Maxime Weygand and the Fall of France: A Study in Civil-Military Relations Author(s): Philip C. F. Bankwitz Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1959), pp. 225-242 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1875584 Accessed: 12-02-2020 07:17 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Modern History This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms MAXIME WEYGAND AND THE FALL OF FRANCE: A STUDY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS1 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ W HEN Premier Paul Reynaud an- age Frenchman knew very little about nounced that he was summon- Weygand, beyond the not very reveal- ing General Maxime Weygand ing facts that he had served under the from Beirut on May 19, 1940, the French revered Foch as chief of staff during the public understood but one thing: the war of 1914-18 and had also been "head heir of Marshal Foch was returning to of the army" at some undefined point in rescue France from total defeat at the the previous decade.