Operation Relex
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13 Chapter 2 Operation Relex ‘The safety of ADF personnel and the wellbeing of the unauthorised boat arrivals and the Indonesian crew members is to be held paramount’. That is an extant direction that overrides everything. We are talking about people coming to Australia illegally. It is not World War III.1 ‘Was this a new style of operation for the Navy?’ the answer is yes. We had not done this style of operation before.2 Introduction 2.1 With the Government’s adoption of a more assertive posture towards preventing both asylum seekers and people smugglers from entering Australian waters, came a new role for the Australian Defence Force. 2.2 Since 1988, the ADF has supported the activities of Coastwatch and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs in ‘national surveillance’.3 This work, according to Maritime Commander, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Smith, has been carried out under the auspices of Operation Cranberry and, in relation to matters such as illegal fishing and other Customs support, continues still.4 2.3 Since 3 September 2001, however, in the area of unauthorised boat arrivals the ADF has become the ‘lead’ rather than a supporting agency. It has designated its corresponding operation, Operation Relex.5 2.4 This chapter provides an outline of Operation Relex: its aim, operational arrangements, and an overview of its interception activities from the arrival of Suspected Illegal Entry Vessel (SIEV) 1 on 7 September 2001 to the arrival of the last illegal entry vessel, SIEV 12, on 16 December 2001. Aim 2.5 Operation Relex’s strategic aim was an extension of the Government’s new border protection policy: to prevent, in the first instance, the incursion of unauthorised 1 Rear Admiral Chris Ritchie, Transcript of Evidence, CMI 405. 2 Vice Admiral David Shackleton, Transcript of Evidence, CMI 60. 3 Additional Information, Department of Defence, Talking points for Senate Legislation Committee Additional Estimates Hearing, February 2002. 4 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 472. 5 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 472. 14 vessels into Australian waters such that, ultimately, people smugglers and asylum seekers would be deterred from attempting to use Australia as a destination.6 2.6 Rear Admiral Chris Ritchie, Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), described the nature and scope of Operation Relex as follows: The mission statement, for example, was to conduct surveillance and response operations in order to deter unauthorised boat arrivals from entering Australian territorial waters within the designated area of operations. The area of operations was quite expansive – it encompassed Christmas Island at the one end and Ashmore at the other.7 2.7 As an operation aimed at preventing unauthorised vessels from crossing into Australia’s so-called ‘contiguous zone’, Relex was fundamentally a forward deterrence strategy. This marked a shift in border protection strategy and the nature of previous operations, away from the more reactive posture associated with Operation Cranberry that sought to detect and intercept unauthorised boats inside Australian waters and escort them to Australian ports.8 2.8 The ‘primary mission’ of deterrence was constrained, in operational terms, by the overriding obligation to ensure the safety of all persons that became involved in Royal Australian Navy (RAN) encounters with SIEVs. Both Rear Admirals Ritchie and Smith emphasised this aspect of Relex operations to the Committee. Rear Admiral Smith indicated that ensuring the personal safety of all involved was inherent in his operational orders: My orders and instructions stressed the overarching requirement for commanding officers of RAN ships to take every reasonable means to achieve the mission without needlessly risking the safety and wellbeing of their ships’ companies, their vessels and the lives of the unauthorised arrivals on board the SIEVs.9 2.9 Similarly, Rear Admiral Ritchie cited a relevant part of the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) directive to him on Operation Relex: In the notion of returning the vessels to Indonesia or the place whence they came, the uppermost issue was always: The safety of ADF personnel and the wellbeing of the unauthorised boat arrivals and Indonesian crew members is to be held paramount. 6 Additional Information, Department of Defence, Talking points for Senate Legislation Committee Additional Estimates Hearing, February 2002. 7 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 404. 8 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 448 and 490. 9 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 448 and 460. 15 That is an extant direction that overrides everything. 10 2.10 As an ‘extant direction’, the directive to ensure safety of life at sea is contained in the Maritime Commander’s Orders that cover all RAN commanding officers.11 These orders reflect relevant provisions in both international agreements and Australian law. Two international covenants – the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention – impose obligations on ‘mariners to assist other mariners in distress’.12 The Commonwealth Navigation Act 1912 contains the provisions of both these international agreements. 2.11 The Committee is satisfied that, in fact, the Royal Australian Navy’s commitment to meeting the humanitarian needs of those on board the intercepted vessels went well beyond the fulfilment of safety of life at sea obligations. Rear Admiral Smith advised the Committee that: Standard practice throughout the operation was to provide a safe, clean and secure environment, sufficient food, water, personal items, bedding and shelter and, where possible, alleviate the cramped and overcrowded conditions that prevailed. Deployed medical and dental staff provided a range of ongoing health services during Operation Relex, including emergency assessments, treatment, health screening and clinics during the boarding, containment and transportation operations. For example, during transportation of unauthorised arrivals on board Manoora and Tobruk the ships’ companies went to great lengths, despite the difficult and trying circumstances, to provide fresh clothing and laundering services, toiletries, toys, videos and games, and to prepare halal meals and national dishes. Saltwater showers were rigged along with squatting stands in toilets to accommodate cultural differences. Whenever the ship’s program allowed, exercise periods on the upper decks were scheduled.13 2.12 Where necessary, the RAN was also equipped to supply things such as nappies, babies’ bottles and formula.14 2.13 In addition to its provision of material assistance, the Committee learnt that the RAN was clearly committed to ensuring that the attitude of its personnel towards the unauthorised arrivals was professional and humane. Testifying to the attitude of 10 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 404-5. The Chair of the PST, Ms Halton, also emphasised the primacy given to safety of life at sea when operational matters were being considered, such as whether SIEVs could be safely towed back to international waters. See Transcript of Evidence, CMI 945. 11 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 470. 12 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 470. See also Answers to Questions on Notice, Department of Defence, Question 8. 13 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 449. 14 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 167. 16 his crew during the rescue of passengers from the sinking SIEV 4, for example, Commander Norman Banks said that: I was particularly proud of … the ship’s company when this situation developed into a humanitarian assistance task - of how they performed a miracle and they went about their business in a very humane and compassionate way and everyone chipped in and lent a helping hand, beyond their specialisation and their training and their category, and just got on with the job. It was some time later, when it had all stablised, that we noted that nobody had whinged about the fact that they had not had a meal - this is the ship’s company - that they had not had a break. They had just got on with it.15 2.14 The Committee was both impressed and heartened by the seriousness with which the officers and sailors of the Royal Australian Navy treated the humanitarian and personal needs of those they encountered on the vessels entering Australia illegally, under what were, for all concerned, very difficult circumstances. Establishment and Operational Arrangements 2.15 As noted earlier, Relex formed the operational component or ‘working end’ of the new whole-of-government response to the issue of unauthorised boat arrivals post- Tampa. As such, the basis for Relex lay in the raft of legislative and policy changes and measures that the Government enacted in late August and September 2001. 2.16 The shape of the operation itself was developed within the Australian Defence Force, following a ‘CDF warning order’ dated 28 August 2001.16 Thus the original military order to start planning Relex arose immediately around the time of the Tampa crisis which started on 26 August. 2.17 The warning order directed the ADF to ‘provide a maritime patrol and response option to detect, intercept and warn vessels carrying unauthorised arrivals for the purpose of deterring SIEVs from entering Australian territorial waters’.17 2.18 The CDF’s order went to Rear Admiral Ritchie, who as Commander Australian Theatre had responsibility for the ‘planning and conduct’ of all ADF operations. Under Rear Admiral Ritchie’s command, Australian Theatre Headquarters developed the ‘broad concept’ for the operation – ‘the way in which we would do this particular business’18 – and the Naval Component Commander, Rear Admiral Smith, started the detailed planning for the operation in ‘late August/early September’.19 15 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 166. 16 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 451. 17 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 451. 18 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 403. 19 Transcript of Evidence, CMI 451. 17 2.19 Since Relex involved mainly naval forces, Rear Admiral Smith (who was also Maritime Commander) was assigned direct command of the operation. 2.20 The development of the operational concept and strategy also required a new set of rules of engagement (ROE) to be tailored to fit the requirements of the enhanced border protection policy and anticipated behaviour of those on the SIEVs.