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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 74-6966 LAZALIER, James Herbert, 1933- SURROGATE DIPLOMACY: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT'S PERSONAL ENVOYS, 1941-1945. The University of Oklahoma, Ph.D., 1973 History, modern University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan © 1973 JAMES HERBERT LAZALIER ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED. THE UNIVERSITY OP OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE SURROGATE DIPLOMACY: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S PERSONAL ENVOYS, 1941-1945 A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY BY JAMES HERBERT LAZALIER Norman, Oklahoma 1973 SURROGATE DIPLOMACY: FRANKLIN D, ROOSEVELT'S PERSONAL ENVOYS, 194l-19%5 APPROVED BY A' 2 DISSERTATION COMMITTEE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS When I arrived at the University of Oklahoma, I carried a fair amount of Eastern Oklahoma parochialism. For their sincere encouragement and advice in broadening my perspective of history, I would like to thank Dr. Donald J • Berthrong and Dr. Arrell M, Gibson. I owe special debts to Dr. Sidney D, Brown and Dr. Rufus G. Hall for their constructive criticism of the dissertation. For his selflessness and friendship throughout these years-- I thank you Dr. Phillip H. Vaughan, and because his humanizing qualities have influenced me more than he can realize, I remain indebted to Dr. David W. Levy, Since his patience with my stylistic lapses has endured beyond that of Job, I can only express my deep and sincere appreciation to ray chairman. Dr. Russell D. Buhite, To my parents, Mr. and Mrs. H. C. Lazalier, I can only hope that this work will in part compensate for a debt that can never be fully settled. Finally, to ray wife Louise, for her patience, understanding, and forbearance, my deepest gratitude. ii TABLE OP CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................................... il INTRODUCTION.............. 1 Chapter I. DECISION MAKING: ROOSEVELT, HULL, 5 AND THE "STRIPED-PANT SET" II. UPHOLDING THE ATLANTIC CHARTER....... 4l ALMOST III. CATHOLICS, COMMUNISTS, COLLABORATORS, 97 AND FASCISTS: ROOSEVELT'S UNHOLY ALLIANCES IV. ROOSEVELT AND THE CHINESE PUZZLE l65 CONCLUSION ....................... 239 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................... 254 111 INTRODUCTION In one of Upton Sinclair’s Lanny Budd stories, a fictional President Roosevelt exclaimed to Budd, his Per­ sonal Representative to China; "Hi Marco Polo.... By golly, I can’t tell you how I have missed you." Sinclair’s Presidential Mission is of course fiction and his charac­ ters somewhat overdrawn, but his description of the affable and politically artistic Roosevelt is accurate; moreover, the characterization of Lanny Budd as a Presidential agent emphasizes one of the most consistent features of Roose­ velt’s administration: the use of the "Personal Represen­ tative" to implement foreign policies. Traditionally, ambassadors and ministers have served as presidents’ representatives, but their responsibilities have centered on the day-to-day relations with a particu­ lar country and are generally guided by the State Depart­ ment. The Personal Representatives were unique, however, as they remained free from the official encumbrances and operated under instructions received directly from the White House. Further, the agents were not recommended to the United States Senate, nor did they receive confirmation from it. 1 2 The urgent nature of the war, the distrust of the bureaucracy, and Roosevelt’s belief that his methods for success on the domestic political level— the direct per­ sonal. approach— would easily transfer to the international stage prompted Roosevelt to select several individuals to serve as his Personal Representatives, Most of these agents were New Deal politicians who lacked the diplo­ mat’s training and experience, but Roosevelt believed that the deficiency could be easily remedied by receiving in­ structions from the White House and reporting directly to the President. The agents included his personal adviser Harry Hopkins; New Deal economist Lauchlin Currie; politicians Joseph Davies, Louis Johnson, Patrick Hurley, Wendell Willkie and Henry Wallace; businessmen Myron Taylor, W. Averell Harriman, and Donald Nelson; and public servants William Phillips and Robert Murphy. This study seeks primarily to determine the value of Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy as implemented by his personal representatives. Since Roosevelt’s preference for such extreme personal control of foreign policy was, in part, an overt demonstration of his lack of faith in the State Department, this study considers the impact of such an approach on that agency. Roosevelt’s willingness to risk the alienation of his own foreign office is not surprising when one considers that the wartime imperatives created special circumstances in which the end often justified the means. 3 To Roosevelt, the larger objective of his diplomacy was twofold; to maintain the alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia at all costs and to enhance his own image in the eyes of the American public. He felt that the personal approach was the only effective manner in which both of these objectives could be met simultaneously. Aware of the high esteem in which the President of the United States is held by foreign officials as well as by the American people, Roosevelt saw the dramatic value that could be gained from dispatching the surrogate diplomats directly from the White House, If Roosevelt had any doubts about the practicality of implementing his program of Per­ sonal Representative diplomacy, they were completely assuaged by two additional important considerations. He could use the missions to pay political debts, and he could also remove from contention certain political aspirants and other "undesirables," Of course, much of the following dis­ cussion is devoted to the missions themselves, the roles of the individual agents, and their success or failures. Since the emphasis of this study is on Roosevelt’s Personal Representative diplomacy rather than his overall wartime foreign policies, I have excluded from consider­ ation the Allied summit conferences. That aspect of World War II international relations was the ultimate in Roose­ velt's personal approach to American foreign policy; and he reserved that activity for himself. Filmed as received without page(s) ^ UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS. DECISION MAKING: ROOSEVELT, HULL, AND THE "STRIPED-PANT SET" CHAPTER I While the main thrust in Franklin Roosevelt’s control of foreign policy emerged during the war years, the habit of close personal supervision appeared throughout the twelve years he served as President. A major character­ istic of New Deal decision-making in foreign policy was Roosevelt’s disdain for the State Department and his un­ willingness to view the Department as anything more than a clerical agency. Although the President often sought out the advice of experts for solving domestic problems, he virtually ignored the expertise available in his own State Department— an approach which became commonplace in Roose­ velt's conduct of American foreign policy. Some observers of the Roosevelt administration noted the "inherently disorderly nature" of the New Deal and the "constant readiness for internecine strife" among Roose­ velt’s subordinates, but explained them as the President’s ways of testing and developing the abilities of his under­ lings. One must conclude, however, that his approach in the area of foreign policy was designed not so much as a 6 means of evaluating his apprentices as a method of con- trolling foreign policy. By

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