James Dundas on Seneca, Descartes and the Fall

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

James Dundas on Seneca, Descartes and the Fall CHAPTER 10 James Dundas on Seneca, Descartes and the Fall Alexander Broadie In the burgeoning narrative concerning the appropriation of the classics by seventeenth-century Scottish philosophers, one important example of such appropriation that is only now beginning to receive due attention is a manu- script entitled “Idea philosophiae moralis”, written in 1679 by James Dundas (c.1620–1679), first Lord Arniston.1 The MS contains discussion of, or at least reference to an immense array of sources, including more than fifty classical authors. These include Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Cicero, Democritus, Epictetus, Epicurus, Lucretius, Seneca, Sextus Empiricus, Tertullian, Lactantius, Augustine and Boethius. Moreover, as evidence that Dundas’ reading extended far beyond classical thinkers, he also quotes or refers to more than forty medieval and post-medieval thinkers, including Anselm of Canterbury, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, Ramus, Amyraut, Bacon, Bellarmine, Beza, Bramhall, Buchanan, Burgersdijck, Cajetan, Fonseca, Molina, Julius Caesar Scaliger, Descartes, Gassendi, Grevinhovius, Grotius, Heerebord, Hobbes, Hornebeck, Keckermann, Lipsius, Maccovy, Culverwell, Henry More and Samuel Rutherford. This immense learning does not mark Dundas out as a unique figure in seven- teenth-century Scotland; many of the theses philosophicae that were composed by the university regents of the period for the graduation ceremonies bear wit- ness to the regents’ grasp of an impressively wide range of classical philosophi- cal sources, sources to which the students were introduced in the course of their lectures. Thus Dundas, who registered as a student at St Leonard’s College, St Andrews in 1635, aged fifteen at most, would quickly have been introduced to classical philosophy if he had not already been exposed to it. It is beyond doubt that the philosophical scene in Scotland during the seventeenth century was deeply informed by the writings of the classical philosophers. Among the classical writers in whom Dundas had a special interest was the Roman statesman and Stoic philosopher Seneca the Younger (c.1BC–65AD), 1 The ms is in the library of Arniston House, Gorebridge, Midlothian. With the permission of Althea Dundas-Bekker of Arniston, Dr Giovanni Gellera and I are preparing an edition of the MS. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004330733_0�� 248 Broadie whose writings deeply informed later classical philosophy.2 Prominent in his writings were his concepts of self-improvement and of the role of our will in enabling us to control our emotions and thereby both to govern our lives, and also to govern nations, under the concept of virtue. That many should wish, with Seneca’s help, to explore these most human ideas and to benefit from them, is understandable. Since these concerns of Seneca’s are well-nigh universal, it is also under- standable that his brilliant explorations of them contributed significantly to the growing interest in Stoicism that occurred among philosophers of the Renaissance and the early modern period, including, as will be noted later, many Scottish philosophers of the time. One of the philosophers who responded to Seneca was Descartes, whose philosophy also engages at a deep level with the question of the power of the will and the will’s role in enabling us to live in the light of truth. Descartes’ response to Seneca was committed to paper as a result of a practical question posed to him by his pupil and friend the Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. A volume containing the pupil’s question and the master’s response came into the hands of James Dundas, and from his “Idea philosophiae moralis” we learn what he thought of Seneca’s and Descartes’ judgments on a topic perceived to be at the heart of Stoic think- ing subsequent to the earliest generations of Stoics. It is Dundas’ rejection of the judgments of Seneca and Descartes that is the topic of this paper. First, however, we must appreciate the immediate personal and historical context of Dundas’ rejection. The context will teach us a good deal about the consider- ations that motivated Dundas’ position on Stoicism. I shall seek to argue that central to the motivation of his response is the fact that he was a Calvinist, and that his Calvinism deeply informed his moral philosophy. Who was James Dundas? First some words on James Dundas.3 He was born into a distinguished fam- ily, the Dundases of Arniston, owners of the Arniston estate, a large tract of 2 J.M. Rist, The Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969); R.W. Sharples, Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1996); M.L. Clarke, The Roman Mind: Studies in the History of Thought from Cicero to Marcus Aurelius (London, 1956). 3 For information biographical and philosophical on James Dundas see G.W.T. Omond, The Arniston Memoirs: Three Centuries of a Scottish House, 1571–1838 (Edinburgh, 1887); A. Broadie, “James Dundas and his concept of moral philosophy”, Journal of Scottish Thought, 2 (2009), 99–111; A. Broadie, “James Dundas on the Hobbesian state of nature”, Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 11 (2013), 1–13..
Recommended publications
  • The Physician and Witchcraft in Restoration England
    THE PHYSICIAN AND WITCHCRAFT IN RESTORATION ENGLAND by GARFIELD TOURNEY THE YEAR of 1660 witnessed important political and scientific developments in England. The restoration of the monarchy and the Church of England occurred with the return of Charles II after the dissolution of the Commonwealth and the Puritan influence. The Royal Society, after informal meetings for nearly fifteen years, was established as a scientific organization in 1660 and received its Royal Charter in 1662. During the English revolution, and for a short time during the Commonwealth, interest in witchcraft mounted. Between 1645 and 1646 Matthew Hopkins acquired the reputation as the most notorious witch-finder in the history of England.I His activities in Essex and the other eastern counties led to the execution of as many as 200 witches. In Suffolk it is estimated that he was responsible for arresting at least 124 persons for witchcraft, of whom 68 were hanged. The excesses soon led to a reaction and Hopkins lost his influence, and died shortly thereafter in 1646. There then was a continuing decline in witchcraft persecutions, and an increasing scepticism toward the phenomena of witchcraft was expressed. Scepticism was best exemplified in Thomas Hobbes' (1588-1679) Leviathan, published in 1651.2 Hobbes presented a materialistic philosophy, emphasizing change occurring in motion, the material nature of mental activity, the elimination of final causes, and the rejection of the reality of spirit. He decried the belief in witchcraft and the supematural, emphasizing
    [Show full text]
  • Presidential Address
    Empowering Philosophy Christia Mercer COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY Presidential Address delivered at the one hundred sixteenth Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Philadelphia, PA, on January 10, 2020. The main goal of my presidential address in January 2020 was to show that philosophy’s past offers a means to empower its present. I hoped to encourage colleagues to make the philosophy we teach and practice more inclusive (both textually and topically) and to adopt a more public- facing engagement with our discipline. As I add these introductory remarks to my January lecture, it is June 2020 and the need to empower philosophy has never seemed more urgent. We’ve witnessed both the tragic death of George Floyd and the popular uprising of a diverse group of Americans in response to the ongoing violence against Black lives. Many white Americans—and many philosophers—have begun to realize that their inattentiveness to matters of diversity and inclusivity must now be seen as more than mere negligence. Recent demonstrations frequently contain signs that make the point succinctly: “Silence is violence.” A central claim of my January lecture was that philosophy’s status quo is no longer tenable. Even before the pandemic slashed university budgets and staff, our employers were cutting philosophy programs, enrollments were shrinking, and jobs were increasingly hard to find. Despite energetic attempts on the part of many of our colleagues to promote a more inclusive approach to our research and teaching, the depressing truth remains:
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy, Religion, and Heterodoxy in the Philosophy of Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and Anne Conway
    Church History Church History and and Religious Culture 100 (2020) 157–171 Religious Culture brill.com/chrc Philosophy, Religion, and Heterodoxy in the Philosophy of Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and Anne Conway Sarah Hutton University of York, York, UK [email protected] Abstract Philosophers who hold the compatibility of reason and faith, are vulnerable to the charge of opening the way to atheism and heterodoxy. This danger was particularly acute when, in the wake of Cartesianism, the philosophy of Spinoza and Hobbes neces- sitated a resetting of the relationship of philosophy with religion. My paper discusses three English philosophers who illustrate the difficulties for the philosophical defence for religion: Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and Anne Conway, for all of whom philo- sophical and religious truth were deeply intertwined. But each of them also subscribed to heterodox religious beliefs. This raises questions of whether there is a direct the rela- tionship between their philosophy and religious heterodoxy—whether they exemplify the charge that philosophy undermines religion, or indeed whether their defence of religion was a cover for heterodoxy. Keywords atheism – heterodoxy – Platonism – Descartes – More – Cudworth – Conway 1 Introduction Accusations of atheism occur relatively frequently in the philosophico-theo- logical polemics of the seventeenth century.1 This is particularly the case with 1 The term “atheism” itself had broader sense than it does today as a blanket term for irreligion © sarah hutton, 2020 | doi:10.1163/18712428-10002002 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0Downloaded license. from Brill.com10/01/2021 08:06:06PM via free access 158 hutton Hobbes and Spinoza, but Cartesianism was seen by many as leading to athe- ism.
    [Show full text]
  • Henry More, Richard Baxter, and Francis Glisson's Trea Tise on the Energetic Na Ture of Substance
    Medical History, 1987, 31: 15-40. MEDICINE AND PNEUMATOLOGY: HENRY MORE, RICHARD BAXTER, AND FRANCIS GLISSON'S TREA TISE ON THE ENERGETIC NA TURE OF SUBSTANCE by JOHN HENRY* The nature of the soul and its relationship to the body has always proved problematical for Christian philosophy. The source ofthe difficulty can be traced back to the efforts of the early Fathers to reconcile the essentially pagan concept of an immaterial and immortal soul with apostolic teachings about the after-life in which all the emphasis is placed upon the resurrection of the body. The tensions between these two traditions inevitably became strained during the sixteenth century when Protestant reformers insisted on a closer adherence to Scripture. Furthermore, even when leaving the problems of Scriptural hermeneutics aside, the dualistic approach to the question, in which soul (or spirit) and body are held to be categorically different in essence, had to overcome a number of intractable philosophical problems. So, it was not simply coincidence that when the new mechanical philosophy began to be formulated in a systematic way in the seventeenth century, it was couched in vigorously dualistic terms. In fact, three of the earliest fully elaborated systems of mechanical philosophy, those of Descartes, Digby, and Charleton, were explicitly intended to provide a philosophical prop for dualist theology.' Moreover, it was because of its usefulness in promoting dualism that Cartesianism was first popularized in England not by a natural philosopher but by the Cambridge Platonist and theologian, Henry More.2 *John Henry, MPhil, PhD, Wellcome Institute for the History ofMedicine, 183 Euston Road, London NWI 2BP.
    [Show full text]
  • Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations Spring 2010 Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection Jason Skirry University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Skirry, Jason, "Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection" (2010). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 179. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/179 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/179 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Malebranche's Augustinianism and the Mind's Perfection Abstract This dissertation presents a unified interpretation of Malebranche’s philosophical system that is based on his Augustinian theory of the mind’s perfection, which consists in maximizing the mind’s ability to successfully access, comprehend, and follow God’s Order through practices that purify and cognitively enhance the mind’s attention. I argue that the mind’s perfection figures centrally in Malebranche’s philosophy and is the main hub that connects and reconciles the three fundamental principles of his system, namely, his occasionalism, divine illumination, and freedom. To demonstrate this, I first present, in chapter one, Malebranche’s philosophy within the historical and intellectual context of his membership in the French Oratory, arguing that the Oratory’s particular brand of Augustinianism, initiated by Cardinal Bérulle and propagated by Oratorians such as Andre Martin, is at the core of his philosophy and informs his theory of perfection. Next, in chapter two, I explicate Augustine’s own theory of perfection in order to provide an outline, and a basis of comparison, for Malebranche’s own theory of perfection.
    [Show full text]
  • Comparison of Focus and Audience Between Seneca's Natural
    East Tennessee State University Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Student Works 5-2014 Comparison of Focus and Audience Between Seneca’s Natural Questions and Pliny’s Natural History Joshua Ely East Tennessee State University Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/etd Part of the European History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, Intellectual History Commons, and the Oral History Commons Recommended Citation Ely, Joshua, "Comparison of Focus and Audience Between Seneca’s Natural Questions and Pliny’s Natural History" (2014). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 2368. https://dc.etsu.edu/etd/2368 This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Comparison of Focus and Audience Between Seneca’s Natural Questions and Pliny’s Natural History _____________________________ A thesis presented to the faculty of the Department of History East Tennessee State University _____________________________ In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History _____________________________ by Joshua J. Ely May 2014 _____________________________ Dr. William D. Burgess Jr, Chair. Dr. Brian Maxson Dr. John Rankin Keywords: History of Antiquity, History of Science, Rome, Pliny, Seneca, Natural History, Natural Questions ABSTRACT Comparison of Focus and Audience Between Seneca’s Natural Questions and Pliny’s Natural History by Joshua Ely Around 65 AD, the Ancient Roman philosopher Seneca wrote his only text concerning Natural Phenomenon: Natural Questions.
    [Show full text]
  • Discovering Romanity in Seneca's De Otio and De Brevitate Vitae Joshua Dean Wimmer [email protected]
    Marshall University Marshall Digital Scholar Theses, Dissertations and Capstones 1-1-2012 Lend Me Your Voice: Discovering Romanity in Seneca's De otio and De brevitate vitae Joshua Dean Wimmer [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/etd Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons Recommended Citation Wimmer, Joshua Dean, "Lend Me Your Voice: Discovering Romanity in Seneca's De otio and De brevitate vitae" (2012). Theses, Dissertations and Capstones. Paper 255. This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LEND ME YOUR VOICE: DISCOVERING ROMANITY IN SENECA’S DE OTIO AND DE BREVITATE VITAE A Thesis submitted to the Graduate College of Marshall University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Latin by Joshua Dean Wimmer Approved by Dr. E. Del Chrol, Committee Chairperson Dr. Caroline Perkins Dr. Christina Franzen Marshall University May 2012 Copyright by Joshua Dean Wimmer 2012 ii Dedication and Acknowledgments DEDICATION Pro parentibus meis ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would sincerely like to extend my most deeply felt gratitude to Dr. E. Del Chrol, Dr. Caroline Perkins, and Dr. Christina Franzen of the Department of Classics at Marshall University, as well as to any and to all who have helped in some way, no
    [Show full text]
  • Title Joseph Glanvill and Some Restoration Climates of Opinions
    Title Joseph Glanvill and Some Restoration Climates of Opinions Author(s) Rees, Simon Citation 英文学評論 (1987), 54: 26-44 Issue Date 1987-10 URL https://doi.org/10.14989/RevEL_54_26 Right Type Departmental Bulletin Paper Textversion publisher Kyoto University 26 Joseph Glanvill and Some Restoration Climates of Opinions Simon Rees Discussing Joseph Glanvill in The Seventeenth Century Background, Basil Willey used the phrase 'the "Climate of Opinion" ', which he had adapted from a passage in Glanvill's first book, The Vanity ofDogmatizing, to describe how ideas of Reason and Nature could become confused with those of commonsense.1' Glanvill's actual phrase referred to 'the larger Souls, that have travail'd the divers Climates of Opinions', and who are 'more cautious in their resolves, and more sparing to determine'.2' Glanvill certainly included himself among these larger souls, and it is his journey through the different climates of opinions that prevailed in the years of the Restoration that is his most interesting memorial: his work is a meteorological record of the changing fashions of ideas and beliefs, habits of thought and expression, and the conduct of controversies of fact and, if not of law, of doctrine and faith. The first edition of Glanvill's most often reprinted work appeared in 1666 with the title A Philosophical Endeavour towards the Defence of the Being of Witches and Apparitions, just in time for most of the copies to be destroyed in the Great Fire, and was later incorporated into the text of an enlarged edition, Saducismus Triumphatus, published in 1681, a year after Glanvill's death.3' However, the final revision of the text did not appear in this edition, but in a collection of essays that Glanvill published in 1676, called Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion, under the title 'Against Modern Sadducism in the Matter of Witches and Apparitions.
    [Show full text]
  • 83 Re-Reading De Grammatico Or Anselm's Introduction to Aristotle's
    RE-READING DE GRAMMATICO 83 MARILYN McCORD ADAMS Re-reading De grammatico or Anselm’s introduction to Aristotle’s Categories1 I. RESTORING ANSELM’S GOOD NAME In the mid-fifties, D.P. Henry began publishing a series of works2 aimed at recovering St. Anselm’s reputation as a logician from blows suffered at the hands of nineteenth century commentators. Scandalized by the apparently nonsensical opening line of De grammatico — « Whether literate is substance or quality ? » (« De grammatico ... utrum sit substantia an qualitas ? ») — Cousin, Prantl, Maurice, and Hauréau found the work ridiculous. Hastening to usher it to the margin of Anselm’s corpus (the only piece — as they thought — devoted solely to logical matters), they rushed to conclude that for Anselm theology and logic have little to do with one another3 . Inspired by F.S. Schmitt’s discovery of Anselm’s logical fragments4 , Henry found them to shed new light, not only on De Grammatico but also on Anselm’s whole literary output, revealing Anselm to be a consummate logician whose formidable technical powers lent brilliance to his writings on other topics. 1 Norman Kretzmann introduced me to D.P. Henry’s work on paronyms in the early sixties, when it first came out, and I have been worrying about it on and off ever since. More recently, I have benefitted from helpful discussions with Robert Merrihew Adams, Andrew Finch, and Calvin Normore. 2 Most notably, D. P. HENRY, The « De Grammatico » of St. Anselm : The Theory of Paronymy, Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame 1964 ; ID., The Logic of St.
    [Show full text]
  • Stoic Leadership
    Stoic Leadership by Stefan Shirley Long before our time, people would gather and discuss philosophical issues such as how to live a fulfilling and virtuous life. During these times of enlightenment, great thinkers like Locke, Kant, Hume, and Kierkegaard, and philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato, Confucius, and Socrates were laying the foundations for how we think about knowledge, reality, and existence. As an example, and the main focus of this article, Stoicism began with the teachings of Zeno of Citium around 300 BCE and continued for more than 500 years through notable Stoic leaders such as Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Younger) (4 BCE – 65 AD), Epictetus (50-135 AD), and Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD). This philosophy combines lessons from others like Epicurus, Plato, and Socrates but differs in the Stoic Leadership | 1 Stoic Leadership individuals motives regarding character. In particular, the Stoics believed that to live a truly good life, one must be virtuous in areas such as temperance, wisdom, bravery, and justice. Like Stoicism, military leadership demands that leaders possess great character. For many, this requires practicing the Stoic virtues of temperance, wisdom, bravery, and justice. This article aims to summarize each of these virtues and provide examples for leaders to incorporate this ideology in their daily lives. Temperance “Better to trip with the feet than with the tongue.” — Zeno Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, realized his fate when his ship sank along with its cargo. He lost everything. Searching for meaning to it all, he began to study the philosophical ideas from Socrates and Crates. From this, he outlined his own ideals underpinned by the belief that “happiness is a good flow of life.” How to achieve this happiness, he surmised, was by living a life of virtue.
    [Show full text]
  • Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca the Younger)
    LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA (SENECA THE YOUNGER) “NARRATIVE HISTORY” AMOUNTS TO FABULATION, THE REAL STUFF BEING MERE CHRONOLOGY “Stack of the Artist of Kouroo” Project Seneca the Younger HDT WHAT? INDEX SENECA THE YOUNGER SENECA THE YOUNGER 147 BCE August 4: On this date the comet that had passed by the sun on June 28th should have been closest to the earth, but we have no dated record of it being seen at this point. The only Western record of observation of this particular periodic comet is one that happens to come down to us by way of Seneca the Younger, of a bright reddish comet as big as the sun that had been seen after the death of the king of Syria, Demetrius, just a little while before the Greek Achaean war (which had begun in 146 BCE). ASTRONOMY HDT WHAT? INDEX SENECA THE YOUNGER SENECA THE YOUNGER 2 BCE At about this point Lucius Annaeus Seneca was born as the 2d son of a wealthy Roman family on the Iberian peninsula. The father, Seneca the Elder (circa 60BCE-37CE) had become famous as a teacher of rhetoric in Rome. An aunt would take the boy to Rome where he would be trained as an orator and educated in philosophy. In poor health, he would recuperate in the warmth of Egypt. SENECA THE YOUNGER HDT WHAT? INDEX SENECA THE YOUNGER SENECA THE YOUNGER 31 CE Lucius Aelius Sejanus was made a consul, and obtained the permission he has been requesting for a long time, to get married with Drusus’ widow Livilla.
    [Show full text]
  • The Pseudo-Senecan Seneca on the Good Old Days: the Motif of the Golden Age in the Octavia
    The Pseudo-Senecan Seneca on the Good Old Days: The Motif of the Golden Age in the Octavia Oliver Schwazer I. Introduction In his fabula praetexta entitled Octavia, the playwright stages the historical events that occurred during the reign of the last Julio-Claudian emperor in 62 CE.1 Following the divorce from his wife Octavia and re-marriage to another woman, Poppaea Sabina, the emperor gives the order for the former to be exiled. Neither a thorough dispute with his advisor Seneca2 nor the interventions of the pro-Octavia Chorus of Romans can deter Nero from his decision to put down the riots amongst the populace by using the sentence of Octavia as a warning.3 For a number of reasons, the Octavia has always been one of the most intriguing and in many ways most controversial pieces of Latin literature. While the fact that this play has been almost fully preserved can be regarded as extremely gratifying, not least because it stands in contrast to the number of praetextae known to us from no more than a few fragments, or even just one, it is particularly its textual transmission that has overshadowed scholarly dispute. Due to its sharp opposition to the eight mythological plays — excluding the Hercules Oetaeus of doubtful authorship — doubts have been raised about the assumption that the Octavia has been transmitted in manuscripts along with the tragedies now unanimously assigned to Seneca the Younger. To many researchers it seems inconceivable that the earlier advisor and later adversary of Nero would choose to appear as a dramatis persona on stage, particularly in a play where the contemporary emperor was presented in such a disreputable light.
    [Show full text]