Fordham Law Review Volume 78 Issue 2 Article 9 2009 Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate Catherine J. K. Sandoval Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Catherine J. K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 641 (2009). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss2/9 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate Cover Page Footnote Thanks to the participants in the Oxford Round Table, Oxford University, particularly Amy Kristin Sanders and T. Barton Carter for their comments about this Article. I appreciate the support of the Santa Clara University School of Law Scholarly Research Grant. Special thanks to Al Hammond, Don Polden, Eric Goldman, Rob Frieden, Phil Weiser, Kevin Werbach, Anthony Varona, Leonard Baynes, Marvin Ammori, James Speta, and Angela Campbell for their comments ont his work. Thanks to the paricipants in the Social Sciences Research Council Academic Conference held in conjunction with the National Media Reform Conference and the participants at conferences and workshops at the American Univerisity School of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law, St.