CEBRIG Working Paper

Revisiting Graeber in the light of a medieval debt-enforcement custom: being hostage in an inn for a debt in the Low Countries between ca. 1250-1350

Jean-Luc De Meulemeester, David Kusman

In this paper, we attempt to apply Graeber’s model of “baseline communism” to a medieval financial custom that was widespread in the former Low Countries: the Inliggen custom. This custom implied that a well-off debtor (often a high aristocrat) could send pledges (often his vassals and councillors) in an inn, to remain hostages as long as his creditor was not reimbursed. Inns offered far more than just lodging facilities, and providing food and drinks; they were information hubs, providing the guest with banking services, brokerage facilities and commercial storage, hence, their intimate relationship to medieval bankers such as the Piedmontese moneylenders. Within the institutional framework of the Inliggen custom, the inn was at the centre of a social network linking the creditor, the debtor and his pledges and the hosteller. Bearing close resemblance to the Pilgrimage economy of the late Middle Ages, the sojourn of hostages in an inn as pledges had a positive impact on the urban economy: the pledges were supposed to eat, drink and sleep in a high-standing inn, following the patterns of a conspicuous consumption, the town administration levied fruitful taxes on the wine excises and the pledges could also entertain ties with the local merchants aiming at buying luxury products such as clothes or jewels. All in all, elements of a “baseline communism” surfaced within this extended credit network: the loaned capital often fuelled the urgent needs of a high aristocrat; the practice both relied on the hospitality custom and on the collective solidarity of the pledges for their overlord. Finally, the ambiguous position of the hosteller (host, broker and partner of the Piedmontese moneylenders) shows that the financial custom was a by-product of aggressive profit-seeking strategies for both the lenders and the hostellers. In this sense, and as recognised by Graeber himself, it was no naïve communism but rather a crucial component of the exchanges in a highly commercialised urban society. Ultimately, this custom could be viewed as a primitive contract-enforcement mechanism (CEM). But to prove its efficiency we need to collect a broader sample of quantitative data that is not easily available for the time span of our study. Keywords custody for debt, inn economy, financial intermediaries, credit information, baseline communism.

JEL Classifications G14, K12, N23.

CEBRIG Working Paper N°21-010 July 2021 Université Libre de Bruxelles - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management Centre Emile Bernheim de Recherche Interdisciplinaire en Gestion ULB CP114/03 50, avenue F.D. Roosevelt 1050 Brussels BELGIUM [email protected] - Tel : +32 (0)2/650.48.64

Revisiting Graeber in the light of a medieval debt-enforcement custom: being hostage in an inn for a debt in the Low Countries between ca. 1250-1350 Jean-Luc De Meulemeester (CEBRIG-ULB), David Kusman (UR SOCIAMM-ULB)

Abstract In this paper, we attempt to apply Graeber’s model of “baseline communism” to a medieval financial custom that was widespread in the former Low Countries: the In- liggen custom. This custom implied that a well-off debtor (often a high aristocrat) could send pledges (often his vassals and councillors) in an inn, to remain hostages as long as his creditor was not reimbursed. Inns offered far more than just lodging facilities, and providing food and drinks; they were information hubs, providing the guest with banking services, brokerage facilities and commercial storage, hence, their intimate relationship to medieval bankers such as the Piedmontese moneylenders. Within the institutional framework of the Inliggen custom, the inn was at the centre of a social network linking the creditor, the debtor and his pledges and the hosteller. Bearing close resemblance to the Pilgrimage economy of the late Middle Ages, the sojourn of hostages in an inn as pledges had a positive impact on the urban economy: the pledges were supposed to eat, drink and sleep in a high-standing inn, following the patterns of a conspicuous consumption, the town administration levied fruitful taxes on the wine excises and the pledges could also entertain ties with the local merchants aiming at buying luxury products such as clothes or jewels. All in all, elements of a “baseline communism” surfaced within this extended credit network: the loaned capital often fuelled the urgent needs of a high aristocrat; the practice both relied on the hospitality custom and on the collective solidarity of the pledges for their overlord. Finally, the ambiguous position of the hosteller (host, broker and partner of the Piedmontese moneylenders) shows that the financial custom was a by-product of aggressive profit-seeking strategies for both the lenders and the hostellers. In this sense, and as recognised by Graeber himself, it was no naïve communism but rather a crucial component of the exchanges in a highly commercialised urban society. Ultimately, this custom could be viewed as a primitive contract- enforcement mechanism (CEM). But to prove its efficiency we need to collect a broader sample of quantitative data that is not easily available for the time span of our study.

Keywords: custody for debt, inn economy, financial intermediaries, credit information, baseline communism

JEL-codes: G14, K12, N23

Revisiting Graeber in the light of a medieval debt-enforcement custom: being hostage in an inn for a debt in the Low Countries between ca. 1250-1350.

David Kusman, Centre de Recherche Arts et Culture des Sociétés anciennes, médiévales et mo- dernes (SOCIAMM)-Université libre de Bruxelles and Jean-Luc Demeulemeester, Faculté Solvay/ Brussels School of Economics and Management-Université libre de Bruxelles.

This paper was presented at the online European Social Science History Conference in Leiden, 24 March 2021, in the session 'Creditors, Debtors, and Early Financial Markets (c. 1300-1800) ', organised by Elise Dermineur and Jaco Zuijderduijn.

In custody for debt in an inn. When high-finance meets the feudal world During medieval times, credit practices were characterised by a chronic lack of trustworthy financial information. Moreover, there were no professional commercial courts in the modern sense of the word in the former Low Countries. To enforce their loan contract titles, creditors had either to resort to private transactions or to aldermen’s courts where they could register their financial transactions and recover any debts owed to them. A legal tool existed among feudal lords to enforce their agreements (peace treaties, marriages, huge land transactions…): exchanging hostages. It was a crucial feature of these agreements to ensure that both parties would abide by their obligations. During the early thirteenth century, merchants and moneylenders adopted this feudal custom to enforce payment owed to them by high aristocrats. A good example is provided by the indebtedness of the count of Guelders vis-à-vis the Piedmontese moneylender Tadeo Cavazzone in 1282:

This is the painful complaint of the count of Guelders against the count of Flanders (…). Be it known that the count of Guelders, for his custody and for the custody of his courtiers and their debts and the debt that he owed to the count of Flanders, had to pawn his estates and all his properties to the count of Flanders, and such a practice has rarely been seen among territorial lords. And the count of Guelders agreed to this because of the special trust he put in the count of Flanders, his father-in law, whose daughter had given him many children. And because of his trust in the count of Flanders, he pawned his estates, his castles and his revenues. 1

1 Excerpt of a letter of complaint from the count of Guelders to the king of France, roughly translated from the Old French, ca. 1296, complaining how badly he was treated by the count of Flanders because he was indebted to him, edited in Meihuizen 1953, appendix 1, p.107, original letter in the Archives Nationales de France, sect. J 522, n°22, document dating from circa 1296.

In this striking example, the count Reginald I of Guelders attempts at contrasting his support of traditional aristocratic ethos with the more mercantile values that the count of Flanders and his entourage— made up of merchants, legal councillors, knights and bankers—supposedly embodied. Of course, we have to stress here that in this letter to the king of France Philip IV, rhetoric played an important role for count Reginald of Guelders. After all, he had lost a great deal of his incomes during the 5 years that his estates had remained under Flemish tutelage (1291-1295). Reginald of Guelders had obvi- ously a card to play in convincing the king of France to condemn the lack of chivalric ethos of his vassal, the count of Flanders, Guy de Dampierre at a time when the count of Flanders contemplated entering into the English party of the Low Countries princes, supporting Edward I. 2

What was the rationale behind this “custody for debt” custom mentioned in the complaint of the count of Guelders? Around the beginning of the 1280ies, the count of Guel- ders embarked on an ambitious territorial enterprise to conquer the duchy of Limburg at the expense of the duke John I of Brabant. The loaned capital fuelled probably the need of the prince to win allies by his side in his political conflict with Brabant for the succession of the duchy of Limburg. Reginald of Guelders asserted that he was the sole legal prince in Limburg through his marriage with his first wife, Ermengarde, last heir- ess of the house of the dukes of Limburg. The duke of Brabant disagreed and vowed to annex the duchy to his territories. The diplomacy of winning allies and, later on, their military support, would indeed prove to be a costly business: no later than in 1282, the duke of Brabant had started a financial campaign to buy the succession rights to the duchy of Limburg.3 In 1282, the count had contracted two loans (on the 15th January and on the 5th April), amounting to the total sum of 3,900 Leuven pounds, with the Piedmontese banker Tadeo Cavazzone, residing in ‘s-Hertogenbosch, in the duchy of Brabant, not far from both the county of Holland and the county of Guelders. This location would prove to be all but innocuous for the count of Guelders as Cavazzone was also a major banker of duke John I of Brabant and count Floris V of Holland: around 1287, Cavazzone would

2 Prestwich 1997, 389 : Guy de Dampierre joined the ranks of the princes supporting king Edward I at the beginning of 1297. 3 Kusman and Demeulemeester 2015, 83-102.

also appear as a pledge for an important debt of the duke of Brabant undoubtedly con- nected with his military campaign to conquer the duchy of Limburg.4 In both debt contracts of 1282, the Italian banker asked his princely debtor personal sureties and, among these, that should the count of Guelders default on his loan at the set date of payment, his pledges had to go sojourning in the city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch, located to the north of the duchy of Brabant. This custom illustrated the so-called conditional hostageship, implying that, had a clause of a debt contract not been fulfilled, nobles of high rank and princely servants had to guarantee as hostages the payment of the sum to be paid.5 The hostages had to sojourn in the city more bonorum fideiussorum, that is to say, in accordance with the principles of good pledges. This so-called “debt garri- son” had to occur most of the time in a renowned inn of the city. That the count of Guel- ders did not shy away from this provision is explained by the fact that the custom was in use in his estates since at least 1226.6

The inn: from a simple alehouse to a hospitable place of credit transactions Inns and hostels, as the book of Murray has clearly demonstrated, offered far more than just lodging facilities, and providing food and drinks. They were places of commercial and financial dealings wherein intermediaries could circulate trade information.7 The inn, with its sign, was an unmistakable pattern in the medieval urban landscape (illustration Pieter Balten) offering a wide variety in lodging standings from the inn where guests had to share the same bed to the luxurious inn where hostages had their own room in a distinct space from their servants as we may infer from a painting of Pieter Balten.8 The inn’s sign could be seen from a distance and contributed to the identity of the hostellers: it provided the putative guests with a message as to which social group

4 Kusman 2013, 86, 100-102 : Cavazzone appears as a creditor of the duke of Brabant from 1284 on and since 1285, he acts as princely merchant and banker for count Floris V of Holland. The ducal debt of 1287 amounted to 4,300 parisis pounds. If the duke defaulted on the set date for repayment, four ducal pledges had to go as hostages in the city of Nivelles near the frontier with the county of Hainault : Godefroid of Vierzon, lord of Vierzon and Aarschot and brother of the duke, two high-ranking ducal officers, Ywain of Meldert, seneschal of Brabant, Wouter Volkaert, ducal receiver and Cavazzone (« Thade Chavachon, Lom- bars »). The first loan had a four-months term for repayment, the second one was a ad voluntatem reim- bursable loan, i.e. at first notice from the creditor : Kusman 2009, 76-113, 85-87. 5 Kosto 2012, 30-31 and Kusman 2009. 6 Nijhoff 1830, 44, n.1. 7 Murray 2003, 178-200. 8 On this painting and its possible attribution to Breugel see Hummelen 1989, 1-45 ; Van Bruaene 2018, 169-186, shows how a hanging jug on the wall of a house is a clear symbol of a drinkhouse function.

the inn was addressed. Of course, a stone hostel had not the same lodging standards as a simple inn with crammed bedrooms. As we will see, a whole elitist vocabulary existed to designate the status of the inn. By the expression ad iacendum more bonorum fideiussorum, the pledges of the main debtor were expected to behave in accordance with chivalric values, following their status of vassals and faithful servants to their prince. This code implied that they had to remain in the inn, eat, drink and sleep, with a determined number of horses and squires, until the promised sum had been paid off. These were typical features of the Leisting -custom (Southern Low Countries) or Inliggen (Northern Low Countries) or Ein- lager in the German-speaking regions - wherein the pledge had to go sojourning in an inn at first notice when the creditor judged that the debtor did not abide by the set date for repayment. The former did not need beforehand a debt litigation judgement of a manor or commercial court to enforce this decision: it was immediately executable. Fi- nally, the lodging expenses, if refundable by the main debtor, had to be advanced first and foremost by the pledges. If the pledge felt that the main debtor would prove unable to fulfil one’s obligations, then this was for him a clear incentive to reimburse the main debt (even at the cost of a new loan).9 The choice of the inn generally lied in the hands of the creditor, a feature that underpinned a pre-existent web of relations between bankers and the milieu of the most illustrious hostellers in the city. Let us underline this early process of contractual debt recognizances that was at play and the fact that Italian bankers brought in elements of Roman law such as the concept of numerate and tradita pecunia or, in other words, coins well counted and delivered. Including Roman law articles was deemed necessary to improve the enforcement of the contract.10 How well the debt contract prevented both parties from violating one of its clauses could indeed hint at its efficiency, even if it implied hostages to ensure that no debtor would renege on his obligation; it applied all the more to interpersonal exchanges that were widespread in preindustrial societies. However, on could also argue that

9 Godding 1987, n°771, 445. 10 in nongentis libris parvorum denariorum Lovaniensis in numerata pecunia ab eodem nobis tradita et deli- berata (Archives Départementales du Nord, Lille, B1426, n°2330). See the classical paper of Gilissen 1951, 513-550.

the Leisting custom was another example of lock-in or an example of institutions being used although they became inefficient and obsolete. The issue remains open to debate. 11

The anthropological perspective of credit transactions: The place of Graeber’s “baseline communism” within the institutional framework of leisting In which way does the Graeber’s perspective on debt and the gift economy helps us in interpreting our Leisting custom? Let us first quote him:

It’s understandable that dealings with potentially hostile strangers should encourage an all-or nothing logic, a tension preserved even in English in the Etymology of the words “host” “hostile”, “hostage” and indeed “hospitality”, all of which are derived from the same Latin root. What I want to emphasize here is that all such gestures are simply exaggerated displays of that very “baseline communism” that I have already argued is the ground of all human social life” (Grae- ber 2011). “I will call this “baseline communism”: the understanding that, unless people con- sider themselves enemies [the bold characters are ours], if the need is considered reasonable enough, the principle of “from each according to their abilities, to each, according to their needs” will be assumed to apply (Graeber 2011). 12

In his two papers on the “Moral Grounds of Economic Relations”, Graeber has ampli- fied his theory and argued that there were three different logics of economic relations: Communism, exchange and hierarchy.13 In the first one, baseline communism grows from the need of someone— if the need is acute enough—whether asking for a cigarette or being welcomed in the house of a total stranger (but not an enemy). In the second case, exchange, both parties kept account of the things exchanged and expect equiva- lence. Moreover, no notion of eternity exists like in the baseline communism: once a loaned thing or capital returned in the creditor’s hands, the relationship ended. Still, rit- uals of an elaborate sociality could occur, such as in a Middle-Eastern bazaar when shar- ing food, tea and tobacco was a prerequisite of all bargaining on the price of the mer- chandise, between seller and buyer. Once the object sold, both parties were not supposed to keep “eternal” ties of friendship. Still, Graeber qualifies these exchanges as a “sort of baseline communism” even though the theatrical dialogues were part of a play

11 See the classical work of North 1990, 52, 55, 59, 81 and 121 and Greif 2005 Springer, 730-747. For a recent and critical overview of the economic theory of contracts applied to medieval economic history, see Ewert 2019, 418-421. 12 Graeber 2011, 98 ; see also his specific contributions on the topic : Graeber 2010a and Graeber 2010b, 51-70. 13 Graeber’s 2010b, paper provides the reader with the more explicit overview of his theory.

between vendor and seller. Finally, in the third one, hierarchy, reciprocity is excluded from relations: one of the parties is superior to the other one. Any gift (if this was the case) to a superior, such as a feudal lord, was likely to be viewed as a precedent, creating accordingly a custom that would be repeated each year. Graeber adds that “when parties belong to different [social] classes, incommensurable sorts of things are given on either side”. So, if we apply the Graeberian grid of analysis to our case-study, when the count of Guelders, in his first loan contract amounting to 900 Leuven pounds, agrees to the terms, he explicitly calls his creditor— Willem, Lombard of s’ –Hertogenbosch— his dear Thadeo, an epithet somehow unusual for a public usurer such as Cavazzone. Moreover, the count promised to reimburse his creditor four months later, “friendly and on his sole risk”, in the city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch. He also agrees to send an unusually large number of vassals (15) as hostages in the same city, should he default on the set date of reimbursement. They are thus conditional hostages. Finally, the total amount (900 Leuven pounds) concealed probably an interest rate of ten percent.14 That those terms and epithets “dear” and “friendly” were not gratuitous, is proved by the fact that in a second loan contract, on the 15th of April, amounting to 3,000 Leuven pounds, and containing important sureties imposed to the prince (pawning of his main revenues), they do not appear anymore. The use of a friendly rhetoric was indeed a major component of those debt arrangements.15 With this debt arrangement, we observe a mix of the three logics that Graeber point- ed out: • Hierarchy (in theory) between the count of Guelders and the banker, as proved by the use of an affectionate term of address by the count to describe his banker16 • Communism because he is helped in a time of great need (he ur- gently needs capital to wage war against Brabant) and his vassals will be pledges in the same hostel, implying an element of conviviality

14 It was a common practice to hide an interest rate in subtracting the interest from the total amount loaned (1,000 in our case). See Wyffels 1991. 15 On the use of friendship by the aristocracy in England to win a clientele and as a patronage tool, see Fontaine 2008, 230-231. 16 Underpining a relationship of patronage : Kusman 2009, 85-86 : the count of Guelders calls his creditor nos dilecto nobis Thadeo dicto Wilhelmo Lumbardi apud Buscum ducis commoranti : « our dear Thadeo, called William the Lombard, residing in ‘s-Hertogenbosch ».

• Exchange: the loaned money must be reimbursed and the calcula- tion of costs and penalties for a delayed payment is provided in the debt contract In fact, Graeber himself asserts that “principles slip into each other”, hierarchical relations including often limited communistic elements such as the patronage and, if the needs proved excessive, as in the case of Guelders, pseudo-communistic relations would evolve into purely unequal relations.17 Of course, the count of Guelders, using friendly epithets, could believe he was in a classical patronage relationship, vis-à-vis his Pied- montese creditor as this was common practice for medieval princes. Finally, within the framework of Graeber’s baseline communism, the ambiguous position of the hosteller —offering hospitality for profit— raises the issue of the common etymologic roots of host, hostage, hostile and finally hospitality, as mentioned by Benven- iste (1969), Derrida (1997) and Graeber (2011); the hosteller was simultaneously the one who offered hospitality and had the power (potere in latin) over his guests as land- lord over his hostel. The host was a potential enemy –hostis/hostilis in latin.18(see scheme 1). We will see in the following part that the hosteller became rapidly a justice auxiliary for the urban authorities but suffice to say already at this stage that innkeepers played a crucial role in controlling their guests as they began registering them for the town authorities. This custom was explained by a common trade practice in the late Middle Ages: the seizure of foreign merchant goods when their native city was indebted to their city of sojourn (i.e., for unpaid life-annuities).19

17 Graeber 2010b. 18 Graeber 2011, 101 ; Dufourmantelle and Derrida 1997, 43-53. In the word hospitem, following Benven- iste, the suffix pet- or pot- contained the idea of master found in the sanskrit word pàtih (master and husband) and in the greek posis (husband) which gave the composed word despôtes, master of the house and the latin potere, from which is derived possum, « I can » See Benveniste 2006, 2, 1744-1745. 19 Hermesdorf 1977, 215-227, see particularly 223-227 and more recently Zuijderduijn 2015, 27-48.

Being hostage in an inn for a debt: A long-standing legal tradition (12th century- 18th century): It is difficult nowadays to perceive how widespread this debt custody custom was: al- most all town privileges mention its use in the late-medieval northern Low Countries and, in the southern Low Countries, sources mention its existence from the thirteenth century on (bishoprics of Liège and Tournai, county of Flanders and duchy of Brabant). The existence of proverbs such as “festin d’otage, festin coûteux “or, roughly translated, “hostage’s banquet, costly banquet” testifies to the popularity of the custom.20 At this stage, we should highlight the fact that the precocious appearance of the custom in the town charters between ca. 1190 and 1297 (Bruges, Ghent, and in some cities of Zeeland) was probably linked to a particular phenomenon: the institution of the vredeghisel (hostage for peace) or “peace-breaker”. During the thirteenth century, someone being convicted of an offence was labelled as a peace-breaker, i.e., someone who had broken the peace of the city. In Flanders and in Zeeland, the peace-breaker and the plaintiff had both to name pledges that would go sojourning either in the town’s prison or in an inn as hostages guaranteeing the enforcement of the judgement. They had to sleep and eat in this place. That the origin of the pledge institution in the town charters was linked to the prosecuting of criminal offences is proved by the fact that as soon as in 1229, in Brussels, the guilty party could name two pledges who could pay the fine in his place within fifteen days.21 Of course, personal sureties made up of hostages were no typical phenomena of late- medieval legal contracts. Hostages as guarantees of political treaties for example go back as far as biblical times and throughout Roman history, consuls or emperors asked their subjected opponents to provide them with hostages, as a proof of submission to the conditions of a peace treaty22. However, the practice of taking hostages as guarantors of personal obligations such as debts does appear foremost during the late Middle Ages.

20 Hermesdorf 1977, 179-201 ; Godding 1987, n. 771, p. 445 : tenir hostage, iacere ad comestus, gésir a magnalhes, leisten ; Kosto 2009 , 130-131. 21 As late as 1619, the town legal customs of Bruges still mention the competence of the town aldermen to pronounce a judgement with an inliggen clause, in civil cases as in criminal cases : Hermesdorf 1977, 196- 197 and Godding 1999, 149, art. 17. 22 Kosto 2009, 2-4.

Initially, this custom developed south of the Loire region, in Francia during the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, before spreading to North Western Europe. However, according to Kosto, the meridional part of France appeared also as a pioneering region in this respect with evidence dating from the end of the eleventh century and the twelfth century in local law texts in Arles and Aix.23 Let us underline the longue durée of this practice; within the Low Countries, it seems to fade away only from the sixteenth century. But, whether in the northern Low Coun- tries or in the southern Low Countries, the Inliggen custom remains in use as a tool to enforce legal judgements that had been rendered24. The custom survived sporadically up to the middle of the eighteenth century in the northern Low Countries. The taking of hostages was not at all, as asserted by Greif, a form of “bargaining in the shadow of the law”.25 Leisting was a custom that was enforced by the local aldermen in the place of sojourn of the pledges. The intensity of law-enforcement varied between the regions and even from one city to the other: sometimes, the pledges would go as hostages in an inn without being summoned to do so, sometimes, they would do so at the first notice of the creditor. In some cases, the main debtor appears among the conditional hostages and in other cases not.26 In some cities such as Elburg (in 1390) if the debtor flew from his hostel of leisting without having paid off his debts, he faced the loss of his citizenship.27 With respect to the debtor, initially, the average debtor could expect a harsher treat- ment than more aristocratic debtors when it came to delayed payments: the privileges charter of ‘s-Hertogenbosch states in 1284 that when someone being indebted to someone else and condemned by a judgment to pay off his debts proves unable to do so, he must be transferred to the custody of the ducal bailiff for two weeks (implying thus a prison for debt). If after the term of two weeks, he still proves unable to reimburse his creditor the debtor must be handed over to the power of his creditor. The latter had then to provide his debtor with food and drink without attempting to any violence until an agreement had been found or the debt been paid off. The town charter gives no further details on the tools that the creditor had at his disposal to enforce the debt pay-

23 See also Roth 2019, 99-136. 24 Hermesdorf 1977, 208-211 ; Godding 1987, n°771, 444. 25 Greif 2005, 739. 26 Hermesdorf 1977, 183-186. 27 Hermesdorf 1977, 187.

ment. A similar provision had to be found by the creditor according to the privileges charter of Gorinchem (1412).28 These urban regulations are of course in stark contrast to the “soft power” debt negotiation at play with aristocratic debtors at the same early period (13th century) when a number of pledges could substitute for the main debtor and go sojourning in a luxurious hostel on their own expenses. High-ranking nobles or princes could indeed send in their place vassals or squires. The hosteller had to be paid and the final bill could fetch quite high. 29 We should highlight the fact that the leisting custom developed predominantly within an aristocratic environment in the late medieval Low Countries during the years 1200- 1300, before gaining ground in the urban society.30 The intensity of the use of this custom in the daily mercantile practices and for modest credit loans is subject to debate. We think that in our regions, this custom was above all aimed at exerting pressure on powerful debtors (thus from mainly aristocratic stock) for the reimbursement of their debts.

The intimate links between bankers and hostellers as seen through the Leisting custom We choose to focus mainly here on Piedmontese (the so-called Lombards) banking net- works because of their financial practices showing a high degree of cultural exchanges with the local elites. Among these, the Inliggen custom figured prominently as early as 1282 as we have seen. That the Leisting custom survived during a very long-time span throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries hints undoubtedly at the good inte- gration of the Piedmontese financial intermediaries among the urban society of the Low Countries.31 We have observed above that through their debt contracts, Piedmontese financiers helped to circulate Roman law principles and terminology, improving the legal strength of the contract. Furthermore, it threatened the debtor with legal suits, should he not abide by the terms of the contract.

28 Camps 1979, I, n. 1284, art. 24, 498 ; Hermesdorf 1977, 187. 29 See Hermesdorf 1977, 181-186 ; Godding 1995-1996, 130-131. 30 The count Willem I of Holland agreed to a form of leisting in Ghent, with two of his knights, should he default on the set date for repayment of a loan (1213) : Zuijderduijn 2009, 82. Similarly, the examples provided in Hermesdorf 1977, 179-184, stem initially from princely archives, linked to « state » finances and manor lords credit dealings (duke of Limburg in 1253 and in 1268, lord of Boxtel with the chapter of Saint Servaas in Maastricht in 1308). The first example stemming from the mercantile milieu is given in 1326 when a Boldewinus Scelewerd, himself an innkeeper, agrees to a leisting, alongside other pledges, in an inn chosen by the creditor, should the main debtor default. 31 Bigwood 1921-1922, I, 553 : shows that the custom was still common practice for princely debts in 1373.

The fact that this custom was in use among economic actors whose financial reputation was at times deemed dubious— Lombards— is another interesting feature illustrat- ing these cultural exchanges. After all, Lombards suffered from an ill-famed reputation of usurers. Similarly, in Germany, Jewish financiers as in Bamberg, or in Nürnberg re- sorted to this guarantee (13th to 15th century), should the debtor not meet his obligations of repayment.32 The same pattern of hostageship for unpaid debt is attested in the customs of Jewish financiers in the late-thirteenth century Narbonne: it was an obvious case for a cultural borrowing of a legal instrument first devised in a Christian context.33 Making use of a practice linking aristocrats and burghers through the obligation of pledges (vassals, knights, squires) to sojourn in a city inn was a good tool to foster exchanges between the nobility and the mercantile milieu. Of course, the managers of Piedmontese pawnshops kept often far-reaching business contacts, most notably with English wool merchants, Hanseatic merchants represented in Bruges or Brabantine cloth merchants exporting their products to the Avignon papal court. The intermediation of brokers-hostellers was pivotal in the deployment of these far-reaching business contacts. 34 As our scheme illustrates, a credit relationship between a prince and a banker rested upon a wide range of intermediaries that helped building up ties between the prince and his future creditor. In the case of the count Renaud of Guelders, his councillor and vassal, John of Cuyck kept strong ties with Piedmontese financiers and Tuscan merchant- bankers. He resided often in ‘s-Hertogenbosch where he enjoyed the profits derived from a feudal rent in the city.35 The fact that the debt contract was written in his lordship of Grave, in 1282, sheds light on his crucial role. Furthermore, the legality of the debt contract was enforced through the intermediation of legal specialists, clerics, town clerks and chancery clerks. In the ultimate phase, local merchants and brokers- hostellers were the key actors of the credit relationship when the main debtor had to send pledges (vassals and princely servants) in the chosen city of leisting.

32 Mentgen 2008, 53-66, 56-57. For other categories of creditors, see for example, Godding 1999, 262-266 : local moneylenders appear in the company of knights, clerics or members of the council of Brabant in the years 1430-1467 among the various creditors. 33 Roth 2019, 108-112. 34 For a good overview of the high-profile trade occupations of Piedmontese financiers in England, see inter alia Reichert 2001, 77-134 ; for their connections with Hanseatic merchants, see Murray 2003, 145- 146 and for their involvement in the trade of Brabantine cloths to the Avignon court from 1327, see Kus- man 2012, Usuriers publics, 315. 35 Kusman 2009, 87.

(see scheme 2) The material documenting the privileged cities of leisting come from our previous study on two important banking societies in the Low Countries and in Rhineland between ca. 1280 and ca. 1330: the Mirabello society and the Roero society. These two families operated a dozen or so pawnshops between Bruges and Cologne. Cities of sojourn for leisting (custody for debt) mentioned in loan contracts with Piedmontese financiers of the Mirabello-de Roero banking societies (1282-1329) Cities ‘s- Woudrichem Cologne Bonn Maastricht Wessem Sint- Hertogenbosch Truiden Leisting 5 4 3 1 1 1 1 mentions

Unfortunately, the scarce archival sources that we have at our disposal for this early period does not provide us with a wealth of details on the chosen hostels and on the hosteller, with one exception.36 We are dealing mainly with debt-litigation records offering poor information on the hostels of residence and focusing above all on the creditor and on the debtor. We now turn to the other important actor in this practice, the hosteller. As we all know, medieval hostellers were multi-faceted intermediaries:37 they accepted deposits, could perform bank transactions between accounts (as in Bruges for example), they could also act as attorneys in local courts or in the princely court (such as the council of Brabant). But they also were very often former merchants who had kept their interregional (if not supra-regional) business connections after having put an end to their ca- reer of itinerant traders. The fact that they kept money or merchandises as deposits from foreign merchants made them important economic actors and more often than not, they belonged to prominent families, recruited among the ranks of the urban elites linked to the ruling social groups.38

36 In ‘s-Hertogenbosch, the hosteller and alderman Alard, hosts the pledges of the count of Guelders and the count of Flanders around 1291-1292 (Meihuizen 1953, 120 and 123-124), probably in connection with the debts owed to Cavazonne. 37 See for example Greve 1996, 6-11 and Murray 2003 186-210. 38 Again we depend on the scarcity of detailed accounts on the hosteller’s business in this respect. But in the rulings of the 15th century-council of Brabant, we find that one of the most luxurious hostel of the city, Den Spiegel is in the hands of Jan Clutinc, a prominent patrician belonging to one of the seven most prominent lineages of the city of Brussels: the top urban elites of Brussels (Godding 1998,126). Further examples: the hostel of De Catte belongs to Jan of Coudenberg, one of the administrators of the cloth guild in 1372-1373 as well a member of the Brussels lineages and de Sterre is in the hands of Jan Taye and finally, In den roiden Scilt is in the hands of Gilles de Mol in 1369 (Dickstein 1981, 75), a patrician whose family, like the Taye, the Coudenberg and the Clutinc frequently is represented among the aldermen of the city

For instance, some of the most luxurious inns mentioned in Brussels during the reign of Philipp the Good (1430-1467) such as den Roiden Schilt or Int Gulden Hoet are located in well-off districts, i.e., the most central ones, near the wheat market or the Sint-John Hospital. Around the end of the fifteenth century, a fiscal census found very low figures of poor inhabitants in those districts.39 Hostellers were liable for all merchant goods deposited in their inns. Inns were public spaces for merchant dealings but also places of fiscal dues on beverages. Of course, this implied that innkeepers were deemed trustworthy and reputable persons. As a rule, inns of a certain standing became true information hubs.40 Finally, in their capacity of former merchants and having ties with the urban administration, hostellers could also function as brokers for foreign merchants. The fact that their legal status varied from one city to another —from early regulated in Bruges with a legally recognized guild of brokers-hostellers by the begin of the fourteenth century to lately regulated in Brus- sels—conveys the idea that hostellers adapted to economic regional conditions and that they were strongly dependent on local political conditions, with regard to the late Mid- dle Ages.41 It is no wonder then that the same cities mentioned as preferential loci of conditional hostageship by Piedmontese creditors often came up in the chivalric tales as cities where knights were given hospitality in luxurious inns. By way of illustration, the fame of the luxurious inns in Limburg and in the Rhine val- ley was spread by chivalric tales, for instance in the Roman de la Rose, written by Jean

during the 14th century. In Mechelen, the Ostel of Arnould d’Oudeghem a prominent patrician and member of the political elite, is chosen for important political events such as the feudal oath taken by vassals of the lord of Mechelen in 1316 when Florent Berthout, lord of Mechelen sold his lordship to the count of Hainault. In the city of ‘s-Hertogenbosch, the hosteller Alardus accepts a bank deposit from Gerard de Luxembourg, lord of Durbuy in 1285. Alardus is a prominent burgher and alderman of the city (Kusman 2012, 40 and 308. In Flanders, Bruges, too, hostellers contrary to brokers (chiefly recruited among the ranks of the middling groups) belong to wealthy and powerful families : Murray 2003,187 as is the case of Middelburg or Eeklo in the 15th century : Hermesdorf 1977, 30-31. In the county of Holland, the most pres- tigious inns are also often in the hands of prominent patricians such as the inn De Witte Hond in Amster- dam in 1455: Hell 2017, 53. 39 Godding 1995-1996, 129-144, 134 and 136, the same inns are mentioned in the census of 1496 : Cuveli- er 1912-1913, I, 276-277 and 279 : poor inhabitants families found in houses of the district of the Gulden Hoet amount to 1,1 percent of the total figure of inhabited houses whereas in the case of the Rooden Schilt.district this figure amouts to 3,3 percent of the inhabited houses. 40 Reyerson 2002, 167. 41 Murray 2003, 196-197, Gelderblom 2013, 42-75. In Brussels, the first town ordinances related to the brokers and hostellers date from the last quarter of the fourteenth century: see : Dickstein 1981, 69-90 and Favresse 1946, 167-234.

Renart, around 1228. This epic tale took place among other towns, in Cologne, Maas- tricht and Sint-Truiden. It told the efforts of an emperor courting a young penniless lady. The regions where the action is set were highly urbanised, alongside the commercial axis linking Cologne with the cloth-thriving cities of Brabant and Flanders. The rich burghers of Cologne, Maastricht and Sint-Truiden lived off their profits in the commerce and as intermediaries in the transit trade between Rhineland and Flanders. To take the example of Sint-Truiden, it was a city ideally located for the cloth exports of Brabant, transported by road to Cologne via Maastricht. Jean Renart mentioned explicitly the inns of Maastricht and Sint-Truiden. A tournament is set in Sint-Truiden, which gave the opportunity for the writer to give a laudatory comment on the local inns hosting the knights coming in the city to joust. The owners of these one-storey hostels with adorned balconies aimed at hosting a mainly knightly clientele that did not shy away from conspicuous consumption. These inns were often located near the main city market. The debt contracts concluded between Lombards and the noble families of Rhine- land that we studied often mention that the hostel should be an honestus one, that is, an honourable hostel. Finally, the aristocrats that came into the hostel for a leisting sojourn as in Cologne could have the feeling to be immersed into an Arthurian romance because some of the lenders, belonging to the Roero and Troya families, bore surnames borrowed from epics in the Arthurian Cycle, such as Percevallus, Galvagnus and Tristanus. The knightly virtues circulated by the Arthur cycle made their way into the towns of Brabant and Rhine- land from the end of the thirteenth century, thanks to the organisation of tournaments attracting the nobility from the Low Countries and the Artois and Cambrésis regions. In ‘s-Hertogenbosch, the count of Holland himself, Floris V, was knighted on the occasion of a tournament in 1277.42 Of course, the distinctive character provided by knightly ideol- ogy played in the hands of Piedmontese creditors. Values of generosity, courtesy, prow- ess, loyalty and above all honour were promoted.43 One might speculate that these same virtues were instrumental in making the leisting contract efficient and more enforceable, from the perspective of Piedmontese creditors. This would explain also the privileged part of ‘s-Hertogenbosch and Cologne in the choices of Piedmontese creditors for the sojourn of the pledges, alongside the fact that these very cities were commercial hubs of

42 Kusman 2012, 105 and Avonds 1998, 47, n. 47. 43 Prestwich 2006, 76-77.

first importance in the urban network of those regions. But the border situation of some cities where Lombards benefited from extended privileges from the local lord could also play a role: such was the case of the Mirabello society established in Woudrichem, a local lordship depending from the Hornes family and an enclave in the county of Holland. The urban laws of Woudrichem were strongly influenced by the town privileges of ‘s- Hertogenbosch, granting an important role to the hosteller in debt litigation cases.44

Concluding remarks In this paper, we have studied how a custom that grew out of aristocratic and Chris- tian values (faithfulness to the overlord, sacred character of the oath) spread to the credit practices between Piedmontese moneylenders and the high nobility. 45 First, as we have seen, the high-standing inns, used for the leisting custom, offered a wide array of facilities, such as credit, deposit banking, contacts with local merchants, and urban elites: they were at the meeting point of an economy where gift and counter- gift ethos mixed with mercantile profit-seeking strategies, embodied by Piedmontese moneylenders and their partners, the hostellers within the institutional framework of the leisting custom. This feature bears a close resemblance with the pilgrimage's economy. Between the eleventh and the thirteenth centuries in the meridional regions of France, a whole commercialised economy grew steadily from the needs of pilgrims to change money, to lodge or even to sell products from their native regions as was the case for instance for Flemish pilgrims. Here too, patterns of a typical gift and counter-gift economy (religious donations for example) interacted with the features of more advanced trade techniques such as long-distance trade, short-term credit, money changing, brokerage fees for hostellers when informing on pack horses for the needs of the pilgrims, etc… not to mention the connection of pilgrimages with regional fairs.46 Second, using a perspective borrowed from Graeber (his baseline communism theory), we attempted at deconstructing the credit relationship between count Renaud of Guelders and Tadeo Cavazonne. We pinpointed that in his credit relationship, the count of Guelders expected a classical patronage relationship-hierarchy- with his Piedmontese creditor. But elements of « baseline communism » surfaced too: the loaned capital fuelled the urgent needs of a prince to support his territorial claims, the leisting relied

44 Kusman 2012, 192. 45 Again, the paper of Roth 2019, 112 provides us with similar patterns of cultural borrowing. 46 See the stimulating overview on this issue by Petrowiste 2012, 729-742.

both on the hospitality custom and on the collective solidarity of the pledges for their overlord. At the same time, the ambiguous position of the hosteller (host, broker and partner of the Piedmontese moneylenders) shows that the financial custom was a by- product of aggressive profit-seeking strategies for both the lenders and the hostellers. It was no form of naive baseline communism. One the one hand, trust and friendship were essential components of those credit transactions, but on the other hand, they soon gave way to more profit-seeking ethos in the second loan contract when the banker asked for more serious guarantees: the revenues of the prince (and most notably, the tolls revenues). Ultimately, for both parties, the contract rested upon a gamble for Renaud of Guelders. He needed to win with money military allies. Had he won the succession war for Limburg, then the costs of his loan received from his “dear Thadeo” would have proven negligible, whereas ten years later the public debt of Guelders amounted to 60,000 tournois pounds. 47 The added value of a Graeberian perspective is to substitute for a lack of quantitative data on innkeepers. Indeed, the period that fell under scrutiny here (the years 1250- 1350) is very poor in terms of archival sources on the costs of the sojourns, their lengths and the extent of the reimbursement of the lodging costs by the main debtor. Third, the longue durée of the leisting or Inliggen custom (three centuries at least) hints at the fact that this custom was perfectly geared towards the needs of the nobility to enter into a debt negotiation process where honour and trustworthiness played an important part, irrespective of the short delays of payment expressed in the original debt contract. Finally, one may suggest that a whole “leisting-economy” developed from the 1250- ies, linking the urban economy of the cities of the Low Countries and Rhineland with the conspicuous consumption of the itinerant high aristocracy of these regions. We plan to study in the following years the patterns of this economy on an interregional scale, using fiscal information, archaeological data and literary sources.

47 Kusman 2009, 106.

Appendix: illustration, schemes and map.

Scheme 1.

Scheme 2.

References:

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