Never Let Me Clone? Countering an Ethical Argument Against the Reproductive Cloning of Humans Yvette Pearson Old Dominion University, Ypearson@Odu.Edu

Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons

Philosophy Faculty Publications Philosophy & Religious Studies

2006 Never Let Me Clone? Countering an Ethical Argument Against the Reproductive Cloning of Humans Yvette Pearson Old Dominion University, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs Part of the Biochemistry Commons, Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, Cell Biology Commons, Molecular Biology Commons, and the Philosophy Commons

Repository Citation Pearson, Yvette, "Never Let Me Clone? Countering an Ethical Argument Against the Reproductive Cloning of Humans" (2006). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 41. https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs/41 Original Publication Citation Pearson, Y. (2006). Never let me clone? Countering an ethical argument against the reproductive cloning of humans. EMBO Reports, 7(7), 657-660. doi:10.1038/sj.embor.7400741

This Editorial is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy & Religious Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. viewpointviewpoint Never let me clone?

Countering an ethical argument against the reproductive cloning of humans Yvette Pearson

n the March 2006 issue of EMBO reports, as mere means—for example, as organ that the physical and social environment Christof Tannert, a bioethicist at the Max banks—would be morally unacceptable, it of an organism also has an important role IDelbrück Research Centre in Berlin, is misleading to identify cloning itself as the in controlling whether and how genes Germany, presented a moral argument core problem. Furthermore, although Kant’s interact with each other and with the against human reproductive cloning on the respect for humanity is of great practical organism’s environment. Genetic deter- basis of Immanuel Kant’s categorical imper- value, it does not provide us with adequate minism has dangerous implications as it ative (Tannert, 2006). In this article, I guidance with regard to cloning. His moral might encourage its believers to neglect address some problems with Tannert’s views principle clearly applies to existing people, obligations towards fellow humans. For and show that our concerns about this but it falls short in helping us to determine example, an employer might conclude prospective procedure should prompt us to whether a particular means of creating that he or she has no obligation to reduce scrutinize carefully the conventional pro- people is morally permissible. As Deborah the levels of toxic substances in the work- creative practices and attitudes. Indeed, if Johnson explained in another context, often place, because an employee’s risk of we set aside objections that are grounded in “moral concepts and principles are ambigu- developing, say, cancer is solely a function genetic determinism, many of the offensive ous in their application to new technology” of their genes. That is, embracing genetic features of human cloning are identical to (Johnson, 2005). determinism encourages the view that problems with procreation by more conven- If we ever hope to figure out why the individuals, not environmental or socio- tional means, including both old-fashioned prospect of human cloning, especially economic conditions, are to blame procreation and assisted reproductive tech- reproductive cloning, is so unsettling, we (Proctor, 1998; de Melo-Martín, 2005). nologies (ARTs). Oddly enough, many see must first remove any marginal problems only cloning as problematic, whereas iden- that infiltrate the arguments in this debate, tical problems with everyday procreation including Tannert’s. First, despite his explicit Although treating people created continue to go unnoticed. rejection of genetic determinism, Tannert by cloning as mere means…would In his article, Tannert endeavours to pro- ends up appealing to it. Second, he be morally unacceptable, it is vide us with a sound argument that human assumes that only selfishness and egoism misleading to identify cloning reproductive cloning “violates our basic could motivate someone to pursue repro- itself as the core problem moral principles”. He grounds his argument ductive cloning. Third, he makes the in Immanuel Kant’s central moral principle assumption that a cloned person would of respect for all humanity, which the great inevitably be treated as a mere means. One corollary of genetic determinism philosopher formulated as: “Act so that you Fourth, his appeal to Kant’s moral principle is the mistaken view that genetic identity treat humanity, whether in your own person fails to clarify where the line should be is equivalent to personal identity. Yet one or in the person of any other, always at the drawn with respect to research cloning. of Tannert’s major arguments against same time as an end, never as a means cloning is that genetic identity carries only” (Kant, 1785). In essence, Kant’s princi- hen engaging in discussions great weight; he claims that it is wrong to ple prohibits using rational creatures— about cloning, genetic engi- “impose the genetic identity of any indi- humans—as mere instruments to attain Wneering or procreation, there is vidual on another” (Tannert, 2006). But it one’s own selfish goals. Tannert claims that a strong and prevalent tendency for argu- is not clear that cloning restricts the auto- human reproductive cloning—through ments to become entangled in genetic nomy of the clone any more than would somatic cell nuclear transfer or embryo determinism. Also known as genetic reproducing with one particular individ- splitting—is immoral because it violates this reductionism or biological determinism, it ual rather than another or, in the case of principle by using a human—the clone—for holds that the physical and mental traits ARTs, with gametes from one donor rather egoistical purposes. However, as I dem- and behaviour of an individual are ulti- than another. In both cases, we place lim- onstrate, this assertion is problematic. mately determined by his or her genotype. its on the possible genetic outcome of the Although treating people created by cloning This myopic view fails to acknowledge offspring, but in neither case is it clear

whether or precisely how these limita- it might be impossible to advance to a child. Moreover, she might not want to tions have an impact on its autonomy. In point at which cloning techniques do not incur risks by using sperm from an anony- an article on the pros and cons of human present an unacceptable risk for individual mous donor; he might have failed to dis- reproductive cloning, Dan Brock reminds clones, women, their fetuses and/or new- close important details about his medical us that the idea of a unique identity “pre- borns. But if these risks of physical harm history, or he might pursue his desire to dates the development of modern genet- were eliminated, it is uncertain whether have a role in the child’s life and thereby ics” (Brock, 1998). Along these lines, cloning would constrain autonomy any cause legal problems and/or emotional Brock also questions the dubious concept more than any other means of procreation. upheaval for the child. Another case in of a “right to a unique genotype” and sug- which logistical cloning might be legiti- gests that the concept is incoherent, not annert claims that cloning is wrong mate would be if the man is sterile, the legitimate, and not to be taken seriously because “it only fulfils the selfish couple believes the use of third-party (Brock, 1998). To place so much weight Tinterest of a creator”, but cloning gametes to be morally objectionable and on genetic identity is, in effect, to invoke need not be motivated by either selfish- both partners want a genetic connection genetic determinism. Tannert’s claim that ness or the desire to replicate a particular to the child. Logistical cloning, assuming cloning is wrong because it “imposes an genotype. Although cloning, by definition, it could be done without exposing women arbitrary restriction on the clone’s individ- means the replication of an existing geno- or children to any greater risk than that by uality and/or external determination of a type, the motives to do so can vary. Along other means of procreation, might be future person—and therefore violates its these lines, Dena Davis draws a distinc- morally defensible in such cases. autonomy” goes against his preceding tion between duplicative and logistical rejection of genetic determinism. If identi- cloning: in the case of duplicative cloning, Although cloning, by definition, cal twins are autonomous agents despite “it is the genetic replication itself that is their shared genetic identity, there is the attraction,” whereas the primary means the replication of an no good reason to think that a clone motive in cases of logistical cloning is to existing genotype, the motives would lack the capacity for autonomous have a child (Davis, 2001). However, the to do so can vary decision-making. motives for duplicative cloning are usually on the basis of gross misconceptions about It is not clear why cloning should cloning, which abound in films, television If we accept such arguments for logisti- programmes—including those that claim cal cloning, then cloning does not neces- be considered either more or less to be news programmes—and science- sarily mean “using one person—the arbitrary than decisions to fiction novels (Maio, 2006). There is a clone—as the means to fulfil the desires of procreate through more nearly universal agreement that duplica- another person: the clone generator”, as conventional means tive cloning would be downright ludicrous Tannert claims. If fulfilling the desires of as well as immoral, and only those in a the procreator to have a child constitutes state of intractable ignorance would want an immoral use of another person, we must Tannert finds it particularly problematic to pursue it. As shown in Kazuo Ishiguro’s also concede that a great deal of ‘natural’ that a clone, unlike offspring created novel Never Let Me Go, even fictional procreation is immoral for the same rea- through the combination of genetic material characters no longer buy into genetic son. It is not at all uncommon for individu- from two individuals, is “the result of delib- determinism. For example, the narrator als or couples to create children to fulfil erate human decision and action… and is Kathy H, herself a clone, makes the fol- several desires: to pass on one’s genes; to therefore, through this arbitrariness, an lowing observation: “Our models were an ensure that there will be enough people to artefact”. Although a great deal of pro- irrelevance, a technical necessity for work the farm, carry on the family busi- creation occurs ‘accidentally’, it is still the bringing us into the world… It was up to ness, or care for the procreators in their old result of some deliberate human action, be each of us to make our own lives… It is age; to produce a ‘saviour sibling’ to save it intercourse or several visits to an ART daft to assume you’ll have the same life as the life of an existing child; to make money, clinic. It is not clear why cloning should be your model” (Ishiguro, 2005). as in cases of full surrogacy; or simply to considered either more or less arbitrary Logistical cloning, which would be a satisfy an inexplicable but intense desire to than decisions to procreate through more means to circumvent obstacles to procre- have a child. Cases of creating a child for conventional means. The emphasis on the ation that cannot be overcome by alterna- its own sake are more the exception than means of procreation also detracts from the tive methods, might therefore be morally the rule, if they exist at all. more important criterion for determining permissible in some rare cases. If both The most likely reason for creating a the moral permissibility of procreation, partners were sterile, cloning would be child by cloning would be to carry on the namely, how offspring will fare once they the only means for them to have a geneti- family line. Although I find it mysterious are born. Merely creating people by cally related child. A woman might want that genetic connections are so highly cloning need not restrict their autonomy to create a genetically related child with- prized—often more than social relation- any more than procreation through inter- out having sex or using donated sperm. ships among individuals—there is no deny- course or ARTs. Granted, as has been She might find the practice of buying ing the importance accorded to genetic shown by cloning experiments with ani- gametes morally objectionable as it ties. One of the reasons why ARTs are in mals, creating humans by cloning at this allows individuals to procreate without such high demand is that people want a stage is likely to be disastrous for the clone; fulfilling any obligations towards the child who is genetically related to at least

one member of the couple. Considering the prevailing attitude about the importance of genetic links, it should come as no surprise that some individuals might be interested in cloning themselves or a beloved family member, living or deceased.

here is probably no decision of simi- lar magnitude that is more arbitrary Tthan the one to have a child. On the face of it, rationality and procreation seem to be extremely odd bedfellows; indeed, it is often the absence of rationality that leads to conception. Although we might prefer individuals to be more thoughtful about their procreative decisions, they are rarely criticized when such careful delib- eration is absent or when their decisions are obviously problematic. Even if individuals do not put a great deal of thought into procreative decisions, they might speculate about the possible outcomes of their actions and recognize that these possibilities are limited. These limitations are also arbitrary, insofar as they are the direct consequence of choos- ing one particular person over the three billion other people around the world with whom one might have chosen to mate. In some cases, these limitations can be dis- concerting for the prospective parents or other family members, including existing it involves using another as a mere means; there is a more pressing problem related to children. If we want to construct a morally instead the claim is that it would be wrong research cloning, to which I will now turn. sound objection to cloning, we must con- to create a person by cloning because that front widely accepted procreative prac- person would probably be born in what hen we talk about reproductive tices and subject them to scrutiny, lest our Joel Feinberg calls a “harmful condition” cloning, we generally assume that objections to reproductive cloning ring (Feinberg, 1984). Wthe clone will be “live and viable” hollow. Ultimately, it seems that we must As logistical reproductive cloning (Gogarty, 2003), and ideally, if clones were to choose between rejecting many of our would not automatically violate a person’s be created, we would want them to be live, procreative practices as morally problem- right to self-determination or cut off a viable and in good health. But how should atic or conceding that reproductive child’s prospect of future autonomy, it is we deal with cloned humans that are beyond cloning is acceptable. erroneous to conclude that cloning always the pre-embryo stage but unlikely to become constitutes using another person—the “live and viable” offspring? These latter clone—as a mere means. Setting aside cir- beings are no more ‘people’ than are pre- On the face of it, rationality and cumstances under which conception is embryos or embryos, and we therefore do not procreation seem to be extremely likely to pose a risk to the offspring—for violate their autonomy. If the entities in ques- odd bedfellows; indeed, it is often example, if either parent carries a deva- tion are non-sentient non-people and lack the absence of rationality that stating hereditary disease—there is noth- the capacity to become people who will leads to conception ing intrinsically wrong with bringing a experience pain or suffering as a result of person into existence by one means having been used in cloning research, instead of another. It is important to place an appeal to well-established principles, Ultimately, the means of procreation greater emphasis on the actual treatment such as the principle of respect for people are morally irrelevant unless they present a of the offspring and not how he or she significant risk to offspring or parents, par- came to be; if cloning is the problem, then To discriminate against people ticularly the mother. This is true of cloning not only reproductive cloning but also because of the manner in which at present, and it is for this reason that we research cloning is problematic. The latter should refrain from creating offspring in could also be construed as being used for they were conceived would be as this manner. But this is not to claim that self-interested or selfish motives, such as unacceptable as discrimination cloning is morally impermissible because to advance the researcher’s career. But on the basis of skin colour or sex

or the principle of non-maleficence, is of through ARTs is, to my knowledge, non- Davis DS (2001) Genetic Dilemmas: no help. existent. Various new methods of ART have Reproductive Technology, Parental Choices, and Children’s Futures. New York, NY, USA: Although legally, in some countries, the been invented during the past 28 years, and Routledge limit until which human embryos can be it seems unlikely that adding a new one to de Melo-Martín I (2005) Taking Biology Seriously: destroyed to harvest stem cells is drawn at 14 the repertoire will lead to an upsurge in dis- What Biology Can and Cannot Tell Us About days, it does not follow from Tannert’s argu- crimination against offspring created by Moral and Public Policy Issues. New York, NY, ment that researchers are morally required to cloning. Although there are concerns about USA: Rowman & Littlefield Feinberg J (1984) The Moral Limits of the Criminal stop there. In fact, given the significance treating offspring as objects instead of Law. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press Tannert places on implanting an embryo in a humans, this is relevant not only for off- Gogarty B (2003) What exactly is an exact copy? woman’s uterus, combined with his claim spring created through ARTs—which in the And why it matters when trying to ban human that an artificial uterus would deprive an future might include cloning—but also for reproductive cloning in Australia. J Med Ethics 29: 84–89 embryo of “an essential condition for offspring conceived in the old-fashioned Ishiguro K (2005) Never Let Me Go. New York, NY, becoming a human”, the implication is that way. Thus, our focus should be on obliga- USA: Alfred A. Knopf research on embryos or fetuses beyond 14 tions towards those whom we create, not on Johnson DG (2005) Computer ethics. In Frey RG, days would be justifiable. Clearly, if such a how they were created. Wellman CH (eds) A Companion to Applied being is missing a necessary condition for Ethics pp 608–619. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell becoming a person, it cannot become a per- …our focus should be on Kant I (1785) Foundations of the Metaphysics of son; hence, a being that develops to 40 obligations towards those Morals [translated by LB White]. New York, NY, weeks or beyond by ectogenesis would not whom we create, not on how USA: Macmillan be protected by Kant’s principle of respect Kant I (1790) The science of right [translated by W Hastie]. In Hutchins RM (ed; 1952) Great for people. Undoubtedly, using cloned they were created Books of the Western World pp 397–458. embryos and fetuses in research would pro- Chicago, IL, USA: Encyclopaedia Brittanica vide us with more and better information We should refrain from making assump- Maio G (2006) Cloning in the media and popular about the efficacy and safety of cloning, and tions that the means by which one was con- culture. EMBO Rep 7: 241–245 Tannert’s view gives us no reason to refrain ceived or the conditions into which one is Proctor RN (1998) Resisting reductionism from the Human Genome Project. In Pence GE (ed) from doing so. In the end, his view about born entail anything about what sort of Classic Works in Medical Ethics: Core research cloning could be construed as too people they will become or how we should Philosophical Readings pp 341–353. Boston, MA, permissive, and his argument provides a treat them. As humans, we should make use USA: McGraw-Hill great deal of ammunition for those who of our unique capacity for moral agency, in Tannert C (2006) Thou shalt not clone. EMBO Rep 7: 238–240 advocate a ban on all types of cloning, particular our capacity to have and fulfil including therapeutic cloning. obligations. As Kant put it, the very act of bringing another person into existence lthough it might seem obvious, many means that parents have an obligation “to do not distinguish between cloning make their children—as far as their power Aand its product, which, in the case of goes—as contented with the condition thus logistical cloning, is a child who would be acquired” (Kant, 1790). Treating clones as nurtured, educated and loved by its parents. inferior to other humans is still safely in the There is no good reason to think that it realm of fiction, and it should stay that way. would be morally permissible to treat clones Fortunately, it is well within our grasp to differently to the way we treat other off- ensure that it does. spring or adults. To discriminate against Yvette Pearson is Co-Director of the Institute people because of the manner in which they REFERENCES for Ethics and Public Affairs in the Department were conceived would be as unacceptable Brock DW (1998) Human cloning: an assessment of of Philosophy and Religious Studies, the ethical issues pro and con. In Nussbaum MC, as discrimination on the basis of skin colour Old Dominion University, Norfolk,VA, USA. Sunstein CR (eds) Clones and Clones: Facts and E-mail: [email protected] or sex. Although such prejudices do persist, Fantasies About Human Cloning pp 141–164. discrimination against people created New York, NY, USA: Norton doi:10.1038/sj.embor.7400741