CHAPTER IV

THE PATTERNS OF POWER

Any organized society is necessarily hierarchical in structure: there must be a supreme authority to impose norms of behaviour, and a subordinate mass who observe these norms, with a variable number of intermediate levels, whose function is to enforce the obedience of the norms. The more complex the society, the greater the number of these intermediate levels of authority. Furthermore, whereas in a very simple society, it would be ideally possible for a single hierarchy to control and regulate the various spheres of social activity, in reality one finds that there is a tendency to specialization so that different forms of social activity are regulated by different norms, enforced by different hierar- chies, though this may not be apparent, since one individual may hold contemporaneously more than one office, and thus belong to more than one hierarchy at once. However, the simultaneous holding of more than one office is usually found in the highest levels of authority, while in the lower levels the tendency to specialization is far more prevalent, reaching its climax in the lower levels of the modern urban bureaucracy, where specialization has gone so far that each office-holder can regulate only a fraction of any given activity, so that any decision requires the consultation of three or more different office holders. Furthermore, when the society in question is not a politically independent entity, but is part of a larger whole, there is superimposed on the pyramid of office of the society itself, a further hierarchy whose role is to ensure that the norms observed by the society conform to those of the larger entity of which it is part. These various hierarchies may act independently of one another, or their spheres of authority may overlap; they may share the same per- sonnel, or they may have a completely different one; they may act in unison, or they may be in conflict with one another. In an ideal society, 100 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE the various spheres of activity could be distinct and the individual hierar- chies could have a distinct personnel, and work in harmony. In practice, however, that is rarely, if ever, the case. There is nearly always a certain overlap of these spheres of activity, giving rise to some degree of confu- sion and conflict. Anybody belonging to a complex urban society knows from personal experience how often one gets involved in such conflicts of authority: sometimes, within the same society, two different hierarchies impose contradictory norms, leaving the individual to solve the dilemma as best he can. A typical example is the regulation of civil marriage in Italy, where the State (the political hierarchy) considers it the only valid form, while the Church (the religious hierarchy) denounces civil marriage as invalid, and treats civilly-married couples as adulterous. The individual must either flout the one and obey the other, or compromise by going through two forms of marriage. This conflict is worse where, by some historical accident, a given society has been allowed to develop its own characteristic organization, and, at a later date, has been, more or less forcibly, incorporated in a larger society whose organization is different. The conflict may reach such a pitch as to lead to anarchy. Alternatively, especially where the larger organism has no effective means of imposing its code, the conflict remains muted, the imposed code remaining a dead letter. This is the case in Calimera. From the date of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the political development of Southern Italy followed a completely different direction from that of the North. The constant warfare of the North led eventually to the growth of the city-states and to the development of a strong tradition of municipal independence, based on commerce and military strength. The insecurity caused by the intermittent warfare diminished the value of land as a symbol of status and authority, and replaced it by financial wealth. The growth of mercenary armies, fighting for pay, stressed the importance of wealth as a source of power. There developed in the North a typically urban organization, in which land lost all importance, while financial ability became a necessary qualifica- tion for obtaining status and authority. Eventually, a democratic elective system was developed, under which ability and wealth became more important than noble birth and land-tenure. The Medici were apotheca- ries, and proudly flaunted the pills of their trade on their escutcheon. Giacomo Sforza was a " condottiere " or leader of mercenaries, whose very name was due to his herculean strength. At the same time, the necessity of presenting a united front to the enemies all around, particularly the Empire and the Papacy, resulted in a strong and effective municipal organization. The collapse of the city-states and the occupation of the area by Austria, left the municipal organization intact. When the Savoyard THE PATTERNS OF POWER 101 kings unified Italy, the organization of local authority followed the old municipal pattern. At the worst of times, under the oppression of Metter- nich's police, the municipalities of Northern Italy retained their freedom to act within specified limits. The recurring conflicts between the central government, represented by the Austrian govenor, and the local authority embodied in the municipality, resulted in the development of two diffe- rent police-forces: a municipal police dealing with offences against the legal code, and a military police, depending from the governor, to deal with political offences, and to be used, if needs be, against the muni- cipality itself. The system was continued under the Kingdom of Italy, the military corps of the " Carabinieri " owing allegiance on ly to the King and the Carabinieri head-quarters in Rome replacing the Austrian political police, with much the same functions, while the municipal police continued to carry out the duties of preserving the peace, as it had done in the past. This double system of police still continues in Italy. In the South, the development of political authority took a quite different turn. The Norman occupation of 1160 introduced a feudal system which was retained under successive dynasties. From Norman days onwards, the Kingdom of Naples was closely allied to the Papacy. Indeed, both Manfred of Hohenstaufen and Peter of Aragon claimed the pro- tection of the Papacy, on the grounds that the Kingdom of Naples was a Papal fief, and themselves vassals of the Church. And was not Charles of Anjou, the restorer of the Kingdom after the disastrous Hohenstaufen interlude, a Papal protege? The Kingdom of Naples (later, of the two Sicilies) remained, throughout its history a feudal kingdom. Power and status depended on hereditarily held lands; the country was parcelled out to a number of barons, vassals of Crown or Church (for the Church was a powerful land-owner), and, except in Naples itself (where the King had personal authority) and in a few large cities (where a shadow of municipal organization existed), the ultimate authority was the local lordling, who was simply the local land-owner. The Crown was the nominal source of authority and justice, and retained control of the courts; but its authority was delegated to the chief barons of the king- dom, who, in turn, delegated this authority to their vassals, and so on, down a chain of lordlings to the local " Don " or great land-owner who, too aristocratic to look after his own land, delegated this authority to his agents. In places, the lord was an abbot or a bishop, for churchmen could, by virtue of their office, be temporal lords too. Benevento, indeed, was a fief of the Papacy and independent of the Kingdom. The royal courts of justice were effective in Naples, and in the larger cities, but for the rural peasantry the source of justice was the local manorial court, whose only law was the lord's will. A nominal appeal lay to the higher lord of whom 102 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE the local lord was a vassal, and eventually to the King, but little reliance could be placed in such appeals to a distant baron who was unlikely to antagonize his vassals for the sake of some wretched peasant. As for the King, he was too far away to be of any help. Like God, he could be prayed to, but, unlike God, he could not be relied upon. Not so unlike God, perhaps, for, as we shall see later, the peasants thought it more profitable to invoke the saints, mere men when all is said, than the Deity Itself, too distant, and too awful, to pay any attention to the prayers of such an insignificant mite as a mere peasant. Political authority was based on the hereditary possession of land. The landless man was barely a man at all. Villages, like the land they were built on, belonged to the landlord; the villagers mere serfs. The officials were but the landlord's agents, executing his orders, and collect- ing his dues. Roads, houses, water-supply, were the landlord's respon- sibility, and were kept in good condition only if it suited him. There were no schools. For landless men, there were only three possible careers which enabled them to escape from bondage: the Church, the Law, and banditry. In the Church, a man might receive enough education to become a parish priest; at the very worst, he could become a friar or monk: in any case, he would be adequately fed. In the Law, provided he had enough funds to acquire a reasonable education, and a certain native intelligence, he might hope to make a moderate living as a notary, or as a lord's secretary and legal adviser. As a bandit, he was at least free from bondage. " In tutti e tre questi mestieri era condizione essenziale di successo la mancanza assoluta di scrupoli; con questa differenza, che il mestiere del brigante richiedeva coraggio, le altre due professioni no " (In all three of these careers the essential qualification for success was a complete lack of scruples; with this difference: that the bandit's career required courage, the two other professions did not) (Martin S. Briggs, Nel Tallone (Thalia, Italian translation, Lecce, 1931, p. 251). There was no shadow of a municipality, or of any authority, local or otherwise, except for the land-owning lords. This state of affairs did not change in 1860, when the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies became part of a United Italy. If anything, it became worse, as the new Savoyard monarchy in its struggle with the Church, weakened her by giving greater power to the landed lords. Indeed, it was not until the Fascist regime that anything was done to break the power of the feudal landlords. For reasons of prestige, roads, electricity, schools, were forced on the South. For political reasons, the power of the feudal landlords was attacked, and a municipal system copied on that of the Northern Italian municipalities was imposed on the South. The judicial system was centralized by the creation of prefectorial courts, THE PATTERNS OF POWER 103 sitting in the capital of every province, and a new system of administra- tion was developed, dividing the country into geographical provinces. But the privileges of the aristocracy were recognized by the monarchical constitution, and the new provinces followed closely the boundaries of the old duchies and counties. To ensure an adequate supply of soldiers for the government's imperialistic adventures, it became compulsory to register births, deaths, domiciles, occupation; a bureaucracy was esta- blished to ensure that this registration was duly carried out. To establish the regime on a firm basis, it was necessary to ensure order, and the Carabinieri were given the task of policing the South, detachments being posted in every important village. But the system of land-tenure was left as it had always been. In the army, the officers were still drawn almost exclusively from the aristocracy. Besides, the ministers of the Crown were Piedmontese, and were barely interested in the " terroni" (earth-grubbers) of the South. The Fascist elite was mostly drawn from the Northern Italian middle-class, and shared this contempt and indif- ference. Afraid of the possible hostility of the Northern King and his ministers, the landed aristocracy of the South backed the upstart Fascists, and thus ensured their immunity. Later, as he established his dictator- ship, Mussolini became increasingly afraid of the potentially dangerous municipalities and reduced their powers, increasing those of the cen- tralized bureaucracy. After the war, the new republican government did indeed strive to improve conditions in the South. By abolishing nobiliary titles and privi- leges, an attempt was made to break the power of the landed nobility. An ambitious programme of redistribution of land was decided on, though its implementation has, so far, proved much more difficult than the government had imagined. Industries were encouraged in the South; schools and medical dispensaries were established. And a new democratic system of government and local authority was imposed; while authority was wrested from the hands of the landed nobility, and vested in the State. The political organization of Calimera, to-day, follows the same pattern as that of all similar communities throughout Italy. The village itself is an independent " comune ", and has its own municipality, headed by a mayor and a council. The mayor (sindaco) and the council (la giunta) are elected, by a free vote of the villagers. They decide the policy to be followed, and are responsible for the proper functioning of the municipal bureaucracy. The latter are not elected, but are professional civil servants, nominated by the state. They are all foreign to the village, and many come from different provinces. To become a civil-servant, one must have a certain education, and appoint- ment is through a competitive examination. On the other hand, there is 104 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE no educational or other qualification required to become a mayor or member of the council: the popular vote is considered sufficient. There have been instances where the mayor and council were completely illiterate. The mayor and giunta can initiate certain measures aimed at improving the standards of living in the " comune ", but, since any action they decide on is limited by the availability of funds, which come either from various taxes and licence-fees (which must necessarily be very little in such a poverty-stricken " comune "), or from a sum loaned by the " Cassa del Mezzogiorno a statal agency controlling the funds ear- marked by the Government for reform in the South, which are quite small for any individual " comune there is relatively little they can do. In theory, the Municipality has wider powers: it has a right of com- pulsory acquisition of land and property; it can impose by-laws; it is responsible for the upkeep of roads, drainage, and municipally held land, such as parks or public gardens; and for the policing of the municipality. In towns, and even in villages, in Northern Italy, the municipality is very active, to the point of becoming aggressive : slums are demolished and re-built; drains are laid down, and such utilities as electricity and gas are made available to the inhabitants; in addition, the Municipality will regulate any new building and rebuilding, and try to impose a certain standard of hygiene and confort. Naturally, the degree of activity of the municipality varies from village to village; but, on the whole, the northern Italian municipalities have a good record of activity for the communal good. Such is not the case in Calimera. The houses of the village, for the most part, are old, even decrepit, and do not conform to any standard of comfort or hygiene; there is no adequate water supply; though electricity has been laid on, and nearly all the houses have electric power, there is no gas, and food must still be cooked over stoves fuelled with wood or animal manure; the drainage system of the village is inadequate, about half of it being open drains; the roads leading into and out of the village are well kept, tarred and macadamized, and so is the central " piazza " and the two main streets which run across the village; but the streets of the village deteriorate as they run away from the piazza : macadam is replaced by paving-stones, which in turn give way to beaten earth. For the most part, there are no streets at all, merely sharp-angled alleyways between one house or group of houses and the next. On the other hand, the approaches to the village on the northern side, are being made more attractive by the creation of a public garden. In short, the municipality is concerned in creating a good impression on visitors to the village, by keeping the central " piazza" and its approaches in excellent condition, by creating a public garden by the side of the main road which leads to Lecce, and by freshly whitewashing THE PATTERNS OF POWER 105 the façade of the " Casa del Comune the building of the municipality itself. All this is aimed at giving the casual visitor from Lecce an impression of prosperity, neatness, even attractiveness. It is significant that the site chosen for the public gardens is an awkwardly shaped triangle lying within the fork made by the main road from Lecce as it divides into two branches, one of which runs to the " piazza while the other by-passes the village; there is plenty of land available for a more ample and better designed garden : but such land would lie off the main roads, and thus would not be noticed by the casual visitor. And it must be remembered, in this context, that the greatest volume of traffic passing through Calimera is made up of traffic going from Lecce to the large towns in the south and returning from them to the provincial capital. The siting of the municipal gardens was carefully thought out. This failure of the municipality is not limited to Calimera. It is characteristic of most southern Italian municipalities. The excuse usually given is lack of funds; but, though this is undeniably true, yet one feels that the municipality could be somewhat more active, and carry out some less jejune measures to improve the standards of life of the village than whitewashing the facade of the Casa del Comune and laying out a tiny municipal garden. After all, the northern " comuni " faced the same problem of chronic lack of funds, yet were able to carry out far-reaching measures of reform. But, of course, lack of funds is not the real reason. In the north, the mayor and his council are backed by the majority of the population. There is little that either the state bureaucracy or the reactionary elements of the population can do, if the town council is determined to stand on its constitutional rights. Indubitably, the consti- tutional powers of the municipality are the same in Calimera : it could take up a similar stand. That it does not is due to a number of reasons. In the first place, the mayor and giunta are either themselves land-owners, or persons whose interests are the same as the land-owners'. And practically no improvement could be carried out without, directly or indirectly, coming into conflict with the interests of the land owning class. No drainage system can be laid, without acquiring the land through which the drains must pass; no houses demolished, no new ones built, without again acquiring them from the landowners; no proper streets can be laid without again encroaching on the land owners' preserves. In the last analysis, all goes back to one point : that the almost total area of the land on which Calimera is built belongs to 15 families, which have no intention of relinquishing it. The land could be compulsorily acquired by a determined and militant municipality; but the men composing the municipality are themselves land-owners, and their own position depends ultimately on their control of the land. 106 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE

The nature of the electoral system of the Italian Republic ensures that political offices in the South will be retained by the very class which is necessarily opposed to reform. The candidates for the office of mayor are nominated by the local cell of the political parties. In any conflict with the state, or with elements of the population, the municipality will count on the backing of the political party to which it belongs. In the North, this is either the Communist Party, or the Demo-Christian Party : the first determinedly set on social reform; the second committed to supporting such reforms as the Government, itself Demo-Christian, has committed itself to. In the South, however, the dominant political party is the Monarchist one. Its programme is the re-establishment of the Monarchy, and it is backed by the aristocracy, and the landed gentry, who see in a restoration of the monarchy the only chance of preserving intact their income and their privileges. The nominees of the Monarchist Party are either land-owners, or closely bound to landowning interests. The historical development of the South is such that, excepting the large cities, there is no middle-class intelligentsia of any importance, such as forms the backbone of the democratic parties. The educated members of the population come from land-owning families : their allegiance to the King is partly due to traditional loyalty, partly to self-interest. The only party which could effectively oppose the monarchists would be the Communist Party, since its identification with the proletariat might obtain for it the necessary popular votes. The Demo-Christian Party is unfortunately too closely identified with the middle-class and the intellectual or capitalist bourgeoisie to command enough votes in the South, where these elements are lacking. On the other hand, the anticlerical bias of the Communists repels the strongly religious peasantry, who feel that a vote for the Communists is a vote for the Devil. The long association, through the centuries, of the Church and the Crown, have convinced the peasant that Cross and Crown, Christianity and Monarchy are indissolubly united. Consequently, the peasant resolutely votes for the one political party which is determined to prevent his ever becoming anything more than a peasant. In Calimera, we find an extreme case of this : the only party which has sufficient adherents to justify the existence of a local cell is the Monarchist Party. A few of the professional families vote Liberal, or Social-Democrat, while the majority vote Demo-Christian. But these are only 10 families: even if it were not divided, their vote would be insignificant. The Monarchist Party is backed by the totality of the peasantry and the aristocracy. Partly through traditional loyalty to the " baroni partly through fear of reprisals, partly through religious fanaticism, and partly through self-interest in the case of the wealthier peasants who dream of becoming themselves small land-owners, the THE PATTERNS OF POWER 107 peasantry unanimously votes monarchist. Many who are not sufficiently interested in politics to care which party rules, vote monarchist all the same, out of habit and tradition. Others, will vote monarchist convinced that this is the only way of preventing the atheistic communists from desecrating the village church. And a number vote monarchist because they know it will please their land-owner if they do so. The insignificant role of the political hierarchy is demonstrated by the negative attitude of the population towards it. They cannot be said to be hostile : rather, they have no personal or social contacts with it. As experience shows, it is possible to carry out all one's activities without coming into contact with the authorities; and this is what the Calimerans do. Strictly speaking, the local municipality has extraordinarily wide powers and functions : for instance, the " imposta famigliare " and the imposta su beni immobili ", roughly equivalent to a tax on families, per capita, and a tax on real estate, is collected by the local authorities, not by a central office; licences to open shops, to practice one's profession in any given commune, to own livestock, to sell salt or tobacco, to own a restaurant or hotel, and so on, all of which are, in other countries, the concern of the police or of some centralized office, in Italy, are within the sphere of the municipality. Indeed, in urban centres, the unavoidable contacts with the local authority are so frequent as to be a source of irritation : payment of family-tax, payment of tax on real estate, renewal of driving licence, renewal of circulation permit, renewal of identity card, registration of births, deaths, and marriages, obtention of resident- status, registration of domicile, obtention of the half dozen certificates required for obtaining or renewing a passport, all of which require personal contacts with the local municipality, as all these transactions must be carried out personally and cannot be done by correspondence. Licence to exercice a particular trade, or to use premises for a particular purpose, to be domiciled outside one's commune of residence, whether for business or private reasons, etc., must all be obtained from the municipality. Anyone visiting the Anagrafe in Rome, or the Municipio in any other city, any working day, will see the various offices crowded with vociferous queues of exasperated citizens who have come to pay some tax or to request some certificate. The majority will have to return the next day, and perhaps the day after that, for the amount of work to be done is such that none of one day's applications can be dealt with on the same day. The delays and frustrations caused by this excessive interference of local authority is a constant subject of complaint and anger. But this is a typically urban phenomenon. In villages, there is little necessity to have dealings with the local authority. The law demands that all Italians be provided with an identity 108 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE card. In cities and large towns, such identity documents must be procured because they are necessary if one moves to a neighbouring commune, in cashing cheques, in obtaining credit facilities, and in any dealings with persons with whom one is not personally acquainted. In a village, where one's dealings are with persons one has known all one's life, proof of identity can be dispensed with. Since the villagers do not travel, they do not require a number of certificates testifying to their national status, good behaviour, lack of a criminal record, etc. Since there arc no hotels or restaurants in a village, they do not require the respective licences. The few shop-keepers will require a licence to make use of their premises for trade. But this will affect but a small minority. Builders, factory- owners, etc., require a licence to carry out their occupation, but their workers do not; and the vast majority of the inhabitants of Calimera are wage-earners. Similarly land-owners will require to register their title to their property, and, if they dispose of it, will require valid title-deeds; but, again, the vast majority are tenants or labourers, and have no need of documents, their contract with the landlord being on a personal basis. The situation regarding taxes is similar; very few have any real property beyond the house they live in. House-owners will have to pay taxes, but only if their property exceeds a certain value; usually, the houses of Calimera come nowhere near that value. The family-tax, too, applies only to families whose income exceeds a given figure: there again, few families in Calimera come within that income group. The licence to keep livestock regards the owner of the beasts, not the persons tending them. In short, the majority of the population can carry out their activities without coming within the purview of the municipality. The only unavoidable obligation, in theory at least, is that of registering births, deaths and marriages. It is a legal offence not to do so. But the enforcement of this law leaves much to be desired : often, children's births are not registered until baptism, or even years later; marriages, being celebrated in church, their registration is usually left to the priest. Only deaths, involving the question of inheritance, are regularly registered at the municipality. And deaths and births, though fairly numerous, are not so frequent during any one person's lifetime. Indeed, the municipality is aware that a number of births have never been registered, since there is no record of it in the municipal archives. In fact, these archives are somewhat pointless. Their records are usually reliable only for the last thirty years or so. Before that, records were not properly kept. Even during the last thirty years, the legal obligation to report births, marriages, and deaths, could only be enforced effectively in regard to the last-named. There are therefore, a number of entries recording the death of persons, who, officially, were never born. During the war, even these mortuary records THE PATTERNS OF POWER 109 could not be properly kept. Finally the Calimeran sees little value in all this complicated bureaucratic red tape. He requires no documents for his daily life. He considers his marriage, the birth of his child, and the death of his father, as private matters which concern only himself, his family, and a small circle of friends and relatives. He is aware that to avoid being charged with " occultamento di cadavere " and to be able to have his father's corpse decently buried, he requires a proper certificate, and so he takes the precaution of registering the death. But since for baptism and marriages in church the priest will ask for no certificates, he tries to dodge the inconvenience of registering these events, usually by letting the priest do it. As time passes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to avoid any contact with the municipality. Pressure is being put from Rome and Lecce on the village municipalities to put their house in order. The state's increasing concern with the South has, indeed, manifested itself mostly by a tightening up of the control over the various local authorities. The compulsory national service is being strictly enforced, and to ensure that draft-dodging be adequately prevented, the state is putting pressure on village councils and compelling them to keep adequate records. Similarly, in view of the notoriously incompetent system of taxation, tax-dodging has been recognized by the state as one of its major losses in revenue, and to ensure that this leak be stopped, the state is increasingly interfering in an attempt to ensure that the licensing and taxations laws be rigidly enforced. This has been particularly true since 1946. The effect of the state's interference has gradually spread to Calimera, and the villagers are finding that the municipality is increasingly " interfering and meddling in their private affairsThis has not made it more popular. On the contrary, it has made worse the villager's avoidance of it. Crudely put, whereas, in the past, the average villager simply did not bother to observe municipal by-laws and regulation, because he saw no point in them; to-day, he still sees no point in them, but conscious that the municipality is trying to enforce them, he deliberately sets out to thwart it. To a greater or lesser degree, every villager is a law-breaker, in so far as every villager has failed to observe at least one regulation, sometimes out of ignorance, more often deliberately, either to avoid having to pay some tax or other, or because the observation of it would have been inconvenient, or, more simply, because it seemed to him a waste of time. When the youths of the village had to present themselves for military service, the Carabinieri found that the number who had valid identity-cards was small; the majority had cards that had expired long ago and never been renewed; and for about a quarter an identity card had never been issued. This is but one example; and not a very 110 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE important one. But the same sort of thing is true for the rest. One constantly hears a peasant say: " I shall have to go to the Comune and get this licence renewed. " An old man remarked that " when dealing with Carabinieri or the Comune, the less you tell them the better." This attitude is prevalent in the village, and affects not only the villagers' attitude towards the municipality as a whole, but also their relations with individual employees. It is almost impossible for them to separate the man's official personality from his individual one, and, pursuing their policy of having as little to do with the municipality as possible, tend to avoid any close contacts with the municipal employees. These municipal employees, who form the bureaucracy, are all professional civil servants, nominated by the state. Unlike the mayor and giunta they cannot be affected by popular suffrage. None of them are native Calimerans, and none are vitally interested in the village. The system of promotion of civil servants in Italy is such that promotion usually entails transfer to a different locality. Consequently, for the majority of the civil servants employed by the municipality of Calimera, their present offices are temporary ones. All cherish the hope of being promoted to a higher grade in a larger, more interesting town. In conse- quence, they are more concerned with keeping to the rules of the bureau- cracy, and doing their job in such a way as to give cause to no criticism from the provincial capital, than in solving the individual villager's pro- blems. Fundamentally, their main interest is in keeping adequate records of given transactions: they have little or no interest in the transaction itself. Furthermore, their awareness of the past inefficiency, of the irre- gularity and incompleteness of the records they possess, of the ineradicable mistrust of the peasants towards them, increases the civil servants' innate tendency to stick to letter of the law, often ignoring its spirit. One more aspect of the situation has now to be considered. The mayor's official role gives him but limited authority over the civil servants composing the bureaucracy. Though he and his councillors initiate measures and decide on the policy to be followed, they have little control over the actual implementation of that policy. The practical methods of carrying out any given measure decided on by the giunta are the concern of the particular department of the municipality, and the mayor has no right to interfere in the workings of the department, unless he has evidence of gross incompetence or of corruption. Even then, he has no right of personal interference: his duty would be to report any instance of misconduct or incompetence to the provincial " prefet- tura", which would take any action required. However, the practice differs considerably from the theory. For the impersonal working of the bureaucratic machinery can be affected by extraneous factors, and its THE PATTERNS OF POWER 111 impartial course deviated into channels more acceptable to certain per- sons. This can be achieved by " friendship Throughout southern Italy, the notorious " raccomandazione " increases the inefficiency of the ad- ministration, and Calimera is no exception. The word itself is innocent enough, meaning only a recommendation; but its implications are far- reaching, since it means exerting influence to obtain from the adminis- tration a result which would not be obtained through the normal channels. Essentially, it is the using of the personal relations of a member of the administration to influence his actions in his official capacity. I want something from the administration: the normal course is to send in an application, which will be duly considered by one or more departments, which will eventually decide on its merits. Even if it is granted, the pro- cess will require a considerable time; and there is no guarantee that it will be successful. But if I know someone in the administration, I can ask him to take an interest in the progress of my application, and thus ensure that the decision will be reached far sooner, and, if my acquain- tance is in a sufficiently influential position, that the decision will be favourable to me. This example reduces the process to its essentials. But such a simple case rarely occurs. More usually, there is a longish chain of such friendships between the applicant and the official he desires to influence. An example will make this clear. A young man is drafted into the army, and wishes to apply for a commission. The normal practice in such cases is to send in an application. In due course, the applicant sits for a competitive examination which tests his general education and his capacities for leadership; if successful, he is then sent to a military school, where he is given a basic military training of three months, at the end of which he sits for another competitive examination, which tests his fitness as a soldier and his understanding of basic military discipline and tactics. If successful, he undertakes a further course of instruction of three months in a school of the particular branch of the services he wishes to enter. At the end of this, a third competitive exam decides finally if he is to be commissioned as a sub-lieutenant or made to complete his military service in the ranks. There is no certainty that a man accepted for basic training will become an officer. Apart from the exams which he must pass, he can be sent back to the ranks at any stage in the process, if his conduct or his progress do not satisfy certain minimum standards. The particular young man in question is well educated, and has a degree in Law; but no outstanding military capacities. However, his father is the close friend of the mayor, and, when the young man is called before the enrolment board, he is provided by the mayor with a letter of intro- duction to the president of the board. As a result, the young man is 112 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE told to present himself for the initial examination, and provided with a letter of introduction to the president of the examining board. He is duly accepted, and the " raccomandazione " originally given by the mayor is repeated by various links in the chain of military instructors, examiners, and superiors, throughout his course of training. He eventually gets his commission, and is posted to an infantry regiment in Venetia. In this case, the " raccomandazione " was powerful enough to ensure his getting the commission; but too weak to obtain for him a posting nearer home, or in one of the crack regiments. The boy writing home points out that a colleague of his who actually was less well placed in the final examina- tion was posted to a crack regiment in Rome, where his family lived: but, he says, the latter was a " raccomandato di ferro " meaning that the influence brought to bear on his behalf was exceptionally strong. Similarly, on mentioning to an acquaintance that I was intending to study Calimera, the latter, a judge of Lecce, gave me an introduction to the director of the Municipal Library who, not only was most helpful in his advice, but gave me a letter of introduction to the mayor of Cali- mera. It is worth noting that my original " raccomandatore " was not personally acquainted with anyone in Calimera, but knew that the direc- tor of the Municipal Library in Lecce was interested in the Greek-speak- ing villages of the interior. Invariably, the individuals forming the chain are anxious to oblige the person who was the last link, not the actual applicant who is unknown to them. Naturally, this interference in the working of the administration is not limited to the mayor, though his patronage is more powerful, because of his direct authority over the municipality, than that of other persons. Every land-owner has his proteges, who in turn have theirs, and the administration in its working must take into account this web of patronage. This does not make for efficient administration. In addition, the action of the municipality in any attempt to improve the standard of living of the village is hampered by vested interests, manifesting them- selves directly, or through the devious paths of the " raccomandazione Consequently, the ineffectiveness of the municipal administration of Calimera is due to a number of factors: to the lack of interest in village affairs of the professional civil-servants forming the actual bureaucracy; to the vested interests of the mayor and giunta and those of their pro- teges; and to the pressure that the landed aristocracy can bring to bear on the municipal council in order to quash any measure harmful to their interests, either directly through their membership of the council, or indirectly by mobilizing on their behalf the influence of the giunta, through personal friendship and the " raccomandazione The abuse of THE PATTERNS OF POWER 113 the latter also causes the actions of the municipality to be erratic and arbitrary, since, whatever the merits of any individual case, it is not decided on according to its merits and the regulations governing it, but according to how powerfully it is " recommended The peasants' mis- trustful attitude is thus justified and encouraged, and leads them to avoid having any contact with the municipality, in whom they have no trust. Lastly, the incredible complication of administrative operation in Italy ensures that even well-intentioned municipalities are bogged down in paperwork and red tape. In addition to his role as head of the municipal bureaucracy, the mayor is also in command of the village's police force. Once again, his authority is a nominal one. The Carabinieri, who police the village, are in fact a military corps, depending from the Ministry of War, and over whose appointment the mayor has no control. By an internal regulation, no Carabiniere may serve in his native province, nor may he marry a woman of the province in which he serves. In the last case, he is auto- matically transferred to a different province. Moreover, he may not marry at all before a number of years, service in the corps. These regulations and the peculiar para-military nature of the Carabinieri are due to the historical development of the police in Italy. In the North, the Austrian Government found it necessary to create a political police under its direct control, in order to carry out such measures as could not be entrusted to the municipal police. Such functions were entrusted to the military. On the unification of Northern Italy under the House of Savoy, the Monarchy preserved this system of two police forces, one of which was under its direct control, so as to be able to check the republican and socialist movements in the newly acquired provinces, and even in the old provinces of the kingdom of Sardinia; imitating the Austrian practice, this police function was given to a military corps, and the practice was regularized by giving the Brigade of Carabineers this specialized task. In the South, there was no police force outside the large cities, since the administration of justice was delegated to the feudal barons. Consequent- ly, when the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was annexed, the sphere of activity of the Carabinieri was extended to cover even normal police duties in the South, thus ensuring that the newly conquered provinces, whose peasantry and much of the gentry was still loyal to the expelled Bourbons, were controlled by a police of whose loyalty to the House of Savoy there could be no doubt. The regulation forbidding service within one's native province, and that forbidding marriage with natives of the province where one serves, ensured that the loyalty of the corps could not be tainted by alliances of its personnel with disaffected local elements. Nowadays, these regulations ensure that the Carabinieri are as impartial

8 114 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE in the execution of their duty as can be humanly achieved. No personal ties link any of them to the inhabitants they police; and by removing them from the control of the local municipality by making them directly dependent from the Ministry of War, the Government ensures that no undue pressure can be exerted on them by the local inhabitants. In addi- tion, legal and penal matters are the province of the " Pretura " and the Tribunal whose seat is in the provincial capital, and over whose actions the individual municipalities have no control. Consequently, the mayor though nominally responsible for the policing of his village, is, in fact, deprived of every means of enforcing his authority over the actual police force, and has no executive or legislative powers in his own village, beyond such limited legislation as the issuing of local by-laws regarding nuisance, hours of opening and shutting, etc. Furthermore, the Cara- binieri can take action independently to preserve the peace, without previously obtaining the municipality's consent. To a very large degree, therefore, the Carabinieri are independent of the municipal authority, though nominally subject to it. Indeed, they are so considered by the villagers, who are fully aware that the salutes given to the mayor by members of the corps, and the attendance at meetings of the giunta of the N.C.O. of the Carabinieri to report, are all empty forms, which but thinly veil the complete independence of the Carabinieri. The independence of the Carabinieri is further brought out by their power of " fermo Italian law recognises two distinct stages in the arrest of a suspected offender. The first stage is known as the " fermo which, in itself, is not an arrest, though it may involve temporary confinement. No charge need be preferred, and no warrant is required. It is intended to facilitate the work of the police when investigating an offence, by enabling them to place in temporary confinement a person whose conduct is not in itself criminal or felonious, but might still lead to a breach of the peace. The second stage is that of " arresto " : this is proper arrest and a charge must be preferred and a warrant obtained. An " arresto " requires a previous presentation of a prima facie case to a magistrate and the obtention of the court's order: the person arrested must be accused of a specific offence, and sufficient evidence must be presented to the magistrate to justify the issuing of a warrant. The issuing of such a warrant will be recorded in the court's records, and, whatever the even- tual verdict, the arrest is recorded in the accused's penal dossier. None of this applies to a fermo ". No application to a court is needed: conse- quently no case need be made out nor evidence presented. Beyond the simple recording of the " fermo " in the local police-station's log-book, no record is kept. There is no " Habeas Corpus " in Italy, and there is no legal limit to the duration of the " fermoIn fact it is not a legal THE PATTERNS OF POWER 115 procedure at all. The Carabinieri require no excuse for enforcing a fermo " other than their personal judgment that it is expedient to place under confinement a particular person. The " fermo" is not a sanction: it is a way of ensuring that a person will be available when required, whether for questioning or any other reason. Abuse of the " fermo " could lead to a prosecution for illegal imprisonment. Consequently, whenever the suspicion against a " fermato " is strong, it is usual for a charge to be preferred and the " fermo " to be transformed into an arresto However, the Carabinieri make great use of the " fermo No doubt a lawyer could prove that in many cases they go beyond their legal powers. But, in practice, the villagers against whom the " fermo " is used have little knowledge of the law, and have an innate fear of being involved in law-suits. Consequently, it is normal practice for the fermo " to be used as a minor sanction in order to prevent breaches of the peace. For instance, drunkenness is not a felony, and unless the drunkard commits an offence the Carabinieri have no right to interfere with him. But they do. A Carabiniere will decide that the man is too drunk to be safely left to his own devices, and will proceed to use the fermo". The drunkard will be marched off to the " caserma" (the Carabinieri's barracks, which incorporates the gaol) and locked up while he sleeps it off, when he recovers, he will be given a solemn admonition by the " Maresciallo ", and released. This is not an arrest, and no record of it will appear on the man's penal dossier. Strictly speaking, the Cara- binieri had no right to place him in confinement, since he had not com- mitted any actual offence, though they could probably justify their action by saying that it was for his own protection. But essentially it was a bluff aimed at frightening the man into keeping more sober ways. Similarly, when two women were involved in a sharp exchange of insults over precedence at the well, the Carabiniere on patrol took both in charge and marched them off to the gaol, where they were allowed to calm down, and were then released with a warning that they might fare worse if they misbehaved again. In effect, this was a clear abuse of power, since no complaint had been lodged, and a mere verbal exchange of insults is not a legal offence unless such a complaint was lodged by an aggrieved party. Furthermore the threat of more serious sanctions was an empty bluff. Another case will illustrate the use of the " fermo " as an alternative to a legal prosecution. A land-owner, D. complained that A. M., a boy aged about fourteen, was in the habit of hanging around the house and pilfering small objects which were left unwatched. D. could have charged the boy with petty larceny, which would have led to a proper arrest and a legal prosecution. He was, however, unwilling to do so, as the M. were a respectable family, and he did not wish to cause 116 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE them trouble. But he did want to teach the boy a lesson. The problem was solved by the Maresciallo sending a Carabiniere to the M. house, where the boy was duly " fermato " and marched off to gaol. He was kept there till evening, then released with a warning. Again, this was essen- tially a bluff, as well as an abuse of power. No charge had been made, so the Carabinieri had no real legal power to detain the boy; further- more, unless a charge was preferred they could take no further action. Nonetheless, the " fermo" had achieved its object. A. M. had been considerably frightened by his short imprisonment. His family was shocked by the disgrace and would henceforth keep a sharp eye on him to avoid a repetition of such a disgraceful confinement. At the same time, no record would be kept, and the boy's legal record was still clean. The effectiveness of the " fermo " depends on the use of force. The legal aspects of it are beyond the villagers' grasp, and are really irrelevant. No explanation that the " fermo " has no legal effects, and that it is essentially a bluff, can convince the villagers. The fact of imprisonment is of more importance to them than any legal argument. The power of the Carabinieri manifests itself effectively on the physical plane, and is backed by the concrete sanction of imprisonment, however temporary the latter may be. The villagers do not distinguish between legal and extra legal imprisonment: to them, the difference between a legally imposed sentence of imprisonment, and the Carabinieri's fermo lasting an hour or two, is one of degree, not of nature. It is a very short spell of imprisonment contrasted with a much longer one; but they see no fundamental difference between the two. And the wholesome terror the villagers have of the gaol ensures the effectiveness of the " fermo " as a penal sanction, and a deterrent. The effectiveness and promptness of the Carabinieri's intervention, the power of imprisonment which they wield, their position as " fo- reigners " to the village (which guarantees a substantial measure of impartiality and incorruptibility), all contrast favourably with the ineffectiveness of the municipality. Thus, while the municipality is ignored the Carabinieri are respected. But the converse of the medal is seen in the fear the villagers have of them. This is inevitable: any respect which is based not on merit, but on the use of force, is necessarily allied to a considerable fear. To some extent, this attitude of mingled respect and fear is found throughout the world and characterizes the attitude of the population towards the police, wherever the latter are both efficient and incorruptible. It is particularly true of the Italians, even in the large cities. But, in urban centres, a difference can be noted between the atti- tude of the population towards the municipal police and that towards the Carabinieri. The latter enjoy a well-deserved reputation for incorruptibi- THE PATTERNS OF POWER 117 lity, and since they deal only with criminal matters whose penalty is imprisonment, while the municipals deal with such minor matters as traffic offences, infractions of bylaws, etc., where the penalty is more usually a pecuniary fine, they are less likely to be connected with the financial interests of the municipality or the government. Consequently, in the large centres, the Carabinieri are liked, while the municipals are cordially disliked. But, in Calimera, as in any other village, there is no municipal police. The Carabinieri have to undertake duties which, in the larger centres, are the concern of the municipals, and thus incur the odium which is normally the lot of the municipal police. In Calimera, the Carabinieri not only preserve law and order, and deal with criminal matters, but have to enforce the by-laws and edicts of the municipality. In so far as their duties concern the criminal offences and the preservation of the peace, no odium is incurred. On the whole, the Calimerans are a law-abiding lot. But where the Carabinieri are compelled to enforce the by-laws of the municipality, to punish infrac- tions to these regulations, or exact the tributes due, they become identified with the municipality and share the dislike and resentment felt towards it. Particularly among the lower class, they are disliked, not personally, for, as a rule, the Carabinieri do their best to keep on friendly terms with the villagers, but as representatives of an organization wielding an effective power, all the more terrifying because its use so often seems arbitrary. This apparent arbitrariness is not due to the use or abuse of the " fermo " to preserve peace and order in the village. In such cases, the cause of the Carabiniere's interference is obvious. Rather, the arbi- trariness of the Carabinieri's interference is felt whenever the latter is enforcing some law or regulation, which to the villager has no obvious purpose. If a crime is committed, or if the Carabiniere steps in to avert a possible act of violence, his intervention is logical and felt to be justified; but when he acts to enforce the observance of a regulation which seems pointless or absurd to the villager, the logical explanation is lacking, and the use of power is felt to be arbitrary and motiveless. Unfortunately, the Carabinieri's duties are not only to preserve the peace, to prevent violence, and to identify and seize such obvious criminals as thieves or homicides, but to enforce 'the observance of Italian law. Only too often, Italian law is concerned with technicalities, as anyone who is involved in a law-suit in Italy finds out to his own cost. These are incomprehensible to the villager; just as certain requirements of the Law seem incomprehensible and illogical. Stealing, murder, violence, malicious damage, all are actions whose criminality the peasant readily recognizes; but there are a number of actions which the law considers 118 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE criminal, but which the peasant does not so recognise. In the same way, he cannot understand crimes by omission. The fact that he may be punished not for doing something, but for not doing something else, is bewildering to him. Hence, when the Carabinieri act in enforcement of some technical regulation or proceed against someone for failing to have performed some specific act, the offender feels himself to be the victim of arbitrary and unjust treatment. A legal restriction on the hours of opening on shops, for instance, appears completely illogical to the peasant: why, he asks, should he not buy his salami after 6 o'clock, provided he finds a " salumiere " willing to sell him one? If he or the shop-keeper is fined for contravening that regulation, he feels unjustly treated. Similarly, if he sees no point in obtaining and carrying about an identity-card, which he may be unable to read; and then gets " fermato " for lacking proper identification-papers; he is obviously the victim of an illogical abuse of power. Whether a child is sent to school or kept at home is surely his parents' business: when a policeman turns up and, not satisfied with carting the child off to school, proceeds to cart the father off on the charge of contravening the law, the peasant is indignant at the blatant injustice perpetrated against him. Again, why should the card-game of " scopa " be permitted, while he risks being arrested if he plays the traditional game of " il tocco " ? If a friend offers him a quantity of tobacco cheap, and he buys it, why should some officious " pizzardone " arrest him for contraband? And so on, ad infinitum. Very often, the Carabiniere is only doing his duty reluctantly, sharing the peasant's feeling of arbitrariness and injustice, particularly when dealing with such technical offences as failing to send a child to school, failing to observe legal closing time, etc. But this only makes the whole thing more bewildering. Hence, apart from the fact that he is by definition a foreigner " to the village, a Carabiniere is further debarred from close social contact with the villagers by their knowledge that the friendly pizzardone " could turn, at any moment, into a relentless enemy whose only aim is to lock them up for having contravened some incomprehensible regulation or other.

The status of the Carabinieri in the village is a peculiar one. In so far as none of them are native to the village, nor even to the province, and none will ever settle in it, they are " foreigners ". Furthermore, the stringent internal regulations of the corps which forbid any fraternization between the Carabinieri and the people they police, increase this alienness. Strictly speaking, the Carabinieri are not part of village society at all. Personally, they may be likeable fellows; but they discourage friendliness, keep aloof from village affairs, and are untrustworthy in that they do not observe a code friendship and personal loyalty, but, in obedience to an THE PATTERNS OF POWER 119 abstract code of discipline, will calmly place behind bars the man they have been greeting for years with a friendly " Buongiorno! " In addition, the discipline of the corps is aimed at developing a close camaraderie within the corps and a total loyalty to it, coupled with as impersonal and detached an attitude to persons and matters outside the corps as is possible. The internal discipline and training of the Carabinieri is, in fact, aimed at increasing their alienness from the population they police. This has the laudable intention of making them as incorruptible and impartial as it is possible to achieve. But it also depersonalizes them: to the villagers, they all look alike". As a Carabiniere said: " We are not really considered human at all: even on leave, it is impossible to make friends; the minute they find out I'm a Carabiniere, they start becoming excessively polite, as if they were afraid I was going to arrest them there and then ". In short, in many respects the Carabinieri lie outside the village structure. Yet, at the same time, they are a vital part of it. In the last analysis, the preservation of the social order is their task, and one could say that there would be no social structure at all without them. This is quite clearly felt by the villagers. That is why their attitude to the Carabinieri is a markedly ambivalent one: they respect them, yet fear them; dislike them, yet rush to them for help; sneer at them, yet depend on them for protection and guidance. It is not that some Calimerans like them and some dislike them, that some fear them and some respect them. It is the same Calimeran who will one minute denounce the Carabinieri for unjustly taking him into custody, and the next praise them to the sky for having effectively put an end to some criminal activity or other. He will sneer at their " all looking alike, strutting up and down like so many toy soldiers ", and the next express his admiration for the discipline of the corps. This ambivalence is clearly seen in the Calimerans' attitude to social relations with the Carabinieri. It is not considered a good thing to be on very friendly terms with them, and a person who is too frequently seen in their company is regarded with suspicion and dislike; at the same time, anyone markedly antagonistic to them is equally suspect. Any relation between a Carabiniere and a villager is a difficult one. Conversation is strained; and behaviour is stiff and awkward. It is quite obvious that the Calimerans feel uneasy when forced by circumstances to have dealings with the Carabinieri, and do not really know how to behave towards them. On the whole, they avoid having any close dealings with them, though they are careful to be polite to them, greeting them and returning their greeting, and being courteous in casual encounters with them. Similarly, the idea of one's son becoming a Carabiniere is not an unpleasant one: for the boy, it is an excellent career which brings prestige and good pay; at the same 120 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE time, this might mean that the family might be less popular with neighbours and friends. Similarly, the idea of one's daughter marrying a Carabiniere is definitely repulsive, though no good reason is ever given. Any argument on the subject is always inconclusive, since the peasant can find no valid reason to justify his irrational dislike of having a Carabiniere in the family. Yet it is to be remembered that the Carabinieri are the only members of the political hierarchy who are really important in village life, and who are generally respected by the villagers. Their status is an ambivalent one. The " Maresciallo the N. C. O. commanding the platoon stationed in Calimera, is socially inferior to both the land-owners and the professional men. He is superior to the landless villagers, and even to the better-off traders and artisans. But he is treated with respect even by the upper classes. The troopers are socially roughly on a par with the peasantry, but are treated with considerable respect by the peasants, and even the upper classes treat them with unusual courtesy. How far this is due to genuine respect or to an unexpressed notion that it is advisable to keep on good terms with them is something that can never be precisely gauged. However, it is noteworthy that the Carabinieri are the only non-land-owning group which is treated with universal respect. On the whole, the political hierarchy does not appear as a natural development of the social structure of the village, but rather as if it were arbitrarily superimposed on it. In fact, the status and prestige of its personnel does not depend on the position they hold within the political hierarchy. The municipal employees have no real status within the community and are, both in their own and in the villagers' eyes, foreigners to Calimera. Where a political official enjoys considerable prestige within the community, this prestige is due to his status as a land-owner or to his personal qualities, not to his official position. In effect, the political hierarchy in Calimera has been created by the Italian Government, and remains largely as a foreign excrescence within the body politic of the village. The Carabinieri are an exception, in so far as they affect far more directly the everyday life of the individual villager. Unlike the municipality which can be ignored most of the time, the Carabinieri and their possible intervention must always be taken into account. But their status is a corporate one. With the possible exception of the Maresciallo ", whose reputation and status depend to some extent on his personal qualities, the Carabinieri enjoy status as members of the corps, not as individuals. They represent the Law and the Government, and are indeed far better representatives of the Government than the rather shadowy municipality. The position the Carabinieri hold within Calimeran THE PATTERNS OF POWER 121 society is far more accurate reflection of the position held by the government in the life of the village than that of the municipality. To the Calimerans, the government is a distant organism, not directly connected with the village or its individual inhabitants, but which nevertheless, through its laws and edicts, governs and fashions their existence. It protects them and exploits them: it exacts tributes, but preserves order and punishes antisocial conduct; it imposes certain norms of conduct, and ensures their being observed by the threat or use of force, yet it leaves unregulated a considerable sphere of everyday existence. To a very great extent it is unpredictable and arbitrary: often its regulations seem to have no valid " raison d'etreit can be exaggeratedly finicky and touchy over such apparently insignificant matters as the recording of a birth or death or the exact spelling of a name; yet it ignores such vitally important matters as the health or illness of persons, or their social relations, unless these result in a death or in overt violence. Its moral code is equally incomprehensible: it punishes adultery, but takes no notice of the more serious offence of seduction of unmarried girls; it is indifferent to a girl's immoral conduct, yet brands her illegitimate child as a bastard. It compels one to send one's child to school, however difficult an economic condition this places a family in, yet cares not a whit whether the said child is brought up as a Christian or a heathen. And so on. And the Carabinieri are there to enforce the government's edicts. Since no Carabiniere expresses any personal opinion, it is assumed that they share the government's views, and that the government's peculiar standards are their own. Consequently, though a vital part of the structure of the society, they remain to a great extent foreign to it. They form the real link between the village and such distant entities as the Government and the Law, and, in consequence, share much of these entities' distance and unfamiliarity. The real hierarchy of status and power is based to-day, as it always was, on the ownership of land. In Calimera, as throughout the South, land is the basic criterion of status, wealth, and power. The nobiliary titles of marquess, count, and baron, have been abolished by law; but the status and power such titles represented have not been affected. Indeed, the abolition of nobiliary titles has, to a great extent, gone unnoticed in Apulia. The land-owners are still addressed and referred to as « Don », preserving the traditional aristocratic form. The system of land-tenure still preserves its traditional feudal form; and the hierarchy of status within the land-owning class still follows the traditional order of precedence of the fifteen families concerned. The gap between the land- owning aristocracy, and the landless villager is still unbridged; and the free peasant of to-day is just as tied to the land and its owner by economic 122 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE and social ties as he was when he was still a feudal serf. It is true that the abolition of the feudal privileges of the aristocracy, the abolition of the nobiliary titles, the extension of the franchise to the landless peasant, and the presence within the village of a class of landless professional men and of a growing class of artisans, as well as the growth of industries, have, to a great extent, obscured the feudal stratification of the village, and that the modern hierarchy of status is far less rigid and clear-cut than the ancient feudal one, but the essential basic elements of it are still present. The fifteen land-owning families can no longer be placed in a rigid order of status and precedence, as in the past; but the primacy of the family owning the " Castello " is still tacitly recognized, and the social superiority of these fifteen families to the rest of the population is universally recognized. The anomalous groups of the professional men and the artisans, which have no place within the feudal system, are still in a somewhat anomalous position. The title of " Don " is never given to a professional man, except if he comes from a land-owning family, and then the title refers to his status as an aristocrat and not to his professional qualifications. Whatever the pretensions of the artisans and traders to be considered as superior to the tillers of the soil, they are addressed with the familiar " tu " and never with " Vui which would be the more respectful form. Still, it is the women who form the vast majority of those employed in industry, the proper occupation of men being still the tilling of the soil. And wealth, when not expressed as ownership of land, still does not bring status. The status-symbols of the cities, the motor-car, the television, the clothes, are meaningless in Calimera. The cafe-owner has a television; many artisans and traders have cars or vans; their status is in no whit increased by such possessions. The hierarchy based on land is simple in its essentials. At the top of the social ladder is the chief land-owner, whose family was formerly enfeoffed with the village. Nowadays, the primacy of this family is much more shadowy, though occasional references to the " barone " can still be heard. But the distinction between the first family and the other land-owning families tends to fade. The great land-owning families form a close-knit group, partly because they have identical interests and political views, partly through intermarriage, and partly as a reaction against the emergence of a small group of professional men, whose status depends on education and professional qualifications instead of land, and of a class of wealthier traders and shopkeepers among the villagers. In addition, obsolete conventions of aristocratic purity and noblesse oblige to which this class is still attached, tend to increase the isolation of the class, and transform it into a caste. Below the aristocracy, there is an ill-defined group of tenants. The THE PATTERNS OF POWER 123 system of tenancy of southern Italy is not based on rent, but on co- operation. A major land-owner does not personally tend his land, but has tenants who work the land and who share the produce with him. In turn, the tenant, if unable to work the land on his own, will give portions to sub-tenants who work it, yielding a share of the produce to him. Similarly, the sub-tenant may hold too much land to work without help, and may associate another who helps to work the land in exchange for a share of the produce. Large tenancies are usually life-long, and it is usual for them to remain in the family. Moreover, certain families of sub-tenants are associated with given plots of land. The result is that the pattern of tenancies is really less casual than it appears, and the relationship of tenant to landlord or to sub-tenant involves far more than a mere payment of rent or temporary association. In many cases, a certain gradation of landlord, tenant, and sub-tenant has been continued among certain families over generations, so that it becomes almost an obligation for a given landlord to have as his tenants the members of a given family. The group is ill-defined however, for certain tenants are themselves petty land-owners; and, in some cases, have for so long been in possession of a given plot of land that it practically belongs to them, though they are nominally only the tenants and not the owners. At the opposite extreme, there are sub-tenants whose tenancies are only temporary, i. e. for one season only, or for only one crop; these, though they do possess land during the tenancy, have no lasting association with it, and can barely be distinguished from the " braccianti" or labourers who work for wages. Furthermore, in a few rare cases, certain tenants are actually poorer than certain families of " braccianti ". However, the possession of land is the ultimate criterion, and the class of tenants is higher in status than the artisans, traders, and labourers. These last form a single group. The word " bracciante " is usually reserved for the labourer, and more typically the agricultural labourer. But in fact families of " bracciante " status may have a higher status than that implied by the term. For instance, the owner of the cafe on the piazza is one of the wealthiest men in Calimera: yet he is of " bracciante " family, though his status is naturally higher than that of a mere labourer. Again, in most families, some members will be employed in a factory, while others work as agricultural labourers, and other relatives, perhaps, own a shop, or are craftsmen. In many cases, the men work as labourers while the women are employed in a factory, or in a shop. Sometimes, a labourer may also be able to rent a small plot of land; and the majority of the sub-tenants whose tenancy is purely casual and temporary are in effect " bracciante Consequently, there is no rigid boundary between the tenants and the labourers, or between agricultural workers and 124 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE traders or artisans. This is reflected by the fact that there is no bar to intermarriage between these groups, as there is between the land-owning aristocracy and the rest of the population. Furthermore, there is no specific form of address within the group. Invariably, the second person singular is used: tu " in Italian, si " in Grico. The plural " vui " is reserved for the aristocracy and the small group of professionnals. Indeed, the plural is only used by the Calimerans when speaking Italian: when using Grico, the plural is never used as a token of respect, even when a child addresses an aged adult. In Grico, the plural form, sis " sas is used only to express plurality, never as a token of respect. This linguistic peculiarity may be correlated to the fact that the aristocracy does not speak Grico, and never did, and, in fact, considers knowledge of Grico as a sign of low birth. The forms of address and reference are revealing, as they reflect the class structure of the village. In standard Italian usage, there are three ways of addressing a person. One can use the familiar tu " followed by the second person singular, when speaking to children, animals, and very intimate relatives and friends. Otherwise, one would use the feminine pronoun " Lei " (standing for " la Signoria Vostra roughly equivalent to " your lordship ", and having the same value as the Spanish " Usted " and the German " Sie ") : in text-book Italian, this use of " Lei", followed by the third person singular, would be used towards strangers, superiors, and equals who are not intimate relatives or friends. The second person plural, " voi ", is never used. In practice, voi" is often used, even by literate and correct speakers as an intermediate form of address. It is felt that, in speaking to one's parents, or to persons not sufficiently close to warrant the use of the familiar tu ", the use of the third person is too formal and distant, and it is usually replaced by " voi Similarly, when speaking to one's social inferiors, one should normally use " tu however, when the social inferiority is not so great as to warrant the use of this almost contemptuous form of address, one uses " voi An illustration of this is given by the prescribed forms of address in the armed forces, which reflect what is considered the proper usage. Thus, a private soldier addresses an N. C. 0. with " voibut an officer with " LeiContrarywise, an officer addresses officers of equal rank with tusuperior ranks with " Leibut uses voi" when speaking to N. C. O.s and tu " when speaking to private soldiers. It is a punishable offence, in the disciplinary code, to use a more familiar form when speaking to a superior. It is, on the contrary, a solecism to use a more formal form of address where a familiar form is prescribed. The same, within limits, is true for general civilian usage: the use of " tu " towards persons who are not close relatives or very THE PATTERNS OF POWER 125 intimate friends would be offensive; whereas the use of " Lei" towards a more distant relative or a friend of the family would be ironical or excessively formal. In the same way, a person of higher status speaking to a social inferior would deem it humiliating to use " Leibut would offend his hearer if he used " tu ". Consequently, the form of address used by various speakers gives a fairly exact notion of their relative status. It is very easy to get an exact picture of the relative status of a group of persons talking, by noting which of the three forms of address is used by individual speakers and towards whom. Unfortunately, this system breaks down in Calimera. The peasants do not know how to use " Lei Their attempts to do so involve them in unsurmountable complications, and they usually give up after a few tries. The logical absurdity of speaking in the third person to someone facing you defeats them. Normally, they use " voi " towards social superiors, and " tu " towards equals. On the other hand, the aristocracy and the professional classes are very punctilious about using " Lei " when speaking to equals, and use tu " when addressing a peasant. " Voi " is rarely used by them, except to relatives or occasionally by a landlord to his agent or chief tenant. Some professionals (the school-teachers in particular) use " voi " when speaking to a peasant of equal age or older. Hence, any attempt to establish status by noting the forms of address used gives the following result: there are a small number of families the members of whom use the very formal " Lei" when speaking to one another, and who are addressed by the peasants with the respectful " voi These are the great land-owning families, the families of professional status, and the priest. In addition, the Maresciallo of the Carabinieri is also addressed with voi " by the peasants and with " Lei " by the professionals and the aristocracy. The remainder of the population is addressed indiscriminately with " tu ". Consequently, the picture given is of a society divided into two classes only. By noting the use of titles or particles, it is possible to subdivide the upper class into two groups. The particle " Don " is used by the peasants only towards the land-owning families, and by the latter among themselves. The professional men are addressed as " signo' " or sometimes " signoria " (dialectical forms of " signore " = sir, the standard form of address and reference). " Don " is never used to or about a person who is not a member of the aristocracy. It is, in fact, the old Spanish nobiliary particle, and is used only of persons whose claim to nobility is generally recognized. The professional families are not accepted as noble ", and are never so addressed. " Signore " is also the proper way of addressing a stranger of whose exact status one is uncertain. It is significant that, in certain cases, the word " signore" is replaced by a professional title. For instance, the local doctors are never addressed as 126 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE

signore but as " dotto' ", and their wives are often referred to as dottoressa ", a quite inaccurate description as, in standard Italian, the latter word can only be applied to female university graduates, which these women are not. Similarly, the school-teachers will be addressed and spoken of as " maestro or mastro ", and the Maresciallo of the Cara- binieri is invariably addressed and referred to as " Marescial'The use of the professional epithet instead of " signore " is not a random one. It is used in the case of persons towards whom the villagers feel affection and respect, and whose position in the village is recognized as being important to the life of the village; the doctor, the policeman, the teacher; none of these belong to the traditional hierarchy based on land-tenure, and they cannot be classified within its limits: but, though " outsiders their role in the life of the community is accepted as being of vital importance to it, and the word " signore " with its implications of distance and its nuance of hostility is not applicable to them. " Don " cannot be used, since they are not noble, but a title derived from their occupation is used to mark the fact that they are distinguished from the rest of the pro- fessional group as being far more intimately connected with the life of the community. That the epithet is used as a title, and not as a mere description, is shown by its extension to their wives and children, and the fact that other professional men are not so described. Significantly, unlike " Don which is always followed by a Christian name, the pro- fessional title is used alone. This stresses the fact that it is the occupation of these people which creates a close link between themselves and the villagers, not any personal tie between them and individual villagers. On the contrary, the use of the Christian name in association with the particle " Don " expresses a notion of personal involvement, derived from the traditional ties between feudal lord and his dependants. In this context, it is interesting to note that the particle " Don " is used in addressing or referring to the priest. Though originally a corruption of the Latin " dominus still used in the abbreviated form " dom " in referring or addressing priests throughout Italy, it is certain that the villagers of Calimera do not distinguish it from " don " as a nobiliary title. It is used to express their recognition both of the priest's superiority in status and the intimate relationship which binds them to him.

Again, we find this close connection between effective power and status. The land-owning aristocracy have power in that they own the land which feeds the village, and on which it is built. All the villagers are, to a greater or lesser degree, their direct dependants, whether as tenants, wage-labourers, or merely as dwellers in houses built on their land. By a mere refusal to continue the tenancy, or by refusing employment, a nobleman can ruin a whole family. His power is too obvious to need THE PATTERNS OF POWER 127 stressing. The professional men, on the other hand, do not wield such power. They are occasionally needed, but are not so placed as to have a stranglehold on the very life of the community. In many ways, they are foreign to it, since none are native-born, and they themselves feel more closely linked with the city than with the village they live in. Essentially, they are not indispensable. But there are exceptions. The doctor and the teacher cannot be considered as expendable. The latter is necessary to give the children the minimum of education which is recognized as necessary if the child is to have any prospect of advancement in the future. The former is indispensable if every illness is not to become lethal. Furthermore, their occupations place them in a very close personal relation with the villagers. There is no relationship as close as that of parent and child, and the teacher is in loco parentis. Through the common interest both have in the child, a personal tie is created between the teacher and his pupils' parents. As for the doctor, the frequent personal contacts he has with his patients, the unavoidable physical intimacy between them, are too obvious to require enumeration. The villagers recognise this, and express it by using towards these people a different mode of address and reference than that normally used for the members of their class. We have already seen how powerful is the position of the Mares- ciallo. The priest, too, enjoys a position of power. He is the one person, in the village, whom even the most powerful landlord must treat with respect. He is the representative of the Church, and is backed by its tremendous spiritual force. He can impose its sanctions: indeed, through the sacrament of Confession and Penance he does so regularly, as part of his duties as parish-priest. What is more, behind the power of the Church is hidden the almighty hand of God, of whom the Church is only the instrument. The individual peasant may or may not like priests; he may or may not respect the Church itself as a social institution: indeed, he may feel little respect towards priests as individuals. But his belief in God is unshakeable, and he accepts absolutely the claim of the priest to be God's representative in the village. Consequently, the priest's status is extremely high, and is correlated with the tremendous power he is believed to have as God's deputy. Furthermore, it must be remembered that, from the age of 7 onwards, the children of the village are taught to confess their sins to the priest at regular intervals. Admittedly, there will come a time when some of them will not observe very faithfully these obligations. Nonetheless, through confession, there is little the priest does not know about the activities and even the thoughts of the parish- ioners : indeed, he knows even the secret desires and longings which 128 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE they have not even admitted to their parents and their intimate friends. This inevitably creates a close personal relationship between the priest and the peasant. Lastly, marriage, baptism, burial, are all controlled by the priest. There is no major crisis of human life in which the priest is not involved: when you are born, when you marry, when your own children are born, when you die, the priest's blessing is indispensable. Hence, though he owns no land, though he comes from the humblest and poorest family, though he depends on his parishioners' gifts to eke out the meagre salary he receives, though he may not even be very wise or very educated, he enjoys a status above all others, and this is reflected in the usage of the particle " Don " which places him on the same level as the powerful land-owning aristocrats, accurately fixing his position in the society. The small group of professional families hardly fit into the tra- ditional stratification. These families, none of which is native to the village, own no land, and have no effective power. With the exceptions already noted, their positions and occupation are not strictly essential to the existence of the village — at least, are not considered so. Most of them are employed in government jobs: the post-office superintendent, the heads of department of the municipality; or in the head offices of the local tobacco refinery and canning factory; or as agents of " foreign " concerns such as the bank. Usually, they occupy posts of managerial status, and are not directly concerned with the everyday routine tasks. Consequently, it is unusual for them to have direct dealings with the mass of the villagers. The bank manager, for instance, rarely has any face to face contact with the bank's customers, unless these are of the upper classes, whose accounts are of such size or involve such operations as require his attentions. The mass of the villagers has no account, or such small accounts as not to require more complex financial operation as the occasional cashing of a cheque, or the issue of a promissory note, matters which are usually dealt with by the cashier. Consequently, the local bank-manager is a vague figure to the villagers, of whose duties they are ignorant. Similarly, the managers of the local industrial con- cerns, have little or no contact with their workers. The latter are hired or dismissed by the foreman, who also gives them their tasks, and they are paid by the cashier. As far as they know, the manager really does nothing at all; he appears occasionally, in the workshop, has a look round, and goes: the rest of the time he is in an office reading or dictat- ing letters. Whenever his activities impinge on their life, it is usually in an unpleasant way. If a worker has to be fired, the foreman shifts the blame on to the shoulders of the invisible manager; unpopular regula- tions are blamed on the arbitrariness of the management, etc. In the THE PATTERNS OF POWER 129 bank, the same holds true: if a loan is granted, the cashier is thanked; if it is refused, it is the manager who is blamed. And the same pattern is found wherever the villagers come into contact with the professional men. Even the lesser grades, such as municipal employees, or those pro- fessional men, such as lawyers or notaries, who come into close contact with the villagers, are not closely identified with the community. It is true that the notary draws up wills and marriage contracts; that he issues attestations, and that his signature is required to validate docu- ments; and that recourse is had to him whenever it is necessary to disentangle some involved dealings with the municipality. Similarly, the lawyer is consulted in dealings with the police, or in the case of conflicts. But the peasant's impression is that they deliberately complicate the simplest matter. For instance, V. has two daughters and one son. The latter has a reasonably well-paid job as a builder's mate and is much older than the two girls. Besides which he was helped by his father when he married. Consequently V. considers that he has fulfilled all obligations towards his son. He now wishes to provide for the two girls, and decides to do so by sharing out between them what little he owns in his will. This intention he declares to the notary, only to be informed that he cannot do so, as Italian law does not allow one to dispose by will of one's possession in such a way as to disinherit one of the children. The notary will explain that such a will would be invalid, unless the conduct of the son was so disgraceful or otherwise reprehensible as to justify his being disinherited. This is not the case. Hence, the will cannot be drawn up in this way. Another case, a widow decides to go and live with her son; since she has no further use for the house she inhabited she decides to let her married daughter have it. But this she cannot do, as the house is rented and the landlord objects to sub-letting. Having recourse to the lawyer only serves to confirm the landlord's right to refuse to countenance the arrangement. This is nearly always the case: whenever the peasant is obliged to have recourse to the lawyer, the notary, or the municipal official, it is usually when he has fallen foul of the law, either in his personal dealings or in his relations with authority. Alternatively, he requires some favour from them, such as a loan, or a licence, which is usually refused. Furthermore, the vast majority of the villagers cannot really appre- ciate the necessity of these people. The municipal employees seem to perform no useful task. The bank-officials and employees are very late comers to the village, and to most of the villagers their exact functions are a mystery. In every case, these people perform tasks which are of great necessity in an urban environment, but which are something of a luxury in a rural village. Where the mass of the population lives from 9 130 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE hand to mouth, a bank is not vitally necessary. In an area where the land belongs to private individuals, the municipality's function is a shadowy one. Similarly, where every family is acquainted with every other family, either personally or through mutual friends and acquain- tances, the lawyer is not really needed. It turns out to be easier and more expeditious to apply directly to the person involved, be it the landlord, or a private individual, than to attempt to use the institutions be they state-organisms or private concerns. If you want a job in the cannery, it is both easier and more likely to succeed to go and talk to the foreman than to ask for an interview with the manager — who will probably refuse to see you and refer you back to the foreman in any case. If you are short of cash, it is better to go and see a friend or ask your immediate employer for an advance than to try and obtain any help from the state or from the bank. The emergencies which occur in the life of the villager are normally of such nature as to be remedied by the personal intervention of immediate superiors, friends, or relatives. Rarely is the intervention of an outsider indispensable. In addition, the attitude of the outsider is rarely as sympathetic as that of someone with whom one has had long and frequent contact. Lastly, the villager soon remarks that the professional men are essentially strangers to the village, and will remain so. With very few exceptions, their employment in the village is temporary. The prospect of promotion and of removal to another post, normally involving resi- dence in another village, is the incentive to all the members of this group. Consequently, none feel any deep attachment or any serious involvement with the life of the village. In the same way, the majority depend from institutions whose main seat is outside the village. Even the municipal employees depend actually from the provincial administration, being professional state officials, not from the municipality itself. The private individuals also do not intend to spend all their lives in Calimera: their attitude is that their present employment is a temporary one, their aim being to obtain sufficient funds and experience to be able to set up an office in the city. It is true that circumstances have, in some cases, trans- formed a temporary employment into a permanent one; but, even then, the basic attitude does not change. The notary is a case in point. Born and educated in Lecce, he set up his practice in Calimera on a temporary basis, some fifteen years ago. Circumstances have made that residence a permanent one. It is extremely unlikely that he will now ever be able to achieve his original ambition of setting up practice in Lecce itself. Nevertheless, though fully aware that he will probably never be able to leave the village, he does not really feel himself a full member of the community. His dream is of having saved enough to retire in Lecce. THE PATTERNS OF POWER 131

The professional families cannot be blamed for their failure to assimilate. Their refusal to consider their present settlement as a perma- nent one is based on sound reasons: they have no personal ties with the village; they own no land in its boundaries; the village lacks the amenities of the city to which they are used; there are no schools beyond secondary schools to which they can send their children; and their relatives and friends do not live in the village. Moreover, they usually have had a good education, and, like all educated Italians, attach great importance to it. They inevitably feel out of place in a community 40 °/a of whose members are illiterate or barely able to write their name. In a city, they would enjoy status and a measure of prestige: here, they have neither. Because they are educated and urbanized, they have little in common with the mass of the villagers who distrust the city and have little use for education. Because they are neither noble nor landed gentry, they are cut off from any close contact with the land-owning aristocracy, whose pretensions to be a superior elite they resent. Conse- quently, they have little incentive to identify with the village. Even where long residence could have led to a greater degree of assimilation, marriage and their children make such assimilation impossible. A few have married girls of the smaller land-owning families; the majority girls from the city belonging to their own class. In either case, the birth of children brings them face to face with the same question: what future will the children have in the village? The honest answer is no future at all. In every case, the same choice is presented: either, on becoming adult, the child must leave the village and make a career for himself or marry in the city, thus breaking up the family; or else, before that becomes necessary the family must have moved out of the village. The professional families are normal middle-class families of urban background: they share the outlook, ambitions, and way of life of all urban middle-class families in Italy. These are quite foreign to the outlook, ambitions, and way of life of the village. They do not share the same values as the villagers, and do not want to assimilate. Indeed, assimilation to them means losing their identity as professional men and being swallowed up in the mass of " contadini bradi" (brutish peasants) whom they despise. At best, they could hope to become pale imitations of the " terroni", the land-owners. Consequently, they keep apart and aloof. They will not assimilate: and the village, in turn, rejects them. They do not fit in the village's hierarchy, and are not part of it. They are an extension, within the village, of the city. In the village they have no status: some are liked, some are disliked, some are respected, some despised. But this for reasons which have nothing to do with their rank of professional men: it is because of mannerisms and habits which are 132 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE purely individual. They are, in fact, judged on the basis of personal merit and according to personal prejudice, not as members of a particular class enjoying a definite status. The structure of the village, therefore, is not a harmonious whole. Basically, the structure is the old traditional one based on the tenure of land: it is a pyramidal structure with the " Castello " at the apex and the " braccianti" forming the base. In between, there is a gradation of various types of tenants. Or, at least, that was the original feudal structure. At present, this structure is to some extent disorganized: there is no longer a definite leading family, but a small elite of more or less equal status, each of whom forms the apex of its own pyramid. More- over, the link between the various grades is not one of feudal duty and serfdom, but is based on an economic association. However, this change from a feudal subservience based on loyalty to an economic subservience based on financial agreements is more apparent than real. The hold the feudal lord had over his serfs and vassals was essentially an economic one: it was control of the land, of the prime source of production, which was the chief source of the barons' power. It is still control of the land which is the chief source of the power of the landed aristocracy. The feudal obligations have been replaced by economic ones. But the picture remains largely the same. And the associated traits of the feudal structure are still largely present: the closed group of noble families forming almost a caste, living off the revenue of the land they own but do not cultivate; the ladder of tenancies with associated status; the recognition by the peasant of the superiority of the noble class; still reflected not only in the universal affiliation to the monarchist party (openly committed to a restoration of the former feudal system) but even in the modes of address; even to the pretensions to noble birth and its consequent prestige and dignity of the land-owning families, and the identification of land- tenure and status. To this basic structure have been grafted organisms and institutions more typical of an urban democratic organization: a municipality based on election, and a bureaucracy of professionals; in addition the development of industry, based on capital, has introduced elements of an industrial organization, and the growing influence of the city has led to the presence of a professional class. But these elements have not coalesced with the basic structure to the same extent: the municipal organization is still, to a large extent, ineffective because of its irrelevance to the basic structure; even more irrelevant and more obviously a foreign intrusion in body politic is the exiguous professional class. Even the Carabinieri are essentially intrusive: their effectiveness is due to the real concrete power they wield, to the ultimate resource to a force which is backed by the State and the Law, rather than to any THE PATTERNS OF POWER 133 organic nexus. And the industrial workers enjoy no status as such. Industry is still a subsidiary element, a kind of reservoir which takes up the available labour which the land does not want. Only the Church fits in homogeneously. And the Church was itself a traditional part of the feudal order. Calimera is largely a feudal society with capitalistic and modern urban accretions. In this it is similar to hundreds of other villages in Southern Italy. For this is the area where the feudal ideal, else- where obsolete, is making a determined and fairly successful attempt to survive in a modern setting.