The Patterns of Power

CHAPTER IV THE PATTERNS OF POWER Any organized society is necessarily hierarchical in structure: there must be a supreme authority to impose norms of behaviour, and a subordinate mass who observe these norms, with a variable number of intermediate levels, whose function is to enforce the obedience of the norms. The more complex the society, the greater the number of these intermediate levels of authority. Furthermore, whereas in a very simple society, it would be ideally possible for a single hierarchy to control and regulate the various spheres of social activity, in reality one finds that there is a tendency to specialization so that different forms of social activity are regulated by different norms, enforced by different hierarchies, though this may not be apparent, since one individual may hold contemporaneously more than one office, and thus belong to more than one hierarchy at once. However, the simultaneous holding of more than one office is usually found in the highest levels of authority, while in the lower levels the tendency to specialization is far more prevalent, reaching its climax in the lower levels of the modern urban bureaucracy, where specialization has gone so far that each office-holder can regulate only a fraction of any given activity, so that any decision requires the consultation of three or more different office holders. Furthermore, when the society in question is not a politically independent entity, but is part of a larger whole, there is superimposed on the pyramid of office of the society itself, a further hierarchy whose role is to ensure that the norms observed by the society conform to those of the larger entity of which it is part. These various hierarchies may act independently of one another, or their spheres of authority may overlap; they may share the same personnel, or they may have a completely different one; they may act in unison, or they may be in conflict with one another. In an ideal society, 100 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE the various spheres of activity could be distinct and the individual hierarchies could have a distinct personnel, and work in harmony. In practice, however, that is rarely, if ever, the case. There is nearly always a certain overlap of these spheres of activity, giving rise to some degree of confu- sion and conflict. Anybody belonging to a complex urban society knows from personal experience how often one gets involved in such conflicts of authority: sometimes, within the same society, two different hierarchies impose contradictory norms, leaving the individual to solve the dilemma as best he can. A typical example is the regulation of civil marriage in Italy, where the State (the political hierarchy) considers it the only valid form, while the Church (the religious hierarchy) denounces civil marriage as invalid, and treats civilly-married couples as adulterous. The individual must either flout the one and obey the other, or compromise by going through two forms of marriage. This conflict is worse where, by some historical accident, a given society has been allowed to develop its own characteristic organization, and, at a later date, has been, more or less forcibly, incorporated in a larger society whose organization is different. The conflict may reach such a pitch as to lead to anarchy. Alternatively, especially where the larger organism has no effective means of imposing its code, the conflict remains muted, the imposed code remaining a dead letter. This is the case in Calimera. From the date of the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the political development of Southern Italy followed a completely different direction from that of the North. The constant warfare of the North led eventually to the growth of the city-states and to the development of a strong tradition of municipal independence, based on commerce and military strength. The insecurity caused by the intermittent warfare diminished the value of land as a symbol of status and authority, and replaced it by financial wealth. The growth of mercenary armies, fighting for pay, stressed the importance of wealth as a source of power. There developed in the North a typically urban organization, in which land lost all importance, while financial ability became a necessary qualifica- tion for obtaining status and authority. Eventually, a democratic elective system was developed, under which ability and wealth became more important than noble birth and land-tenure. The Medici were apotheca- ries, and proudly flaunted the pills of their trade on their escutcheon. Giacomo Sforza was a " condottiere " or leader of mercenaries, whose very name was due to his herculean strength. At the same time, the necessity of presenting a united front to the enemies all around, particularly the Empire and the Papacy, resulted in a strong and effective municipal organization. The collapse of the city-states and the occupation of the area by Austria, left the municipal organization intact. When the Savoyard THE PATTERNS OF POWER 101 kings unified Italy, the organization of local authority followed the old municipal pattern. At the worst of times, under the oppression of Metter- nich's police, the municipalities of Northern Italy retained their freedom to act within specified limits. The recurring conflicts between the central government, represented by the Austrian govenor, and the local authority embodied in the municipality, resulted in the development of two different police-forces: a municipal police dealing with offences against the legal code, and a military police, depending from the governor, to deal with political offences, and to be used, if needs be, against the municipality itself. The system was continued under the Kingdom of Italy, the military corps of the " Carabinieri " owing allegiance on ly to the King and the Carabinieri head-quarters in Rome replacing the Austrian political police, with much the same functions, while the municipal police continued to carry out the duties of preserving the peace, as it had done in the past. This double system of police still continues in Italy. In the South, the development of political authority took a quite different turn. The Norman occupation of 1160 introduced a feudal system which was retained under successive dynasties. From Norman days onwards, the Kingdom of Naples was closely allied to the Papacy. Indeed, both Manfred of Hohenstaufen and Peter of Aragon claimed the pro- tection of the Papacy, on the grounds that the Kingdom of Naples was a Papal fief, and themselves vassals of the Church. And was not Charles of Anjou, the restorer of the Kingdom after the disastrous Hohenstaufen interlude, a Papal protege? The Kingdom of Naples (later, of the two Sicilies) remained, throughout its history a feudal kingdom. Power and status depended on hereditarily held lands; the country was parcelled out to a number of barons, vassals of Crown or Church (for the Church was a powerful land-owner), and, except in Naples itself (where the King had personal authority) and in a few large cities (where a shadow of municipal organization existed), the ultimate authority was the local lordling, who was simply the local land-owner. The Crown was the nominal source of authority and justice, and retained control of the courts; but its authority was delegated to the chief barons of the kingdom, who, in turn, delegated this authority to their vassals, and so on, down a chain of lordlings to the local " Don " or great land-owner who, too aristocratic to look after his own land, delegated this authority to his agents. In places, the lord was an abbot or a bishop, for churchmen could, by virtue of their office, be temporal lords too. Benevento, indeed, was a fief of the Papacy and independent of the Kingdom. The royal courts of justice were effective in Naples, and in the larger cities, but for the rural peasantry the source of justice was the local manorial court, whose only law was the lord's will. A nominal appeal lay to the higher lord of whom 102 THE STUDY OF AN ITALIAN VILLAGE the local lord was a vassal, and eventually to the King, but little reliance could be placed in such appeals to a distant baron who was unlikely to antagonize his vassals for the sake of some wretched peasant. As for the King, he was too far away to be of any help. Like God, he could be prayed to, but, unlike God, he could not be relied upon. Not so unlike God, perhaps, for, as we shall see later, the peasants thought it more profitable to invoke the saints, mere men when all is said, than the Deity Itself, too distant, and too awful, to pay any attention to the prayers of such an insignificant mite as a mere peasant. Political authority was based on the hereditary possession of land. The landless man was barely a man at all. Villages, like the land they were built on, belonged to the landlord; the villagers mere serfs. The officials were but the landlord's agents, executing his orders, and collect- ing his dues. Roads, houses, water-supply, were the landlord's respon- sibility, and were kept in good condition only if it suited him. There were no schools. For landless men, there were only three possible careers which enabled them to escape from bondage: the Church, the Law, and banditry. In the Church, a man might receive enough education to become a parish priest; at the very worst, he could become a friar or monk: in any case, he would be adequately fed. In the Law, provided he had enough funds to acquire a reasonable education, and a certain native intelligence, he might hope to make a moderate living as a notary, or as a lord's secretary and legal adviser.

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