Alternatives for Lebanon Amid the Ongoing Crisis by Racha AWADA

POLICY BRIEF Alternatives for Lebanon Amid the Ongoing Crisis By Racha AWADA Executive summary: Lebanon is facing a multi-dimensional crisis that is worsening by the day, therefore the need for a solution is crucial. Lebanon has long been suffering from the fragility of the state, limited administrative capabilities, and persistent social tensions. This analysis discusses suggested alternatives to alleviate the crisis. One of the proposed solutions comes from previous members of the political class, the second comes from a civil society group that was formed in 2016 to combat the foreseen economic crisis, and the third is a plan designated by the political class: form a government and wait for international aid. The postwar realities of countries like allocated, which allowed the political Lebanon and Iraq led to consociational elite to avoid the creation of a state power sharing, which according to and the development of a real Bassel Salloukh “incentivize[s] economy. The Lebanese power sectarian and ethnic modes of political sharing model came at the expense of mobilization and identification, proper governance, and strong and serve[s] elite political economic accountable institutions. Instead of interests, and encourage[s] enforcing state building, it has institutional dysfunction”1. In the case institutionalized sectarianism and has of Lebanon, the civil war ended by put in place a clientelist postwar ushering in an elite power sharing economic system that has helped the scheme that assigned political office elite maintain a sectarian hegemony along sectarian lines, maintaining a over the Lebanese society. This parity between Christians and economic system has been expanding Muslims. Ibrahim Halawi2 argues that the elite’s gains while impoverishing the conflict did not end, instead it was lower and middle classes. Salloukh et imported into the state and turned into al. describe the Lebanese sectarian a conflict over how resources are system as a socioeconomic and Page 1 of 7 political power where the political securitize it by portraying it as a elite employs clientelism, economic security threat and blaming it on practices and sectarian discourse to foreign interference. Additionally, maintain hegemony over their Salloukh and Halawi argue that the sectarian subjects.3 “NGO-ization”7 of civil society and The World Bank Lebanon Economic the refusal to politically organize Report (on the 1st of June 2021) was limited its effectiveness. Political titled “Lebanon sinking into one of the organization is another aspect of most severe global crises, amidst Lebanese society that the sectarian deliberate inaction”4. The report elite controls by infiltrating civil revealed that there was no turning society organizations and NGOs point on the horizon and described the “denying them their natural role as political class’ policy response to the agents of political and socioeconomic 8 challenges as “inadequate”. The change” and through decades of current crisis is rooted in an economic sectarianized political identity. infrastructure that caters for the A year and a half post uprising and political elite and harms all sectors of almost a year since the August 4 the economy. Salloukh says “we are Beirut Port explosion, and amid reaping what 30 years of postwar crushing economic, political and “zombie power sharing”5 and its health crises, no changes have been clientelist infrastructure has sown: A implemented. Lebanon now stands on state stripped of the bare minimum of the brink of collapse. In addition to its credibility, service delivery, and fundamental problems, Lebanon is institutional capabilities”6. still, inactively, facing the In October 2019, protesters mobilized repercussions of both the Beirut Port across Lebanon to demand an end to explosion and COVID-19 pandemic corruption and the sectarian power- on the economy and on the health sharing order. They stressed the need sector. The international community for reforms and structural changes. promised to help Lebanon financially Protesters expressed their discontent at if a number of reforms were years of politicization of sectarian implemented, yet so far none of the identity, and their desire for a civil conditions have been met. state. The protests came as a result of In order for Lebanon to end this increased popular dissent that brought stalemate a series of fundamental and together anti-sectarian movements. structural changes must be However, the uprising did not lead to implemented to address all dimensions any radical change in governance, of the crisis. There are three instead, the political elite managed to suggested ways to accomplish those: Page 2 of 7 engage in early parliamentary Lebanese realized that their elections (as suggested by ex-members politicization and lack of participation of parliament); a transitional in elections helped the political elite to government with exceptional further entrench itself. They are also legislative powers (as suggested by the counting on a wider participation in civil society group Citizens in a state); the next elections that would certainly and the formation of a new produce a new non-sectarian political independent government (as class. suggested by the political class). However, those who are proposing early elections do not present a Early Elections political and economic roadmap for Lebanon. Opponents of this move The first suggestion is referred to as argue that early elections are a trap “snap elections”, the purpose is to due to tailor-made electoral laws and capitalize on unusual electoral asymmetric media representation that opportunities, which in the case of favor the political elite, and that any Lebanon manifests in a change in the hope for tangible changes will not political landscape as a result of the materialize in the results.9 uprising. In the aftermath of the port explosion, the Kataeb MPs, along with Charbel Nahas, secretary general of Paula Yacoubian (independent Citizens in a State (referred to as candidate) and Marwan Hamade MMFD), expressed his skepticism (Progressive Socialist Party), resigned towards early elections as a solution, from office, hoping to create a based on the experience of the 2018 snowball effect of opposition parliamentary elections that resignations. However, no additional reproduced the same political parties. MPs followed suit. According to some However, the current momentum, after members of the opposition, no the uprising and the Beirut Port solution for Lebanon can be attained explosion, is not comparable to that of as long as the current political elite 2018, yet the opposition’s chances of holds a majority of parliamentary claiming a parliamentary majority is seats. Proponents of early elections still far from certain. argue that this would be the only way to achieve real changes in the Transitional Government financial, economic, and political sectors. They rely on an increase in Out of the October 17 protests 10 political awareness after the October emerged “conscious” political 17 uprising. They argue that the alternatives, such as Citizens in a State, which is spearheading a rescue Page 3 of 7 plan as a way out of the stalemate. In are collapsing and unsustainable. He early 2019, Nahas was among the first argues that the political class is faced to warn that Lebanon is in a pre-crisis with two options; they either phase, and that the political class will peacefully transition power, or they not be able to avoid it. He also warned will have to deal with imminent chaos. “that an uncontrolled crisis will have He claims that it is in the political devastating effects on the country”.11 class’s benefit to concede if it wants to Citizens in a State see that the only maintain some level of support among way to build an alternative system its supporters. He argues that if the away from sectarian narratives and sectarian elites were to stay in power subjectification is through controlling in the heart of the crisis, they are the state where the sectarian resource likely to risk their support base allocation takes place and through because they no longer have the means putting an end to this postwar political to fund their clientelist network. economy (Halawi & Salloukh, 2020, Some criticism of Citizens in a State’s p. 331). They rely on a peaceful plan is a strong belief that the political transition of power through a class will not give up their power to transitional government with another entity. Others ask how will exceptional legislative power holding this government be enforced on the the cabinet for a period of 18 months, deep state and the sects? Traboulsi ultimately engaging in parliamentary disagrees with Citizens in a State’s elections. The goal is to eventually claim that the legitimacy of the state build a civil state. “The plan is set out has collapsed. He believes that the in three phases, capturing reality, state is still strong internally, has not controlling the effects of bankruptcy lost control over security and and forming a cohesive society and an institutions, and has not lost its economy with defenses and balanced legitimacy because it still has 12 relations with respect to the outside”. international support.13 The old power-sharing system needs to be replaced and Citizens in a State’s The only way Citizens in a State will road map presents a viable alternative, succeed in implementing their plan is offering a complete and clear strategy in the case of a complete collapse of and mode of action. the state, then they could step in and take charge14. So far, the political elite Nahas believes that under normal is proving to be as resilient as ever. circumstances a peaceful transition of With the unlikely event of a peaceful power would have been impossible, transition of power, and the but that the political class failed, and improbability of early parliamentary that the system’s tools and methods elections leading to any real change, Page 4 of 7 the only alternative remains in the Hariri and Aoun over the designation hands of the political elite.

Load more