Maxime Weygand and the Fall of : A Study in Civil-Military Relations Author(s): Philip C. F. Bankwitz Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1959), pp. 225-242 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1875584 Accessed: 12-02-2020 07:17 UTC

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This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms AND THE FALL OF FRANCE: A STUDY IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS1

PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ

W HEN Premier an- age Frenchman knew very little about nounced that he was summon- Weygand, beyond the not very reveal- ing General Maxime Weygand ing facts that he had served under the from Beirut on May 19, 1940, the French revered Foch as chief of during the public understood but one thing: the war of 1914-18 and had also been "head heir of Marshal Foch was returning to of the army" at some undefined point in rescue France from total defeat at the the previous decade. The more sophisti- hands of the hereditary enemy. If the cated might have been able to add that French fleet, under the command of a he was illegitimate, the putative son personage described as the most jealous of Maximilian of Mexico or Leopold of if not cunning of modern naval officers, Belgium, that he was an ultra-conserva- Admiral Darlan, did not exactly hoist tive who allegedly detested the republi- its standards to proclam that "Maxime is can regime, and that he had a following back"-as had its ally at Churchill's ap- in the army opposed to the "clans" of pointment as first lord-there was, as the other two military chiefs, the current borne out by innumerable contemporary commander, Maurice Gamelin, and the and retrospective accounts, a universal apparently indestructible hero of Ver- haut les coeurs!2 Admittedly, the aver- dun, Marshal Petain.3

1 The basic research for this article, which Commission . . . Documents, or Commission includes military documents of the French gov- . . . Temoignages.), VIII, 2388 and IX, 2795-96, ernment and extensive interviews with General respectively. (Hereafter, when the testimony of Weygand and almost all of the principals in- more than one witness, or testimony of the same volved in the defeat of 1940, was made possible witness taken on different dates, is cited, the by a Fulbright Award and aid from a Townsend pages referred to will follow in the same order.); Travelling Fellowship from Harvard University Paul Reynaud, La France a sauve l'Europe in 1950-51. (, 1947), II, 96 and 124-28; Gen. Maxime 2 Leon Blum, untitled article in Le Populaire, Weygand, AIWmoires (Paris, 1950-57), III, 85-86; May 20, 1940, p. 1; , "Gouvernement Gen. Maurice Gamelin, Servir (Paris, 1946-47), et commandement (I)," and A. Reussner, "La III, 427; , Neuf mois au gouverne- reorganisation du haut-commandement au mois ment, avril-decembre 1940 (Paris, 1948), pp. 9 de mai 1940," in Re7rue d'histoire de la deuxie'me and 60; and Andre Geraud ["Pertinax"'], Les guerre mondiale, VIII (1952), 8 and X-XI (1953), fossoyeurs (New York, 1944), I, 81-82. 49-59, respectively. For a discussion prior to -3See FranSois Le Grix, En e'coutant Wey- May 10 of the alternative appointment of Gen- gand (Paris, 1949), pp. 7-17; Henry , eral Alphonse Georges or General Henri Giraud Weygand (Paris, 1957), pp. 1-135 passim; R. see the testimony of Paul Reynaud, Dec. 7, 1950, Mennev6e, "Le 'Cas' Weygand; les influences and of General Paul de Villelume, Apr. 17, 1951, 6trang&res dans la politique franSaise," Docu- in Assemblee Nationale, Commission d'enquete ments politiques, XVI (1935), 125-33; Raymond parlementaire sur les evenements survenus en Recouly, "Un chef: Weygand," Annales politiques France de 1933 a' 1945. Rapport. Temoignages et et littiraires, CIII (1935), 456-57; Gerabd, I, 9-51 documents (Paris, 1951-54) (This work contains and II, 9-56; and Jacques Benoist-M6chin, Soix- reports, documents, and testimony, and will be ante jours qui ebranlerent l'Occident (Paris, hereafter cited as Commission . . . Rapport, 1956), III, 493-519. Cf. Henri de Kerillis, Franfais,

225

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 226 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ None of this information bers of the inter-war answered "Heavenly Triumvi- the really essential question on everyone's rate," Petain and Gamelin, and had lips: Did this general possess the quali- failed to implant the expectation of rapid ties necessary to master a revolutionary change and the specific outlines of it in military situation? This question cer- his subordinates and colleagues while in tainly figured in the public reaction to command or in retirement.5 He was not the widely circulated statement Wey- an original military thinker, not a Fuller, gand allegedly made upon assuming the Eimannsberger, Guderian, Douhet, or supreme command from the heir of Billy Mitchell; he was not, in the words Joffre, Gamelin, on May 20: "I have the of the most faithful of his subordinates, secrets of Foch!"4 The verdict of history the desperately needed "chief who would is, of course, that Maxime Weygand, pound on the table and give orders." 6 He while the holder of remarkable talents, was an intelligent and devoted follower did not have the qualities of the hero, who had, in terms of the problem in- revolutionary in thought and deed, who volved, little sense of urgency.7 alone could provide the answer at this 5 Weygand's role in the debate on theory and desperate moment. But at least a hint application, bearing especially upon the ques- of the verdict could have been obtained tions of armored warfare and the Instruction by the interested observer from a brief . . .tactique des grandes unites of 1936 was re- viewed in the testimony of Gen. Julien Dufieux and dispassionate look at Weygand's rec- (Apr. 20 and June 15 and 20, 1948), Gen. Bruneau ord as a military thinker, planner, and (July 6, 1948), Gen. Devaux (Dec. 23, 1948), Gen. politician during the previous ten years. Marcel Bloch-Dassault (Feb. 10, 1949), and Wey- In the most general terms, such a look gand (Mar. 31 and May 24, 1949) Commission ... Temoignages, IV, 865-98, 1037-76, and 1097- would have revealed that while Weygand 1136, V, 1163-90, 1137-66, and 1459-78, and VI, understood the fundamental changes in 1593-1612 and 1673-1718. See also Weygand, AMmoires, II, 352-55, 407-8, and 427-28, and En military doctrine which had developed lisant les mdmoires de guerres du General de especially since 1933, he had not recog- Gaulle (Paris, 1955), pp. 11-17; , nized the tempo of these developments Vers l'arme'e de metier (Paris, 1934), and Mem- oires de guerre. I, L'appel, 1940-1942 (Paris, any more than had the other two mem- 1954), pp. 4-25 and 40-41; P. Reynaud, Le probleme militaire frangais (Paris, 1937), and La voici la viritW! (New York, n. d.), pp. 231-46; France, I, 484-506; and Geraud, I, 21-205. Cf. Gen. Edouard Requin, D'une guerre a l'autre, Philippe Petain, "La securite de la France au 1919-1939 (Paris, 1949), pp. 206-89; and Gen. cours des annees creuises," Revue des deux Victor Bonrret, La trage'die de l'armee francaise mondes, XXVI (1935), 1-20, and his preface to (Paris, 1947), pp. 118-46. See also Cdt. Jacques Gen. Narcisse Chauvineau, Une invasion est- Minart. P. C. Vincennes, secteur 4 (Paris, 1945), elle encore possible? (Paris, 1939), pp. v-xxi; and pp. 21-81; Gen. Emile Laure, PMtain (Paris, 1941), Gamelin, I, 223-86. See also Gen. Georges Ferr6, pp. 361-85; and Georges Loustaneau-Lacau, Le defaut de l'armure (Paris, 1948), pp. 49-79 Men'oires d'Iln fran(ais rebelle, 1914-1948 and (Paris,160-225; Gen. J. Boucher, L'arme blinde'e 1948), pp. 47-160. dans la guerre (Paris, 1953), pp. 28-63; Henry 4 This statement, which epitomizes the rivalry Contamine, "Vers une rehiabilitation du systeme between the two men, is affirmed in the testi- militaire franSais en 1939?" Bulletin de la So- mony of Gamelin (Dec. 23, 1947) and denied in ciete d'Histoire moderne, Nov.-Dec. 1949, pp. that of Weygand (May 24, 1949), Commission 3-7; Gen. A. Laffarguie, Jutstice pour ceux de ... Temoignages, II, 533 and VI, 1679. See also 1940 (Paris, 1952), pp. 83-112; and Gen. Alfred Weygand's testimony, Aug. 1, 1945, in Haute Conquet, L'e'nigme des blindes, 1932-40 (Paris, Cour de Justice, Compte rendu . . . des audi- 1956), pp. 59-126. ences. . . . Procds du Mare!chal Pe'tain (Paris, 6 Testimony of Georges (Feb. 26, 1948), Com- 1945) (hereafter cited as Proces . . . PMtain), mission . . . Temoignages, II, 758. p. 156; Gamelin, III, 433-38; and Minart, pp. 7 "When the storm broke, the instruction of 197-202 and 222. the armored divisions was so recent that the

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Neither was the new generalissimo a in armaments during his retirement.9 But revolutionary in the matter of materiel. he had enough general knowledge of the There were specific mitigating factors, to situation to be aware of serious shortcom- be sure. During his term as chief of the ings in the armaments programs.10 general staff and designated wartime Nevertheless, obeying a perhaps too nar- commander from 1930 to 19935, Wey- rowly defined code of professional and gand had been engaged in an exhausting patriotic duty in which the sense of ur- diversionary battle against parliamentary gency was again lacking, he had quite attempts to reduce the army's cadres, ef- deliberately shunned the role of a fectives, basic armaments, and budgetary prophet in the wilderness crying the need appropriations below the survival limit. for an advanced arms structure before it The policy of the assembly had pre- was too late." He confined himself in- vented him from developing the gen- stead to careful, meticulously balanced eral structure of modern armaments judgments concerning the state of the much beyond the strictly prototype army in brochures, articles, speeches, and stage.8 In the rather seminaristic parlance private conversations.12 This complex of the French military hierarchy, "never 9 Weygand, Memoires, II, 445-46 and 514-16, in the confidence" of Gamelin, the post- and III, 11. Cf. Gamelin, II, 138-39, 141-49, 261, 1935 generalissimo, Weygand had not 306, and 357. 10 Letter of Weygand to been informed of current developments in June, 1939, in , Les respons- ables. Ma deposition devant la cour supreme de justice (Paris, 1941), p. 57. See also documents in Commission . . . Rapport, II, 177-236; testimony executants had not yet had time enough to of R. Jacomet (July 18, 1947), P. Cot (Aug. 1, translate principles into reflexes" (A. Wauquier, 1947), Guy La Chambre (Nov. 25 and 27, 1947), "Les forces cuirassees dans la bataille," Revue Georges (Feb,. 5, 1948), (June 1, d'histoire de la 2e. guterre mondiale, X-XI [1953], 1948), R. Dautry (Jan. 11 and 18, 1949), Gen. 162). See an implicit admission of faulty judg- Rinderknech (Feb. 15, 1949), Gen. Happich (June ment in the matter of doctrine in Weygand, 2, 1949), Commission . . . Temoignages, I, 187- Memoires, III, 79, 143-44, and 561; and Gamelin, 214 and 263-86, II, 295-366, III, 625-42, IV, 961- I, 273, and 373-74. Cf. Brigadier E. D. H. Tolle- 82, V, 1389, VII, 1945-2036, V, 1479-92, and VI, mach, "French military training for defeat," 1717-58. Cf. Gamelin, I, 192-222; Lt. Col. C. de Quarterly review, CCLXXVII (1941), 180-91; and Cosse-Brissac, "Combien de chars francais contre Gen. Marcel Boucherie, "Les causes politiques et combien de chars allemands le 10 mai 1940?" morales d'un desastre: 1940," Revue de defense and Col. Pierre Paquier and Cdt. P. Lyet, "Com- nationale, XIV (1958), 413-16. bien d'avons allemands contre combien d'avions 8 See Weygand's report on the state of the franSais le 10 mai 1940?" Revue de defense na- army, dated Feb. 10, 1934, in Commission tionale, V (1947), 75-89 and VI (1948), 740-59, re- Rapport, I, 92-126; and testimony of Gen. de spectively; Gen. Maurice-Henri Gauche, Le Sable (Mar. 29, 1949), Commission . . . Temoig- deuxieme bureau au travail (Paris, 1954), pp. nages, VI, 1579-92. Also, J-M. d'Hoop, "La 109-60 and 237-39. politique franSaise du rearmement, 1933-1939," 11 Weygand, Mirnoires, II, 445-46, and testi- and J. Vial, "La defense nationale: son organisa- mony (May 24 and June 9, 1949) Commission tion entre les deux guerres," Revue d'histoire de . Temoignages, VI, 1673-75 and 1774. la 2e. guerre mnondiale, XIV (1954), 1-26, and 12 See his La France, est-elle difendue? (Paris, XVIII (1955), pp. 45-116 respectively; Jean Fabry, 1937), Histoire de l'armrne franpaise (Paris, 1938), Fevrier 1934-juin 1940. De la Place de la Con- "L'6tat militaire de la France," Revue des deux corde au cours de l'Intendance (Paris, 1942), pp. mondes, XXV (1936), 721-36, "L'unit6 de l'arm&e," 88-97 and 126-73; Gen. J. Armengaud, Batailles Revue militaire generale, I (1937), 15-19, "How politiques et militaires sur l'Europe. Temoig- France is defended, address at Chatham House, nages, 1932-1940 (Paris, 1948), pp. 9-38; Gen. G. May 16, 1939," International affairs, XVIII (1939), Roton, Annees cruciales, 1933-1940 (Paris, 1947), 459-77, and preface to Gen. Raymond Duval, pp. 42-49; and , Triumph of treason Lefons de la guerre d'Espagne (Paris, 1938), pp. (New York, 1944), pp. 177-90 and 301-35. i-vi. See also Weygand's privately expressed

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 228 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ circumspection on the part of a famous 1916, involving Joffre, Foch, and Briand; general had carried its own penalties. and the crisis of authority surrounding Following his version of duty, Weygand the Armistice and the Versailles Treaty had got himself into the uncomfortable of 1918-19, involving Foch and Clemen- situation of making at Lille, just before ceau-had developed his attitudes of dis- the outbreak of the war, the famous trust and disdain toward politicians and statement: "The French army has greater the "regime des partis" or what is now value than at any other moment in its called, by like-minded individuals, "le history."'3 In the context of the situa- systeme." The third event, concerning tion of May 1940, such a statement could the attack made on the 1928 military be compared only with Marshal Le- laws during the period of leftist cabi- boeuf's equivalent "gaiter-button" prog- nets from 1932 to 1934, confirmed these nostic of July 1870. attitudes.14 Since the prospective commander was These attitudes and feelings become not the revolutionary deus ex machina meaningful when seen within the frame- alone capable of winning the hour-and work of Weygand's social status, his reli- where could one be found in the French gious beliefs, and his political ideals. He military hierarchy at this time?-he was was, making due allowance for generali- going to face a primarily political, not zation, a successful "climber" into the military, situation. Here, also on the basis rarefied circles of the Faubourg Saint- of his pre-war record, Maxime Weygand Germain and the Academie Francaise.15 had a reputation. This is not to suggest The victor over the Bolshevik legions that he was a military meddler like Gen- before Warsaw in 1920, he was a mili- eral Noel de Curieres de Castelnau of tant Catholic with two idees fixes, the the anti-masonic committees, nor a mili- pernicious influence of the Free Masons tary plotter like General E. Dusseigneur and the scourge of "Godless commun- of Cagoule notoriety, nor even a military ism."'16 A self-styled apolitique, he had solitary with a hidden but powerful nonetheless a political ideal, situated thirst for power like Petain. In the course 14Weygand, Meimoires, I, 354-66 and II, 31-60 of his long military career, however, Wey- and 382-409. gand had found himself in posts of great '5 Bordeaux, pp. 109-21; H. Bidou, "Le g6n- responsibility during every major crisis 6ral Weygand," Revue de Paris, XXVI (1930), 798-812; and Andr6 Maurois, "Le general Wey- between the civilian and the military au- gand i I'Acad6mie," Annales politiques et lit- thorities since 1914. The first two of these te'raires, XCVI, (1932), 455-56. events-the command crisis of December 16 Weygand, Comment diever nos fils? (Paris, 1937), pp. 2-6 and 30-44, Histoire, pp. 163, 288- 89 and 307-10, France?, p. 45, statement on bol- views on military problems at this time, and shevism to the press, New York Times, Feb. 13, comment on his role as a military observer in 1920, p. 15, speech to the "Semeurs de Billan- Geraud, II, 28-30, 45-46 and 53-54; Reynaud, La court," (described as an anti-Communist organi- France, II, 427-28; Kerillis, pp. 241-43; Andre zation of women "de grand coeur et de bonne Bellesort, "'L'histoire de l'arm6e franSaise' du soci&tP"), Gaulois, Jan. 29, 1928, pp. 1-2, speech General Weygand," Revue des deux mondes, at the twelfth dinner of the Revue des deux XLVII (1939), 170-93; "'Ist Frankreich stark mondes, Revue des deux mondes, XII (1932), 7-8, genug?'," Militdr Wochenblatt, CXXIII (1938), and speech at , Temps, Apr. 13, 1935, p. 2981; and "Friedenstorer im Orient," Deutsche 4. For comment, see Bellessort, loc. cit., pp. 170- Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 21, 1940, p. 1. 93; R. Mennevee, "L'instauration d'une reaction 13 Temps, July 4, 1939, p. 3. Cf. Reynaud, La internationale . . . ," Documents politiques, XI France, I, 504; and testimony of Weygand (July (1930), 4-46; "Generalissimo," New Republic, 31, 1945), Proces . . . Pertain, p. 141. CII (1940), 714; and Geraud, II, 44-46.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms WEYGAND AND THE FALL OF FRANCE 229 somewhere in the misty reaches of the less able than almost anyone else in the Moral Order and the Orleanist "Rdpub- military hierarchy to withstand the fan- lique des Ducs."17 What emerges is the tastic pressures shortly to be placed upon stereotype of the aloof, suspicious officer him-pressures requiring him to behave just shading into the "general de coup totally out of character in a situation d'etat" which, indeed, his public person- where, so to speak, he would be called ality had become as early as 1930 when upon to think and act the part of not Maginot, then , was able only the military leader but also of the to secure the chamber's approval of Wey- arbiter of the political destinies of gand as chief of the general staff only by France. promising never to give him the powers of vice-president of the Conseil supdrieur I de la guerre at the same time and by ap- For the purposes of brevity, this ar- pointing, as a kind of political counter- ticle will concentrate on the political weight, General Gamelin as his assist- struggle between Weygand and Reynaud ant.18 Much more significant than this and will omit discussion of virtually all stereotype from the point of view of of the operational questions in what an what transpired in May and June of unfriendly sharpshooter, M. 1940, however, is the picture of a man Benoist-Mechin, has called "the sixty

l7Weygand, Comment dlever?, pp. 34-46, and days that shook the west." The elements Histoire, pp. 288-318. See the background of of this political struggle were laid down these views in Weygand's experience as a young by Weygand's two major operational de- officer involved in the Dreyfus Affair and the "Affaire des Fiches" in his Mdmoires (I, 30-32), cisions.19 The first of these decisions was the interesting continuation of them in a that taken at Ypres on May 21 when Wey- note submitted to Petain at Bordeaux on June gand, in what was essentially a duplica- 28, 1940, advocating a "moral order" version of a tion of Gamelin's Instruction No. 12, or- "new social regime", in the Medmoires (III, 298- 99), and also Weygand's testimony of June 30, dered a dual offensive by Allied units 1949 (Commission . . . Te'moignages, VI, 1922- southward from Flanders and north- 27). Cf. his two formal statements professing ward from the Somme across the Ger- loyalty to the Republic as the "only regime pos- sible for France" (France, Annales de la chambre man-held corridor stretching from Sedan des de'putds, Debats parlementaires. . . . 1929-35 to Abbeville. The second was the Ordre [hereafter cited as A. C. D6batsj, LXII [1930], 84), and his testimony in July 31, 1945 (Proces 19 For Benois-Mechin see n. 3 above. Wey- Pdtain, p. 144). For comment, see Bellessort, gand's major published summaries of his mili- loc. cit., pp. 192-93; Baudouin, pp. 224-25; tary and political action during the crisis of Maurice Martin du Gard, La chronique de May- are: his deposition for the Cour Vichy, 1940-1944 (Paris, 1948), p. 64; P. A. Bour- supreme de justice sitting at Riom, dated Aug. get, De Beyrouth i Bordeaux. La guerre de 1939- 26, 1940, found in Commission . . . Rapport, II, 1940 vue du P. C. Weygand (Paris, 1946), pp. 407-13; Allocution . . . aux officiers des armdes de 178-79; Reynaud, La France, II, 442-43; and Paul terre, de mer et de l'air d Dakar le 29 octobre, Coblentz, Le silence de Sarrail (Paris, 1930), pp. 1940 (Hanoi, n. d.); "Extraits r6sum6s de l'allo- 48-49. cution prononc6e a Casablanca le 27 novembre 18 A. C. De'bats, LXII (1930), pp. 54-57; journal 1940 devant les officiers . . . de la garnison des Debats Jan. 2-3, 4, 22, and 23, 1930, pp. . . . " in Capitaine de Fr6gate L. J. M. Le Roc'h, 1 and 3; Emile Burt, untitled article in Ordre, Defaite et redressement de la France ([Toulon?], Jan. 4. 1930, p. 1; J. Debu-Bridel, L'agonie de la 1942) p. 23; Weygand's testimony (July 31 and troisieme Redpublique, 1929-1939 (Paris, 1948), Aug. 1, 1945), Procs ... Petain, pp. 130-49 and p. 64; Weygand, Me'moires, II, 340-45; and 154-57 Me'moires, III, 77-296; statement read in Gamelin, II, xxii-xxi. A classic version of the Weygand's testimony (Mar. 8, 1949), Commission Weygand "stereotype" is found throughout Ger- ... Te'moignages, VI, 1547-78, En lisant les Me'm- aud. oires de guerre du Gene'ral de Gaulle (Paris,

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 230 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ general d'operations No. 1184-3 F/T of ity of this interpretation.22 A somewhat May 26, originating in a high command less extensive but equally polemical mass conference on May 24 and drawn up in of material maintains that there were draft on May 25, which established a de- not, thus neglecting not only the old fense line running along the Somme professional law that the soldier must (from its mouth to the Canal du Crozat), exercise his imagination to the breaking the Ailette, and the Aisne to Longuyon point to avoid becoming what Foch and Montmedy.20 This line-and these styled a "chef battu, chef disqualifie," were the fatal words-was to be held at but also a legion of humble aphorisms all costs, "sans esprit de recul."'21 pointing out that self-described "realists" Were there alternatives? A vast litera- are responsible for the majority of the ture, stretching from De Gaulle's radio woes of human race.23 address from London three weeks later to 22 Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, Andre Truchet's recent masterly exami- 1940-1946 (Paris, 1946), pp. 3-4; and Andr6 nation of the military potentialities of Truchet, L'armistice et l'Afrique du Nord (Paris, French North Africa in June 1940, has 1955). See also telegrams and documents in Commission . . . Documents, II, 416-544; and maintained that there were, and a world testimony of Gamelin (Dec. 23, 1947), Dautry which has grown accustomed to inter- (Jan. 18, 1949), Gen. Rene Bertrand (June 14, continental missiles and space satellites 1949), and Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), Commis- sion . . . Temoignages, II, 531-33, VII, 2023-25, has little difficulty in accepting the valid- VI, 1787-1804, and IX, 2781-89. Cf. Armengaud, pp. 216-46; Contre-Amiral Raymond de Belot, 1955) pp. 38-93 and 147-96; and Cdt. Jacques ILa marine fran?aise pendant la campagne de Weygand, The role of General Weygand: con- 1939-1940 (Paris, 1954), pp. 183-88; Adolphe versations with his son (London, 1948), pp. 46- Goutard, 1940, la guerre des occasions perdues 167. (Paris, 1956), pp. 382-402; De Gaulle, L'appel, 20 For the Instruction see Reynaud, La France, pp. 45-74; Col. J. Philibert, "Les forces franSaises II, 136-37; for the Ordre general see Commission d'Afrique du Nord (septembre 1939-juin 1940)," . . . Rapport, II, 370. Testimony of Weygand Revue historique de l'armee, IX (1953), 105-10; (May 24, 1949), and Gen. Louis Koeltz (Apr. 17, Louis Marin, "Contribution 'a 1'tude des prod- 1951), Commission . . . Temoignages, VI, 1680- romes de l'armistice," and "Gouvernement (I)," 93 and 1701-10 and IX, 2802-10 and 2821-23; Revue d'histoire de la 2e. guerre mondiale, III Major L. F. Ellis, The war in France and (1951), 5-11 and 24-26 and VIII (1952), 13-22, Flanders, 1939-1940 (London, 1953), pp. 103-33; respectively; Gen. Paul Ely, "Les leqons qu'il Gen. the Viscount Gort, "Second despatch (cov- faut tirer des op6rations de 1940," Revue de de'- ering the period from 1st February, 1940, to 31st fense nationale, IX (1953), 563-82; Gen. * May, 1940, with an appendix covering operations Aux heures tragiques de l'empire (Paris, 1948), of 1st Corps from 6 p. m. 31st May, to midnight pp. 188-204; Gen. G. Catroux, Dans la bataille de 2nd/3rd June)," Supplement to London Ga- la Aldditerrande, 1940-1944 (Paris, 1949), pp. zette (Oct. 10, 1941), pp. 5915-21; Col. Robert 11-28; and Winston S. Churchill, The second Villate, "Le changement de commandement de World War (London, 1948-53), II, 194-96 (re- mai 1940," Revue d'histoire de la 2e. guerre consideration of an opinion expressed to Georges mondiale, V (1952), 27-36; and Claude Gounelle, in Jan. 1944). Le mirage de la victoire, 18-19-20 mai 1940 23 Marshal , Principes de guerre (Aix-en-, 1957), pp. 83-138. (Paris, 1903), p. 272. See testimony of Georges 21 Commission . .. Rapport, II, 370; also docu- (Feb. 26, 1948), Weygand (June 9, 16, and 23, ments in Albert Kammerer, La veritd sur l'armis- 1949), Commission . . . TVmoignages, III, 738-39 tice (Paris, 1945), pp. 289-335, and in Col. P. and VI, 1766-85, 1805-15, 1847-55, and 1875-79. Lyet, "La bataille de Belgique et du Nord," Also Baudouin, pp. 106-29 and 140-42; Bourget, Revue historique de l'armee, II (1946), 59-92; pp. 22-23; Benoist-Mechin, III, 261-83; Con- testimony of Weygand (June 21, 1949), and tamine, letter loc cit., pp. 3-7; Gen. John F. C. Fuller, of Koeltz to the president of the commission The second World War, a strategical and tacti- d'enque'te describing the May 24 conference cal history (London, 1948), pp. 77-78; Gen. (dated June 25, 1951), Commission . . . Tdmoig- Heinz Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten nages, VI, 1868-70 and IX, 2820. (Heidelberg, 1951), pp. 123-24; Maj. Eddy Bauer,

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Besides placing heavy reliance on ex campaign: first when Reynaud, encour- post facto arguments, both theories mini- aged by De Gaulle, finally made an ef- mize the essential point in the question, fort to regain control of war policy, and namely, that Weygand was the first mili- then when Petain briefly considered a tary commander in World War II called flight to in case the German upon to make an extraordinarily dif- armistice terms proved too harsh. ficult, if not revolutionary, departure It is only fair to point out that Wey- from the strategic, logistical, and tactical gand's tradition-oriented response to his pattern of a war fought against a contin- problem was repeated by other profes- ental super power. Here, the problem in- sionals involved in similar cases later on volved the transfer of the military bridge- in the war, notably by the German com- head from the continent itself to an manders and strategists confronting the adjacent but non-European area, and the question of conquering Britain after acceptance of a long, bitter war against June 1940. But this comparison cannot in this area, fought if obscure the fact that Weygand's response necessary with a loosely-organized guer- was an extraordinary and fateful step by rilla force dependent, after an initial which, five days after assuming command, period of perhaps two months, upon he confined the battle within the tradi- British and United States supplies.24 Be- tional continental sector, and within a cause Weygand's mind, formed in the restricted part of that sector as well. As matrix of the stable, continental-oriented General Rene Bertrand, chef de cabinet French concept of the nation armee, was of General Auguste Nogues (command- not that of a strategical revolutionary or er-in-chief in North Africa), commented genius (and he admits these limitations nine years after the event: "The general while paradoxically rejecting any descrip- staff should never have begun the battle tion of his strategy as a "narrow one"),25 of the Somme without another rear posi- he found it impossible to make the "leap tion on which to resist . . . North Africa. into the unknown," for that was the Once this possibility was overlooked, it measure of the problem as it existed on would obviously be extraordinarily dif- May 24 and 25, 1940. At this time, he ficult to effect a later re-establishment in dismissed once and for all any possibility this area."126 that the non-European world could main- In Weygand's opinion, what chances tain or defend an operational bridge- of success did this operation have at that head in North Africa, let alone effect an time? Behind his "obligatory optimism," early reconquest of the French home- 26 Bertrand testified, June 14, 1949: "L'etat- land. This question does not emerge major . . . n'aurait jamais dcu engager la bataille again until the last two weeks of the de la Somme sans avoir une autre position sur laquelle r6sister derrilre . . . I'Afrique du Nord. Du moment que I'affaire n'avait pas ete pr6vue La guerre des blinde's . . . (Paris, 1947), pp. 112- avant, il etait evidemment tres difficile qu'on ar- 14; and Admiral Paul Auphan, "The French rive 'a la reussir" (ibid., 1800). See also Gen. navy enters World War II," United States Naval Pierre Jacquet, Essai de strategie occidentale Institute proceedings, LXXXII (1956), 592-601. (Paris, 1953), pp. 39-40; Richard Challener, The 24Testimony of Bertrand (June 14, 1949), French theory of the nation in arms, 1866-1939 Commission . . . Temoignages, VI, 1800. Cf. (New York, 1955), pp. 215-16, 248-55, and 268- Philibert, Oc. cit., pp. 105-10. 77; and Hans Dorr, "Uber den Wert und Unwert 25 Testimony of Weygand (June 9 and 16, von Kriegserfahrungen," Wehrwissenschaftliche 1949), Commission . . . Te'moignages, VI, 1770 Rundschau, IV (1954), 396-97. Cf. Fuller, pp. 83- and 1804. 87 and 90-91.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 232 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ he appears to have had but two faint troduced much later30-he had hardly hopes: (1) that the Germans would allow the time or the will to reflect upon the the French sufficient time to concentrate timing or upon the nature of the politi- their forces on the line; and (2) that the cal act which would then become neces- British would give massive air support, sary. But neither at this moment of recog- following this with a 1915-style levee en nition of a bitter eventuality nor at any masse in the empire. Since the first de- later time was there a question in Wey- pended upon stupidity and the second gand's mind as to what general form this upon a kind of exalted sacrifice-rare act should take; claims to the contrary, qualities in either enemies or friends- such as that concerning his readiness at it is possible that Weygand, in his Bordeaux on June 15, 1940 to fight to secret heart, was almost ready then to the bitter end without capitulating un- admit, as he would later: "France . . . der orders from a refugee government, was destined for defeat."27 Certainly, come after the event.31 For him, as for his the sans esprit de recul motif indicated entire military generation, the political that he believed that he had no more act could be only the traditional one end- strings to his bow. It signified, as did the ing a continental war, the one in which appeal to "honor" also used during those he himself had taken so prominent a tense days, that "everything was lost." 28 part in November 1918, when he had The contradiction in the thought of the handed the famous terms to Matthias military professionals between recogni- Erzberger from the worn leather brief- tion of harsh facts and hopes for a mir- case he now carried with him constantly: acle led straight to the atmosphere of un- an armistice.32 reality in the nation as a whole and spe- cifically in the Reynaud cabinet, where, 30 Weygand, AIemoires, III, 273-94; J. Wey- as Adolphe Goutard wrote later: "No one gand, p. 128; testimony of (Dec. 19, 1950), Commission . . . Thmnoignages, VIII, wished to see the situation as it was and 2454; Louis-Dominique Girard, Montoire, Verdun to draw the consequences."29 diplomatique (Paris, 1948) pp. 497-516; Jacques These consequences, in the very likely Isorni and jean Lemaire, Requete en re'vision pour Philippe Petain (Paris, 1950) pp. 66-190, event that Weygand's holding operation 203-6; and Gilbert Renault ["Remy"], La justice failed, would inevitably be the end of et l'opprobre (Monaco, 1950). Cf. Maurice Van- hostilities. At the moment (on May 23 ino, Le temps de l honte: de Rethondes a l'Ile de Yeu (Paris, 1952) pp. 29-51, 319-38; and or 24) when the dread possibility of the Marquis d'Argenson, Petain et le Petainisme end occurred to Weygand-and there is (Paris, 1953) pp. 147-67. no evidence that he considered the end 31 Weygand, Meimoires, III, 277, En lisant, pp. 69 and 73, and testimony (June 21, 1949), Com- as anything other than definitive, the mission . . . Temoignages, VI, 1843 and 1846. "temporary suspension" of fighting and 32Weygand, Memoires, III, 207-8 and 226-27. the "sword and buckler" motifs being in- Support of the armistice by the entire officer- corps is indicated in Reynaud, La France (II, 345); and testimony of Georges (Feb.. 26, 1948), 27 Testimony of Weygand (May 24 and June and Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), Commission . . . 9, 1949), Commission ... Tdmoignages, VI, 1710 TVmoignages, (III, 742 and IX, 2786). The ques- and 1769. tion of when the possibility of the armistice was 28 Goutard, p. 308. Cf. Ellis, p. 319; and Gen. first mentioned and by whom is at the heart of the Viscount Wavell, The good soldier (London, the controversy over what actually was discussed 1948), p. 29. in the Comit6 de guerre of May 25, and is re- 29 Goutard, p. 341; De Gaulle, L'appel, pp. 39 viewed in Baudouin (pp. 75-77); Marin, "Con- and 49; and testimony of Georges (Feb. 26, tribution" (loc. cit., pp. 3-4); Reynaud, La France 1948), Commission . . . Tdmoignages, III, 739. (II, 180); and testimony of Baudouin (July 26,

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II military-civil struggle of any importance would immediately result in divided Reynaud, to whom this decision was loyalties both in the nation as a whole, submitted by noon on May 25, knew concentrating what remained of its that Weygand's operational concept di- shaken confidence in an authoritarian rectly affected the political question of military leader, and in the officer corps, the general conduct of the war. Reynaud sympathizing with this leader whose so- recognized at the time that it limited him lution, allowing "lost honor" to be re- to two strategic and political alternatives; deemed on the field of battle, was pro- "Armistice or. . . continuation of the war fessionally "acceptable."35 Finally, it in North Africa"; 33 he must also have must always be remembered that no ade- sensed at this moment that it gravely quate substitute for Weygand agreeable compromised his ability to put into op- to this officer corps could be found in eration the latter of these two alterna- the gerontocracy that was the French tives, evacuation to North Africa. Why, high command. Weygand was, literally, then, did the premier accept a point of the last of the military chiefs. view whose immediate consequences he It is thus small wonder that at the abhorred? The heart of this complex meeting of the Comite de guerre, at the matter lies not so much in Reynaud's Rlysee on May 25, Reynaud should have specific concern for the redressement allowed himself to approve Weygand's moral of the nation or in his own in- general plan for a military Gotterdam- fatuation with the "European" strategy merung along the water lines north of as in his instinctive awareness of the Paris, a "fight to the death"36 which was army's superior strength in its relations to lead the French military establishment with the state during a military crisis in straight to another Sedan. For the pre- time of war and especially during a mili- mier, caught in the horrifying situation tary disaster. He knew that the govern- of May 1940, was a man of extremely ment's ability to contravene the high limited endowments as a war leader in command in the question of the general conduct of the war, and to enforce its decision, especially when the command Reynaud's actions here and suggestions of pos- sible alternatives are contained in De Gaulle, was headed by an obdurate generalissimo L'appel, pp. 38-39; Philippe Barres, Charles de notoriously contemptuous of politicians Gaulle (New York, 1942), pp. 164-65; R. Dautry, adrift in military seas, was theoretically "Note au pr6sident du conseil (13 juin, 1940)," Revue d'histoire de la 2e. guerre mondiale, III unlimited but practically very restricted (1951), 56-58; and testimony of Gamelin (Dec. and had been so since the start of the 23, 1947), Andre-Victor Laurent-Eynac (Feb. 8, debacle.34 Reynaud also realized that a 1949), Weygand (June 9, 1949), and Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), Commission . . . Temoignages, II, 531-32, V, 1449, VI, 1778-80, and IX, 2783-88. 1949), and Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), Commission 35 "For the public, the question of whether to Te'moignages (VII, 2108 and IX, 2786). continue the war was a military affair" (Rey- 33 Reynaud, La France, II, 175, and In the naud, La France, II, 179). See also Goutard, p. thick of the fight (New York 1955), (trans. of Au 340; and Gen. Spears' interview with Georges coeur de la melee [Paris, 1951]), p. 382. Reynaud's Mandel on May 25, 1940 in Maj. Gen. Sir Ed- military aide, Villelume, claims he told the ward Spears, Assignment to catastrophle (London, premier at about that time: "France was open 1954), I, 205-6. to the Pyrenees" (testimony of Villelume [Apr. 36 Reynaud's statement in Baudouin's draft 17, 1951], Commission Temoignages, IX, proces-verbal of the Comite de guerre of May 2784). 25, 1940, in Commission . . . Temoignages, VI, 34 Reynaud, La France, II, 175-79. Criticism of 1713.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 234 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ the great (and, at this point, shrilly self- actual military plot to overthrow the advertised) tradition of Danton, Gam- state with Weygand as its sinister instiga- betta, and Clemenceau. Reynaud had tor did not exist in 1940, however, as the really but one possible course of action to best legal minds of the state concluded in follow throughout the entire crisis. This the two instructions preceding the Petain course was none other than that upper- trial in 1945 and the Weygand case in most in the minds of all the major par- 1946. Such a plot did not have to exist. ticipants in the drama and, according to The elements of the problem itself made the garbled documentary record, explictly it certain that Weygand's operational suggested at that celebrated meeting of and strategical concepts would go vir- May 25: to resign, after a decent interval tually unchallenged and that, because of of suppressed conflict with the military this abnormal situation, Petain could power. put into operation his plan for the armis- Tragically enough for Reynaud, the tice which alone would give him the timing of even this gesture of futility and "means of seizing the power" he despair was far beyond his control. His coveted.39 political and military opponents had III only to wait in the wings during the three weeks following May 25, watching It is impossible in this article to his "Hamletesque" predicament evolve trace the evolution of the struggle be- to its inevitable end. It is understandable tween Weygand and Reynaud from a that, after the event, Reynaud should at- relatively decorous question of divided tempt to minimize his passivity and sense counsels in high places to an open rup- of fatality, to emphasize his "control" of ture. Unfortunately, such fascinating by- the situation through various plans and paths as the Comite de guerre meeting hopes, all of them naive and ground- of May 25, the exchange of notes be- less.37 It is even more natural that he and tween Reynaud and Weygand on May 31 other advocates of the "world," as op- and June 10, and the feeble attempts of posed to the "European," strategy should Reynaud to recapture control of the sit- have attempted, also after the armistice, uation by "suggesting," but not ordering, to construct a specific military plot or a withdrawal to the "Breton Redoubt" coup de force theory to explain the out- and retreat to North Africa, must be come of the debacle. They are aided and omitted.40 By June 13-the date of Rey- abetted in this fantasy by some of the more prominent of the Versaillais de (Paris, 1951), II, 139-48. Cf. Reynaud, La France, II, 452-53; G6raud, I, 243-377; Kerillis, pp. 252- Vichy, especially Paul Baudouin, for 75; Kammerer, pp. 105-60; Jean Giraudoux, whom Weygand is a national hero.38. An Armistice a Bordeaux (Neuchatel and Paris, 1945); and testimony of L. Rollin (Jan. 20, 1949), 37 See especially Reynaud, La France, II, 124 G. Monnet (Feb. 3, 1949), and Laurent-Eynac and 175-81, Fight, pp. 379-97, and testimony (Feb. 8, 1949), Commission .. . Temoignages, V, (Dec. 12, 1950), Commission . . . Thmoignages, 1395, 1426, and 1458. VIII, 2425. 39 Louis Nogubres, Le veritable proces du Ma- 38 Baudoin's adulation is shared by Le Grix re!chal Petain (Paris, 1955), p. 66. See also the act and Bordeaux in their works on Weygand (see of accusation and the arret in Proces . . . Pe'tain, above, note 3). See also Charles Reibel, Pourquoi pp. 6-12 and 385-86; Times Jan. 9, 1946, p. 3, et comment fut decidee la demande d'armistice and Mar. 29, 1946, p. 3; New York Times, May (Vanves, 1940); Yves Bouthillier, Le drame de 10, 1946, p. 12, and May 7, 1948, p. 12. Cf. Marin, Vichy. I, Face d l'ennemi, face d l'allie (Paris, "Contribution," loc. cit., pp. 1-3. 1950); Henri Massis, Maurras et notre temps 40 Testimony of Weygand (June 16, 1949),

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms WEYGAND AND THE FALL OF FRANCE 235 naud's reply to the last of Weygand's general did apply from June 12, the date veiled requests, both written and verbal, of the meeting of the supreme war for an armistice4l-the moment of con- council at Briare, to June 16, the date trol over the general conduct of the war of the fall of the Reynaud cabinet at had long since vanished for Reynaud, as Bordeaux, a variety of techniques of per- had the moment of a bataille de conduite suasion and pressure which, since they for Weygand. The premier was now dealt with the political corollary of his locked with his commander-in-chief in a military decision of May 25 and unfolded struggle for political survival. primarily before a political council, can There is, then, the question of Wey- be given only the pejorative if Clause- gand politicien. Despite his sincerely witzian description. Indeed, the political indignant but typically "military" denial coloration of all action during this tor- of the very existence of such "degrading" tured week was so great that the pivotal thoughts or actions in his record,42 the question of withdrawal to North Africa

Commission . . . Temoignages, VI, 1805-6. was treated exclusively on political, not Baudouin's draft proce's-verbal of the Comit6 de technical or military, grounds; and none guerre meeting of May 25, 1940 is found in of the major participants seemed to be ibid., VI, 1711-16. A summary of the tangled documentary history of this gathering is con- aware at the time of this startling tained in P. Dhers, "Le comite de guerre du 25 anomaly.43 mai, 1940," Revue d'histoire de la 2e. guerre This problem of Weygand's military mondiale, X-XI (1953), 165-83. Additional docu- ments and testimony concerning the Breton Re- politics has, curiously enough, been ex- doubt and two questions affecting North Africa amined solely from the point of view of (the mission of Koeltz to Algiers on June 22, his personal animosity toward Reynaud 1940 and the protests against the armistice of Gen. Auguste Nogues from June 17 to June 24) and politicians in general, or of the are found in: testimony of Georges (Feb. 26, capitulard cabal working through him, 1948), Weygand (June 9, 1949), Bertrand (June or of his alleged threats of a military 14, 1949), Weygand (June 16 and 21, 1949), Rey- naud (Dec. 12, 1950), Villelume, and Koeltz coup de force. These elements were un- (Apr. 17, 1951), Commission . . . Temoignages, deniably present. Convinced by June 9 III, 733, VI, 1775-85, 1800-1, 1806-17, and 1850, that Reynaud had summoned him from VIII, 2400, and IX, 2781-83, 2791-92, and 2810-16. See also Commission . . . Rapport, II, Beirut merely to use him as a whipping- 381-84 and 416-30. Cf. Klaus-Jtirgen Muller, boy in a program of defeat and surren- "Franzosisch-Nordafrika und der deutsch-franz- der,44 Weygand exhibited a splendid dis- osische Waffenstillstand von 1940," Wehrwissen- schaftliche Rundschaut, VII (1957), 687-700. regard for the civilized amenities and 41 The notes and their import are contained usages even during a crisis. Nothing and discussed in testimony of Weygand (June 16, could be more explicit on this point than 1949), Commission . . . Temoignages, VI, 1808- 17; Weygand, Memoires, III, 149-53, 188-91, and his barracks language and sarcasm in the 213-14; Reynaud, La France, II, 182-87, 293-95, heat of the hysterical exchanges at Cange and 331-33. The note of June 10 is specifically on the night of June 13 (some hint of the treated in Weygand, En lisant, pp. 50-51, and his "Rectification 'a Candide," Candide, Dec. 18, general tenor is given in depositions 1940, p. 3; Reibel, Comment, pp. 16-17; De Gaulle, L'appel, pp. 50-51; Reynaud, La France, 43 Testimony of Weygand (June 9, 1949), and II, 446-47; and Baudoin, pp. 142-43. Bouthillier (Dec. 28, 1950), ibid., VI, 1781 and 42 See Weygand's curious definition of what VIII, 2521. constitutes "political activity" in his testimony 44 Weygand, Me'moires, III, 148, 188, and 228; (June 30, 1949), and compare with that of an- and Bouthillier, pp. 48 and 89-90. Ct. testimony other "technician," Baudouin, in his testimony of PMtain (July 10, 1947), and Weygand (Mar. 8, (July 12, 1949), Commission . . . Temoignages, 1949), Commission . . . Temoignages, I, 183 and VI, 1922-27 and VII, 2069. VI, 1559.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 236 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ made later at Riom), his -two famous coup, as distinct from its actual existence, public denunciations of Reynaud and the was important enough to become a vir- regime two nights later at Bordeaux, and tual obsession of Reynaud by June 15 his use of Foch's old confidant, Senator and a real possibility in the minds of the Charles Reibel, to abuse and threaten the rest of the politicians in Bordeaux.48 deliberating politicians.45 Certainly those But the essential point, that of Wey- politicians and officials led by Petain, gand's invasion as a military man of the who were convinced that the anti-Nazi political sphere of the general conduct of war lay outside the interests of la vraie the war, highlighted by his specific acts France, had links with Weygand. Before or declarations of disobedience, is often the flight of the government from Paris, overlooked or minimized. And yet, these connections were informal: Petain around this inge'rence turns the whole sympathized with Weygand's military drama of the Reynaud cabinet in its point of view and approved his letters to agony of the second and third weeks of Reynaud concerning an armistice.46 But June. As Louis Marin, a participant in these links became precise at Bordeaux these events and a prominent member of where Weygand was used as a kind of the postwar commission d'enquete par- bogeyman to intimidate Reynaud into lementaire examining the question, has playing the political charade of the written: "It played a capital role . . . "Chautemps Proposal" of June 15 and which has escaped public attention al- 16, much as he was used by Laval in the most completely."49 similar maneuver at Vichy three weeks The invasion took place at the cabinet later.47 Finally, the fear of a military

45 See WXeygand's deposition at Riom in Com- these actions of Reynaud are treated in Marin, mission . . . Rapport, II, 407-13. Cf. his Allocu- "Gouvernement (I)," loc. cit., pp. 9-10. The epi- tion . . . le 29 octobre 1940, and "Allocution . . . sode at Vichy is covered in the testimony of le 27 novembre 1940," in Le Roc'h; and his Uon Blum (July 27, 1945), Proces . . . Pe'tain, testimony (June 9, 16, and 21, 1949), Commission pp. 77-78, and L'oeuvre de Leon Blum (Paris, . . . Temoignages, VI, 1759-86 and 1805-70. On 1955), II, 84-86; Albert Lebrun, Temoignage Reibel, see testimony of Rollin (Jan. 20, 1949), (Paris, 1945), p. 108; , Ci- WVevgand (June 23, 1949), and Matteo Connet devant (Paris, 1942), p. 260; Joseph Paul- (Jan. 12, 1950), Comnmission ... Tedmoignages, V, Boncour, Entre deux guerres, souvenirs sur la 3e. 1391, VI, 1874, and VII, 2189-90; Reynaud, La Republique (Paris, 1945-46), III, 284-86; Pierre France, II, 446-51; and M. M. Tony Revillon, Laval, Laval parle: notes et medmoires (Paris, MVIes carnets (juin-octobre 1940) (Paris, 1945), pp. 1948), p. 51; and Martin du Gard, pp. 55 and 44-47. 478-79. 46 Weygand, Ake'moires, III, 150-52 and 190; 48 Testimony of Rollin (Jan. 20, 1949), Monnet and Reynaud, La France, II, 182. (Feb. 3, 1949), and Laurent-Eynac (Feb. 8, 1949), 4' The activities of this group and of Wey- Commission . . . Temoignages, V, 1395-97, 1426, gand, especially with regard to Saturday, June and 1458; Reynaud, La France, II, 446-53; Kam- 15, when Petain allegedly attempted to persuade merer, pp. 178-79; and Spears, II, 269. Cf. Reibel, the general to accept the policy of continued re- Comment; testimony of Michel Clemenceau (July sistance overseas, are discussed in the testimony 28, 1945), and of Reynaud and Weygand (Aug. of XVevgand (June 16 and 21, 1949), Baudouin 1, 1945), Proces . . . Pe'tain, pp. 92-94 and 154-57; (July 12 -and 26, 1949), Reynaud (Dec. 12, 1950), and notes of Gen. Joseph Lafont, commandant and Bouthillier (Dec. 19 [questions of P. Dhers] of the 18th Military Region at Bordeaux, in and 21, 1950), Commission . . ., Te'moignages, Louis-Georges Planes and Robert Dufourg, Bor- VI, 1823-25 and 1851-56, VII, 2062-67 and 2106- deaux, capitale tragique, mai-juin 1940 (Paris, 16, and VIII, 2413-14, 2416-17, 2457-58, and 1956), pp. 94-97. 2529-30. Cf. Weygand, Me'moires, III, 224, and 49 Louis Marin, "Gouvernement et commande- his testimony (July 31, 1945), Proces . . . Petain, ment, II," Revue d'historie de la 2e. guerre p. 130; Baudouin, p. 165; and Reynaud, La mondiale, IX (1953),- 14. Marin was a vice-presi- France, II, and Fight, pp. 533-34. The effects of dent du conseil in the Reynaud cabinet.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms WEYGAND AND THE FALL OF FRANCE 237 meetings on June 12 and 13 at Cange, of a divided France, with the homeland where Weygand calmly requested and under the control of a military regime then emotionally demanded an armistice, and the colonies under a weak civilian completely shattering the ministers' one. Shortly after Weygand, in a huff, "moderate optimism," for until then the left the council room (allegedly because dreaded word had never been openly he mistook 's rictus for mentioned in an official gathering.50 The a sneer; if true, a fitting shift from low first specific act of disobedience occurred comedy to high tragedy), Jean Ybarnega- on the second day, June 13, when Wey- ray declared for the armistice because his gand forcefully stated: [He] "would re- military "chiefs had spoken." 53 Before fuse to leave the soil of France even if Weygand was out of the chateau's put in irons ... [should the government] grounds, Wtain rose to read an identical quietly decide to take cover in Africa declaration of his determination to re- or elsewhere."51 Since the government's main and treat, influencing Charles Pom- ability to shackle him was practically aret, minister of labor, and Georges Per- non-existent,52 this statement meant not, minister of public health and the- that not only defiance but success- family, to join the "soldiers."54 ful defiance had at last emerged. For the The second act of defiance occurred partisans of the armistice, this clear-cut two days later at Bordeaux when, shortly declaration of disobedience signified before the cabinet meeting on the after- that the army was formally on their side; noon of June 15, Weygand refused to for the coward, it furnished an ironclad obey Reynaud's "suggestion" that, rather justification for transferring their alle- than seek a truce, France follow the giance to the armistice under threat of Dutch example of surrender of the land violence; for the courageous and level- forces by the commander-in-chief and headed, it created the sobering prospect the withdrawal overseas of the govern-

50 Testimony of Weygand (June 9, 1949 [com- ment, even if Weygand, himself, were al- ments of L. Marin]), and of Villelume (Apr. 17, lowed to remain in the homeland after 1951), Commission ... Temognages, VI, 1768 and the act was accomplished.55 Overcome IX, 2786. Also testimony of Lebrun (June 1, 1948), Rollin (Jan. 20, 1949), Monnet (Feb. 3, with rage, Weygand based his refusal 1949), Laurent-Eynac (Feb. 8, 1949), Weygand upon a questionable and strictly military (Mar. 8 and June 9, 1949), Matteo Connet (Jan. interpretation of the concept of honor 12, 1950), and Reynaud (Dec. 12, 1950), ibid., IV, 996, V, 1392-1408, 1417-25, and 1450-53, VI, and justified his refusal by an invidious, 1564-65 and 1763-85, VII, 2185-95, and VIII, if hasty, political comparison between 2410-14. Cf. Louis Marin, "Temoignages. . . sur the prestige of Queen Wilhelmina as a le conseil des ministres tenu A Cange le 13 juin 1940," Commission . . . Rapport, II, 413-15, and 53 Testimony of Lebrun (June 8, 1948), ibid.. his "Contribution," loc. cit., pp. 3-11; Weygand, IV, 1011. AlIemoires, III, 209-21, and En lisant, pp. 45-50 54Reynaud, La France, II, 324. A list of tlie and 54-55; Reynaud, La France, II, 313-27; De cabinet members who favored the armistice, Gaulle, L'appel, pp. 53-58; Baudouin, pp. 149-65; those against it, and those undecided is con- Reibel, Comment, pp. 18-21; Spears, II, 172-234; tained in Marin, "Contribution," loc. cit., p. 23. Churchill, II, 152-74; Kammerer, pp. 78-104; 55 Weygand, Memoires, III, 223-28; and Rey- Jean Prouvost in Sept jours (Nov. 10-17, 1940), naud, La France, II, 337-47. See also the testi- pp. 10-13; Roger Langeron, Paris, juin 1940 mony of Georges (Feb. 26, 1948), Weygand (June- (Paris, 1946), pp. 35-37; and Bourget, pp. 111-24. 21, 1949), Reynaud (Dec. 12, 1950), and Bouthil- 51 Weygand's deposition at Riom, Commission lier (Dec. 21, 1950), Commission . . . Temoig- . Rapport, II, 411. nages, III, 742-43, VI, 1835-56, and VIII, 2416- 52 Testimony of Bouthillier (Dec. 19, 1950), 21 and 2518-19. Cf. Bouthillier, pp. 25-39; Commission . . . Tdmoignages, VIII, 2456. Baudouin, pp. 167-71; and Spears, II, 244-75.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 238 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ

national symbol in the Netherlands and fatal Chautemps Proposal to query the Reynaud cabinet's lack of such a Germans concerning the conditions of reputation in France.56 In loud and an armistice, had neither the actual power violent terms, which could not fail to to replace Weygand nor the person with impress the vacillating ministers, he re- whom to replace him.59 This last fact was peated this refusal twice within the next obvious on general grounds, although few hours: in a most public altercation the specific attempt to find a replace- with Reynaud outside the council room ment, De Gaulle's mission to General shortly after the end of the afternoon at Arcis-sur-Aube on meeting, and, a half an hour later, be- June 11 and its failure, was unknown at fore President Lebrun, to whom Wey- the time.60 What transpired on June 16, gand intimated that Reynaud's sugges- the day after the cabinet meeting, when tion was part of a politicians' plot to Reynaud was actually overthrown, was, transfer the onus of defeat to the from the point of view of the military- shoulders of the military.57 Behind both civil struggle, somewhat anticlimatic. public declarations of disobedience Weygand's act of disobedience, his re- loomed a third. It was taken for granted fusal at noon before the premier and Le- that the generalissimo had no intention brun to surrender the army even with of resigning and, if requested by the gov- the covering order from the government, ernminent to do so, would refuse.58 was a mere recapitulation of the acts of With these three moves-refusal to the day before.61 It was perhaps typical leave France, refusal to surrender the of the whole horrible week that a mes- army if allowed to remain, and certain, sage of desperation from General Al- though unspoken, refusal to resign de- phonse Georges, commander of the spite his disobedience-Weygand had forces of the northeast and Weygand's completed his part in the overthrow of direct subordinate at the non-existent the Reynaud cabinet. For, despite the front ("absolute necessity to make a de- 1preluier's muttered threats of dismissal cision"), sent in by Weygand to Lebrun and the generalissimo's vocalized expec- 59 Testimony of Bouthillier (Dec. 19, 1950), tation of disgrace, all the witnesses knew ibid., VIII, 2456. See also testimony of Weygand that the government, enmeshed in the (June 9 and 21, 1949), and Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), ibid., VI, 1769 and 1845 and IX, 2791; 56 Testimony of Weygand (June 9, 16, and 21, Weygand's deposition at Riom in Commission 1949), Commission . . . Temoignages, VI, 1759- . . .Rapport, II, 412-13; Bourget, pp. 138-39; 61, 1817-23, 1827-29, and 1841-46. Cf. De Gaulle, Klaus-Jurgen Muller, "Das Ende der Entente- L'appel, pp. 38-39; Weygand, En lisant, pp. 63- Cordiale," Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 75; and Tony Revillon, pp. 214-15. Beiheft 3 (1956), 48-49 and 71. ,5 Weygand's deposition at Riom in Commis- 60 De Gaulle, L'appel, pp. 51-53. Cf. Massis, sion . . . Rapport, II, 412; testimony of Monnet I, 138-50. Also Baudouin, pp. 63 and 115-16; (Feb. 3, 1939), Laurent-Eynac (Feb. 8, 1949), and Weygand, En lisant, pp. 56-57; letter of Rey- Weygandl (June 16 and 21, 1949), Commission naud in Revue d'histoire de la 2e. guerre mon- . . . Temoignages, V, 1419, 1424-25, and 1448 diale, XXIX (1958), 105; testimony of Reynaud and VI, 1818-23 and 1846; Lebrun, p. 82; Dirk (June 13, 1947), Laurent-Eynac (Feb. 8, 1949), Forster, "Kapitulation und Fahnenehre: ein ex- Weygand (June 19, 1949), and Villelume (Apr. emplarischer Konflikt zwischen Reynaud und 17, 1951), Commission . . . Temoignages, I, 115, Weygand im June 1940," Aussenpolitik, VII IV, 1449, VI, 1827, and IX, 2797. (1956), 438-45. 61 Weygand, MWmoires, III, 232-33, En lisant, 55 Testimony of Laurent-Eynac (Feb. 8, 1949), pp. 69 and 73, and testimony (June 21, 1949); and Weygand (Mar. 31 and June 21, 1949), Coin- and testimony of Lebrun (June 10, 1948), Com- mission . . . Temoignages, V, 1449 and VI, 1602 mission .. . Tedmoignages, VI, 1843 and 1946, and and 1844-45. IV, 1016. Cf. Reynaud, La France, II, 344-47.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms WEYGAND AND THE FALL OF FRANCE 239 during the afternoon session of the cabi- Paul Reynaud a vecu . . . enfin, la pre- net, should have been the last straw.62 miere demarche pour cessation des hos- The president called a halt to the pro- tilites est en cours. Raison de plus que ceedings and indicated with some vigor Besson [commander of Army Group 3] the necessity of making a decision con- tienne bon." cerning the Chautemps Proposal. Rey- Thus, as a witness, General Bertrand, naud's answer, again in the traditional was to declare: "When the fate of the peacetime manner, was to resign.63 The country was in question, the premier entire political maneuver of the armistice whose mission it was to direct, abdicated ground to a close with the precision of a in favor of an irresponsible authority."65 military operation in the best Kriegspiel At the very last, the military and political tradition of the general staff. Early the destinies of France were fused; but then, next morning, a telegram went out from from the very first-from the start of the General Andre Doumenc at Bordeaux campaign of 1940, if not from the con- to General Georges at Vichy:64 clusion of peace in 1919-the military "Mon general, le general Weygand me cart had been before the political horse.66 telephone 'a l'instant que le ministere IV

62 Lebrun, p. 83; also testimony of Reynaud What Weygand's disobedience in 1940 (Dec. 12, 1950 and Apr. 26, 1951), Commission illustrated was the enormous difficulty a . . . Temoignages, VIII, 2422-27 and IX, 2848-49. democratic government may have, under Cf. Reibel, Comment, p. 23. 63 For this denouement and the recriminations the severely critical conditions of modern between Reynaud and Lebrun over the responsi- war, in avoiding a major political up- bilities involved, see testimony of Mtain (July heaval resulting from an attempt to en- 10, 1947), Lebrun (June 10, 1948), A. Rio (Dec. 16, 1948), Rollin (Jan. 20, 1949), Laurent-Eynac force its strategico-political decisions (Feb. 8, 1949), Reynaud (Dec. 12, 1950), and upon a recalcitrant commander-in-chief Bouthillier (Dec. 19 and 21, 1950), Commission determined to impose those of his own . . . T!moignages, I, 175, IV, 1011, and 1079-90, V, 1321, 1394, and 1454, and VIII, 2423-27, 2478- choosing. In an era of nuclear war, the 81, and 2483-86. Also, Reynaud, La France, II, problem is complex; in an age of close in- 347-64; Lebrun, pp. 83-85; Weygand, Memoires, ternational military and diplomatic agree- III, 233-35; testimony of (July 26, 1945), and Weygand (Aug. 1, 1945), Procds ments, it is shared.,67 Weygand's version ... Pitain, pp. 57-63 and 156-57; Baudouin, pp. of it (supported, of course, by the parti- 171-78; Edouard Herriot, Episodes 1940-1944 (Paris, 1950), pp. 74-75; , un- titled article in New, York Times, Aug. 30, 1945, 65 Testimony of Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), p. 8, and "Lettre d'un condamne'," tcrits de Commission . . . Temoignages, IX, 2787. Paris, no. 33 (1947), p. 118; De Gaulle, L'appel, 66 Reynaud, Probleme, p. 88; Admiral Raoul pp. 65-66. For the sudsidiary question of con- Castex, Theories strategiques (Paris, 1913-33), IV, nections between Reynaud and De Gaulle con- 509-11; Weygand, "L'unit6," loc. cit., p. 15; and cerning further resistance overseas, see testi- France?, p. 15; Raymond Recouly, "Les le ons mony of Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), and of Rey- d'une crise," Revue de France, XVI (1936), 535- naud (Apr. 26, 1951), Commission . . . Temoig- 40. Cf. testimony of Pierre-E. Flandin (June 4, nages, IX, 2788-89 and 2850; Spears, II, 311-23; 1947), Commission . . . Teimoignages, 1, 143 and and especially Lucien Galimand, Origines et de- his report, "Les leqons du 7 mars 1936," Com- viations du Gaullisme (Paris, 1950), pp. 65-76. mission .. . Rapport, I, 89; and P. Dhers, "Du 7 64Unnumbered telegram dated June 17, 1940, mars 1936 a I'Ile d'Yeu," Revue d'histoire de la 1:00 a.m., in Bordereau d'envoi, No. 7 CP/SH, 2e. guerre mondiale, V (1952), 22. 'Ordres Principales ou telegrammes du General 67 Forster, loc. cit., pp. 444-45. Cf. questions Weygand du 29 mai, 1940 au 23 juin, 1940, and statements of Marin and Charles Serre in Commission d'enquete parlementaire . . . Bor- testimony of Weygand (June 16, 1949), Commis- dereaux d'envoi (unpublished). sion . . . Temoignages, VI, 1826-28.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 240 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ sans of the armistice) as a simple con- ficer corps, were at least the elements of test of wills between "male" and "female" what might be called a split image of can be classified as merely picturesque, loyalty; that is, a concept of the nation if pungent.68 And, despite the various as distinct from the regime. While it is suggestions and solutions brought to the true that this concept existed primarily- problem-extension of governmental as a feeling rather than as an idea, seldom powers over operations, automatic resig- verbalized and then only by rare eccen- nation of the supreme commander after trics, it was a definite state of mind and every unsuccessful major military cam- carried with it a functional corollary, paign-it will doubtless remain an in- conditional obedience to the regime.70 tractable one, because it concerns the be- This potentially dangerous mood havior of men subjected to the extraordi- deepened during the conflicts between nary emotional pressures of war, the most the army leaders and the state over the irrational of all social phenomena.69 conduct of the war of 1914-18 and over Some safeguards are, however, fur- the terms of the peace that followed. It nished by a history of harmonious mili- was reinforced by the difficult relations tary-civil relationships; and here the between the two during what a writer French experience of 1940 is most in- on French military affairs has recently structive. Weygand's action came as the termed the period of "Regrets, 1919- fatal conclusion to the bitter dialogue 194O."71 At this time, according to the between government and command, orthodox military point of view, the reaching back at least as far as the origins "politicians," after having obtained the of the Third Republic. In the most gen- military institutions they desired in 1928, eral terms, the conflict arose from the fact proceeded first to ignore the threat of a that the officer corps, the guardian of ulti- new war these laws created and then to mate power in the state and the "sublime push the country into an unequal con- neutral" in the seven changes of regime flict before adequate material and spirit- from 1814 to 1871, was long dominated ual preparation, a re'veil national, could by an essentially anti-republican nucleus take place.72 By 1939, then, the army of ultra-conservative bien pensants. It chiefs were psychologically prepared to took a stand on the opposite side from the political majority in the great schism 70 Raoul Girardet, La societe' militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815-1939 (Paris, 1953), at the end of the century and retreated pp. 117-60 and 320-28; Pierre Chalmin, L'officier thereafter into dignified, or sullen, si- frangais de 1815 a' 1870 (Paris, 1951), pp. 358-64. lence as the Grande Muette. What had Cf. Gen. Andre Zeller, "Armee et politique," Revue de defense nationale, XIII (1957), 499- been laid down by 1914, in a select and 517. powerful minority of this Deroulediste of- 71 Henrv Contamine, La revanche, 1871-1940 (Paris, 1957), p. 8. 68 Testimony of Weygand (June 16, 1949), 72 Actually, this theory blames France's allies Commission . . . Tdmoignages, VI, 1838. for both the war and the defeat. See Petain's 69 Testimony of Laurent-Eynac (Feb. 8, 1949), speeches of June 20 and Oct. 11, 1940, and his Weygand (June 21 and 23, 1949), Bouthillier (Dec. statement after his conviction in 1945, in Philippe 19, 1950), and Villelume (Apr. 17, 1951), ibid., P6tain, Quatre anne'es au pouvoir (Paris, 1949),. V, 1449, VI, 1835-40, 1843-46, and 1880, VIII, pp. 16, 49, and 60; Weygand's statements in the 2455-58, and IX, 2787-88; Marin, "Gouverne- draft proces-verbal of the Comit6 de guerre of ment, I," and "Gouvernement, II," loc. cit., May 25 and testimony of Weygand (June 9, pp. 1-28, and 1-14, respectively; and an inter- 1949), and Baudouin (July 27, 1949), Commission esting suggestion by Senator Jacques Bardoux in . . . Tetmoignages, VI, 1713, and 1771 and VII- Commission .. . Rapport, II, 545-56. 2107-08; and Laffargue, pp. 225-33.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms WEYGAND AND THE FALL OF FRANCE 241 identify the army in wartime with the France as a continental power, so aptly nation, to the exclusion, if necessary, of described by Carlton J. H. Hayes a gen- the regime. Thus Weygand, the living eration ago, and devoid of the "ideolog- symbol of the historic tensions, negative isms" represented by Hitler, Mussolini, attitudes, and resentments, should nat- or even De Gaulle, formed the core of the urally come to what he called a "ref us de conceptual and value system responsible conscience" over the question of surrend- for Weygand's military and political de- ering the army-qua-nation and of "emi- cisions in 1940.75 Along with the firm be- grating" in June 1940; thus Petain, the lief that conscience ultimately regulates personification of the civilian-old-soldier the actions of a highly-placed soldier, it pater familias should "not have been dis- explains why he cannot now consider pleased" at the prospect of being called himself a "subjective traitor," and why upon to ransom his country.73 he sincerely and doggedly holds to his Finally, it is important to note that version of 1940 and its aftermath as a Weygand is far from being an atypical personally painful exercise in man's re- commander of World War II. He, Ad- grettable penchant for misunderstand- miral Wilhelm Canaris, General Diet- ing and persecuting essentially noble rich von Choltitz, Marshal Rodolfo Gra- aims.J76 ziani, and Field-Marshal Bernard Mont- And yet, this private interpretation of gomery are similar not only in upbring- the great debate, however deeply rooted, ing, aims, and personal qualities-the cannot be totally satisfactory to a man French, German, Italian, and British ver- whose arrogance is paradoxically com- sions of the parfait soldat-but also in bined with genuine humility. Weygand their nineteenth-century nationalism of wrote as much at the end of his polemi- the most pure and most narrow variety.74 cal reply to De Gaulle's L'appel, the The self-interest at the given moment of greatest work of art on 1940, when he

73Andre FranSois-Poncet, "Discours ai l'Acad- appealed to De Gaulle to be the mag- emie FranSaise," Le Monde, Jan. 24, 1953, P. 7. nanimous victor, a Henri IV after Cout- See testimony of Weygand (June 21, 1949), Com- ras.77. (The embarrassing parallel Wey- mission . . . Timoignages, VI, 1844-46, and his Memoires, III, 213 and 225-26; note of Admiral gand thus creates between himself and FranSois Darlan to Vice-Admiral Felix Michel- the unsuccessful pactisant Henri III must ier, June 18, 1940, in Admiral J. T. Docteur, be overlooked.) Weygand's is a life of Darlan, amiral de la flotte (Paris, 1949), p. 63. Compare various instances of conditional obed- struggle, struggle against everything, ev- ience in the actions of Rossel in 1871, Foch in erybody, and ultimately against himself, 1919 and Choltitz in 1944, in Gen. Louis Rossel, for we must recognize his courageous mas- Memoires et correspondance (Paris, 1908), p. 291; Maxine Weygand, Foch (Paris, 1947), p. 293; Jean 75 Bouthillier testified, Dec. 19, 1950: "[The Martet, Monsieur Clemenceau peint par lui- question ofl victorious resistance by Britain . . . meme (Paris, 1929), pp. 243 and 251; and Gen. did not govern the basic reflexes of the ministers Dietrich von Choltitz, Soldat unter Soldaten on Juine 16" (Commission . . . Te'moignages, VIII, (Zurich and Stuttgart, 1951), pp. 292 and 303. 2459). See also Weygand, Me'moires, I, 644-45; 74 See Karl Abshagen, Canaris, Weltbiirger und Reynaud, La France, II, 176; and Carlton J. H. Patriot (Stuttgart, 1949); Choltitz; Marshal Ro- Hayes, France, a nation of patriots (New York, dolfo Graziani, Ho difeso [a patria (Milan, 1947); 1930). Alan Moorehead, Montgomery (London, 1946); 76 Testimony of Weygand (Mar. 8, and June and a penetrating analysis of the role of Wey- 9 and 30, 1949), Commission . . . Temoignages, gand, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Graziani, Pierre VI, 1564, 1769, and 1924-29; and the preface by Laval, and Franz von Papen in H. Stuart Weygand to A. Laffargue, Le general Dentz Hughes, "The problem of limited collaboration," (Paris 1940-Syrie 1941) (Paris, 1953), pp. v-vi. Confluence, III, (1954), 172-83. 77 Weygand, En lisant, pp. 145-46.

This content downloaded from 95.183.184.51 on Wed, 12 Feb 2020 07:17:31 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 242 PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ tery of a violent and combative temper- officer wrote in a haunting examination ament in the decision of 1940. His trag- of the years since the defeat, "il n'y avait edy is that this struggle resulted in the plus . . .de vertu qui pu' t s'appeler . . . death of the institution he loved and discipline, mais il n'y avait plus, served, the army. As is often observed, d'armee." 78 disobedience cannot be the monopoly of one man. With "no clearly designated TRINITY COLLEGE HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT enemy" for four years after 1940, the army could be revived physically but not 78 Jules Roy, Le mnetier des armes (Paris, 1948). spiritually. "De mon temps," a reflective p. 149.

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