NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS by Patrick Thomas Baker June 2011 Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious Assault Warships 6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number: N/A. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class amphibious assault ship. In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia’s domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country that some still see as a threat. For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by Russia’s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Mistral, Russian Navy, Russian Naval Modernization, Amphibious Assault Warships, Helicopter PAGES Carriers, NATO Arms sales, NATO solidarity, NATO Baltic relations 152 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS Patrick Thomas Baker Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2000 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (EUROPE AND EURASIA) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2011 Author: Patrick T. Baker Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin, PhD Thesis Advisor Douglas Porch, PhD Second Reader Harold Trinkunas, PhD Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class amphibious assault ship. In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia’s domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country that some still see as a threat. For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by Russia’s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................1 C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS...................................................................2 D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 II. RUSSIAN PLANNING AND REASONS BEHIND THE SELECTION OF THE MISTRAL .........................................................................................................15 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 B. RUSSIAN PLANNING DOCUMENTS.......................................................15 C. RUSSIAN STATE ARMAMENTS PROGRAM (GVP)............................17 D. WHAT STARTED THE TREND TOWARD MISTRAL? .......................19 1. Russian Defense Industry..................................................................20 2. Outdated Shipbuilding Facilities......................................................24 3. Further Arguments Against Domestic Design and Production Only .....................................................................................................30 4. Tirpitz Plan Redux .............................................................................31 5. Lessons Learned From Georgia Conflict.........................................33 E. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS..................................37 F. NEW RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS BESIDES THE MISTRAL........................................................................................................40 G. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY..............................41 H. OTHER COMPARABLE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS TO THE MISTRAL........................................................................................44 I. MISTRAL CAPABILITIES .........................................................................49 J. RUSSIAN NAVAL CAPABILITY GAPS...................................................54 1. Command and Control......................................................................55 2. Hospital Ship or Disaster Relief Warship........................................57 3. Long Range Cruises to Show the Flag .............................................58 4. Amphibious Assault...........................................................................59 K. GENERAL PLACEMENT OF RUSSIAN MISTRALS .............................61 1. Pacific Fleet.........................................................................................62 2. Baltic Fleet ..........................................................................................68 3. Northern Fleet ....................................................................................69 4. Black Sea Fleet ...................................................................................70 L. RUSSIAN NAVAL INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................................72 M. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................78 III. EFFECTS OF MISTRAL SALE ON NATO ALLIANCE ....................................81 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................81 B. BALTIC AND POLISH CONCERNS.........................................................81 C. EU COUNCIL/PARLIAMENT REACTIONS...........................................87 vii D. NATO RESPONSE BEFORE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE ...............................................................................................................89 E. LISBON SUMMIT RESULTS .....................................................................96 F. NATO REACTIONS POST FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT...................98 G. BALTIC REACTIONS POST-OFFICAL ANNOUNCEMENT...............99 H. CONCLUSION