Organising for Peace Operations: Lessons Learned from Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands
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Commissioned by C O R P O R A T I O N Organising for Peace Operations Lessons Learned from Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands John Gordon IV, Jason H. Campbell For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1556-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9495-7 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2016 Commonwealth of Australia R® is a registered trademark. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Australian Civil-Military Centre or any government agency. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise for any statement made in this publication. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute Preface This report is for the Australian Civil-Military Centre (ACMC) in Canberra. ACMC’s mission is to support the development of national civil-military capabilities to prevent, prepare for, and respond more effectively to conflicts and disasters outside Australia. ACMC spon- sors research of past Australian interventions in order to determine and record important lessons that could be of value to future operations. Because of ACMC’s whole-of-government perspective, the results of this research are valuable to a wide variety of agencies. As part of this report, the RAND Corporation examined the governmental organisa- tional structures that were used in three Australian-led interventions that commenced in the late 1990s and early 2000 in the Southwest Pacific regions: Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands. Interagency efforts requiring participation of many parts of the Aus- tralian Government characterised each of these operations. Impor- tantly, each of these operations was unique, and different organisa- tional approaches were used to manage the participation of various agencies. Numerous lessons were learned as branches of the Austra- lian Government gained experience over time about how to interact with one another and manage complex operations such as these. The June 2015 project proposal tendered by the Australian Government is titled “Australian-led Responses to Conflict Intervention: Organisa- tional Structures for Effective Whole-of-Government Co-ordination and Decision-Making.” This research responds to Australian Govern- ment contract Activity Ref Number BP15CONC35. The research for this report relied heavily on in-person interviews held by the authors in August 20–21 and 24–28, 2015. Although these iii iv Organising for Peace Ops: Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands discussions were not for attribution, a number of current and former senior Australian officials agreed to have their names listed among the participants (see Acknowledgements). While this is not an exhaus- tive catalogue of interviewees, in the interest of protecting partici- pants’ identities the specific dates of interviews are not provided in the citations. This research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defence and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defence, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and founda- tions and other non-governmental organisations that support defence and national security analysis. For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on web page). Questions and comments regarding this research are welcome and should be directed to John Gordon (+ 1 (703) 413-1100, ext. 5269, email [email protected]) or Jason Campbell (+1 (703) 413-1100, ext. 5355, email [email protected]). Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgements ...........................................................xxvii Abbreviations .................................................................. xxxi CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Research Design .................................................................... 1 Background ......................................................................... 3 Key Organisations in Australian Whole-of-Government Operations ....... 6 National Security Committee of Cabinet ..................................... 7 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade .................................... 9 Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force ...............11 Australian Federal Police .......................................................14 Australian Agency for International Development .........................15 CHAPTER TWO Bougainville ......................................................................19 Planning and Preparation ........................................................21 Devising a Truly Unique Deployment .......................................21 Pre-deployment Preparation for Personnel .................................. 23 Implementation: A Limited Mandate, but with Gaps to Fill ............... 24 Avoiding Culture Shock and Sustaining Effectiveness .................... 24 General Personnel Issues ...................................................... 26 Interagency Planning and Execution ........................................ 27 v vi Organising for Peace Ops: Bougainville, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands Intelligence Support ............................................................31 Issues Related to the End of the Mission .....................................32 Conclusion and Lessons ..........................................................33 CHAPTER THREE East Timor/Timor-Leste ........................................................37 Planning for Australia’s Most-Significant Deployment Since Vietnam ....39 Storm Clouds on the Horizon: Shaping the Bureaucracy Prior to INTERFET ............................................................... 40 Looming Crisis: Preparing for Peace Enforcement .........................41 Facing Hard Realities and Enduring the Paradigm Shift ................... 46 Australian Defence Force and the Challenge of Implementing INTERFET ................................................................47 Interagency Coordination Turns the Corner ............................... 48 Australian Federal Police Evolves into a Deployable Force ............... 50 Fixing Intelligence ..............................................................51 The Importance of Clear Messaging and Guidance ..........................52 Return of the ADF in 2006......................................................55 Conclusion and Lessons ..........................................................58 CHAPTER FOUR Solomon Islands ..................................................................63 Planning and Preparation for RAMSI ..........................................67 Engaging in a Whole-of-Government Planning Process ...................67 Pre-deployment Training and Preparation ...................................70 A New Twist on Interagency Leadership: The Role of the Special Coordinator ....................................71 Making It Work on the Ground: The Implementation of RAMSI .........73 Addressing and Overcoming Cultural Issues ................................76 Enabling Multifaceted Coordination: Agencies and Allies ................78 Progress? Reporting and Assessment During RAMSI .....................79 Election Riots and the Return of the ADF in 2006 ....................... 80 Unclear and Confounding Issues ...............................................81 Risk of Unforeseen Contingencies: Honiara Prison .......................83 Conclusion .........................................................................83 Contents vii CHAPTER FIVE Conclusions and Recommendations .........................................89 Overarching Whole-of-Government Insights ................................ 90 The NSC Provided a Structure for Whole-Of-Government Coordination .............................................................. 90 Relatively Small Size of the Australian Government Allowed Important Personal Relationships to Be Built (Key to Both Interagency and Whole-of-Government Coordination) ................................. 90 Interagency Processes Were Developed and Evolved over Time ..........91 Agency Cultures and Processes Were Quite Different, but Understanding Improved over Time ................................93 Challenges That Could Impact Future Operations .......................... 96 Unrealistic Expectations About the Duration and Lasting Impact of Interventions .................................................. 96 Intelligence, Reporting, and Information-Passing Procedures of Agencies Varied ..........................................