome step made headway in its relations with other forward. Finally, the international community Asian countries, with the Japanese Emperor’s must cope with Chinese nationalism calmly, visit to China in 1992 and the establishment without rising to the bait of its anti-foreign of diplomatic relations with the Republic of tendencies, and at the same time seek Korea in the same year. China reacted calmly cooperation with cooler Chinese heads to the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end through mutual understanding. of 1991, and swiftly established diplomatic relations with the successor states which 2 The effects on the international comprised the Community of Independent system of China’s immense growth States, including Russia. China declared its intention to join the ASEAN Regional Forum, China’s growth and the East Asian the founding of which was agreed upon in international system 1993, and in 1994 became a consultative dialogue partner of ASEAN. However, it must China’s economic and social development also be pointed out that at same time the has not only effected various changes in its theory of the ‘Chinese threat’ was gaining own conduct towards other countries—it has currency in the nations of Southeast Asia, also had major effects on the nature of the against a backdrop of China’s rapid economic international system. These changes have growth in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s been due to China’s conduct towards other Southern Tour speeches of 1992 and disputes nations—principally a result of its immense over sovereignty in the South China Sea. economic growth. Chief among them are the two changes considered below. In order to change this state of affairs, from the mid-1990s China became even more The first change is the increase in China’s actively involved in Southeast Asia. At the influence in the surrounding region. When ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting in 1996, China stood isolated internationally, facing China became a full dialogue partner of sanctions from Western nations over the ASEAN and presented a new security concept Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989, it incorporating the notion of cooperative sought a breakthrough by focusing on the security. The following year, China hosted improvement of its relations with the nations an ASEAN Regional Forum inter-sessional of Southeast Asia, which had not taken such meeting on confidence building. At the a critical stance on the incident. Between time of the Asian currency/financial crisis the latter half of 1989 and 1991, China in 1997, China responded to the concerns normalised relations with Laos, Indonesia, of Southeast Asian nations by averting and Vietnam, established diplomatic devaluation of its currency, the yuan, and relations with Singapore and Brunei, actively concurrently gave economic assistance participated in the Cambodian peace process to Thailand and Indonesia. At the end of in 1991, and then collaborated with the that year, China launched the ASEAN+1 subsequent UN peacekeeping operation consultation mechanism with the nations in Cambodia. It developed relations with of ASEAN, while simultaneously joining the 60 Proceedings

ASEAN+3 mechanism encompassing China, were set back by India’s nuclear testing in May Japan, and South Korea. Under ASEAN+1, in 1998, but the summer of 1999 saw a recovery. 2000 China proposed the conclusion of a As the above developments illustrate, against free trade agreement with the nations of a backdrop of rapid economic growth since ASEAN, with a view to sharing the fruits of its the 1990s, China has succeeded in improving own economic growth with them; in 2004 a relations with its neighbours through framework agreement was finally concluded. vigorous diplomacy, and has strengthened In 2000 China also began discussions with its presence in the region. However, these ASEAN nations over sovereignty disputes in events did not signify the instant formation the South China Sea, and in 2002 it signed of an Asian power balance in which the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in China predominated. This was because the South China Sea. In 2003 China joined the simultaneously with the developments Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast described above, other—sometimes Asia and announced a strategic partnership countervailing—developments were taking with the nations of ASEAN. place in Asia. Of particular importance was At more or less the same time that these the strengthening of the Japan–US security developments were taking place, China was alliance. After the end of the Cold War, the making great strides in its relations with security partnership between Japan and the the nations of Central Asia, its neighbours US lapsed into a temporary drift, due to the to the north. In 1996 China took advantage loss of the potential common enemy in the of the signing of an agreement with Russia, shape of the Soviet Union. However, starting Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan on around 1994, there were concrete activities confidence-building measures in border by both parties to improve the situation. In areas to inaugurate the Shanghai Five the Joint Declaration on Security issued in Summit Meeting. Since then, the Shanghai April 1996, the two nations reaffirmed the Five have held an annual summit meeting, importance of the alliance in the post-Cold expanding and deepening their cooperative War era without identifying any nation as relationship. In 2001 Uzbekistan was admitted a potential enemy. They agreed that, even to the group and it was transformed after the end of the Cold War, the US–Japan into a formal regional organisation, the security alliance played a vital role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. To the preservation of peace and stability in the south as well, China was making progress, Asia–Pacific region as an institution capable of developing improved relations with India responding effectively to regional instability while maintaining amicable relations with and uncertainty. Such a move was not meant Pakistan. By setting aside the resolution to be directed against the expansion of of territorial problems as a precondition to China’s influence, and the joint declaration improved relations, India and China took affirmed China’s ‘constructive role’ as being the opportunity of the 1988 visit to China by in the common interest of Japan and the US. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to start improving Rather, many of the actions taken by China their relationship. In 1993 the two nations since 1996 have been countermeasures concluded an agreement on maintaining against the strengthened US–Japan alliance. tranquility in the areas around the line of Following the 1996 declaration, the actual control, and in 1996 concluded an framework of cooperation in the Japan–US agreement on confidence‑building measures security alliance was strengthened step in the military field relating to the same areas. by step with the revision of the Japan–US Improvements in China’s relations with India The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 61

defence cooperation guidelines in 1997, the the US. In the international relief efforts that start of joint technical research on missile followed the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, defence in 1999 (which was propelled by the the US constituted a formidable presence, firing of a Taepodong missile by North Korea contributing a large-scale dispatch of forces in 1998), and Japanese legislation relating to that included an aircraft carrier, as well contingencies in areas surrounding Japan in as providing enormous sums in financial 1999. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, assistance; likewise, Japan dispatched its self the two nations have been drawing closer defence forces and made the largest financial ever more rapidly, with the acceleration of the contribution of any nation. The East Asia realignment of US forces in Japan, and against Summit of December 2005 witnessed a tug a background of the affirmation of the global of war between Japan and China over which significance of the US–Japan alliance. This nations should participate. The Southeast can be seen in the identification of joint Asian nations sided with Japan, which insisted strategic objectives in February 2005; the that Australia and India be invited. formalisation of each nation’s missions, roles, and capabilities in October 2005; and the Formation of a US–China–India strategic publication in May 2006 of the Roadmap for triangle? Realignment Implementation. Concurrently, the realignment of the US–South Korea Another change in international systems alliance also made progress through the brought about by China’s (and India’s) Future of the Alliance and Security Policy economic growth which merits examination Initiative meetings, despite turbulence caused is the possible formation of a strategic by rising domestic anti-US sentiment, while triangular relationship between the US, China, the US–Australia alliance also remains on and India which encompasses the entire an even keel. The evolution of the linkage Asian region. Here the strategic triangle is between the Japan–US and the Australia–US distinguished from trilateral relationships by security alliances, which seems to have gained the existence of three conditions: steam since 2008, is not ostensibly directed • any one of the three handles its against China but will certainly function as relationship with the second in the antidote to the formation of a Sino-centric consideration of its relationship with Asian order. the third

The nations of Southeast Asia are not • the political and military capability of completely under the influence of China, any one is significant enough to seriously either. After the Asian currency crisis, Japan affect the strategic balance if it changes provided a far greater sum in assistance alignment from the second to the third than China under the New Miyazawa • none of the three has a stable and Initiative, which was unveiled in 1998. lasting alignment with either one of the In December 2003 Japan hosted the other two. 11 Japan–ASEAN Commemorative Summit The US played the critical role in what Meeting in Tokyo, which was intended to seems to be the formation of this triangular strengthen its collaboration with ASEAN relationship. The US’s post-Cold War policy nations. Similarly, the number of countries towards China has undergone fluctuation reinforcing cooperative relations with the of great magnitude, with the trauma of the US since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 has Tiananmen Square incident and the loss of increased, and in 2003 the Philippines and the need for an anti-Soviet card due to the Thailand became ‘major non NATO allies’ of 62 Proceedings

collapse of the Cold War order. Nevertheless, that India was already a major global power. in addition to its renewed recognition of the After visiting Japan on a round of stops in importance of the Chinese market due to Asia to explain the US policy of promoting China’s rapid economic growth since 1992, the missile defence in May 2001, Deputy Secretary US recognised China’s strategic importance of State Richard Armitage subsequently due to factors such as its permanent went on to India, skipping China. After 9/11, membership of the UN Security Council, cooperation between the US and India grew its possession of nuclear weapons, and its even stronger and the sanctions over the 1998 role in the problem of the Korean Peninsula. nuclear testing were rescinded. When Jiang Zemin visited the US in 1997, the As has already been mentioned, China had two sides agreed to work toward building a been steadily improving its relations with ‘constructive strategic partnership.’ However, India since 1988. However, it took China anxieties over China’s military modernisation some time to treat India as a force to be and lack of transparency about it, suppression reckoned with in the global power balance. of human rights, and other factors were not Since the establishment of a ‘strategic allayed. On the other side, China was aware partnership’ with Russia in 1996, China had that US markets, technology, and investment been pursuing a strategy to promote a were essential for economic development and multipolar global power structure, with the recognised the need to maintain amicable deliberate intention of opposing the trend relations with the US (the sole superpower in towards unilateral domination by the US, but the post-Cold War era) in order to ensure the China did not immediately treat India as a stability of the international environment, target of this strategy. Only when it realised without which it would not be able to that the US and India were rapidly growing concentrate on economic development. closer, as noted above, China changed the However, China strongly resented the US way in which it handled India. In January inclination towards unilateralism and the 2002, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji visited India, imposition of its own values in matters such accompanied by his ministers of economic as human rights and democratisation. affairs, in an effort to strengthen relations Given this state of affairs, the US began through economic ties. When Prime Minister to turn its attention to India, which had Vajpayee visited China in June 2003, China switched to a policy of opening up to the finally expressed its intention to include outside world and was achieving rapid India in its strategy to promote multipolarity. economic growth, primarily as a balance In January 2005, China and India began a to China. From the mid-1990s onwards, a ‘strategic dialogue,’ and, when Prime Minister succession of US think-tanks released reports Wen Jiabao visited India in April of the same stressing the importance of India, and these year, the two nations announced a ‘strategic were essentially rehashed in a Department of partnership for peace and stability.’ Defense report entitled Asia 2025, published It is interesting that, while relations in 1999. In this new climate of awareness, between China and India were visibly in 2000 President Clinton visited India and progressing, US–Indian relations were also Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the US. When progressing further. In January 2004, the Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh visited the US US and India agreed on the ‘next steps in in April 2001, the Bush administration, which strategic partnership,’ and in June 2005 they had previously designated China as the US’s strengthened their cooperation on security main strategic competitor, acknowledged in the form of the ‘New Framework for The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 63

the US–India Defense Relationship.’ When favourable balance against one another. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited the However, Sino–Indian and US–Indian relations US the following month, the US Government are certainly not completely stable. Although agreed to cooperate with India for its civil the territorial disputes between China nuclear energy program, despite the fact and India have currently been effectively that India had pursued the development of decoupled from other problems, they have nuclear weapons outside the framework of in no way been resolved, and India’s distrust the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty with of China since the 1962 border war has not its 1998 nuclear testing. In March 2006 been dispelled. India is also opposed to, and President Bush visited India and proclaimed a wary of, the US’s inclination towards unilateral ‘strategic partnership.’ domination and becoming a pawn in US strategy towards China. In the long term, the Meanwhile, in the wake of 9/11, Sino–US possibility that the US military angst currently relations have improved rapidly on the directed at China may be brought to bear on diplomatic front. In August 2005 the two India cannot be ruled out, depending on how nations began ‘senior dialogues’ between India’s economic and military development the US Deputy Secretary of State and China’s progresses. The US, China, and India all Executive Vice Foreign Minister, which prize their independence, and the trilateral covered a number of problem areas. The US relationship seems to be in the process took this opportunity to designate China as of coalescing into a strategic triangular a ‘stakeholder’ in the existing international relationship in which the three sets of bilateral system. However, the US refuses to categorise relations evolve in intricate correlation with these dialogues as ‘strategic,’ as the Chinese one another. had hoped, characterising its relations with China as a ‘complex relationship,’ 3 Conclusion and showing no intention of concluding a strategic partnership with China. Moreover, China’s phenomenal economic growth led by expressly stipulating that China should to a very complex and confusing outcome. be a ‘responsible’ stakeholder, the US was In many ways China became a welcome clearly signaling to China that it wished international presence and actor, but in China’s actions to meet with US expectations. many other ways it also caused international The Quadrennial Defense Review Report concern. Whichever is judged to be more (QDR) published by the Department of critical, no one can deny that China has Defense immediately after 9/11 expressed a achieved a greater presence because of strong sense of wariness regarding China’s its dramatic economic growth and the modernisation of its military capability, and consequences of that growth, especially in the the QDR published in February 2006 explicitly Asia–Pacific region. However, as there were states that ‘… China has the greatest potential concomitant, and sometimes countervailing, to compete militarily with the United States developments in the region, China’s enhanced and field disruptive military technologies presence did not lead to the formation that could over time offset traditional US of a China-dominant regional system. military advantage’.12 Another interesting systemic implication of China’s rise, coinciding with India’s rise, Under these circumstances, India is now in is the possibility that a US–China–India pole position, being courted diplomatically strategic triangle may be emerging in the by both China and the US, as both nations Asia–Pacific region. principally seek to use India to achieve a 64 Proceedings

Endnotes Review and prospects for the

1 An earlier version of this paper was bilateral strategic relationship published as ‘China’s economic and social between Japan and Australia development and the international scene,’ Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi Asia–Pacific Review, vol. 13, no. 2, 2006, Aoyama Gakuin University pp. 27–37.

2 Wenran Jiang, ‘Dynamics of China’s social 1 Introduction crisis,’ China Brief, vol. VI, issue 2 Historically speaking, Japan and Australia’s (January 20, 2006), p. 2. relations were full of tensions and conflicts. 3 ‘2005nian quanguo xinshi lianshu Even if both countries normalised diplomatic huiluo’ [The number of cases of criminal relations in 1952, the legacy of World War II prosecution dropped in 2005], Renmin was vivid in the minds of the Australian Ribao, January 20, 2006, p. 10. people. Australia’s discriminatory policies against Japanese in both immigration and 4 Elizabeth Economy, ‘China’s Environmental trade ignited Japanese people’s anxieties Challenge,’ Current History, vol. 104, no. 683 and concerns. (September 2005), pp. 279–280. Despite enhanced postwar economic 5 For further details of the evolution of relations, Australia’s perception of Japan, the theory from this point of view, see especially Japan’s increasing security role Seiichiro Takagi, ‘Chugoku “Wahei kukki”- under the US–Japan alliance, had been ron no Genndannkai’ [The current phase ambivalent for many decades. On the one of China’s theory of ‘peaceful rise], Kokusai hand, there had been a clear recognition Mondai, no. 540 (March 2005), pp. 31–45. on the part of Australia that the enhanced 6 Interview with Jin Canrong, August 2004. security role of Japan underlined by the alliance with the US would contribute greatly 7 China Internet Network Information to the security and stability of the Asia–Pacific Center, 17th Statistical Survey Report on the region. However, at the same time, there Internet Development in China (January was a strong feeling in Australia that the 2006), p. 26. ANZUS alliance among the victorious powers 8 Peter Hays Gries, ‘Chinese nationalism: should be the key pillar of regional security challenging the state?’ Current History, vol. management in the Asia–Pacific region, 104, no. 683 (September 2005), pp. 251–252. rather than the US–Japan alliance. Australia had a deep-seated belief that Australia, 9 Asahi, November 21, 2006. second only to the US in defeating Japan, had 10 Elizabeth Economy, op. cit., p. 282. to play a key role in regional security affairs, and that ANZUS should be the key alliance in 11 Lowell Dittmer, ‘The strategic triangle: a the region. critical review,’ in Ilpyong J. Kim (ed.), The Strategic Triangle, Paragon House, New With heightened Cold War tensions in York, 1987, p. 33. Asia, the centre of gravity of international politics in Asia and the Pacific shifted to 12 The Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial the north. Japan emerged as an economic Defense Review Report, February 6, power. Northeast Asia became a strategically 2006, p. 29. important region in the global Cold War The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 65

confrontation. Thus, the US paid more interdependence, along with confidence attention to Japan and, as a result, put a building, overcame the legacy of the past. higher priority on the US–Japan alliance for Japan and Australia gradually expanded regional security management. The US–Japan their cooperative relationship over the alliance increased its importance as a key following decades. Both countries took component of the Asia–Pacific regional order. the joint leadership role in promoting the cause of Asia–Pacific cooperation from the Faced with this power shift in the late 1970s. Their joint endeavour to launch Asia–Pacific region, Australia’s attitude the Asia‑Pacific Economic Cooperation was ambivalent. On the one hand, as a (APEC) forum symbolised the deepening Cold War warrior, Australia welcomed the understanding and collaboration between development of US–Japan relations, because the two countries. Cooperative activities have it further encouraged Japan to adopt more recently expanded to include security areas.1 Western‑oriented policies in the Cold War. On the other hand, however, Australia could not However, despite the recent willingness by help feeling left out because of its gradual both governments to expand their bilateral isolation from the major power centre of relationships to address pressing regional and regional politics and security. global issues, there are a variety of issues that require skillful management of the bilateral This feeling of isolation, coupled with a strong relationship. Those issues arise mainly from sense of mission to play an important role in structural changes in the regional and global regional political and security management, political, security and economic environments. forced Australia to search for a new role or identity in regional diplomacy in the 1970s. In this paper, I touch upon a few issue and Australia began to define its role as an honest areas in which both governments should broker for achieving accommodation between respond more carefully in the decades Southeast Asian countries and Japan, or to come: as a balancer to check or somehow absorb • first, the changing power relationships rising Japanese power in the region. Indeed, among the countries in the region, Australia became a first dialogue partner of especially transformations of ASEAN in 1974. Northeast Asian international relations, These Australian policies and attitudes and the implications for regional introduced various irritating factors into security architecture Japan–Australia bilateral relations. Australia • second, the project to build an East Asian was perceived in Japanese diplomatic circles Community as an uncomfortable partner that gave • third, bilateral relations between Japan ‘lectures’ in a too straightforward way, based and Australia. upon ‘Western’ norms and rules. However, these irritants have now been removed to a I take three dimensions into consideration large extent and new areas of cooperation when I examine the challenges facing Japan are emerging which need constructive joint and Australia in Asia: competition and engagement by both countries. rivalry; regional production networks; and the normative structures of international In the meantime, the 1957 Australia–Japan relations in East Asia.2 Commerce Agreement paved the way for deepening economic interdependence between the two countries. That 66 Proceedings

State-to-state competition and rivalry enough to understand contemporary East Asian international relations. I point out States are still the key players of international a second perspective: the rapid expansion of relations. This is a well known and old the cross-border and multinational production fashioned standard approach to the analysis network, mainly conducted by multinational of strategic and international relations. companies, and its implications for security Usually, we identify changes in ‘national and state to-state relations in Asia (not just power,’ such as economic power (reflected in increased trade and investment volume). GDP), military power, technological capacity, Multinational companies are constructing size of population, etc. as key factors affecting region-wide production networks. Many strategic relations. companies are connecting with each other Asia’s political and strategic environments across national boundaries through those have been becoming more fluid, uncertain production networks. This phenomenon is and complicated. The rise of China; a more more pronounced in Asia than in any other assertive Japan pursuing an enhanced region of the world. Our prosperity depends regional and global security role; the on our development of even more effective predominant US military power, the regional production networks. quagmire in Iraq and Asians’ ambivalence toward the US; India’s rise; North Korea’s Normative structures underlining nuclear development—all these are making East Asia’s international relations the strategic landscape of Asia more fluid and complicated. The third challenge arises from the normative structure or value structure of contemporary Because of this, there are deep-seated senses East Asian international relations. By ‘norm of uncertainty, insecurity and vulnerability structure’ and ‘value structure,’ I mean in most of the Asian countries. Responding the different approaches to organising the to those insecurities and uncertainties, international affairs of the region. We are East Asian countries have been taking a witnessing a serious competition among variety of strategies to protect their own East Asian countries in this area. Competition interests, ranging from ‘engagement’ to over the norms and rules will greatly affect ‘risk hedging’ and ‘soft balancing’. Japan and the future shape of international relations in Australia are no exceptions. the region, including the cause of East Asia Bilateralism is another characteristic of Community building. state strategies adopted by most of the countries of the region in responding to 2 Alliances + a (subregional uncertainties. Almost all the countries of the security multilateralism in region have been enhancing security and Northeast Asia) economic relations with others on a bilateral Asia’s international political economy and basis. Indeed, many countries in Asia have security landscape is changing rapidly, been concluding free trade and security particularly in Northeast Asia. How to cooperation agreements. formulate mechanisms to deal with those changes is a major policy challenge for Regional production networks both Japan and Australia, given their respective political and economic stakes in However, a focus only on state to-state Northeast Asia. relations (competition and rivalry) is not The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 67

Knowing how to respond to changing Six Party process promises to establish a international relations in Northeast Asia more stable regional security multilateralism is becoming more pressing, given new in Northeast Asia that addresses a variety of developments such as rising Chinese security issues in the region. military power, Japan’s desire to be a more How should we conceive security active player in regional and global security, multilateralism in Northeast Asia? We North Korea’s nuclear development programs, usually assume the establishment of a South Korea’s quest for more ‘autonomous’ single multilateral security institution positions in the developing new regional that regulates security issues collectively. power structure (reflecting this, the structure Indeed, there have been many proposals to of the US–South Korea alliance has been construct multilateral security institutions in changing), and Taiwan’s pursuit of a broader Northeast Asia, for example in the style of the space for survival in international affairs. Asian version of the Conference of Security Northeast Asia is becoming a more important Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). And the so region for Australia, too. Australia’s major called ‘2 + 4 formula’ on Korean affairs has trading partners are in Northeast Asia, been proposed since the 1970s. It is assumed and their weight in Australia’s trade has in these ideas that a single multilateral been constantly increasing. Maintaining security institution could address a variety of stable relationships among the countries security‑related issues. in Northeast Asia is critically important for My arguments are based on a different Australia’s economic prosperity. conception of security multilateralism. I Alliances centred on Washington have argue that linking institutions (whether been and will continue to be crucial for bilateral, multilateral, regional or global), peace and stability in Asia, providing a rather than establishing a single multilateral stable framework of managing transition, institution, is critical for developing security especially in Northeast Asia. Almost all multilateralism. Mutually coordinated or states in the region acknowledge that the interlinked institutions create de facto alliances provide ‘public goods’ of stability security multilateralism.3 for the region, although some make the There are several bases for this argument. acknowledgment begrudgingly. Our initial focus of discussions is the However, the function of the alliances is Korean Peninsula. First, there are a variety mainly to sustain the status quo in the of security issues to be addressed in the short term. It remains to be seen whether peninsula—issues that are closely connected the current mode of US centred security with each other. A piecemeal approach is management will be adequate for the not effective. For example, the North Korea’s management of the longer term power nuclear issue cannot be dealt with in isolation transformation of the region. We may have from the larger security issue of the peninsula. to think about a new, longer term, regional It is closely linked with US–DPRK relations, security architecture for the region, based North–South relations, Japan–DPRK relations, upon the existing alliance arrangements. China–DPRK relations, relations with global I refer this as an ‘alliances + a’ system for institutions such as the United Nations, the security management. Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), In this regard, we should pay more careful the armistice regime, peace-regime building, attention to the ongoing Six Party Talks. The 68 Proceedings

economic cooperation and so forth. Those what institutional relations are developed issues must be addressed simultaneously to between the institutions are critical for resolve the nuclear crisis. A comprehensive the overall regional security structure. approach is critical to resolve conflicts, which The establishment of mutually reinforcing must be dealt with as a whole. institutional relations is important in this regard; we must produce synergistic effects Second, although we must address a variety by linking institutions effectively. of security issues simultaneously, each issue needs a different composition of participating Fifth, not a single multilateral institution countries and different commitments from but instead well-coordinated and mutually each. Some issues would be handled more connected institutional relationships will appropriately on a bilateral basis, while other form de facto security multilateralism in issues may be best addressed by a group of the Korean Peninsula. De facto security three or four countries. Some issues need to multilateralism will emerge as a result of the be addressed by six countries. For example, coordination of different institutions through the transition from the armistice regime to institutional linkages. a peace regime needs a group of countries Sixth, therefore, institutional linkages (how different from the group of countries that one institution is linked with others) are key would address the missile and nuclear issue. A when we talk about security multilateralism. single multilateral institution cannot address As far as institutional linkages are concerned, all of these issues, so some division of labour a certain type of institutional linkage is among different institutions is necessary. conducive to security and order. On the Third, because of these multiple aspects other hand, institutions may conflict with of Northeast Asian security, we will need a each other, thereby weakening overall variety of institutions to address respective security. Institutions may be linked in various security issues, whether bilateral, trilateral, ways, and the linkages can strengthen quadrilateral or otherwise. We will have regional structures for stability or weaken bilateral institutions between, for example, them. Individual institutions can operate the US and the DPRK, North Korea and independently only as long as they do not South Korea, Japan and the DPRK, China and affect each other. But they will amalgamate the DPRK, and so forth, reflecting different into larger bodies to cope with problems agendas and commitments. We may have that are beyond the scope of any single a trilateral institution addressing military institution. Depending on the type of confidence-building across the DMZ (the US, institutional linkage, we can expect both South Korea and North Korea). We may have a positive and negative effects on the operation quadrilateral institution among North Korea, of the respective institutions. I argue that South Korea, the US and China that deals with a stable regional security order could be the transition from the armistice regime to a established through institutional linkages peace regime. and coordination, even in conflict-ridden Northeast Asia. De facto multilateral Fourth, because of the need for a coordination could be possible by adequately comprehensive approach, an issue of critical linking a variety of institutions. importance is how to coordinate these different institutions, thereby strengthening Seventh, although most security-related an overall security structure. Put differently, issues in the region will be addressed by how one institution links with others and different groups of countries, we need some The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 69

comprehensive multilateral forum or umbrella generate a synergistic effect on regional framework where institutional relations can stability have been blocked by one or more of be coordinated to enhance an overall security the parties concerned. structure. An umbrella framework is quite So, the most serious problem is the lack important, given that resolving pressing of institutional linkage and coordination. security concerns such as the North Korean Institutional linkages have been prevented nuclear issue will take a long time (probably and/or limited and, as a result, no synergistic more than a decade) and various institutions effect has been generated. For example, the will have to be coordinated during this long 1992 North–South Basic Agreement has not transition period. Without institutional been well linked with other institutions, such coordination under a common umbrella as the South Korea–US, South Korea–China, institution, the final goal (a peaceful, South Korea–Japan, DPRK–US or DPRK–Japan prosperous and nuclear-free Korean Peninsula) bilateral institutions. Because of the lack will not be achieved. of institutional linkages and coordination, If we look back at the past from this one party could easily sabotage the perspective, we can find some quite implementation of an agreement. interesting developments. There are already a How can we assess the Six Party Talks variety of institutions on the Korean Peninsula underway to address the North Korean that address security issues. A serious concern nuclear crisis from the viewpoint of these for Northeast Asian regional security is not a arguments about institutional linkages? The lack of multilateral security institutions, but Six Party Talks provide an excellent laboratory a lack of coordination and linkages between when we discuss the possibility of creating a existing institutions. There already exist multilateral security framework in the region. many useful institutions covering Northeast In my view, the success of the talks depends to Asia—bilateral, subregional, regional and a large extent on whether we can successfully global ones—that could contribute to regional link and coordinate various institutions with peace and stability if they were interlinked each other, and then amalgamate them into and integrated in an appropriate way. For de facto multilateralism. This means that example, we have many institutions that link the Six Party Talks are not a venue where we South Korea and North Korea, such as the can address security issues directly, but they 1992 Basic Agreement and the Agreement are important in coordinating a variety of on Non Nuclearization. There is also the institutions that will be developed to address 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and different security-related issues among the DPRK, and a bilateral institution between different groups of countries.4 Japan and the DPRK underlined by the 2002 Pyongyang Declaration. The joint statement of the fourth round of the Six Party Talks, in September 2005, However, those institutions have not suggests how institutional relations are functioned well. They have been weak, and crucial. The talks were established to resolve have not bound the relevant parties strongly. the North Korean nuclear issue. However, the Even when agreements were concluded, joint statement clearly demonstrates that a serious difficulties in implementing them comprehensive approach is critical to resolve quickly arose. One reason is that the various the nuclear impasse; it refers not only to institutions operated independently and were North Korea’s pledge to dismantle its nuclear not linked with other institutions. Mutually weapons and existing nuclear programs, but coordinated institutional linkages that would 70 Proceedings

also to a variety of other issues, including institutions to address different issues, will security assurance, US–DPRK normalisation, be established. Japan–DPRK normalisation, energy and The third session of the fifth round of the food assistance, economic cooperation, Six Party Talks held in February 2007 agreed peace-regime building on the peninsula, to set up working groups to carry out the and so forth. The statement also refers the initial actions and full implementation of the 1992 North–South Basic Accord, the 2002 September 2005 joint statement. The various Japan–Pyongyang Declaration, multilateral working groups are requested to discuss security reassurance, the transformation and formulate specific action plans for the of the armistice regime to a peace regime, implementation of the joint statement. They provision of energy, economic cooperation, are also requested to report to the Six Party the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the Heads of Delegation Meeting on the progress International Atomic Energy Agency and so of their work. These arrangements indicate forth. Almost all security issues on the Korean that, based on the working groups, a variety Peninsula will have to be addressed to resolve of institutions with different membership the nuclear crisis. composition will be established under the It is almost certain that resolving the umbrella of the Six Party Talks. The talks will North Korean nuclear issue will be a long serve as an institution coordinating various process. As was seen in the 1994 US–DPRK other institutions, whether bilateral, trilateral Agreed Framework, it may take more than or quadrilateral ones. a decade to finally dismantle the DPRK’s Rather than directly addressing specific nuclear development program and establish a security issues, the Six Party Talks will be a permanent structure of peace, even if the six loosely organised multilateral umbrella forum countries agree on some formula to dismantle under which existing and newly established the nuclear programs soon. institutions are mutually coordinated. Under If the joint statement is implemented, that umbrella, decoupled institutions must be various institutions will be created in this amalgamated into an integrated institutional long process, and existing institutions will package, thereby enhancing the regional need to be revitalised. As I have mentioned, security structure. different issues will involve different specific Institutional linkages and coordination under commitments and obligations by the parties the Six Party Talks are quite important, given concerned; therefore, various types of that individual institutions in Northeast Asia institutional arrangements with different are generally weak and therefore vulnerable memberships will be created in the process. to changes in the policies and attitudes of For example, the Four Party Talks that were even one of the parties concerned. Therefore, aborted in the late 1990s may be revitalised institutions will need some supporting to tackle the transformation of the armistice mechanisms for the implementation of the regime to a peace regime. Other subregional, agreements. By linking institutions, we can trilateral or bilateral institutions focusing on strengthen the institutions and, therefore, the such issues as conventional arms reduction, implementation of the agreements. missiles, biochemical weapons, and bilateral relations (US–DPRK, South Korea–North Thus, I argue that there is a possibility for Korea, China–DPRK, Japan–DPRK, US–China, Northeast Asia to develop multilayered, Japan–China, etc.), as well as regional interlinked, institutional mechanisms The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 71

based on existing and newly established respective economic engagements of Japan institutions. Mutually reinforcing relations and Australia are different in this regard. between various institutions could be Australia’s economic relations with the rest of established through institutional linkages, Asia show a quite traditional trading pattern: even if individual institutions are still weak exporting mineral and other natural resources and limited in their scope. and importing manufactured goods. Japan’s Finally, mutually coordinated institutional economic relations with the rest of Asia relations (which we may call a ‘concert of are fundamentally different from those of powers’ system for security management) Australia. Japan is more and more closely will support regional peace and stability, even connected with the rest of Asia through if North Korea’s nuclear programs are not regional industrial production networks. totally dismantled. Indeed, North Korea will Multinational companies have been continue to resist the total dismantling of its expanding their production networks nuclear development programs and weapons. across national boundaries. Japan-based Our concern over North Korea’s nuclear threat multinationals have played crucial roles might not disappear forever. in establishing regional production Even so, we can effectively contain the networks. East Asia has grown into a giant, threat through institutional coordination East Asia-wide, factory with economies based on some form of a concert of powers interlinked through extensive, region-wide in Northeast Asia. In addition, the possible production and distribution networks run by institutional coordinating mechanisms multinational companies. We do not see this centred on the Six Party Talks will also serve phenomenon in other regions of the world. not just as a regional collective constraint East Asian production networks led by on North Korea’s nuclear ambition, but multilateral companies have given rise to also as a regional instrument to respond to a ‘triangular’ trade pattern: Japan and NIEs such ‘emergencies’ as Korean unification, (newly industrialised economies) export a collapse of the North Korean regime, capital goods and sophisticated intermediate domestic disturbances in China, an so on. goods (parts and components) to the The coordinating mechanism based on the less‑developed countries (some ASEAN Six Party Talks would serve as a regional countries and China), which process them for mechanism to smooth power transition and export to North America and Europe. adjustment. Thus, the significance of the Six Party Talks far goes beyond resolving the China’s position reflects this triangular trade North Korea’s nuclear crisis.5 relationship. China’s surplus vis-à-vis the US is offset by its huge trade deficit with other 3 Economic relations and Asian economies. So we can say that the their security implications: the massive US trade deficit is held against East emergence of regional production Asia as a whole. networks connecting Japan with China’s export of high-technology products the rest of Asia has expanded in recent years. This growth When we talk about a new security is also attributable to China’s integration architecture (based on the alliances) in into the East Asia-wide regional production Northeast Asia, we must understand and distribution networks formed through current economic relations in the region. The extensive foreign direct investment by foreign 72 Proceedings

(not Chinese) firms. In the meantime, China’s the past decades. China gives Japan plenty of contribution in terms of added value has been economic opportunities. limited to its function in the assembly sector, Second, Japan is not competing with China. which is heavily dependent on the supply of The real economic competition is taking place abundant cheap labor. not between state and state, but between The recent increase of exports from private firms operating globally. Southeast Asia to China could be explained Third, Chinese firms are not competitors for by the expansion of cross-border production Japanese firms in the foreseeable future. networks led by multinational companies. Real competition is taking place between The most rapidly increasing items of trade Japanese firms across national boundaries. from Southeast Asia to China are not SONY–Japan’s rival is not Chinese firms finished goods or agricultural products, but but SONY–China. Toyota–Japan will soon components and parts to be assembled by be competing with Toyota–China in a foreign multinational companies in China global market. for export. Fourth, these aggressive ventures by These days, goods marked ‘Made in China’ multinational companies have been changing are mostly made elsewhere by multinational domestic politics. The political influence of companies, and the label should read companies that are aggressively pursuing a ‘Assembled in China.’6 Multinational region-wide production strategy is growing. companies are using China as the final Look at the case of Japan. The presidents of assembly site in their cross-border production the Japan Economic Federation, the most networks. Japan-based multinational powerful business association, used to be companies are largely ‘invisible’ behind the mostly CEOs of the big companies heavily ‘Chinese’ factories producing a large amount protected by the government, such as big of tradable goods. And about 60% of China’s banks. But this has changed. The previous exports are controlled by foreign companies. president was the CEO of TOYOTA and the This means that multinational companies current one is from CANON—both global are now playing the key roles in producing, companies aggressively pursuing regional and supplying and assembling various parts global strategies. for the final products in the region. We are obtaining income through these networks. Fifth, Japan’s prosperity is more and more dependent on the success of multinational Japan’s economic relations with the rest of companies. Japan-based multinational Asia, including its relations with China, must companies are getting the bulk of their be understood in this broader picture, which profits from their overseas business in East gives us a new understanding of East Asian Asia, including China. Actually, Japan’s profits economic relations and their implications for from overseas investment are now roughly security in Asia. equal to Japan’s annual trade surplus. Japan is First, Japan views China as an opportunity, getting huge amounts of profit from overseas and a challenge. However, the argument that investments today. The country is becoming Japan is concerned about China’s economic more and more dependent on overseas development (that Japan fears losing its world business for its economic welfare. no. 2 position to China) is fundamentally Sixth, with the coming of an ageing society, flawed, and ignores the fundamental changes Japan must generate profit overseas by in the economic structures in East Asia over effectively using the huge assets it has The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 73

accumulated over past decades. Japan regional institutions that touch upon desperately needs good overseas markets domestic affairs to address pressing political, for investment to sustain its prosperity. security, economic, and social issues. China’s growth provides Japan with excellent Strengthening domestic governance opportunities for investment and contributing institutions and harmonising domestic to the upgrading of Japanese economic institutions among East Asian countries structures. It is good for Japan to hear that are critical. More binding measures for hundreds of millions of excellent Chinese military confidence-building are also critically people are ready to work for Japan‑based important. For this, East Asia needs some firms and sustain Japan’s prosperity. There degree of ‘likemindedness’ among the states are no reasons why Japan should be worried on social organisations and internal values. about it. Japan’s primary goal is to make East Asia a Seventh, what Japan is concerned about more integrated economic area. As we have is domestic instability and economic seen, Japanese firms have already established disturbance in China, which might be caused two region-wide production and distribution by internal contradictions and the lack of networks in East Asia since the middle of Chinese economic governance. Japan should the 1980s (one with Southeast Asia and the be concerned that the Chinese leadership other with China). The pressing task of Japan may face serious criticisms that it has been is to connect the two networks more closely, ‘selling’ China to foreign multinationals, once thereby constructing ‘seamless’ networks of economic growth slows down.7 production and distribution that will greatly Eighth, all these factors affect our security enhance the international competitiveness of calculations. It is becoming more difficult for Japanese firms in a global market.9 Using this countries to resort to military force, although advantageous position, Japan could become a we need to prepare for such emergencies 21st century economic phoenix. (see Peter Brook’s excellent book on the In this regard, contrary to the general view, security implications of the emerging regional the government and business community production networks). We can reasonably of Japan welcome the venture by China and expect the tensions and conflicts to be ASEAN to conclude a free trade agreement contained within a manageable scope if (FTA) between them, because Japanese we have a clear understanding of this new firms will be the largest beneficiary such an economic reality.8 agreement. What Japan is concerned about is that China and ASEAN might fail to conclude 4 East Asian Community building a deeper FTA, with a substantial opening Normative premises of regional of their respective economies and their cooperation institutional and regulatory harmonisation. Indeed, the current FTA between China The futures of Japan and Australia are closely and ASEAN is too shallow to tackle deeper connected with that of East Asia. Therefore, integration issues. East Asian Community building is important The issue of which countries should be for both countries. invited to the first East Asia Summit was However, the current level of functional hotly debated for many years. Of critical cooperation is not enough. East Asia today importance is not just ‘Who are stakeholders needs much stronger and more intrusive in East Asia?’, but the fundamental norms and 74 Proceedings

principles of organising international relations On the other hand, we have an American in the region. China’s reluctance to invite way that emphasises ‘internal’ aspects and Australia, India and New Zealand to the first harmonisation. Democracy, freedom, human East Asia Summit demonstrates that China’s rights and good governance are the key norms and principles are not necessarily in principles that should underline international harmony with those of others in the region. relations in the region. The harmonisation of There are thus several distinct approaches on domestic institutions underlined by liberal how to organise the international relations of norms is vital in this regard. Australia’s the region (see Figure 1 and Table 1). position is close to that of the US.

On the one hand, we have a Chinese way. The In between, we have an ASEAN way and a ‘New Security Concept’ and the concept of hybrid type of Japanese way. Japan has been ‘Peaceful Development’ were recently added moving toward accepting an American way to the decades-old Five Principles of Peaceful more positively. Strengthening domestic Co-existence. Although these concepts governance institutions and harmonisation emphasise various new forms of inter-state of domestic institutions among East Asian relations (such as mutual trust, mutual countries are critical. benefit, dialogue and consultation, confidence What Japan and Australia must be most building, cooperation, and so forth), they are concerned about is that international basically the Westphalia type of norms of relations in East Asia are organised under international relations. mixed principles and norms from China’s way Chinese norms and principles mostly relate and an old-fashioned ASEAN way, mostly to ‘external’ dimensions that could be dealing with only the external dimension of applied only in inter-state relations. As for state to-state relations and taking internal ‘internal’ matters, China sticks firmly to the matters out of the regional agenda. traditional concepts of national sovereignty In this regard, it is critically important for and non-intervention. China is selling the ASEAN countries to successfully develop new so called ‘Beijing Consensus’ instead of a norms and principles for cooperation in the ‘Washington Consensus.’ ASEAN Charter, overcoming old-fashioned

Figure 1: Organising norms/principles of international relations

ARF

APEC

ASEAN+3 EAS(?) New China ASEAN ASEAN Japan Australia US

Note: Left hand side: ‘External’ norm oriented, Right hand side: ‘Internal’ norm oriented The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 75

Table 1: External and internal norms/principles ‘External’ norms and principles ‘Internal’ norms and principles Sovereignty Democracy, human rights Non‑intervention in internal affairs Harmonisation of domestic institutions Different nation-building processes Good governance State security Human security Border measures (tariffs, etc.) Democratisation of internal political system Democratisation of international affairs

ASEAN premises of cooperation. Japan and unipolar world. In a sense, we have both Australia should encourage ASEAN’s shift of been seeking to jointly manage US power in normative premises of cooperation. East Asia.

Enhancing trans-Pacific linkages and Other Asian nations are more ambivalent. responding to a US unipolar world On the one hand, they understand that the continued engagement of the US in North America, including both the US and Asia is essential; on the other, they are Canada, will continue to play the critical role concerned about US intervention in the for peace and prosperity in East Asia. We must name of protecting human rights, promoting make the best efforts to reconcile East Asian democracy and good governance, and institutions with Asia–Pacific institutions. fighting against terrorism. US global power creates a lot of local resistance; it is not Despite East Asia’s recent economic growth, automatically transformed into US influence the basic economic relationship between and prestige in Asia. East Asia and North America has not changed for decades. Economically, the US market Japan and Australia should be aware of these is still critical for Asia’s growth, and Asia is sensitivities. Neither we, nor the US, should quite vulnerable to policy changes by the US. take it for granted that ASEAN countries and Asia needs a broader regional framework for South Korea fully support the US–Japan and economic coordination between Asia and US–Australia alliances. North America. Responding to changes in the East Asian Militarily, the US forward military strategic landscape, Japan has been presence—underlined by a web of alliance enhancing its alliance relations with the US. networks—continues to provide a basic The alliance is critically important, and will foundation of regional peace and stability, continue to provide a basic foundation of containing military tensions and rivalries. regional peace and stability. Therefore, it is critically important for Asia to But Japan and Australia must go beyond these develop trans-Pacific institutions, in tandem alliances. We have many issues that must with East Asian ones. be addressed multilaterally. Our countries In this regard, Japan and Australia must be should not try to run away to the comfortable more sensitive to the ambivalence among shelter of the US alliance. We must face Asians toward the US. Both our countries and respond to the challenges, even if that need to handle relations with the US carefully. demands a painful rethinking of our own past Overall, we are both comfortable in a US‑led and future roles in East Asia. Especially, as I 76 Proceedings

pointed out, there is a promising potential international system. According to Pyle, ‘Abe’s for Northeast Asia to develop a multilateral election is an unmistakable indication of framework for security management based Japan’s maturing response to the far reaching upon the ongoing Six Party Talks processes changes in its post Cold War environment.’11 that would greatly contribute to developing Australia has been welcoming and has stable relations among the major powers in encouraged Japan to take a more proactive Northeast Asia. Japan and Australia should policy line in regional and international not miss this golden opportunity. security for many years. However, at the same time, it is against Australia’s interests 5 Conclusion: Japan–Australia if proactive Japanese security policies bilateral relationships cause negative reactions among Japan’s Australia’s strategic stake in Northeast neighbours. It is in the best interests of Asia has increased with closer economic Australia that Japan’s as yet undefined global relations with the region’s economies. and regional security roles are welcomed and Japan will occupy a much larger part of well accepted in the region. The worst-case Australia’s strategic thinking on Asia in the scenario for Australia would arise if Japan’s decades to come because Japan’s future expanded security role, together with its foreign and defense policy direction will more assertive foreign policy, causes serious increasingly affect Australia’s political and trouble with its Asian neighbours. economic interests. How Japan develops its Thus, it is crucial for Australia that Japan’s relationships with the rest of Asia—especially expanded new security roles (which Australia with China—will be crucial to Australia’s strongly supports, especially under the former strategic and economic interests. Howard government) are developed with Contrary to popular belief, the 1990s was not regional blessings. For that to happen, it the ‘lost decade’ for Japan. Japan adapted would be highly desirable for Australia to have itself to changing internal and external channels available to make Australia’s voice environments during the 1990s, although the heard in Japan’s decision-making processes. process was painful and difficult. Japanese Through those channels, Australia could help governmental and political institutions have Japan expand its security roles, with blessings become more transparent and accountable, from the other countries in the region. and therefore resilient. Japanese private It seems to me that this consideration pushed companies have become more competitive, the Australian Government to propose and taking more aggressive business practices conclude the March 2007 joint security abroad. A new generation of political leaders declaration with Japan. The declaration clearly is more willing to assert Japan’s interests demonstrates that Japan’s future direction in international affairs. Japan is changing has been occupying more of Australia’s and rising.10 strategic thinking. Contrary to general Kenneth Pyle of the University of Washington, perceptions on the security declaration, a distinguished scholar of modern Japanese which most people understood and assessed political history, argues that ‘Japan is making in the context of alliance coordination to a revolutionary change of course.’ For more deal with the rise of China, I have a strong than 150 years of its modern history, Japan feeling that the ‘Japan factor’ drove Australia’s has adapted both its foreign policy and its proposal to conclude the declaration, not domestic institutions to fit changes in the The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 77

the ‘China factor’ (although the China factor 3 Tsutomu Kikuchi, ‘Institutional linkages was involved). and security governance: security multilateralism in the Korean Peninsula’ On the other hand, Japan has ‘discovered’ (a chapter of a forthcoming book to Australia as one of its most important be published by the United Nations partners in dealing with great University, Tokyo). transformations in East Asia. Japan appreciates Australia’s strategic thoughts 4 On institutional interplay, see Vinod K and insights in its foreign and security Aggarwal (ed.), Institutional Designs for a policy considerations. Complex World, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998; Oran Young, Governance in Japan and Australia share basic policy World Affairs, Cornell University Press, orientations to the changing regional Ithaca, 1999. environments in the Asia–Pacific region. However, the new Labor government under 5 This may take a form of a loose ‘concert of Kevin Rudd’s leadership may pose policy powers’ among the major powers. challenges for Japan in its relations with 6 David Barboza, ‘Some assembly needed: Australia, which were firmly established China as Asian factory,’ New York Times, under John Howard. Intensive strategic 9 February 2006. dialogue and consultation should be further enhanced, given the tremendous implications 7 Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign for both countries of decisions about how to Direct Investment during the Reform Era, respond to the great transformations of Asian Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, international relations. 2003.

The challenges to Japan–Australia cooperation 8 On the security implications of are so huge that both countries need to cross‑border production networks, see address them carefully and creatively. Stephen G Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, Endnotes and the Changing Calculus of Conflict, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1 Tsutomu Kikuchi, ‘Toward multilateral 2005. initiatives: can Japan and Australia cope with an emerging Asia Pacific?,’ in Peter 9 See a series of the annual reports by the King and Yoichi Kibata (eds), Peace Building Japanese Ministry of Economics, Trade and in the Asia Pacific Region, Allen & Unwin, Industry (METI). NSW, 1996, pp. 1–15. 10 Kenneth B Pyle, Japan Rising: The 2 Tsutomu Kikuchi, ‘Beyond “Strategic Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, Studies”: strategic relations in East Asia,’ Public Affairs, New York, 2007. paper presented at the Plenary 3, The 11 Kenneth B Pyle, ‘Abe Shinzo and Japan’s Global Strategic Balance and Competition change of course,’ NBR Analysis (National among the Major Powers in East Asia: Bureau of Asian Research), vol. 17, no. 4, Implications and Responses, The 21st October 2006, pp. 5–31. Asia–Pacific Round Table, June 5–7, 2007, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 78 Proceedings

The Japan–Australia strategic that trade between the two countries would relationship; an Australian face no greater tariffs, tax barriers or other perspective hindrances than imposed on any third party, and that quotas or other restrictions on Dr Mark Thomson imports would not differ from those imposed Australian Strategic Policy Institute on all third parties.

On the 6th of July 1957 in Hakone Japan the Compared with the aspirations of today’s Prime Minister of Japan Nobusuke Kishi and free trade advocates, it was a modest Australia’s Trade Minister ‘Black Jack’ McEwen agreement. It even included a clause allowing signed the Agreement of Commerce between either nation to ‘take such measures as Australia and Japan. Designed to improve and are necessary to safeguard its external develop commercial relations between the financial position and balance of payments’. two countries, the Agreement heralded what Nonetheless, it unleashed trade between was to be a mutually beneficial economic Australia and Japan which has grown partnership between Australia and Japan; substantially over the years. In 1957, for a partnership that has now endured for more example, Australia exported only $67,000 of than half a century and remains as vibrant coal to Japan1. Today annual exports of coal and strong as it has ever been. from Australia to Japan stand in excess of $9 billion2. Over the same period, relations between Japan and Australia have grown in other The volume of trade between the two ways with culture, tourism and education countries is impressive. According to data now firmly established as important parts prepared by Australia’s Department of Foreign of the bilateral relationship. While such Affairs and Trade; developments may have been foreseen by • Japan was the number one destination for those present at the signing of the Agreement Australian merchandise exports in 2006 back in 1957, it is unlikely that they anticipated with a value of A$32.6 billion representing Japan and Australia drawing together to 19.4% of the total cooperate in the security domain as has • Japan was the number three source of occurred over the past several years. merchandise imports to Australia in 2006 This paper reviews the development of with a value of A$17.4 billion representing relations between Australia and Japan 14.3% of the total. and examines prospects for the future. It From the Japanese side, these merchandise begins by looking broadly at the impact of exports and imports put Australia at number the 1957 Agreement on Commerce before twelve in the ranking of Japanese export narrowing its focus to explore in detail the destinations (1.9%) and number five in terms recent developments on the security and of import sources (4.8%). strategic fronts. The importance of Japan as an export ‘Being desirous of improving and destination for Australia is not a recent developing commercial relations…’ development. In fact, it took only ten years after the signing of the 1957 Agreement for In essence, the 1957 Agreement conferred Japan to become Australia’s number one most-favoured-nation status to each of the export destination, a position it has held for parties. Put simply, Australia and Japan agreed four decades. The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 79

The success of trade between Australia But such matters are now largely the concern and Japan is built upon the complementary of historians. So much so that in the past structure of the two country’s economies. several years Australia and Japan have Australia has resources that Japan needs, and begun to broaden their relationship beyond Japan is an efficient manufacturer of goods shared economic benefit to embrace—albeit that Australia desires. In addition, Australia is tentatively—shared strategic interests. an attractive destination for Japanese tourists and students. Around 700,000 Japanese ‘Affirming that the strategic people visit Australia each year. Interest in partnership between Australia and each other’s cultures is also strong with Japan…’ more than 300,000 Australian students Many have been surprised at the pace studying Japanese in secondary schools and Australia and Japan have moved to deepen tertiary institutions. their defence and security relationship over With so much vested in the relationship, the past couple of years. it is not surprising that the last forty years In June 2007 the two nations held inaugural have seen a growing political relationship two-plus-two defence and foreign minister between the two nations. In 1957, the then talks in Tokyo4. This meeting followed the Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies signing of a Joint Declaration on Security visited Japan—the first Australian leader Cooperation5 in March that committed to do so. Subsequently, Australian Prime both sides to work together ‘to respond Ministers visited Japan four times in the 1970s, to new security challenges and threats’. five times in the 1980s, six times in the 1990s Both initiatives complement the inaugural and five times already this decade. Australia–Japan–United States strategic It is worth remembering that the depth and trilateral dialogue6 that brought the three breadth of bilateral relations between Japan nation’s foreign ministers together to discuss and Australia owes a lot to the foresight and security in March 2006. continued efforts of governments on both Perceptions in Australia of what is behind the sides. The 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship and newfound strategic partnership between Co-operation between Japan and Australia Australia and Japan vary.7 was an important step in cementing the gains from the 1957 treaty3. It remains the only On one side are those who see recent events bilateral umbrella treaty to which Australia is in entirely positive terms. Japan is finally a party to. shaking off the strictures of an outdated post-WWII constitution to play a role befitting What makes the 1957 Agreement, and even the world’s second largest economy. In this the 1976 Treaty, so impressive is that they ‘coming of age’ tale, deepening security were achieved against a background of less cooperation with Australia and the United than complete amity between Australia and States will help Japan emerge as an effective Japan. The 1957 Agreement was signed only security actor for the good of all. To the extent five years after the San Francisco peace treaty that this version of the story has villains, they was concluded. At that time, WWII still cast a are the villains of the so-called non-traditional heavy shadow over Australian perceptions of security agenda; violent non-state actors, Japan. Conversely, Australia carried the burden transnational criminals, pandemic causing of a racist immigration policy (only effectively microbes, weak states in need of rebuilding revoked in 1973) that hardly endeared it to its and rogue states in need of restraint. Asian neighbours, Japan included. 80 Proceedings

Others see a less promising narrative Although the Australia–Japan Joint developing. The long-established power Declaration on Security Cooperation is a balance in East Asia is being torn by the rise much more substantive document than of China causing roles and relationships to the anodyne trilateral communiqué, it still be redefined. In this version of the story, the accords closely with an upbeat perspective new found closeness between Australia and of the emerging security relationship. At its Japan, and the United States in turn, represent heart is a list of nine areas for cooperation; the first steps in counter-balancing the rise eight focused directly on non-traditional of China as a great power. Take care, we are security issues and one for the exchange of told in this version of the story, or our actions information. There is absolutely no reference might create a China more in line with our to balance-of-power geopolitics, let alone fears than our hopes. anything that could be construed as a suggestion of collective defence. The joint So where does the truth lie? declaration is most definitely not a mutual The more upbeat of the two assessments can defence treaty or pact. certainly lay claim to reflecting the official Nonetheless, the joint declaration does line of the three countries. For example, the establish a program of strengthened defence joint communiqué following the March 2006 and security cooperation through exchanges Australia–Japan–United States Trilateral of personnel, coordinated activities and joint Strategic Dialogue reads like a checklist of exercises. Importantly, however, the latter uncontroversial security concerns centred two initiatives are cast in the context of mainly, but not exclusively, on the Asia Pacific. non-traditional security concerns, specifically; Topics canvassed included North Korean humanitarian relief, law enforcement, peace and Iranian proliferation, counter‑terrorism operations and regional capacity building. cooperation, democratic reform in Burma, The joint declaration was followed by an the stability of Pacific Island states and Action Plan in September 20078 that provided preparing to deal with the consequences of more detail without expanding the scope of major pandemics. planned cooperation. The only mention of China was a single The joint statement9 following the sentence that ‘welcomed China’s constructive two‑plus‑two talks in June 2007 was bland engagement in the region and concurred in the extreme, once again canvassing a on the value of enhanced cooperation with range of non-traditional security problems other parties…’ The only hint to changing while avoiding any mention of China. The power balances was a tangential reference only point of vaguely strategic import was a to ‘the importance of reinforcing our global diplomatic statement of concern regarding partnership with India’ (in which the reader is North Korean proliferation. left to speculate on the meaning of the term ‘global partnership with India’). And the only Thus, on the basis of what has been said concrete actions agreed to were to enhance officially, and in terms of actual cooperation the ‘exchange of information and strategic in Iraq and elsewhere, the emerging trilateral assessments’ and, naturally, to hold another Australia–Japan–United States and bilateral dialogue. In the final analysis, the Trilateral Australia–Japan security relationships are Strategic Dialogue saw the three nations explicitly directed at security concerns other agree to agree on things that they had already than the changing power balance in East Asia. agreed upon. The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 81

So where does this leave the interpretation minds, any move by the US to consolidate its of recent events centred on counterbalancing alliances in the Asia Pacific inevitably, even if China’s rise? Certainly, none of the three inadvertently, factors into that balance. countries have ever suggested that their Second, and even more important, the closer security relationship has anything to recent bilateral and trilateral initiatives used do with China, if anything they have argued language that put China on the opposing the contrary. Explicitly so in the case of side of an ideological rift. The preamble to Australia, whose then Prime Minister John the Australia–Japan joint declaration refers Howard said that the trilateral dialogue (and to ‘democratic values, a commitment to by implication the bilateral Australia–Japan human rights, freedom and the rule of law’ strategic relationship) ‘is not directed against and the trilateral communiqué mentions China or the people of China’10. Nonetheless, ‘supporting the emergence of democracies’. there are two strong reasons to give credence By themselves, these statements are to a perspective that puts China at the centre nothing more than diplomatic recitals of of recent developments. long established positions. But, once again, First, the mere fact the United States and context is everything. two of its Asia–Pacific allies are drawing The ideological rhetoric needs to be seen in together on security issues is important in light of the US position, reaffirmed as recently and of itself. In this regard, context is critical. as 2006, calling for ‘political liberalization’ in While the US–China relationship has warmed China13—the inevitable conclusion of which considerably in the years following 9/11, would be an end to the communist regime. tensions remain between the two countries. Couple this with the proposal from the United In part, this reflects memories of the three States14 to create a partnership of democracies recent Sino–American crises; the 2001 EP-3 including Australia, India, Japan and the aircraft downing incident, the 1996 Taiwan United States—centred geographically Strait crisis and the 1999 US bombing of the around, but necessarily excluding, China—and Chinese embassy in Belgrade. a different picture emerges: Despite the While these events are now in the past, the recent warming of relations between China fact remains that both the United States and and the United States/Japan, an ideological China are strategically wary of each other—to rift remains that, among other things, defines the extent that they both appear to be a sphere of security cooperation centred on developing military capability with each other the United States to the exclusion of China. in mind. The United States does so explicitly Similarly, though somewhat less pointedly, through its stated policy of maintaining under foreign minister Aso, Japan embarked decisive military superiority in order to on a program of ‘values based diplomacy’ ‘influence countries at the strategic cross with an emphasis ‘on ‘universal values’ such roads’ of which China stands preeminent in as freedom, democracy, human rights, the US thinking.11 For its part, China is developing rule of law and the market economy’ which a range of advanced weapons, including sought to ‘[f]urther strengthen ties with the anti-satellite capabilities, presumably with US, Australia, India and the member states the aim of having freedom of action (against of the EU and NATO among others’ and US counters) across its air and maritime create an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ that approaches particularly around Taiwan12. With formed a ‘prosperous and stable region based the military balance between China and the on universal values around the outer rim of United States at the forefront of both nation’s the Eurasian continent’15. 82 Proceedings

At least one neoconservative commentator16 democracies and non-democracies be in the United States has gone so far as to reconciled with one based on equality? propose establishing a League of Democratic Apparently not—from China’s perspective States ‘to bestow legitimacy on actions at least—if India is added to create a that liberal nations deem necessary but quadrilateral grouping. According to media autocratic nations [specifically China and reports that were subsequently confirmed Russia] refuse to countenance’ and specifically by official Australian sources20, China sent mentions ‘Japan, Australia and India’ as a demarche (a ‘please explain’ diplomatic potential members. note) to Canberra, New Delhi, Tokyo and To the surprise of some domestic Washington on the eve of senior officials commentators, Australia’s normally pragmatic from those capitals meeting to discuss Prime Minister at the time, John Howard, security on the sidelines of the May 2007 was quick to accept this ideologically based ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila.21 conception of strategic affairs. His response Subsequently, both New Delhi and Canberra when challenged on China’s possible reaction downplayed any suggestion of a four-way to the development of a closer bilateral security partnership22, notwithstanding joint security relationship between Australia maritime exercises involving the four nations and Japan was informative. On two such and Singapore in September 200723. occasions he argued, not unreasonably, that So where does this leave us? Which of there was no conflict in Australia having the two disparate interpretations of the constructive relations with both nations, growing security partnerships between before then pointing out that Australia’s Australia, Japan and the United States is relationship with Japan fell into a qualitatively correct? To some extent, it depends on different category because both nations are the preconceptions that one brings to the democracies.17 On other occasions he has question. Those who see the world changed stressed the ideological basis of the trilateral irrevocably by the events of 9/11 tend to place relationship between the United States, greater emphasis on the gains from engaging Japan and Australia18 going so far as to a responsible and prosperous nation like Japan call it ‘a natural coming together of three to assist with the new non-traditional security Pacific democracies’. agenda. Those who see the emergence of China’s response to the Australia–Japan– China through the bitter lessons of European United States trilateral has been diplomatic. history fear a repeat of the nonsensical When asked for China’s perspective on the situation that saw the world go to war in 1914. trilateral strategic dialogue, President Hu The Howard government was confident that said that China ‘believed that countries in it could reap the benefits promised by the this region should increase their dialogue former perspective while avoiding the risks and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust, inherent in the latter. Others are not so sure. mutual benefit, equality and cooperation Australia’s new Prime Minister Kevin Rudd to attain common security and common has, so far, adopted a decidedly more cautious development’19. The notion of ‘mutual trust, approach. While committing to continue mutual benefit, equality and cooperation’ security cooperation with Japan across the has for several years now been the basis for effectively full gamut of areas set out in the what China calls its ‘new security concept’. 2006 joint declaration, he’s taken a firm line The question is; can a model of security against a formal defence pact with Japan cooperation that differentiates between The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 83

arguing that it would ‘unnecessarily tie our engaging Japan on non-conventional security security interests to the vicissitudes of an matters must be conservatively balanced unknown security policy future in North East against the danger of provoking a potentially Asia’. In contrast, his predecessor John dire deterioration in international relations Howard said that the joint declaration might in East Asia. A key part of doing so is for eventually lead to a treaty24, a view consistent Australia, Japan and the United States to with that expressed by then Japanese remain constructively engaged with China. Foreign Minister Aso who left open the For Australia, the task has been made easier possibility of a future Australia–Japan–United by the recently announced Australia–China States alliance25. strategic dialogue.

In many ways, however, Australia has a It remains to be seen whether the Australia– different view of China to both the United China dialogue leads to security cooperation States and Japan. We have no arguments between Australia and China on par with over history or trade and, unlike the United that being developed between Australia and States, we do not lecture the Chinese regime Japan. Even more interesting would be an about how to be a ‘responsible stakeholder’. Australia–China joint declaration on security. In fact, following the 2007 two-plus-two talks The fact that the Australia–China dialogue in June 2007, the Australian Foreign Minister commenced at the ministerial level is Alexander Downer was at pains to explain significant. While bilateral security dialogues to the media that China’s growing military are not extraordinary—China and Japan budget was both reasonable and benign26. have held seven and China and the United Australia’s perspective of China is best States four—these have all been at the vice described as relaxed and comfortable. ministerial level. Whatever happens, at least On past experience, Australia’s largely the Australia–China strategic dialogue brings sanguine view of China will limit the a degree of symmetry to Australia’s relations potential of either the bilateral or trilateral with the powers of North Asia and softens initiatives to go beyond their present the perception that earlier Australia/Japan/US carefully circumscribed limits. Recent joint initiatives were directed at China. Australia–Japan diplomatic pronouncements reinforce this judgment. And even though Moving forward the Howard government took Australia Assuming that the foregoing argument one small step closer to a partnership of is correct, the new dimensions of the democracies on China’s periphery, this is will Australia–Japan relationship will be more not survive the new Rudd Labor government. focused on security issues than strategic If there was ever any doubt of this, Stephen affairs (in the sense of competition between Smith, the new Australian foreign minister, great powers). That still leaves ample room put the matter to bed during his inaugural for worthwhile cooperation given the two visit to Japan and China when he informed countries’ shared interests. both nations that Australia would no longer participate in four-way security talks with To begin with, Australia and Japan are Japan, India and the United States27. mercantile states which are highly dependent on the free flow of goods, materials This more cautious approach makes sense. and energy to and from our shores. As a From Australia’s perspective, prudence consequence, their prosperity is vulnerable to dictates that the potential benefits of even relatively small disruptions in the global 84 Proceedings

security landscape. Moreover, in recent years controls, transport security, law enforcement, both have experienced rapid growth in trade international finance and the development of with China; a phenomena that has every response capabilities for chemical, biological prospect of continuing into the future. and radiological incidents.

Then there is the fact that both countries are Arguably the most tangible commitment that close allies of the United States. And while Australia and Japan have made in countering their respective alliances greatly enhance our terrorism was the dispatch of forces (albeit local security, both are subject to growing in quite different roles) to Afghanistan in the expectations from the US to support its aftermath of 9/11. Of course, it would be naïve broader security global agenda in places like to pretend that Australia and Japan’s efforts Afghanistan and Iraq. Recent cooperation in Afghanistan were not at least equally between the Australian Defence Force and motivated by a desire to nurture the US the Japanese Self Defense Force in Iraq shows alliance for its own sake. the potential for synergies from bringing The rise of Islamist terrorism has, in turn, together complementary capabilities. given new urgency to containing the spread Finally, both countries have open democratic of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). political systems and free market economies. Accordingly, both Australia and Japan are Thus, while their two cultures reflect distinctly members of the ‘core group’ of fifteen different Eastern and Western heritages, countries participating in the Proliferation they nevertheless share a range of important Security Initiative (PSI). underlying values. Specifically, they agree on While the PSI and other ongoing the fundamental relationship between the non‑proliferation initiatives are important, individual and the state, and on the best way it is the diplomatic efforts underway to curb to build prosperity at home and abroad. North Korea’s nuclear ambitions that will Taken together, these three factors give be critical in the immediate future. Here, Australia and Japan a good deal of common the opportunity for Australia and Japan to ground, and indeed common cause, to cooperate has been limited. Although there work together. It’s not surprising then is much at stake in North Korea, the reality that cooperation is already underway in is that Australia is but a concerned observer several areas. while Japan is a direct party to the Six Party talks. Of all the security issues that have arisen in recent years, none has attracted as much On the question of Iranian proliferation, attention as that of Islamist terrorism. Both Australia and Japan are so distant as to be Australia and Japan lost citizens in the 9/11 irrelevant in the first instance. That said; attacks of 2001 and the Bali bombing of 2002, following the 2003 attempt to ‘disarm’ making terrorism an important issue for both Iraq, Japan and Australia ended up working our countries. It’s understandable then, that together to rebuild infrastructure in they have been cooperating on a number that country. of levels to combat international terrorism. Despite the relatively circumscribed level of This was formalised in the Statement and cooperation between Australia and Japan on Action Plan issued jointly by the Australian counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, and Japanese Prime Ministers in July 2003 a worthwhile contribution to the overall and reinforced in the Joint Declaration of international effort has resulted in both areas. 2007. Cooperation embraces immigration The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 85

The same is equally true for cooperation Even if a manageably small and properly between Australia and Japan in other focused ‘security architecture’ emerges, it non‑conventional security areas. No doubt will be at best a means to an end. What’s this will continue as opportunities arise and ultimately needed is a combination of implicit new challenges emerge. norms and explicit rules by which regional countries—and especially China, Japan, Finally, although future cooperation between United States—delineate power, resolve Australia and Japan will likely avoid trying to disputes and accommodate each other’s influence the actual or perceived balance of interests. Although a forum for discussion power in East Asia, it is still perhaps possible is almost certainly necessary, it will not for the two countries to enhance strategic be sufficient. stability in that region. Specifically, Japan and Australia could work towards creating a Australia has a strong stake in seeing a forum security architecture for East Asia based on emerge with the necessary accompanying cooperation rather than confrontation. rules and norms. The country’s three key trading partners (Japan, China and the United It has become cliché to say that the stability States) are the principle strategic players in of East Asia depends on finding a way to East Asia, and the United States is its closest simultaneously accommodate the rise ally. Australia’s security and prosperity of China as a great power, manage the depends critically on the strategic stability of normalisation of Japan as a strategic entity East Asia. The same, of course, is even more and keep the United States engaged as a acutely true for Japan. stabilising factor in the region. Usually it is assumed, implicitly or otherwise, that this Of itself, the recently established security/ would be easer if there was a regional forum, strategic partnership between Australia and usually termed a security architecture, to Japan is but a minor development in the facilitate consultation and dispute resolution. broader landscape of East Asian security. None of the existing alphabet soup of Nonetheless, it presents the opportunity for regional forums is suitable for this purpose; both nations to work together on the truly most are two large to be practical and all are strategic task of helping establish an effective principally focused on non-security affairs. security architecture for East Asia. Arguably, the prospects for doing so are improved by The most credible proposal at present is to the distinctly different relationships they each evolve the six party talks into some sort of have with the key players—the United States standing entity to deal with questions of and China in particular. It may be that, as North Asian security. Such an entity would with commerce, Australia and Japan find that have the advantage of engaging China, Japan their complementary characteristics deliver and the United States on an equal basis. Of mutual benefit. course, the difficulty of institutionalising such a forum would be the exclusion of the myriad Endnotes of smaller nations in the broader region including those of Southeast Asia. But this 1 Phil Ingram, Australia-Japan Commerce might be unavoidable if a workable solution Agreement 1957 - 50th Anniversary, is sought; the problems of what is essentially Commentary, at http://www.australia. North Asian security are not going to be or.jp/english/seifu/50/20070627.html solved by convening a ‘general assembly’ of 2 Australian DFAT, Japan Fact Sheet, at the Asia Pacific. http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/jap.pdf 86 Proceedings

3 Gary Woodard, Moreen Dee and Max Greg Sheridan, Madness to miss political Suich, Negotiating the Australia-Japan investment, The Australian, March 14, 2007, Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation: at http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com. Reflections and Afterthoughts, ANU, au/gregsheridan/index.php/theaustralian/ Asia Pacific Economic Papers #362, comments/madness_to_miss_political_ 2007, at www.eaber.org/intranet/ investment documents/26/901/AJRC_Woodard_07.pdf Hugh White, Japan’s welcome to arms, The 4 Japan, Australia eye meeting in June, Diplomat, April/May 2007, at http://www. Sydney Morning Herald, 23 May 2007, the-diplomat.com/article.aspx?aeid=2687 at http://www.smh.com.au/news/ 8 Security cooperation with Japan, Media World/Japan-Australia-eye-meeting-in- Release, Prime Minister John Howard, June/2007/05/23/1179601489149.html 9 September 2007, at http://www. 5 Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on pm.gov.au/media/Release/2007/Media_ Security Cooperation, 13 March 2007, Release24545.cfm at http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/japan/ Major Elements of the Action Plan to aus_jap_security_dec.html implement the Japan-Australia Joint 6 Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United Declaration on Security Cooperation, States; Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,at 18 March 2006, at http://www. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/ foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2006/ australia/action0709.html joint_statement-aus-japan_usa_180306. 9 Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence html Ministerial Consultation – Joint Statement 7 Recent Australian commentary includes: 2007, at http://www.foreignminister.gov. Gerard Henderson, Friends in peace and au/releases/2007/fa064_07.html prosperity. The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 Joint statement and press conference by March 13, 2007 at http://www.smh.com. the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia, au/news/opinion/friends-in-peace-and- Sydney, 9 September 2007, at http://www. prosperity/2007/03/12/1173548110222.html pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/ Paul Kelly, Security accord flags new Interview24544.cfm Japan, The Australian, March 13, 2007, Joint Press Conference with the President at http://blogs.theaustralian.news.com. of the People’s Republic of China, His au/paulkelly/index.php/theaustralian/ Excellency Hu Jintao, 6 September comments/security_accord_flags_new_ 2007, at http://www.pm.gov.au/media/ japan Interview/2007/Interview24538.cfm Rod Lyon, Evolving secuiry structures will 11 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 2006, displace US hegemony. The Australian, Office of the Secretary of Defense, at March 22, 2007, at http://theaustralian. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ news.com.au/story/0,20867,21423631- library/policy/dod/qdr-2006-report.pdf 7583,00.html 12 Military Power of the People Republic of Greg Sheridan, Howard can make history China, 2007, Office of the Secretary of with Indian alliance, The Australian, April Defense, Report to Congress, at http:// 19, 2007, at http://www.theaustralian. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/070523- news.com.au/story/0,20867,21580534- China-Military-Power-final.pdf 25377,00.html The 4th Australia and Japan 1.5 Track Security Dialogue 87

13 Reference 11 above and The National 20 Brendan Nicholson, Japan jittery Security Strategy for the United States over closer ties between Australia and of America, 2006, at http://www. China, The Age, 6 February 2008, at whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/ http://www.theage.com.au/news/ national/japan-jittery-over-our-ties-with- 14 Dennis Shanohan, Pacific allies to enlist china/2008/02/05/1202090421830.html India, The Australian, March 15 2007, at http://www.theaustralian.news.com. 21 Brahma Chellaney, ‘Quad Initiative’: an au/story/0,20867,21384779-601,00.html inharmonious concert of democracies’, The Japan Times, 19 July 2007, at http://search. 15 Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizon japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20070719bc. – New Pillar for Japan’s Foreign Policy, at html http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/ horizons.pdf Siddharth Varadarajan, ‘China demarches to 4 nations’, The Hindu, 14 June 2006, at 16 Robert Kagan, The Illusion of Managing http://www.thehindu.com/2007/06/14/ China, Washington Post, 15 May 2005, stories/2007061404451200.htm at http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/13/ 22 Stephen McDonell, Nelson reassures AR2005051301405.html China over regional defence pact, ABC Online, at http://www.abc.net.au/news/ Robert Kagan, League of Dictators?, stories/2007/07/09/1973982.htm Washington Post, 30 April 2006, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 23 Navies join forces for Exercise MALABAR, wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/28/ RAN website, at http://www.navy.gov. AR2006042801987.html au/news/navies-join-forces-for-exercise- malabar Robert Kagan, The world divides... and democracy is at bay, Timesonline, 24 John Howard, Doorstop interview Imperial 2 September 2007, at http://www. Hotel, Tokyo, 11 March 2007, at http:// timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/ www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/ columnists/guest_contributors/ Interview24195.cfm article2367065.ece 25 Ministers Aso, Downer, Kyuma and Nelson 17 John Howard, Press Conference, Sydney, – 2 + 2 Joint Ministerial Doorstop, 6 June 9 March 2007, at http://www.pm.gov. 2007, at http://www.foreignminister.gov. au/media/Interview/2007/Interview24193. au/transcripts/2007/ cfm and John Howard, Doorstop 070607_min_doorstop.html Interview, Sydney, 11 March 2007, http:// 26 Alexander Downer, Media www.pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/ Conference, Tokyo, 6 June 2007, at Interview24194.cfm. http://www.foreignminister.gov. 18 Reference 10 above. au/transcripts/2007/070608_media_ conference.html 19 Joint Press Conference with Prime Minister John Howard and President Hu Jintao, 27 Reference 20 above. Sydney, 6 September 2007, at http://www. pm.gov.au/media/Interview/2007/ Interview24538.cfm 88 Proceedings

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