Vernon Parker Oration Basing of RAN
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
ISSUE 143 March 2012 Vernon Parker Oration Basing of RAN Assets and the Force Posture Review Australia’s Future Submarine Capability; An Integrated Plan for Success JP Stevenson: Justice denied - a career unfairly cut short Australia’s Future Submarine Capability – Research and Development Implications Explaining the failings in US strategy for the Afghanistan war PWO SM – A Broader Future for the‘Deep’ Specialist JOURNAL OF THE QinetiQ Maritime Oceans of Experience QinetiQ is a leading international provider of independent technology based services and solutions to Defence, Aerospace and Security Markets. Our clients benefit from 300 specialist staff based in Australia and the ability to draw upon the expertise, experience and knowledge of over 10,000 QinetiQ employees from across the globe. As Australia’s largest independent provider of specialist technical advice services to Defence and industry, QinetiQ provides through-life Design, Delivery and Sustainment services to help our maritime customers complete challenging missions safely and effectively. For more information contact our Maritime team: Tel: 1800 038 081 www.QinetiQ.com.au Issue 143 3 Letter to the Editor Contents ‘BlackBerry Leadership’ Pitfalls Vernon Parker Oration 4 - The Positives and the Classified military systems permit Pitfalls deliberation, consideration and control of sensitive and important information. Basing of RAN Assets Positives Unclassified instant systems open the and the Force Posture Review 14 Management processes have changed door for knee jerk reaction and one- rapidly in a few short years. 24/7 upmanship - tempting even the wisest Australia’s Future Submarine email connectivity, remote access leader to transmit instead of receive. Capability; An Integrated Plan to corporate databases and tools... Command and control becomes for Success 22 and possession of the notorious blurred, and truth against speculation BlackBerry/iPhone/gadget which is becomes difficult to assess. Security It’s Preparedness, Stupid. 27 becoming as common as car keys in a classification can become selective leaders pocket. when speed overrides sensitivity. JP Stevenson: Justice denied The pace of news, whether Senior leaders remaining in touch - a career unfairly cut short 31 corporate information or public while out of the office, and even on information management, has leave, can void any delegation to the increased to real time. Daily and 2IC, removing an important level Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond: hourly updates are required to avoid of leadership grooming. If the 2IC Visionary or Heretic? 37 the ‘how come I didn’t know before knows they’re being watched, he or they did’ knowledge demand that has she is missing a key independence Royal Moroccan Navy F ront page photograph: perpetuated its way through corporate and responsibility in the necessary commissions first SIGMA 42 Royal Australian and public society. Defence is not opportunity to grow as the next leader. Navy Sea King helicopters from 817 immune from this phenomenon. Accountability never sleeps it seems. Australia’s Future Submarine Squadron making Now that momentum has started, I’m not trying to suggest that Capability – Research and their final flight before and grasped by Prime Ministers and ‘BlackBerry leadership’ devolve back Development Implications 45 Presidents down, it can’t be stopped. to the 1990s and hand-written memos, decommissioning. A Daily Orders, once gestetnered out but rather raise issues so that we can be formation of 3 Sea for noticeboards (and the purple ink prepared for potential consequences of Where to Britain? 52 Kings from the Naval stained hands), have been replaced reaching in, when sometimes the best Air Station at HMAS with emailed information directly course of action is to let the situation Records Management – the backbone Albatross, Nowra, to monitors, desktop and laptop work its way through the ‘system’. That’s of an efficient organisation 53 proceeded up the computers, phones and mounted on why we have the ‘system’. NSW coast to Sydney, webpages; even at sea. I’m no Luddite. Embrace the HRH Prince Phillip 56 flying over Sydney Face to face discussions are being gadgets and the opportunities I say, Harbour then turn replaced by video teleconferencing and and the synergies that technology south to Canberra, over Explaining the failings in US ‘email hockey’. brings. Embrace it - or get left behind. Lake Burley Griffin strategy for the Afghanistan war 58 Automated receipt messages have Ironically (or perhaps not!), this ‘letter’ and the Australian taken away the excuse of ‘I didn’t was written and submitted on a War Memorial before see that’. Signal reading logs have BlackBerry. PWO SM – A Broader Future heading east to the moved to online message distribution. for the ‘Deep’ Specialist 64 coast back to the Naval The immediacy of the news and Ashley Papp Air Station information cycle is at a hectic pace. Is Book Reviews 70 it going to increase further? Can it? Issue Number 143 Visions from the Vault 79 Printed by Everbest Printing SPONSORS: Company Style Notes for Headmark 81 - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL ISSN 1833-6531 - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - QINETIQ - ATI - SAAB Design & DTP by ANI Membership Application Form 83 Diane Bricknell - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - LOPAC - BLOHM+VOSS NAVAL [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 Vernon Parker Oration Australian Naval Institute 4 August 2011 FROM REAR ADMIRAL JAMES GOLDRICK, RAN et me start with two caveats. The should explain that when I talk of a understanding how that seaborne first is that some of the arguments ‘fleet unit’, I am not describing a task trade operates or explaining just why as Land ideas which I will propose are group or task force as such, but a range well as how it should be protected. In ‘works in progress’. The second is that of capabilities which together provide doctrinal terms, I could describe much I will speak here specifically about a coherent construct that meets our of the debate in Australia as oscillating the Navy – after all, if I cannot do so maritime strategic requirements. And, historically between a focus on denial here, where can I? – but many of my while I will talk here only about the – the cliché of ‘fortress Australia’ – and comments do have applicability to the navy, the truth is that a ‘fleet unit’ also on projection – the cliché of ‘deployed other Services and to the ADF as a encompasses air and land capabilities forces in distant lands’ – while missing whole. when they have maritime application. much of the necessary link between The story of the Australian Navy It is clear that part of the issue over these two of control, which remains is one that reflects the continuing force structure has been partly due an abiding requirement for a sea strategic challenges faced by our to a difficulty in achieving national dependent nation like ours. Just what nation as it has evolved towards acceptance of the full span of our constitutes an effective ‘fleet unit’ may full independence and a greater maritime strategic requirements, which be change as a result of changes in the understanding of its place in the world. have always included both surety of the relative priorities for denial, control T he Australian And as I consider, from the basis of local and regional environment and and projection, but in the Australian destroyer HMAS studies that I have done over the years protection of the maritime networks situation there will always need to be Brisbane (DDG 41) on our carrier acquisition program, our upon which Australia’s economy some mix of all three. and the US Navy DDG acquisition and, most recently, depends. Perhaps there should be The second aspect relates to destroyer USS John the history of our various submarine little conflict between these two, but the national commitment, human S. McCain (DDG 56) cruise side by programs1, I perceive a recurrent there has been a tendency, despite and material, required to maintain side in Australian theme. It is one of critical mass and our dependence upon seaborne trade, the desired force structure. It is an waters during a struggle to sustain a level of effort to ignore its absolutely fundamental empirical observation, but I believe Operation Exercise which will be truly effective in relation importance – and the navy has not that we sit in Australia at a point Tandem Thrust 2001 to the resources that we devote to it. always been good at either fully at which the relationship between (Courtesy RAN) There are two aspects to this problem. The first is that of force structure – what I term the ‘fleet unit’ question, whereby Australia has repeatedly sought to create a force capable of meeting our strategic demands, but has often found it more expensive and difficult to sustain than the nation was willing to accept. I 1 See the author’s ‘Carriers for the Commonwealth’ in T.R. Frame, J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones (Eds) Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991; J.V.P. Goldrick & P.D. Jones Struggling for a Solution: The RAN and the Acquisition of a Surface to Air Missile Capability RAN Sea Power Centre Working Paper No. 2, January 2000; James Goldrick ‘From Submersibles to SWUP: The First Seventy Five Years of Submarines in Australian Defence and Naval Policy’ 2011 Creswell Oration. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 143 5 the investment required to sustain our desired force structure and the actual combat capability realised is at its most unfavourable. I emphasise here that I am not talking just about the resources required to maintain ships and systems in service but those needed to experiment, to innovate, to develop doctrine and to push both technological and operational boundaries. These are the really difficult things, these are the things which involve risk and, quite frequently, failure.