A Report for the BBC I

A report for the BBC i

Executive Summary

Overview Some 34 million people use the internet in Iran today. 45% of the population is online, up from 1.5% a decade ago. Iranian authorities have invested heavily in internet expansion, recognizing its importance for economic development. At the same time, the government fears the internet’s social and political communication potential, and works to maintain strict control over access and content.

Many Iranians reject these strictures by using circumvention technologies to access the information they desire. For these Iranian digerati – mostly youthful, educated and employed – the ability to freely access the internet outweighs the risks of being caught.

Purpose of this study and research methods This study presents evidence-based research on Iran’s internet environment and on who is using circumvention technology in Iran - and why. Its purpose is to provide the BBC with recommendations for enhancing the ability of their Iranian audiences to access BBC programming online.

The findings are based on primary and secondary research. Primary research included in- field participant observation studies, four online surveys (with 3500 complete responses) and four focus groups. The findings are biased: research participants represent a self-selecting sample of actual circumvention tool users. Still, they provide foundational insights on the demand for unfettered internet access in Iran, as well as the demand for circumvention technologies and the barriers that limit their use.

The Iranian internet: Control In Iran, the internet is strictly controlled with sophisticated censorship and surveillance techniques.

Internet access is extremely expensive -- especially for high-speed access, which is essential for accessing most content.

The main Internet Service Provider (ISP) is government-owned, and controls all international internet connections. Almost all international traffic flows through a single gateway, making it technically trivial for censors to monitor and restrict non-encrypted traffic.

Internet speed is extremely slow. Iran’s centralised internet connection allows authorities to control bandwidth and artificially restrict the volume of data transmitted. The government is strongly suspected of deliberative traffic slowing during important political events.

ISPs are legally obliged to block access to a wide range of content that the government has defined as “criminal.” This includes international and independent local press, social media sites, and a wide range of innocuous sites such as online dictionaries and academic journals. ISPs must also inform the authorities of any potential “illegal” content and keep records of traffic and user details for six months. Penalties for non-compliance range from fines and suspensions to permanent closure. ii iii

The government uses keyword filtering (which causes significant collateral blocking) and Barriers to internet use and circumvention sophisticated second and third generation controls. These controls include: a legal environment exists that supports denial of access to information and arbitrary enforcement; The main barriers to circumvention tool use are overt surveillance techniques such as CCTV camera monitoring of internet users; and lack of awareness, slow internet speed, the fear of disinformation campaigns purporting that circumvention tools are foreign spyware that surveillance and language difficulties(most tools “…the collect private information about the users. are in English, not Farsi). internet Many users fear that circumvention tools are backed by the government and used for The fear of surveillance and the risk of harsh reper- in Iran surveillance and entrapment. cussions are widespread. Over 80% of respondents believed that internet use is monitored has eyes.” in Iran. At present, only a few services including Circumvention in Iran: Who is doing it, why and how (Visitor to Balatarin.com, Balatarin.com seem to be genuinely trusted, a find- March 2011) Who ing that underlines the emphasis on community and The Iranian digerati are young (under 40), tech-savvy, and well-educated. Most also live networks in Iran. in Tehran. Proxy servers, one of the main circumvention meth- The number of high-speed Internet users in Iran is growing steadily, as is the demand for ods used, are the easiest to access and configure and are circumvention tools. low cost or free. However, they are slow and unreliable. Suspicion and fear of VPNs is high: many Iranians believe they are either spyware or a Why form of government honey trap that allows authorities to concentrate surveillance on Most Iranian circumventors use the tools to access everyday information and communi- individuals attempting to avoid it. cation. They want to know what is going on. Circumvention is necessary because collateral filtering means that even mundane information is out of reach. Social and political The very security of VPN endpoints (which require individual user authentication) makes activists are a minority among circumvention tool users. many users feel less secure.

Social networking and news websites are highly valued and people are willing to pay Recommendations and opportunities for the BBC nominal amounts to improve freedom of access. 80% of respondents indicated that they follow politics more often than they did six months previously, but this could be attribut- Strategy ed to the timing of the surveys (which coincided with widespread protests in the Middle Make uncensored access a core component of BBC’s global online strategy. The BBC East). should have providers delivering online programming into markets where content is censored. 95% of BBC World Service listeners reside in countries practicing active censorship Breaking rules is embedded in Iranian life. Iranians have a well-developed culture of of the Internet. This represents an online audience of 615 million people. getting around and even defying the many harsh social and political rules imposed by authorities. Using circumvention tools to access information is just part of everyday life Be apolitical in approach. Circumvention tools allow the general population to get on for many Iranians. with their everyday lives. This message will resonate with ordinary people, while avoiding accusations of political interference. Circumvention is viewed as risky by most respondents, but their desire for free access outweighs the threat. (see Barriers) Build trust through information and education on internet security. BBC should educate users in a non-controversial, apolitical way about internet security and how tools can How be effective and safe to use. A feature or even a mini-site focusing on internet security Iranians have many options for circumvention tools to access the uncensored internet, in Farsi and aimed at the everyday consumer could be invaluable. Improving trust and from web proxies to Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). However, most tools are too slow dispelling fear are core challenges for any media or technical service in Iran. and/or thought to be insecure. Build trust in the BBC brand. In Iran’s propaganda-rife informational environment For those in the know, tools can be accessed via various methods: downloaded, pur- Iranians are unsure about the potential links of the BBC to the Iranian government and chased, or accessed by typing their URL. therefore the authenticity of the news presented. How does the average Iranian who is aware that BBC Persian exists know that they can trust it as a reliable and impartial news Trust is vital: Friends, family and colleagues were overwhelmingly cited as the source source? of information about circumvention tools and sometimes the source of the tools themselves (including diaspora networks). Iranians are more likely to rely on a circumvention method if people whom they trust advocate its use. Word of mouth is primary, although Facebook and other social media sites have expanded the circle of trust by providing virtual personal connections. iv v

Distribution and marketing Raise broader awareness of circumvention potential, methods and safety.

Provide tools to enable uncensored access to BBC content through alterative channels. One option is launching a transparent proxy service that would deliver content directly to users without requiring any additional software.

Improve circumvention tools and adapt them to Iran’s environment. If circumvention is to become a core channel for distributing BBC content, then investing in innovative and proven technologies adapted to the Iranian context is an important element of success. Existing circumvention tools need to be adapted to minimise latency and pre-cache sites that people visit often. Tools need to be in Farsi. A successful circumvention tool needs to be both effective and trusted.

Leverage trusted social network sites such as Facebook to promote different links to services and increase readership. Trust and social networks are key for enabling better access to information in Iran.

Do not ignore traditional media. While extending and improving internet services is of growing significance, radio and television remain important.

Dedicate staff and resources. The ability to penetrate state-controlled internet space will not develop sufficiently or quickly enough without a concerted effort. vi vii

Table of contents

Executive summary...... i Introduction...... 1 Iran at a glance...... 3 Key takeaways...... 4 Research: Key findings...... 5 Controlling the digital revolution: The internet in Iran...... 7 A risky business: Why Iranians circumvent...... 17 Who circumvents: A profile of Iran’s digerati...... 20 Barriers to circumvention tool use...... 25 Recommendations and opportunities for the BBC...... 32 Appendix 1...... 36 Appendix 2...... 37

List of figures Figure 1. Renesys’ depiction of Iran’s internet ecosystem Figure 2. Location of internet access and circumvention tool use Figure 3. “Compared to six months ago, how often do you use the internet for the following activities? Figure 4. “How often do you follow each type of news online?” Figure 5. “Unmonitored and uncensored access to the internet is a universal right.”

Figure 6. Age of respondents

Figure 7. Gender of respondents

Figure 8. Education levels of respondents

Figure 9. Employment status Figure 10. Locations of respondents by province (Psiphon surveys only) Figure 11. “What are the greatest barriers to accessing the uncensored internet?” viii A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 1

List of tables Introduction Table 1. Summary of economic and social data Table 2. ADSL costs in Iran Table 3. Internet users in Iran The past decade witnessed a tremendous internet addresses, i.e. closed newspapers, Table 4. Common circumvention tools increase in the number of Iran’s internet media that belong to deviant and illegal users. Iranian authorities have invested groups.” Banned websites include BBC Per- in this growth, being well aware of the sian, Gmail, and others. Accessing banned List of boxes internet’s potential for economic devel- sites carries a maximum punishment of one opment. At the same time, the govern- year in prison. In addition, anyone arrested Box 1. The surprising underrepresentation of women in the research sample ment has worked to keep tight control for propagating circumvention tools or over access to information, fearing the providing training on their use also faces Box 2. How Iran is connected to the global internet internet’s potential for facilitating so- up to a year in jail and a potential fine Box 3. Computer malls in Tehran cial and political communication. of 25 million IRR (about 1,470 GBP).3 Box 4. Portraits of Iranian cybercafés Widespread censorship has blocked both Despite the potential repercussions, many Box 5. Use of circumvention tools peak around times of social tension. international and local press as well as youthful, well-educated workers – at least major social media sites such as Facebook, according to this research – are keen to use Box 6. Iran’s digerati – a composite portrait YouTube and Twitter. Many other innocu- alternative methods to access the internet Box 7. Buying VPN services in Iran ous sites – including online dictionaries for everyday activities. The fundamen- and academic journals – are blocked for no tal ability to freely access information apparent reason, thanks to collateral filter- outweighs the threat of being caught. ing1 techniques. Access to even mundane information is often a matter of luck. This report, based on primary (qualitative and quantitative)4 and secondary source For many Iranians, relying on luck is not research, provides insight on how accessing an option. They actively seek the infor- the uncensored internet works in Iran: how mation they want using a variety of cir- and why Iranians use circumvention tools, cumvention tools and systems that allow and what barriers they face in so doing. them to avoid government restrictions and censorship. Circumvention services A caveat. Undertaking research in authori- carry a nominal price, but this does not tarian contexts comes with certain biases. deter users. Internet access in Iran is suf- There is significant selection bias through- ficiently expensive that the additional cost out this report in both the quantitative for an uncensored internet is negligible. and qualitative research: all participants were part of a self-selecting sample. Despite its apparent randomness, censorship in Iran is highly sophisticated. The online polling used in this report Iranian authorities have moved beyond focused on internet users accessing two using keyword filtering to what researchers popular websites: BBC Persian and at the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) call second Balatarin.com (the Farsi equivalent of 2 and third generation controls: developing link aggregator Reddit). The overwhelm- a legal environment that officially enables ing majority of respondents were men the denial of access to information, as well (see Box 1). Moreover, the polls were as the active use of surveillance and coun- conducted at the end of 2010 and be- ter-information campaigns. The latter ginning of 2011 – a time when many includes advocating that circumvention countries in the Middle East and North tools are espionage fronts for Western companies and governments and con- Africa were (and still are) in political doning cyberattacks against opposition turmoil, resulting in regime changes in and human rights websites. According Tunisia and Egypt and military action in to the Iranian government, cybercrime Libya. Facts presented in the report – such includes “republishing or connecting to the as a short-term increase in the number of criminal content of banned websites and people following political news – should be considered in this context. 2 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 3

Qualitative research was conducted via Because of the number of responses and Iran at a glance both in-field researchers and focus groups labour of translation, not all comments of Iranian expatriate students. Although throughout this report are directly attribut- both of these groups give a representa- able to a particular age, gender or location. tion of a strong strand of opinion in Iran, Provenance is given as fully as possible. they are just one strand of many. They are The identity of our field researchers is also individuals who chose to participate in this withheld for the sake of their personal Table 1. Summary of economic and social data research, and many of whom chose to leave security. Year Source Iran for opportunities abroad. In short, Average GDP growth rate (%) 5.1% 2000-2009 World Development they are not necessarily representative of UK: 1.8% Indicators the typical Iranian citizen. Foreign Direct Investment $3.02 billion 2009 World Development (net inflows, BoP, US$) UK: $24.8 billion Indicators

$11,470 2009 World Development Box 1. The surprising underrepresentation of women in the research sample. GNI per capita ($PPP) UK: $37,230 Indicators The lack of female participants in our research is notable. Women in Iran are known for having relatively equal access to opportunities in comparison to other countries in the Middle East. For Population 72.9 million 2009 World Development instance, according to the United Nations Statistics Division Gender Info (2007), in 2005 51% of UK: 61.8 million Indicators students in further education were women; they made up 67% of all science students and 58% of those studying social sciences, business and law. Internet users (%) 45% 2011 International UK: 83.6% (estimate) Telecommunications Union Barriers to internet access are reported by Iranians to be consistent across both genders: there is UK: 2009 no evidence to suggest that women face more obstacles than men. In the videos of internet cafes across Iran, women are visible at many; indeed, in at least one, an elderly woman is running the Mobile phone subscribers (%) 70.8% 2009 International café. UK: 130.6% Telecommunications Union

Adult literacy rate 82.3% 2010 UNESCO It is difficult to ascribe any reason based on access as to why the results of the surveys were UK: 99% heavily male-dominated. The same proportions were observed across both the BBC Persian and Balatarin-hosted surveys.

One potential explanation is linked to the fact that survey respondents had to be using circumvention tools to access the survey sites (BBC Persian and Balatarin). Perhaps women are less likely to use circumvention tools, or to answer surveys when so doing. This is an issue that requires further on-the-ground research.

“We don’t have access to information in Iran.” (Visitor to Balatarin.com, March 2011) 4 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 5

Key takeaways Research: Key findings

The Iranian digerati are young (under 40), User education on circumvention means Trust and social networks are key for is rife and the vast majority of media tech-savvy, and well-educated. They are and opportunities is key. The default enabling better access to information. In is biased in some way. How does the graduates and students who have access behaviour in Iran is reliance on word of a region where one cannot trust the state, average Iranian who is aware that to a relatively fast internet (fast for Iran). mouth and blindly hoping that proxies or informal trust networks are critical. Our BBC Persian exists know that they Over 60% of respondents in our research tools are still working. Many users do not research revealed three insights relevant to can trust it as a reliable and impartial were under 30.5 This is an important understand just what it is that they are BBC objectives: news source? demographic for the BBC: according to a using, what they could be using, or how 2009 BBC survey, 58% of the weekly audi- censorship and monitoring work. The BBC • Trusted networks: Sensibly, Iranians Iranians use circumvention tools to access ence for the Persian service were between can make a real difference in helping to are more likely to rely on a circum- everyday information, rather than for activ- the ages of 15 and 34. inform and facilitate understanding of how vention method if they know that ism: “people break the law to have access tools can be effective and safe to use. people whom they trust advocate to information.”6 Users read the news, send They want to know what’s going on. its use. Word of mouth is the primary emails and use social networks. They are Accessing news, chatting with friends and Improving trust and dispelling fear method for dissemination of informa- not, in general, bloggers or activists try- family and watching videos are all motiva- are the main challenges for any media or tion about circumvention tools and ing to actively overthrow Ahmadinejad’s tors. Such basic activities are not generally technical service in Iran. At present, only the sharing of information more gen- regime. Some discuss the news with family possible without using circumvention tools. a few services, including Balatarin.com, and friends; others simply consume it for erally (for instance, BBC Persian con- People want to be connected – both within seem to be genuinely trusted (and note that themselves. There were no strong patterns tent). People learn from their friends, Iran and the wider world. Balatarin.com does not generate content about the sharing of information in the family and collegues, whether inside itself, but rather collates and republishes research. or outside Iran, both on and offline. The internet is strictly controlled with links from other sites, including the BBC). sophisticated and broad-based surveillance This underlines the emphasis and reliance The vast external network is par ticu- Iranians strongly value unfettered and and censorship techniques. Even mundane on community and networks in Iran. Given larly important: the fact that blogging reliable access. Given widespread censor- information is caught up in this net. Private the BBC’s wide reach in the region and took off was largely due to diaspora ship, users are often willing to pay for providers are subject to intense regula- multimedia approach, this is an important efforts to make blogging tools popul- unrestricted internet access, whether it is a tion and the whims of government. A legal opportunity for growth. ar within Iran. While offline social small fee for a VPN service or buying time framework legitimises information and networks are invaluable, Facebook at one of the many internet cafes in Iran. access control and criminalises violators. and other social media sites have As a result, access to information becomes Government propaganda and intimidation altered this landscape by providing essentially monetised. People will pay campaigns spread fear and encourage self- personal connections without neces- nominal amounts just to be able to read re- censorship. sarily having met in person. liable news sources, stream Parazit7 videos online, or log in to Facebook. • Circumvention tools: With the back- drop of anti-circumvention tool The number of high-speed Internet users in propaganda and a highly developed Iran is growing steadily, as is the demand legal environment, there are real for circumvention tools. The Iranian gov- concerns that Virtual Private Net ernment is actively encouraging the adop- works (VPNs) and proxies are tion of high speed internet for economic surreptitiously set up or backed by growth, although progress is hampered by the government to gather informa- the lack of infrastructure in certain regions. tion. A successful circumvention tool At the same time, filtering techniques have needs to be both effective and trusted. become technically and politically sophisticated. A result is a rising demand for • Programming: Although BBC Persian circumvention tools. Experience shows, is currently blocked, people are con- however, that web proxies are burned at a cerned or unsure about the potential considerable rate. Responding to the grow- links of the BBC to the Iranian ing demand for unfettered internet access government, and therefore have in Iran requires concerted effort to provide doubts as to the authenticity of the and promote updated circumvention tools, news – particularly because they are adapted to the Iranian environment. in an environment where propaganda 6 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 7

Security fears are a major barrier to the Controlling the digital revolution: The internet in Iran propagation of circumvention tools, although actual users state that their desire to access information outweighs the risks. The fear of surveillance and the possibility of harsh repercussions are widespread. Ira- nian government propaganda campaigns The government has invested significant amounts of money in technology, state that circumvention tools are a form seeing the internet as a driver for development. At the same time, authorities of Western-backed espionage. Many users remain fearful of its potential for fomenting social activism – particularly as in also think that the Iranian government uses the past, the large and growing Iranian diaspora has had a hand in promoting circumvention tools as a means of surveil- digital literacy.8 These two tensions have shaped key features of Iran’s internet lance. Hearsay tales of acquaintances and environment. The government exercises tight control -- with strict requirements friends of friends being arrested and pun- for private internet service providers, exorbitant prices for access, and limita- ished by the authorities are common. At tions on speed. At the same time, the number of Internet users has increased the same time, this research confirmed that rapidly, the country is rich in technological consumer goods (despite limitations for many Iranians under 30, the ability to on importing and services), and Internet cafes are prevalent. freely access information outweighs their fears of being caught.

Key features of Iran’s internet environment proved in June 2009 (just after the presi- include: dential elections), has had several effects on the country’s internet infrastructure. ISPs Strictly controlled internet service providers are legally obligated to cooperate with the (ISPs). Numerous government-associated government in filtering and surveillance. and owned companies are involved with Should an ISP fail to implement the block- the flow of traffic in Iran. Despite having of access to ‘criminal’ content, they face ing “one of the oldest and most advanced penalties ranging from fines and suspen- domestic internet ecosystems in the region” sions (for example, a three year suspension internet traffic suffers as a result of a “state should they fail to act due to careless su- “Knowledge imposed bottleneck.”9 The principal ISP is pervision) to being shut down permanently the Data Communication Company of Iran for intentionally not blocking the site. and information (DCI), owned by the Telecommunications Company of Iran (TCI) – which in turn ISPs must also inform the Working Group is everyone’s right… was recently bought by companies that (an inter-agency body with the legal power in Iran [it] is not are affiliated with the Islamic Revolution to make final decisions on filtering) as soon Guards Corps (IRGC), thereby strengthen- as they are aware of any such content.12 recognised – like ing the state’s control over communication Article 32 of the Cybercrimes Bill requires networks. Nearly all internet traffic into ISPs to maintain information related to many other rights.” and out of Iran must pass through the their traffic for at least six months, as well DCI – exceptions being some academic and as personal information on their users for research institutions that have their own a minimum of six months after the end of gateway. The fact that the vast majority their subscription.13 “In Iran you always of traffic flows through a single common feel like a criminal gateway makes it technically trivial for cen- Expensive access. Internet prices are uni- sors to monitor and restrict non-encrypted versally exorbitant, although they vary because, for internet traffic. amongst different ISPs as well as the speed and limits of services. According to the example, you use The Telecommunication Infrastructure Iranian Central Bank, the average monthly Company (TIC), a subsidiary of the TCI, urban income is 7,300,000 - 7,800,000 Facebook.” has the monopoly on international internet IRR per month (approximately 430 - 470 connections in Iran:10 it is responsible for GBP).14 The average monthly expenses building and providing network capacity of an urban family are estimated to be (Visitors to Balatarin.com, March 2011) for international and local traffic for both 10,000,000 IRR per month (approximately public and private sectors (see Box 2).11 600 GBP). Iran’s Cybercrimes Bill, which was ap- 8 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 9

Table 2 (below) gives an indication of some Box 2. How Iran is connected to the global internet of the different monthly prices, providers and speeds that are available to Tehran Iran’s international internet connections are through the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Azerbaijan: residents. Note that like most ISPs across the TIC provides connection “by fibre optic links through Kasj-Fojeyreh and Falkon in the South of Iran the world, many Iranian ISPs place data 1 and maintains a backup transit in the north-west from Tabriz to Ankara and Istanbul in Turkey.” Accord- limits on traffic except for the highest speed ing to Iranian officials, the fibre optic link in the south to the UAE is sometimes cut f.of internet.

In December 2009, it was reported that Iran Mobin, one of the largest stakeholders in TIC, was working The fastest service in this table (from Pars, with Azerbaijan’s AzTelekom and Russia’s Synterra to install a fibre optic link through the Caspian Sea to the largest private internet service provider Azerbaijan and Russia, with the aim of expanding Iran’s internet infrastructure in the north by linking it to 2 in Iran) only reaches the low boundary Europe. of broadband speeds in highly developed Table 3. Internet users in Iran18 countries. Its cost is more than 235 GBP In addition, since late January 2010, Rostelecom has been an international transit provider for the per month plus an installation fee, which is ITU Estimates Iranians for international data transfer through Turkey. According to internet monitoring firm Renesys, roughly half the monthly income of an av- Year (Millions of Users) Penetration “Rostelecom has suddenly and decisively become the third most important provider for Iran’s interna- erage Iranian family. But this service is not 1996 0.01 - tional transit, behind Turk Telekom (TTnet) and TeliaSonera.”3 officially available to the average Iranian, 1997 0.03 - as it is restricted to business consumption 1998 0.07 - only. 1999 0.3 0.40% 2000 0.6 1% By way of comparison, BT in the UK now offers “superfast BT Infinity broadband” 2001 1 1.50% 2002 3.2 5% Azerbaijan to their phone line users with download 2003 4.8 7% Turkey Baku speeds of up to 40 Mpbs for 25.60 GBP Turkmenistan per month – which is both cheaper than 2004 10.6 15% most ADSL services in Iran and hundreds 2005 12.3 18% of times faster. Tabriz 2006 11 16% 2007 13 18% A rocketing number of internet users. 19 Tehran Despite the government-driven restrictions 2008 23 32% on access over the last decade, the number 2009 28 37% of internet users in Iran has exploded, with Afghanistan 2010 32 43% some 34 million users in 2011 (see Table Iraq Iran 3). 2011 34 45%

Table 2. ADSL costs in Iran

ISP Price per month in IRR (GBP) 128 kbps 256 kbps 512 kbps 1024 kbps 2048 kbps

Jask Pars15 299,500 499,500 699,500 2,190,000 3,950,000 (excluding 150,000 (18) (30) (42) (130) (235) Fujairah IRR installation fee) UAE

Datak16 420,000 790,000 1,460,000 (excluding (25) (47) (87)

1. Asr-e Ertebatat Weekly, Iran Mobin installs fibre optic ring, 27 February 2010. installation fee) 2. International Telecommunications Union (ITU), ICT Newslog – Russia-Iran-Azerbaijan venture to improve Caspian connectivity, 8 December 2009. 3. Cowie, The geopolitics of iranian connectivity, Renesys, 11 February 2010. Sepanta17 200,000 300,000 (hourly fees are for (12) deposit; (18) deposit; 60-240 hours use) 1500/ 2500/ (0.09)/hour (0.15)/hour 10 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 11

Wide range of available hardware. Iran is • Range of services. Internet cafes are Figure 1. Location of internet access and circumvention tool use22 no technological backwater. A visit to important for those without technical Tehran’s Capital Complex mall reveals knowledge. They provide multiple plentiful displays of computers, smart- services, including accessing vital Other phones and software: “All makes and forms and printing documents.21 types of computers, speakers, webcams, Videos from one researcher for this monitors, flash memory and other com- present study showed cafes full of puter-related products can be found and elderly people filling out government Coffee shops with wifi easily purchased, even in instalments.”20 forms online. Equipment from companies such as Apple is available, despite restrictions that bar • Anonymity. Internet cafes also Mobile phone American companies official represen- provide a degree of anonymity to Respondents using circumvention tation in Iran. Hardware is shipped in customers, giving them access to tools (%) from countries such as Dubai and resold. censored sites with a greater sense of Internet Cafe iPhones, although expensive, are popular security and protection. Cafes vary in Respondents regularly accessing in Tehran, much like the rest of the world whether or not they provide circum the internet (%) (see Box 3). vention programs – although USB ports are almost always enabled, University Internet cafes are numerous and offer allowing tech-savvy customers to speed, services and anonymity (see Box 4): install their own. For instance, in Qom, “all the usual suspect websites Office/Work • Speed. Residential internet access were filtered. …I asked if there was is expensive and slow, or simply non- anyway I could access filtered web- existent due to a lack of infrastruc sites like Facebook and they told Home ture. Internet cafes tend to offer me ‘if you have an anti- filter soft faster internet to customers. ware or VPN, you can install it and use it. Just make sure you delete it 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% when you leave!’”

Only 2.2% of respondents said that they regularly accessed the internet at internet Box 3. Computer malls in Tehran cafes, with the majority preferring to use Paytakht Complex, Tehran. “A multi-story building, Paytakht is one of Tehran’s computer centres. their residential connections (a finding that You can find every hardware and software as well as computer accessories. I was looking for soft- likely reflects the technological sophistica- ware compatible with Macs which were sold in different ‘packs’. You can purchase any type of flash tion and socio-demographic profile of our sticks, speakers, printers etc. It is one of the trusted locations for purchasing computers and related self-selecting research sample). products.”

One field researcher’s video also showed the Capital City mall in Tehran, where plenty of hardware and bootlegged software was on display. These malls are found in smaller cities as well, such as in Isfahan, where the Pegah Mall on Mir Street is popular, and in Rasht. Hardware is brought in initially from Dubai and for smaller cities is then shipped from Tehran. 12 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 13

A risky business: Why Iranians circumvent Box 4. Portraits of Iranian cybercafés.

There is no average Iranian internet café. Some are small, with only about five computers. Others are much larger and with a more professional gleam. Our in-field researchers visited internet cafes across Iran. Many internet cafés offer multiple services. For example: Given Iran’s extensive surveillance and monitoring of activities on the internet, it in Tehran: “The internet café was in an administrative building on the first floor. It was rather busy and there might be surprising that people use circumvention tools at all. This study re- were a couple of people waiting for the manager to take down their information to register for a computer. vealed three reasons why Iranians circumvent: The internet café had two rooms, and both rooms had recording CCTVs…A few people (foreigners) had brought their laptops and were using wireless.” Censorship affects the most mundane Social networks and news websites are tasks. “Homayoun, 46, was discussing a highly valued. Respondents commented in Ahwaz: “The manager was a woman with four computers. It was obviously a shop selling CDs, work issue at home, and his wife used a that they use circumvention tools to go mobile top-up cards and scan/print jobs, but because of the demand they got the license and particular Persian word; they were not on Facebook and Orkut, read news sites added computers. According to the owner, they have 20-30 customers per day which usually chat sure whether the word could be used in including Balatarin, BBC Persian, Gooya or search.” that context. They tried to look it up in the News and Voice of America, and watch Dekhoda dictionary [the largest compre- Parazit videos.28 Surprisingly, given the in Karaj: “The first internet café I went to was part of a mosque and had a religious atmosphere hensive Persian dictionary], but were sur- widespread Western media coverage of the to it…there was a camera in the middle of the room, and a large sign on the wall stating that prised that it was filtered. Homayoun knew importance of Twitter and YouTube after ‘connecting to immoral and political websites was a crime, and those who accessed such sites that his son, Amir, 20, had installed a VPN the elections in 2009, the two websites would be dealt with by law.’ I asked the manager for a circumvention program and he said that it on the computer; he connected through were barely mentioned throughout our was not allowed…they had been busted last week.” VPN and finished his search successful- research. A possible explanation for this is ly.”23 This story shows that Iranian govern- that our respondents were not (declared) in Qom: “Most of them were around the central and northern part of the city…the four shops I ment filtering practices are so widespread activists. visited were packed. One of the bigger ones…had 20 computers and they were all in use. The that many sites that contain no obvious owner claimed to have 100-150 users a day…I asked Nima, 28 and owner of one of the shops ‘criminal’ content are somehow blocked: The research also indicated changing us- about what people usually do, and according to him, they usually search or chat, and some check “Many sites (neither political nor indecent) age patterns, likely in response to ongoing emails. The coffee nets were working as game-nets too, allowing users to play group games have been filtered without any apparent political events (see Box 5). When asked online. They would sell you CDs of games or programs you liked as well.” reason.”24 Keyword triggers and collateral to compare their online activities to those filtering mean that it is almost a matter of of six months ago, respondents indicated in Isfahan: “Majority of the clients were females. There were seven to eight computers in a large luck as to what is or is not filtered: “Even a sharp increase in reading the news, using space. It was located on the second floor of an administrative building on the main street of scientific/academic sites which have the social networks and using email, while time Isfahan. There was no time limit. The monitors had a ‘privacy’ option, and you had to ask per word ‘filter’ in them are also blocked (elec- spent playing games and watching videos mission for downloading anything over 2Mb. After a certain amount of downloading, the client trical filters, water filters, etc.).”25 decreased.29 There was also a spike in the would be charged on amount rather than on time spent online. Until a short while ago…Facebook number of respondents who said they fol- was not filtered in Isfahan – apparently because tourists were dependent on it.” Breaking rules is embedded in Iranian life. low political news ‘very often.’30 “The only The relatively recent crackdown on inter- way to see what is happening is to actually net activities is what gets attention from see and hear what is going on, to get access the media; but a relaxed attitude towards to news. They want to learn, to know, to pushing the rules is common in Iran. “For learn the history not only to hear news and 40 years Iranians have defied any kind of what is happening but analyse why it is banning…in private they are confident happening.”31 Note that these results were to do it. Satellite is banned, people use it. obtained mid-March 2011, in the midst Women are not supposed to show hair, it of rapid upheaval in the Middle East and does happen. People are not supposed to North Africa. It is too soon to tell whether drink but they do.”26 Circumvention tools these shifts are temporary or lasting. are not just for social activists or for the stereotypical ‘Facebook generation.’ The use of circumvention tools is just part of everyday life for many Iranians: “So many things are blocked and illegal, but people still do access them; movies, music, certain clothing, partying have always been banned and people go around them.”27 14 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 15

It is important to realise that this research Furthermore, participants in our research Figure 2. “Compared to six months ago, how often do you use the internet for the covers a particular segment of Iranians: overwhelmingly supported the notion that following activities?”32 namely, those who visit Balatarin.com and “uncensored access to the internet is every BBC Persian, and so this should not be tak- person’s right.”34 en as representative of the general Iranian Downloading/playing games population. However, it indicates that there is a keen interest to know what is going Entertainment on. Circumvention tools are necessary for access to unbiased news sources. Homework

More often 35 Figure 4. “Unmonitored and uncensored access to the internet is a universal right.” Work The Same

Less Often -1% DISAGREE Reading the news 1% STRONGLY Not sure 2% NEUTRAL DISAGREE Using social networks

11% Email AGREE

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Figure 3. “How often do you follow each type of news online?”33 86% STRONGLY AGREE Entertainment

Technology

Environment

Very often Health and wellbeing Often Arts and culture “Many sites Rarely Not applicable [are] filtered Financial without reason.” Politics

(Visitors to Balatarin.com, March 2011) Sports

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 16 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 17

Who circumvents: A profile of Iran’s digerati Box 5. Use of circumvention tools peak around times of social tension

At times of social tension there is a peak in the usage of web proxies. The most popular sites that users access through Psiphon are bbc.co.uk, google.co.uk (or google.ca and google.com) and facebook.com (or m.facebook.com). Amongst respondents to our research, the biggest group of circumvention tool 14 February 2011 was supposed to be the first big and official call for an opposition rally: leaders asked users was well-educated men in their twenties, either still in further (and were denied) to be able to march in solidarity with Egypt and Tunisia. education or employed in the private sector.

BBC Persian page requests via Psiphon (Feb 12-18 2011) They used circumvention for everyday Figure 5. Age of respondents 39

25,000 needs -- to chat with friends, follow sports news and consume information that is otherwise inaccessible: “Given that news 20,000 is greatly censored in Iran -- and a lot of the news which is broadcast is more of a 15,000 marketing strategy – having access to a de- pendable circumvention tool is necessary.” 10,000 Page requests There are no official statistics on the

5,000 number of Iranians who use circumvention tools to access forbidden content. In 2010, researchers at Harvard Law School 0 estimated that only 3% of citizens in countries with heavy internet censorship

12-Feb-11 12-Feb-11 13-Feb-11 14-Feb-11 15-Feb-11 16-Feb-11 18-Feb-11 17-Feb-11 policies know about or use circumvention tools in their daily lives, because “users do not know that the tools exist, do not know The last three Tuesdays (1, 8, and 15 March) of the Iranian year, which ended on 20 March 2011, were Teenagers 20-30 31-40 41-50 how to find them, or consider that the designated as days to protest. The 15 March was Chahar-Shanbe Soori, when bonfire celebrations take benefits of using the tools do not outweigh 51-60 61 and above Under 13 place – an event the government has been historically opposed to. the costs.”36 While the methodology used to derive this estimate is questionable,37 it Figure 6. Gender of respondents40 BBC Persian page requests via Psiphon (Feb-March 2011) nevertheless gives an indication that tools 45,000 are only common amongst a small segment

40,000 of society.

35,000 The present research revealed important 30,000 insights on actual circumvention users in

25,000 Iran (see Box 6):

20,000 Page requests Young men. 84% of participants in our 15,000 research (3,045 respondents) were young

10,000 men between the ages of 20 and 40. The male bias is surprising, given that previous 5,000 BBC research found women to constitute 0 38.7% of the weekly audience for BBC Persian. Overall, respondents in this pres- 1-Mar-11 2-Mar-11 3-Mar-11 4-Mar-11 5-Mar-11 6-Mar-11 7-Mar-11 8-Mar-11 9-Mar-11 11-Mar-11 10-Mar-11 12-Mar-11 13-Mar-11 14-Mar-11 15-Mar-11 16-Mar-11 17-Mar-11 18-Mar-11 26-Feb-11 27-Feb-11 28-Feb-11 ent research were 89% men, with only 38 7.3% women. Male Female Not stated 18 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 19

Well-educated students and workers. In One government employee interviewed in Figure 8. Employment status44 the initial survey hosted on BBC Persian, Iran said that although his internet access many respondents refused to reveal their at work was carefully controlled by the educational status, and some 57% refused security forces, he used Ultrasurf at home Government Employed to reveal their employment status: a strong on a daily basis to read social and political response to seemingly innocent questions. news, and tried to educate his children to Private Sector Employee Interestingly, this information was not do the same: “I worry without my presence withheld to the same extent on the Balata- that they will [read political news] without rin-hosted survey (perhaps due to higher taking into consideration any safety proto- Self Employed/Small Business Owner trust levels in the medium). Balatarin re- cols.”42 sults found 76% of respondents to hold a Student first degree, and some 25% had a master’s Living in the captial. The Psiphon-hosted degree or a PhD. With respect to employ- surveys asked respondents to indicate the ment, 28% stated they were students, region in which they lived. Just under half Homemaker of all respondents stated that they lived in 25.1% worked in the private sector, and Tehran, indicating that the infrastructure Not stated interestingly, 12% worked for the govern- for high speed internet – which is essential ment. for effective use of circumvention tools – is better in the capital than elsewhere.

Box 6. Iran’s digerati – a composite portrait

Figure 7. Education levels of respondents43 Iran’s digital generation is a diverse and fast-growing segment of the population. But who among them is willing to risk penalties and use circumvention tools? Our surveys suggest that well-educated men under 40 are the largest demographic – but they are not the only ones surfing the uncensored net.These are Not stated some of the composite faces of Iran’s digital natives.

PhD and above

Masters

Bachelors

College or technical education

University Prep

High School

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% Shahin is a 45 year old Tehrani Jamileh is a 28 year old female Amjad is a 16 year old male high man with a bachelor’s degree government employee with a school student from Tabriz, who who works in the private sector. master’s degree, who uses Ultra- is particularly interested in sports, While he doesn’t know whether surf. She finds that monitoring, technology and entertainment circumvention tools are illegal, slow speed and the language news. He uses the internet for he is convinced that his online barrier impede her internet ac- school and watching movies, but activities are monitored. He uses cess, but she is still a keen news also finds that the language bar- the internet at home, and uses reader. She likes to read about rier can be an issue it for work as well as access- politics and culture, and also ing political and financial news uses the internet for email and online. He likes watching Parazit social networking: she shares videos, and is hoping to teach his news on Facebook and uses it to children how to use the internet keep in contact with her friends effectively and safely. outside the country. A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 21

Figure 9. Locations of respondents by province (Psiphon surveys only) Barriers to circumvention tool use 100 200 300 400 500 0

Ardebil Iranians have a plethora of options for circumvention tools to access the Azerbaijani Gharbi uncensored internet (see Table 4). However, tool use is compromised by four main factors: fear, the slow and expensive internet, language barriers, and the Azerbaijani Sharqi challenge of accessing tools. Overall, two key findings emerged: the need to Bushehr better adapt tools to the Iranian internet environment; and, the need to raise

Chahar Mahall Va broader awareness of circumvention potential, methods, and safety.

Bakhtiari Figure 10. “What are the greatest barriers to accessing the uncensored internet?”46 Esfahan

Fars Other

Gilan None of the above Golestan

Hamadan Not having enough time

Hormozgan Slow speed of internet connection Ilam

Kerman Lack of computer or internet knowledge/skills

Kermanshahan Lack of availability of internet café etc Khorasan Resavi

Khuzestan Concerns about the authorities being aware of my online activity Kohkiluyeh Va Buyer Concerns that too much of the content is in Ahmadi English, or languages other than Farsi

Kordestan Lack of money

Lorestan 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Markazi

Mazandaran

North Khorasan

Qazvin

Qom “Whenever I make a political Semnan posting on my weblog, my Sichan Va Baluchistan whole body shakes with the South Khorasan thought that agents are go- Tehran ing to come and arrest me.” Yazd (Visitor to Balatarin.com, March 2011) Zanjan 22 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 23

Table 4. Common circumvention tools Limitations on tool use include: For instance, one of our researchers described a television program, Tool Type Advantages Disadvantages Additional Fear for safety: circumvention is viewed Marzhaye Shishei (‘Glass Borders’) notes as risky. Over 80% of participants in our featured on the News Channel that Web proxies Server-side, Easy to use; Some proxies lack Possible to research believed that internet use is moni- had IT experts warning against on- 49 (e.g. Psiphon) accessed by web no downloads compatibility with download tored in Iran. Whether or not the govern- line purchasing from unknown com- page forms47 necessary; widespread Javascript and Flash; source code and ment’s surveillance is as deft as rumoured, panies and the use of circumvention slow; easily blocked make own filter surveillance is regarded as a major issue: tools. They argued that many such breaker “What is even more important than by- tools are created by companies look- passing filtering is for my activities to not ing to access private information. 52 Slow to connect; Can’t be traced – leading to the disclosure of my This notion was echoed by some par- Ultrasurf Downloaded, Popular, easy to get always access full sites 50 client-side hold of (e.p. Facebook)48 identity to the government.” In Iran, sur- ticipants: “I think that some of these veillance techniques are both hard and soft: circumvention tools have turned Actively pro- into spying tools.”53 Note that it Freegate Downloaded, Easy to find Several sources say it no moted on Voice • Overt surveillance. The government is unclear whether this particular client-side longer functions within of America Iran website; created requires ISPs to keep records of traf- participant was referring to private by Falun Gong fic and users’ details for up to six companies extracting personal data practitioners months. The intelligence services are or government surveillance (our next Reportedly pervasive and carefully integrated, point). AOL Explorer Server-side Fast complicated to use; making many citizens paranoid of Activity on service can discussing potentially controversial • Fear: VPNs as government tools? be registered topics. Internet cafes occasionally Overall, there is a common fear that carry warning signs. Some have VPN providers may be backed by Client-side: en- Fast; all activity using Fear of insecurity - crypts and tunnels any protocols is routed and government Nominal price CCTV cameras installed, or other the Iranian government. In other Virtual Private all internet traffic through virtual tun- backing, acting as a for use forms of overt surveillance. For ex- words, that while giving the illusion Network (VPN) through a proxy nel outside of Iran; surveillance tool; ample, in Qom: “To control [the in- of freedom, such networks are in machine hosted Perceived speed and configuring network ternet café’s] users, they had a remote fact surveillance tools: “…use of the outside of the latency are unaffected can be a challenge; admin programme installed on all of aforementioned software [Ultrasurf country [the computers] that would let them and Freegate] has decreased relative 51 Very slow, making it view each user’s screen remotely!” to the use of VPNs – VPNs which Client side: uses difficult to use as a Popular among One of our researchers visited without a doubt are produced and Tor ONION routing to Protects anonymity and practical means to the technical universities in Tehran and Isfahan distributed by the government, and encrypt and privacy of users and access Web content; community and found all computer labs ob- which are disconnected on specific obfuscate traffic in communications subject to degradation because of served had CCTVs installed. Al- days.” In addition, having to pay for ways that enhanced due to traffic shaping or enhanced privacy and security protocol throttling; can privacy though the computers had accessible VPN services creates a trail of infor- of end-users be challenging to USB ports, and despite the fact that mation between the subscriber and use and maintain circumvention programs tended to the service that may pose a security be readily accessible on the computer risk (see Box 7). Overall, suspicions drives, many students remarked run high, as further evidenced by a that they were too scared to access comment on the Balatarin survey: sites such as the BBC and Radio “You think people don’t know that Farda. Surveillance practices and you are the Islamic Republic, and fear of them -- according to Iranian the IR is you? Your intentions from undergraduates studying abroad -- this survey are completely clear. The “degrades the quality of education.” end result is fear and self-sensorship: Simple online research is hard with- “the widespread knowledge that the out the use of circumvention tools, as government is actually monitoring many relevant journals and articles would lead to self-censorship.”54 are blocked. The widespread suspicion and fear of • Disinformation: VPNs as spyware? VPNs is an important finding of this The government pushes the notion of research. conspiracies and spies to to dissuade users from using circumvention tools. 24 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 25

Internet slow speed and high cost: Iranian sources report that it is relatively An important finding of this research is the However, friends, family and colleagues circumvention requires speed. Iran’s easy to get around this residential cap, need to adapt existing circumvention tools were overwhelmingly cited as the source centralised internet connection allows the especially by contacting providers and say- to minimise latency and pre-cache sites that of information about circumvention authorities to control bandwidth by arti- ing that they require high speed internet people visit often. Redeveloping existing tools, and sometimes the source of the ficially limiting the volume of data trans- access for work. However, in some regions technology to better function in Iran’s com- tools themselves. This includes diaspora mitted. Slowing down the internet was or neighbourhoods the infrastructure is promised internet environment is a better networks: 24% of respondents said that allegedly a tactic used around the 2009 non-existent or insufficient for high-speed investment than spreading weak services. contacts outside of Iran provided them elections and the resulting protest to make access. For instance, in Kurdistan “the state with private proxies, while 5% got access it harder for individuals to share videos. of internet is regretful [sic]. They offer 128 Language barriers. Tools are customar- to VPNs in this way. Personal contacts Users suggested that the technique has been kb unlimited for 30,000 Toomans/month ily configured in English. Resources in mean a safer way of obtaining access, as used subsequent to 2009, saying that “the [approximately 18 GBP] – but even this Farsi are rare. This presents difficulties they go some way to eliminating a paper speed of the internet is terrible – especially stated speed is not the real thing. There- in part because installing and configur- trail: “I asked Neda, 36, how she buys her when there is a demonstration planned or fore, a lot of people due to high inflation ing a VPN (for example) can be challeng- VPN accounts. She said that she knows the government has a special event.”55 and unemployment cannot access the so- ing (“installing some circumvention tools somebody who sells accounts, but in order called high-speed internet.”58 requires strong computer skills”59), but to pay that person for the account, she has Dial up and ADSL services are popular: also because those who do not understand to buy Irancell charge cards [top up cards], the former is relatively cheap and secure, With respect to circumvention tools use, English may not be aware what they are and transfer the credits to that person’s given that the user is required to reveal an ADSL connection is the only realistic using. Some circumvention services have number.”61 only limited personal information to the minimal option. As pointed out towards been written in or localised into Farsi: for provider. Pre-paid internet access cards are the beginning of this report, ADSL con- example, Psiphon has a Farsi interface, and The internet is also a way of finding out also popular, as a 31-year old Iranian man nections tend to be significantly slower Ultrasurf has an Iranian-specific version. about circumvention tools, particularly on suggested,“you can purchase any internet than comparable connections in Europe or However, VPNs – one of the most popular social networking websites such as Face- card and use it.”56 However, dial-up inter- North America, where speeds at the low tools – do not have this option. The BBC book. For example, Valasvpn is a VPN net is also slow and unstable. end of ADSL and cable modems tend to be already operates in Farsi – there is real po- provider who has almost 1500 members around 2 Mbps. Web proxies and services tential to build on this language asset. on their Facebook page. Therefore social For a country with so many internet users, such as Ultrasurf are easy to find and free. networks – whether person-to-person or Iran is unique in that it places a cap on the However, slowing down an already slug- The challenge of tool access and confi- online – are key to the dissemination of speed of residential connections (reportedly gish internet is frustrating. dence: The importance of basic awareness information, and are likely to become 128 kbps). Downloading applications or and social networks/trust. The need for increasingly important for finding different updating operating systems is time- information on circumvention tools and tools. consuming and requires patience: “speed is how to use them emerged as a critical is- snail-like.”57 sue: “One of the most important things is But even experienced users -- who formed educating people about their options and the cohort for this study – highlighted Box 7. Buying VPN services in Iran how they can overcome these censorships, their need for constantly updated infor- telling them about anti-proxies, about their mation. Respondents noted that proxies Access to VPNs can be obtained in several ways: costs, their options.”60 have a short lifespan – they are often either blocked or throttled – and requested a By money transfer to account numbers (such as those listed on the websites www.irvpn.tk and For those that know of their existence, cir- frequently updated list of circumvention www.freeitc.com). www.irvpn.tk and www.freeitc.com are reported to have bank accounts in all Iranian cumvention tools can be accessed via vari- tools or proxies. Also as noted, the fear banks. Clients transfer money to these accounts and receive a subscription to a VPN service for ous methods. They can be downloaded, that some tools may be surveillance mecha- about 1.85 GBP for one month, 3 GBP for two, 8.60 GBP for six months and 15.40 GBP for one year. purchased, or accessed via typing the URL nisms is widespread, and means that many (for web proxies). For instance, access to people may be wary of using new, untested From computer stores and some internet cafes whose employees install software and issue users VPNs can be obtained in several ways: by tools. This again highlights the value of usernames and passwords for a monthly charge of around 2 GBP. “When I asked [the internet café money transfer to account numbers (such circumvention options that leverage the in Abadan] how I can check my Facebook…they also said, if you want to pay, we can give you a VPN as those listed on the websites www.irvpn. socially networked circles of trust. account, which is fast and better [than Hopster]” tk and www.freeitc.com), and from computer stores, whose employees install soft- From personal contacts. One field researcher gave several examples: ware and issue usernames and passwords. “Ali…has a friend in Germany who has set up a VPN server which Ali sells his accounts to friends www.irvpn.tk and www.freeitc.com are re- and family and people he trusts, at a fee of about $5 per month.” ported to have bank accounts in all Iranian “Mohammad works for an ISP in Arak, and uses VPN. He also resells VPN accounts from another banks. Clients transfer money to these ac- server in the US to trusted people and friends, for the same cost.” counts and receive a subscription to a VPN service for about 1.85 GBP for one month, “I asked Neda, 36, how she buys her VPN accounts. She said that she knows somebody who sells 3 GBP for two, 8.60 GBP for six months accounts, but in order to pay that person for the account, she has to buy Irancell charge cards [top and 15.40 GBP for one year. up cards], and transfer the credits to that person’s number.”] 26 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 27

Recommendations and opportunities for the BBC proxies such as Psiphon X, they suffer Don’t ignore traditional media. While from high latency and unreliability. There the internet is undoubtedly important, are several methods by which circumven- other media should not be ignored: “[The tion services could be made more robust, internet] should not be the only source of trustworthy, and effective. news…[people] are resorting to old ways of spreading news through graffiti, news- Strategy to-follow expert commentary on the risks Leverage social network sites such as Face- papers, flyers, pamphlets etc.” Cab driv- of internet use. User education is critical book. Many users typically find out about ers listened to Radio Farda, BBC Persian Make uncensored access a core component and, most importantly, desired: “It will be proxy nodes via social networks. Using the or other stations while they drove our of BBC’s global online strategy. Online very helpful if you set up a website which BBC Persian Facebook page to promote researchers around. 68.1% of respondents access is critical to the BBC’s shift away will teach people how to bypass censorship different links to its services might be a reported that they watched BBC Persian on from broadcasting to online delivery. A and increase internet safety.”62 A frequently useful way of increasing readership. The satellite television, indicating that there is a 2009 study prepared by The SecDev Group updated listing of reliable tools and prox- page currently has over 41,000 people who large audience beyond those who typically suggested that up to 95% of the BBC ies will also build trust over time. The BBC ‘like’ it, receiving updates from it in their access the website. BBC statistics from World Service listeners reside in countries can play a key role in helping to target the news feed. People can also interact with 2009 regarding their Persian services sup- practicing active censorship of the Internet. right groups. Access information need not the page with comments on its updates and port this: only a quarter of those surveyed This represents an online audience of over be proselytising, but simply informative. by participating in discussions. Using the accessed the website, while almost half 615 million people. The BBC must prepare This site could also be extended or repli- page would lend a degree of reliability and listened to the radio and 98.6% watched for an environment in which services will cated for other countries, such as China. trustworthiness to the links, and it would television. While extending and improving become less available as a result of censor- be easy (given the staff who are involved in internet services is of growing significance, ship and targeted blocking. Delivery is key Distribution and Marketing updating the page) to maintain an updated particularly for the younger generation, The BBC already contracts companies like list of proxies. Given that Facebook is radio and television remain powerful and Akamai for optimising delivery in open Provide tools to enable uncensored access blocked, this is not a primary method of pervasive media. markets: it should have a similar strategy to BBC content. Circumvention tools are finding out about proxies, but it is useful and similar providers delivering program- fundamental to personal empowerment for those already familiar with circumven- Dedicate staff. The above recommenda- ming into markets where content is subject in Iran, and are identified as such through tion tools. Other social network tools tions for BBC services require resources to censorship and filtering. our research. In regions where the BBC such as Twitter should also be considered, and staffing. Budgets are currently tight at content blocked or filtered, the BBC should especially as their value as propagation the BBC; however, this is a core business Be apolitical in approach. Internet access actively promote alternative links to access tools has been validated in pilots run by strategy and it should not be left to develop should be understood and promoted as its services, an approach which has been the BBC during the unrest in 2009 that organically. In all likelihood the ability to a pragmatic rather than a democratising successful in trials. For instance, one option prompted filtering of BBC services. penetrate Iranian internet space will not political tool. Helping to provide internet is launching a transparent proxy service develop sufficiently or quickly enoughwith- access should be framed by the under- that would deliver content directly to users out a concerted effort. standing that circumvention tools allow without requiring any additional software. the general population to get on with their Such services could be set up quickly and everyday lives. This message will resonate discreetly as the centralised character of with ordinary people, while avoiding ac- BBC infrastructure lends itself well to cre- cusations of political interference. ating a second, mirrored hierarchy that is optimised for delivery through alternative Build trust through information and educa- link providers. tion on internet security. Trust is a recur- “It will be very ring theme throughout this research. The Improve circumvention tools and adapt to core challenge is how to mollify concerns Iran’s environment. Tools promoted in Iran helpful if you set about a particular tool to paranoid Irani- must be as effective as possible. At present, ans. BBC should educate users in a non- with few exceptions the most popular tools up a website [to] controversial, apolitical way about internet are of the do-it-yourself variety. If circum- security in Iran. A feature or even a mini- vention is to become a core channel for teach people how site focusing on internet security in Farsi distributing BBC content, then investing in to bypass censor- and aimed at the everyday consumer could innovative and proven technologies adapt- be invaluable. Such a site could satisfy ed to the Iranian context is an important ship and increase the spectrum from paranoia to complete element of success. VPNs are indisputably openness by describing how to secure the most popular services. However, they internet safety.” one’s network and how censorship works: leave a paper trail and are subject to ultimately, how can one know that their blocking at the protocol level. Proxies are (Visitors to Balatarin.com, March 2011) internet is secure. It could also have easy- popular but with the exception of elite 28 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 29

Endnotes 25 A comment on Balatarin.com on 2437 responses.

26 Iranian expatriate student, focus group 45 Figure is from all Psiphon survey results com- bined, based on 1227 responses. 27 Iranian expatriate student, focus group 46 Figure from Balatarin.com survey results, based 1 “Collateral filtering” is defined as ‘”where filtering Iranian Ministry of ICT. Available online http://www. 28 Psiphon surveys; questionnaire on 2467 responses. of content and communications channels of dark ict.gov.ir/introduction-affileted-tic-en.html; accessed and resistant networks impact civic networks as 29 April 2010. 29 Balatarin survey 47 Roberts et al., 2010 circumvention tool usage well.’” This definition is from Deibert et al, Access report, The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, 30 Balatarin survey denied: The practice and policy of global internet 12 Cyberspace Criminal Law, approved by the October 2010, p4. filtering, 2008, p133. parliament. The complete text of the law, Iran’s 31 Iranian expatriate student, final focus group Judiciary. Available online at http://mofidlinks.ir/0-8. 48 Video 1 demonstrates using Ultrasurf at an 2 Deibert et al., Access controlled: The shaping of htm internet café in Isfahan to access Facebook (2:20 to 32 Figure from Balatarin.com survey results, based power, rights, and rule of cyberspace, 2010, p23. 3:00). It shows that connecting to Ultrasurf is slow, on 2467 responses. 13 Ibid. and that it is unable to access the ‘full’ version of 3 Iran’s Cyberspace Law: section 7, article 25. Facebook (with images and the site’s blue banner); 33 Figure from Balatarin.com survey results, based 14 For the year ending March 2011. See: Aver- the difference between this and when the full Face- on 2467 responses. 4 Primary research consisted of in-field participant age family income and expenditure has been book site is accessed via a VPN (4:55) is acute. observation studies by five native researchers announced, Afarinesh News, 18 October 2010. 34 A comment on Balatarin.com (including video logs); two online surveys that Available online at http://www.afarineshdaily.ir/ 49 Balatarin survey returned over 3500 complete responses; and, four afarinesh/News.aspx?NID=71357. Also in What 35 Figure from Balatarin.com survey results, based focus groups with Iranian university students study- is the monthly average income of different strata?, 50 A comment on Balatarin.com on 2467 responses. ing abroad (36 participants in total). See Annex 1. Eco-News, 19 October 2010. Available online at http://www.mihania.ir/view/103.aspx 51 Report from male field researcher 36 Roberts et al., 2010 circumvention tool usage 5 Iran’s fully “digital natives” - meaning those born report, The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, into an already wired Iran – are teenagers today, 15 ADSL2+ in Tehran – Prices, Pars Online. Avail- 52 Report from husband and wife field researcher October 2010, p12. given that the first email was sent in 1993. The able online at http://www.parsonline.com/en/ser- team percentage participating in our study was only 4%. vices/adsl/adsl_price_tehran 37 The report draws many of its conclusions from 53 A comment on Balatarin.com self reporting based upon a very small sample 6 Iranian expatriate student, first focus group 16 ADSL – View tariff, Datak Telecom. Available set, and uses a questionable methodology using 54 Iranian expatriate student, focus group online at http://www.datak-telecom.net/adsl/price Google insight and add words as proxy indicators 7 Parazit is a popular satirical news show run for the popularity of specific tools and approaches. 55 A comment on Balatarin.com by Voice of America, similar to the Daily Show in 17 ADSL, Sepanta Network Solutions. Available the USA. It is broadcast on the Voice of America online at http://www.sepanta.net/pages/main_ser- 38 See also discussion in Box 1 above. 56 Report from male field researcher television channel and online. The word ‘Parazit’ vices_dsl.asp means ‘static’ – a reference to what happens when 39 This chart combines the Balatarin.com survey 57 A comment on Balatarin.com the Iranian authorities block the show’s satellite 18 International Telecommunications Union sta- results, as well as the Psiphon survey results. It is broadcasts into homes. The show is hosted by two tistics, as given in Lewis, Iran, telecoms, mobile, based on 3045 responses. 58 A comment on Balatarin.com expatriate Iranians from Voice of America’s head- broadband and forecasts, a Buddecom Report, 2010. quarters in Washington. 40 This chart combines the Balatarin.com survey 59 A comment on Balatarin.com results, as well as the Psiphon survey results. It is 8 For instance, Hossein Derakhshan, an Iranian 19 The sharp increase between 2007 and 2008 based on 3681 responses. 60 A comment on Balatarin.com who studied in Canada, was influential in introduc- may be attributable to the uptake of internet access via mobile devices. ing blogging to Iranians still in-country. 41 Ultrasurf is a downloaded, client-side circumven- 61 Report from male field researcher. tion tool that is popular in Iran. It is produced by 9 James Cowie, “The geopolitics of Iranian connec- 20 See 00:48, video taken by male field researcher Ultrareach Internet Corporation, a global Internet 62 A comment on Balatarin.com. tivity, Renesys, 11 February 2010. Available online in Capital City Mall, Tehran. freedom coalition affiliated company with connec- at http://www.renesys.com/blog/2010/02/irans-inter- tions to the Falun Gong. net-the-geopolitics.shtml#more 21 Video taken by female field researcher 42 Questionnaire conducted by husband and wife 10 Management problem in providing bandwidth, 22 Figure from Balatarin.com survey results, based team Data Processing Iran (DPI), 18 December 1999. on 2467 respondents. Available online at http://www.dpi.net.ir/newsdetail- 43 Figure from Balatarin.com survey results, based 23 Report from male field researcher fa-1344.html. on 2451 responses. 24 A comment on Balatarin.com 11 Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, 44 Figure from Balatarin.com survey results, based 30 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 31

Appendix 1

Research summary

Research for this report was conducted from December 2010 to March 2011. It used a multidisciplinary approach consisting of the following:

• Qualitative research conducted within Iran. In-field researchers submitted detailed reports of their observations, as well as photos, videos, surveys and (in one case) a further questionnaire. They covered several cities and regions within Iran.

Researcher Regions and cities visited Materials submitted

Husband & wife team Tehran; Karaj; written report; Isfahan; Mashad questionnaire; video; photos

Male, under 35 Tehran written report; video; photos Female, under 35 Tehran; Tabriz; written report; Isfahan; Mazandaran seven videos

Male, under 35 Tehran; Mashhad; Arak; Qom; written report; Ahwaz; Abadan; Shiraz; Isfahan photos

• Qualitative research outside of Iran . Date Number of participants Four focus groups were held involving 12/02/2011 5 Iranian university students studying abroad 02/03/2011 15 who still have close connections to Iran, 05/03/2011 10 including up-to-date knowledge obtained from recent visits and family contacts. 07-08/03/2011 6

• Online surveys. Two main ‘pop-up’ surveys were used. The first used BBC Persian as a landing page while the second was hosted by Balatarin.com. In sum, the surveys re- ceived over 3500 complete responses. An identical survey to that hosted on BBC Persian was sent out via email to users who had signed up to Psiphon. All three surveys allowed for comments, which were translated from Farsi and form the majority of quotes in this report.

Survey Dates in operation Number of complete responses Psiphon email survey 03/01/11 – 28/02/11 201 Psiphon online survey (hosted on 03/01/11 – 28/02/11 934 BBC Persian) Balatarin.com online survey 10/03/11 – 14/03/11 2453

• Secondary source materials and key informant interviews. These were used in order to gain an appreciation of the historical, legal, and cultural censorship in Iran. Personal contacts of the researchers contributed additional nuggets of information. 32 SecDev Analytics A risky business: The internet, circumvention and Iran’s digital generation 33

Appendix 2 Significant protest followed the elections and it was widely reported by the international press that the internet played a crucial role in organising and mobilising people. Although the government banned reports of the rallies, citizen journalists spread news online illustrated with camera phone pictures and videos. The immediate reaction of the authorities was to increase the level of internet censorship in the country by blocking access to opposition websites, blogs and social networking websites; sites blocked included the websites of the Iranian reformist Historical background: development and control MPs (Palemannnews), BBC Persian, Facebook and Twitter. Photo and video sharing websites Small media during the 1979 Iranian revolution.1 The end of the Shah’s rule in 1979 demon- such as Flickr and YouTube were also filtered in order to prevent protestors from sharing strated how powerful small media – including tapes, pamphlets and the radio - could be in images of violent enforcement by members of the Basij militia and police forces. Prominent mobilising a large opposition movement. Information was key. journalists and bloggers were arrested.

1990-2000: A forum for propaganda and free speech. Iran’s long-running war against Iraq Blogging has become increasingly risky, and some journalists have been sentenced to lengthy from 1980 to 1988 weighed heavily on the country. The Iranian government saw the inter- prison terms after being convicted in show trials. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) stated net’s rapid expansion in the 1990s as a tool for economic recovery. It contributed to the devel- that, “with some sixty journalists and bloggers behind bars and another fifty forced to seek opment of entrepreneurship, created new jobs and provided investment asylum elsewhere, the Islamic Republic of Iran has become the largest prison in the Middle 5 opportunities. East – and one of the world’s largest prisons – for journalists and netizens.” The RSF’s Press Freedom Index ranked Iran 175th, with only Turkmenistan, North Korea and Eritrea scoring The internet also appealed to the government as a potential forum for the dissemination of lower. pro-Islamic and pro-state propaganda. At the same time, many ordinary Iranians adopted the internet as a medium for self-expression in the context of strict press censorship and heavy Authorities have also arrested dozens who they claim to be involved in producing and propa- restrictions on freedom of expression. gating circumvention tools to help people bypass internet filters.Kayhan newspaper, widely believed to have close ties to the Iranian intelligence agencies, reported that the ‘Iran Proxy’ 6 The internet became increasingly politicised towards the end of the 1990s. In 1999, Salam network distributed over 70 million circumvention tools between 2008 and 2010 in Iran. newspaper was closed by the government, resulting in violent altercations between students Individuals have also reportedly been arrested for selling VPNs. and security forces. Over the next few years, conservative authorities shut over a hundred newspapers and periodicals. Nevertheless, discussion continued to proliferate online. The government has increased its efforts to develop online propaganda. This has included mandating the Information Communication Technology Department of Basij to support the 7 Whilst acknowledging the vital role of the internet in stimulating economic growth and in development of 10,000 pro-government blogs. Officials also promote what they consider to providing a medium for exporting Islamic revolutionary ideas, the government also advocated be ‘useful’ content. From March 2010, users trying to access a blocked website would arrive the introduction of restrictions to monitor and regulate freedom of expression online. This at a page with both an ‘access denied’ message and a list of suggested ‘useful’ websites. has led to a somewhat contradictory official policy of on the one hand expanding internet access for economic and propaganda reasons, and on the other keeping tight control of online Blocked and filtered websites include popular opposition sites (e.g. rahesabz.net and kaleme. content. com), Farsi news websites (BBC Persian, Gooya News, Radio Farda and Radio Zamaneh), Balatarin.com, English language news sources like BBC News and the New York Times, the 2000-2009: Official censorship. In 2000, Iran passed legislation that made all electronic pub- websites of international groups advocating free speech, and blog hosting services. Popular lications subject to the country’s Press Law. All online publications needed a license from the sites such as Gmail, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Orkut, MySpace, and Flickr are heavily Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, and anonymous publication of material became il- filtered. legal. In November 2001 the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution announced that all ISPs were to come under state control2 and that they would be required to use filtering systems to Despite government efforts, some Iranians are aware of and use methods to bypass filters. As restrict their users’ activities, as well as remove any anti-government or anti-Islamic content explained in the report, information about such tools is mainly spread by word of mouth or posted by users. In 2002, an inter-agency committee (the straightforwardly named Commit- via online social networks. Among the most popular of the various circumvention tools and tee in Charge of Determining Unauthorised Sites) was set up to define criteria to identify methods are Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), Psiphon, FreeGate and UltraSurf. Although illegal websites. A filtering division of the Information Technology Company of Iran, under they are illegal, circumvention tools are readily available. Tools have a limited shelf life, with the Ministry of Information Communication Technology (MICT), was made responsible for censors blocking or throttling traffic to some services as soon as they become aware of their use. implementing filtering policies.3

In the face of continuing government efforts to censor the internet, its popularity continued Nations including the United States (through the Broadcasting Board of Governors) have to grow rapidly. According to an OpenNet Initiative report, “over the past eight years [2000- been supporting circumvention tools for close to a decade; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 2008], the number of internet users in Iran has grown at an average rate of approximately recently explicitly stated that the State Department will be providing millions to companies 48 percent, increasing from under one million internet users in 2000 to around 23 million in creating circumvention technologies. While the funding is a positive step, the American influ- 2008.”4 ence may have had a negative effect by connecting proxies to US foreign policy and its ‘soft war’ strategies. It is important that the BBC does not fall into the same trap. 2009 onwards: Violence and reaction. In 2009, online political content in Iran increased substantially during the country’s presidential election. A mock election was purportedly held 1 Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, Small media, big revolution, 1994. 2 Iran CSOs Training & Research Center, A report on the status of the internet in Iran, November 2005. on Facebook with the ‘clear’ winner of the race one of the opposition candidates, Mir-Hossein 3 OpenNet Initiative, Internet filtering in Iran, 2009 Mousavi. The government blocked access to Facebook as cyber-campaigning gained 4 Ibid, p2. momentum. 5 Reporters without Borders, Countries under surveillance: Iran, 12 March 2010, p20. Available online at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies.pdf. 6 Kayhan Newspaper, New Details about Destruction of the CIA Cyberspace Network, 15 March 2010 7 Radio Farda, Many centers, groups and organisations, just to control the internet, 15 February 2010

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