The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2019, 273－291

Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine

Huazhong Tu,* Prashant Kumar Singh,** Nan You *** and Bo Tu ****1234

Tsinghua University, Beijing and Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, Kunming, People’s Republic of ; Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New , Republic of ; Tsinghua University, Beijing, People’s Republic of China; Silla University, Busan, Republic of Korea

This study analyzes the debate on ’s nuclear weapons program among the Pakistani elites, who include scientists, strategists and politicians. The study examines the nuclear doctrine that emerges from this, as well as the likely ways in which it can impact peace and stability on the Indian subcontinent. It also underlines the possible influence of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine on the nuclear doctrine of other “unrecognized” emerging states such as North Korea. After its creation and independence in August 1947, Pakistan’s elites considered survival to be the primary national strategic objective of the country in the harsh international environment, especially with regards to India. This understanding shaped Pakistan’s security policy in the early years, post August 1947. The three wars Pakistan fought with India proved that the collective security policy and the anti-nuclear weapons advocacy by Pakistani defensive realists was not the best strategy in the prevailing security environment. In this backdrop, the Multan meeting in January 1972 initiated a fierce debate on whether a nuclear weapons program was the best strategy for ensuring national security. The participants included defensive realists, offensive realists, liberals and separatists. The offensive realists won the debate, shaped Pakistan’s nuclear policy, and initiated its nuclear weapons program. Separatists here refer to the sub-nationalist forces that seek political separation from Pakistan.

Keywords: Pakistani nuclear debate, defensive realism, offensive realism; liberalism; nuclear doctrine

* First Author. E-mail: [email protected] ** Corresponding Author. Email: [email protected] *** Corresponding Author. Email: [email protected] **** E-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online © 2019 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda 274 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu Introduction

At present, five countries—the , Russia, the , France, and China—which happen to be the first developers of nuclear weapons and incidentally the permanent members of the Security Council (UNSC)—are recognized as nuclear–weapon states (NWS) under the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). However, since the NPT came into force in 1970, the number of nuclear powers outside the official nuclear club has been continuously expanding, to include India (1974), Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006). Israel is also widely believed to be in possession of a nuclear weapon arsenal.1 These four however are yet to be recognized as NWS under the international nuclear regimes, particularly the NPT. This has given rise to legitimate concerns regarding their nuclear doctrines and whether they are more radical than those followed by the recognized NWS. This issue is extremely crucial for world peace. Among the unofficial NWS, Pakistan deserves special attention considering the geopolitical significance it has enjoyed since it came into being in 1947. Pakistan is a country with the sixth–largest standing army in the world, and a as well as a declared, albeit unrecognized, nuclear–weapons state, the second in South Asia and the only nation in the Muslim world to have that status. Therefore, an analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, which was quite vague and complex in the years following May 1998 when it conducted its first nuclear tests, has its own relevance. In terms of conventional military power, India has been stronger than Pakistan according to almost every metric of military power—the army, the navy and the air force. And the gap continues to grow, as claimed by a Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs report.2 Pakistan and India went to war in 1948, 1965, 1971 and fought an “undeclared war” in Kargil in 1999. Even though the two countries possess nuclear weapons, these weapons have not been able to negate or reduce the possibility of war, as the Kargil war proved. An intense armed conflict broke out between the two countries in 1999, unmindful of the fact that the two countries had declared their nuclear weapon status just a year ago in May 1998. Thus, contrary to expectations, one may, in fact, argue that their nuclear weapons have actually enhanced the possibility of war in South Asia, as they have acquired the confidence provided by nuclear weapons, which are their guarantee against any “existential insecurity” or nuclear blackmail. Thus, the takeaway from the 1999 Kargil war was that Pakistan saw its newly acquired nuclear weapons as a shield behind which it could fuel and stoke the conflict in Kashmir, safe from any possible Indian retaliation. However, the counter to this argument is that it was the nuclear signaling3 which hastened international intervention that prevented the situation from deteriorating further. Thus, there is a recurring fear that a conflict in South Asia has the potential to escalate into a nuclear war in a short span of time. This situation warrants an analysis of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine to understand exactly under what compulsions it would resort to exercising its nuclear option in a war with India. Pakistan’s nuclear program has been widely criticized for lacking transparency. Therefore it is necessary to review the trajectory of its development to arrive at an Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 275 understanding of its nuclear doctrine. According to some Western experts in and non-proliferation studies, military cooperation with China and North Korea have been prioritized in Pakistan’s foreign policy since 1965. This cooperation, in their opinion, has included Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear and missile development activities as well. In fact, A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, in 2004, confirmed the existence of a global proliferation network, which had, over almost two decades, passed on nuclear technology, expertise and designs to North Korea, Iran, Libya and possibly other countries. This reveals the inadequacy of the existing nuclear non- proliferation architecture for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.4 The clandestine missile and nuclear technology exchange between North Korea and Pakistan has long been a proliferation concern. This exchange also says something about Pakistan’s desperation for nuclear weapons, which is reflected in its ambiguous nuclear doctrine. Pakistan has yet to formally declare its nuclear doctrine. Pakistani officials maintain that ambiguity serves Pakistan’s interests better, as it denies information about Pakistan’s nuclear threshold to the enemy, who could use it to exploit the gaps in Pakistan’s nuclear strategy.5 The lack of a publicly declared official doctrine does not, however, suggest that no doctrine exists.6 This can be deduced from the debate among the Pakistani elites available in newspapers, journals and other media. In fact, a literature review of the nuclear debate remains the most effective way to understand Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine.

Pakistan’s Earliest Security Policy: Collective Security and Dialogue

The , at the end of British colonial rule in 1947, gave birth to the new state of Pakistan on the Indian subcontinent, which comprised British India’s Muslim majority provinces in the northwest and east of the country. Its creation as an independent state was the culmination of decades of intense political churn around the issues related to Muslim identity during colonial rule in India and concerns relating to their future in a free and democratic India.7 In Pakistan’s view, the creation of Pakistan followed the acceptance of the two nation theory, that Muslims and Hindus constituted two different nations, in view of their distinctly different religious outlooks and history.8 This theory has shaped a perception in Pakistan that India is the “other.” Political elements, such as military and religious fundamentalists, have exploited this sense of the “other” to designate India as Pakistan’s “arch-enemy.”9 However, since the comprehensive national strength of India at various levels has been far greater than that of Pakistan, its survival in the face of the threat from “Hindu India” was deemed a primary security and strategic concern by Pakistani elites. Although this concern may not be as acute now as it was in the earlier period, India has been the point of reference for shaping Pakistan’s threat perception all along. The first Indo–Pak war broke out in Muslim-majority Kashmir as early as 1947 itself. The Pakistani army suffered huge losses in the war. The secured two– thirds of the territory, while the Pakistan army could hold onto only one–third. It learned the lesson that it lacked the weapons and training to counter the Indian army in battle. 276 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu

Hence, ensuring the territorial survival and integrity of Pakistan, and the security policy it should adopt to guarantee its existence, became the paramount issue for the Pakistani elites of the time. In this scenario, the first school of thought, which grappled with the issue of the best possible strategy for Pakistan’s security, was that of the defensive realists.10 Defensive realists generally avoided aggressive security policies towards India. This approach shaped Pakistan’s early security policies to a great extent. Liaquat Ali Khan, the first prime minister, foreign minister and defense minister, represented this school of thought in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Considering Pakistan’s weaker comprehensive national strength compared to India, the defensive realists underlined the importance of a “collective security policy” as a diplomatic instrument to balance India. They acknowledged that other countries’— particularly the “big powers”—security guarantee was critical for Pakistan’s survival. It is noteworthy that U.S.–led Western countries were quick to appreciate the strategic importance of the geographical location of the newly created Pakistan. George Marshall, the U.S. secretary of state, wrote to President Truman on July 17, 1947: “Pakistan with a population of seventy million persons will be the largest Muslim country in the world and will occupy one of the most strategic areas in the world.”11 U.S. secretary of state, John Foster Dulles visited Pakistan from May 23 to 24 in 1953, and expressed U.S. desire to accelerate security cooperation with it. Pakistan decided to join the U.S.–led defense alliance during the Cold War, and signed the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) on September 8, 195412 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) on September 23, 1955.13 The two organizations were important defense alliances for containing the spread of communism in the world.14 After the Sino– Indian border conflict in 1962, Pakistan found another important external force, China, to counterbalance India. The years after the war saw the beginning of a friendship between China and Pakistan, which eventually has come to be known as an all-weather friendship. The border negotiations between Pakistan and China, which had been on hold for many years, were re-started in 1962. The two countries successfully concluded the Sino–Pakistan Border Agreement on March 3, 1963.15 The resolution of the border issue between them paved the way for close bilateral military cooperation, making China another important country, after the United States, which could give Pakistan a military security guarantee, vis-à-vis India. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Liaquat Ali Khan, the greatest representative of defensive realism, set the course for the country’s national security policy. Prioritizing peace and domestic development, he favored communication and dialogue with India, and signed a series of agreements relating to immigrants and national minorities.16 In keeping with this approach, the later foreign minister Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan announced in 1953 that, “Pakistan does not have a policy towards atom bombs” to reassure India and alleviate the mistrust between the two.17 Defensive realism shaped Pakistan’s nuclear debate and policies to a great extent.18 It underscored domestic development as the national priority. In line with this approach, Pakistan upheld the policy of “peaceful use” of nuclear energy. This approach supported Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 277

“communication and dialogue” with India and prevailed in Pakistan’s strategic security discourse. It also favored dialogue with India as it would enable Pakistan to understand India’s intentions and reduce the risk of military conflict between the two countries. The “collective security and dialogue” approach failed its first test during the second Indo–Pak War in 1965 when Pakistan did not receive any assistance from both SEATO and CENTO. The two organizations were unwilling to get involved in the conflict as their focus was on battling communism, not India.19 The same was repeated during the third Indo–Pakistan war in 1971 when Pakistan sought assistance from SEATO. The United States rejected its plea because it was not interested in getting involved in a war in South Asia.20 Likewise, China also stayed away from helping Pakistan militarily, for it was still in chaos after the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. Thus, while the Americans and Chinese just did not do enough to save their ally, the Arab and other Muslim nations too did not have enough religious fervor to come forward and stand by Islamic Pakistan against India.21 It seemed that the whole world had left Pakistan to fend for itself in the crucial hour of its existence. Thus, the “collective security policy,” which Pakistan had pursued for decades, could not ensure its allies’ compliance with the cause of collective security to defend Pakistan. The Pakistani military suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Indian armed forces in East Pakistan in 1971. India’s military action not only tore apart Pakistan’s elaborately built “collective security net” but also split Pakistan, creating the new country of Bangladesh, out of East Pakistan. “Communication and dialogue,” advocated by defensive realists, failed to fathom Indian intentions. The dismemberment of the country in the 1971 war put a question mark on Pakistan’s defensive realist security policies, including the “collective security policy.” Pakistan’s eventual exit from SEATO in 1973;22 and CENTO in 197923 marked the end of this policy.

The Nuclear Debate among Pakistani Elites

From the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1956 until the 1971 war with India, Pakistan did not have a definite nuclear weapons research and development policy. However, as Pakistan began to rethink its strategy for security and survival vis-à-vis India after its break-up in 1971, the Multan meeting in January 1972 kick started the debate on developing a nuclear weapon program to counter the Indian threat. Incidentally, it is believed that the decision to acquire nuclear weapons was made at the Multan Meeting, convened by Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto. The meeting was one of the two important meetings convened by Bhutto in 1972 to decide the issue. The other one was held in Quetta.24 Pakistan’s defensive realists, offensive realists, liberals and separatists have been debating this issue since then. Ishrat Hussain Usmani, chair of the PAEC (1960–72), who is regarded as one of the prominent defensive realists, strongly opposed the decision to acquire a nuclear deterrent to counter India.25 Muhammad Shoaib, the minister of finance, also opposed the nuclear weapons program, citing the economic cost of the project.26 Usmani’s passionate 278 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu opposition to nuclear weapons clashed with Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto’s views on the subject, though he admired Usmani’s intellectual caliber. Staunch defensive realists like Usmani and Shoaib believed that Pakistan should lay greater emphasis on “collective security” in the hope of becoming part of the NPT, in order to re-negotiate support for its security with the international community.27 Liberal voices were also opposed to the development of nuclear weapons. Former Air Marshal Malik Nur Khan and others believed that Pakistan lacked the economic heft to compete with India with regard to nuclear capability, which would certainly burden Pakistan economically.28 Samina Yasmeem summarized that the anti-nuclear liberals, most of whom advocated better relations with India, generally believed that Pakistan should give up its nuclear weapons research and development plans.29 The opposition of defensive realists and liberals, together with the enormous technological and other hurdles in the way of developing nuclear weapons, meant that the program made very slow progress. However, the offensive realists did not give up. They countered the “no-nuclear weapons” arguments of the Ishrat Hussain Usmani–led defensive realists equally passionately. The offensive realists including some nuclear physicists such as (Chairman, PAEC, 1972–91), Pervez Amirali Hoodbhoy and Fayyaz Uddin, said that there was no unbridgeable difficulty in the way of nuclear weapons research and development for Pakistan.30 They argued that without nuclear weapons, Pakistan would again be confronted with the survival issue in the face of another attack from India, so Pakistan must develop nuclear weapons. Shireen Mazari, a representative offensive realist, refuted the argument that the development of nuclear weapons would put economic pressure on the country. Incidentally, around a month before Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998, Mazari had argued that, “if Pakistan owns nuclear weapons, it can cut conventional military budget on the contrary and finally relieve economic pressure.”31 The defensive realists’ arguments lost their appeal after the 1971 war and ceased to find favor with Pakistani decision-makers, whereas the offensive realists advocating the development of nuclear weapons came to enjoy second-mover advantage. The debate between the defensive and offensive realists finally came to a head in 1972 after Bhutto dismissed Usmani from the Commission, marking32 the defeat of the defensive realists in the debate. The ascendancy of Munir Ahmad Khan, who was an ardent votary of developing a nuclear deterrent against India, as the chairman of PAEC, marked the beginning of the dominance of the offensive realists in the discourse on nuclear weapons in Pakistan.

India’s Nuclear Program as a Point of Reference

Concerns relating to the United States, the opposition of the international nuclear non- proliferation regimes and the fear of a pre-emptive strike by India to deter Pakistan from pursuing its nuclear weapons ambitions, did not allow Pakistan to pursue its nuclear weapon program aggressively in the beginning. Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, who initiated Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons, President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, Prime Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 279

Minister Benazir Bhutto and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, all pursued the nuclear program prudently in a low-key manner. However, as the 1971 war had prompted Pakistan’s search for nuclear weapons, India’s announcement on May 18, 1974, that it had tested a “peaceful nuclear device”, yet again sent shock waves throughout Pakistan and catalyzed Pakistan’s desire to acquire nuclear deterrence to counter India. Since 1947, Pakistani elites had sought parity with India in conventional military terms, only to learn, over the course of three wars, that they could not defeat their larger neighbor by conventional military might.33 Now India had achieved nuclear superiority too. In this backdrop, the advocacy for developing nuclear weapons in Pakistan grew stronger; however, its nuclear weapon research and development would take some more time to take off. The establishment of the Kahuta Research Laboratories in 1974 by Dr. A.Q. Khan, a Netherlands–trained Pakistani nuclear physicist, was the turning point in Pakistan’s nuclear weapon ambitions. Pakistan’s search for international cooperation for its nuclear program also intensified. U.S. intelligence obtained evidence that Pakistan was clandestinely purchasing sensitive technology to develop nuclear weapons. There were indications that the Chinese had provided Pakistan assistance in the form of designs for the key components for an atom bomb.34 In fact, later in October 1990, the United States imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan and also refused to deliver the already booked F-16 warplanes, declaring that Pakistan was secretly undertaking nuclear weapons research and development.35 The economic sanctions only deepened Pakistani dissatisfaction with America. Its offensive realists remained undeterred and further accelerated its nuclear program. Incidentally, Pakistani scholars and commentators believe that the United States had actually turned a blind eye to India’s preparations for conducting nuclear tests in 1998. They opine that this not only encouraged India’s nuclear weapon ambitions but was also contrary to the U.S. anti- policy. This, yet again, revealed the unreliability of the great powers and Pakistan’s vulnerability, further deepening the mistrust in Pakistan about the reliability of the United States as a security guarantor in time of crisis.36 When India conducted five nuclear tests between May 11 and 13 in 1998, the political and security situation in South Asia suddenly heated up. India’s nuclear tests were in the nature of a death warrant for the defensive realists and liberal advocacy groups in Pakistan. Offensive realists gradually gathered disruptive force and persuaded Pakistan’s decision-makers to undertake nuclear tests as soon as possible, so that the country could meet the Indian challenge. When Pakistan conducted six nuclear tests between May 28 and 30 in 1998 and announced that it too was a “country of nuclear weapons,”37 the offensive realists had their final victory.

A Brief Comparison of Defensive and Offensive Realist Positions

Both the defensive and offensive realists believed that security was a rarity for Pakistan. The only difference between them was with regard to the methods they advocated. 280 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu

For Pakistani defensive realists, Pakistan’s security and survival could be guaranteed only through “collective security” agreements with great powers. They advocated maintaining a “balance of power” vis-à-vis India, so that the country did not have to expend its limited resources on a costly nuclear weapon program. On the other hand, offensive realists argued that great powers like America and China could not guarantee security for Pakistan. They further argued that Pakistan could guarantee its survival in the self-help anarchic international system only by developing nuclear weapons. Since it was these offensive realist arguments that carried the day in May 1998 and are presently leading Pakistan’s nuclear program, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine also emanates from their argument, to be discussed separately.

Baloch Voices against Pakistan’s Nuclear Program

Although the turn of events in 1998 defeated the defensive realists, not all in Pakistan supported the nuclear tests. Organizations such as the Baloch National Front (BNF) who have separatist leanings, declared that the day the nuclear tests were conducted in Balochistan a “Black Day.”38 The concerns about the damage caused to the local ecology by the tests gave rise to protests by the BNF and other local voices in Balochistan.39 Organizations like the BNF cannot be said to have any substantial say within Pakistani’s nuclear establishment and have thus remained outside the mainstream nuclear debate in Pakistan. However, they can be considered to have used their anti-nuclear plank to solidify separatist views in Balochistan.

Factions in Contemporary Nuclear Debate in Pakistan and Their Divergences

Twenty years have passed since Pakistan went nuclear in 1998. Pakistan has gone from being a non-nuclear weapon state to a nuclear weapon state. This has led to readjustments in Pakistani points of view regarding nuclear weapons. It should be underlined that even though Pakistani offensive realists have molded Pakistan’s nuclear policies and doctrine, defensive realists, liberals and the Baloch voices have not disappeared. They still exist and make their presence felt from time to time.

Transition in Pakistan’s Defensive Realism

With the dismissal of Ishrat Hussain Usmani, the Pakistani defensive realists’ position in the discourse received a great setback. It is noteworthy that there was no serious difference or divergence of views between Pakistani defensive and offensive realists with regard to the country’s threat perception. Both accepted that India was the external security threat; the only difference between them was that they differed in their understanding of being in a self-help regime in an anarchical world system, which created a wide ranging divergence between the defensive and offensive realists’ Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 281 understanding of national security strategy, before the nuclear tests in 1998. While the former opposed nuclear weapons, the latter favored them. However, after the successful nuclear test in 1998, Pakistan’s defensive realists’ views have changed quietly.40 They have gradually come to terms with the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state. Yet, divergences between the two schools of thought still exist. Offensive realists opine that nuclear weapons are both a political and battlefield weapon; whereas defensive realists hold the view that nuclear weapons are only political weapons, not battlefield weapons. They (defensive realists) argue that if tactical nuclear weapons are used against India in a conventional war, Pakistan will certainly invite massive nuclear retaliation from India, which in turn, will lead to a full-scale nuclear war and both India and Pakistan will suffer unbearable consequences. As to the means of ensuring national security, Pakistani defensive realists still advocate the path of reducing contradictions and divergences with India through the “collective security” and “dialogue and communication” approach and suggest that the two countries should build mutual trust. Moreover, they believe that if the discriminatory articles in the NPT are revised, Pakistan should join the treaty so that the international community can recognize it as a legitimate nuclear power. In the meantime, pressure should be applied on India through a series of international agreements with great powers, so as to avoid war with India and safeguard Pakistan’s national security. In the backdrop of the debate between defensive realism and offensive realism and the long influence of defensive realism on Pakistan’s nuclear policy, it would be apt to describe Pakistan’s doctrine until 1998 as one of “minimum credible deterrence.” Naeem Salik’s summation of Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar’s speech at the National Defence College in May 2000 resulted in what may be deemed to be the nuclear doctrine it had followed until then:

● Pakistan’s policy will be based on a minimum credible deterrence. ● It will avoid getting embroiled in a strategic arms race with India. ● It‌ will continue to support international arms control regimes that are non- discriminatory in nature. ● Pakistan’s nuclear policy will be conducted with “restraint” and “responsibility.” ● It will participate in the FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty) negotiations. ● It‌ will refrain from further nuclear testing. However, this commitment is subject to change in case India decides to resume testing. ● Pakistan‌ will strengthen existing controls on the export of nuclear technology through administrative and legal mechanisms.41

However, after the 1998 test, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine moved beyond minimum credible deterrence to full spectrum deterrence, that laid emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and their first use.

282 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu Deriving Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine from Offensive Realist Arguments

It is generally believed that after Pakistan’s successful nuclear tests, the objective of offensive realists changed from “survival” to maximize “power” to bargain with India. The scope of this “power” maximization included disputed territories and other interests such as the water resources. The two countries have a long-standing dispute over Kashmir. Both of them consider it to be an indivisible part of their territory. Now that Pakistan has successfully secured nuclear weapons, their fundamental purpose is not only to be used as political weapons, but also as tools which can be employed to achieve certain objectives, subject to the condition that India does not exact nuclear revenge. According to this view, if Pakistan’s nuclear weapons can achieve their objective in its dispute over Kashmir, then these tactical nuclear weapons should not be kept locked in cabinets. As against India’s commitment to “no first use” of nuclear weapons, Pakistan has always refused to use any such expression. Its unyielding attitude on this count is closely related to the Pakistani offensive realists’ approach to the subject. They generally believe that nuclear weapons can be used to maximize power and further their interests. In keeping with this, they stress that tactical nuclear weapons can be used to cope with a conventional military attack from India. This proposition highlights the vital importance of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in its security strategy.42 Notwithstanding the aforementioned proposition and explanation, it is difficult to ignore the interaction between India’s strategic and military doctrines and Pakistan’s offensive nuclear doctrine, and how the Indian doctrines might have shaped Pakistan’s offensive nuclear doctrine that appears to be sanctioning the use of tactical nuclear weaponry.43 Ali Ahmed argues that “a slow but unmistakable shift can be seen from defensive realism to offensive realism [in India], from 1971 when it cut Pakistan to size, to 1998 when it crossed the Rubicon.”44 This shift has shaped India’s doctrine of military operations as well. Ali underscores that there is a difference in what India “professes” as its strategic doctrine and what it actually “aspires” to. According to him, although “India’s professed strategic doctrine calls for an offensive deterrent…its aspirational doctrine, aiming to transcend the regional box [South Asia] in which it is hemmed in by Pakistan and China, appears to compel a quasi-compellent military doctrine, at least in so far as its in-region challenger, Pakistan, is concerned.”45 He points out that considering the nuclear age in which India and Pakistan are living, India can only opt for a limited war as its “war-of-choice,” which will give India the leeway to impose its will on Pakistan and which will keep the nuclear threshold for Pakistan high. He explains that India’s military doctrine is practically a doctrine of “proactive, offensive operations to limited depths in Pakistan,” though it does not officially confirm it.46 Its so-called “Cold Start” military doctrine,47 which relies on highly mobile ready-for-war army battle groups (integrated battle groups (IBG)), supported by superior air power, deployed within striking range from the border with Pakistan, is meant precisely for executing a short, swift and effective limited war with Pakistan.48 The war objective of this doctrine is to militarily paralyze Pakistan by entering Pakistan from various points and occupying its territory within close range of the border; while at the same time keeping below Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 283

Pakistan’s nuclear threshold. Although there has yet been an actual instance of its application, this doctrinal formulation poses a grave military and political challenge to Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear missile system may also be seen as a response to this war scenario. Thus, tactical nuclear missiles are a message to India that its attempt to paralyze Pakistan’s political and security environment, or put its national existence into jeopardy by impairing its national capabilities by employing superior conventional capabilities, will necessarily lead to a nuclear war in the initial stage of the war itself.49 Thus, Pakistan’s offensive realists advocate keeping the nuclear threshold fairly low. They make no attempt to conceal the fact that the “first use” of nuclear weapons can be undertaken even in the initial stages of a war. In 1998, the then foreign minister of Pakistan Shamshad Ahmad stated that nuclear weapons of Pakistan were not only to be used for thwarting nuclear counterattacks, but also to pre-empt a conventional military attack from India.50 In December 2009, India’s chief of army staff Deepak Kapoor remarked that Indian troops had made significant progress in their capabilities for mobilizing conventional military armed forces, to rapidly attack Pakistan.51 The then chief of the Pakistan army Parvez Kayani responded by saying that, “it’s a risky and dangerous way to discuss about using conventional military force with nuclear weapons on the top of [the] head, and it will bring about unexpected and irredeemable consequences.”52 The “Cold Start” doctrine was the unstated doctrinal backdrop of this exchange between the two generals. From this it can be deduced that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons to fight off a conventional military attack from India.53 In January 2014, Usman Ali Khan, from Jinnah University in Pakistan, suggested that the United States and Russia had deployed thousands of tactical nuclear weapons to ensure mutual nuclear deterrence in even after the end of the Cold War; thus, he believed, Pakistan should not ignore the significance of tactical nuclear weapons.54 Retired General Khalid Kidwai, speaking at the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Conference in Washington, D.C., on March 24, 2015, maintained that Pakistan needs short-range “tactical” nuclear weapons to deter its arch-rival, India.55 Thus, these doctrinal bits of offensive realism differ from the realist opinions expressed before the nuclear test in 1998. It is not difficult to perceive that offensive realist views in Pakistan’s nuclear policy are becoming harsher than before. As per a latest study by Kristensen, Norris and Diamond, Pakistan has acquired significant capabilities to counter military threats below the strategic level. The efforts seek to create a full-spectrum deterrent that is designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks, but also to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory.” According to this, Pakistan has 140–150 nuclear warheads and further that this stockpile actually “exceeds the earlier projection made by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60–80 warheads by 2020.” As per the study, Pakistan has around 24 nuclear-capable F-16A/B and approximately 12 Mirage III/V, an estimated 102 land-based ballistic missiles of various types, with ranges that vary from as short as 60–70 kilometers (NASR [Hatf-9]) and as long as 2,750 kilometers (Shaheen-3 [Hatf- 284 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu

6]). It has around 12 ground and air-launched cruise missiles such as Babur GLCM (Hatf-7), which according to Pakistan have a range of 700 kilometers, though studies calculate this as 350 kilometers. Pakistan is reported to have test launched its sea-based cruise missiles.56 Thus, Pakistan may have completed its nuclear triad. Separately, Sannia Abdullah summarizes that, “after India’s proactive military operations strategy, commonly dubbed Cold Start, came to the attention of ,” Pakistan has “aimed at averting a conventional attack from India by ‘plugging the gaps’ in its deterrence posture.” It has given greater attention to “the induction of low yield ballistic missiles, cruise missiles [particularly sub-sonic cruise missiles], Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) and improved sea-based deterrence.” Moreover, she says, Pakistan has focused on “constructing new reprocessing facilities” for the supply of adequate fissile materials.57 Maimuna Ashraf discusses how Pakistan has focused on minimizing the gap with India on the conventional war-capabilities front. Pakistan’s conventional war strategy includes both offense and defense. Under this strategy, Pakistan’s army strike corps are expected “to launch an offensive” to occupy “some Indian territory near border while holding back the initial hostile advances” by India. Ashraf also suggests that its military exercises have given greater attention to enhancing synergy between the three services. Further, it has focused on increasing its arms inventories and diversifying its suppliers, which now include even Russia. Importantly, its missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles and strengthened air defenses will help Pakistan to effectively deal with India’s air-superiority and the IBGs that are the backbone of India’s Cold Start strategy.58 Finally, although at present, Pakistan’s focus is on tactical weapons and their first- use, Khalid Kidwai opines:

…a second strike capability helps in stabilizing the first strike capability … therefore, at some point in time Pakistan should be looking at a second strike capability, … the Pakistan has to come up with its minimum safeguards. And those minimum safeguards, in our situation today where there is a drive for a second strike capability on the other side [India], Pakistan cannot be oblivious to it … a limited second strike capability, a modern second strike capability for Pakistan, I think will be helpful.

Pakistan’s reported move towards acquiring nuclear submarine capabilities can be a pointer in this regard since as argued by Khalid Kidwai, an “assured second strike capability comes from being sea based.”59

Liberal Opinions Have Experienced Almost No Change

Going against the local experience of the defensive and offensive realists, Pakistan’s liberals have a strong Western orientation of thought and experiences. Even though a Western outlook in social and cultural life is not much appreciated in Pakistan society, a considerable number of its elites are Western educated and trained, and maintain strong ties with strategic circles in the West. They not only have the same attitude to Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 285 life but also follow the same social and political theories and concepts as their Western counterparts.60 Unaffected by the political and security strategic context in Pakistan, a desire for world peace and amity61 and nuclear safety informs their opposition to nuclear bombs.62 They have all along advocated developing a mutual understanding with India through economic, cultural and political interaction in order to ensure national security and the successful pursuit of national interests. Their views have not changed even after the nuclear test. Physicist Zia Mian, journalist/activist A.B. Naqvi and activist Salima Hashmi are some notable examples in this regard.

Anti-Nuclear Stance of Pakistani Separatist Organizations Becomes More Radical

Pakistan is home to many ethnic groups such as the Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns and Baloch. However, separatist organizations in Pakistan are mainly concentrated in Balochistan and include the BNF, the Balochistan Liberation Front and the Baloch Liberation Army. Their opposition to the conduct of nuclear tests and activities in Balochistan by the Pakistani federal government and Pakistani army in Balochistan has become more pronounced. They say that nuclear weapon research and development in Pakistan will not benefit Balochistan. On the contrary, it lives in fear of nuclear radiation. They are critical of countries such as China for assisting Pakistan in its nuclear program. An anti-nuclear weapon stand is a reference point for these separatist organizations in their cause. It can be said that perhaps it is the separatist organizations in Balochistan that are at the forefront of street-level resistance against nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The success of the program has not impacted or changed their views and activities. On the contrary, they have become more vocal in recent years.

Conclusion

Pakistan is important as a case study on whether the nuclear doctrine of a de facto or “unrecognized” emerging NWS is more radical than that of a recognized NWS. International, regional and extra-regional factors have shaped Pakistan’s nuclear policy and are likely to continue to do so. These include Pakistan’s experience of its formal and informal alliances with the United States, military ties with China, which are perceived to be an undeclared alliance, and the impact of the Cold War and the post–Cold War security environment on South Asia.63 The authors have analyzed the existing literature on this topic and offer the following conclusions: Firstly, the Pakistani elites regarded survival as Pakistan’s primary security objective. Pakistan’s nuclear policy was mainly debated by defensive realists, offensive realists, liberals and separatists, in which the offensive realists won. However, the 1998 tests have proved to be a turning point for defensive as well as offensive realist arguments. The defensive and offensive realists have since readjusted their views. While the defensive realists are more likely to favor membership of the international 286 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu non-proliferation regime, the offensive realists want to pursue and maximize power, therefore joining the international non-proliferation regime or being recognized by the international community is not a priority for them. However, unlike the defensive and offensive realists, there has been little change in the positions of liberals and separatists since 1972. Most observers believe that China proved to be a crucial partner in Pakistan’s nuclear program and went on to become the principal supplier of sensitive nuclear and missile technology to Islamabad.64 It seems that China and Pakistan have very close ties with their nuclear program, even though Pakistan has adopted a nuclear doctrine that is completely contrary to China’s. China pursues a “no first use” of nuclear weapons doctrine, whereas Pakistan seems to be more inclined to the “first use” doctrine. Thus, it is not difficult to see that regardless of the critical help it has lent to Pakistan’s nuclear program, China’s nuclear doctrine has not influenced the nuclear debate in Pakistan. Pakistan’s nuclear debate has basically engaged the issue of the Indian threat to Pakistan’s security and survival. Secondly, the Indian subcontinent is regarded as one of the most fragile regions in the world from a security point of view, where the two nuclear power neighbors have reason to wage a conventional war on issues such as the Kashmir dispute, which could always escalate into a nuclear war, in a short period of time. Notably, since no crisis management mechanism currently exists between India and Pakistan, limiting a war between them would always be uncertain, thus, the likelihood of it escalating into a nuclear war cannot be ruled out. In this backdrop, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine requires attention. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is both ambiguous and opaque. Compared to the rapid enhancement of India’s conventional military power, Pakistan’s conventional capabilities are relatively weak. It is hard to determine whether Pakistan would be able to successfully defend itself against an all-out conventional Indian attack. Therefore, Pakistani offensive realists advocate adopting the first use doctrine to deter an Indian conventional strike. Thirdly, Pakistan’s offensive realist approach and the country’s nuclear doctrine, its “first use” option, could provide clues about North Korea’s nuclear doctrine as well. Considering that North Korea has rare good military relations with Pakistan that also include missile and nuclear technology exchange, it would be safe to assume that the former must be following the latter in doctrinal matters as well. Although the security and strategic environments of North Korea and Pakistan are completely different, both countries have powerful adversaries to face: Pakistan faces India and North Korea faces the U.S.–South Korea military alliance. It is, therefore, that both of them have the same demand of “first use” of nuclear weapons to deter a conventional attack. If Pakistan’s “first use” option appears to be working well to deter India’s conventional strike, North Korea has all the more reason to emulate Pakistan’s offensive realists and their nuclear doctrine to deter the perceived threat from the U.S.–South Korea alliance. Further, Pakistan’s example also shows that while a “first use” nuclear doctrine may address and cure existential insecurity vis-à-vis a more powerful adversary, it cannot end the conventional conflicts. Thus, an offensive nuclear doctrine can serve national interest Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 287 only up to an extent. This may possibly explain Chairman Kim Jong Un’s meetings with President Donald J. Trump. He may be convinced that North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities and its hyper-aggressive posturing have already served the purpose of insuring North Korea against existential insecurity. Therefore, this is the time to go for political dialogue. To sum up, since Pakistan went nuclear in 1998, no official nuclear doctrine has been released by the government to date. Therefore, it is difficult to have a definite sense of Pakistan’s nuclear red line, though some conclusions could be drawn from the public debate on nuclear issues. The point which can be made with some certainty is that since offensive realists won the debate and have shaped Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, their advocacy for “first use” and using “tactical nuclear weapons” in the early stages of war is the most distinct feature of the Pakistani nuclear doctrine. Notwithstanding this advocacy, the doctrine, in official terms, remains ambiguous and opaque, which perhaps serves Pakistan’s interests better. Countries such as North Korea, or any other which may be the de facto or “unrecognized” NWS in the future, are likely to follow the same ambiguous but inherently offensive doctrine. This makes world peace fundamentally fragile.

Notes

1. Paul K. Kerr, “Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends,” CRS Report for Congress, February 20, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL30699.pdf (accessed July 1, 2017). 2. Francisco Aguilar, Randy Bell, Natalie Black, Sayce Falk, Sasha Rogers, and Aki Peritz, “An Introduction to Pakistan’s Military,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Updated July 2011, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Pakistan-Military- final-B.pdf (accessed July 1, 2017). 3. Michael Krepon and Liv Dowlin, “Crisis Intensity and Nuclear Signaling in South Asia,” in Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories, eds., Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegelan (Washington, D.C.: Stimson, 2018), 201–03. 4. Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan and the New Nuclear Taboo: Regional Deterrence and the International Arms Control Regime (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2012), 29. 5. Sadia Tasleem, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Use Doctrine,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 30, 2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-use- doctrine-pub-63913 (accessed July 1, 2017). 6. Ibid. 7. Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions, Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2013), 11. 8. Ibid., 12. 9. Mussarat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, “Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan,” Pakistan Economic and Social Review 49, no. 1 (Summer 2011): 109–32. 10. In brief, offensive realism makes a case for states making “worst-case assumptions of others’ intentions” because states are “inherently aggressive… due to anarchy.” On the other hand, defensive realism rejects any such assumption, describing it as “irrational, unsustainable, and counterproductive,” even though they do not deny the role of mutual fear emanating from mutual mistrust and security dilemmas in states’ interactions. Thus, as a corollary of these 288 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu

two different assumptions, while offensive realism reinforces fear of anarchy, promotes the imminence of war and advocates to continuously prepare for it, in a way, for a preventative war, defensive realism accords primacy to rationality and benign intentions of states, and points to mutual reassurances through diplomacy and institution-building, as a way overcome the problem of mutual fear in the international system. Shiping Tang, “Fear in International Politics: Two Positions,” International Studies Review 10, no. 3 (September 2008): 451–71. 11. Ibid., 109–32. 12. Lubna Saif, “Pakistan and SEATO,” Pakistan Journal of History and Culture 28, no. 2 (2007): 77–90. 13. Eric H. Arnett, ed., Military Capacity and the Risk of War: China, India, Pakistan, and Iran (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1997), 150. 14. Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., Michael J. Meese, and Suzanne C. Nielsen, American National Security (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 405. 15. Alastair Lamba, “The Sino–Pakistani Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963,” Australian Outlook 18, no. 3 (1964): 299–312. 16. Asia Mukhtar, Threat Perception: Pakistan’s Nuclear Program (Lahore: Peace Publication, 2013), 51. 17. Shahid-ur-Rehman, Z. A. Bhutto, A Man in Hurry for the Bomb, Long Road to Chagai (Islamabad: Print Wise Publication, 1999), 22. 18. Zafar Khan, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Testing May 1998: External and Internal Pressures,” IPRI Journal 12, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 28–45. 19. Reuters, “CENTO Nation Help Sought by Pakistan,” Chicago Tribune, September 7, 1965. 20. Jabeen and Mazhar, “Security Game: SEATO and CENTO,” 109–32. 21. Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions, 209. 22. B. K. Shrivastava, “U.S. Military Assistance to Pakistan: A Reappraisal,” India Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1976): 33. 23. Dennis Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 2001), 237. 24. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Anatomizing Pakistan’s Motivations for Nuclear Weapons,” Pakistan Horizon 64, no. 2 (April 2011), 10. 25. Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 91. 26. Andrew Small, The China–Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (: C Hurst and Co Publishers Ltd, 2015), 31. 27. The authors’ knowledge about the struggle between defensive realists and offensive realists in the 1960s and the 1970s have benefited from their interviews with Pakistani scholars in China and Pakistan on nuclear affairs. They conducted these interviews during the year 2016. 28. Malik Nur Khan and Ayaz Ahmad, “Missile Technology Control Regime and Missile Self- Reliance,” Nation, May 11, 1998. 29. Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests: Domestic Debate and International Determinants,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no.1 (1999): 43–56. 30. Authors’ interviews with Pakistani scholars in 2016. 31. Mazari Shireen, “The Security Route,” News, April 16, 1998. 32. Pervez Hoodbhoy, “Pakistan: Climbing the Nuclear Ladder,” in Confronting the Bomb, Pakistani and Indian Scientists Speak Out, ed. Pervez Hoodbhoy (: Oxford University Press, 2013), 69. 33. Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions, 209. 34. Ibid., 225. 35. Yasmeen, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests,” 43–56. 36. Ibid. 37. Bhumitra Chakma, ed., The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2011), 46. 38. “Black Day against Nuclear Explosions in Parts of Balochistan,” The Nation, May 29, 2013. Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 289

39. Muhammad Amir Hamza and Muhammad Ijaz Laif, “Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: A Case Study of Baloch Nationalism during Musharraf Regime,” Pakistan Vision 10, no 1 (2011): 49–80. 40. The authors have formed their understanding regarding changes in Pakistan’s defensive realists’ standpoints on nuclear issues on the basis of their interviews with Pakistani scholars, which they conducted in 2016. 41. General (Ret) Naeem Salik, “The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine,” in Nuclear Learning: The Next Decade in South Asia, eds., Feroz Hassan Khan, Ryan Jacobs, and Emil Burke (Monterey, CA: Naval Post Graduate School, June 2014), 78. 42. Masood Haider, “Islamabad Refuses to Accept ‘No First Strike’ Doctrine,” Dawn, May 31, 2002. 43. “The Threat of ‘Tactical’ Nuclear Weapons,” Pervez Hoodbhoy’s interview by Jayant Sriram, The Hindu, January 14, 2016. 44. Ali Ahmed, “India: ‘Dissonance on the Doctrinal Front” in India’s National Security in the Liberal Lens (Margao Goa: CinnamonTeal Publishing, 2016), 14, e-book edition. The authors would like to thank Ali Ahmed for providing drop box access to the book at https://www. dropbox.com/s/qcl8uyeqqwdji9x/India%E2%80%99s%20national%20security%20in%20 the%20Liberal%20Lens.pdf?dl=0. The authors would also like to thank him for his valuable advice and suggestions to them. 45. Ibid., 17. 46. Ibid., 17–22. 47. The realization regarding serious flaws in India’s Sundarji doctrine in the wake of its rather unimpressive Operation Parakram against Pakistan (2001–02) occasioned its Cold Start doctrine. The Sundarji doctrine is named after India’s Chief of Army Staff (1985–88), who propounded it in the mid-1980s. The Sundarji doctrine relied on seven “holding corps” and three “strike corps.” The seven “holding corps” were stationed near India’s Western border with Pakistan. On the other hand, two of the three “strike corps” were stationed in the hinterland of India. Although the third one was comparatively nearer the border, it was still a few hundred kilometers away from it. Under this doctrine, the “holding corps” was to employ static defense to halt and hold the enemy’s advance with the help of infantry divisions, mobile mechanized divisions and “a small number of mechanized divisions.” While the “holding corps” would halt the enemy (Pakistan), the Indian Air Force would “first gain superiority over Pakistan and then provide close air support to ground operations,” carried out by the “strike corps.” The “strike corps” under Air Force protection would strike deep into Pakistan from India’s Rajasthan. In this “high-intensity battle of attrition,” the Indian army would “destroy the Pakistan’s own two strike corps,” achieving absolute military domination. However, the lackluster performance during Operation Parakram was an eye-opener. India launched Operation Parakram, after a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, to exert maximum military–diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to curb Pakistan–based terror networks hurting India. India’s suspicions were on Pakistan–based organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Taiyyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad. India mobilized its army on the border with Pakistan to extract Pakistan’s compliance. It was a stern message that if Pakistan failed to control the terrorists operating from its territory, India would cross the border to ensure this. The mobilization basically followed the Sundarji doctrine of exerting massive military pressure on Pakistan crossing the border into Pakistan. However, from a military perspective and planning, this operation exposed glaring gaps in India’s war planning. India’s mobilization proved clumsy as “the armoured columns of the strike corps took nearly three weeks to make their way to the international border area.” This gave enough time for Pakistan to strengthen its defenses. Also, the diplomatic situation changed by the time the Indian army reached the border and the U.S. could extract a denunciation of terrorism from Pakistan “in the name of Kashmir.” After this, Operation Parakram appeared irrelevant. Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 159–63. 290 Huazhong Tu, Prashant Kumar Singh, Nan You and Bo Tu

48. Walter C. Ladwig III, “Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (2015): 759–62; and Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars?,” 163–67. 49. Zachary Keck, “Pakistan Says It’s Ready to Use Nuclear Weapons—Should India Worry?,” The National Interest, November 3, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistan-says- its-ready-use-nuclear-weapons%E2%80%94should-india-23034 (accessed April 5, 2018). 50. Roshan Khanijo, Complexities and Challenges of Nuclear India (New Delhi: Vij Books India, 2014), 227. 51. A. H. Nayyar and Zia Mian, “The Limited Military Utility of Pakistan’s Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons in Response to Large Scale Indian Conventional Attack,” Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU), Brief no. 61, November 11, 2010, 3. 52. Iftikhar Khan, “Tough Kayani Warning to Proponents of ‘Adventurism,’” Dawn, February 9, 2010. 53. Nayyar and Mian, “The Limited Military Utility,” 3. 54. Usman Ali Khan, “India, Pakistan and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: What’s in a Name?” Institute of Peace and Conflicts Studies, January 7, 2014, http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/ipcs-debate- india-pakistan-and-tactical-nuclear-weapons-whats-in-4241.html (accessed July 1, 2017). 55. Khalid Kidwai, “Pakistan Needs Short-Range Tactical Nuclear Weapons to Deter India,” Tribune, March 24, 2015. 56. Hans J. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris and Julia Diamond, “Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2018,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 5 (2018): 348–49. 57. Sannia Abdullah, “Pakistan’s Full-Spectrum Deterrence: Trends and Trajectories,” South Asian Voices, December 13, 2018, https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-full-spectrum-deterrence- trends-trajectories/ (accessed February 9, 2019). 58. Maimuna Ashraf, “Pakistan’s Consolidating Conventional Deterrence: An Assessment,” South Asian Voices, December 7, 2018, https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-conventional-deterrence- assessment/ (accessed February 9, 2019); and Ali Ahmed, “The Future of Full Spectrum Deterrence,” CLAWS, October 16, 2016, http://www.claws.in/1651/the-future-of-full-spectrum- deterrence-ali-ahmed.html (accessed February 9, 2018). 59. “A Conversation with Gen. Khalid Kidwai,” moderated by Peter Lavoy, Monitor 360, Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, March 23, 2015, https://carnegieendowment. org/files/03-230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf (accessed February 9, 2018). Lt. Gen. (retd.) Khalid Kidwai was Advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority. 60. This description of Pakistani liberal peace activists’ social and ideological location in their country is based on the authors’ interviews in 2016. 61. M. B. Naqvi, “Nuclear Weapons: The Greatest Hurdle to India–Pakistan Friendship,” South Asian against Nukes Newsletter, January 7, 2005, https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/ SAAN_/conversations/topics/756 (accessed July 1, 2017). 62. “Stop Nuclear Energy Pursuit Demands Pakistan Peace Coalition, on First Anniversary of Fukushima,” Press Release by the Pakistan Peace Coalition, South Asia Citizens Web (SACW), March 10, 2012, http://www.sacw.net/article2581.html (accessed July 1, 2017); and “Rethink Nuclear—Shut Down the Reactors: A Letter to Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission by Citizen’s Groups,” SACW, March 30, 2011, http://www.sacw.net/article1998.html (accessed July 1, 2017). 63. Samina Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices,” International Security 23, no. 4 (1999): 178–204. 64. Monika Chansoria, “China’s Nuclear and Missile Transfers to Pakistan: Trends and Analysis,” in Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapon: Conflict Redux, eds., Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2014), 39–62. Pakistan’s Nuclear Ambitions: The Debate over Doctrine 291

Notes on Contributors

Huazhong Tu is an associate assistant and postdoctoral in the Institute of the Belt and Road Initiative of Tsinghua University. He is also an Associate Professor at the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences, Kunming. His research interest includes arms control, non-proliferation studies, and international security studies. He received his Ph.D. in 2019 from the Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences of Tsinghua University. He has published his contributions in China, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Singapore, etc. He speaks English, Korean, Japanese, , Hindi, and Chinese.

Prashant Kumar Singh is an associate fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India. His research includes the strategic and domestic affairs of China. He is a keen observer of India–China relations, and China’s engagement with South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. He obtained his Ph.D. in 2009, from the Centre for East Asian Studies (CEAS), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. He speaks English, Hindi, and some Chinese.

Nan You is an assistant research fellow and postdoctoral in the Department of International Relations, School of Social Sciences of Tsinghua University, and also a researcher in the Institute of the Belt and Road Initiative of Tsinghua University. Her research field mainly includes international politics, and Belt and Road initiative. She speaks English and Chinese.

Bo Tu is a professor in business administration of Silla University in Korea. He received a Ph.D. from GSIS at Dong-A University. He started working at Silla University since 2018. His research interests include international politics, international trade, and international economics. He has published his research in the Korean Association of Area Studies, local Chinese journals and so on. He speaks English, Korean, and Chinese.