DOCSLIB.ORG

A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French "Mistral" Amphibious Assault Warships

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS by Patrick Thomas Baker June 2011 Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious Assault Warships 6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number: N/A. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class amphibious assault ship. In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia’s domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country that some still see as a threat. For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by Russia’s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Mistral, Russian Navy, Russian Naval Modernization, Amphibious Assault Warships, Helicopter PAGES Carriers, NATO Arms sales, NATO solidarity, NATO Baltic relations 152 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS Patrick Thomas Baker Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2000 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (EUROPE AND EURASIA) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2011 Author: Patrick T. Baker Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin, PhD Thesis Advisor Douglas Porch, PhD Second Reader Harold Trinkunas, PhD Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class amphibious assault ship. In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia’s domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country that some still see as a threat. For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by Russia’s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................1 C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS...................................................................2 D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 II. RUSSIAN PLANNING AND REASONS BEHIND THE SELECTION OF THE MISTRAL .........................................................................................................15 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 B. RUSSIAN PLANNING DOCUMENTS.......................................................15 C. RUSSIAN STATE ARMAMENTS PROGRAM (GVP)............................17 D. WHAT STARTED THE TREND TOWARD MISTRAL? .......................19 1. Russian Defense Industry..................................................................20 2. Outdated Shipbuilding Facilities......................................................24 3. Further Arguments Against Domestic Design and Production Only .....................................................................................................30 4. Tirpitz Plan Redux .............................................................................31 5. Lessons Learned From Georgia Conflict.........................................33 E. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS..................................37 F. NEW RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS BESIDES THE MISTRAL........................................................................................................40 G. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY..............................41 H. OTHER COMPARABLE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS TO THE MISTRAL........................................................................................44 I. MISTRAL CAPABILITIES .........................................................................49 J. RUSSIAN NAVAL CAPABILITY GAPS...................................................54 1. Command and Control......................................................................55 2. Hospital Ship or Disaster Relief Warship........................................57 3. Long Range Cruises to Show the Flag .............................................58 4. Amphibious Assault...........................................................................59 K. GENERAL PLACEMENT OF RUSSIAN MISTRALS .............................61 1. Pacific Fleet.........................................................................................62 2. Baltic Fleet ..........................................................................................68 3. Northern Fleet ....................................................................................69 4. Black Sea Fleet ...................................................................................70 L. RUSSIAN NAVAL INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................................72 M. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................78 III. EFFECTS OF MISTRAL SALE ON NATO ALLIANCE ....................................81 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................81 B. BALTIC AND POLISH CONCERNS.........................................................81 C. EU COUNCIL/PARLIAMENT REACTIONS...........................................87 vii D. NATO RESPONSE BEFORE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE ...............................................................................................................89 E. LISBON SUMMIT RESULTS .....................................................................96 F. NATO REACTIONS POST FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT...................98 G. BALTIC REACTIONS POST-OFFICAL ANNOUNCEMENT...............99 H. CONCLUSION
Load more

Recommended publications
  • A New Carrier Race? Yoji Koda
    Naval War College Review Volume 64 Article 4 Number 3 Summer 2011 A New Carrier Race? Yoji Koda Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Koda, Yoji (2011) "A New Carrier Race?," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 3 , Article 4. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen Koda: A New Carrier Race? A NEW CARRIER RACE? Strategy, Force Planning, and JS Hyuga Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired) n 18 March 2009 JS Hyuga (DDH 181) was commissioned and delivered to Othe Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The unique characteris- tic of this ship is its aircraft-carrier-like design, with a “through” flight deck and an island on the starboard side. Hyuga was planned in the five-year Midterm De- fense Buildup Plan (MTDBP) of 2001 and funded in Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2004 as the replacement for the aging first-generation helicopter-carrying de- stroyer (DDH), JS Haruna (DDH 141), which was to reach the end of its service life of thirty-five years in 2009. The second ship of the new class, JS Ise (DDH 182), of the JFY 2006 program, was commissioned 16 March 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • General Assembly Distr.: General 9 September 2014 English Original: Chinese/English/French/ Spanish
    United Nations A/69/124/Add.1 General Assembly Distr.: General 9 September 2014 English Original: Chinese/English/French/ Spanish Sixty-ninth session Item 97 of the provisional agenda* General and complete disarmament United Nations Register of Conventional Arms Report of the Secretary-General Addendum** Contents Page II. Information received from Governments............................................ 2 A. Index of information submitted by Governments ................................. 2 B. Reports received from Governments on conventional arms transfers ................. 3 III. Information received from Governments on military holdings and procurement through national production ............................................................. 10 IV. Information received from Governments on international transfers of small arms and light weapons ...................................................................... 19 * A/69/150. ** The information contained in the present addendum was received after the issuance of the main report. 14-60679 (E) 190914 290914 *1460679* A/69/124/Add.1 II. Information received from Governments A. Index of information submitted by Governments Background information International Procurement transfers of Views on the through small arms Register/ Data on Data on Military national and light national State Report received on exports imports holdings production weapons policies 1. Argentina 30 June 2014 nil X X nil X .. 2. Australia 28 August 2014 X nil X X X .. 3. Belgium 17 July 2014 X X X .. .. .. 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 27 June 2014 X nil .. .. .. .. 5. Brazil 26 August 2014 X X .. .. .. .. 6. Cambodia 2 September 2014 nil nil .. .. .. .. 7. China 28 July 2014 X nil .. .. .. .. 8. Grenada 5 September 2014 nil nil .. .. .. .. 9. Hungary 5 August 2014 X X X .. X .. 10. Republic of Moldova 28 August 2014 nil nil .. .. .. .. 11. Trinidad and Tobago 2 September 2014 .
    [Show full text]
  • China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities
    China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress Updated May 21, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Summary In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long- standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.
    [Show full text]
  • 23. Baltic Perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy
    23. Baltic perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy Elzbieta Tromer I. Introduction Given the choice between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Euro- pean Security and Defence Policy as providers of their national security, the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—look to the USA. One reason is their perception of Russia as a source of instability. Another is their lack of con- fidence in the ability of the ESDP to deal with present-day threats. Although these three states are eager to be ‘normal’ members of the European Union and thus to join in its initiatives, their enthusiasm for the EU’s development of its own military muscle is lukewarm. An EU with some military capability but without the USA’s military strength and leadership holds little promise for them. Since the ESDP vehicle is already on the move, the Baltic states see their main function as ensuring coordination between the ESDP and NATO. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania want to be ‘Atlanticists from within the ESDP’.1 The Baltic states see themselves as exposed to challenges similar to those confronting the Nordic countries: notably the challenge of the new transatlantic dynamic, which makes it almost impossible to avoid taking sides between the US and Europe on an increasing range of global and specific issues. Being torn in this way is bound to be especially painful for Scandinavian [and Baltic] societies which have strong ties of history, culture and values with both sides of the Atlantic, and which in strategic terms are relatively dependent both on American military and European economic strength.2 The Nordic countries are seen by the Baltic states as allies in this context.
    [Show full text]
  • Mistral Albi
    MISTRAL ALBI is a lightweight, 360° turret, optimised for the protection of armoured or mechanised units as well as convoys and which, mistral albi additionally, provides crews with an excellent level of protection vehicle mounted twin mistral missile Mounted on armoured vehicles, MISTRAL ALBI has been designed to carry out all the usual air defence missions such as point defence, local air defence system area defence and, more particularly, defence of mobile units. MISTRAL ALBI benefits from all the advantages associated with the MISTRAL missile (Fire-and-Forget, ease of operation, unrivalled kill probability). The system is based on a lightweight foldable turret with 360° azimuth coverage, manually operated by the gunner. Two missiles are mounted on the turret, even when driving off-road. MISTRAL ALBI can be easily integrated on nearly all types of Armoured Personal Carriers or Light Armoured Vehicles. Six or more missiles can be carried on the vehicle, including two on the turret. • 2 ready-to-fire MISTRAL missiles The system can be operated autonomously, thanks to its thermal sight • Fire and Forget (passive sectorial surveillance) and IFF or integrated to a fire control and • Ease of operation co-ordination system such as the MCP (MISTRAL CO-ORDINATION POST) • Can be integrated to a fire control and co-ordination system or I-MCP (Improved Missile Control Post). such as the MCP MBDA Contacts Sales and Business Development 1 avenue Réaumur 92358 Le Plessis-Robinson cedex - France Tel. + 33 (0) 1 71 54 10 00 Fax + 33 (0) 1 71 54 00 01 [email protected] LAND www.mbda-systems.com MISTRAL 2 is a man-portable, fully digital, heat-seeking missile, designed to meet the requirements of all Name branches of the armed forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Cvf) Programme
    CHILD POLICY This PDF document was made available CIVIL JUSTICE from www.rand.org as a public service of EDUCATION the RAND Corporation. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE Jump down to document6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit POPULATION AND AGING research organization providing PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY objective analysis and effective SUBSTANCE ABUSE solutions that address the challenges TERRORISM AND facing the public and private sectors HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND around the world. INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Europe View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Options for Reducing Costs in the United Kingdom’s Future Aircraft Carrier (cvf) Programme John F. Schank | Roland Yardley Jessie Riposo | Harry Thie | Edward Keating Mark V. Arena | Hans Pung John Birkler | James R. Chiesa Prepared for the UK Ministry of Defence Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United King- dom’s Ministry of Defence.
    [Show full text]
  • World News Agencies and Their Countries
    World News Agencies and their Countries World News Agencies and their Countries Here, you will read about the World News Agencies and their Countries World News Agencies and their Countries 1. Bakhtar News Agency is located in which Country? – Afghanistan 2. Where is the Xinhua (New China News Agency) located? – China 3. Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF) is the News agency located in which Country? – Bolivia 4. Albanian Telegraphic Agency (ATA) is located in which Country? – Albania 5. Where is the Cuban News Agency (ACN) located? – Cuba 6. Angola Press (Angop) is located in which Country? – Angola 7. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) located in which Country? – Iran 8. Telam is the News agency located in which Country? – Argentina 9. Novinite is the News agency located in which Country? – Bulgaria 10. Armenpress is the News agency located in which Country? – Armenia 11. Agencia Estado is the News agency located in which Country? – Brazil 12. Where is the Agence Djiboutienne d’Information News Agency located? – Djibouti 13. Oe24 News is the News website located in which Country? – Austria 14. Azartac is the News agency located in which Country? – Azerbaijan 15. Mediapool is the News agency located in which Country? – Bulgaria 16. Where is the Agencia Globo Press Agency located? – Brazil 17. Where is the Bahrain News Agency (BNA) located? – Bahrain 18. Where is the Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS) News Agency (BNA) located? – Bangladesh 19. Where is the Belta News Agency (BNA) located? – Belarus 20. Where is the Walta Information Centre (WIC) News Agency located? – Ethiopia 21. Where is the Belga Press Agency located? – Belgium 22.
    [Show full text]
  • Naval Postgraduate School Thesis
    NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS by Patrick Thomas Baker June 2011 Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master‘s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious Assault Warships 6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • 20150213 DP Mission JDA2015 ENG
    PRESS RELEASE l THE 2015 JEANNE D’ARC MISSION MARINE NATIONALE THE JEANNE D’ARC MISSION Ensign training integrated into the operational deployment of Landing Helicopter Dock Dixmude and destroyer Aconit PRESS RELEASE l THE 2015 JEANNE D’ARC MISSION MARINE NATIONALE I 1 SUMMARY The Jeanne d’Arc mission: conducting today operations and preparing the future French Navy…………………………………………………………………………………………………….2 A multidimensional deployment …………………………………………………………………….3 The 2015 promotion…………………………………………………………………………………..4 The Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) Dixmude…… ………………………………………………..6 The embarked reaction force and Navy detachments…………………………………………….9 Captain de Briançon, commanding the LHD Dixmude …………………………………………. 10 The frigate type La Fayette (FLF) Aconit .........................................................................11 Captain Helluy, commanding the FLF Aconit…….. .............................................................13 PRESS RELEASE l THE 2015 JEANNE D’ARC MISSION MARINE NATIONALE I 2 THE JEANNE D’ARC MISSION CONDUCTING TODAY’S OPERATIONS WHILE PREPARING THE FUTURE FRENCH NAVY From March to July 2015, an amphibious group composed of LHD Dixmude and LSF Aconit will be deployed in the Indian ocean and then beyond the south of the sea of China even reaching the sea of Japan. Military operations and bilateral co-operation actions will be conducted during the mission. Meanwhile, the trained officers from the 2012 French Naval Academy promotion, as well as foreign officers, will carry out their first operational deployment. This will make these young officers acquire a solid military leader and seaman status through this “embedded” training, an experience of taking responsibilities opening their minds to the issues linked to this strategic area. FOUR MISSIONS AN OPERATIONAL MISSION Strategic pre-positioning: under the Chief of Staff’s command, the group can conduct operations of various kinds, ashore or at sea.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy News Week 35-2
    NAVY NEWS WEEK 35-2 27 August 2018 Russia debates giving up on building helicopter-carrier ships for its Navy Meduza 14:48, 20 august 2018 There‟s some confusion in Russia‟s shipbuilding business about whether or not the country is done trying to build helicopter carriers. Russia‟s industry and trade minister, Denis Manturov, said in an interview with the news agency Interfax on August 20 that these projects, “in a pure sense of the word,” are over, though the Navy will retain a few such ships. (Manturov added that Russia is still discussing the construction of a second aircraft carrier.) Almost immediately after the interview was published, however, a “high-placed source in Russia‟s shipbuilding industry” told RIA Novosti that the Defense Ministry hasn‟t yet made up its mind about the future of helicopter-carrier construction in Russia. In June 2017, Viktor Bursuk, the deputy head of Russia‟s Navy, said the country planned to acquire two helicopter-carrier ships and complete work on a new aircraft carrier before 2025. Moscow wanted to buy two Mistral-class helicopter-carrier ships from France, but the deal fell through in 2015, following the annexation of Crimea. Those vessels, built for Russia, were ultimately sold to Egypt. Source: https://meduza.io Competition to build cut-price frigates for Royal Navy relaunched Alan Tovey, Industry Editor 20 August 2018 • 1:35pm A computer-generated image of how the Type 31e ships could look The competition to build budget frigates for the Royal Navy has been relaunched after it was halted last month, with defence chiefs saying they had received “insufficient compliant bids”.
    [Show full text]
  • An Analysis of the Navy's Amphibious Warfare Ships for Deploying
    CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE CBO An Analysis of the Navy’s Amphibious Warfare Ships for Deploying Marines Overseas NOVEMBER 2011 Pub. No. 4172 A CBO STUDY An Analysis of the Navy’s Amphibious Warfare Ships for Deploying Marines Overseas November 2011 The Congress of the United States O Congressional Budget Office Notes Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this study are fiscal years and all dollar amounts are in 2011 dollars. On the cover—top left: the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp and the amphibious transport dock ship USS San Antonio during a training exercise (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communi- cation Specialist 1st Class Arif Patani); top right: sailors aboard the amphibious dock landing ship USS Whidbey Island in the Gulf of Aden (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Rachel L. Leslie); bottom: sailors disembark a landing craft utility assigned to the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp in Virginia Beach, Va. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Paul D. Williams). CBO Preface Today, the U.S. Navy’s fleet numbers 284 ships, including 29 amphibious warfare ships that are designed primarily to carry marines and their equipment into combat but that per- form other missions as well. This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report, requested in the report of the Senate Armed Services Committee on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, reviews the size, missions, and use of the Navy’s amphibious warfare ships and related expeditionary forces under the Navy’s 2012 shipbuilding plan.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Shipbuilding: Prospects for Building a Larger Fleet
    Navy Shipbuilding: Prospects for Building a Larger Fleet January 15, 2021 Presentation at the Surface Navy Association’s 33rd Annual Symposium Eric J. Labs Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons National Security Division For further information about the venue, see https://navysnaevents.org/national-symposium. CBO’s Relevant Reports 1 Prospects for Building a Larger Fleet . The Navy’s New Shipbuilding Plan . The New Shipbuilding Plan in Historical Context . The Challenges of Building a Larger Fleet 2 The Navy’s New Shipbuilding Plan 3 The Future Naval Forces Study’s Larger and More Distributed Fleet 2016 FSA FNFS Ship Type Inventory Goals Inventory Goals Difference Aircraft Carriers 12 8 to 11 -1 to -4 Light Carriers 0 0 to 6 0 to 6 Ballistic Missile Submarines 12 12 0 Attack and Large Payload Submarines 66 72 to 78 6 to 12 Large Surface Combatants 104 73 to 88 -16 to -31 Small Surface Combatants 52 60 to 67 8 to 15 Large Amphibious Warfare Ships 12 9 to 10 -2 to -3 Small Amphibious Warfare Ships 26 52 to 57 26 to 31 Logistics and Support Ships 71 96 to 117 25 to 46 Unmanned Surface Vehicles n.a. 119 to 166 n.a. Unmanned Underwater Vehicles n.a. 24 to 76 n.a. Total Manned Ships 355 382 to 446 27 to 91 Total Unmanned Systems n.a. 143 to 242 n.a. Total Manned and Unmanned 355 525 to 688 170 to 333 FNFS = Future Naval Forces Study; FSA = Force Structure Assessment; n.a. = not applicable. 4 Ship Purchases Under the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2020 and December 2020 Shipbuilding Plans Ship Type Fiscal Year 2020 Plan December 2020 Plan Difference Aircraft Carriers 7 6 -1 Light Carriers 0 0 0 Ballistic Missile Submarines 12 11 -1 Attack and Large Payload Submarines 66 81 15 Large Surface Combatants 76 55 -21 Small Surface Combatants 58 76 18 Large Amphibious Warfare Ships 28 16 -12 Small Amphibious Warfare Ships 0 55 55 Logistics and Support Ships 57 104 47 Unmanned Surface Vehicles n.a.
    [Show full text]