UGAMUNC XXI Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution

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UGAMUNC XXI Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution Dear Delegates, 1 UGAMUNC XXI Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution Dear Delegates, Welcome to the 2015 University of Georgia Model United Nations Conference. My name is Bobby Wetherington ([email protected]), and I will be your Chair for the Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution specialized committee. I am a sophomore from Hahira, Georgia, and this is my first year on UGA’s Model United Nations team. This year we have decided to do something a little different and offer a highly specialized committee following similarly to the Model United Nations crisis simulation format. It should be a lot of fun to see all of you debate and discussion on how to deal with the circumstances of the Libyan Revolution. I’m sure all of you will enjoy this unique role-playing experience! Before proceeding, I would like to introduce myself. I am currently an honors student double majoring in Arabic and International Relations. Also I am currently pursuing my Masters in International Policy through the honor college’s dual graduate/undergraduate program. Besides Model UN, I am involved in the Thomas Lay Foundation where University students tutor underprivileged inner city children. In my free time I like to read, cheer on the Dawgs, experience the great city of Athens, and practice my Arabic. It is my pleasure to have Thomas Gottilla as my Co-Chair for this committee. He is a first-year student at UGA, majoring in Applied Biotechnology. This is his first year on the team, but he has participated in Model UN throughout high school. Outside of Model UN, he is also involved in Minorities in Agriculture, Natural Resources and Related Sciences, the Demosthenian Literary Society, the Thomas Lay After-School program, and undergraduate mycology research. As you begin your research, I hope that you will find this background guide useful as a starting point. However, it is important to realize that this guide is only a starting point. I strongly encourage you to do your own research in order to better understand the causes of the Libyan Revolution and what you and your faction want the state of Libya to look like in the future. We encourage all delegates to write a position paper for the conference and email it to me at least a week before the conference begins. This way once we are at the conference Thomas and I can pay attention to the debate instead of reviewing your position papers. Keep in mind that in order to receive an award at UGAMUNC it is required that you submit a position paper. Please feel free to email me if you have any questions. I am very excited for this year’s committee, and I look forward to meeting you all in February. Best of luck and GO DAWGS! Sincerely, Bobby B. Wetherington Chair, Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution 2 UGAMUNC XXI Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution Structure of the Committee It is February 27, 2011, in the North African state of Libya. Over the past month dissent against the established regime has come to a head and thousands of Libyans from all walks of life are in the streets calling for an end to Muammar Gaddafi’s forty-two year rule. In order to coordinate protestors and provide a unified face for what some Libyans are calling a revolution, the National Transition Council has been established. However, members of the Gaddafi regime have also joined the committee. Some say they have done this out of a sincere desire to convince the dissenters to once again support Gaddafi, while others insist they have joined in order to spy on the other delegates and wait for the right time to strike. Each of you will play a member of the National Transition Council. The Arab Spring: Libya committee will function as a committee in the Unite Nations in so far as rules and format are concerned. However, there will be no formalized list of topics or voting procedure. Instead “news updates” will be periodically released and I expect debate to flow organically around what is happening in Libya at the moment. Working papers will need to be approved by the chair and then will be voted on immediately upon approval. Working papers will be able to pass with a simple majority. Everything that has happened in Libya and the world before February 27, 2011, pertaining to the Arab Spring and Libya should be researched. It is important to mention though that this committee will not follow historical events after February 27. Therefore please do not spend time memorizing events that occurred after this point in history. You should certainly be familiar with what actually happened but do not tailor your strategy to that end. The following background guide should aid you in beginning your research into the history of Libya and your characters’ positions. Finally throughout the multiple sessions of our committee, time will progress forward from February 27 through the rest of 2011 and 2012 as new information and ideas arise. You should arrive on day one ready to present your views on the current situation and try to convince other Libyans to cooperate with you and those who have similar views to yourself. You will notice that there are multiple “factions” in the committee. While there are similarities between faction members, this in no way means you must act as a “bloc”. Each independent delegate should choose what they believe is the best course of action for themselves and for Libya. I look forward to your extensive debates and am personally excited to see how this will turn out! 3 UGAMUNC XXI Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution Arab Spring: Tunisia In December of 2010, the Arab Spring began in Tunisia as a result of high unemployment, food inflation, poor living conditions, corruption, and a lack of freedom of speech. Tunisian dissidents believed President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s government was responsible for the problems they were facing in Tunisia. He and his party had held power for decades.1 Protest began with the self-immolation of a vegetable merchant, Mohammed Bouazizi. He was a sole provider of a family of eight, earning the equivalent of seven US dollars a day. On December 17, 2010, Bouazizi’s produce was confiscated, and when he went to the local magistrate to register a complaint, the government refused to hear him. After being forced to leave the magistrate, he returned to the building several hours later and lit himself aflame. 2 Immediately upon Mr. Bouazizi’s death, protests against the regime began. Protestors were outraged at the treatment of Bouazizi and used his death as a rallying cry for change. On December 30, Ben Ali security personnel responded violently to protests, resulting in the deaths of several protestors. Government endorsed violence only outraged Tunisians more, and protests grew in number and spread throughout the country by January. It was demonstrated that revolutionary fervor had spread to the educated elite when 95% of Tunisia’s 8000 lawyers went on strike. On January 11, 2011, President Ben Ali fled Tunisia for Saudi Arabia, thus vacating his office.3 After Ben Ali’s departure Prime Minister Ghannouchi announced the formation of a transitional national unity government. However, protestors were not satisfied and continued daily protests, demanding that the government be purged of officials from Ben Ali’s Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party. In response, Ghannouchi announced that he would resign after ensuring free and fair elections in six months time. He also reshuffled the cabinet, leaving only two other officials, other than himself, who were close to Ben Ali. By this point in time, Tunisia’s army chief and large numbers of security personnel had joined and endorsed the revolution. 4 As of this month of February, Ghannouchi is still in office.5 However all of the twenty- four regional governors have been replaced, and the RCD’s activities have been suspended. 6 The Libyan Kingdom and First Revolution In 1949, the UN called for the establishment of an independent Libyan state by 1952. In order to accomplish their goal, an international council included Libyans from all three regions (Cyrenaican, Fezzan, and Tripolotanian) in order to aid in setting up a government. The more liberal and urban Tripolitianians wanted a republic, but the Cyrenaicans feared domination by the more populous Tripolitanians. They wanted a monarchy led by the most prominent family of 1"Tunisian Revolution." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation, 20 Nov. 2014. Web. 21 Nov. 2014. 2 ibid 3 ibid 4 ibid 5 "Tunisia Profile." BBC News. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Nov. 2014. 6 The Middle East edited by Ellen Lust, Tunisia Profile Jeferey A. Coupe and Hamadi Redissi 789-828 4 UGAMUNC XXI Arab Spring: Libyan Revolution their region, the Sansuni. Ultimately, the council decided to implement a federal system, where each region had significant autonomy but were unified by a monarch. The chosen monarch was Idris Sansuni, the revolutionary hero from the east. Not all Libyans were pleased with the new constitution and government, especially concerning the Sansuni monarch.7 Their fears were justified when in 1963 King Idris abandoned the federalist system and centered all political power around himself. This political move lost Idris a lot of support but the main source of dissatisfaction came from income inequality. After World War II, a lot of Libya’s oil was bought by western powers, exulting in a considerable flow of capitol into Libya. However, the King and his allies were the only ones to reap the benefits of the new cash flow, as rural and less strategically important regions of Libya were left undeveloped.
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