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Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan

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Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan ENHANCING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN December 2016 (This page left intentionally blank) Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan December 2016 Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended. Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $234,000 in Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017. This includes $22,000 in expenses and $211,000 in labor. Generated on November 3, 2016 Ref ID: 5-C4C5E62 This report is submitted in accordance with Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 (P.L. 113-291) as amended by Sections 1213 and 1531 of the NDAA for FY 2016 (P.L. 114-92). This report includes a description of the strategy of the United States for enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan, a current and anticipated threat assessment, as well as a description and assessment of the size, structure, strategy, budget, and financing of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. This report is the fourth in a series of reports required semi- annually through calendar year 2017, and it was prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State. This report describes efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from June 1 through November 30, 2016. This report complements other reports and information about Afghanistan provided to Congress, and is not intended to be the single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its coalition partners, or Afghanistan. A classified annex accompanies this report. The next report will include an analysis of efforts to enhance security and stability in Afghanistan from December 1, 2016, to May 31, 2017. TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 1 Section 1 – Strategy and Objectives ............................................................................................... 7 1.1 U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan ................................................................................................. 7 1.2 U.S. Objectives in Afghanistan ............................................................................................. 8 1.3 U.S. Counterterrorism Mission ............................................................................................. 9 1.4 NATO-led Resolute Support Mission ................................................................................. 10 1.5 Indicators of Effectiveness .................................................................................................. 17 Section 2 – Threat Assessment ..................................................................................................... 20 2.1 Importance of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations ................................................................... 20 2.2 Current Security Conditions ................................................................................................ 21 2.3 Anticipated Security Conditions ......................................................................................... 29 Section 3 – Overview of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ............................... 31 3.1 Strategy................................................................................................................................ 31 3.2 Budget ................................................................................................................................. 32 3.3 Force Size and Structure ..................................................................................................... 33 3.4 Capabilities .......................................................................................................................... 35 3.5 Assessment .......................................................................................................................... 38 Section 4 – Ministry of Defense and Afghan National Army ...................................................... 40 4.1 Ministry of Defense ............................................................................................................. 40 4.2 Afghan National Army ........................................................................................................ 50 Section 5 – Ministry of Interior and Afghan National Police ....................................................... 70 5.1 Ministry of Interior .............................................................................................................. 70 5.2 Afghan National Police ....................................................................................................... 78 Section 6 – Financing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces ................................... 87 6.1 Holding the Afghan Ministries Accountable ...................................................................... 87 6.2 U.S. Contributions ............................................................................................................... 88 6.3 International Contributions ................................................................................................. 88 6.4 Afghan Government Contributions ..................................................................................... 89 Annex A – Indicators of Effectiveness for the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior 92 Annex B – Acronyms.................................................................................................................... 97 I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have shown promising but inconsistent progress as they near the end of their third year in the lead for security of their country and the second year maintaining full security responsibility with limited U.S. or coalition support on the battlefield. During the June 1 to November 30, 2016, reporting period, the ANDSF effectively executed their 2016 summer campaign plan, Operation Shafaq; capability gaps in key areas such as intelligence, aviation, and logistics are improving but still hinder effectiveness. The ANDSF retained control of major population areas and quickly responded to and reversed any Taliban gains. The United States currently maintains a force posture of up to 9,800 military personnel in Afghanistan.1 Based on an assessment of the security conditions and the strength of Afghan forces, President Obama announced on July 6, 2016, that the United States will draw down to approximately 8,400 military personnel by January 2017, rather than to 5,500 military personnel as he previously announced in October 2015. The force presence of 8,400 military personnel will allow United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) to continue to conduct two well- defined and complementary missions: supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda, its associates, and other terrorist groups such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)2 affiliate in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region, ISIL – Khorasan (ISIL-K); and training, advising, and assisting the ANDSF through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Resolute Support (RS) mission. The President’s July 2016 decision reaffirms the U.S. Government’s enduring commitment to the ANDSF, to the Afghan Government, and most importantly to the Afghan people. The decision also recognizes that the ANDSF will require more time and assistance to develop into an effective, sustainable, and affordable force that can protect the Afghan people and contribute to regional and international security. During this reporting period, 39 NATO Allies and partner nations and the broader international community also reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing security and stability in Afghanistan. This commitment includes continued support to the RS mission both through continued financial contributions to the ANDSF as well as to economic development announced at the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July and the Brussels Conference on Afghanistan in October 2016 respectively. THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY CONDITIONS The ANDSF continue to face a resilient insurgency and a myriad of terrorist and criminal networks; however, the Afghan Government remains in control of all major population centers and key lines of communication. The Taliban did not achieve any of the stated campaign objectives of its 2016 summer campaign, Operation Omari. Taliban territorial gains during this reporting period were fleeting, as the ANDSF consistently retook district centers and population 1 Per the reporting requirement outlined in section 1213 of the NDAA for FY 2016, this report does not contain an assessment of the risks to the mission in Afghanistan of such a drawdown, because there was no drawdown of U.S. forces during this reporting period. 2 ISIL is also known by its Arabic name “Daesh” or as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. 1 areas within days of a loss. Although security conditions vary across the provinces, the Taliban have exploited their localized and temporary successes by portraying these events as major strategic shifts through the use of social media and other public information campaigns. Consistent with historical trends, overall levels of violence increased during the traditional 2016 spring and summer fighting
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