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International Relations 1900 -1901 You Are Studying 3 Sections for This Exam

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International Relations 1900 -1901 You Are Studying 3 Sections for This Exam Unit 1 – Peace and War: International Relations 1900 -1901 You are studying 3 Sections for this exam. Section 4 – How did the Cold War develop? 1943 -56 Section 5 – Three Cold War crises: Berlin, Cuba and Czechoslovakia c. 1957 – 69 Section 6 – Why did the Cold War end? The first thing you need to understand is the differences between America and Russia. America Russia 1. The richest country in the world. 1. The biggest country in the world. 2. A democracy with free elections, 2. A one-party state led by a dictator. There were led by an elected president. elections, but you could only vote for the Communist Party. 3. Freedom of speech and belief. 3. State control: censorship, secret police, terror and purges. 4. Capitalism - private ownership and 4. Communism - state ownership of the means of the right to make money. production, and the belief that wealth should be shared. 5. Led by Truman, who believed that 5. Led by Stalin, who believed that capitalism was Communism was evil. evil. 6. Had the atomic bomb- but was 6. Had the biggest army in the world - but was scared of Russia's conventional army. angry that Truman had not warned that he was going to drop the atomic bomb. 7. Feared the spread of 7. Was angry because America and Britain had communism throughout the world. invaded Russia in 1918-19 to try to destroy communism. 8. Angry about the Nazi-Soviet 8. Believed that America and Britain had delayed Pact that was a major factor in opening the second front (attacking France) to let starting the Second World War. Germany and Russia destroy each other on the eastern front. 9. Wanted reconstruction - to make 9. Wanted to wreck Germany, take huge Germany a prosperous democracy and reparations for the damage done during the war, a trading partner. and set up a buffer of friendly states around Russia to prevent another invasion in the future. 1 What was the Grand Alliance? • Set up in 1941 to defeat Hitler • America, Britain and USSR worked together • Once Hitler had been defeated in 1945 alliance became increasingly uneasy. The Tehran Conference 1943 • Big three Stalin (USSR), Churchill (Britain) and Roosevelt (USA) • Agreed Soviet Union could have sphere of influence in Eastern Europe • Disagreements 1. Stalin wanted Germany to pay reparations 2. Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to rebuild Germany The Yalta Conference, February 1945 • Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt got on well – high point of the alliance • Agreements 1. Russian troops would help defeat Japan in the Pacific 2. Countries of Eastern Europe would be allowed to hold free elections 3. Germany and Berlin would be divided into 4 zones, run by USA, Britain, France and USSR • Disagreements • Over what democracy meant. • Stalin believed a democratic government had to be communist, Roosevelt believed it involved a number of different political parties. The Potsdam Conference, July – August 1945 • Roosevelt died in April 1945 and had been replaced by Truman. During the conference Churchill was replaced by new PM Atlee. These new leaders did not get on as well with Stalin. • Agreements 1. Ban the Nazi party and prosecute surviving Nazis as war criminals. 2. Reduce the size of Germany by approx a quarter. 2 • Disagreements 1. Stalin wanted more reparations than Britain and USA did. Compromise was made – each ally would take reparations from the zone they occupied. Stalin was not happy as his zone was poorer than the other countries’ zones. 2. Stalin set up a communist government in. Truman and Atlee were suspicious of his motives. 3. Atom bomb worsened relations between Truman and Stalin. Stalin believed the USA was using it as a warning to the USSR. Truman believed he had the ultimate weapon which made him determined to stand up to Stalin and stop Soviet expansion. An arms race developed. Why did the Cold War begin? • Although elections were held in Eastern Europe, evidence suggests that they were rigged to allow USSR-backed communist parties to take control. By 1948 all Eastern Europe states had communist governments. • By 1946 Europe had been divided between capitalism in the west and communism in the east. Churchill called this division the ‘iron curtain’. • The Long Telegram (1946) was from an American ambassador in Moscow who reported that Stalin was building up his military power and calling for the destruction of capitalism. • Novikov’s telegram (1946) was from the Soviet Ambassador to America who reported that America wanted to dominate the world and had no interest in co-operation with USSR. • Both countries now believed they were facing war. Truman Doctrine 1947 • Truman believed that Stalin was going to encourage communist revolutions across Europe, especially in countries such as Italy, France, Greece, Turkey and the UK who had suffered hardships due to the war. • Truman responded with the Truman Doctrine which was seen as the unofficial declaration of the Cold War. 1. World had a choice between communist tyranny and democratic freedom 2. America had a responsibility to fight for liberty, no longer staying out of international affairs 3. America would send troops and economic resources to help governments threatened by communism and stop communism gaining territory (containment) 3 The Marshall Plan 1947 • Committed to economic recovery of Europe to prevent spread of communism. • $13 billion was sent to rebuild shattered economies of Europe between 1947 -51. • Aim: make Europe prosperous so communism was not an attraction. • Terms of the plan – you had to agree to trade freely with America. • 16 countries accepted it – all western European states. • Stalin refused Marshall Aid and banned Eastern European countries for accepting it and responded by setting up Cominform and Comecon. Cominform 1947 • Alliance of communist countries under direction of USSR. • Ensured loyalty of Eastern European countries by removing opposition, investigating government ministers and employees, and removing those not loyal to Stalin. Comecon 1949 • Set up to co-ordinate trade and production in Eastern Europe countries. • Aim: encourage economic development of Eastern Europe and prevent trade with Western Europe Bizonia • By 1947 British and American zones were operating as one and became known as Bizonia, which later became known as Trizonia (1948) when the French zone joined. This became known as West Germany in 1949. Berlin Blockade and airlift, 1948 -9 Causes • Marshall Aid was helping West Germany to recover; people were leaving the poverty stricken East Germany as WG seemed a better place to live. • Stalin felt that the Allies were building up West Germany to attack him, when they introduced the new currency in West Germany he decided to act. 4 Events • Stalin tried to blockade Berlin, cutting off all road and rail connections from Berlin to West Germany. Aim: force Western Allies out of the city. • Two choices for USA and UK. 1. Withdraw – but this would be humiliating and encourage Stalin to think he could invade West Germany. 2. Lift supplies into West Berlin by air. • The airlift lasted until spring 1949. It provided West Berliners with food, clothing, oil and building supplies. • At its height 16 -17 April 1,398 flights landed nearly 13,000 tonnes of supplies in 24 hours. Results • By 1949 USSR lifted the blockade. It was a propaganda success for USA. • In August 1949 Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) was created and in October the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) was created. The Formation of NATO, 1949 • Military alliance which was between USA and Western European countries. Its purpose was to defend its members; if one was attacked the other members would help to defend it. The Warsaw Pact 1955 • A communist version of NATO The Arms Race • 1945 -9 USA was the only country to possess atomic weapons. • 1949 USSR successfully tested an atomic bomb. • 1952 USA detonated its first hydrogen bomb • 1953 USSR tested its own hydrogen bomb. • Arms race is significant as it prevented a war in Europe. Neither country wanted to risk a nuclear war. 5 Hungarian Uprising, 1956 Causes • Communist government had been established under Rakosi, who called himself Stalin’s best pupil’. • Hungarians hated him and his secret police that had imprisoned 387,000 and was responsible for more than 2,000 deaths. • There were protests against falling standard of living and increased poverty which they blamed on the Soviet policies. Events • Protests got worse and Stalin’s statue was pulled down. Rakosi was forced to resign and Soviet troops moved in. • Nagy (a more liberal leader) was made the new leader, he wanted reform. He proposed that. 1. Hungary should leave the Warsaw pact. 2. Communist government should end. 3. Hungary should become a western style democracy with free elections. 4. Hungary should ask the UN for protection from Russia. • Khrushchev (new Soviet leader) responded by sending in Soviet tanks and 1000 tanks to crush the uprising. Nagy appealed to the West for help but none came. Two weeks of fighting followed. Nagy was captured and shot. Results • Between 2500 – 30,000 Hungarians (mostly civilians were killed) • Over 200,000 refugees fled Hungary and settled in the West. • No active support for the uprising in the West. • New pro-Soviet government was set up under Kadar, he re-established communist control of Hungary. • Other satellite states in eastern Europe did not dare to challenge Soviet authority 6 Section 5 – Three Cold War crises: Berlin, Cuba and Czechoslovakia c. 1957 – 69 Berlin Why was Berlin such an area of conflict? • Berlin was within the Soviet zone of Germany • West Berliners had a high standard of living, which reminded the communist East Berliners of their poor living conditions. • Between 1947 -61 an estimated 3 million East Berliners crossed to the West.
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