Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube
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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) Russell W. Glenn Prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract DASW01-01-C-0004. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this document. ISBN: 978-0-8330-4027-5 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover design by Stephen Bloodsworth. Photo courtesy of the Government of Australia, Department of Defence, Operation Anode photo gallery. Used with permission. © Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface On July 24, 2003, a joint, multinational, interagency force landed in the Solomon Islands at the request of that nation’s prime minis- ter. Its intent was to “reinforce and uphold the legitimate institutions and authorities in the Solomon Islands, and to ensure respect for the country’s constitution and implementation of its laws.”1 The call for help came after years of turmoil during which the legitimacy and effec- tiveness of the Solomon Islands government had been undermined by social strife, corruption, intimidation, and armed groups acting with no regard for the law. Within weeks, the worst of the problems had been suppressed and national rebuilding began. This analysis consid- ers why the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) succeeded in its first weeks, months, and years, and what lessons of value its operations might offer to counterinsurgency (COIN) and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. The document will be of interest to individuals in or supporting the government sector whose responsibilities include planning, policy, doctrine, training, or execution of insurgency, counterinsurgency, or other stability operations. It will similarly be of value to students, ana- lysts, or others with a general interest in such undertakings and in the Solomon Islands mission in particular. This research was sponsored by the Joint Urban Operations Office, J9, Joint Forces Command, and conducted within the Inter- national Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National 1 Bryant (2005a, p. 9). iii iv Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and develop- ment center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intel- ligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the Director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at [email protected]; by phone at 703-413- 1100, extension 5134; or by mail at RAND, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More information about RAND is available at www.rand.org. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Summary .......................................................................... xi Acknowledgments .............................................................. xxi Abbreviations .................................................................. xxiii CHAPTER ONE Background and Brief History of Operation Helpem Fren, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)......... 1 Previous Operations ............................................................... 2 Bougainville ...................................................................... 2 East Timor........................................................................ 6 RAMSI: A Concise History.....................................................11 The Backdrop to RAMSI ........................................................12 RAMSI: Deployment and Execution.......................................... 22 RAMSI as a Counterinsurgency Operation .................................. 40 CHAPTER TWO Considering the Nature of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency....... 43 The Nature of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency .......................... 43 CHAPTER THREE July 2003 Solomon Islands as an Insurgency: Participant Perspectives .................................................................53 v vi Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube A Solomon Islands Insurgency? No............................................ 54 A Solomon Islands Insurgency? Yes............................................ 54 A Solomon Islands Insurgency? Perhaps .......................................55 A Solomon Islands Insurgency from the Perspective of RAMSI Participants? Concluding Thoughts........................................57 CHAPTER FOUR Successful COIN: Three Crucial Conditions...............................59 Orchestrating Interagency Capabilities: The “All of Government” Approach ..................................................................... 60 Law Enforcement Support to RAMSI ...................................... 68 Nga Hoe Tuputupu-mai-tawhiti (The Paddles That Bring Growth from Afar): Aid Organizations and RAMSI............................71 Intelligence in Support of COIN and Other Stability Operations .......76 Command and Control During the Early Months of RAMSI .......... 77 Civil-Military Coordination of Aid Efforts .................................79 Concluding Thoughts Regarding Interagency Challenges.................81 Avoiding Future Interagency Shortfalls ..................................... 94 Building and Maintaining the Multinational Team..........................95 Forming and Seizing the Moral High Ground: Shaping Indigenous Perspectives ................................................................. 104 CHAPTER FIVE RAMSI: Was It a Counterinsurgency?..................................... 115 CHAPTER SIX Fitting the RAMSI Square Peg into the World’s Round Holes ....... 121 Vital Elements: Building on the Foundation of Successful Interagency, Multinational, and Shaping Operations ................. 125 Intelligence..................................................................... 125 Leadership ..................................................................... 126 Control ......................................................................... 129 Focus on the People........................................................... 132 Implications for Current and Future Operations ........................... 134 Interagency Operation Considerations ..................................... 134 Contents vii Multinational Operation Considerations .................................. 136 Leadership Considerations................................................... 137 Final