Chapter V - the SIEGE of MALANGGAD (17S0)
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THE FIRST aNQLO-MARATHA WAR THIRD PHASE (1779-1783) Chapter V - THE SIEGE OF MALANGGAD (17S0) For geographical refergnccs. see lllus. Kps. 11. 11 A. IIB.IIC. 12. and I'i. attached at the beglnnln£ of this chapter, between d p . 15^-155. Also see seven photos attached with notes at C the end of this chapter between pp. 2oy.“2o8. a r a &z PA^AP Pin MACNI CD HAJI MAL 1=3 1=3 D SON MACH! N O . 11'R {^ ROITGH SKUTCH OF ? l ^ M R C H I ( MH Lft^^gGftI>) (N 0.11--B) REMAINS OF RETAINING W/ILL OF LOWER PORT (m ALAN G-G AD ) I I \ a *€ — ^ 1 CMal" PLAN OF BURUJ & CAJf WAV in SON MAdHl'r^lftLftNGGBJ)) 18' • Holes fo r r/A7a^/?'^oo BALE KILLA ^— -— ► MACHI (j\l‘0 , 1 1 - c ) . MAP NO. 12 PtACES RELATED TO ©SIEGE or MAUANGGAD (1780) ©SIEGE OF THE VASAI FORT(1780) ©SECOND BORqhM“ EXPED|TI0N(1781) BAHIRAVGAD MACH»NDRA(rAy t BHIMASHANKAR ^ Vpek T g h a t p a n v e l 0? PAuAspe •^ALDUNGE MAN;Ti tl. i« 'itNCH a SMILES yVnopoti I n) BoRGHAr jQ ,KW AN»AtA \ a UfNAWAt^ Ni t^HaA0£3v«SAPUR To POOH A i / I'JAP N O 13 ^ Pi.AN O f ihf aa/\p FORT.-RiyjvL positions(lyeo) (kfPRODtJCfD fljtoM ^jiiWFV Nv> FM.MOU.tr VAl)l, 1>(lUKA KALVAN) BOUNDARY Of VHLAGt NOTAl.F. CHAPTER V THE SIEQSOF MALANQGAP (17^0) The Convention of Vadgao marked the end of the second phase of the first Anglo-Maratha War, but it did not end the war itself. The dark clouds of a fresh Anglo-Maratha conflict soon arose on the political horizon of India. When the Bomba/ army was suffering humiliating defeat at Vadgao in January 1779, the Calcutta army under the command*of Colonel Goddard, despatched by Governor General Warren Hastings, was on its way to Bombay to help it* Goddard crossed Narmada on the 3rd December 177d and reached Surat via Burhanpur on^25thtb<£ February, 1779. X To his morti fication, he heard the nei^is of the disaster of Vadgao at Suratf before he could Join the Bombay army. The humiliating treaty of Vadgao gave a rude shock to Governor General Warren Hastings. However, he exhibited a statesmanlike grasp of the situation and put forth seve ral proposals before the Supreme Council to retrieve the disgrace heaped on the British arms by the i^arathas. 2 One of them was that the Snglish should conclude peace with the Marathas on the basis of the treaty of Purandar of iVlareh 1775.^ His plan was unanioiously agreed to and Colonel Goddard was appointed the accredited envoy to treat with the Peshwa’s Government. According to this plan, the Marathas were to forego the territories acquired by them through the 155 156 Convention of Vadgao and they were never to adialt any trench forces or allow the Irench traders to fora any estab lishments in Uieir territories. Hastings considered that if peace could not be obtained on these basic conditions, the English should resort to a vigorous war to efface the loss they had suffered at Vadgao. Before Goddard started negotiations with the Pune Darbar as instructed by Warren Hastings, Raghoba, who was in the custody of Mahadaji Shinde according to the terms of the treaty of Vadgao, made good his escape near Jhansi and accompanied by Bajirao, his son and .\raritrao, his adopted son, reached Surat at the beginning of June, 1779. Raghoba sought the English protection which Goddard promotly granted. This act was a serious breach of the terms of the treaties of Purandar and Vadgao on the part of the British. Soon Goddard started negotiations with the Pune Darbar. iiiii The negotiations went on tillj[28th October, 1779. Ultimately Goddard was informed by the Karbharis that tJhey would not make peace with the English unless Sashti was relir^uished ♦and the person of Haghunathrao delivered up to the Marathas.^ Thus the negotiations stood on the verge of a breaking point. vsrhile the fate of the Anglo-Mar atha peace talks thus hung in the balance, Goddard received intelligence of a ry confederacy between the Peshwa, Mudhoji Bhonsale of Nagpur, 157 th« Nizam and Haidar Ali against the British in September, 1779.^ While the Nisaun was its originator, Nana Phadnis was the brain behind it and its organiser. The comnrion feeling of enmity against the British had brought the unity of these four Indian powers, who otherwise used to quarrel with one another. The Nizam had broken himself with the British because they had usurped Guntur from Basalat Jang, one of his vassals. Haidar .^i alienated himself from the British because the latter had captured Mahe from the French who were on friendly terms with him. Mudhoji Bhonsale was indignant at the manner in which the British established their sway over the Bengal province, depriving him of his annual share of Chouth from that province. The Pune Darbar was already displeased with the British because Colonel Goddard refused to hand over Sashti and the person of Haghoba to the Marathas. The scheme laid down by the members of the quadruple alliance was this; Mudhoji Bhonsale was to invade Bengal and its dependencies, Nizam Ali the Northern Circars, Haidar Ali the Karnatak and *4ahadaji - i’ukoji were to oppose Goddard 6 in G uj^at. If properly planned and executed, this scheme would have Isolated the three British Presidencies at Bombay, Calcutta and Madras and exterpated them from the political map of India. It was a masterstroke of Nana's political strategy. Sensing the grave threat posed by the confederacy to I5d the British power in India, Goddard broke the peace parleys with the r^une Government and came to i3ombay on the 1st November, 1779. In consultation with the Bombay Council, he planned a counter offensive against the ii^arathas as a fitting reply to the plan evolved by the four native powers. According to Goddard’s plan, the British were to attack the Maratha territories in Oujrat, Malwa and Konkan simultane ously, 8 0 that the Maratha forces would be divided on three fronts and prove impotent to get the better of the British arms. Goddard knew well that Oujrat was tom with a civil war between the two brothers, Fateh Sing and Govindrao Gaikwad. He, therefore, advised the Bombay Governtnent to conclude a treaty with fateh Sing and win over his alle- tt giani through peaceful overtures. If Fateh bing refused to reconcile to the British proposcl , then force was to be applied. In that case Goddard hiraself was to lead an expe dition to Gnjrat, conquer the fertile i'laratha territories there within two months and rotorn to Bombay to help the Bombay Government in its conquest of the important port of Vasai and its adjacent territories, whose revenue would make substantial addition to the treasury of the Bombay Govern ment and relieve it of its financial difficulties which were the outcome of a continuous war with the /larathas. Besides, the expenses of the Calcutta army under Goddard could be met without any undue burden on the financial r-sources of the Bombay Governinent. 159 GkJddard furbher &ug,^,ested that the British rulers In north India should encourage the recalcitrant local chiefs to rebel against Mahadaji Shinde and harass his army stationed in his territories so that he would be compelled to leave Gujrat and go to /ialwa. This vrould further reduce the strength of the I^arathas on ^Gujrat and Konkan fronts. The plan envisaged by Nana, Haidar, Mudhoji and the Nizam did not function properly. The last two did not take any initiative in making swift attacks in their reupective territories, Haidar Ali, however, kept up his promise and attacked i^^dras with a view to harassing the British, which was also a litiiJLe behind the schedule, i'lana and Manadaji too lacked swift movements in attacking che British terri tories. They were suspicious of each other and wasted much time in correspondence regarding the military tactics to be adopted. I advantage of lethargy on the part of the Maratha officers, Goddard, by swift, rapid marches entered Gujrat and 7 captured the fort of Dabhai on the 20th:ot January 1780 and lihmedabad on the 15th Febz*uary next. Earlier, he concluded a treaty with Fateh Sing Gaikwad and won him over to the British side.^ At t^is stage iMahadaJi Shinde and i'ukoji Holkar entured Gujrat. The I'larathas avoided a direct attack on Goddard's army which was well-equipped with artillery and adopted their traditional guerilla tactics. Goddard, there fore, could not achieve a decisive victory thovigh he gained loo some minor triumphs over the i^arathas. As the rainy season was approaching near, he returned to Surat on the 8th June, 1780. ^When the British and the ^^iarathas were locked in minor engagements on the Oujrat front, the army units of the Calcutta Government captured the strong fort of Gwalher in possession of Kahadaji Shinde on the l»th August, 1760. This was a severe blow to the prestige of the ^iarathas in general and rtahadaji in particular. *'dahadaji, therefore, decided to encamp at UJJain in June 1780. Thus Ooddard's plan succeeded in removing Mahadaji from the Gujrat front. W t e r the departure of Goddard and ^ahadaji to Surat and Ujjain respectively, the focal point of the nnglo-Maratha iftar shifted from Gujrat and j'lalwa to the Konkan region, fhe Bombay Government was growing impatient because Goddard's Gujrat campaign was consuming more time than was expected.