Franklin Roosevelt, Thomas Dewey and the Wartime Presidential Campaign of 1944
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POLITICS AS USUAL: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, THOMAS DEWEY, AND THE WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1944 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. POLITICS AS USUAL: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT, THOMAS DEWEY AND THE WARTIME PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1944 A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Michael A. Davis, B.A., M.A. University of Central Arkansas, 1993 University of Central Arkansas, 1994 December 2005 University of Arkansas Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the U.S. wartime presidential campaign of 1944. In 1944, the United States was at war with the Axis Powers of World War II, and Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt, already serving an unprecedented third term as President of the United States, was seeking a fourth. Roosevelt was a very able politician and-combined with his successful performance as wartime commander-in-chief-- waged an effective, and ultimately successful, reelection campaign. Republicans, meanwhile, rallied behind New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey. Dewey emerged as leader of the GOP at a critical time. Since the coming of the Great Depression -for which Republicans were blamed-the party had suffered a series of political setbacks. Republicans were demoralized, and by the early 1940s, divided into two general national factions: Robert Taft conservatives and Wendell WiIlkie "liberals." Believing his party's chances of victory over the skilled and wily commander-in-chiefto be slim, Dewey nevertheless committed himself to wage a competent and centrist campaign, to hold the Republican Party together, and to transform it into a relevant alternative within the postwar New Deal political order. Often overlooked by historians, the low-key and "uninteresting" Dewey was an institutional preserver, opening the door to a Dwight Eisenhower presidency, and the "Modem Republicanism" of the 1950s. Unlike Taft (and Herbert Hoover before him), Dewey (and Eisenhower after him) tacitly condoned the basic New Deal reform structure. Though set against a backdrop of global war, the 1944 campaign was also an old-fashioned, free-swinging, partisan affair-including stump speeches, rallies and parades, radio and newspaper advertising, harsh rhetoric, and a near record voter turnout Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on Election Day. As an ordinary event in an extraordinary time, the 1944 campaign was a testimony to the strength of American democracy. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Contents Chapter One Introduction 1 Chapter Two The State of the Nation 13 Chapter Three The Republican National Convention 90 Chapter Four The Democratic National Convention 124 Chapter Five The Making of a Wartime Campaign 146 Chapter Six The Fall Campaign 164 Chapter Seven Conclusion 239 Notes 250 Bibliography 279 v Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Chapter One: Introduction The United States was in the midst of a presidential election, and at war. The president was running for reelection, and his poll numbers were at an all time low. His challenger, an aloof, intelligent, and sophisticated Northeasterner, loathed the president, believing that the U.S. was "lied, not led into war," and that the upcoming election was one between "competence and incompetent bungling."] The opposition party, selecting its nominee early in the election process, and without much fight, affirmed the need for partisanship and constructive, wartime criticism. The president, to the disbelief and anger of his critics, refused to acknowledge mistakes, and used his status as commander- in-chief to promote his candidacy-even addressing the nation from a battleship in the Pacific. He was, detractors charged, arrogant, deceitful, and reckless. He faltered before the media-fumbling his words, and appearing both agitated and distant. Investigations into the reasons for America's entry into the war also abounded-- could the President have done something to prevent the attack on America just three years earlier? The President, meanwhile, hammered at his opponent's vagueness and inconsistencies on policy issues-particularly as it related to foreign policy. "Let's have an end to the shilly-shallying," declared one of the President's more vocal supporters. "Do you remember [the opposition] candidate as a courageous leader who took strong stands ... Or do you remember him as an office seeker dealing in platitudes and sitting on the fence waiting to find out which way to jump? ... Can you afford to take a chance on a fence straddler with a record on foreign affairs like that ... when your future and that of your children is at stake?,,2 The United States was at a crossroads. Emotions were high, lines were drawn, the campaign was intense, and the year was 1944. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The election of 1944 was the first presidential election since 1864 to take place while the nation was at war. After a brief primary season, the Republican Party, in late June, settled upon New York Governor Thomas Edmund Dewey~the former District Attorney, and popular special prosecutor of Legs Diamond and Lucky Luciano~as its nominee for President of the United States. Dewey, aged forty-two, was the first presidential candidate to be born in the twentieth century. His running mate was the conservative Governor of Ohio, John W. Bricker. The Democratic nominee for President was the three-term incumbent, sixty-two year-old Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Though there was little doubt about Roosevelt seeking a fourth term, much speculation existed concerning his choice for a running mate. Vice President Henry Wallace was widely unpopular among party elites, especially those from the South, who objected to his liberal views on race, and who feared that Roosevelt~rumored to be deteriorating in health~ might not survive a fourth term. In the end, Democratic professionals replaced Wallace with Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri. Sensitive to the wartime setting of the election, both Roosevelt and Dewey~early in their campaigns~adopted dignified and low-key electoral strategies. By late September, however, "politics as usual" returned, as the campaign degenerated into a "free-swinging" partisan affair, characterized by political "body punches and head-rocking.,,3 On Election Day, despite polls indicating a race too close to call, the Roosevelt-Truman ticket received fifty-three percent of the popular vote, and 432 electoral votes. Still, this was the closest presidential election since Woodrow Wilson's upset over Charles Evans Hughes in 1916. A shift of only 500,000 votes in the right states would have given Dewey an Electoral College win, and the White House. 2 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Though it took place in wartime and was extremely close, the 1944 election has interested few scholars. There are several reasons for this neglect. One is that it does not conform to what Harvard political scientist V.O. Key described in the 1950s as a "critical election.,,4 "According to Key, critical elections have occurred periodically in American history, generating high levels of voter interest, upsetting the previous balance of power among competing parties, and producing durable changes in the compositions of the voter coalitions supporting each party.,,5 Examples of such elections include 1860, 1896, and 1936. By this standard, then, 1944 was a not a "critical election," but a mere "maintaining election" that resulted in neither a transfer of power nor a major realignment in voter allegiance. A second reason is that the relevance of the American presidential campaign in general has come under attack in recent decades from both historians and political scientists. With the rise of "new history"-characterized by an emphasis on the experience of ordinary Americans, quantification and cultural analysis, and the eclipse of conventional political and intellectual history-- many historians, by the 1970s, began to dismiss presidential elections studies as narrow, elitist, and ill-equipped to examine those changes-- such as family, environment, and social beliefs-- that have most affected the human condition.6 "The old 'presidential synthesis'-which understood the evolution of American society chiefly via presidential elections and administrations-is dead (and not lamented)," historian Eric Foner declared in the early 1990s.7 Similarly, many political scientists have, since the 1940s, argued against dwelling on "campaign effects"-those twists and turns of candidate strategies, endorsements, and appearances that "impact" elections. "Voters are not fools," v.o. Key once observed, and neither are they 3 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "straitjacketed by social detenninants or moved by unconscious urges triggered by devilishly skillful propagandists."s Instead, they are retrospective: "As voters mark their ballot they may have in their minds impressions of the last television spectacular of the campaign, but, more important, they have in their minds recollections of their experiences of the past