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The Insane and the Melancholy

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No 259,260 Year XI/19,20 – 20 May 2018 104,60 RON Bilingual-monthly publication of political analysis Motto:“Opinions are free, but not mandatory” I. L. Caragiale Turkey: the insane and the melancholy 1 (in alphabetical order) Adrian CONSTANTINESCU Adrian SEVERIN PhD in international economy and Master Born in March, 1954, he had a remarkable in public international law political ascent after 1989. He was minister of Scientific researcher and head of depart- Foreign Affairs in 1996-1997, deputy in the ment within the World Economy Institute, Romanian Parliament in 1990 and later be- permanent deputy representative and tween 1992-2007. As of the 1st of January, chief negotiator of Romania to GATT/OMC, various oth- 2007, he was elected member of the Europe- an Parliament. He was UN’s special rapporteur for human rights in er positions in diplomacy up to that of Ambassador in the Belarus and PACE member between 1993-2007. Kingdom of Sweden and the Republic of Macedonia. A talented politician who probably did not find the best juncture in order to advance further on a national and European level. Andrei KORTUNOV Director General of the Russian Interna- Anis. H. BAJREKTAREVIĆ tional Affairs Council (RIAC) Prof. (FH) Dr. Anis Bajrektarevic, Acting Deputy Di- Graduated from the Moscow State Institute rector of Studies EXPORT EU-ASEAN-NAFTA Pro- of International Relations (MGIMO) and fessor and Chairperson International Law and Global postgraduate studies at the Institute for US Political Studies University of Applied Sciences IMC- and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Krems AUSTRIA Sciences. Holds a Ph.D. degree in History. Former MFA official and career diplomat Was Deputy Director of the Institute for US and Canadian (early ‘90) of BH, is a member of IFIMES Internation- Studies. Founder and first president of the Moscow Pub- al Institute, author of dozen presentations, speeches, seminars, re- lic Science Foundation. search colloquiums as vell a numerous public events (round tables, Taught Russian foreign policy at the University Of Miami study trips, etc). (USA), and at the Lewis & Clark College in Portland (University of California). Dan DUNGACIU Author of over 120 publications dedicated to the analysis PhD, Director - Institute of Political Science and of Soviet/Russian-American relations, global security, International Relations of the Romanian Academy and the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR and Master in Political Sciences, PhD in Sociology, Russia. with numerous training courses abroad at prestig- ious institutions in Great Britain, USA, Austria, Anton COSTESCU Greece, Italy. Researcher at the Institute of Politi- Orientalist and specialist on economic interna- cal Science and International Relations of the Ro- tional relations manian Academy. Former counselor of Moldavian President. Author Former Minister Counsellor (economic affairs) and coauthor of numerous articles, studies and books. covering for more than 30 years the Middle East and North Africa. An experienced connoisseur of the Arab world. Dorian VLĂDEANU Ist degree senior researcher within the Romanian Acade- Dieter FARWICK my. Associate university professor. Senior Vice-President World Security Net- Degree in economics and automation and computers, work Foundation Doctor of Economics, author of over 100 works in macroe- Brigadier General (ret), former advisor to conomics. He developed the first strategy on public ser- Manfred Worner, former Force Commander vices at a national level. Author, co-author and coordina- and Chief of Operations at NATO HQ and tor of the first generation of legislation made by the Romanian Gov- Director of German Federal Armed Forces Intelligence ernment for public services (2002-2004). Office. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London. He is author of six books on geopolitics and security, and of numerous oth- Hrant KOSTANYAN er articles and assessments. Dr. Hrant Kostanyan is a Researcher at CEPS ‘Europe in the World’ unit, a Senior Key Expert at the College of Emilian M. DOBRESCU Europe Natolin and an Adjunct Professor at Vesalius Professor College. His research focuses on EU institutions and Born in 1954, he is since 25 years the Scien- decision-making, primarily on the European External tific Secretary of the Romanian Academy Action Service (EEAS), the European Neighbourhood with the Department of Economy, Legislation Policy (ENP) and the EU’s relations with Eastern Neighbours and and Sociology. He is specialized in European Russia integration, general management, social economy and sociology of management. Liliana POPESCU Liliana Popescu is Associate Professor at the Iulian FOTA National School of Political Studies and Public Former Advisor on National Security of the Ro- Administration (SNSPA) Bucharest – presently manian President. Formerly deputy of the Ro- Vice-Rector. She was adviser to the minister and manian Secretary of State on defense policy Director of the Policy Planning Unit within the with the Ministry of Defense, head of defense Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998 – office with Romania’s mission at NATO and 1999). Liliana Popescu holds a Ph.D. from the WEU at NATO’s Headquarters in Brussels. In 2005 he was University of Manchester, Department of Govern- appointed Director of Romania’s National Defense College. ment (1996). He has a SNSPA’s doctor’s degree in political sciences and Publications. Books: The Construction of the European Union. graduated NATO’s Defense College in Rome and the Nation- Bucharest: Ed.C.H.Beck, 2009. Gender Politics. Bucharest: Ed. 2 al College of Defense in Romania. He is a member of the Maiko, 2004. Individual Freedom and Political Manipulation. Bu- European Center’s Council for Political analysis (CEPA) and charest: Politeia-SNSPA, 2003. Founder and Editor-in-Chief of of other numerous international foundations and institutions. the Romanian Journal of Society and Politics (since 2001). (in alphabetical order) Maksym BUGRIY Marian RIZEA Visiting Fellow at Jamestown Founda- Counter-intelligence officer on economics (Reserve Colonel), tion in Washington D.C. He has a wide is Professor, Ph.D, Eng., at the Ecological University of Bucha- experience as a researcher and analyst rest and Fellow Professor at the Oil and Gas University of with the most important think-tanks in Ploiesti, member of DIS-CRIFST of the Romanian Academy, Ukraine, the National Institute for expert in the security of classified intelligence, critical energy Strategic Studies included. infrastructure and environment protection, risk analyses and geopolitical studies. He is the author/co-author of 17 books and more than 250 arti- cles published in the national and international specialized magazines. Mihaiu MĂRGĂRIT Political-military analyst, Project Director at EURISC Foundation- The Mihnea CONSTANTINESCU European Institute for Risk, Security A fost S ef al Cabinetului Primului Ministru s i Consilier de and Communication Management Stat î n cinci guverne, S ef de Cabinet s i Consilier al minis- Refined political-military analyst, trului roma n de externe, Purta tor de cuva nt al Guvernu- author of several studies and articles published in the lui Roma niei s i Sub-Secretar de Stat pentru Informat ii specialized and civilian media concerning the mili- Publice. Doctor î n inginerie nucleara , bursa î n manage- tary, the strategic research, the national security ment la Universitatea Tennessee s i trei tipuri de cursuri strategy, the secret services and democracy, NATO la Kennedy School of Government de la Universitatea Harvard. Membru Integration, etc. fondator al Institutului Aspen - Roma nia s i al Asociat iei “Casa NATO”. A î ndeplinit diferite misiuni internat ionale la Bagdad, OSCE s i î n Georgia. Murray HUNTER Associate Professor at University Malay- Paul SĂNDULESCU sia Perlis A businessman and investor in speculative financial instru- Entrepreneur, consultant, professor ments. Master in international trade, having an extensive and researcher involved in the Asia - experience in import-export activities, trade, tourism and Pacific business for the last 30 years. He financial speculation. Passionate for investment and geo- is an editorial member to nine international academic strategic analysis. journals and member of the advisory council of “Diplomatic Insight”, “4th Media” as well as of Simion COSTEA “Addelton Academic Publishers” in New York. PhD, Senior Lecturer – Deputy Dean of “Petru Maior” State Uni- versity in Târgu Mureş Sergiu MEDAR Doctor in History, “Jean Monnet Professor” of European Inte- Presidential Advisor for National gration acknowledged by the EU, awarded with the Romanian Security at the Romanian Presi- Academy Prize for his work as historian of European Integra- dency (2006-2008), university tion. Chief Editor of “L’Europe unie” magazine (Paris), author professor, author of numerous and coauthor of numerous books, studies and articles. studies and articles on issues of national security, of the book Vasile DÂNCU “Defense Diplomacy” and coordinator of “Military Born on November 25th, 1961 he is a Romanian politi- Intelligence within the Current Security Context” cian, sociologist by proffession. Professor at the Sociology volume – 2006. He is now dealing with aspects of Faculty of the University of Bucharest and at the Faculty “Corporate Security Management” of Sociology and the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences of Babes -Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca. Founder of SINTEZA – a magazine of culture and strategic
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