Making Sense of Libya

POPULAR PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (V): MAKING SENSE OF LIBYA Middle East/North Africa Report N°107 – 6 June 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION: THE UPRISING .............................................................................. 1 II. THE NATURE OF QADDAFI’S REGIME ................................................................... 6 A. THE EARLY YEARS ...................................................................................................................... 6 B. THE JAMAHIRIYA AND THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY ........................................................................... 7 C. THE FORMAL POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................ 8 D. INFORMAL POWER NETWORKS................................................................................................... 10 1. The Men of the Tent .................................................................................................................. 10 2. The Revolutionary Committees Movement ............................................................................... 10 3. Tribes and “Social People’s Leaderships” ................................................................................. 11 E. QADDAFI’S FAMILY ................................................................................................................... 12 F. THE ROLE OF PATRONAGE ......................................................................................................... 14 III. A REFORMED CHARACTER? LIBYA’S REHABILITATION AND THE REGIME’S NEW DISCOURSE .................................................................................... 15 IV. THE ISSUE OF THE EAST ........................................................................................... 17 A. GEOGRAPHIC AND TRIBAL ISSUES .............................................................................................. 17 B. ISLAMISM................................................................................................................................... 17 C. STATE POLICY TOWARD THE EAST ............................................................................................. 18 V. OPPOSITION CURRENTS ........................................................................................... 19 A. THE MAIN OPPOSITION GROUPS ................................................................................................ 19 1. National Conference for the Libyan Opposition ........................................................................ 19 2. National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL)..................................................................... 19 3. Libyan Constitutional Union (LCU) .......................................................................................... 19 4. The Libyan League for Human Rights (LLHR) ........................................................................ 19 5. Islamist Opposition: The Libyan Islamic Group, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and other currents ............................................................................................................................. 19 B. MINORITIES: BERBERS, TEBU AND TUAREG ............................................................................... 21 VI. THE NEW REVOLUTIONARIES................................................................................ 24 A. THE INTERIM TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL .................................................................... 24 B. DEFECTORS ................................................................................................................................ 26 C. OTHER FORCES AND CURRENTS ................................................................................................. 27 VII. CONCLUSION: THE IMPERATIVE OF A CEASEFIRE AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS .................................................................................. 28 A. THE MILITARY DEADLOCK ........................................................................................................ 28 B. A CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS ............................................................................. 28 1. The ceasefire .............................................................................................................................. 28 2. Handling the Qaddafi issue ........................................................................................................ 29 3. The transition phase and interim administration ........................................................................ 30 APPENDICES A. MAP OF LIBYA ................................................................................................................................. 31 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 32 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2008 ... 33 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 35 Middle East/North Africa Report N°107 6 June 2011 POPULAR PROTEST IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST (V): MAKING SENSE OF LIBYA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The character of the Libyan crisis today arises from the logic of civil war from a very early stage. This owes a complex but so far evidently indecisive impact of the great deal to the country’s history and chiefly to the pecu- UN-authorised military intervention, now formally led by liar character of the political order Colonel Qaddafi and NATO, in what had already become a civil war. NATO’s his associates set up in the 1970s. Whereas Egypt and intervention saved the anti-Qaddafi side from immediate Tunisia had been well-established states before Presidents defeat but has not yet resolved the conflict in its favour. Mubarak and Ben Ali came to power in 1981 and 1987 Although the declared rationale of this intervention was respectively, such that in both cases the state had an exis- to protect civilians, civilians are figuring in large numbers tence independent of their personal rule and could survive as victims of the war, both as casualties and refugees, while their departure, the opposite has been true of Libya. As a the leading Western governments supporting NATO’s result, the conflict has taken on the character of a violent campaign make no secret of the fact that their goal is life-or-death struggle. regime change. The country is de facto being partitioned, as divisions between the predominantly opposition-held Eight years after overthrowing the monarchy in 1969, east and the predominantly regime-controlled west harden Qaddafi instituted the Jamahiriya (“state of the masses”) into distinct political, social and economic spheres. As a that is very much a personal creation largely dependent result, it is virtually impossible for the pro-democracy on his role. A constitutive principle of the Jamahiriya is current of urban public opinion in most of western Libya the axiom, proclaimed in Qaddafi’s Green Book, that “rep- (and Tripoli in particular) to express itself and weigh in resentation is fraud” and that no formal political represen- the political balance. tation is to be allowed. Whereas all other North African states have at least paid lip-service to the right to political At the same time, the prolonged military campaign and representation and have permitted political parties of a attendant instability present strategic threats to Libya’s kind, however unsatisfactory, in the Jamahiriya there has neighbours. Besides fuelling a large-scale refugee crisis, been none at all, and attempts to create parties have been they are raising the risk of infiltration by al-Qaeda in the considered treason. The consequence of this radical refusal Islamic Maghreb, whose networks of activists are present of the principle of representation has been to stunt the in Algeria, Mali and Niger. All this, together with mount- development of anything approaching effective, formal ing bitterness on both sides, will constitute a heavy legacy institutions or civil society. Notably, the articulation of for any post-Qaddafi government. diverse ideological outlooks and currents of political opinion, which other North African states have allowed to Thus the longer Libya’s military conflict persists, the more at least some degree, has been outlawed. it risks undermining the anti-Qaddafi camp’s avowed objectives. Yet, to date, the latter’s leadership and their A corollary of this low level of institutionalisation has been NATO supporters appear to be uninterested in resolving the regime’s reliance on tribal solidarities to secure its the conflict through negotiation. To insist, as they have power base. Strategic positions within the power structure done, on Qaddafi’s departure as a precondition for any – notably command of the security forces’ most trusted political initiative is to prolong the military conflict and units – have been held by members of Qaddafi’s own deepen the crisis. Instead, the priority should be to secure family, clan and tribe and of other closely allied tribes. At an immediate ceasefire and negotiations on a transition to the same time, and especially since the late 1980s, the a post-Qaddafi political order. regular armed forces have been kept weak, undermanned and under-equipped,

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