ISSUE 143

March 2012

Vernon Parker Oration Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review Australia’s Future Submarine Capability; An Integrated Plan for Success JP Stevenson: Justice denied - a career unfairly cut short Australia’s Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war PWO SM – A Broader Future for the‘Deep’ Specialist

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‘BlackBerry Leadership’ Pitfalls Vernon Parker Oration 4 - The Positives and the Classified military systems permit Pitfalls deliberation, consideration and control of sensitive and important information. Basing of RAN Assets Positives Unclassified instant systems open the and the Force Posture Review 14 Management processes have changed door for knee jerk reaction and one- rapidly in a few short years. 24/7 upmanship - tempting even the wisest Australia’s Future Submarine email connectivity, remote access leader to transmit instead of receive. Capability; An Integrated Plan to corporate databases and tools... Command and control becomes for Success 22 and possession of the notorious blurred, and truth against speculation BlackBerry/iPhone/gadget which is becomes difficult to assess. Security It’s Preparedness, Stupid. 27 becoming as common as car keys in a classification can become selective leaders pocket. when speed overrides sensitivity. JP Stevenson: Justice denied The pace of news, whether Senior leaders remaining in touch - a career unfairly cut short 31 corporate information or public while out of the office, and even on information management, has leave, can void any delegation to the increased to real time. Daily and 2IC, removing an important level Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: hourly updates are required to avoid of leadership grooming. If the 2IC Visionary or Heretic? 37 the ‘how come I didn’t know before knows they’re being watched, he or they did’ knowledge demand that has she is missing a key independence Royal Moroccan Navy F ront page photograph: perpetuated its way through corporate and responsibility in the necessary commissions first SIGMA 42 Royal Australian and public society. Defence is not opportunity to grow as the next leader. Navy Sea King helicopters from 817 immune from this phenomenon. Accountability never sleeps it seems. Australia’s Future Submarine Squadron making Now that momentum has started, I’m not trying to suggest that Capability – Research and their final flight before and grasped by Prime Ministers and ‘BlackBerry leadership’ devolve back Development Implications 45 Presidents down, it can’t be stopped. to the 1990s and hand-written memos, decommissioning. A Daily Orders, once gestetnered out but rather raise issues so that we can be formation of 3 Sea for noticeboards (and the purple ink prepared for potential consequences of Where to Britain? 52 Kings from the Naval stained hands), have been replaced reaching in, when sometimes the best Air Station at HMAS with emailed information directly course of action is to let the situation Records Management – the backbone Albatross, Nowra, to monitors, desktop and laptop work its way through the ‘system’. That’s of an efficient organisation 53 proceeded up the computers, phones and mounted on why we have the ‘system’. NSW coast to Sydney, webpages; even at sea. I’m no Luddite. Embrace the HRH Prince Phillip 56 flying over Sydney Face to face discussions are being gadgets and the opportunities I say, Harbour then turn replaced by video teleconferencing and and the synergies that technology south to Canberra, over Explaining the failings in US ‘email hockey’. brings. Embrace it - or get left behind. Lake Burley Griffin strategy for the Afghanistan war 58 Automated receipt messages have Ironically (or perhaps not!), this ‘letter’ and the Australian taken away the excuse of ‘I didn’t was written and submitted on a War Memorial before see that’. Signal reading logs have BlackBerry. PWO SM – A Broader Future heading east to the moved to online message distribution. for the ‘Deep’ Specialist 64 coast back to the Naval The immediacy of the news and Ashley Papp Air Station information cycle is at a hectic pace. Is Book Reviews 70 it going to increase further? Can it? Issue Number 143 Visions from the Vault 79 Printed by Everbest Printing SPONSORS: Company Style Notes for Headmark 81 - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL ISSN 1833-6531 - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - QINETIQ - ATI - SAAB Design & DTP by ANI Membership Application Form 83 Diane Bricknell - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - LOPAC - BLOHM+VOSS NAVAL [email protected]

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 Vernon Parker Oration Australian Naval Institute 4 August 2011 From Rear Admiral James Goldrick, RAN

et me start with two caveats. The should explain that when I talk of a understanding how that seaborne first is that some of the arguments ‘fleet unit’, I am not describing a task trade operates or explaining just why as Land ideas which I will propose are group or task force as such, but a range well as how it should be protected. In ‘works in progress’. The second is that of capabilities which together provide doctrinal terms, I could describe much I will speak here specifically about a coherent construct that meets our of the debate in Australia as oscillating the Navy – after all, if I cannot do so maritime strategic requirements. And, historically between a focus on denial here, where can I? – but many of my while I will talk here only about the – the cliché of ‘fortress Australia’ – and comments do have applicability to the navy, the truth is that a ‘fleet unit’ also on projection – the cliché of ‘deployed other Services and to the ADF as a encompasses air and land capabilities forces in distant lands’ – while missing whole. when they have maritime application. much of the necessary link between The story of the Australian Navy It is clear that part of the issue over these two of control, which remains is one that reflects the continuing force structure has been partly due an abiding requirement for a sea strategic challenges faced by our to a difficulty in achieving national dependent nation like ours. Just what nation as it has evolved towards acceptance of the full span of our constitutes an effective ‘fleet unit’ may full independence and a greater maritime strategic requirements, which be change as a result of changes in the understanding of its place in the world. have always included both surety of the relative priorities for denial, control T he Australian And as I consider, from the basis of local and regional environment and and projection, but in the Australian destroyer HMAS studies that I have done over the years protection of the maritime networks situation there will always need to be Brisbane (DDG 41) on our carrier acquisition program, our upon which Australia’s economy some mix of all three. and the US Navy DDG acquisition and, most recently, depends. Perhaps there should be The second aspect relates to destroyer USS John the history of our various submarine little conflict between these two, but the national commitment, human S. McCain (DDG 56) cruise side by programs1, I perceive a recurrent there has been a tendency, despite and material, required to maintain side in Australian theme. It is one of critical mass and our dependence upon seaborne trade, the desired force structure. It is an waters during a struggle to sustain a level of effort to ignore its absolutely fundamental empirical observation, but I believe Operation Exercise which will be truly effective in relation importance – and the navy has not that we sit in Australia at a point Tandem Thrust 2001 to the resources that we devote to it. always been good at either fully at which the relationship between (Courtesy RAN) There are two aspects to this problem. The first is that of force structure – what I term the ‘fleet unit’ question, whereby Australia has repeatedly sought to create a force capable of meeting our strategic demands, but has often found it more expensive and difficult to sustain than the nation was willing to accept. I

1 See the author’s ‘Carriers for the Commonwealth’ in T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones (Eds) Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991; J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones Struggling for a Solution: The RAN and the Acquisition of a Surface to Air Missile Capability RAN Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 2, January 2000; James Goldrick ‘From Submersibles to SWUP: The First Seventy Five Years of Submarines in Australian Defence and Naval Policy’ 2011 Creswell Oration. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 5

the investment required to sustain our desired force structure and the actual combat capability realised is at its most unfavourable. I emphasise here that I am not talking just about the resources required to maintain ships and systems in service but those needed to experiment, to innovate, to develop doctrine and to push both technological and operational boundaries. These are the really difficult things, these are the things which involve risk and, quite frequently, failure. Indeed, the problem of critical mass relates not just to sustained funding – although that remains critical - but to the difficulty, given the complexity of our defence requirements, of generating sufficient intellectual capital to have a navy which is completely self reliant. In CAPT Dechaineux, other words, while we need multiple Government had no money and would capital ship for the Royal Navy. RADM Collins, CMDR capabilities in our order of battle, it is not until greater control of tax revenues But a ‘one off’, however generous, Rayment on bridge very hard to manage the conundrum passed to the Commonwealth after was not the same thing as an Australian HMAS Australia 1944 of generating them effectively from ten years. Nevertheless, many issues navy and others prevailed who had a national base that is too small to be were identified in what was a complex a more sophisticated understanding ideal. problem. The record of small navies of the threats to its shared sea In 2011 this remains a fundamental was not good, while many in Britain dependent interests that the British challenge and, as I go on to discuss viewed with dismay the prospect of empire faced. The Fleet Unit concept the last century, I’d ask you to bear local services which they felt would which was announced by the famous this in mind, because I believe many contribute little to the British Empire’s ‘Jacky’ Fisher, at the Imperial Defence of the difficulties in our history have global security. Others, however, Conference of 1909 provided a derived at least partly from a simplistic were coming to understand that the remarkable solution because it understanding of just what is required only way to get the new dominions to satisfied both nationalist sentiment not only to maintain a navy but to contribute significantly was to allow and – at least partly – the concerns develop it and that this naiveté has them ownership of their own forces. of Whitehall. The heavily armed, fast stemmed at least in part from our early On the locals’ part, the more that a and long ranged battle cruiser (and experiences. If I have a bumper sticker navy was thought about, the more its long range was a key factor) and for the RAN – perhaps for the ADF as formidable the commitment seemed the supporting force of light cruisers, whole - it would be ‘self awareness, not to be. Australians wanted to control destroyers and submarines was capable self reliance’ and I do not think that their own naval destiny, but they were of both offensive and defensive action our journey to full self awareness is yet becoming increasingly aware that they for denial, control and projection in the complete. would have a hard time achieving that ways that our situation demanded. It is destiny without help. Conversely, with no exaggeration to say that the battle The First Fleet Unit the naval arms race with Germany in cruiser Australia was the most effective full swing, there was also a desire by single strategic investment ever made The first years of Federation were many Australians to support Great by this country – paying its dividend marked by debate over the form of a Britain. It was in this spirit that, during within eleven months of entering national defence effort. In part this the naval crisis of 1908, Australia Sydney Harbour. remained theoretical because the new offered to cover the cost of a new Though its execution proved very Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 Vernon Parker Oration, Australian Naval Institute – 4 August 2011

different for countries such as Canada, the Fleet Unit concept provided the model for a successful creation of naval services that has continued almost to this day. I have elsewhere termed the process of creation as being one of cloning. However, refining the analogy, I now think it more accurate to describe it as ‘genetic modification’, because even from the outset none of the new Services was anything like identical to the Royal Navy and each steadily developed in its own way. The GM process had significant consequences. I have termed one the ‘fleet, not a navy’ syndrome in that the provision of external support by Britain, even if when was paid for, meant that the smaller nations did not have to invest to the degree which would have been otherwise required by the electorate or by industry. In cost of Australian workers (who did Significant capital for the level of combat capability that particular, Australia had little or no generally produce very high quality ships within the RAN; they sought.2 More to the point, they exposure to just how difficult it is to work), many governments funded David Martin being did not need to think about or set up to identify the right technologies and naval shipbuilding at levels so low “rowed ashore” from the aircraft carrier deal with these matters as much as they get them into service. The British did that they caused building schedules to Melbourne at the end ought. In other words, the Dominions the job and carried the risks and all become unduly protracted and their of his command (Tom acquired fleets, but they did not for Australia had to do was acquire and products even more expensive than Lewis Collection) many years operate complete navies. adapt in very limited ways to meet our they should have been. This was true Undoubtedly, in 1913 and for many needs. for the cruiser HMAS Adelaide, known years afterwards, it was an excellent There was also the question of as HMAS ‘Long Delayed’ in the early bargain because a formidable capability resources. A sustained in-country 1920s and true for the destroyer and was acquired without the need to shipbuilding effort was just possible, frigate programs in the 1950s. Here we invest in the full range of overheads. but only if money was consistently can see a direct relationship between It would also remain a much more committed. Unfortunately, although the size of the fleet unit that the nation efficient force than otherwise possible matters got off to a reasonable, albeit was willing to support and the ability because of the continuing ability to expensive start in 1911, post-war for that unit to be generated efficiently benefit from all the Royal Navy could economies would soon slow and and at reasonable cost within Australia. provide in the way of expertise and the then halt new warship construction, There were other, more subtle latest technology. initiating a series of stops and starts problems. The new Service was However, although substantial that punctuated the remainder of the sometimes viewed by outsiders efforts were made to create an century. It would always be a dilemma as uncritically reflecting British indigenous naval shipbuilding and for governments to make the choice views when in fact its people were repair industry, the way in which the between expensive and protracted local demonstrating a naval outlook, new Service was grown also meant that construction, with the significant set- particularly an outlook that appreciated many of the inherent risks were not up costs involved but with real benefits that national security was more fully understood by the government, for national development or purchasing than the simple defence of national off others’ building lines and enjoying territory. This should not have been 2 James Goldrick ‘A fleet not a navy: some the economies of scale and reduced surprising, particularly as some in the thoughts on the themes’ David Stevens & John Reeve (Eds) Southern Trident: Strategy, risks. RAN failed to make the distinction history and the rise of Australian naval However, notwithstanding the high between the United Kingdom and the power Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001, p. 292. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 7

navy themselves and were occasionally ‘captured’ by the ethos of Britain to a degree that made it difficult for them to operate comfortably in the Australian 1 national environment , but it also tended to make it very hard for them to argue a naval case amongst national defence policy makers. The focus on professional training rather than education inherent in the Royal Navy’s culture also did not help, in that the understanding of the roles of the Navy was essentially emotional rather than rational. ‘There is nothing the Navy cannot do’ was deeply ingrained but why it should do it was 2 rarely analysed . I believe that this was one of the key factors in a too-slow growth of critical consciousness on naval matters within the RAN itself and indirectly within the nation as whole. Other navies, however, particularly the RN, never saw Australian personnel or ships as anything other than proud and distinctive representatives of their nation. ‘Three cheers for Wallaby Land’ was the cry from a member of the crew of the Australia at her commissioning in Portsmouth in 1913 and when the Australian destroyers passed through college were viewed with respect by the matters rather earlier than do much Significant capital 4 7 the Dardanelles in 1918 after the British from the very first – a respect larger services. The question would ships within the RAN; Armistice with Turkey, the Australian sustained by their performance in the be the extent to which the RAN might HMAS Australia after national flag was prominent at their years that followed in their professional have to accept – or at least risk – a a kamikaze strike 5 mastheads. courses and at sea. reduction in individual seagoing and As an aside, I am convinced that But the system of officer war fighting skills to achieve such for many years the RAN’s professional development caused other difficulties. earlier diversification and how to draw standards were maintained at the levels Given the internecine disputes the right balance. they were substantially because of the amongst senior officers that occurred It would be also a question of expertise gained through being able to in both the Australian Army and the how much was enough in terms of operate in much more complex and RAAF in the 1930s and 1940s, the shore and staff infrastructure because sophisticated environments than was RAN’s avoidance of them at this time a smaller navy faces much greater ever possible around Australia. All this must have some connection with its relative challenges in generating opened the professional and personal ability to judge and promote to external sufficient experts than a larger one. The 6 horizons of those concerned and also standards. However, the career USN, for example, may be 25 times created a competitive attitude amongst profile of the RN became increasingly the size of the RAN, but it does not the members of the new services, who difficult to impose upon the RAN as have 25 times the number of different were determined to prove that they officers became more senior. The fact problems. Australian slowness in the were as good as – and better than the was and is that smaller navies require creation of national staff capability also 3 British. The young officers who were diversification of the professional skill did not help – in 1932, admittedly at the products of our national naval base into policy and administrative a low point, the Australian CNS had Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 Vernon Parker Oration, Australian Naval Institute – 4 August 2011

a grand total of 10 naval personnel government had other concerns and Great Depression, its very existence working for him on the naval staff welcomed the treaties that placed threatened and much of its offensive itself – to cover plans, operations, limits on naval strength despite the fact capability, notably its submarine force, engineering, communications and that those treaties, counting Australia’s abandoned. By 1932, only a handful of ordnance. Independent and creative navy as an integral element of Britain’s surface ships survived in commission. thought is fairly difficult in such for arms limitation purposes, did The absence of the submarines – and circumstances. not properly recognise Australian no less than six had been intended to Nevertheless, the operations independence. The agreements sealed supplement a British force in East Asia of what I term the ‘first Fleet Unit’ the Australia’s fate and she was scuttled that later peaked at sixteen operational triumphantly proved the worth of off Sydney Heads in 1924. boats - left the RAN with no serious the RAN. Von Spee did not bring his capability to contribute to the defensive cruisers anywhere near Australia – T he Second Fleet Unit campaign against a Japanese offensive achievement of denial. The German which the British planned to buy possessions in the South West Pacific A very different second fleet unit the necessary time to get their main were rapidly brought under control in concept was embarked upon in 1923, fleet out from European waters. The Australia’s first joint and multinational with a combination of heavy cruisers absence of the submarines meant that operations – achievement of and a submarine flotilla. This scheme the Navy was shorn of the offensive projection. The troop convoys were came as part of the Admiralty planning capability which would give it strategic safely escorted to the Middle East, with for the expansion of the naval forces weight. We paid a heavy price for this the destruction of the cruiser Emden in the Far East against the threat of in the Second World War because, by the Sydney in November 1914 Japan, an expansion in which it was even having focused on surface forces, confirming both the efficiency of the expected that the Australian navy the RAN never possessed the necessary new Navy in the sea control function would have a significant role. However, range of units to operate independently and the value of investing in ‘high end’ events combined to end the submarine in the Second World War for offensive capability – the Emden’s guns were project within a few years. One would operations – in the South West Pacific no match for Sydney’s much heavier be a lack of money, but there was our cruisers and destroyers had 6 inchers. Australia had cause to another factor at play – the RAN’s first always to be supplemented by at least celebrate its navy. experience of prototypes. The new equal numbers of US ships to create Yet, November 1914 marked the submarines Oxley and Otway were a sufficiently capable task force and, end of the RAN’s primacy in the public two of the first three of the new patrol lacking large scale organic air, even that eye. The submarine AE 2 successfully submarines which were effectively the force could only operate in essentially penetrated the Dardanelles, but its first British post-war design. They were supporting roles. In short, we did not sortie was only a counterpoint to not ready for operational service and have at this time a coherent ‘fleet unit’. the landings at Gallipoli. Australian their delivery voyage a debacle. The Nevertheless, rearmament and ships played a significant role in many resultant controversy soured the image expansion, albeit too late and too theatres until 1918 but they did so as of the capability. It is difficult to avoid limited, did result in a relatively minor elements of a global naval effort the impression that the British had modern force in 1939, as well as that had little or no glamour attached been so eager to take advantage of the the renewal of a substantial local to it and whose work went largely Australian commitment to a renewed shipbuilding program and the RAN unremarked, except when it appeared naval effort that they (and the RAN) was by far the most combat ready of to have failed. had not stopped to think through the the Services at that time. It went to war The RAN enjoyed a brief problems of operating brand new, on the first day of conflict and stayed renaissance in the immediate aftermath highly complex systems half a world there until the last. The grievous losses of the war, but there was trouble away from their builder. It was not it suffered are too often listed only ahead. By the early 1920s, the first until more than two years later that the in ships – but it was the people who fleet unit had become unsustainable. RN itself deployed the class to the Far counted and those losses were not only Technological development had East and then it was done in company terrible in their own right, but created rendered obsolete its core asset – the with a brand new, built for the purpose continuing gaps in the RAN’s trained Australia - and, in any case, there was depot ship. strength and talent for many years insufficient money. The Australian The RAN was hard hit by the ahead. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 9

The Navy played its part globally, the breathtaking effectiveness of the protecting both local waters and trade American naval advance across the and helping hold the line against Pacific also provided demonstration of Germany and Italy until late 1941 when the benefits of the combination of sea its units were recalled to deal with the with air power. The war also saw the crisis in South East Asia. The successes development of a much more effective of the early months of the war, notably local shipbuilding, repair and naval the triumph of the Sydney over the weapons industry. Forced into such Italian Bartolomeo Colleoni were national effort by the inability of Britain followed by a series of heavy blows. to provide the support which the Sydney’s disappearance was succeeded RAN had hitherto enjoyed, Australia by the Japanese onslaught which saw began to come of age. Most notable in rapid succession the destruction of were two initiatives. The first was that, the Perth, Yarra and Vampire and in when the Admiralty were slow to give later operations that of Voyager in East priority to Australian intentions to Timor and the cruiser Canberra in the build destroyers in country, the RAN Solomons. went directly to the British shipbuilders But some points may be made. In to get the plans and specifications. an era in which Joint operations are so The second was the highly successful key to our effectiveness as a Defence class of 60 Australian minesweepers Force, it should be noted that not only – the famous Bathurst class corvettes the majority of the losses listed above – which were a local effort that very had some direct connection with land clearly demonstrated that good enough operations, but so did those of the can sometimes be the successful RAN in the Mediterranean – the Perth, enemy of the best. Had we been more Napier and Nizam were all damaged ambitious in the capabilities of these evacuating troops from Crete, while ships, we would never have got them the Waterhen and the Parramatta were out in time or in sufficient numbers. both sunk supporting the besieged Australian and Allied troops in Tobruk. T he Third Fleet Unit Many more of our operations and our successes – and Australian units were The post-war plan for the RAN which Significant capital responsible for the destruction of at the Labor Government endorsed in that a planned refit for the Sydney ships within the RAN; least seven enemy submarines, as well 1947 was effectively the third Fleet never happened. These and a whole HMAS Melbourne as other many units, and the capture Unit. Centred around two light range of other problems served to limit or destruction of over 150,000 tons of fleet carriers and their embarked other areas of the RAN’s expansion. shipping – were directly related to the squadrons, the future navy was Yet the Navy staged a remarkable protection of the global trade system intended to have both a capacity for recovery. Despite the heavy losses of and cutting the enemy’s access to it. sustained independent operations personnel and the almost complete lack Control and denial again. and to be able to make a significant of recruiting for the permanent service The last months of the war provided contribution to the global effort to during the conflict, the practically a significant fillip to a Navy which protect sea communications. Once moribund fleet of 1947 was soon the had felt for some time unknown again, the concept was straitened by effective force of the early 1950s that to the public. The heroism of the limits on resources and the pressures saw the RAN not only operationally cruiser Australia’s crew under the of continuing technological change. deploy the Sydney to Korea in late 1951, kamikaze onslaught gained much Australia only briefly operated two but allowed the continual rotation of coverage at a time when Australia’s operational carriers at once – the destroyers and frigates there and an land forces were largely unemployed. Sydney and the loan carrier Vengeance increasing commitment to South East Furthermore, the combination of the – and the costs of adapting the Asia. Perhaps much of this success arrival of the British Pacific Fleet and Melbourne for jet aircraft were such was enabled by a continuing flow of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 Vernon Parker Oration, Australian Naval Institute – 4 August 2011

officers and men from the Royal Navy Indo-China but Indonesia seemed overseas commitments on land which as well as its more formal support but, at risk. After ASW helicopters were underlay much of the discussion also in an era in which immigration was a provided for the Melbourne, she was hindered proper examination of the central plank for national development, modernised to take new jet fighters continuing need for commitment this was not inappropriate. The Navy and anti-submarine aircraft. This to protection of the global maritime also began to develop its own scientific expansion and modernisation were system. research capability, which initially well timed as the mid-1960s saw the For the Navy, the eventual victim focused – and with great success – on RAN operationally engaged in both the was the aircraft carrier. In a time the anti-submarine warfare problems defence of Malaysia and in support of of continuing budgetary restraint, which were at the heart of the challenge the American –led conflict in Vietnam. the large sums involved in finding that the Soviet bloc was perceived to TheAdams class particularly proved a replacement for Melbourne were represent at sea. their worth in operations as part of the always going to be difficult to secure. There were pressures. The fixed American Seventh Fleet. A window opened by the sudden wing naval arm always suffered from I am particularly interested in availability of the British light carrier the problem of inadequate resources, this period because it was one in Invincible was soon closed in the wake not only for itself, but because it drew which we did not at first try to be a of the Falklands War of 1982, ironically away funding from other elements of parent navy for complete systems or a conflict that demonstrated both the fleet. Furthermore, the increasing ships, but rather – and with some the flexibility and reach of seaborne capabilities of precision guided success-adapted particular systems forces. The new Labor Government of weapons provided challenges the RAN to particular platforms. The British 1983 mandated the end of fixed wing had yet to meet. Matters came to a designed River class frigates, for aviation, a decision from which this crisis with the Government’s decision example, were modified to take Dutch time there would be no return. But to abandon the fixed wing capability in radars and fire control systems. The the RAN did not become moribund. 1959, but this step – traumatic as it was Ikara anti-submarine missile was The submarine force was advancing – provided a much clearer way ahead successfully developed in an Australian rapidly with new sensors, new for the Navy because, in compensation, led venture and then installed in both torpedoes and, particularly significant, the Government was willing to the River class and the DDGs where it anti-ship missiles in an Australian invest in a whole range of areas. The proved itself to be the most effective led modernisation program that Navy was able to commission its shipborne ASW weapon system in the stands as one of the most significant replenishment ship. A submarine force world. This selective approach seems to technological and industrial successes was set up, the core of a new offensive me, whether it was conscious or not, to in our naval history and perhaps the capability and the beginning of what I have been much more realistic than a ultimate expression of the selective term the ‘fourth fleet unit’. A modern wholesale effort at being a parent navy. approach that I have already described. mine countermeasure squadron The 1970s provided a whole new Maritime forces received further was acquired and brand new missile range of challenges for the RAN, support in the review by Paul Dibb destroyers ordered from the United as they did for Australia’s strategic in 1986 and the White Paper of 1987 States. outlook. The Cold War remained which followed. Both Dibb and the and, although Indonesia was no White Paper appreciated that Australia T he Fourth Fleet Unit longer the immediate concern, a was a maritime nation and, if there was weary United States was much more too much on the ‘sea air gap’ and too The Australian Navy’s first major likely to require its partners to look little on Australia’s dependence on the purchases from the US, the Charles F after themselves. There was also little global and regional maritime system, Adams class were also the forerunners enthusiasm for defence spending on there was nevertheless recognition of a turn towards America that anything like the scale of the 1960s and that an island nation requires defence reflected not only changing strategic therefore increasing pressure to reduce at sea. Spurred by an enthusiastic realities but also where the leading edge overheads. For the next decade and a Defence Minister in Kim Beazley, the of naval technological development half, debate raged as to the appropriate 1987 White Paper helped set in train now lay. Naval aviation won a form and functions of an Australian the submarine and frigate projects reprieve, helped by a deteriorating defence force. As I consider that debate, which have come to define much of strategic situation in which not only my belief is that the aversion to further the Navy’s force structure in the new Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 11

HMAS Australia

Graphic by Peter Ingman

century and which have provided an the USN. Looking back, I think that exclusive economic zones and other updated version of the ‘fourth fleet there was insufficient attention paid additions to national authority over unit’. Of the two major projects, that to the costs and, in particular, the maritime areas. This legal regime only for the eight Australian and two New demands on our expertise in trying to reflected the greater exploitation of Zealand Anzac class frigates was the be independent to the extent that we fisheries and of offshore resources more obviously successful. One hard did, largely because so many of them that marked the later decades of the fought battle, to fit the ships with a 5 had hitherto been largely invisible last century and its demands brought inch gun, was triumphantly vindicated to us – and perhaps because they about a steady increase in the RAN’s during the 2003 Gulf War when the were so difficult. The challenges of patrol and response capacity – and Anzac herself provided critical gunfire being a ‘parent navy’ inherent in the its commitment to the task. This has support to the amphibious assault on acquisition of unique ships and systems involved difficult, unremitting and the Al Faw peninsula. have received the most attention in sometimes unpleasant work but it The submarine project was more both internal and public examinations has also kept the Navy, even in an complex. It is not appropriate for me of the pitfalls and problems that we increasingly inter-agency environment, to discuss here the current state of experienced in this period, but there very firmly in the public eye in a way the class, but I do want to make some were other issues which have received that I believe has benefited the Service. observations about the project in less notice. For example, in patriating retrospect, because they bear upon so much training and reducing our T he Fifth Fleet Unit the sophistication of our national exchange programs to the extent that understanding of the task of operating we did, I am unsure that we provided Other operational deployments a navy. Two key mistakes were made adequate substitutes for the continuous mounted. While the 1980s had in what was a much more successful injection of intense professional seen the Navy focused on regional project than many recognise. The first experience that had hitherto been engagement, the first Gulf war of 1991 was that the contingency funding was maintained by these means. Similarly, was the beginning of a commitment inadequate, which meant that many of there were hidden costs, not all to the Middle East that would surge in the problems inevitable in any complex well understood, in the necessary the wake of 911 and into the second prototype were not fixed as they arose, redistribution of our ships to bases in Gulf War and which would continue but left to fester. The second, and it Western Australia and in Queensland to this day, albeit with much of our is associated with the first, is that the and the Northern Territory in effort now transferred to anti-piracy issues of risk and complexity in a brand transport, training and people, as well operations in the Indian Ocean. There new design were never really explained as the sheer difficulty of assembling have been other commitments, such properly to the electorate, so that sufficient numbers of units in one spot as the interventions in East Timor and when problems arose the nation was to create a realistic maritime training the Solomons which have emphasised ill-prepared to understand or accept environment. effective Joint operations. them. There was an additional theme in Given all these demands, it is There were other problems the ‘fourth fleet unit’ and this was the not surprising that the ‘Force 2030’ as the RAN took on many other need to protect the maritime domain. construct should have been devised, responsibilities in terms of The 1982 United Nations Convention or that it includes such a wide range sustainment, training and doctrine on the Law of the Sea saw the extension of capabilities. Recognition of the that had been left largely to the RN or of territorial seas and the creation of continuing need for an ability to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 Vernon Parker Oration, Australian Naval Institute – 4 August 2011

project power around the region has of them as never before. Nevertheless, come in the acquisition of the big I believe that the key problem of the new amphibious ships Canberra and mismatch between the expertise that Adelaide and the newly purchased we can generate and sustain ourselves Choules. And recognition of the need and the wide range of capabilities for an effective control capability has that we need to operate means, as come in the project for the new Air part of that self awareness, we need Warfare Destroyers. The White Paper to consider how we can go about of 2009 has provided a final element – squaring the circle. I will therefore for the moment – of the newest ‘fifth close by suggesting that at least part of fleet unit’ concept for the RAN with the solution may be a revival of some plans for a much expanded submarine of the shared approaches by which the force which will provide the core of the original fleet unit concept prospered. denial element and contribute in other For there are many like-minded navies, R ear Admiral James Goldrick AM, CSC, ways. culturally and organizationally similar RAN joined the RAN in 1974. He has to ours, who are faced with similar Conclusion problems – the Canadians and Dutch commanded warships in peace and and, to an increasing degree, the fast war; lectured in naval history and In 2011 the Australian Navy can look reducing British – and this is just a contemporary naval affairs at many back with some pride on 110 years start. Given that it is the intellectual institutions; published several books, of life as a national organisation and aspect of capability management and served in a variety of command a century of existence as a modern which presents us all with such fighting force. It has had its share of challenges, could it not be possible positions ashore. failures, but they have been outweighed to go even further than our current by its successes. If there has been a cooperative efforts and formally divide recurring element to many of the up responsibilities for experimentation, problems it has experienced, it has to doctrine development and training (Endnotes) be said that many of the challenges between the various services, with a 1 See a Canadian analysis of this question that it faces are endemic to a Service lead navy as a centre of excellence for a by Robert Glover ‘The RCN: Royal Colonial or Royal Canadian Navy’ Michael L. Hadley, which has such wide responsibilities particular area of warfare? t Rob Huebert & Fred W. Crickard (Eds) A – perhaps the greatest relative to any Nation’s Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity McGill-Queen’s University Press, navy – in a vast, maritime-dependent Montreal and Kingston, 1996, pp. 71-90. nation with a small population and 2 See Glover’s argument in Ibid. pp. 71-90. relatively limited resources. And, as it 3 Captain W.S. Chalmers ‘Australia and has moved from being a unique but her Navy Today’ The Naval Review Vol. XX, No.1, February 1932, pp. 35-46, see p.44. closely bound element of the global 4 See the Second Sea Lord’s 1922 comment organisation led by the Royal Navy that ‘The Australian young officers compare into a fully national service which still very favourably with ours in the Sub- contributes to the security of the global Lieutenants examinations and are generally more self reliant and wide awake.’ 2SL maritime system, it is fair to say that the Minute of 21 April 1922. Nicholas Tracy journey has not been from dependency (Ed) The Collective Naval Defence of the Empire 1900-1940,Ashgate for the Navy to self reliance, but from unconscious Records Society, London, 1997. p. 312. operation to self awareness. 5 See James Goldrick ‘The naval The challenge for the Navy in the professional: Admiral Sir Francis Hyde KCB, CVO, CBE, RAN’ The Navy and the Nation years ahead will come in meeting all the Op. Cit. p. 336. needs of the new capabilities in terms 6 See Richard O. Mayne Betrayed: Scandal, of people and infrastructure and I think Politics and Canadian Naval Leadership University of British Columbia Press, that the nature of those challenges will Vancouver, 2006. be very familiar to any student of the 7 Michael L. Hadley & Roger Sarty Tin- RAN’s history. We are certainly aware Pots and Pirate Ships, Op. Cit., pp. 296-297. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

14 Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review By Lieutenant Commander Grant White

verwhelmingly, Australia’s posture provide security for the new of the Navy ‘to fight and win in the strategic interests are lying in oil, gas and iron ore developments? maritime environment’. Oand around our northern waters. In particular, are there sufficient The Defence Minister announced Australia is set to develop the second security measures in place to counter on 22 June 2011 the Force Posture largest reserve of LNG in the world threats or developing threats against Review in response to rising visions in northwest Australia, and currently infrastructure along our coastline in that the ADF and more particular has $273.5 billion in new resource our northern areas? the Navy needs to be appropriately commodity projects identified for State and non-state organisations distributed to meet Australia’s strategic development1, with the majority of new know that to affect the economic interests. The vastness of Australia’s projects taking place within Australia’s stability of any nation, an attack on northern areas and the unique northern areas. Capital expenditure infrastructure is a good prospect. Not operating environment makes this a for 2011 alone for new resource only would such an attack make an difficult task. The Defence Minister, commodity projects is forecasted to enormous public proclamation of the the Hon. Stephen Smith, stated that be $33.6 billion.2 What is startling is effectiveness of the aggressor and to ‘the need for a Force Posture Review is that over the next ten years, Defence the impotence of the defence, it also driven by our strategic circumstances’ is set to acquire significant capital affects national psyche and the nation’s and that ‘Australia’s strategic interests equipment, mostly in the form of bottom line. In short, damaging are overwhelmingly positioned to our U SS Shoup sails into the Port of Albany to AWDs, LHDs, new frigates and a new infrastructure can negatively affect a north, north west and north east’.3 This come alongside with submarine fleet costing almost the country in many ways. Our ability to provided the catalyst for the strategic HMA Ships Darwin same amount spent in developing and defend and respond against an attack review of the geographic positioning of and Sirius for the exporting our resources over the next on infrastructure, investments and ADF assets. Great White Fleet decade. trade contributing seven percent of our Whilst aligning the force posture 100th Anniversary (RAN photo) How does our current Defence GDP will be paramount to the mission of the ADF to meet our strategic aims

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 15

and demands, Australia’s north offers interests within the Indian Ocean. Her little in terms of existing infrastructure, bilateral arrangements and ties with transport and industrial complex. near states within the region will be an Maintenance and logistical support for important lever for India in the years ADF platforms is problematic without ahead. Its expanding naval capabilities access to such complexes. In such an see India being positioned as a ‘net environment, consideration also needs provider of security in the Indian to be given to supporting Defence Ocean and beyond’.6 families and their ability to cope in less Australia’s commodities trade populated areas. Ultimately, a fly-in remains pivotal to the regional fly-out routine similar to businesses boom and is intricately linked to the operating in Australia’s northern areas developing strategic situation in the will perhaps provide the most cost and Indian Ocean. The LNG and iron ore socially effective posting cycle. trade with China alone accounted for This paper will have a maritime nearly $40 billion in trade for 20117 focus and explore current basing and will remain important markets in arrangements and how they may be providing resources and energy for the better positioned to meet a developing region well into this century and into threat to Australia’s north. The options the next. The significant investment in of mobile and forward basing of infrastructure and development of the naval platforms will be considered resources trade in Australia’s northern in this paper and a look at existing areas is a key enabler for the region’s arrangements with Australia’s Port economic expansion. The possibility Authorities in utilising shore side of an attack on this infrastructure infrastructure. from regional powers or even a more daunting prospect of a terrorist attack F igure 1: Australian The Changing Regional Strategic is hopefully unthinkable, but perhaps a to remain a vital corridor for Australia Environment and Australia’s Iron Ore Exports by possibility in the event of hostilities or if and regional states to pursue in Destination and LNG Involvement the opportunity presents8. If a regional defusing situations and potential Export Capacity (source: The rise and re-role of the PLA-N from power declares hostilities, Australia conflict points. Discussions between http://www.rba. brown water interests to blue water would have to seek alternative markets Naval Officers who understand how gov.au/publications/ bulletin/2011/mar/1. operations and increasing Chinese and established protection mechanisms these incidents may lead to conflict are html) interests in securing energy transport for infrastructure that is considered also important within the context of routes has arguably led to a shifting important to continue trading. such apparatus as ‘Rules of the Road’ focus from the Pacific to the Indian There are a number of known on the high seas10. Ocean. China is capitalising upon catalysts for potential conflict within In summing up Australia’s strategic the forward basing concept through the region and as wealth becomes more position, Australia no longer holds close ties with Pakistan, Bangladesh, readily available to regional countries, a technological edge as one of its Myanmar, Sri Lanka and African investment into sophisticated maritime force enablers within the region states to secure port infrastructure and defence and attack capabilities will and faces a region that is growing logistical arrangements for its ships.4 continue as will the potential for in naval capabilities and reach. As China continues to forge closer conflict. As China continues to Australia is situated within a region ties along its trade routes, the US is demonstrate willingness to contest that is witnessing the development also ‘intensifying its activities across its growing interests, particularly of two potential superpowers on its the region with nations including within the first island chain, more doorstep. Both India and China, but Japan, South Korea, Thailand, The incidents that potentially provide the particularly China, have shown intent Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and provoking catalyst for conflict such as on expanding its influences within Cambodia’.5 the USNS Impeccable incident in 2009 the region by accessing new resources India remains watchful over the will continue to occur9. Diplomatic and trade and orchestrating a complex development of Chinese strategic agreements and regimes will continue web of bilateral arrangements within Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

the region, as well as developing a develop in Australia’s significant military capability. north against existing infrastructure and the Current Shore Base and Platform responses needed and Response Arrangements time to deploy is also The Navy has four major bases that a key consideration would support ships and submarines within the Force Posture deployed in Australia’s northern Review. It takes days for approaches. These are Fleet Base West a submarine to deploy on (FBW) – HMAS Stirling covering the operations within Australia’s Indian Ocean areas and approaches, northern approaches. The Fleet Base East (FBE) – HMAS opportunity to conduct Kuttabul covering the Pacific Ocean such missions would lie and its approaches, HMAS Cairns around the choke points and HMAS Coonawarra which both within the archipelagic support the majority of small craft approaches. It takes days and vessels employed for surveillance or perhaps longer for a patrols, fisheries and immigration Task Group to prepare taskings, hydrographical work, and deploy on operations amphibious taskings and a multitude from existing Fleet Bases. of constabulary work that is conducted Frigates can be dispatched in co-ordination with Headquarters at short notice, but their Northern Command (HQNORCOM) extended time within F igure 2: First and based in Darwin. the Area of Operations (AO) would crew. Up until the decommissioning Second Island Chains Re-development proposals for require sustainment. A sophisticated of HMAS Stalwart in 1990, the RAN (source: http:// HMAS Coonawarra have explored surveillance network already exists held a dedicated mobile basing and media.economist. the possibility of permanent limited within Australia’s northern areas and maintenance platform. She was com/images/ shore facilities for the new AWDs and supporting platforms engaged with commissioned in 1964 to ‘greatly na/2009w17/ CAS940.gif the use of port infrastructure at the providing support to vessels operating increase the Navy’s self-sufficiency East Arm port facility in Darwin to within this surveillance and response and its scope for afloat support [and] embark equipment and troops for the network potentially explores a cost enable warships to operate for long LHDs. Redevelopment plans at FBW and operationally effective solution periods away from their homeports11. aim to facilitate the arrival of the LHDs to extended operations; even to Dedicated AO and AOR platforms and AWDs by providing long term dispatched frigates and submarines. provided this capability, but the logistical support. In conflict, this extends to providing capability for maintenance and support To support high end warfighting sustained logistical and maintenance to Minor War Vessels (MWVs) and on sustained operations, access support in defence of key infrastructure frigates was lost. to logistical support including such as offshore gas platforms. Forward basing is a concept that can ammunition, fuel, victuals, technical already lean on existing arrangements support and parts, docking and New Definitions of Basing and infrastructure located within maintenance yards, personnel support – Not so old Australia’s north. The premise of and training is a complex undertaking There are two broad concepts being forward basing involves stockpiling and requires access to local industrial proposed in this paper: mobile and and is based on limited shore complex infrastructure and systems. forward basing. The concept of support, maintenance and logistical Trained personnel needed to undertake mobile basing is not new. During arrangements. the support for different class of WWII, submarine tenders provided ships the RAN operates now and into a means of submarine support on Mobile Basing the future will need to be carefully operations. Submarines were able to Existing platforms after modification structured and positioned. berth outboard, fuelled and victualled or newly acquired platforms could The speed at which a threat may and provided messing facilities for the achieve the task of mobile platform Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 17

maintenance and support. HMAS patrol missions while ensuring that the Paper recognises that ‘the size of area Sirius is one such platform that already operation remains sustainable. over which our maritime forces may holds existing capabilities that can Maintaining Sirius on station for have to operate, and the extended support sustained operations through a prolonged period is feasible within periods they may be required to Refuelling-at-Sea (RAS) or through current bunkering tank arrangements remain at sea, means that resupplying rafting up vessels outboard. Equipped and through the regular change-out of our deployed ships is an essential with side fuel hose reels and fendering personnel. Servicing and maintenance capability’13. Project SEA1654 has arrangements, Sirius has already facilities would be limited to mobile identified platforms to replace HMAS proven her capability to fuel ACPBs workshops that are able to be Success14 and coupled with the new and MHCs alongside. embarked onboard and more complex strategic lift vessel identified as a With some modifications and engineering tasks would require vessels requirement in the 2009 Defence pneumatic cylindrical submarine to return to Fleet Base. It would also White Paper, the changing strategic fendering, the prospect of berthing be worth investigating the capabilities dynamics within the Asian region a submarine outboard is a prospect that HMAS Success provides in and the interest in more focused worth exploring. Embarked or nearby matching Sirius if dedicated to operations within Australia’s northern tug or barge support to assist in rafting support submarine, ACPB and MHC region presents an opportunity to operations would be needed to assist. operations. The recently acquired impose additional capabilities to these With embarked accommodation and HMAS Choules also holds two 30 platforms to fulfil a mobile basing maintenance modules on the container tonne cranes, large deck and internal concept. If these capabilities cannot deck of Sirius, it remains feasible for spaces to facilitate maintenance and be met within existing or future AO/ onboard crew support facilities for logistical support arrangements. AOR platforms or even the LHDs, submariners. Spare parts, oils and The 2009 Defence White Paper consideration to the mobile basing lubricants and victuals could also be identified the need to acquire concept should identify a dedicated accommodated onboard Sirius. The amphibious strategic lift support platform for this capability. This concept of tendering submarines vessels to ‘provide ongoing sustainment platform would have to be large F igure 3: HMAS Sirius under a mobile basing concept will support for deployed forces’ and to enough to accommodate up to 130 (source: Department allow flexibility in surveillance and replace HMAS Success12. The White personnel in addition to the crew with of Defence)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

support and recreational facilities, provides a suitable wharf for such that facilitates mutual cooperation administration and warehouse support on Australia’s north-west. and understanding whilst ships and facilities, hold space for dedicated Located in Exmouth, Point Murat submarines utilise port facilities and workshops and maintenance facilities, provides suitable short term berthing infrastructure. Despite the good intent hold sufficient fuel capacity to support arrangements for most types of vessels of the arrangement, commercial submarines, future offshore combatant if added fendering arrangements are priorities remain overriding to ADF and MWVs on extended missions made to the wharf. The pre-positioning access to port facilities and in providing and the capability to deliver different of fendering at the nearby Harold E sustained security presence and types of fuels and lubricants, ability to Holt facility will provide the flexibility operations, access to these facilities at store various types of ammunition and of RAN vessels (including submarines) short notice, particularly to the mobile training facilities such as simulators to berth at the facility in suitable sea basing vessel will be paramount. and classrooms. It would be able to conditions. Point Murat wharf is in an For capital ships and submarines, provide a one stop shop to support exposed location to wind and tide and maintenance and technical expertise in vessels on extended operations. these needs to be carefully factored support of these platforms is expensive The capability possibilities of into planning with short programmed and difficult to sustain. Access to the basing a dedicated support vessel periods alongside. The strategic larger Fleet Bases and into nearby operating within Australia’s north positioning of fuel reserves and other industrial complexes is an important are endless, particularly within the logistical needs would make Point facet in sustaining and supporting north-west region. Support could also Murat ideal as a destination to meet capital ships and submarines. Despite extend towards other government general logistical requirements and a a long synchronisation of support, with departments by providing a platform holding site for stores and ammunition a new type of support vessel to support for regional oceanographic and weather for a dedicated mobile basing platform. mobile basing, many more options are monitoring, marine mammal and The general cargo wharf at Dampier made available. conservation management support, also provides another facility for RAN oil spill response and emergency vessels to gain access to fuel, victuals Access to Training, Exercise and co-ordination, fisheries surveillance and respite. Local airports also provide Patrol Areas in Australia’s North and response platform, Search and the flexibility to provide fresh victuals Australia already holds access to Rescue (SAR) response, offshore and facilitate personnel movements training and exercise areas ashore and platform (GOPLAT) surveillance and on the mobile basing platform and at sea. The North-West Australian monitoring, shipping monitoring on the platforms on operations. This Exercise Area (NWXA) lies off the through Vessel Tracking Services could allow routine personnel change North West Cape near Exmouth which (VTS), Automatic Identification outs and facilitate multi-crewing is situated close to the North-West System (AIS) and Long Range arrangements whilst on operations. Shelf development areas. More routine Identification Tracking (LRIT), disaster Other facilities to various levels already exercises of a shallow water nature response and co-ordination, Maritime exist within Australia’s northern areas can be conducted by Major Fleet Security Operations (MSO), casualty that can act as a logistical staging area Units (MFU) in this area instead of the evacuation and the simple measure of for mobile basing platforms include Western Australian Exercise Area off providing a continued presence in the Broome, Darwin, Gove, Thursday Perth may be a small undertaking and region that is set to expand in shipping Island and Cairns. additional cost in fuel but a large offset congestion. The concept of forward basing in providing a security presence in the is proposed to utilise existing port area. Support Facilities for the infrastructure already located within Mobile Basing Platforms and Australia’s north. This requires Defence Force Posture Review Forward Basing careful and on-going consultation In announcing the Defence Force Defence has numerous sites and relationship building with port Posture review, the Defence Minister throughout Australia’s north in support authorities and state governments announced that the catalyst for the of a deployed platforms operating to facilitate the use of existing review is the changing strategic within Australia’s northern approaches. infrastructure when and where needed environment within the Asia Pacific These ports offer basic support such as to meet ADF strategic aims. The ADF and Indian Ocean area. He referred fuel, victuals and respite. Point Murat holds an MOU with Ports Australia to the need for Australia to be in a Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 19

position to respond to a range of bases within the Asian region in Japan, into response and deployment times of F igure 4: Australia’s north-west Region contingencies including humanitarian Philippines, Guam and South Korea. existing ADF platforms and people to (source: http://www. assistance and disaster relief. He also The shift of US troops within the respond. Navy is not the only Service environment.gov.au/ referred to the need to complement the region begins a process of dispersing involved in countering such threats. coasts/mbp/north- US Global Force Posture review.15 the US military footprint.17 Sustainment of prolonged activities west/publications// Whilst the Force Posture Review In conclusion, the recent Force within Australia’s north requires a images/northwest- will affect the whole of the ADF, its Posture Review announcement and the layered approach to cover the tyranny draft-plan-figure23. jpg ) focus will lie in reviewing the ADF’s US shift in troop dispersal throughout of distance. This paper proposes the ability to respond to a developing threat the South Asian region under the US use of mobile basing as a technique in closing the air-sea gap to Australia’s Global Force Posture review both providing maintenance and logistical north or deploy at short notice to provide the ADF the opportunity to support to platforms on prolonged respond to a developing regional review managing our presence within operations within Australia’s northern threat. Coupled with the Force Posture Australia’s north and in particular areas. The ideal platform for mobile Review, the recent US announcement Australia’s north western approaches. basing would be a dedicated design of greater involvement on our shores This will enable the ADF to provide platform, but there exists within the provides a ‘pivot point’ to align with security to the burgeoning resource RAN present inventory a smaller but the US.16 trade in Australia’s north and provide proven capability to sustain platforms The US President’s recent visit to protection to infrastructure from fast on operations through the mobile Australia on 16 November and the joint developing threats such as a terrorist basing concept. The positioning of announcement with Australia’s Prime attack, sabotage or enemy strike on mobile basing allows flexibility in Minister in the eventual stationing of these facilities. The amount of capital maintenance, logistical support and 2500 US Marines commencing with invested in resource development extension of Navy’s capability into an immediate contingent of 250 troops projects in Australia’s north needs to be other areas of government activity. complements the US recognition of commensurate with a level of security The mobile basing vessel would the growing importance in the region protection. The speed at which threats require short notice access to local and possible attack on existing US can develop requires careful insight commercial port and airport facilities. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review

(Endnotes) These facilities (including existing 1 Department of Resources, Energy and Defence facilities) can provide a Tourism. ‘Resource Facts and Statistics’. forward base for the mobile basing 26 November 2011. access to maintenance facilities and 2 Ibid. logistical support. Greater liaison and 3 Department of Defence. Hon. Stephen co-operation with port authorities can Smith. Force Posture Review announcement only better these arrangements. Mutual speech, 22 June 2011. understanding and support can only 4 Wesley, M. There Goes the Neighbourhood – Australia and the Rise provide added security to port and of Asia. Sydney: University of New South offshore infrastructure whilst allowing Wales Press Ltd,. 2011. platforms to remain on station longer. 5 Franklin, M. ‘The Future Belongs to the Free’, US President Obama speech in Access to industrial complexes, Darwin, The Australian 18 November 2011. docking facilities and on-site technical 6 Bateman. S & Bergin. A. Our Western support provides the final layer of Lieutenant Commander Grant White, Front – Australia and the Indian Ocean, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. March maintenance and logistical support to RAN joined the Navy in 1996. After 2010. RAN platforms. The position of Fleet graduating from ADFA he specialised 7 Department of Foreign Affairs and Bases already facilitate these regimes. Trade. ‘China: Fact Sheet’. 26 November The opportunity to sustain longer as a Navigating Officer and served 2011. patrol, surveillance, security presence onboard Fremantle Class Patrol Boats, 8 Sheridan, G. ‘Big Guns United on Asia to improve the ability for the ADF to be FFG, FFH and HMAS Sirius. LCDR White Strategy’. The Australian 12-13 November 2011. in an advantageous position to defend served ashore as the Port Services against attacks on infrastructure in 9 Pedrozo, P. ‘Close Encounters at Sea – The USNS Impeccable Incident’. Naval War Australia’s north would be enhanced Manager – Fleet Base West before College Review. Summer 2009. Vol 62. No.3. through the support of a mobile basing joining HMAS Warramunga as the 10 Erickson. A.S, Goldstein. L.J & Li. N (Commanding Officer – HMAS Stirling) (eds). China, the United States and 21st for assistance in developing the paper. Century Sea Power – Defining a Maritime Security Partnership. Annapolis. China Maritime Studies Institute and the Naval Institute Press. 2010. 11 Department of Defence – Royal Australian Navy. HMAS Stalwart (I). 26 November 2011. 12 Department of Defence. ‘Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030’. 2009 Defence White Paper. 13 Ibid. 14 Australian Marine Technologies. ‘Project Sea 1654 Phase 3 HMAS Success Replacement – Options Survey’. Port Melbourne. 2009. 15 Department of Defence. Hon. Stephen Smith. Press Conference – Announcement of Force Posture Review. 22 June 2011. 16 Medcalf, R. ‘It’s our Change to Align with the US Pivot Point’, The Australian 15 November 2011. 17 Sheridan, G. ‘Gillard’s Great Leap Forward Buys Insurance and Increases Influence in Asia’, The Australian 19-20 November 2011.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 21

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 Australia’s Future Submarine Capability; An Integrated Plan for Success Boy C mmander Glen Miles Australia’s Future Submarine Capability – An Integrated Plan for Success

he 2009 Defence White Paper into action will have has laid a roadmap for the a significant effect on Tdevelopment of Australia’s submarine the introduction of this force. A force comprised of twelve capability, and likely submarines, slightly larger and with reduce or choices of longer endurance than our current platform. The stated Collins-class has been decided by the reason – that the government as adequate to address Collins-class issues a need to be “more potent in certain must be remedied areas, particularly in undersea before SEA1000 will warfare and anti-submarine warfare commence – is not (ASW)…strategic strike, special consistent with logic forces, intelligence, surveillance and associated with other 1 reconnaissance” . In the White Paper, government-initiated the government has attempted to tailor major projects such a force to deal with future strategic as the National threats emerging from “the beginning Broadband Network, 2 of the end of the…uni-polar moment” commenced when – that is the ascendancy of China and significant issues India to be militarily and economically still remain with competitive with the United States, the telecommunications think hard before acting against Collins-class trio running on the Global Financial Crisis, and continual across the nation. Submarines provide Australia, and so our allies recognise surface (RAN photo) instability in both our region and the a deterrent by their mere existence the Australian Submarine Force as Middle East. and give a power-projection capability a formidable partner. A successful The next 30 years are likely to bring far beyond the net explosive quantity submarine future for Australia is reliant about a greater chance of conflict in of their munitions. It is only with on an integrated submarine strategic the region than a lesser one. Ice-free submarines can we truly take the plan. summers are expected in the Arctic fight to the enemy, real or potential, An integrated plan would see all within the period covered by the and achieve total surprise. This is a shore support come under the direct White Paper. This will mean a massive capability that will serve our nation control of the Commander of the effort to tap energy resources that superbly as the world powerbase shifts. Submarine Force. For what will be were previously unrecoverable and a We have some major decisions Australia’s only strategic platform, potential shift in world trade routes to make in the immediate future, it is appropriate that this command with a resulting polarization of markets involving the largest industrial project be elevated to 2-star level. The unseen since the openings of the Suez in Australia’s history. We must do this Commander would be responsible and Panama canals. More nations right. Australia’s future submarine will for individual and collective Training, will acquire both nuclear power and be the linchpin of our strategic power Escape and Rescue, Tactical nuclear weapons, including more in and deserves a total package that Development, Logistics, Finance our own region. underpins its importance. That means and Administration, Sustainment, The Government’s 2009 formulating a plan that will ensure that Engineering, Ordnance, Futures, commitment to expand Australia’s we can crew, train, support, evolve, Operations and Personnel. This submarine numbers was far-sighted sustain and employ our submarines so would then bring all areas related to and reflective of the position that that not only does the Commonwealth submarines, some of which currently the modern submarine is a force- get a sound return for the investment, report elsewhere, consolidated multiplier. The delay in turning words but so that our potential adversaries under the direct responsibility of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 23

Submarine Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 Yr4 Yr5 Yr6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10 Yr11 1 Commander. In short, 2 the Commander of the 3 4 Submarine Force would 5 be responsible for all 6 aspects of Australia’s 7 future submarine 8 with the exception 9 of acquisition, where 10 he would be a joint 11 stakeholder with the 12 DMO. This would Maint 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 ensure the lines of Deployed 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 accountability and Unit Ready 4 5 6 5 4 4 5 6 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 responsibility were Workup 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 clear – certainly a Enhance desirable outcome. Figure 1 – Proposed Our missions for Australia’s future expectations that the performance expected to deploy as part of its cycle Operating Cycle submarines are largely defined in of the boat will be measured. Our – there would be no “haves” and “have- (does not include introduction into the White Paper and will be more or core warfighting capabilities – that is nots”. service) less the same as what they are now; sinking ships and submarines – must The operational period would ASW, ASuW, Mining, Special Forces, be complemented by the additional last approximately two years and Strategic Strike and Intelligence, defensive capability to destroy fixed- include short maintenance periods. Surveillance and Reconnaissance and rotary-wing aircraft. All of our Deep Maintenance availabilities of six (ISR). But our future submarine should future submarines must be capable of months duration would be conducted not be a ‘Jack-of-all-trades’, and with conducting sustained, multi-spectrum immediately after the two year cycle. dimensions described as only slightly ISR at any time. Year-long (and greater) refits that larger than our current Collins-class An integrated plan should also cripple our current force availability nor will this be possible. Simply put, be based on a notional operating would be consigned to history. A all submarines should have core schedule so that rates of effort for 2.5 year cycle would mean that with warfighting ability, but we should industry support are known and can be twelve submarines 2-3 would be in plan on our future submarines being priced from the beginning. The future deep maintenance at any given time, mission-configurable through the use submarine operational cycle should 2-3 would be deployed, 2-3 would of a changeable payload module. This be based on a hybrid of the current be working up and the remainder could be used to house Special Forces Australian and US submarine cycles. would be available for exercises equipment, Unmanned Aerial Systems All submarines should commence a and mission-specific preparations. (UAS) or Underwater Vehicles (UUV), cycle as is currently done, by individual This is represented at Figure 1, and a land attack missile launch module, and team training, followed by safety represents a 5.5 year Usage and Upkeep mobile mines, mine countermeasures training. Once safety training is Cycle. Whilst it may seem unusual or any number of other special fits complete then basic warfighting skills to predicate a running cycle of a including those associated with including weapons firing evaluations submarine yet to be built, it is precisely oceanographic research. should be completed. At the end of this this way that statement of requirements What we must always keep in mind period, as now, the submarine would be should be written when calling for though is that we cannot build a mini- Unit Ready. A period of fleet availability tenders. We would have an operational SSN. The requisite power to size ratio would then occur, so that the requirement of submarine availability does not increase in a linear manner submarine and other fleet units could that industry would be required to as the size of the submarine increases, train together in general warfighting present a total solution to achieve, with but in an exponential manner. We exercises. On completion of this phase, an accurate indication of the ongoing need to be very careful to be realistic the submarine would conduct ISR industry workforce requirements. about the expected capabilities of our and payload-related training before Capability enhancements evolve new submarine for it is by the public’s deploying. Every submarine would be at differing rates dependant on the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 Australia’s Future Submarine Capability; An Integrated Plan for Success technology involved. For example, diesel engine technology evolves at a far slower rate than computer technology. A Futures branch of the Australian Submarine Force should be created and charged with the investigation, development and implementation of new technologies to enhance our future submarine. The evolutionary process that already exists with our BYG-1 combat system and ADCAP torpedo is a good foundation to begin with and the concept must be expanded in scope, but limited in its rate of change. We should not be improving our submarines’ capability at such a rate that the training, support and sustainment organizations cannot and we should continue to plan on be seriously considered in addition. Collins-class ready for hull work keep up. This is evident in the US combat system upgrades during every The future submarine should be (Courtesy RAN) Submarine Force of today, where (as second release. capable of up/downlink and control of of 2009) there are 26 combinations of With regards to specific capabilities UAS and link-type operations. A full combat and sonar systems spread over and equipment, it is certainly in suite of high data rate, discreet and 70 hulls, and where it creates a training our interest to maintain close encrypted communications should burden for each individual command. interoperability with the US, and to that be available. We must not forget the A six-month enhancement availability end to continue leveraging of the vast lesson than we must be able to conduct at the end of two running cycles (five resources available to our closest ally. visual observations, conduct basic years) might be sufficient. BYG-1 and its variants and successors communications and receive electronic Our future submarines should should be a part of our submarine warning from a single mast to keep our be chosen from designs that meet or future, as should our investment in radar cross section low. A dived Low exceed our operational requirements. the ADCAP torpedo. This is not to Probability of Intercept (LPI) radar In this, it is not desirable to specify say that we should tie ourselves into capability is essential. for example that we are after a the sole-sourcing of all our submarine Our expertise in electronic warfare diesel electric submarine with air- electronics and weaponry from the US across the spectrum must not only independent propulsion. When and again, besides these two examples be maintained but increased and speaking of power and propulsion we we need to express our operational supplemented with a spectrum- should merely state that we are seeking requirements in broad terms. denial capability. The obvious need a non-nuclear submarine with a top We should continue to explore for hull-mounted sonar will persist speed of X knots to be sustained for alternatives for all our needs, and utilize into the future, as will the usefulness Y hours, a submerged endurance of A Australian products where ever they of a reliable and supported towed days at B knots, and a range of C miles can be demonstrated to be the superior array, but we should not overlook from home port. This gives industry choice, but we should not be limited the contribution that offboard sonar leeway to examine alternative forms of by this principle. Our masts should sensors such as UUVs are already technology that may not yet be widely generally be non-hull penetrating, and providing today. A mine avoidance available or even widely recognised each mast ‘silo’ should have common capability against all types of sea mines 3 such as aluminium combustion , as interfaces for hoisting mechanics and is essential. Our future submarine will well as improvements in traditional connecting power/electronics so that require discreet, long range underwater diesel-electric technology. Our current we can interchange masts to suit the voice and data communications. combat system Advanced Processor mission. A minimum of one optical Communications at depth and speed Build/Tech Insertion (APB/TI) periscope should be retained, although will be essential for operations with schedule would fit well into this plan, an Optronic/Photonic ability should surface, air and land forces. Lastly and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 25

very importantly, all our sensors and people for the sake of filling a billet. An mortgage would be taken care of weapons should be of a plug’n’play integrated plan should address these every five years. The money should nature, compatible with a common key aspects of personnel to ensure that be paid up-front in a lump sum, so control system. Australia’s future submarine will be a that achieving five years would not In 2011 we stand unable to fulfill our sound investment. warrant a pay-off to leave. Again taking potential as a submarine force because Boosting our submarine force from the experience of the US Navy, a we do not have sufficient numbers of numbers is not something that can submarine career should not mean a trained and experience people to fully occur overnight – we need to set life-sentence of ‘watch on, stop on’. We crew four submarines, let alone fill our realistic targets and do what we can must offer shore postings out of branch vital positions ashore. The problem to retain the people we have so that at intervals that allow both career is recognised and solutions are being we can train the ones we want. Whilst broadening and respite. implemented, but we are implementing the solution isn’t entirely monetary, Currently, we are hampered in these for a force of six submarines. In it must be realised that money will our efforts to recruit submariners the near future we will be required certainly talk in this case. Taking from because we can only offer potential a to have crews for twelve submarines. the experience of the US Navy where life in Western Australia. As of 2009, The easiest solution that some will nuclear engineers and operators (as according to the Australian Bureau of propose is to ensure that the twelve of 2009) receive rolling bonuses to Statistics, in 2010 the population of future submarines have complements remain for either 2, 4 or 5 years, we Australia was projected to be in the 4 that are less than the current numbers should be looking at something similar order of 22 million. Of this 22 million, onboard Collins-class submarines. to retain hard-won experience. The US only 1.6 million reside in Western It is important to recognise that the Navy is paying for people it wishes to Australia. Assuming a linear, consistent number of crew is predicated on retain, and retaining them for periods recruitment rate regardless of state, what it takes to effectively fight the that ensure their force remains viable. this means that statistically only 7% submarine during war, not conduct The RAN has not done this well. The of the RAN is likely to come from independent peacetime passages. An periods and amounts associated with WA. Therefore 93% of the RAN has increased number of mission types retention bonuses do not ensure force their main support network of family would generally indicate that there viability. Australia’s future submarine and friends elsewhere. This is strong would be an increased number of force should be able to offer sign-on, discouragement to many of those specializations/rates. We also must qualification and 5-year retention contemplating a submarine career. take into account the limitations of bonuses based on experience, with To combat this, some of Australia’s human beings – we can only process tiered levels as submariners reach 5, 10 future submarines should be East Collins-class enters so much information at a time, and we and 15 years of submarine experience. Coast based. This, of course, is not the dock. Should their have physical endurance limits. We This would ensure that it would be a only reason that submarines should successors be should not therefore automatically take very big step to take for a submariner be based on the East Coast. There maintained on the for granted that crew numbers can to leave the service, as he or she could is certainly a strategic imperative as east coast? be reduced from what they are now be sure that a large portion of their well as a substantial surface force (Courtesy RAN) without a corresponding reduction in capability and endurance. Even our highly-automated Collins-class submarines now require 60 people to run them as well as generate the force – a significant increase over the originally estimated number of 42. To ensure that we train our force effectively, positions in the submarine training world need to be filled by hand-picked, superior people. We need to incentivise training positions and cannot afford to get this wrong by filling training positions with the wrong Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 Australia’s Future Submarine Capability; An Integrated Plan for Success and Fleet Air Arm ASW capability of negative publicity which has plagued should be “availability”. This gives industry options to provide gain to be realized through regular our submarine arm in recent years. The a total solution to our needs, with a workforce package to interaction. Adding a squadron of four- future submarine needs to arrive with achieve it. Finally, the future in the region is, as always, an six submarines to an already congested a bang, and impress from the outset – uncertain one. Too many variables exist to predict if and Fleet Base east is a tall order, but only a cooperative approach will ensure when a major conflict will arise that involves our submarine there is an alternative that should be this. force but the one thing we can be sure of is that the notice considered: Newcastle. To conclude, what we have been will not be great and our submarine force needs to be ready. Newcastle is 60nm from Sydney, given by the White Paper and therefore A future submarine force that is created from an integrated therefore not so far that ships and the people of Australia is not just 12 plan will ensure that. A decision regarding our new submarines would not regularly new submarines but a chance to shape submarines needs to be made now, or we run a significant interact. It has a protected harbour, and the future of Australia’s submarine fleet risk of losing the luxury of choice regarding the type of major shipbuilding and repair facilities. for the next half century. We should platform, or having a capability gap forced upon us. t Although construction of a submarine seize this opportunity to put in place base would require substantial an Integrated Submarine Strategic Plan infrastructure investment, it would be that will redefine how we operate. T his essay has been adapted from one written in 2009 that won the inaugural Submarine Institute of Australia essay prize. far less expensive that construction of By restructuring our Submarine a similar facility in Sydney, and provide Force and consolidating our diaspora an enormous and much needed boost under one command we can influence to the Hunter region economy. It would the way ahead like never before. Under also alleviate the issues sure to be the command of a 2-star, submarines created when the new LHDs are based will assume a much higher visibility as in Sydney. Our force would be, for the Australia’s sole platform for strategic first time, divided into two squadrons. strike. As such, we must ensure that What this would give us is freedom of our plan for the future encompasses choice in both sea and shore postings, a thorough personnel recruiting and an opportunity to increase our and retention path with actions recruiting base. Should the choice of outstanding from previous reviews platform focus on a Military Off-The- being implemented, and new initiatives Shelf (MOTS) solution with a reduced such as experienced-based retention Commander Glen Miles is the current Commanding Officer of range from what is desired, ports in bonuses introduced. Perth should be Western Australia such as Exmouth augmented by Exmouth and joined by HMAS Farncomb. He has served in the Submarine Force for significantly reduce the transit to Newcastle as a home to our submarines 19 years in both Oberon and Collins-class submarines, and forward operating areas, and should be – this will increase our recruiting base, previously commanded HMAS Collins. considered as a submarine (and surface provide fleet interaction opportunities force) base not only for this reason, and eliminate at least three weeks of but due to the proximity to Australia’s wasted transit time for each submarine (Endnotes) major oil and gas development region. that currently operates off Sydney. The delivery schedule of our Our statement of requirements 1 Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, from the website www.defence.gov.au/ submarines should be such that two to industry should aim to be as non- whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf accessed 16 Jun 09, should be commissioned as every one specific regarding equipment as p13 Collins-class is paid off. This would possible when formulating the call 2 Fitzgibbon, J., Minister’s Preface, from Commonwealth of Australia, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force stagger the delivery so that emerging for tender. The operational need and 2030, from the website www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/ issues with the new submarines could capability endstate should be what we defence_white_paper_2009.pdf accessed 16 Jun 09, be rectified in the ones following, ask industry to provide. We should 3 Cawley, T., Penn State University/Defence Advanced Projects and Research Agency (DARPA - US DoD), Personal but would not halt the increase in pre-determine what the running cycle Communication 09 Feb 09 our submarine force altogether. It is will be, so that we are not left with 4 Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population – Australian States important that we avoid a repetition inordinate periods of submarines in and Territories Dec 2007, from the website http://www.abs.gov.au/ of the Defence/Industry conflict that extended maintenance. The aim should Ausstats/[email protected]/0/8ca5022b2135f162ca256cd0007bee22?OpenDo cument accessed 14 Aug 09 we have previously experienced, and be much less maintenance, not more, even more so that we avoid the depth and the catch-cry of the new boat Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 27 It’s Preparedness, Stupid. By Rear Admiral Davyd Thomas

n 1992, Bill Clinton made a statement about the fundamental Irole of the economy in a nation’s success when he said it’s the economy stupid. From my experience over the past decade, the same could be said of the link between preparedness and a successful Navy. It’s that basic because in many ways it is the linchpin of our success. It is a core task for Navy. Significantly, it gives Government confidence in the Navy, it reinforces the relevance of the Navy and highlights the professionalism of those who serve, and all that entails within and outside Navy. It is all about preparedness! The 2007 Wilson Review came about as a result of the then imminent co-location of the Joint Operations Multi-role capability Command at Bungendore. From impact our Force, let the Amphibious obligations for which we will be held - USS Bonhomme February 2007, the three Services Force lesson of 2010 and 2011 collectively accountable. The Australian Richard (Photo by were no longer to be enmeshed in the reinforce that we collectively have community rightly expects their dollars Michael Nitz) conduct of operations; they now had a responsibility to meet the balance will meet these obligations now – and a clear and distinct role to Raise, Train between readiness and sustainment, into the future. and Sustain (RTS) their services in to provide assets now and into the order to provide the forces necessary future. An out of balance readiness and Inculcating Preparedness into Navy for the conduct of operations. This was sustainment equation comes to the actually a fundamental shift, and it has fore only when the future becomes the The real issue is how to best inculcate now been in place for almost five years. present, and various sustainment issues preparedness into our Navy and how Yet this change seems not readily spill over into readiness. When our to best ensure a ready and sustained understood by many across the preparedness directive can’t be met, we force going forward. Remember this ADO. It’s not that some stakeholders fail to meet our most basic task. is about culture shift and enhancing a in Navy cling to the past era of This goes to the heart of warfighting culture. There a number of conducting operations because that’s preparedness and is why it is so ways we can address this, which when what they always did, it’s a lack of important. As a Navy, and indeed as taken together will focus our Navy on understanding by many of what a a Defence organisation, we have to the job at hand and therefore improve Service is actually meant to do, what it think in these terms and be aligned our deliverables. First, review the is to be accountable for. We now have as one organization in support of mission. Second educate. Third, focus a new mandate and a new mission! that collective endeavour. Simply put, on sustainment, and finally, get radical. This is a cultural and capability issue it’s all about preparedness, and this for Navy and it needs to be addressed sort of thinking needs to permeate Review the Mission to best ensure our warfighting culture our entire Navy, including those who is enhanced and Navy is best prepared support us. Only by being an informed Navy’s current mission is “to fight and to undertake operations in support of and focused customer measuring the win in the maritime environment”. ADF goals and objectives. right things, can we get readiness and Correctly it’s about war fighting. But If there was any doubt about Navy’s sustainment in balance across all our this mission does not support the apparent lack of understanding of inputs to capability from equipment to revised role of Navy and the advent of where readiness and sustainment people to organisation, in order to meet JOC within the ADF command chain. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 It’s Preparedness, Stupid.

Navy’s role is now about being ready to fight and win and so our mission needs to take this into account. It should read “to be ready to fight and win in the maritime environment”. This does not detract from our Navy as a warfighting entity; rather it supports it, because such a mission forces a focus on what it means to be ready. What this change does is remove any doubt that Navy still exists to conduct operations. It reinforces the fact that sustainment is an essential element of readiness, and that a balance between the two is required, in addition to a thorough understanding of what comprises each element. It makes us understand what we should be directing as a Navy, and N ew technology what we shouldn’t. ADF. For some reason Navy has been educate every stakeholder on what - Singapore RSS By way of example, Navy conducts reluctant to take it on and likewise so Preparedness actually means and what Formidable (photo international engagement. Until the has JOC. Until that is done, the C2 it comprises at its core. Doctrinally by Chris Sattler) revised C2 arrangements were in place, changes will be rhetoric and the ADF there is documentation on the subject, this was conducted internal to Navy will not be as effective as it could be. A but there is little on the practice or as part of the raise, train and sustain new mission, more focused on Navy’s what preparedness means as an end function and managed through fleet core role drives this sort of necessary to end system from a raise, train and headquarters through a standing cultural change, and much more. sustain perspective. The CN Capability deployment instruction. Things are Directive should provide at least some different now, or at least they should E ducation of that guidance, but until all inputs be. International Engagement is a are treated as part of the system we Defence task and Navy should be used There is a broad spectrum of will stay at a low knowledge baseline. All types of vessels to support it as a Phase Zero shaping knowledge of the subject of Without traction, the drive will not be provide usefulness activity. Navy should not be sending preparedness. At one end there are there to change the culture. That this - Indonesian Navy ships offshore on overseas deployments the zealots whose referent positions document is not central to our role as corvette KD Kedah without being part of a standing actually provide guidance or opinion a Navy highlights our cultural thinking (photo by Michael Nitz) Operation (in support of Phase Zero, in the absence shaping) sanctioned by the ADF’s sole of policy. At operational command headquarters - the other end, HQJOC. there are those Not for a moment am I professing who see it as Navy does not get training benefit from a bureaucratic this international activity, but it should distraction and no longer be originated, governed don’t think in and commanded inside Navy. Simply, these terms. Fleet doesn’t do operations and this From my is a spill over from pre-2007 thinking. dealings there We must walk the talk, adapt and are many more not fear the change. In addition to in the latter providing role clarity, it will also put a group, than cost on International Engagement and the former. drive more focused activity across the We need to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 29

on the subject. Regrettably it is left to a select few, yet there is a part for all. By way of example, when readiness cannot be met, or sustainment is in jeopardy, reporting it through the Preparedness Management System is often seen as an afterthought. The seemingly inordinate time taken to raise a Deficiency Report is testament to my assertion. Preparedness is an afterthought for many because we have not educated our people on it. Yet it can be taught. Stakeholders need to understand the doctrine, the preparedness requirement, the fundamental inputs to capability and where they impact readiness and sustainment, the readiness sustainment H omegrown build balance and accountability, conducting mundane long haul tasks By all means tilt to readiness but capability - newly governance, the Defence Preparedness for Operation Resolute, at the expense make that decision, within an finishedO ffshore Management (reporting) System and of sustaining core warfighting skills. organisational accountability trail. Patrol vessel HMNZ the arrangements in place to manage Tasks like this may satisfy today, but Unfortunately, finding accountability Otago photographed it within Navy, and our reporting at a cost for tomorrow’s leaders. The for sustainment is not an easy task in Australia by Kevin obligations. We cannot rely on osmosis same can be said of Navy’s failure to because organizational failure often Dunn-FLEETLINE to impart knowledge on this stuff. If we enforce compliance on respite for our takes years to manifest. Again, the are to change culture we need a plan Operation Resolute patrol boat crews Amphibious ships provide a classic and educate all stakeholders through a when this issue could ultimately impact example, where a generation of formal training force developed course, our ability to support future readiness stakeholders has contributed in so when they become senior leaders for Operations. The key message is cumulative ways to create the recent it will be a fundamental part of their that today’s sustainment becomes train smash. This outcome started with HMAS Stuart and focus and lexicon. tomorrow’s readiness. The Amphibious the government decision to purchase friend at the Doha example of 2010 and 2011 once again secondhand ships and took 15 years International F ocus on Sustainment provides us with a classic example of a to manifest. The same logic applies to Maritime Defence lack of focus on sustaining forces. For Navy People where our engineering Exhibition 2010 (photo Navy’s task of providing ready forces too long maintenance and regulatory qualification shortfalls have been a by Michael Nitz) in accordance with the covenant compliance has with CDF and CJOPS is a core been seen as an expectation. Indeed failure to meet overhead, rather it understandably gets close CDF, than an enabler, Government and media attention. and its long term The pressure this creates often results impact is clear for in the balance being tilted to meet all too see. readiness demands over sustainment. The simple Understandable, but there needs to question that be an organizational – not just Navy always needs to – understanding and acceptance be asked is how of the opportunity cost of meeting today sustainment readiness at the expense of long term issue could impact sustainment. There are many examples tomorrow’s including having major fleet units readiness. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 It’s Preparedness, Stupid.

known sustainment issue for years need to hold onto our ships until they and have now impacted readiness. The reach end of life needs to be tested. upshot of this presents a dilemma for Significantly, it would better sustain Navy. Without ships available for sea our Navy and ultimately provide there is not enough opportunity for Assured Readiness. In this scenario the training throughput so resolving the potential winners are Government, the conflict between maintenance and workforce, defence industry, Navy and training demand is required for Navy the operational commander. to assure readiness into the future. This highlights the inexorable link between T ime for Action readiness and sustainability. The solution in this case is a step Preparedness is the key to a successful change in the use of simulation, and Navy yet it has not been viewed as a R ear Admiral Davyd Thomas, RANR not relying on ships to provide all system, or holistically, nor have the served in the full time navy until late the training. This is what a focus various inputs been attacked with this 2011. Key appointments included on sustainment achieves - Assured in mind. Assured Readiness can only Commodore Flotillas, Fleet Commander Readiness. And Assured Readiness is achieved by a collective, organisational and Deputy Chief of Navy during the responsibility of all who steward focus on a sustainment framework by forces. So important is it that it should all stakeholders, not just the zealots. To periods of great change. He is now a form part of any future performance achieve this Navy needs to adjust its part of the Defence Export Unit in the appraisal. Reward readiness by all mission post the 2007 command and DMO. means but focus on and reward control changes, to reflect the notion sustainment too. of Assured Readiness. Likewise there needs to be an education program to Get Radical reinforce the subject of Preparedness to a generation of stakeholders, and to Apart from the impact on the inculcate preparedness management capability edge, ageing ships are more into Navy’s culture. We have had the expensive to maintain at the end of train smash and it’s time to make the life than at the start. This spills over change. into sustainment and readiness and In the context of preparedness, all that its detrimental impacts entail. consideration should be given to Given capability is the ADO’s goal, getting radical with the provisioning Defence and Government could take and disposal of assets, in order to a different view of the impact of force assure readiness into the future. It structure provisioning on sustainment, comes down to a cost benefit analysis. and hence readiness. Forces could be Although the 2010-11 amphibious disposed of around mid life, rather than experience has been a difficult one at end of their life. At first glance, this for Navy, it represents an opportunity may seem expensive but a cost benefit to finally address preparedness analysis may provide a different answer. holistically. Assured Readiness is If we look at shipbuilding in a complex task requiring careful Australia and see it as a priority judgment at many levels and tough industry, and if we look at disposal decisions and a step change for Navy as an opportunity (rather than an to inculcate it as core business. We afterthought) within the capability life need to think differently and link all the cycle, we could sell ships to developing inputs to our new role - preparedness. states thus improving our own We can. t sustainment, readiness and enhancing our capability edge. The notion that we Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 31 JP Stevenson: Justice denied - a career unfairly cut short Ba y D vid Farthing

Judge Advocate: “It is RAN College and thus competent for the Court, had the air whether the accused J P Stevenson joined RANC in January warning be an officer or rating, 1935 and graduated in December 1938, duties for to record a verdict of with prizes in Mathematics, Chemistry the force. honourable acquittal, and Physics. On Subs’ Courses he JPS clearly established an early reputation for impressed as but only in exceptional excellence with “firsts” in Signals, a radar officer cases and where the Gunnery, Navigation and Pilotage, as he was professional conduct or and Torpedo courses. His first ship then selected personal honour of the was HMS Shropshire and he relates with his good accused is in issue.” his first naval “adventure”. In 1940 friend “Dusty” the Admiralty issued an order that Millar (later Captain Stevenson, with cap, in winter uniform Subsequently: all Dutch merchant ships were to be Captain Robin A H Millar RAN) to ‘’This is the Court’s arrested. JPS found himself “as a very undergo the Radar Officers’ course in nervous Midshipman” climbing up the UK. He flew by B24 Liberator to finding: the first charge the side of a 5000-ton freighter, with a San Francisco, travelled by train across - Honourable Acquittal; support party of fifteen sailors, to take the US, with a two week stopover the second charge – the ship into Dakar. After two pleasant in Washington and then a “very Honourable Acquittal. weeks in Dakar, he was retrieved by uncomfortable” passage across the (Extracts from the Shropshire’s Walrus and rejoined his Atlantic in Queen Elizabeth. Court Martial of ship in Freetown. Shropshire then Captain J.P. Stevenson, took part in the hunt for the Graf Spee R adarcourse RANC Class Photo: 25 August 1969) and subsequently in the operation Flinders Year 1935 against the Bismarck. He was posted The Admiralty “boffins” declared entry: ohn Philip Stevenson comes from as Navigator of HMAS Nestor not long that the two RAN officers could not Back row L to R: D H Stevens, P Berry Smith, a naval family. His father John B. before that ship was sunk (bombs and possibly complete the course because J E R Eddy, R C Savage, R Stevenson joined the Royal Navy as a torpedo) in the Med in 1942. He then their academic qualifications were G Watkins. a Cadet in 1890. Stevenson Senior’s joined the sister ship, HMAS Napier. inadequate, but they stuck to their Front row L to R: first connection with the RAN In 1943 Lieutenant Stevenson was guns and passed the six month course J P Stevenson, E occurred when, having been lent by posted back to Shropshire, then fitting at Eastbourne - undeterred by being P Keatinge, G V Gladstone, Lt Cdr A G the Admiralty, he came to Australia out in the UK for re-commissioning directly under the flight path of V1s Skipwirth, as Commander of HMAS Encounter and transfer to the RAN as a (many) and a few V2s. After the course, A D Black, D A H Clarke, in 1911 and then had command of replacement for HMAS Canberra. On JPS was given high priority to return E H Simmonds. HMAS Cerberus, then the naval depot arrival in Australia, at Williamstown. He served in several Shropshire joined RAN cruisers during WWI and was Task Force 74 - promoted to Captain in 1916. Having comprising three transferred to the RAN, he served USN and three in Navy Office, as Australian Naval RAN cruisers and Representative in London from 1924 five USN and three to 1927, and as Second Naval Member RAN destroyers – of the Commonwealth Naval Board. for service in the He was briefly Acting Chief of Naval Solomons and with Staff. He retired as a consequence a support base in of the severe naval reductions of the Milne Bay. Shropshire depression. had the best radar Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 JP Stevenson: Justice denied - a career unfairly cut short

to Australia and ordered to fly home; On passage he first met Joanne, his Commission into initially in a Sunderland. Dusty Millar future wife, but she disembarked in the Melbourne/ received lower priority, travelled by sea, India and they did not meet again for a Voyager collision. and beat him home. further five years. Unsurprisingly, After his N/D course he joined Counsel War’s end the frigate HMS Loch Quoich as Assisting, Jack Navigator and served in the Persian Smyth QC, soon Lieutenant Stevenson finished the war Gulf and Indian Ocean. He was decided that he in HMAS Shropshire as Fleet Radar briefly CO of the minesweeper HMS knew all there was Officer and was at the surrender in Flying Fish, which was soon deployed to know about Tokyo Bay. Shortly after the surrender, elsewhere, and then joined HMS naval matters he was detached to a joint Allied force Vengeance as Direction Officer in the and Stevenson tasked with Prisoner of War recovery Med, before transferring to HMAS returned to his and restoration of Japanese essential Sydney which had returned to the UK ship. Captain J P Stevenson services. A few days later he was flown to collect RN sailors transferring to RAN to Nagasaki in a C47 aircraft. The the RAN. Co mmand of the Flagship Japanese had immobilised the airfield runways by digging trenches across Commands and promotions Captain Stevenson then had command them. After searching for some time, of HMAS Sydney, was Commodore the aircraft captain announced that On return to Australia JPS assumed Superintendent of Training at Cerberus they would have to do a belly landing. command of HMAS Barcoo, then (where the writer first met him and JPS says that “this was probably my the training ship, followed by a brief learned a great deal about leadership) least enjoyable experience of the war.” period in command of Hawkesbury. and had a tour as Naval Attaché The group then went to the coal He commented that “the River class in Washington before assuming mines where the POW’s had been most ships were good to handle”. Then command of HMAS Melbourne. harshly treated and were in the greatest followed HMAS Australia as Fleet On the 3 June 1969, Captain J need of help. They organized air drops D, Navy Office as Director of Plans, P Stevenson’s distinguished and of food and medical supplies and had Manus Island (HMAS Tarangau) “to remarkable career came to an abrupt to deal with serious unrest between sort out some irregularities”, and a very and desperately unjust end. A ircraft carrier: national groups, some of whom had enjoyable interlude in the Royal Yacht HMAS Melbourne been collaborating with their captors. as ADC to the Duke of Edinburgh for JPS also reported that there was no the Melbourne Olympic Games. (He opposition from the Japanese; they had had been promoted Commander on 30 completely accepted the Emperor’s June 1954.) order to surrender. Next he was CO of Anzac and the ship was awarded the Gloucester Shore posting, and another Cup in 1957. Marriage followed and course a very agreeable appointment to the US Naval War College. He did not Post-war found Lieutenant Stevenson finish this course as another “crash” training radar operators at HMAS posting intervened; this time as Naval Watson. Infrastructure was basic and Attaché in Bangkok. JPS reports that he they went to the Watsons’ Bay pub for achieved an “adequate” level of fluency meals. After six months at Watson, in both spoken and written Thai. After he was informed that he was to be Bangkok he was XO at Watson before transferred to the Electrical Branch. A becoming D10 (as Acting Captain; polite, but determined “no thank you” it would be confirmed 31 December resulted in JPS, accompanied by J L 1960) in Vendetta. He was detached W “Red” Merson, travelling in RMS briefly from Vendetta to act as Naval Strathaird to UK for long N/D Courses. Adviser to Counsel assisting the Royal Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 33

SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit manoeuverable than the much-larger carrier — are A few days earlier, at the end of invariably required and May 1969, HMAS Melbourne was obliged to keep out of the at anchor in Manila Bay preparing way of the carrier at such for the SEATO Exercise Sea Spirit, times.) an exercise involving convoy escort from Manila to Sattahip in Thailand. Ships in the Melbourne Task Group De parture from Manila comprised HMAS Melbourne, USS Larson, USS Keyes, USS Frank E The Task Group sailed Evans, HMS Cleopatra and HMNZS from Manila on 29 May. Blackpool. FOCAF, Rear Admiral G J B On the night of 30/31 May Crabb CBE DSC RAN, was task Force the feared collision was Commander; Captain Stevenson was narrowly avoided. USS away from the carrier. Commander Jo and Philip Stevenson Task Unit Commander. Larson was moving from the screen to Rilling, CO of Larson, reported that he at HMAS Watson on the day of his court martial In Manila, Captain Stevenson planeguard astern of Melbourne on a received a “serious chewing out from entertained the Commodore of the clear, moonlight night with a calm sea. the Commodore.” USN Destroyer Squadron and all the Visibility was excellent. Larson initially exercise Commanding Officers to turned away from Melbourne, but Tragedy dinner. In his own words: “The purpose then reversed her course and headed or the dinner was to get to know the directly towards the carrier. Captain Tragically, on the night of 2-3 June an Captains, exchange information, tell Stevenson broadcast in the clear “You almost identical situation occurred them what I was going to do, and to are on a collision course”, Larson then which did not have such a happy build confidence. I said to them all; ‘I used hard rudder and passed very close ending. Again visibility was excellent; want you to be particularly vigilant as down Melbourne’s starboard side - one witnesses said “you could see for we are going into a wartime situation, estimate gave the minimum clearance miles;” again the US destroyer Frank E Stern half of destroyer so you have to be on the ball.’ ” He also as 100 feet (30.5 metres). Evans turned towards the carrier; again with two other escorts said “Melbourne had a collision with It later transpired that Larson’s CO Melbourne broadcast in the clear “You and two helos nearby: Voyager in 1964 and we do not want was not on the bridge. Rear Admiral are on a collision course”; again the USS Frank E Evans to have another. Watch my signals Crabb sent for the USN Commodore destroyer CO was not on the bridge. after the collision with very closely before going to your new and pointed out that FOCAF Standing The differences in this situation was HMAS Melbourne; position. I do not think that either the Orders stipulated that destroyers that neither of the officers on Evans’s HMS Cleopatra and USS Larson are in RAN or its Government can stand changing station were always to turn bridge was fully qualified and there attendance another collision at sea.” He also said words to the effect “If there is to be any close manoeuvring the Captain has to be on the bridge.” (For readers unfamiliar with aircraft carrier operations, it must be pointed out that a carrier is severely restricted in its ability to manoeuvre while it is operating aircraft, for reasons of flight safety. For this reason, all escorting vessels — which necessarily are much more Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 JP Stevenson: Justice denied - a career unfairly cut short

was more time to recover the situation process that was followed. For a legal previously because, after the Larson incident, practitioner the abandonment of the that he was screen spacing had been increased basic rules of procedural fairness is suspected from two thousand to three thousand horrifying. The hectoring, overbearing of doing yards. But even that extra time did not approach of Admiral King is disturbing something or stop what happened. enough, but the passive acceptance failing to do Shortly after 0300 on the 3 June by the Australian Board members something. Melbourne and Frank E Evans collided. of the irregularities in the conduct Tony Evans was cut in two; her forward of the Investigation is sickening and Vincent, a end sank immediately and the stern incomprehensible. successful section remained afloat. 74 American The writer accepts that the RAN Sydney crew members lost their lives. (The Board members must have received barrister and details of the precise actions leading very firm riding instructions of a an officer up the collision, and its aftermath, political nature, laying stress on in the RAN have been discussed at length in the importance of the American Legal Reserve numerous other places, and will not alliance, but the absence of moral Panel, was be addressed here. The accident was fibre in all the circumstances is hard excluded from unbelievably harrowing, and included to understand. The writer cannot appearing Vice Admiral Jerome H King Jr USN. As many instances of personal heroism accept the suggestion that the alliance at the investigation on the specious Rear Admiral, King and individual tragedy. Of the latter, was so fragile that the prospect of grounds that he may have represented was President of the the worst was certainly the loss of three three Australian officers standing more than one client. The USN legal Joint USN/RAN Board brothers from one family on board up for Australian rights would have staff in Subic Bay comprised dozens of Investigation into the Evans; their father, also on board, placed the relationship in jeopardy. of lawyers; Vincent was the only the collision. He died survived.) On the contrary, their unquestioning Australian Counsel available. The in 2008 acquiescence could only have reduced Naval Board apparently thought that Joint Board of Investigation respect for the RAN. Commander H H Glass QC RANR Admiral King should never have could represent Australian interests, Following this disaster, a Joint USN/ been allowed to head the Investigation but he was Counsel assisting the Board RAN Board of Investigation was as the US destroyers were under his and had very different responsibilities. convened. The senior American operational command. The earlier, Vincent, now deceased, commented officer and President of the Board very similar incident with USS Larson, that if he had been allowed to appear, was Rear Admiral Jerome H King Jr combined with the Evans disaster, may his presence may have boosted the USN. Australian members were Rear well have pointed to systemic failures morale of Australian witnesses in the Admiral H D Stevenson CBE RAN, within the Destroyer Squadron and, “massively Americanized” atmosphere; Captain J Davidson RAN and Captain perhaps, in the wider US Navy. Admiral and may have given more backbone to Destroyer carrying K W Shands OBE RAN. This article King quite deliberately and forcefully the Australian members of the Court number 754: USS Frank E Evans will not explore the details of this prevented all evidence of that earlier (who, despite their undoubted abilities, (DD754), in 1963 Investigation. Many readers will be near-disaster from being discussed or familiar with at least the broad outline reported. and Joanne Stevenson’s excellent book, Even under the “dodgy” procedural In the wake, provides a good reference rules adopted for this Investigation, point. Captain Stevenson should have been warned early in the proceedings that Fslaw in the conduct of the he was suspected of an offence. He investigation would then have been entitled, as were American witnesses, to decline to give Almost any lay person and especially evidence and to be legally represented. any mariner, on reading a transcript The Investigation’s findings reported of the Investigation would recognise him for contributory negligence the unfairness and injustice of the without his ever having been warned Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 35

allowed Admiral King to completely actions. On completion of the O ther opinions dominate the proceedings). He may prosecution’s case the Judge Advocate, also have been able to intervene when Commander P L Sharp QC RANR, Perhaps the thoughts of Gordon the findings of contributory negligence directed the Court that, as a matter of Samuels QC, as he drove back to the (without the requisite prior warning to law, there was no case to answer. He city after the verdicts, constitute the Captain Stevenson) were announced. then explained that the Court could best summary: “I said goodbye to her return a verdict of “no case to answer” (Joanne) and to Steve and drove alone From Investigation to Court or the alternative of “Honourable back to town. I clearly remember Martial Acquittal”. After a brief retirement this curiously empty feeling, quite the Board returned with the verdicts contrary to the elation which counsel Following this procedural travesty, of “Honourable Acquittal” on both would feel after a good win. I think tailored to suit Admiral King’s purpose, charges. that the reason was that it was quite consideration was given by the RAN impossible to regard this court martial to the Court Martial of J.P. Stevenson. A new posting as a ‘contest’. As Jo Stevenson has made Despite the fact that he had given clear, it was more in the nature of a evidence that Captain Stevenson had So ended two processes, the ritual sacrifice. The sacrifice was to be done nothing wrong, Admiral Crabb, Investigation and the Court Martial, exacted whatever the result of the legal FOCAF, received orders from Canberra which were both in some respects proceedings. And it was.” to convene a Court Martial. This placed farcical. Soon after the Court Martial, Even more trenchant were the Crabb in a most difficult situation as Captain Stevenson was informed that comments of HRH The Duke of the legal advice he was receiving was he would be sent to a new posting, Edinburgh, in a letter written to adamant that there were no grounds as Chief Staff Officer to FOICEA: a Captain Stevenson many years after for a Court Martial. Gordon Samuels, position that was at the time filled by a the collision, after he had read Jo QC, J P Stevenson’s Accused’s Friend junior captain. His new posting would Stevenson’s book. (JPS had been at the Court Martial (and much later clearly be a substantial reduction in HRH’s ADC in the Royal Yacht during Governor of NSW), wrote “I do not status and responsibility, and could the Melbourne Olympics in 1956.) think that ever in my experience as not be regarded as anything other than The Duke’s letter has been seen by an advocate I have appeared in a a demotion. In the circumstances, the writer, and the following two proceeding for a defendant in which Stevenson felt that, having been cleared sentences from it are quoted as a the prosecution’s case was so totally by Court Martial of any wrong-doing, sample: “Miscarriages of justice occur bereft of any possible proof of guilt.” he had no honourable alternative other from time to time, but not since the The Court Martial was convened than to resign. middle-ages – except under a military at HMAS Watson on 20 August 1969. An editorial published at about dictatorship – has there been such Captain Stevenson faced two charges: that time in The Canberra Times said a blatant and deliberate distortion “… in his (Captain Stevenson’s) new of justice. I read the account with (1) That he failed to give a positive appointment he may well have leisure mounting despair and disbelief.” direction to USS Frank E Evans to for reflection, for he has been made correct the collision course; and Chief Staff Officer to the Flag Officer In Epilogue Charge of the Eastern Australia Area. (2) That he failed to back his engines It is a shore job, one which until now After an initial refusal, J P Stevenson when it was determined that action has been the preserve of officers at was eventually allowed to retire and his by Evans alone could not have least nine years his junior. He will not pension was restored; although only in avoided collision. be able to take, for some time at least, the rank of Captain, despite six years the courses at the Imperial Defence service as a Commodore. He had to H onourable acquittal on both College. … If an officer who was one of appeal over the Permanent Head of the charges the RAN’s most senior and respected Defence Department to have his name captains, and who was found to have included in the Emergency List. The Throughout the brief proceeding no case to answer at his court martial, “argy-bargy” surrounding this period Admiral Crabb reaffirmed his complete must be put ashore and punished, then reflects no credit on the Naval Board or support for Captain Stevenson’s that in itself is a naval disaster.” the Government. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 JP Stevenson: Justice denied - a career unfairly cut short

Commodore DD Farthing DSC RAN Transcript of the Court Martial of Captain J As anyone who knows him would P Stevenson RAN. (Rtd.) joined RANC in 1955. He became expect, J P Stevenson made a great Author’s Note: I became involved in the success of his subsequent career a pilot, receiving his wings in1963. He detail of this matter when, as a member of the Sydney Bar, I was briefed by the with AGL and then became General initially flew Gannets, then converted Australian Government Solicitor to join Manager of ELGAS. The loser in this Captain Stevenson’s defence team. An to helicopters. He commanded RAN action in negligence had been brought by whole sorry story was the RAN. The Helicopter Flight Vietnam, for which a Senior Sailor who had been serving in man’s experience, leadership and, above HMAS Melbourne at the time of the Evans service he received the DSC, as well as collision. The plaintiff asserted that he had all, ability to inspire confidence and not received proper care for traumatic stress loyalty would have been of incalculable American and Vietnamese decorations. following the collision 36 years previously. I considered the claim absurd and still do, and value in the higher ranks of the Service. He commanded HMA ships Snipe, was delighted to play a part in convincing If the injustice that he suffered was the Swan and Hobart, and retired in 1989. the plaintiff’s legal team to abandon the proceedings. Inevitably, the action brought price of the American alliance (and the Having earlier qualified inL aw, he was renewed stress on J.P.Stevenson and his writer does not accept for one moment family, which he dealt with calmly and impressively. that it was) then one can only say that called to the Bar, from which he retired the price was too high. t in 2010.

Headmark acknowledges the article’s R efERENCES: prior publication in the Naval Stevenson, Jo. In the wake. Sydney: Hale & Officers Club Newsletter No 87 of Ironmonger; 1990. 1 December 2011. Report from the combined USN/RAN Board of Investigation into the Melbourne/ Evans collision.

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 37 Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: Visionary or Heretic? Boy C mmander David Goble

At every crossroad on the road that While at the Admiralty (perhaps leads to the Future each progressive while sidelined) he developed further spirit is opposed by 1,000 men his love of history and commenced a appointed to guard the past. writing career that would end with his (Maurice Maeterlinck (1862-1949) death 39 years later. His first attempt at Belgian poet and author.) authorship was an analysis of the Navy in the war of 1739 to 1748 and made up his paper discusses the life and three volumes. It was a masterful work thoughts of Admiral Sir Herbert and highlighted Richmond’s command TRichmond for two reasons. The first for detailed analysis. is, because as an historical figure, he Promotion to Captain followed in receives less attention than is his due 1908 and on leaving the Admiralty, and the second is that many of the he was posted to the staff of the issues he faced while in service are as Commander-in-Chief of the Home relevant today as they were in his time. Fleet and then to the command of The article will provide the reader with HMS Dreadnought, a new class of an overview of the career of Admiral turbine driven battleship that rendered R ichmond as an Richmond because his experiences did all earlier ships obsolete. This was an Admiralty, but it is likely that he was Admiral (Marder, much to shape the views he expressed, important command and should have also frustrated at not being able to take AJ, Portrait of an 1 which often differed from what was secured swift advancement; however, part in the planning process as well. Admiral) accepted practice at the time. It will this did not occur mainly because, More postings followed, and after then present his thoughts on British according to many writers, he offered tenuously clinging to his naval career maritime and military strategy. too much advice to his superiors on (often spent in second class ships) Admiral Richmond was born in matters related to training and strategy. he was promoted Rear Admiral and 1871 and joined the Royal Navy in This didn’t win him friends in high awarded the KCB. He then spent two 1885 as a Midshipman serving in HMS places. years as the first Commandant of the Britannia. He later served in HMS He returned to the Admiralty New Imperial Defence College, now Nelson on the Australia station, spent a and watched as war with Germany called the Royal College of Defence short time in the Hydrographic Service, developed at a time when naval Studies, which was founded in 1927. and then trained as a torpedo officer corporate planning was actively This role gave him the scope to develop at HMS Vernon. He was known for his discouraged. He made numerous his lecturing talents and time to study 2 energy, enthusiasm and for his ability as predictions about naval dispositions, naval history in more detail. The a caricaturist and artist. While serving especially Rear Admiral Craddock’s position also gave him a platform in the Mediterranean he developed his South America Station forces that from which to air his criticisms of passion for British naval history, which proved to be so accurate when it was Admiralty policy and this really became the cornerstone of his life. annihilated by Von Spee at Coronel estranged him from his bosses. Even After numerous sea and shore postings on 1 Nov 1914. He was vocal about so, he was promoted to full Admiral he was promoted to Commander in Admiral Jellicoe’s inability to achieve in 1929, but his airing of his personal 1903 and was later employed in the a decisive victory at Jutland. He didn’t views about compositions of navies, Admiralty as assistant to the First Sea like Jellicoe’s leadership and didn’t hide which were published in lengthy open Lord, Sir John “Jackie” Fisher, and then this view from Admiral Beatty who letters to The Times newspaper; in the Second Sea Lord. After some high took command of the Grand Fleet in particular, his support for smaller hopes on his part, his relationship 1916 when Jellicoe took up the post of ships – the functions of a capital ship with the establishment developed into First Sea Lord. Schurman argued that being discharged by a ship of 10,000 one of open hostility. He questioned Richmond’s vocalisations were mostly tonnes was a blasphemy in those days doctrine, he questioned practice, and motivated by a desire to improve – further fuelled the Big versus Small he questioned training. the war making machinery of the ship debate. This airing saw Richmond Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: Visionary or Heretic?

forced to retire from the Navy fully academic credentials. His writings of Admiral Sir William James, had to aware that top command positions the 1739-1748 war, of course, stood admit that “Richmond was right, but were outside his reach; although he him in good stead. This appointment the [German occupation] seems to 4 held rank he had little influential lasted for two years until he turned have taken most people by surprise”. 3 power. 65. Richmond is reported to have Richmond was an intellectual. It should also be noted that mellowed at Cambridge. His toughness He had the formidable ability to be Richmond was instrumental in and reserve as an Admiral was taken able to see the fine detail and to form setting up the Naval Review, a journal over by gentleness, sensitivity, and considered opinion about its meaning. published by the Naval Society that personal warmth that his closest He did not suffer fools gladly and this, printed articles related to the running friends knew lay hidden beneath his at a time when there were many in and conduct of the RN. It was tough veneer. When he retired from senior positions in the Admiralty, kept available only to those who subscribed this appointment, he was elected him in the outer. His main weakness and provided for anonymity, thus as the Master of Downing College, was that he did not conceal his protecting the “Young Turks” who were Cambridge, where he was to remain contempt for those who did not share thus able to express their discontent until his death in 1946. his enthusiasm for the study of, and about the deplorable management of Academic life did not silence him. practical benefits derived from, naval the Navy. The Review is still published He continued to press for change in history. today. the Navy, drawing on history, naturally, It is not completely accurate to After leaving the service in 1931, and his own experiences to drive home define Richmond as a strategist using Richmond entered a new phase of his the point. In 1939, for example, he the common meaning of the term. life. He took up life as an academic, proposed to the British Government Richmond espoused methodology delivering lectures on such topics that Norway would be a target in a and advocated good planning and as “officer education”, “Imperial German war. His contemporaries were staff skills rather than undertaking the defence”, and “capture at sea”. In 1934 astonished by the idea that Germany actual planning itself. A better term for he was offered the position of Vere would want to occupy Norway to him may be “analyst”, for he analysed Harmsworth Professor of Imperial improve her strategic position against history in order to make predictions H MS Nelson (1931) and Naval History at Cambridge – an Britain. Shortly after Germany invaded, about naval operations. He was also a profile drawing amazing honour for a sailor without the Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth, career naval officer, unlike Corbett, and (Public domain)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 39

T he first IDC ourse,c this gave him the singular advantage during World War II proved Richmond degree of continuity . . . The lesser vessels held in 1927. Richmond is front centre. On of personal experience of the Service correct. of the flotilla and the smaller types of his left is Wing from which he could express informed Indeed, Richmond advocated cruiser, run no greater danger in such Commander Stanley opinion. This was the advantage that smaller, faster, more manoeuvrable, work [exposed to aerial attack] than James Goble, CBE, Corbett did not possess. and cheaper ships to fill the capital the greatest armoured ships. This belief DSO, DSC, (later AVM). It is clear that Richmond held role. He supported the “fleet in being” necessarily carries with it a denial of the Another Australian is strong views about a number of naval strategy by arguing for the use of claim that great size is essential in order Commander CJ Pope 6 (2nd row 3rd from right) issues, not least being the role of the smaller cruisers to harass the enemy. to provide security against . . . attack. later RADM (Courtesy capital ship. Geoffrey Till, a current Schurman noted that he was not a blue The loss of HMS Prince of Wales David Goble) commentator on naval strategy, water dogmatist and was acutely aware and HMS Repulse to Japanese air attack and author on the topic, noted that of the restrictive effects of the almost in December 1941 proved him correct Richmond urged his colleagues to be perpetual lack of small vessels for use again. 5 aware of the difference between the in probing enemy dispositions. His Although not a strong advocate of battleship as a ship and the capital strong vocal support for a shift to a the concept of the Decisive Battle, he ship as a role. According to Richmond, more balanced fleet was another virtual was disappointed that the Admiralty this confusion in thought meant that blasphemy at the time but is now a did not adopt a more aggressive there was a tendency to believe that view advocated by Navies around the approach in dealing with the German if another weapon could be operated world (note the USN’s Littoral ship High Seas Fleet in the North Atlantic by another service, say aircraft, which concept). Richmond could not see during WWI. To Richmond, operating might be proven to be superior to the the value of focusing on enormous from a passive stance in this instance battleship, then the entire structure battleships positioning themselves in was fruitless. Although the RN can of naval strategy would crumble. line ahead in an attempt to broadside be judged as having performed its In other words, if one criticised the the enemy and noted in 1936: wartime service superbly – Germany battleship, one attacked the Navy and I do not believe that a fleet, however was effectively blockaded, causing this, of course, Richmond did with powerfully the capital ships are great discomfort to the German regularity. Interestingly, and with the constructed and armoured, can operate people while the British Isles were power of hindsight, the advent of the . . . in waters where it [sic] is exposed to relatively unhindered – Richmond aircraft carrier and the role it played attacks by aerial torpedo craft with any (and other Young Turks) believed Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: Visionary or Heretic?

that a decisive attack on the German deck while the young men who flew to delve into the life of a man who High Seas Fleet would have shortened them were brash arrogant time wasters. deserves more credit in British Naval the war considerably. By mounting a Richmond will be remembered and Military History that he has pitched battle with the German Fleet, for his views on officer education and received. An examination of the Richmond believed that the ships that strategic training. The First World War shelves in most Defence Force Libraries were otherwise tied up containing convinced him that men tended to reveals little or no mention of his name the Germans could have been freed become subordinate to their machines, in most texts covering the History of to engage the new submarine menace and that strategic thought became the Royal Navy. This is a great injustice. and perhaps then allow the RN to enter subordinated to routine and was then To answer the question posed in the the Baltic in force, thus opening up the ignored by “mighty wearers of gold title of this paper, “Yes”; to his superiors possibility of joint operations directed braid”. He held strong views about in the Admiralty, Richmond was a against the German coast. the need for a Naval War Staff at the heretic; his opinions were contrary He also was a strong believer in Admiralty and as early as 1907, noted to conventional wisdom in place in combined operations. Although most in his personal diary that: Navy circles at the time; however, to of his contemporaries believed that the Fisher makes no move . . . we have no those who appreciate the lessons that war was won by sea power, it would one trained to think of the problems of history can provide and who value seem that Richmond’s assessment of war, the organisation required and the the importance of sound planning the role of sea power is closer to the multitudinous details. I know only too and guidance, he can only be seen as a truth. He stated that: well how ignorant we are, not only of visionary for the high status he placed Sea power would have been modern wars but even wars in History on strategy and training. impotent to defend the liberties [sic]. Fisher, clever as he is, has not The words delivered at Richmond’s of Europe unsustained by land- made a study of it, and in reality has funeral in 1946 by his wife’s brother- power. Nothing is clearer than the no knowledge. He is a genius . . . but his in-law, Sir Charles Trevelyan, interdependence of the two, nothing predecessors have not been, nor may his summarise Richmond’s life: 8 more misleading or objectionable than successors be geniuses. Where goodness and beauty of the attribution of success to one or the This situation did not remedy itself character . . . are united to great and 7 other separately . before the war and perhaps Britain well disciplined powers of mind, we see He saw the necessity of rapport suffered considerably more harm to what height in the hierarchy of being 9 between sea and land commanders. than she needed to by not addressing a brother man can rise . Both rely on one another for the Richmond’s pleas. The materiel was It is evident that Richmond was achievement of national goals. This is a present to fight a war but there was ahead of his time; however, while he lesson that some of us still have to learn arguably no brain to steer it to its did manage to sow seeds where little today. proper end. had grown before he would likely have He also advocated the use of aircraft Richmond urged for tactics and accomplished much more had he in support of fleet operations. In the strategy to be taught to younger officers been able to temperate the delivery of pre-war years, air power, to Richmond, at an age when they were still flexible his message. Many of his ideas – for was seen as an auxiliary support for and inquisitive, before they had settled example, the use of aircraft, and the the protection of the Army and Navy. into a life of mediocrity. He wanted practice of joint operations – were de Although he possessed a certain them provided with the opportunity rigueur by the end of WWII. It is as an amount of anti-air prejudice, his views to deal with problems involving insightful thinker and teacher of the of the importance of air power were abstract thought and reasoning and to principles of warfare that he should be at variance with many who saw it read history in order to draw lessons remembered and he thus deserves to simply as a way of inflicting terror on from the past. Even towards the end be ranked alongside the likes of Corbett an enemy rather that as a means to of WWI, however, when Richmond and Mahan. t fulfilling a specific military objective. was posted to a war staff position, it His more positive views of air power was still the admirals who dealt with are contrasted with the views of his strategy. This situation did not begin peers in the early days of naval aviation to resolve itself until many years after who saw the aircraft as a noisy nuisance war’s end. that leaked oil and stained the scrubbed These few words are not enough Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 41

Command and Staff Program at the 2 The uthor’sa grandfather (later AVM S.J. Goble and a RAAF Chief of Air Staff) Canadian Forces College, Toronto, was one of Richmond’s first students, being sent to the College by the Australian and is a Registered Psychologist. He is Government in 1927. currently the Deputy Director Workforce 3 For a fuller description of Richmond’s career see Chapter 1 of Marder, Arthur .J., Modelling, Forecasting and Analysis – Portrait of an Admiral: The Life and Papers Navy. of Sir Herbert Richmond. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952. 4 See Lambert, Andrew. “Seapower 1939- 1940: Churchill and the Strategic Origins of the Battle of the Atlantic”, in Geoffrey Till (Ed). Sea Power: Theory and Practice. Essex: Frank Cass and Co., 1994. (104). 5 Schurman, ibid. 6 Richmond, Herbert. Comments made and reported in the Report of the Sub- Committee of the C.I.D. on the Vulnerability Commander David Goble RAN joined of Capital Ships to Air Attack. Cited in Hunt, B.D. Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert the Navy as a Reservist in 1983, Richmond 1871-1946, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1982. training as a Maritime Warfare Officer, (220). before transferring to the PNF. He has 7 Richmond, Richmond. “Consideration of the War at Sea”, Naval Review, 5, 1917. (8) been posted to a variety of positions 8 Richmond, Herbert. Entry in his including the RAN Recruit School, personal diary (April 1907). Cited in Hunt, B.D. Sailor-Scholar: Admiral Sir Herbert HMAS Cerberus and HMAS Creswell. Richmond 1871-1946, Ontario, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1982. (20). CMDR Goble completed a Master (Endnotes) 9 Trevelyan, Charles. Cited in SWR’s of Educational Psychology at the 1 Schurman, Donald. The Education of Book review of Marder’s ‘Portrait of an a Navy: The Development of British Naval Admiral’, Naval Review, 40 (3), 1952. (343). University of Melbourne; the Canadian Strategic Thought, 1867-1914, London: Cassell, 1965. Minister for Defence Materiel Jason Clare today announced that two more keel blocks had been delivered to Adelaide to construct Australia’s firstA ir Warfare Destroyer. This follows the delivery of the first keel block last month. The blocks were constructed at the Williamstown shipyard in Melbourne. They were loaded on to barges last week and transported to Adelaide over the weekend. Photos Bryan Charlton and the AWD Alliance

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42 Royal Moroccan Navy commissions first SIGMA

he first Royal Moroccan Navy of contract with all agreed technical Complement consists of 110 people. SIGMA-class frigate, RMoNS Tarik specifications and cost met. The weapon suite of all three Royal Tben Ziyad, has been handed over, named Meanwhile the second and third Moroccan Navy SIGMAs comprises a S and commissioned, at Damen Schelde SIGMA-class frigates for the Royal 76mm OtoMelara 76/62 SR medium Naval Shipbuilding (DSNS) in Vlissingen Moroccan Navy are both on track calibre gun forward, two sextuple (The Netherlands). process at the DSNS city shipyard. MBDA VL-MICA sea air missiles and The 105 meter long and 2.335 All ships will serve in naval four MBDA MM40 Exocet Block II I tons displacement frigate has been patrol EEZ duties, maritime security SSM; two GIAT 20mm guns next to commissioned by the Commander-in- operations, as well search and rescue the helicopter hangar as well two triple Chief Royal Moroccan Navy, RADM tasks. The three SIGMAs are suited to torpedo tubes for the Eurotorp MU-90. Mohamed Laghmari. support humanitarian aid operations Ship sensors are the Thales 3D G The frigate left Vlissingen the day if needed. A nine ton helicopter can be SMART-S Mk2 radar operating in after commissioning and headed for the carried on board. E/F-band. As weapon control system North Sea for safety training the Royal In contrast to future ships RMoNS the electro-optic system Thales LIROD Netherlands Navy. Tarik ben Ziyad has a 7,2 meter enlarged Mk2 is carried. Thales TACTICOS has M After completion of the training hull module for housing tactical been fitted as combat data system, and RMoNS Tarik ben Ziyad will start its command facilities to serve as a flagship. Kingclip is fitted as hull-mounted sonar. maiden voyage and sail to its homeport The diesel motor driven frigates can Casablanca naval base. achieve a top speed of more than 26 Michael Nitz, A The ship was delivered by DSNS knots. Endurance at sea is 20 days, with a correspondent, Vlissingen within four years from the effective date maximum range of 4.000nm at 18 knots.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 43

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Issue 143 45 Australia’s Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications B y Peter Briggs

n overwhelming strategic requirement exists to sustain and Adevelop Australia’s underwater warfare capability post Collins. Australia’s geographic and strategic requirements are particularly demanding - no “off the shelf” solution is likely. FSM will therefore be a developmental project, led and executed by Australia. Noting the difficulty of accessing submarine IP and the timescales, as the parent Navy Australia will require incentives to develop an indigenous R&D capability in key technologies. University, Industry particularly SME’s R&D will made a significant Collins-class enters and unique contribution. As a trusted Submarine will have greater range, with the same export platform. dock (Courtesy RAN) R&D partner, DSTO and the Defence longer endurance on patrol, and Thus if it is to succeed, the design of Science Institute it has established will expanded capabilities compared FSM will also be unique. have a critical role in managing the to the current Collins class Noting the proliferation of R&D program for FSM. submarine.’ submarines in our region of interest, it will be important that the FSM The Capability The Elephant In The Room maintains an underwater warfare Requirement – No MOTS technological edge throughout its Strategic Setting Having regard to the anticipated roles, service life. Exploitation of existing The strategic environment 2020 – 2050 missions, endurance, payloads and technology, particularly in the will demand a range of ADF capabilities the level of capability required, there areas of command, control and including a high-end underwater is currently no military off-the-shelf communications, should ensure warfare capability, centred on a long- (MOTS) conventional submarine interoperability with our major allies range, sophisticated submarine. The design (nor is there one expected) that and other ADF capabilities while capability will be required to deliver will meet Australia’s requirements for reducing both investment and program an expanded range of strategic effects Future Submarine (FSM) - a situation risk. and undertake a wider range of roles similar to that impacting the design A Developmental Program compared with the current COLLINS development of COLLINS in the mid- FSM will therefore be an Australian led, Class submarines. 1980s. I have developed this argument developmental project, quite different This growth in capability is more fully in a recent article in the to the norm for Defence equipment appropriately recognised in the Australian Naval Institute’s journal. acquisitions in which generally acquire Defence White Paper (DWP): Not only would a MOTS solution equipment designed and developed by ‘ .. the Government has not perform the functions required, it others. In this case Australia will be the decided to acquire 12 new Future would also deny access to technology ‘parent navy’ for the new submarine Submarines, to be assembled in opportunities that are currently capability, this is an enduring role for South Australia. This will be a enjoyed through links with DSTO, the the life of the capability. major design and construction USN and trusted industry partners. The DWP envisages at least 12 program spanning three decades, It would also provide Australia with a submarines. These will be built in and will be Australia’s largest ever platform capability baseline with no ‘batches’, typically three batches of four single defence project. The Future advantage over potential adversaries submarines, launched at 15-24 month Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 Australia’s Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications intervals facilitating upgrades between R&D batches and potentially providing a Objectives rolling construction program, without Technologies a major gap between FSM number 12 and its successor class of submarine, ie While it is the first batch of the next generation. anticipated that What is envisaged is an Australian some systems from national capacity to design, build and Collins, evolved upgrade submarines. and updated, The closest philosophical starting could be migrated point for the design process and the to FSM (eg, the submarine with the most experience in combat system operating in our environment is Collins elements, elements (Australia/ASC has been the design of the external authority for Collins since 2001). communications system and ship The Failure of Collins Parenting Collins-class berthing control systems) with attendant consideration of stealth, efficiency, party (Courtesy RAN) The shortcomings in the Defence benefits, the development of FSM will manoeuvrability, etc); management of the Collins class be a significant challenge involving d. Sensors – acoustic, optical, provide a number of good lessons on new technologies and elements of microwave/sub microwave and how not to manage this capability. In risk. Australia has existing R&D non-conventional. brief: relationships in the combat system, e. Air independent propulsion; a. Significant under investment in torpedo and external communications f. Combat system elements; sustainment and manning; systems areas, principally with the g. Energy generation storage and b. Lack of technical and operational USA, these are likely to continue and its use, ie propulsion motors (eg, submarine policy oversight at the expand. conventional, permanent magnet strategic level in Canberra; There are a number of critical or superconducting); c. A failure to manage the capability technologies for which Australia will h. Propulsion technologies and holistically as a strategic asset, have to develop an indigenous R&D related stealth implications (eg, with a whole of life perspective. capability. Such technologies are propellers and main machinery); central to meeting Australia’s unique i. The payload system capacity to Hopefully the Cole Review now submarine requirements arising handle and deploy weapons and underway will catalogue the issues in from our geostrategic circumstances, other payloads and its flexibility greater detail, provide a public/political including the requirement to be able to quickly adapt to meet mission circuit breaker and set the scene for a to operate in the demanding tropical requirements; structured program to recover the lost littoral environment and ensuring that j. Diesel engine development; capability. Australia maintains an advantage in k. Life support systems for the submarine capability and operations. extended period of dived Summary Identified critical technologies operations for the crew and The DWP correctly sets the strategic include: embarked personnel; scenario and the top-level capability for l. Unmanned underwater, surface Australia’s future submarine capability. a. Hull and superstructure materials and above water vehicles and their To achieve the capability set out in the (including composites, steel, interfaces; and DWP, Australia will need to undertake welding materials and hull m. Human factors arising from a developmental programme. penetrations); the small crew, long endurance Developmental projects pose different b. Signature management and patrols, impact of habitability on challenges and require different reduction in all spectra. effectiveness and huge volume management, including the leadership c. Hydrodynamics and hull of information to be analysed, of the underpinning R&D effort. Let forms (these have significant presented and acted upon. me now turn to these aspects. impact on designs, including Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 47

Technology Readiness Levels Accessing Technology USN has arguably the world’s largest It will be important to ensure that USN Support and most capable submarine R&D technologies are ready for deployment, USN support for the FSM project capability; it is focused on nuclear having been de-risked in shore has been affirmed publicly, most powered submarines – a limitation for testing and prototyping. This will be recently by the media release following many conventional submarine issues an important function for the land AUSMIN 2010: (but a significant advantage when based Platform Test Site now being ‘The United States welcomed considering high speed stealth). USN contemplated by Defence and will Australia’s program of capability submarine spokespersons have publicly probably necessitate an expansion development outlined in the White emphasized that the USN does not of this facility to a multi-site, virtual Paper, and Australia noted the have a current capability to design organisation, exploiting centres of importance of technology and materiel conventional submarines and continues excellence within Australia’s R&D and exchanges in meeting these capability to resist suggestions that it should industry capabilities. goals.’ acquire a force of modern conventional Cooperation and technical support submarines. The USN would Sensitivities Surrounding Submarine for the FSM program appear to have therefore probably be keen to ensure Technologies been discussed more directly in the that any cooperation did not lend Submarine technologies are closely Navy-Navy meetings that preceded weight to those arguing for acquisition held and jealously guarded. In some AUSMIN as evidenced in the US Chief of conventional submarines. cases the leading edge technology will of Naval Operations, Admiral Garry Therefore, whilst Australia could not be available for ‘love or money’. In Roughead’s remarks as reported in an benefit significantly from USN these cases Australia can expect to have interview with John Kerin: support and oversight of the design to lead the development of its own ‘The Chief of Operations process – such support will be a solutions. A past example of this was with the United States Navy, significant political reassurance and the anechoic tiles designed to reduce Admiral Gary Roughead, has risk mitigation measure (that was not Collins’ active sonar signature. urged Australia to press ahead available for the Collins development), with a formidable generation of Australia will have to lead and manage A Viable R&D Partner new submarines, warning that no the FSM R&D program. In many cases Australia will only country in the Asia-Pacific region The USN is particularly sensitive be able to access other advanced can maintain an effective defence about protecting its submarine technologies if it has something to without them. technology. Any collaboration with contribute to a joint R&D program. a 3rd party will therefore need to be The sensitivity surrounding many Indicating that Australia could rely on managed to conform with the ground submarine technologies will limit the the US Navy’s full technical support, ..’ rules for the provision of USN support. Collins Weapon opportunities for joint developments. Admiral Roughead, who held talks Compartment in Canberra with Australia’s Chief of (RAN photo) Summary Navy, Vice- Existing R&D cooperation on Admiral Russ submarine systems is likely to expand Crane, said to meet the requirements of the FSM the two had project. A significant range of new discussed ways areas of R&D will also be initiated. to ensure their Sensitivities surrounding some of this submarine technology and the requirement to be a forces worked viable contributor to joint projects will more closely demand Australian led R&D in many together, areas. including Let me now consider how Australia co-operation might go about accessing this on the new information. submarines.’ Whilst the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Australia’s Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications Accessing and Protecting Conventional Submarine Design undertaking much of this research. and Systems IP An R&D program involving both industry and the Defence Science and Access to and control over IP is a key Technology Organisation (DSTO) will determinant of shipbuilding and repair therefore be a key part of reducing risks capability particularly in relation to and achieving the capability; it will be vessel design and combat systems ongoing throughout the life of FSM to and their ongoing development and maintain the capability edge Australia upgrade. seeks. The number of conventional The design and its supporting R&D submarine designers and R&D program must be undertaken with capabilities accessible to Australia is Australia’s operational environment in quite limited. All are European and all mind and leverage off the significant are keen to protect their IP. experience Australia has gained a. Sweden and France maintain a in operating a large conventional Government funded submarine submarine in it. The design and R&D capability, albeit the latter is outcomes from the R&D program predominately focused on nuclear must be protected; it would be counter- powered submarines. productive to have advances achieved b. Germany has a well-established through this process simply exported capability based in universities and into the region. Collins-class boat on industry for development of their c. The USN requirement for Acquisition Strategy the surface designs and systems. Australia to put in place (Courtesy RAN) c. Spain is undertaking its first There is no market place for the design safeguards to protect its sensitive design activity based on French of a large conventional submarine such SM technology from third parties. antecedents. as we seek. We are dealing with a sole d. Government ownership of ASC. In developing the design, Australia source design situation – as do the e. The need to ensure that Australian should make maximum use of USA, UK and all European submarine industry develops a design proven European and US submarine builders. I agree with Paul Dibb and authority capability for in-service technologies to reduce risks and Geoffrey Barker’s recent arguments for support of FSM. achieve the capability required. sustaining a naval shipbuilding industry f. Early release of FSM performance Australia therefore needs access to for this critical capability. requirements to Australian both European and US sources of Measuring and achieving value for industry to exploit its experience technology. money in this situation is discussed and potential innovative Given the sensitivity of submarine in greater detail in the Submarine technologies. IP it is likely that accessing foreign Institute of Australia’s paper setting out g. A concept design and design IP, technology or joint R&D for FSM the critical issues for the initiation of development process that will entail Government-Government Australia’s next generation submarine provides for early involvement agreements covering the interaction project. of experienced operators and to provide mutually agreed safeguards In summary, from an R&D Australian industry with design for the exchange of information and to perspective, the acquisition strategy engineers. (This should avoid ensure the over arching regime for the will need to take into account: the ‘operator/engineer divide’ protection of information is achieved. a. The need to access both European that occurred in the COLLINS Within this framework it is envisaged and USN design elements and program.) that selected R&D projects could be associated technologies. h. The need to supplement Defence established with specialist areas and b. The equirementr to protect both submarine engineering and industries. European and USN IP throughout operator expertise with “above the An Australian R&D base would all phases of the FSM program line” support. therefore offer significant advantages (design, construction and in The Integrated Product Process and provide the simplest model for service). Development (IPPD) technique using Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 49

multi discipline, Integrated Product be vital to both industry and Defence Teams (IPT) was used throughout the providing through life support and design and production of the Virginia capability upgrades. Class submarines. It achieved huge One of the lessons learnt from the gains in efficiency and provides a COLLINS program - DSTO should model for FSM. have been involved from the outset a. The process is aimed at across the full range of submarine minimising the Cost of Ownership technologies rather than on a niche for achieving the desired product basis. This might have capability. avoided or largely mitigated some b. Designer, builder, major sub of the problems experienced later in systems/equipment suppliers, the program such as hydrodynamic maintainers, CCDG, DMO and induced flow noise, combat system F uture sub concepts DSTO in an Integrated Product shortfalls, diesel unreliability, Australia’s behalf. DSTO is clearly (Courtesy Dynamics Research) Team (IPT) from concept battery performance shortfalls and the logical organisation to be the development forward. periscope vibration. Thus DSTO focal point, actively manage the R&D c. It is a seamless process, avoids involvement across the spectrum program for FSM and to ultimately stop start decision making, saving of FSM technologies and capability advise Defence on the risk and time and $s. development activities will be vital to readiness of the range of technologies d. It avoids issues over ‘buildability’ the success of FSM and subsequent available to support key FSM and maintainability of design. through life support. capabilities. e. The ustralianA Department As noted above, many of the R&D programmes with the USN of Defence has the benefit of a technology issues arise from Australia’s and European R&D organisations are RAND Study that is believed to requirements for a long range, high generally collaborative; DSTO’s access advocate a similar process for endurance conventional submarine, will depend on being able to make a FSM. able to carry a large and flexible valued contribution. payload and operate in the tropical It is suggested that under the An Australian Design Environment littoral environment. The USN has umbrella of DSTO, a number of In summary an Australian design little exposure to the conventional small expert teams be established environment is seen as essential submarine aspects of these issues, across functional areas of underwater to access the offered USN support neither do they attract the same technology to evaluate the most and uniquely able to combine this priority for European designers, promising technologies and create and support with access to key European DSTO’s leadership will therefore manage specific R&D programs. The conventional submarine technologies. be critical in achieving the synergy teams should include subject matter These arrangements should be necessary to achieve a capability edge specialists from DSTO, DMO and integrated within an IPPD design, for Australia. Navy and act as ‘expert’ advisers to the production and through life support This role is significantly different project (eg development of the User model. Some initial thoughts on what in a developmental project compared Requirement), participate in relevant this arrangement might look like are with the typical DSTO contribution to conferences and work with industry captured diagrammatically in figure 1 a project to acquire equipment from during the concept and design phases below; I have termed it ‘Team Australia’. an overseas supplier. It is a high risk, to ensure optimum application of high payoff situation and one where products and technologies. While Partnerships For Success the right policy will achieve significant ultimately Defence will be reliant on DSTO’s Central Role advantages for Australia. industry to deliver FSM capability, the The contribution of DSTO to the There is clearly a need to plan, teams will play a vital role in fostering COLLINS project development, coordinate and manage activities the required technologies, ensuring construction, ‘get well’, and in-service associated with the development that Defence fulfils its ‘informed phases was critical to the success of technologies required for FSM customer’ role and enabling Defence to of the construction program. The irrespective of where or who conducts be the arbiter of industry performance. contribution of DSTO continues to the particular R&D activity on Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Australia’s Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications The Defence Science Institute’s Role they competed for limited R&D for cooperation and long-term The Defence Science Institute (DSI) funding. programmes. Defence Industry, has recently been established by DSTO d. FSM R&D funding will be (both majors and SMEs), will make and Melbourne University, supported managed via the research team an important contribution, including by the Victorian State Government. leader (DSTO) and be focused providing the important bridge Its objective is to establish a cohesive on delivering this project and between laboratory and production. research capability, linking R&D sustaining a capability edge The DSI has a role to facilitate and capabilities in Australia’s Universities, through life. mobilise Australia’s wider defence R&D Industry and defence related research e. The ongoing nature of the FSM capacity to best effect and in particular, organisations to address long term R&D task offers a very attractive support DSTO in discharging its defence challenges. opportunity for continuity and responsibilities for the FSM capability. Existing and emerging fields of stability in research. research are supported through Conclusions the Institute and currently include Major defence industry companies FSM – It’s Developmental biochemical systems; intelligent have a well established role in R&D The top-level requirements set out in information systems; human and form an important bridge in the DWP correctly recognise the need performance and neurosciences; transitioning leading edge R&D for significant growth in Australia’s energy and propulsion systems; concepts to commercial products. submarine capability to meet the active materials and micro-radar They will form an important part of the changing strategic circumstances now technologies. The Institute’s aim R&D Team. I note that the DSI already unfolding. There is no Military Off captured in its logo is to mobilize has an active relationship with several The Shelf option, nor is one expected Australia’s R&D capabilities to provide of the major Defence Industry players – the closest and lowest risk starting smarter solutions for a safer Australia. and no doubt this will grow as FSM point is a developmental project based DSI aims to focus and leverage begins to exert its influence. on Collins antecedents and experience, Australia’s R&D capabilities across SME’s made a significant and often (good and bad!). the country, to the benefit of all unique contribution to the COLLINS participants and the maximum benefit Program by way of development and A National Submarine Capability of Australia’s defence capability. manufacture of a range of equipments Twelve submarines provide an for example, pumps that set a new opportunity for the continuity of a FSM R&D Opportunities for international bench mark in terms of rolling construction program, offering Universities and Industry efficiency and low noise performance, significant benefits to industry and The FSM project offers a particularly water desalination equipment, the underpinning R&D organisations challenging and unique opportunity batteries, casings and sonar domes. – we are embarking on an Australian for the DSI to assist Australia’s R&D Given early identification of required capability to design, build and sustain capabilities across the spectrum to technologies, Australian SME’s with the its submarine capability. contribute to the achievement and support of Defence have the potential sustainment of this critical capability. to exploit their own IP and to make a R&D - An Essential Enabler significant contribution to FSM. An active, Australian led R&D a. As the illustrative range of capability, led by DSTO will be technologies above demonstrates, Summary essential to underpin the design the FSM R&D requirements will FSM will invoke a new paradigm for environment. Australian led R&D add significantly to the existing cooperation and place unique demands must solve the unique challenges that range of themes being managed by on our national R&D capabilities. our requirements and environment the DSI. DSTO will play a key role as the R&D pose in order to achieve and sustain b. It will bring together new Team Leader for FSM, evaluating the the capability for the minimum cost of collaborative teams across State risk/readiness of technologies and ownership. It will provide the essential and institute boundaries. providing a key linkage to US and basis for joint development with c. Boundaries that hitherto perhaps European R&D organisations. The overseas technology partners. served to separate and divide requirements for R&D to support Australia’s R&D capability as FSM will offer new opportunities Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 51

An Australian Design Environment and University R&D organisations The design environment must be will be an important enabler for the able to demonstrably protect third national effort – ‘Team Australia’. t party’s IP, leveraging off the support and oversight offered by the USN whilst accessing the best of European conventional submarine technology. An Australian design environment based on the Government owned ASC is uniquely capable of performing this Peter Briggs retired in 2001 after a function. 39 year career including command of Coordinating and Focussing Aus- HMAS Otway, Oxley, Platypus, Stirling, tralia’s R&D Capacity Flag Officer Naval Training Command, DSTO will have a critical role to Head of the Strategic Command coordinate and lead this effort as the Division and Head Submarine R&D team leader, providing a focus Capability Team. As the President of the for Australian efforts and exploiting Submarine Institute of Australia (SIA) its links with Allies and other R&D organisations. The DSI’s role in he led the SIA’s contribution to the DWP. facilitating and coordinating Industry

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Blohm + Voss Naval

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 Where to Britain? By Hal GP Colebatch

rime Minister Cameron has slashed more appropriately, named Moscow economist Lord Peter Bauer, whose defence spending. So where is all University, the Russian authorities Dissent on Development was published Pthat money going now? evidently decided it was time for the in 1972, and others including a growing British Prime Minister David Moscow University to teach them a body of African economists, who believe Cameron has cut British defence below lesson: they stormed the ship, captured foreign aid, except for emergency disaster the minimum level for national security, the pirates, and sent them home, but relief (where something like an aircraft- despite pleadings from service chiefs, apparently without benefit of their boat. carrier might be useful), is actually much of his own party, and large sections Given they were several miles from counter-productive and hinders rather of the public. shore, and in shark-infested waters, it than helps long-term development. Britain’s front-line Air Force is now is perhaps not surprising that they and Now, however, the British Daily Mail hardly bigger than Belgium’s, with only their colleagues have attacked no more reports that African countries which seven squadrons of modern bombers Russian ships. persecute homosexuals will have their and fighters (Belgium has six). The Meanwhile, Cameron has said aid slashed by the government in a bid by Falkland Islands are defended by just Britain’s foreign aid expenditure is David Cameron to take his homosexual four aircraft. The Navy does not have a “ring-fenced” and will not be cut in rights crusade to the Third World. single capital ship. The air operations in any circumstances. International Mitchell has already cut aid to Libya have had to be conducted without Development Secretary Andrew Mitchell Malawi by about $40 million after two a single dedicated aircraft-carrier, claims that lavish foreign aid makes the homosexual men were sentenced to multiplying their cost and diminishing UK something called a “development prison. their effectiveness. superpower” and that voters should take A spokesman for Mitchell said: “The The Army has lost one historic the same pride in it as they do in their Government is committed to combating regiment after another, and a succession armed forces. violence and discrimination against of coroner’s inquests has blamed the Britain has actually decided to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender deaths of British servicemen in Iraq and increase foreign aid spending by 34 people in all circumstances, in this Afghanistan on skimped and inadequate percent to about $24 billion. Mitchell country and abroad. We take action equipment. claims this spending is achieving where we have concerns.” This could be Where American troops have “brilliant” results and gaining the country taken as a naked declaration of cultural armoured vehicles, British troops have admiration around the world. imperialism. been forced to travel in ancient Land One wonders if there is not some Meanwhile, Pakistan will continue to Rovers, leaving them vulnerable to kind of impulse for national suicide at receive more than $400 million a year, improvised roadside explosives. work in Westminster. Mitchell claims: but there the victims of persecution Servicemen in all three services have “My ambition is that over the next four are only Christians, who don’t count. been sacked without warning in mid- years people will come to think across Hundreds of millions go to such dubious career, sometimes receiving notice of our country -- in all parts of it -- of beacons of liberty as the Democratic dismissal while actually in action. Britain’s fantastic development work Republic of Congo and the gulag-police There also seems to be a peculiar around the poorest parts of the world state of Vietnam (try founding an decadent passivity. An elderly British with the same pride and satisfaction that opposition political party there, and see couple in a yacht off Somalia were they see in some of our great institutions where it gets you!), with no suggestion kidnapped by pirates and severely like the armed forces and the monarchy. that aid be tied to ordinary human rights. mistreated while a Royal Navy auxiliary This is brilliant work that Britain is While all persecution is worse ship, the inappropriately named Wave doing.” than deplorable, it seems the British Knight, with heavy machine-guns and This includes $600 million a year to Conservative government considers a contingent of heavily-armed marines India, which, as Tory MP Phillip Davies the rights of homosexuals in Africa aboard, stood by, virtually alongside, pointed out, is spending billions on worth cutting aid over. Not the case and did nothing, lest the pirates’ human defence and has its own space program. with innumerable other instances rights be violated (I am not making this It has a navy with about twice as many of persecution, nor its own national up). ships as Britain, a booming economy, defence. t When the pirates attempted to seize and probably more nuclear weapons. Originally published in American a Russian ship, the oddly, but perhaps This is despite the arguments of LSE Spectator Online Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 53 Records Management – the backbone of an efficient organisation By Deb Grooby

R ecent studies in the United Kingdom have shown that managers spend an average of four weeks per year searching for or waiting for missing files that have either been mislabelled, untracked or ‘lost’.

he Strategic Reform Program has been established to build a Tstronger Australian Defence Force and it is being implemented across all areas of Defence to improve the supporting ‘backbone’ of Defence (Strategic Reform Program- Delivering Force 2030). At the System Program Offices we are constantly trying to achieve more Objective, or DRMS as it used to be turn, complies with the Australian with less and we have all been tasked known, Objective being the name of Standard, ISO 15489, which outlines with trying to provide savings without the software with DRMS or Document recordkeeping responsibilities reducing capability. Whilst reform is Records Management System being as being to develop a corporate a positive move in any organisation its actual function, has been in use recordkeeping policy to ensure that the because we should always be striving in parts of Defence since 1999. In agency’s business needs for evidence, to improve our processes, it can be 2007, the Defence Inspector-General accountability and information about counter-productive if the supporting conducted an audit on the Effectiveness its activities are maintained. This policy elements of that reform are not taken of Defence Recordkeeping. The report is then to be adopted and endorsed into consideration. This is what I findings highlighted deficiencies with at the highest decision-making level believe is happening with Records recordkeeping and assessed Defence as and to be promulgated throughout Management. non-compliant with the Archives Act the organisation. Specific leadership Accountability, transparency and 1983. responsibility and accountability for cost-effectiveness are just some of To address this issue and to recordkeeping is to be assigned and the keywords found throughout the position Defence as a best-practice recordkeeping responsibilities are to Strategic Reform Program. By 2019, recordkeeping agency, the Defence be defined to all employees (Standards savings of approximately $20 billion Records Management Committee was Australia, 2002). are expected to be delivered, with established and a program to fix records The Defence Records Management this money then being reinvested to management across Defence was Policy Manual, POLMAN 3, edition provide stronger military capabilities started. This Committee developed the 4 was endorsed by the Secretary and (Strategic Reform Program- Delivering Defence Records Management Strategy Chief of the Defence Force on 15 July Force 2030). In order to achieve this, which was endorsed in November 2009 2010. It contains policy that assists the Strategic Reform Program has and which captured the scope, current Defence personnel with recognising invested in fifteen separate reform situation, risk and implementation and adhering to their recordkeeping streams, including Information and of the work needed to bring Defence responsibilities. The manual describes Communications Technology, which recordkeeping up to Australian and how Defence will manage its records encompasses Records Management. international standards for electronic in accordance with legislation as well It was announced in March 2011 document and records management as to improve business processes and that Defence would be expanding its (Records Management Strategy, 2009). outcomes. The Records Management information management capability Records Management in Defence Policy website has been utilised with the rollout of Objective across the is mandated by the Defence Records to distribute this information in Defence organisation. Management Policy which in conjunction with the release of simple Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 Records Management – the backbone of an efficient organisation factsheets and user guides. creation, receipt, maintenance, use and methodology for ensuring that the records manager, the The Defence Record Keeping disposal of records, including processes organisation and the employees make the correct decisions Strategy was endorsed to implement for capturing and maintaining evidence that will ensure good corporate governance (Kahn, 2004). a comprehensive document and of and information about business The essential elements of Information Management records management framework that activities and transactions in the form Compliance include the importance of having good policies would enable Defence to comply with of records’ (Standards Australia, 2002). and procedures so the employees know what to do and what legislation, to support efficiency and What this all means is that records not to do. It also states that for records management to be accountability through the consistent are one of a businesses main assets and seen as important for an organisation, then someone in a creation, capture, maintenance, access, the ability to manage records effectively position of seniority needs to support it and following on disposal and preservation of records helps to improve the competitiveness of from this, the correct employees then need to be given the and to support sound decision-making the business. In turn, having a records appropriate levels of responsibility. As has been noted earlier, through the use and management management policy, supported by recordkeeping is not an optional extra, or something to be of information. It was also identified everyone in the business to ensure that picked up by a staff member who has a bit of spare time on that staff needed to have standardised the correct records are kept, is crucial their hands. As unlikely as this sounds, this has often been tools to manage records for which for the organisation to be able to meet the case. Other critical factors in having a successful records they were accountable and to ensure their legal obligations (ISO 15489 – management programme are to have a well developed effective and efficient use of resources the essentials, 2010). Organisations training plan, an auditing process to be able to pick up any for the management of records. A are only as good as the decisions they faults in the system and for the organisation to ensure that its key deliverable of the strategy was the make and these decisions should be directives are followed (Kahn, 2004). upgrade and rollout of the Defence based on highly accurate records and The functional aspect of good recordkeeping should records management system (Objective information. Therefore a well managed also be considered as accurate records of past decisions or name change to set the record straight, recordkeeping department is crucial actions can greatly assist the current management team in an 2011). to an organisations ability to function organisation and prevent a duplication of efforts and a waste The aims of the expansion of competitively and effectively and of resources (Pember, 1997). By implementing an efficient Objective are stated as being to records must never been seen as an records management program based on the guidelines achieve the twin goals of significant optional extra (Pember, 1997). outlined in ISO 15489, an organisation can ensure that all of savings and the increase of the use of Records are kept so that the their records are properly maintained, easily accessible and Objective across Defence. In my role information needed to meet legal correctly documented from their creation to their disposal as a Configuration Baseline Manager requirements and to ensure the and in doing so will provide cost-effectiveness as mandated at a System Program Office, I use the competitiveness of the business, is by the Strategic Reform Program. document and records management stored in an accurate and reliable way. Recent studies in the United Kingdom have shown system extensively and due to my At the same time, an organisation that managers spend an average of four weeks per year previous career as a Librarian, I have a needs a policy outlining its corporate searching for or waiting for missing files that have either been vested interest in how these systems are governance procedure as this is the mislabelled, untracked or ‘lost’. It is estimated that up to 70% managed. system by which an organisation more records than are needed are kept by most organisations Accountability is another key is directed, controlled and held and in general office workers can waste up to two hours a day element of the Strategic Reform accountable. These two concepts are looking for misplaced paperwork. This amounts to almost Program and this can only be achieved closely related because whilst corporate 63 days each year, which is a lot of lost productivity (Bradley, through effective recordkeeping governance provides the structure 2002). (McKemmish, 1998). According through which the organisation’s Defence plans to continue to rollout Objective, targeting to AS ISO 15489.1-2002, records objectives are set and the means by approximately 30,000 new users over the next three years. are ‘information created, received which these objectives are achieved, It is estimated that upon completion, the system will have and maintained as evidence and efficient, accurate recordkeeping over 60,000 users in Australia and overseas (Objective name information by an organisation or provides the means by which the change to set the record straight, 2011). Whilst I was studying person, in pursuance of legal obligations performance of the organisation can be for my graduate diploma in Records Management last year, or in the transaction of business’. To determined (Standards Australia, 2003). I conducted an evaluation of Objective with another well continue this definition further, records Kahn, in his paper on Records known records management product and in all respects, management is then described as ‘the Management and Compliance, Objective is a very powerful tool with the capability to field of management responsible for the advocates Information Management provide Defence with effective and efficient record keeping efficient and systematic control of the Compliance as a model and capabilities. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 55

However, problems of poor all users, together with a maintenance A fter working as a Librarian recordkeeping will not be solved by just programme to correct any errors and for seven years, Deb Grooby providing users with the correct tool. a file creation system that is managed took a change in career It has been stated that in an effort to by qualified records managers. As part direction by becoming a reduce costs, an online training package of the rollout of Objective, an audit has been developed for user training should be conducted to determine configuration baseline instead of the one hour training session current information needs in each officer at the ANZAC System currently provided by the Workplace area to enable a plan to be formulated Program Office in 2007. Coordinator. In my experience, the that will account for future needs She completed a Graduate one hour training session was grossly and highlight areas of high priority. A Diploma in Records inadequate when trying to explain to document could then be developed to users how and why they must use the map the information architecture which Management in 2010 partly records management system. This was would identify business processes and to add to her library studies reinforced by discussions with users which business systems store records. knowledge, and also to assist with her knowledge of DRMS: at the System Program Office who This would also map the relationship the Document and Records Management System. She is regarded DRMS as a place for filing between the different business systems currently employed at the Amphibious and Afloat System documents, but as it would then be and set standards for metadata and impossible to ever find them again, terminology that must be used by all Program Office in WA. it didn’t really matter how they were business systems. A qualified records filed. At least, after completing the manager should be appointed in each training session with the Workgroup System Program Office to coordinate Coordinator, a new user would know the training and to establish control as who to ask if they had any problems, to who can create files and folders. although in my experience this didn’t I am passionate about my job and happen very often either. about doing the best I can for the All of the staff at the System System Program Office , for the Ship Program Offices are doing their best we manage and ultimately for Maritime References: to manage the records they produce. Systems Division as a whole. I want ISO 15489- the essentials (2010). Retrieved from In a lot of instances they are saving my organisation to be able to function everything ‘just in case,’ and often competitively and effectively and http://www.datacapture.co.uk/information/ISO-15489.htm quite unnecessarily. As it states in for this to take place a well managed Kahn, R.A. (2004) Records Management and Compliance: Making the connection. ISO 15489, to determine if a piece recordkeeping department is crucial Information Management Journal, 38(3):28-34,36. of correspondence should become a and must not be seen as an optional McKemmish, S.(1998). The smoking gun: Recordkeeping and record, the following three questions extra. The most frustrating thing is that accountability. Keynote address must be asked. Is it is a credible a cost effective solution would be very 22nd Annual Conference of the Archives and Records association of document, will the correspondence easy to achieve, would reap enormous New Zealand, 1998. lead to further activity, and does the savings for the organisation and http://www.sims.monash.edu.au/research/rcrg/publications/ correspondence record a decision would ensure total accountability and recordscontinuum/smoking.html or a proposal? If the answer to any transparency of our actions. Objective name change to set the record straight (2011) Retrieved from http://www.defence.gov.au/defencemagazine of these questions is yes, then the We have been given an excellent Pember, M.(1997). Accountability in Local Government in Australia: correspondence should be retained. system to use, which will ensure that The recordkeeping nexus. Informaa Quarterly, 13(3):16-23. If the number of users is set to Defence is compliant with all relevant Records Management Strategy (2009) Retrieved from http://intranet. double in the next three years, then legislation but with no infrastructure defence.gov.au/oscdfweb/sites/RMP/docs/defencerecordsmanagem with inadequate training, the amount of such as training or maintenance of entstrategy.pdf information stored could soon render the records produced to back it up, Standards Australia. (2002). Records Management – Part 1 General (AS ISO 15489.1-2002. Retrieved from http://www/library.defence. the system unworkable due to the time we are only paying lip service to the gov.au/standards taken for it to retrieve any records. requirements. My fear is that the Standards Australia. (2003). Good Governance Principles (AS 8000- 2003 Retrieved from http://www/library.defence.gov.au/standards The fundamental keys to success for importance of good record keeping will The Strategic Reform Program – Delivering Force 2030 (2011) a records management system are to only become apparent when things go Retrieved from http://www.defence.gov.au/srp/ provide adequate, ongoing training for wrong. t Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 HRH Prince Phillip

His Royal Highness Rosyth for convoy escort duties on the Prince Philip, The Duke of east coast. Edinburgh, has formally He was promoted to Lieutenant on received Letters Patent 16 July 1942 and in October he was as the holder of the title appointed First Lieutenant of HMS and office of Lord High Wallace at the unusually early age of Admiral. 21. In July 1943, Wallace took part in the Allied landings on Sicily. er Majesty the Queen conferred After further courses, he was the title and office as a gift appointed as First Lieutenant of the Hto the Duke of Edinburgh on his new Fleet Destroyer HMS Whelp, 90th birthday, which keeps alive the which was then being built on the he was appointed First Lieutenant of tradition of the monarch investing the Tyne. HMS Chequers in 1949. Chequers was office as an honour. After commissioning, Whelp first Leader of the First Destroyer Flotilla in The Queen and the Duke of joined the 27th Destroyer Flotilla and the Mediterranean Fleet. Edinburgh arrived at the Admiralty sailed for the Indian Ocean to join the He was promoted to Lieutenant- Board yesterday, Wednesday 23 British Pacific Fleet. Commander in 1950 and then November 2011, and were met by Whelp was present in Tokyo appointed in command of the Frigate the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Bay when the Japanese signed HMS Magpie. Stanhope, and the Guard and Band of the surrender. After the Japanese In 1952 he was promoted to the Royal Marines provided a Royal surrender, Prince Philip served Commander, but his naval career came Salute (photograph top right). continuously onboard Whelp to an end on the death of his father-in- After receiving the Letters Patent throughout the following months. law, King George VI. and the Lord Admiral’s flag, the Duke Whelp returned home in January 1946. Although His Royal Highness gave watched a short performance of the After instructing in the Petty up his active naval career when the Royal Marines Corps of Drums. Officers’ School and attending the Queen succeeded her father, he has The Duke of Edinburgh has a strong Naval Staff College at Greenwich, remained closely connected to, and involvement with the Navy, having enrolled at Dartmouth Naval College when he was 18 years old. He completed his initial training at RNC Dartmouth, where he was awarded the King’s Dirk and a prize as the best Cadet of his entry. In 1940, he joined the battleship HMS Ramillies in Colombo as a Midshipman and spent the following six months in the Indian Ocean. In January 1941 he joined the battleship HMS Valiant in Alexandria. During the night action off Cape Matapan, he was in charge of Valiant’s searchlight control, for which he was mentioned in despatches. Having qualified for promotion to Sub-Lieutenant, he returned home and, after taking a series of Commander-in-Chief Fleet, Admiral Sir Trevor Soar, briefs Her Majesty The Queen and His Royal Highness The technical courses, was appointed to Duke of Edinburgh on naval matters in the Admiralty Board Room at Admiralty House in London, with the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, also in attendance the destroyer HMS Wallace based at Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 57

actively interested in, every branch of Navy - Lord High Admiral - since the By 1628, following the death of the Service life. Navy’s organisational structure was Duke of Buckingham, the position In 1952 he was appointed Admiral reviewed in 1964 and the title was became entirely honorary, with the of the Sea Cadet Corps, Colonel-in- reinvested in the sovereign. duties of running the Navy delegated Chief of the Army Cadet Force and The office of the Lord High Admiral to a board of commissioners. Control Air Commodore-in-Chief of the Air dates from the 14th century when of the Navy was passed to and from the Training Corps. The following year he the English Navy consolidated into board and the Lord High Admiral until was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet one force. Originally responsible for 1709, when the powers of the Lord and appointed Captain General of the aspects of Navy policy, the position High Admiral were finally vested in the Royal Marines. of Lord High Admiral was held on board. t Her Majesty The Queen has held commission by various peers of the the office of titular head of the Royal realm.

HMS Ramillies HMS Valliant

HMS Whelp

The royal wedding in 1947

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war By Lieutenant Mike Gordon

s the war in Afghanistan passes its tenth year, military Aprofessionals, political commentators and academics are generally united in one view that the United States, along with its NATO and coalition allies, is in deep trouble in Afghanistan. A war that at its outset carried widespread international support, endorsement from the United Nations and genuine hope for the improvement of life in Afghanistan, has descended into a complex, costly counter-insurgency campaign that will surely occupy significant US assets well beyond the current proposed withdrawal date of 2014. With political, economic and human consequences mounting, it is crucial to assess where this “good war” went bad. This article analyses the 11th, 2001. President Bush, in the constitutionally centralized, yet weak failings of US strategy in Afghanistan clamour to take action, called on the national government in return for since 2001 through an examination Taliban regime of Afghanistan to little interference in their control over of the conduct of the war and the produce Al-Qaeda’s leadership that regional areas. It was during this repeated failures of the US Strategy, had hitherto received shelter. Following phase, that the US made what would arguing that this failure is derived Taliban refusal, the US developed a prove to be an important failure, from three main areas: first, the strategy to transform Afghanistan from namely omitting to capitalise on a flawed kinetic methods employed its position as a haven for terrorists devastated and reeling Taliban. by the US throughout the course of through the removal of the Taliban One of the key factors in the failure the campaign; second, the burdening regime. to secure the environment following rather than intended legitimising role To achieve this end the US the swift downfall of the Taliban of NATO; and third, a critical failure embarked on an innovative military regime was the light footprint used to understand both the nature of the campaign marked by special force by US forces upon their entry into enemy and the broader geo-political operations, local proxy militias and Afghanistan. Initial deployment to landscape, resulting in a confused and targeted air strikes. The US claimed Afghanistan totalled some 30,000 often contradictory strategy. defeat of the Taliban and their al Qaeda soldiers, with a reliance on high I conclude that while the US allies and by early 2002 a national levels of air and fire support. As position in Afghanistan is not reconciliation government stretching a point of comparison, in South untenable, significant changes are across tribal lines, led by anti-Taliban Vietnam, a country one-fifth the size required in both the policy of the Pashtun Hamid Karzai, had been of Afghanistan, 500,000 Allied troops US and Pakistan for the conflict in established by international coalition failed to attain any semblance US Afghanistan to achieve any form of forces. policy goals. success. This political outcome was achieved While the initial levels of forces The current conflict in Afghanistan by crafting a political settlement in proved sufficient to remove the was precipitated by Al-Qaeda’s terrorist which local warlords would support Taliban, they were woefully inadequate attacks on New York on September Hamid Karzai as president of a for providing continuing security for Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 59

the development of the new Afghan commitment of ground forces, eastern Afghanistan together with government’s capabilities. Diverging increased involvement from NATO the tribal areas of the Pakistan border foreign policy interests compounded and a subsequent focus on taking the region has provided an almost an the problems of a light presence in fight to the enemy. Crucially, however, unlimited base for recruitment for the Afghanistan, as precious military and much of the damage was already Insurgency, effectively negating the aim intelligence assets were diverted to Iraq done as a consequence of the lack of dealing a crushing kinetic blow to in 2002 and Afghan reconstruction of a prompt and effective counter- the Insurgency. floundered as international aid donors insurgency campaign, the extensive use This idea of the weaknesses of failed to meet their obligations. The of air strikes, and the lack of contact a kinetic approach is beginning to effect of too few troops, lagging with the local population. These take hold in higher echelons of the economic development, rampant failures had the effect of nullifying US military, as reflected in recent corruption and poorly trained security most of the US military efforts and the Army and Marine Corps Field forces led to a resurgence of the Taliban achievements. Manual 3-24, CounterInsurgency. This as a part of a broader based Insurgency. US Army Colonel Charles Pfaff document, largely penned by two of the As the Insurgency took shape in 2003- argues that this kinetic approach is not US’s most intelligent military leaders, 04, the US and later NATO began to the most effective means of achieving army General David Petraeus and A n Antonov 124- 100M cargo aircraft rely heavily on air power to support US goals. Operations in Afghanistan Marine General James Mattis, argues delivers an MRI its limited troop numbers in their illustrate this point, in that killing one that attrition alone would not defeat machine to the Role kinetic efforts to defeat the enemy. insurgent can serve to motivate many insurgencies. It states that in addition 3 Medical Facility at This contributed to a drastically others who were otherwise not in the to using lethal force against insurgent Camp Bastion, the negative image of western forces within fight to take his place; thus in effect forces, the US military would also be first of its kind in the country. Afghanistan. killing that insurgent increases the required to see to the physical and (Royal Air Force From 2005, continued insurgent enemy’s combat power. Further, the security needs of the populations where photo by Sergeant attacks prompted a greater ethnic composition in southern and it operated. As a result, US forces Mitch Moore)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war

would have to emphasize protecting and caring for the population over combating insurgents. This view is corroborated by the recent International Security Assistance Force Commander’s Guidance, which stated “[t]he intricate familial, clan, and tribal connections of Afghan society turn ‘attrition math’ on its head. From a conventional standpoint, the killing of two insurgents in a group of ten leaves eight remaining. From the insurgent standpoint, those two killed were likely related to many others who want vengeance.” Pfaff argues that United States has previously employed a strategy aimed at imposing without an end in sight. In Afghanistan on the other hand see operations as a A fghan Article/Work its will, when it would be better off NATO is currently involved in ground- stabilisation mission. continues as troops from the Mentoring employing a strategy aimed at gaining combat operations for the first time It is important to recognise that and Reconstruction acceptance for its interests through in its history, far from its normal area these views are not mutually exclusive. Task Force 1 carry out a population-centric strategy. This of responsibility and against a threat The varied nature of the security a works inspection insightful view provides that unless very different from the one it had been landscape in Afghanistan means on the progress of US strategists shift the emphasis in created to face. that each view may be appropriate in the Primary School warfighting from imposing US will to At first glance the deployment of different provinces of Afghanistan. redevelopment in Tarin Kowt, making adversary interests compatible NATO in Afghanistan was a move with The situation in Afghanistan can be Afghanistan. with those of the United States, current potential and which garnered broad best described as a peace support (Photo by ADF military efforts are not likely to yield support. Approved by the UN Security operations in the northern and western Corporal Ricky Fuller) victory. In broad terms, the US failed Council and involving troops from parts of the country, while at the same to align its operational plans with 40 democracies, in addition to a UN time counter-insurgency operations in its strategic end state, allowing its Assistance Mission, it set out to achieve the eastern and southern parts. preferred methods of operations to commendable aims of contributing to On the ground however, this dictate strategy, rather than providing the development and modernisation clash of perspective does not assist a clear focused strategy and developing of Afghanistan. The alliance’s impact cooperation of forces in difficult the most appropriate means to achieve on the war, however, has been operations, with conflicting rules of this. Had a population-centric strategy questionable at best, with it proving engagement and national policy often been developed earlier in the conflict, to be far from the strong supporting preventing effective co-operation the dire situation that the US now influence the US had hoped. The lack between units. NATO, which was finds itself in could possibly have been of unity among NATO members with intended to be a saving solution, has averted. regard to certain operational matters is only contributed to a greater security As US involvement in Afghanistan a striking example of this. problem and has called the standing of continued, it eventually called for Contributing states have different the Alliance in Afghanistan into serious increased deployment of NATO visions of NATO’s role. The most question. Ponderous, flat-footed, and in order to arrest the deteriorating obvious difference is that the United rank-heavy, the NATO command security situation within the country States, Britain and Canada tend to view has often proved disappointingly itself, and to allow access to the military involvement in Afghanistan, albeit with overbearing and unhelpful. The power of the alliance. This was at some minor variations between each Alliance’s eventual withdrawal from a time in which the strength of the country, as encompassing a counter- Afghanistan will inevitably bring US itself was being sorely tested by insurgency operation. Germany, France about difficult questions; particularly the maintenance of two costly wars and many other European nations how the reputation of the longest Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 61

lived military alliance in the world, through increasing attacks which are comprised of states with fundamentally well beyond the ability of the fledgling stable political systems, has made itself Afghan security forces ability to handle. vulnerable to the outcome of a war Rory Stuart, veteran of the UK in the unpromising surroundings of diplomatic service, argues that the Afghanistan. Taliban, largely discredited as a The most significant and damaging backward movement, gains support single element that has contributed by portraying itself as fighting for to the continued difficulties being Islam and Afghanistan against a experienced in Afghanistan is a foreign military occupation. Control dramatic failure to learn from the of the image of the US is thus easily country’s history. This failure is also achievable where the alternative is combined with a neglect to fully for the Afghan people to believe the descriptor for part of the Insurgency RAAF C130J in understand the enemy being faced unbelievable from their perspective: as it considers the numerous ‘players’ Afghanistan and the social terrain in which this that foreigners are unselfishly involved: the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the (ADF photo) battle is being fought. US Strategy, expending blood and treasure to help Haqqani Tribal Network, Hezb-islami for a large part of the war, almost them. The insurgents, rather than the Gulbiddin and various drug and completely ignored the population local authorities, are in the position to criminal motivated organisations. The in an attempt to focus on their war control the population around them. US’s initial view of the Insurgency against the Insurgency. This failure to This provides a political advantage as a solely Afghan phenomenon focus on the populations exacerbated that is enough to allow a motivated prevented an effective strategy from long standing barriers to US success insurgent to overcome all manner of being developed to counter it. This in Afghanistan. David Loyn, veteran tactical weakness in combat power view was exacerbated by a dominant BBC reporter on Afghanistan who has or skill. Furthermore, as support for mindset of Western map-making charted the country’s turbulent history government is not always the default in US strategy which emphasised in great depth, argues that mistakes position for inhabitants, a strategy of the importance of sovereign state are being repeated today because support by the US for these authorities borders that do not much matter at of a neglect of the study of history. also serve to negate the image it seeks the local level. The effect of a lack of He charges that the US has failed to to create. understanding of the enemy has been understand the extent of resistance The US failure to understand the a neglect to focus on the key strengths in Afghanistan to anything that looks social terrain in which it operates of the Insurgency, including several like foreign control. The problems of is compounded by a failure to fully thousand dedicated cadres, significant non-state violence, regional rivalries comprehend the nature of the funding from the drug trade, and the and the religious element in politics enemy faced. The relatively slow luxury of an unimpeded sanctuary in a are not new to Afghanistan, but these commencement of the Insurgency neighbouring country, Pakistan. have all been re-enforced by the meant that the gravity of the risks it The failure to take into account the current conflict. The legacy of the war posed was not appreciated for some insurgents’ relationship with Pakistan against Soviet Union remains one of time. Its common label, the ‘Taliban is the most crucial element of the the most dominant shaping factors in Insurgency’, is illustrative of this as it inability of US strategy to combat the collective memory of Afghanistan, fails to take into account the wide base the Insurgency, and has contributed manifesting itself in the instinctive of support the Insurgency has enjoyed most to Afghanistan’s ongoing suspicion of foreign projects and of as the war has progressed. As the divisions. The links between the central government. war in Afghanistan developed, the US Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan This suspicion has been recognised that they were facing not stretch back to the resistance against underestimated by the US and just a resurgent Taliban, but a much Soviet occupation in the 1980s when capitalised upon by their enemies. The more complex and deeply rooted Mujahideen were supported by the Insurgency has been able to portray Insurgency. CIA and ISI in Pakistan. Then from the United States as a belligerent The term ‘terrorist syndicate’ used 1994 onwards there was extensive occupying force seeking to control and by US Secretary of Defence Robert Pakistani official support for the manipulate the Afghan Government Gates in 2008 is a more appropriate Taliban movement in Afghanistan. The Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war

importance of this relationship cannot been assisting the Islamists. This by US Special Forces deep in Pakistani be overstated. Ahmed Rashid describes Pakistani retreat, moreover, was not territory without the foreknowledge or the situation succinctly in stating that: well supervised by U.S. forces and consent of the Pakistani Government may have permitted the escape of key for fear that plans would be leaked [t]he United States and NATO Taliban commanders. which did not bode well for US- have failed to understand that the The Obama administration has Pakistan relations. The unattractive Taliban belong to neither Afghanistan in recent times acknowledged the truth however, is that Pakistan is a far nor Pakistan, but are a lumpen importance of the Pakistan connection, larger, more powerful and generally population, the product of refugee which has resulted in increased drone more strategically important country camps, militarised madrassas, and the strikes in Pakistani territory and a than Afghanistan. If the price of lack of opportunities in the borderland greater emphasis being placed on saving Afghanistan were to be the of Pakistan and Afghanistan. the role of Islamabad in combating destabilisation of Pakistan, this is one the Insurgency. However US policy that is too great to pay and would By treating the Insurgency as an towards Pakistan still lacks strategic have greater consequences for US and Afghan problem and implementing coherence. The fact that Washington regional security. strategies and operations to combat considers the Pakistani authorities This policy shift to focus on this view, the US and NATO have in unreliable, with certain elements Pakistan may have come too late effect only dealt with half the problem. willing to pass on intelligence to US to salvage the situation within In early stages of the war there existed enemies, means that any efforts to deal Afghanistan. Support for the Afghan an almost unwillingness to deal with with the Insurgency problem within war is dropping in almost all nations the Pakistani connection in fear of Pakistan cannot be based on close involved, with many having set dates disrupting the delicate political balance military co-operation. for withdrawal. From the outset of the of Pakistan. The subordination of US This situation was perfectly Obama Administration it was clear that interests to those of Pakistan reached illustrated by the operation that located the US was looking for an exit strategy. an absurd point during the Afghan and killed Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin President Obama made this clear to the war when US forces ceased attacks on Laden, found to be hiding almost in participants in the 2009 policy review, Oil assets outside the Taliban in Kunduz to permit the plain sight in a town less than an hour stating ‘I’m not doing 10 years. I’m Iraq...a very withdrawal of thousands of Pakistani from the Pakistani capital. The assault not doing a long-term nation building different war ISI and military personnel who had that lead to his death was carried out effort. I’m not spending a trillion from Afghanistan (Courtesy RAN)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 63

dollars.’ The failure of the US, and its Bibliography NATO allies, in preventing the creation Richard Celso, ‘Phase IV Operations in of a social and security situation that the War on Terror: Comparing Iraq and allowed the Insurgency to gain traction Afghanistan’, Orbis, Spring 2010, pp 185- 198. has resulted in a long, costly and now Joseph Collins, ‘Afghanistan: The Path to seemingly pointless war. The failure to Victory’, Joint Forces Quarterly, 54, 3rd utilise the correct strategy and effective Quarter 2009 pp 58-61. tactics, the involvement of NATO Seth Jones, ‘Averting Failure in Afghanistan’, and the crucial failure to understand Survival, 48:1, Spring 2006, pp 111- 128. the environment in which they are Edward Luttwak, ‘Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military operating and the enemy they are Malpractice’, Harpers Magazine, 314, facing will result in, at best, a stale mate February 2007, pp 33-42. in Afghanistan. At worst, US credibility Michael McNrney, ‘Stablization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan’, Prameters, will have been dealt a major blow and 35:4, Winter2005/2006 pp 32- 46. the standing of NATO will be greatly Sean Maloney, ‘Can we Negotiate with the diminished. Paired with this outcome, Taliban?’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21:2, and often forgotten, is the plight of June 2010, pp 404-408. ordinary Afghans who have already Allan Orr, ‘Recasting Afghan Strategy’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 20:1, March 2009, endured almost 30 years of constant pp 87-117. war and who look set to find no peace Mark Pency & Yury Borsin, ‘Winning with in the near future. t Warlords in Afghanistan’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 22:4, October 2011, pp 603- 618. Charles Pfaff, ‘Aligning Means and Ends’, Military Review, September-October 2011, pp 78 – 83. Paul Rich, ‘Counterinsurgency or a War on Terror? The war in Afghanistan and the debate on Western Strategy’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21:2, June 2010, pp 414-428. Adam Roberts, ‘Doctrine and Reality in Afghanistan’, Survival, 51:1, February-March 2009, pp 26-60 Valentina Taddeo, ‘US responses to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan Campaign’, Journal of Strategic Security, 3:2, 2010 pp 27-38. Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: A Localised Insurgency with a local objective’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 21:2, June 2010, pp 259 – 276.

H MAS Bundaberg, crewed by Ardent Four and Commanded by Lieutenant Mike Gordon RAN is a Lieutenant Commander David Ince, sails under the Sydney Harbour Bridge during a port visit to HMAS Waterhen, Sydney Maritime Warfare Officer in the Royal Australian Navy. He graduated from the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2008 with a BA in History/Politics and is now studying a Masters in Strategy and Security. He is currently deployed as a Battle Watch Captain at Combined Maritime Forces, Bahrain.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 64 PWO SM – A Broader Future for the ‘Deep’ Specialist Boy C mmander Matt Buckley

This article identifies the significant structure. The PWO benefits the RAN can gain through title is considered incorporating Submarine Warfare important. Officer Course (SMWOC) students Common use of into key elements of future Principle this highly regarded Warfare Officer training to create a qualification ‘PWO SM’. appropriately This proposal goes beyond acknowledges skills suggesting that Submarine (SM) beyond core MWO students simply complete all ‘common’ roles and would phases of the new PWO course or serve to break fine-tuning a separate common warfare down some of the package. In essence this article is artificial barriers suggesting that SM students conduct which currently exist those elements of the new PWO between Submarine course which develop important skills and Surface Warfare for every specialist Maritime Warfare Officers. Officer (MWO) 1, while still completing The current the necessary specialist training to SMWOC comprises serve as a Submarine Warfare Officer approximately five at sea. months of: Far from providing a ‘watered • maritime down’ or soft path towards a PWO warfare qualification, this combination of theory training would almost certainly including incorporate a similar quantity of high Common intensity simulation and sea assessment Warfare periods as exist for the surface Training CPL Devlin and specialisations. (CWAR), Enduring challenges for conduct LAC Leedham from The important product of this • specialist theory, of the course are the provision of ideal 11SQN loading Sonar ‘course’ is that a student graduates • weapons and systems courses, student numbers, availability of the Bouys into the AP-3C Orion for Exercise as a PWO SM. Far from being • and practical assessment in the right concentration of assets for sea PWO SAW at odds with the future Maritime simulator and at sea. phases, and continuity of instructors. Warfare continuum, this proposal is These challenges are primarily induced sympathetic to the general concept of The course has traditionally been by the relatively small size of the the ‘deep specialist’ who still has the run annually with an ideal number Submarine Force and the Submarine necessary common maritime warfare of six students, which allows all key Training Authority. A number of knowledge to perform a range of non- ‘Officer Positions’ in the simulator to recent initiatives are however expected platform or functional duties. be filled by students and provides a to alleviate some of these issues over The example I will use here is reasonable rotation for sea assessment. the next two to three years; namely that the specialist skills required of a A successful graduate is able to directed specialisation2 and application PWO Air Warfare in an AWD will be ‘fight the submarine’ in a two-watch of the Fleet Operating Concept3. These notably different to those of a PWO system, serve as the Principle Sensor initiatives should respectively address Amphib in an LHD, and that the Coordinator in an action stations 2 This initiative ensures all junior warfare officers are streamed as specialists at a concept of a ‘general duties’ PWO will environment, and conduct the relatively early stage in their career no longer apply within our new force planning requirements of a SMWO at 3 This concept ensures the Fleet is sea and ashore. regularly ‘concentrated’ to achieve quality 1 Previously Seaman Officer training days underway Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 65

the key issues of student numbers Specifically the introduction of the time providing an increased focus on and asset concentration for underway PWO SM will serve to: the deep specialist knowledge required training. in our future force. Additionally Junior SM Officers • Create a baseline for Maritime While the exact nature of the now have a series of clear milestones Warfare Officer specialists. baseline is still in the process of being which they are required to achieve • Account for increased developed, it is apparent that common prior to SMWOC with the principle ‘integration’ of submarines into PWO phases are less likely to reflect requirement being the award of the networked force. what we currently view as ‘console an ‘Officer of the Watch Dived’ • Streamline training PWO’ requirements and will focus qualification. The implementation of resources and maximise the more on the requirements necessary these guidelines, which incorporates concentration of assets. for all specialised Maritime Warfare a quantitative number of dived hours • Increase cross pollination Officers. on watch, ensures SM Officers are of ideas amongst maritime The inclusion of submariners into well prepared for SMWOC and assists warfare specialists. the mix of specialists expected to career managers to identify when • Develop flexibility in career complete the future PWO course not candidates are likely to be ready for and posting options for only acknowledges that submarines are course. submariners. a crucial element in our maritime force Noting that SMWOC is likely to but also ensures these Officers have the benefit from an increase in candidates Developing a baseline for same important baseline knowledge and a higher concentration of assets Maritime Warfare Officer as other specialists. In addition to in coming years, it is important to Specialists the more traditional PWO ‘Air’ and detail precisely why the PWO SM path One of the key reasons for pursuing ‘Surface Warfare’ expected to complete should be pursued when the SMWOC the PWO SM concept is that it serves the Future PWO course, Navigators, solution may suffice. Fundamentally to provide a broader baseline for Mine Warfare and Amphibious the key reason for proposing the specialised Maritime Warfare Officers. specialists will also contribute to a introduction of the PWO SM is that Recent changes introduced under the genuinely broad phase of common a significant increase in capability can MWO continuum have incorporated training. be achieved without a marked increase a wide number of disciplines into the The addition of key elements of in cost or overall training liability. PWO qualification, while at the same the current Force Warfare Officer

FLTLT Kev Mulgrew of 92WG and FLTLT John Humphreys of the Australian Joint Acoustic Analysis Centre work together testing the acoustic station on board the AP-3C prior to taking off Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 66 PWO SM – A Broader Future for the ‘Deep’ Specialist

Course (FWOC) to the future PWO distinct from the more advanced level operating at the extremities of theatre, continuum also provides a baseline of tailored training delivered in PWO such as deep within a ‘non permissive’ amongst Maritime Warfare Specialists course. The SMWO would not only littoral, but still directly supporting the which enables employment of these benefit considerably from exposure objectives of the battle group or force. individuals in range of operational and to this higher level of training but The level of integration is expected task group roles aside from single unit would also be able to make valuable to increase in a connectivity sense, specific functions. Failure to include contributions to the general discussion where submarines previously operating Submarine Warfare Officers into this and provide another perspective to the ‘independently’ and managed directly training continuum may reduce the class. through the SUBOPAUTH will soon ability to employ these officers in non The second important element to be connected into the vast network of submarine seagoing roles, including consider is that FWOC in the present information through which the battle is in submarine specific ‘Headquarters’ form incorporates subject matter managed. functions. which is relevant to the SMWO, While many of the traditional The counter argument to including particularly when employed outside of roles of the submarine will remain, SMWOC students into the PWO submarine seagoing positions. Despite this integration into the battle group continuum for baseline warfare this very few SMWO have actually will require an increased awareness purposes is that these Officers could completed FWO training although on the part of the Submarine Warfare continue to complete Common several have been employed in a range Officer of the processes through which Warfare Course (CWAR) as a of roles where this course would have the Common Operating Picture and supplement to SMWOC and Force greatly enhanced their capability. Commander’s Priorities are managed. Warfare Officers Course (FWOC) as This is mainly due to the difficulty These skills will be fundamentally required to meet follow on posting in these Officers being released for addressed in the future PWO course requirements. There are a number a non-mandatory course once they and as long as there is an expectation of reasons why these courses do not are already SMWO qualified. The that Australian Submarines will be provide the best solution. integration of the core components of networked contributors to future Task Firstly, with Future PWO course FWOC into the future PWO course Group and Task Force Operations, it capturing the majority of maritime strengthens the case for the submarine is important that Submarine Warfare warfare specialisations into the students to pursue a PWO SM stream. Officers receive this training. common phases, submariners are likely to find they are conducting legacy The Increased Integration of Streamlining Resources and CWAR and FWOC training with a Submarines into a Networked Maximising Concentration of majority of non MWO specialists, Force Assets ranging from ‘application course’ The integration of Australian One of the key concerns raised Intelligence PQ Officers and Aviation Submarines into the future networked when identifying a concept such as Warfare Officers to other service task group is expected to increase the PWO SM, is that the training Officers expected to work in the significantly over the coming overhead and cost of achieving this maritime domain. decades. This will occur as the task outcome will increase beyond the While cross pollination amongst groups themselves form around new existing SMWOC requirement. If these groups is not a bad thing, it is capabilities such as the LHD and as this paper were proposing that SM important to understand that SMWO projects to increase the connectivity of candidates simply completed the ‘first students, like their PWO brethren are Collins Class Submarines take effect. six months’ of PWO course before tactical and operational practitioners The way in which submarines conducting a further five months of the who already have seagoing experience. will be integrated into a battle group current SMWOC, this may be a valid They not only have the same MWO construct is expected to vary from the argument. origins as their surface force peers more traditional ‘support’ roles where As stated earlier however, this but would benefit most from direct the submarine is generally operating in proposal is seeking to reach beyond exposure to them. CWAR by necessity the same tactical region as other units this solution to ensure that students needs to cover a broad spectrum of of the Task Group. With advances are only exposed to what they actually candidates and impart a generalist level in communications and networked need and that minimal duplication of maritime warfare knowledge quite information, submarines may be occurs between common and specialist Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 67

phases. Provided this can be achieved, there is a genuine opportunity for cost savings, as the delivery of common training to a larger group reduces overheads previously borne by the individual training delivery points. To use a current example, radar and acoustic theoretical training delivered to the current SMWOC and PWOC are surprisingly similar but are delivered separately by external providers through different Training Authorities. Much of the warfare theory delivered by uniformed instructors for both courses is also similar and while the cost is less apparent in this case, in terms of a reduction in instructor hours, the net effect is the same. SMWO students would under the proposed model be completing a broader level of common warfare training probably over more training hours than is currently the case, however through the rationalisation of resources, these additional requirements should be largely offset. HMAS Melbourne Additionally the overheads of extra While there have been efforts in the simulator phases of the course, again Command Team Training conducted courses such as FWO and CWAR past to match SMWOC and PWO sea increasing the level of integration and in the FFG-up would be eliminated under a common weeks, without a genuine common maximising shared resources. Operations Room delivery model. purpose these plans have sometimes It is worthy of note in this section Simulator at HMAS Assuming that the common been changed to meet other pressing that streamlining of assets also needs WATSON in 2011 elements of PWO SM training are imperatives. The delivery of a SAW to include directing staff. PWO course (Courtesy George viewed as a netsum gain, the true which incorporates submarine and is one of the premier courses run by Deakin) value in terms of efficiency in this surface requirements (along with Training Authority Maritime Warfare proposal comes with the unification aviation training) not only combines (TA-MW) while the smaller TA-SM of Sea Assessment Weeks (SAW) the necessary assets, but effectively runs the SMWOC. There are a range and potentially elements of practical creates a period which is ‘too big to fail’ of overheads which naturally go into simulation phases. Without and appropriately focuses the Fleet on course development, operations phase conducting deep analysis of the achieving this as a key force generation planning and administration. For the numbers, the frequency of SAW outcome. PWO SM model to be truly effective, required to meet PWO A/SW student At the time of writing Training it makes sense that the lead authority requirements should be appropriate to Authority Submarines (TA-SM), is would be TA-MW supported by TA- meet the proposed PWO SM demands. pursuing options to link the Collins SM. This is not only important because With this in mind, conducting a Class tactical Simulator in the West TA-MW ‘owns’ the PWO qualification SAW with ‘PWO’ students embarked with the Warship Simulator models at but also because this much larger in both ships and submarines Watson. Assuming this is achievable, organisation has the momentum to depending on specialisation, presents there is scope to conduct linked tactical support the course, keep it current and a unique opportunity to maximise level operations for PWO Surface and facilitate the SAW. scant resources for underway training. Submarine students during practical While this may appear to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 PWO SM – A Broader Future for the ‘Deep’ Specialist undermine the key role of TA-SM, in a exposure to major surface combatants PWO positions ashore and in deployed course with a large specialist element, than their predecessors and as a result or afloat headquarters without an this organisation could focus purely on are more likely to have a reduced additional training burden. The the delivering high quality specialist understanding of the conduct of common baseline may also provide training to which they are perfectly both surface and maritime aviation options for other PWO specialists to suited. In terms of the additional operations. fill some of those positions currently burden on TA-MW, this could be offset The introduction of these identified for SMWO’s increasing by the addition of qualified SMWO Officers into PWO course is a timely posting options for these individuals on staff, who would not only focus on opportunity for them to re-connect particularly in WA. PWO SM student requirements but with the greater Fleet and to develop The other important benefit of the who would also increase the breadth of a necessary understanding of the PWO SM is that those Officers who do warfare knowledge within the training broader aspects of maritime warfare. not progress to a SM Command (SM authority. From the perspective of the surface +) qualification, have a significantly specialists, addition of the submariners reduced training overhead to re- Increase cross pollination to the course enables them to gain specialise in another PWO field, of ideas amongst maritime unique exposure to submarine warfare, increasing their employability and warfare specialists this is particularly relevant for those future career prospects. Finally the Perhaps the most apparent benefit of Officers who may have only had limited important force warfare elements of a PWO-SM model is the significant exposure to submarine specialists the new PWO course will provide increase in cross pollination of ideas during their pre PWO careers. SM+ with significant additional skills that would naturally occur across the which they can directly apply both spectrum of PWO candidates. The Develop Flexibility in Career during their Sea Command and in a inclusion of the submariners into and Posting Options for number of post Command roles where the course proper would reduce any Submariners a solid baseline knowledge of broader ‘interloper’ type tag which may be The development of the PWO SM maritime and force warfare matters is associated by simply adding SMWOC will also provide a broader scope highly desirable. students to various components of the of employment options for the course. warfare qualified submariner which The Proposal Increasing the mix of specialists will improve flexibility for both the In essence this article is recommending on PWO course will achieve positive individual and the organisation. The the inclusion of submariners into the interaction for all students which will development of a career path for future PWO course, with the ultimate considerably enhance relationships professional submariners which objective being the formation of a between Fleet Warfare Officers. The incorporates a balance of sea and shore PWO SM qualification5. This proposal addition of submarine specialists roles, particularly for LEUT/LCDR may seem quite radical at first glance into the PWO fold is considered rank, can be enhanced by increasing but when considered against the more pressing now with the advent opportunities across the full spectrum overall changes to the way in which the of directed specialisation. The most of warfare postings rather than the common elements of PWO training are common path for submarine specialists limited number of positions which being considered. But it is in fact in line under the new MWO model is require submarine warfare specialists. with the broader intention to provide directly from completion of Phase This will not only provide incentive both baseline and deep specialist IV shore4, which achieves a steady for Officers who require respite from warfare training to all MWO’s. flow of candidates into the submarine submarine specific roles but also While this paper has not addressed stream and ensures Officers achieve ensure there are geographic options the specific components of exactly specialisation aims earlier in their outside of WA and Canberra where what a PWO SM continuum would careers. nearly all LEUT/LCDR SM positions look like, consultation with those The side effect of this change exist. developing the new PWO course however is that these Officers are The provision of a PWO SM 5 There have been a number of now less likely to have gained broader qualification will provide submarine Submariners that have successfully 4 The final stage of application course officers with the range of skills completed PWO training in the RAN at training for the MWO before proceeding to necessary to serve in a number of least three of these in the last two decades sea to achieve a Bridge Warfare Certificate have achieved SM Sea Command. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 69

and knowledge of existing SMWOC Commander Matt Buckley RAN is specialist requirements indicates a 3-4 The author would like to acknowledge month common phase at WATSON currently serving as the Executive the valuable contributions and would most likely be followed by 2-3 Officer of HMAS Watson. Prior to candid advice received from a large months of deep specialist training this he served as Commander Sea number of PWO and SM specialists in incorporating simulator and sea Training Submarines, Commanding formulating this submission. assessment phases. While this does Officer HMAS Collins and the Head of extend the overall time on course when compared to the current five Submarine Warfare Training at TA-SM. month SMWOC, this needs to be Matt has served in both Australian and balanced against the additional skills Canadian Oberon Class Submarines in gained, cross pollination of ideas, addition to the Collins class. rationalisation of resources and maximisation of assets which would be the products of this proposal. A detailed analysis of this proposal may recommend a solution which falls short of the full PWO SM model. However there is considerable evidence to support at a minimum the rationalisation of key elements of SMWOC and PWOC. Ultimately as the RAN moves towards a more integrated and focussed force, it is important that maritime warfare professionals across all dimensions break down artificial stovepipes and create a genuine baseline from which deep specialist knowledge can be launched. The addition of submariners into the PWO model is considered a vehicle for genuinely broadening the horizons of our ‘deep’ specialists and increasing the overall capability of all of our Warfare Officers. t

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 70 Book Reviews

of explanatory text which goes into details such as the design, component costs and the manpower allocated to each stage of construction. There is also a small section on the ‘G3’ battlecruisers that were cancelled as part of the Washington Naval Treaty, one of which was to have been built at Clydebank. Appendices give comparative dimensions of the five ships, construction timelines and summaries Clydebank of managers’ monthly reports that were originally used to chart progress at Battlecruisers: monthly meetings. Forgotten The ships and the shipyard have all Photographs from gone now but the 150 ton crane seen British Naval Aviation, in many of the photographs next to the John Brown’s Shipyard fitting-out berth is similar to the one at the First 100 Years Garden Island in Sydney; it survives as a By Ian Johnston visitor attraction and remains a familiar E dited by Tim Benbow; Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Seaforth Publishing/Naval Institute part of the Glasgow skyline. Press; £30 Most Australian readers will be Published by Ashgate Publishing, interested in the chapter on HMAS Farnham and Burlington, 2011 Reviewed by David Hobbs Australia which contains, in addition to the photographs, details about the pp: 226 pages plus index and This fascinating book delivers exactly contract agreed for her construction on footnotes what it says on the cover. The author 1 April 1910. It included the cost to the Reviewed by Commander David has gained access to and published yard, prices charged to the RAN, and a large number of photographs held thus profit agreed on every item, and Hobbs MBE RN (ret’d) by the National Records of Scotland we learn from it that the hull was priced that show the battlecruisers Inflexible, at £475,015 and the Babcock & Wilcox This important new work is the Australia, Tiger, Repulse and Hood under boilers at £120,700. sixth in a series on maritime policy construction in John Brown’s shipyard The inclusion of the ships built before published in both the UK and USA at Clydebank. Most of them were taken and after Australia allows the reader to by Ashgate for the Corbett Centre for originally as glass-plate negatives and are study the development of the type and Maritime Policy Studies. It contains of pin-sharp quality; all are in black and to compare the Australian flagship with nine Papers, each taking an academic white. Most show construction from other vessels that formed part of the look at a different aspect of the subject the launch and fitting out stage but the Battlecruiser Fleet in World War I and and then considering its impact on author has added images from his own with the later Hood. the Royal Navy. Sources, indicating archive to show Hood from the keel- I found this to be an attractively much primary research, are indicated laying onwards. presented book that is worth the cover by footnotes on almost every page but Cameras were still a novelty in price for the unique photographs there is no bibliography. the first two decades of the twentieth alone; they show aspects of the ships The authors include Eric Grove, century and the author rightly draws that are not usually seen by anyone Geoffrey Till, Ben Jones, Jon Robb- attention to the reaction of the workmen outside a shipyard. The well-researched Webb, Ian Speller, Edward Hampshire, and sailors to the cameramen in their data and details about the design and Lee Willett and Tim Benbow himself. midst with their tripods and other construction of Australia’s first capital Two papers analyse operational matters paraphernalia. ship add significantly to earlier works in the Mediterranean and Pacific The photographs are extensively on battlecruisers, balancing the images during World War II and a third covers captioned and each vessel has a chapter nicely. I recommend this book highly. t operations from the Korean War to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 71

the Falklands Conflict. Whilst these factual errors that have slipped through often more expensive options that are draw out the successful impact of the editorial ‘net’. On page 13 George not under naval control. naval aviation from global warfare to Colmore is described as a naval officer The Corbett Centre for Maritime deterrence in periods of relative peace, who obtained a Royal Aero Club pilot’s Policy Studies states on the back cover it is a pity that a further paper was not certificate at his own expense before that this book is sure to stimulate commissioned to study operations in the first four pilots trained officially at further discussion. It will certainly do the Atlantic where the initial failure Eastchurch. A study of contemporary that and this book has contemporary of Coastal Command led to it being Navy Lists, however, shows that he did relevance in Australia. The two placed under Admiralty control. It not join the RNAS until some years new Canberra-Class LHDs will give would have made an interesting study after gaining his certificate and was a Australia an impressive expeditionary and given a more rounded approach to civilian when he obtained it. capability but one in which the conflict in the different oceans. On page 120, the author fails to deployed ships and military forces and The first two papers cover the put the British Admiral’s choice of the their helicopters will rely in the initial beginnings of naval aviation and the battleship King George V as his flagship stages on fighters operating from a development of the RNAS. into context by pointing out that remote and vulnerable land base if Papers covering the period after Admiral Halsey USN, Commander of they are opposed by a credible enemy 1918 illustrate the fact that naval the Third Fleet and himself an aviator, equipped with its own close-support aircraft operating within a task chose to fly his flag in the battleship fighter aircraft. force under naval command have Missouri rather than an aircraft carrier. The decision as to whether this is represented not only an effective Also, he does not make clear that the a good idea or not will be the result of but in many cases the only option practice of handing tactical command exactly the sort of arguments that are available to the British Government in to the carrier admiral during flying described in this book. Arguments a number of crises and examples are operations was copied from the USN, about the viability of an independent quoted of deterrence as well as war- not a ‘legacy’ RN procedure. air force that does not share the fighting. However, notwithstanding On page 158 the Westland Wyverns operational views of its deployed these successes and the Royal Navy’s embarked in Eagle for Operation expeditionary forces are not unique pioneering development of naval ‘MUSKETEER’ are described as and although this book focuses on the aviation throughout much of the period ‘piston-engined’. The original UK, the arguments are equally relevant in question, it has had to fight for its prototypes in 1946 were piston- in Australia and the USA. They are very existence in a series of peacetime engined but by 1956 the Wyvern S4 probably far from over and those who ‘battles’ in Whitehall. It is in this area was a much-developed turbo-prop take an intelligent interest in defence that the work excels and its analysis of version powered the Armstrong matters will find this book fascinating the political intrigues that have sought, Siddeley Python ASP 3. These are as will those who wonder why the and still seek, to limit the Royal Navy’s minor flaws, however, in a book that Royal Navy is in the state it is today. I ability to deploy aircraft can genuinely is otherwise well researched and recommend it highly. t be called groundbreaking. authoritative. By simultaneously addressing For me the papers that stand out historical and current issues, British are those that describe the failed Naval Aviation reveals the continuing experiment of ‘dual-control’ in the themes that run through them inter-war years; the ‘Radical Review’ and exposes many of the fallacious of 1953-55; the ‘battle’ for CVA-01 and arguments that have been deployed the background to the present Queen against aircraft carriers as shallow and Elizabeth class carriers. It seems that self-interested. Similar arguments were as long as an air branch forming an deployed in Australia when the RAN integral part of the Royal Navy has attempted to replace the aircraft carrier existed, there has been a cadre of Melbourne in the late 1970s and early opponents determined to remove 1980s and they will sound familiar to what has proved to be the Service’s the book’s Australian readership. most effective weapons system and to Inevitably there are some small replace it with other less-capable and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 72 Book Reviews

of war in the Pacific began a process of it very clear that there never was a slow differentiation in uniforms which golden age of perfect uniformity when has gathered pace in recent decades. sailors wore their uniform strictly as it This book does not deal only was intended. The casual Australian with the regular naval forces of the approach to formality meant that Australian colonies and later the “Jack” was usually not keen to be seen Commonwealth. It has a chapter on to conform closely to what the Naval the Australian Naval Reserves and Board intended him to look like. Here Auxiliary Forces, the Women’s Services there are photographs of sailors with – both the WRANS and RAN Nurses; their caps worn “flat aback” with a Navy Bands and the Naval Dockyard tangle of hair showing in front. Sailors Police. illegally modified their best uniform Uniforms tell us much about by making the jacket very tight and the attitudes and beliefs of our professional bell bottoms wider than regulation. K it Muster:Uniforms, forebears. The elaborate ceremonial Clearly “Jack the sailor” wanted to look uniforms and fine points of rank like “Jack the Lad“ when he was going Badges and Categories distinction of the commissioned and ashore and was reluctant to let Navy of the Australian Navy warrant officers contrasted with the dress regulations cramp his style, or his 1865 -1953 austere and simple rigs with which chance of attracting admiring glances. sailors were issued. As frock coats and In 1923 the Naval Board issued the first By John Perryman, CSM - Sea Power bullion disappeared this distinction of several rebukes to ratings over their Centre diminished, and now we view with departure from dress standards. some amazement the sheer richness It has been brought to the Hardback. 305 pages. of the dress uniforms of officers in attention of the Naval Board that Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods the period before World War II. Fore there is a marked tendency to and aft cocked hats, and elaborately depart in small details from the This beautifully illustrated book is a decorated sword belts, were required authorised pattern of various long overdue encyclopaedia of what for formal events. In 1929 it was articles of uniform. The attention the sailors and officers of the Australian decided that RAN officers appointed of Commanding officers is drawn Navy have been wearing since the for duty in the United Kingdom, or to this wrong practice and it is inception of the colonial naval services on loan to the RN, were to provide desired that the necessary steps be through until the coronation of Queen themselves with this full dress uniform. taken forthwith to cause all such Elizabeth II. John Perryman has put Considering that officers were required articles of apparel to be strictly together a definitive source for all those to buy all their uniform items out of in accordance with the approved who are keen to understand what was their modest pay this instruction must pattern. worn and why, over the first years of have entailed considerable borrowing One can imagine the general apathy the Australian Navy. As the senior from family or from the tailors and and disregard with which such naval historical officer at the Sea Power outfitters. It is hardly surprising that “harrumphing” by British trained Centre–Australia the author has been many young officers took years to pay admirals would have been received on ideally placed to access the illustrations off their gold bullion epaulettes alone! the lower deck of Australian warships. and photographs which, combined The purchase of a sword was another Every generation of sailors has gone with his clear narrative, make this major expenditure for young officers into battle wearing what was believed book so enjoyable to read and useful and it was not until 1943 that Masters to be most appropriate for their to refer to. He has also made good use at Arms, the most senior of non- circumstances. In the tropics that often of records and uniform illustrations commissioned sailors, were permitted meant very little. Topless gunners are from the UK. This reflects the fact that to draw a sword on loan, on an “as not exactly compliant with our modern appearance of the sailors and officers required” basis from the armoury OH&S regulations but photos show of the Australian Navy was almost instead of being required to buy their that they were common enough in the indistinguishable from that of the RN, own. waters off New Guinea in 1942. Even the parent service, until the exigencies The photographs in the book make overalls were once a novelty. Until the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 73

1930’s stokers worked in a wide variety their attention to the women’s lack of (and women), dressed as seamen” wore of pieces of naval uniform in the steamy anything to wear. It read: “To all intents during the formative decades when heat of boiler and engine rooms. The and purposes WRANS here in the the nation and the Navy were both still wearing of the civilian pattern duffel nude for life. Please expedite delivery of young . coat and a tin hat has become familiar armbands.” Single copies of Kit Muster may be from WWII films like The Cruel Sea John Perryman has filled this book obtained from the SPC-A by e-mailing along with mugs of cocoa served at with snippets of information like this the Centre, Attention: Publications all hours to exhausted watchkeepers. and captions which bring to life the Distribution Officer. E-mail: seapower. What officers and their sailors wore at uniform items depicted. As a collector [email protected] There is no sea on long wartime patrols depended of militaria himself he understands charge and the print run is limited to not so much on uniform regulations that the significance of an items of 1000 unless there is an overwhelming as on what was available and practical uniform is in its provenance not in its requirement to produce a second given the climate. face value. Uniforms are every bit as edition. t Wartime RANVR officers wore much a part of the Navy’s history as their “wavy navy” sleeve stripes with the guns mounted outside our shore pride, but their insignia indicated establishments and the paintings that they were volunteers, borne hanging on the walls of naval museums for “hostilities only”, unlike their and wardroom. Uniforms define the straight-laced RAN shipmates. In the officer and sailor and though much modern navy we seek to avoid making has changed it is also remarkable such external distinctions between how much has survived essentially permanent Navy and the Reserves. In unaltered. For example, the basic the past such external distinctions were pattern of the summer and winter seen, however unfairly, as being the uniforms worn today are unchanged in dividing line between the amateur and over a century. Blue Action Working the professional officer. Dress (AWD) survived from 1945 until Materials which we take for granted very recently. Pride in appearance is were once novel and expensive. For only possible because uniform makes example rubber soles for boots and it possible for a ship’s company to feel shoes were not generally available until “ all of one company.” That has not rationing of rubber stopped in 1952. changed and nor will it. Navy Divers Prior to that leather soles must have One often sees naval uniform worn been lethally slippery on wet ladders by actors in films made by directors By Gregor Salmon and decks. In 1934 stokers were issued and their assistants who clearly have with wooden-soled stokehold clogs, little idea about what exactly was worn Random House ( Ebury) ISBN presumably to diffuse the heat from in a particular period at sea and ashore. 781741666571 the engine room plates. It is easy to A minor but irritating example is imagine the general response by stokers officers’ shoulder boards “going astern”. Reviewed by LCDR Desmond Woods to their appearance! These are commonplace. Now there The requirement to dress women are no more excuses for the wardrobe The more secretive and specialized seems to have taken the Naval Board department of a film or TV production a military unit is the more intriguing completely by surprise in 1942 when getting uniform details wrong. In this and interesting it is to discover the the WRANS were instituted. The first book John Perryman has nailed the truth about its history. All special women wireless telegraphists at HMAS questions, what was worn, when and forces like to cultivate an aura of elite Harman had no naval uniforms to start by whom? In doing so he has provided exceptionalism in which to cloak their work in; all they were issued with was a a book which should be widely popular operations. The RAN’s Clearance WRANS armband and even they were with the serving, ex-serving and the Divers Branch retains a mystique which in short supply. The Inspector of naval “never-served” population alike. It will helps ensure that its members are recruiting sought to remedy this by appeal to anyone interested in what recognised as being second to none. sending a signal to the Board drawing Australia’s naval officers and “men, But the reputation of an elite unit Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 74 Book Reviews needs to be firmly based on a history into the “Heart of Darkness” that was the last five years the Navy’s divers of operational success. That history is the riverine war on the Mekong and have been clearing the roads and what this new book by Gregor Salmon at Vung Tau during the Vietnam War. buildings of Afghanistan from Taliban provides very well indeed. The author gives vivid descriptions of IEDs so that troops and civilians can Many of us are aware that during the hair’s breadth escapes that all the keep moving. Frequently the diver at WWII the RAN’s most highly divers experienced as they became the work on an IED knows that he is being decorated men were those who served “go to guys” for any ordnance issues watched as he clears it by the Taliban with the RN, clearing German mines that were too dangerous for simple technician who planted it. This is a that were dropped onto British cities, destruction and needed to be rendered very personal war. Failure to detect estuaries and in 1944 into French inert. and disarm means lives will be lost. and Dutch ports. HMS Vernon in The CD Team 3 divers were But that fact has been true for the Portsmouth was the cradle of this up against Soviet-trained North whole history of the Diver Branch back new breed of mine disposal expert. Vietnamese special operations units to 1939. These men had to combine patience, that waged a determined campaign Salmon includes in the book an courage, meticulous attention to to destroy shipping, ammunition account of the shark attack which took detail, rapid ability to learn, skill with dumps, foot patrols. They targeted a hand and most of one leg from diver primitive hand tools, decisiveness the specialists able to deal with their Paul de Gelder and his extraordinary if they were to survive. A capacity mines and bombs. This EOD work was determination to survive, recover and for an explosive sprint away from a every bit as dangerous as that done return to duty. That is a story every mine was also essential. A rare breed by those who defused German mines, bit at inspirational and courageous indeed! Four Australian officers but in the disillusionment of the post- as those of the heroes who defused Lieutenant Commander John Stuart Vietnam war period, due recognition underwater mines using touch alone. Mould, Lieutenant Commander Leon of this heroism was never granted by This fine book will be particularly Goldsworthy, Lieutenant Hugh Syme an ungrateful nation. Only in the last welcomed as a clear narrative history and Lieutenant George Gosse were few years has this changed and a unit of this specialist unit by those who are universally admired for their repeated citation sent by the US for the divers members or former members of the demonstrations of their technical skill has been finally presented decades after diver branch. It should also be enjoyed and ability to learn and teach life saving they were sent. According to Salmon, by a much wider readership. lessons to others. Their deeds laid the the citation was left languishing in a Too little is known by most bedrock for the post war Australian filing cabinet in Russell for 30 years ! members of the ADF and the wider Navy diving branch. Salmon goes on to describe the Australian public about ordinary men Salmon takes the reader through long running experiment of putting the performing extraordinary service and each of these men’s careers and Navy’s Divers through the SAS Cadre who have been saving lives at the risk explains why the odds against their courses. This was an experiment in of their own for more than 60 years. survival never got any better as cultural integration which was never They must surely deserve the accolade the Germans laid more technically tested on operations. It had some “ the bravest of the brave.” t complex mines with new booby serious teething problems some of traps for those who had learned how which were resolved in a famous fist to defuse the previous ones. This is fight. When the decision was made gripping page-turning writing and to end the partnership both units had explains why the George Crosses and a profound respect for what the other George Medals which these Australians was capable of. received from the King were so well Salmon moves smoothly into the earned. modern counterterrorism era and They demonstrated exceptional gives a fine explanation of the work valour, not in the face of the enemy, done to clear Umn Qasr so that relief but in the face of the enemy’s most ships could dock after the invasion ingenious and talented explosives of Iraq. Australian divers were the engineers. acknowledged experts in clearance The author next takes the reader diving throughout this campaign. For Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 75

enemy retreated north, and slowly the numbers of those who died in the Allied aircraft followed them, leaving defence of northern Australia climbs over 40 airfields behind them; facilities steadily through the story – there is a and wreckage galore – and a great testimony to their efforts in these pages need to fill in the pages of history to that will ensure they are not forgotten. catalogue such momentous events in For that reason alone the second Australia’s history. Author Bob Alford edition of this book will doubtless be was a local historian – he now lives sought out by the family members of overseas – and he charted the way with those who served in the air war. meticulous attention to detail. The only problem for any reader Darwin’s Air War’s second edition who possesses the first edition of this expands on this with much more detail. admirable work is what to do with the Thirteen chapters replace eight, and the original book. Personally, I have passed author has also given the reader more my first copy of Darwin’s Air War on Darwin’s Air War strategic analysis with chapters such as to “a southerner” who wanted to know “A Show of Force; the Japanese a Fading more about the Top End conflict, now Threat?” A chapter of seven “pilot gaining more deserved recognition as By Bob Alford profiles’ remains, but more reference the 70th anniversary of the first raids detail is presented in the shape of five arrives. Doubtless once his appetite is ISBN 978-0-9807713-0-5 appendices as opposed to three. whetted he will be back for more with Reviewed by LCDR Tom Lewis Alford has not been afraid to this 2011 book. This second edition disassemble his old analysis and revise is at once timely, valuable, and a most Bob Alford’s first edition of Darwin’s it where new facts come to hand. For impressive work in its own right. Air War was a most timely and useful example, he now notes 107 incursions Bob Alford is to be congratulated for publication when it was released in over the northern land border, which bringing his excellent revised book into the 1990s. The original book was a resulted in 64 raids. Such revelations history’s service. t slim A4 hardback edition, of 80 pages. open up the air story for Australia’s The new edition of the work, still A4, north even more than previously. is more than three times the size at An extremely welcome addition is 260 pages. There looks to be well over the expanded index that will make this 100% more photos, and they are well the definitive reference work for WWII reproduced to assist the text and tell a air battles in this region. Over 30 pages story themselves. And most welcome long, the index is presented in several is the delivery of a huge quantity of different ways, enabling squadrons, further information concerning enemy personnel, aircraft, general subjects air activities over the Top End in World and more to be the key of choice for the War II. researcher. The first work featured a In presentation terms, as before, this chronological build-up of the air is both an easy and a fascinating read. defences of the Northern Territory Almost every page has an illustration, in WWII, followed by an outline of and there are several pages of colour the first raids, and the fight back with photographs. All serve to bring to life strengthening units which first took a the individual and squadron stories deterrence role, and then progressed to of the aircraft, pilots and the most taking the war further afield from the valuable ground crew who kept the Australian airfields. Spitfires replaced whole show on the road. The photos Kittyhawks; four-engined bombers also give an insight into the tough replaced light twins, and radar came conditions of the Territory: heat, dust, in to give early warning. It was a hard- and a harsh terrain that took as few fought war, lasting two years. Then the prisoners as the enemy. The grim Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 76 Book Reviews

dog with its handler is unique, and previously written what the cover tells both grow to understand each other in us is a bestseller – Matterhorn – which a most intense way. On patrol, if a dog’s this reviewer hasn’t read. That was a ear goes up, or their hair flattens: such novel, a fictionalised version of the indicators mean something, and the south-east Asian war. This new book is message is mostly essential. reality, and also a work of questioning The book is quite heartbreaking and reasoning. when dogs are described dying, as they Marlantes ventures into difficult do. The dogs have rank, and if their territory. A United States Marine, handler dies they are buried alongside he is honest in that he and his fellows their human master. Sarbi, like all sometimes obtained exultation from armed forces’ dogs, was selected for her their experiences – the ultimate keenness and in her particular case, an adrenaline high. This will instantly obsession with selecting tennis balls. repulse some readers. But then This book is both unusual the author presents them with the and fascinating. It has a series of hypocrisy of what they ask – they Saving Private Sarbi photographs which help the story belong to societies which ask some of along, and overall, Saving Private their people to go into combat. By Sandra Lee Sarbi was an excellent read. Highly The author’s Vietnam stories are Allen and Unwin, 2011. 315 pages; recommended. t usually singular, and followed by a soft cover; illustrated. piece of commentary in which he argues the points of a mixture of Reviewed by Kaylene Anderson ethics, sociological ponderings, and Quick Review philosophy. There are questions raised by LCDR Tom Lewis such as how should warriors behave; Australian journalist Sandra Lee has how should they be trained, and put together in Saving Private Sarbi a tasked, and honoured. It’s an absorbing readable but lengthy story concerning and well-written account. There are a work dog employed by the Australian personal anecdotes about Marlantes’ Army. A black Labrador-cross, Sarbi successes and failures following his detected explosives in Afghanistan. combat experience: it seems he was Then she went missing in action well-decorated but somewhat of a bad following a battle between the Talban boy for some time before he left the US and elements of the Special Air Service. military. Altogether it’s an easy read In 2008, some months later, Sarbi despite the somewhat strange alleyways was found near a local village. She had the author has travelled through in the survived injuries and a cold winter. decades since that most divisive war Reunited with her handler, she is now The fate of the book is going to be helping to train new dogs for their curious. I would not be surprised to essential work in detecting bombs, see it taken up within military training improvised weapons, and buried across any country – for which it would ammunition in the inhospitable terrain What it is Like to be well suited. Whether it will succeed of Afghanistan. in changing the minds of those who I found this an often sad, but usually Go to War criticise the military for what they do gripping story of man’s best friend in This is a most curious book. It mixes remains to be seen. I expect many action. Saving Private Sarbi will be read reminiscences from the author’s time would dismiss What it is Like to Go to easily by those who don’t have a dog of as a platoon commander in Vietnam, War without reading it, simply because their own in their lives, but for those with his reflections on veterans’ places of its author’s background. That would who do this book presents a further in society – both what is it is, and what be a pity, for this is a work that deserves challenge. The bond of the working it should be. Writer Karl Marlantes has to be read. t Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 77

T he Royal Brunei Armed Forces has officially accepted two Darussalam Class Patrol Vessels: KDB Darussalam & KDB Darulehsan T he handing over ceremony took place at Lürssen Shipyard, Germany. The vessels have a length of 80 metres and 13 metres breadth; are propelled by diesels and have an endurance of 21 days at sea. The ships are equipped with surface to surface missile and a medium calibre gun. The Darussalam class replace the Missile Gun Boat Waspada class which have been in service with the Royal Brunei Navy for more than 30 years.

Photos by Michael Nitz

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 78

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 79

Supporting the Ontario Barrage – A major naval undertaking

he torpedo boat destroyers, Italian coast. Much of their work to submarine detection and Huon HMA Ships Huon and was in support of the Otranto and Parramatta also operated TParramatta, two of the six Barrage, a major undertaking captive observation balloons. The members of the RAN’s Destroyer involving heavy nets, surface primary anti-submarine weapon Flotilla, pictured late in World ships and aircraft, and designed consisted of hand-launched depth War I. From August 1917 the to prevent enemy submarines charges, which can be seen here flotilla began patrol operations escaping into the Mediterranean. mounted on the sterns of both in the mouth of the Adriatic Sea The Australian destroyers were vessels.t from a base at Brindisi on the fitted with hydrophones as an aid

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 80 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

O ur new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). F igure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member

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Figure 7

Participating in the forum Figure 2 Figure 3 In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login Logging in to your account and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with and your reply will not be added to the topic. the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 81 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work So: the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use Conventions: If citing web sites please use the alongside the article title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words convention: Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use and italics. Book and Journal titles use 17 February, 2004. Forwarding your article: Citations: So, web site name. Article title. Full Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: footnotes to explain any points you want Bylines: The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where the reader to notice immediately. Book Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to titles follow Author surname, first name, beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations. title if any. Title. Place of publication: Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack publisher, year of that edition. Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 82 Australian Naval Institute

The Australian Naval Institute was formed as a self- considered. As much of the RAN’s attention Editorial Board. supporting and non-profit making organisation; operational and administrative history Articles of greater length can incorporated in the Australian Capital Territory in 1975. The is poorly recorded, the recollections of submitted to the Sea Power Centre- main objectives of the Institute are: members (and others) on these topics Australia for possible publication as • to encourage and promote the advancement of knowledge are keenly sought. a Working Paper (seapower.centre@ related to the Navy and the maritime profession; and Views and opinions expressed in defence.gov.au) • to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas concerning Headmark are those of the authors and subjects related to the Navy and the maritime profession. not necessarily those of the Institute, the Editorial Board Membership subscription rates are located on the next page. 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(See the style guide naval and maritime matters (where they Public Officer: in this issue for further details.) will either be added to the collection lcdr David Swanson ran (non mem. position) Articles should ideally range in size or traded for difficult to obtain books). from 3000-7000 words, but smaller The point of contact for access to the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute articles will be considered, as will collection, or to make arrangements for Headmark is published quarterly. The Editorial Board seeks the occasional larger piece of work. book/journal donations is the SPC-A letters and articles on naval or maritime issues. Articles Submissions should be sent to the Editor Information Manager on (02) 6127 6512, concerning operations or administration/policy are of in the first instance. email: [email protected] particular interest but papers on any relevant topic will be Email: [email protected] and mark Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 83 The Australian Naval Institute ABN: 45 988 480 239 PO Box 29 Red Hill ACT 2603, AUSTRALIA PHONE: +61 2 6295 0056 FAX: +61 2 6295 3367 EMAIL: [email protected]

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute T he Royal Australian Navy’s newest ship HMAS Choules arrived at its homeport at Fleet Base East in Sydney for the first time after being formally commissioned into service in Fremantle on 13 December 2011. Family and friends lined the wharf to welcome the Navy’s latest amphibious ship and her crew of 158. Commander of Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Steve Gilmore AM, CSC, RAN joined HMAS Choules for her maiden voyage through Sydney Heads, before officially handing over the weight of command to the new Commander Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Tim Barrett AM, CSC RAN. The acquisition of HMAS Choules will ensure that the Royal Australian Navy has the amphibious capability it needs for operations and humanitarian support in our region in the period leading up to the arrival of the Royal Australian Navy’s Landing Helicopter Dock Ships in 2014 and 2015 (Photos courtesy RAN)