ISSUE 140

June 2011 A Common Platform for a New AO, AOR & Sealift Support Ship Command Course – Sanitising the near field, Looking into the deep field Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer The Indian Ocean through the Ages Gulf Deployment - Through an Artist’s Eyes

808 Squadron Support Arrangements to meet Navy MRH90 Operations Adrift in a Think Tank: Insights from the Lowy Institute

Journal of the

Issue 140 3 Letters to the Editor Contents

Dear Editor, As a member of the Naval Historical I enjoyed the article in Issue 138 Advisory Committee responsible for A Common Platform for a New AO, December 2010 by Midshipman overseeing the selection process for the AOR & Sealift Support Ship 4 Claire Hodge on RAN Helicopter names of future RAN ships I was very Flight Vietnam but must correct her interested to read the article written by Submarine Command Course – Note 2, where she states that SEA LCDR Paul Garai, RAN, which appears Sanitising the near field,L ooking into DRAGON was the RAN’s principal in Headmark Issue 138, concerning the deep field 7 commitment during the Vietnam war, giving more meaningful names to the and the ships involved were HMA two new LHD’s. Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer 13 Ships Hobart, Vendetta and Brisbane. When viewing the article I was SEA DRAGON was the surprised to read that the RAN The Indian Ocean through the Ages 20 interdiction of supply routes and had previously named a logistic craft along the coast of North Gallipoli. This is a misleading Studies in Trait Leadership – Loved Vietnam from the DMZ to the Red comment. No RAN destroyer, or Leader: Sir David Martin, River Delta (near Hanoi). On those any other commissioned RAN kcmg, ao, ran 28 operations ships came under fire warship, has ever carried the name from shore batteries and there was Gallipoli, although three RAN ships Gulf Deployment the threat of North Vietnamese air have been named Anzac giving much - Through an Artist’s Eyes 38 and torpedo-boat attack – they were broader recognition to the deeds of the suspended on 1 November 1968, Australian and New Zealand soldiers 808 Squadron Support Arrangements during Perth’s second deployment. who fought at Gallipoli, and elsewhere, to meet Navy MRH90 Operations 42 Hobart and Perth were the only RAN during World War I. ships involved. After November 1968 The names Canberra and Adelaide Collective Amnesia in Whitehall 1981 the latter deployments of those two were selected for the two LHDs by the – 2010: The 2010 UK Strategic Review ships, plus Brisbane and Vendetta, all then-incumbent Chief of Navy in 2005 of the . An antipodean involved Naval Gunfire Support or following a lengthy and consultative perspective 47 other activities off the coast of South process. Both names were considered Vietnam. highly suitable and subsequently Adrift in a Think Tank: approved by the Governor General and Insights from the Lowy Institute 54 Yours sincerely, announced by the then Minister for AC, VADM (RAN Ret) Defence on 20 January 2006. It is most Last words... unlikely that any consideration will be from HMAS Sydney 1941 57 given to changing them now. The Global Maritime Partnership John Perryman, CSM and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Senior Naval Historical Officer Australia at the Crossroads of the Sea Power Centre - Australia “Maritime Century” 58

Book Reviews 65

Front page photograph: Hundreds of family and friends welcomed the 230 crew of HMAS Visions from the Vault 75 Melbourne home to Sydney after a six month deployment in the Middle East. (ABIS Sarah

Williams, Navy Imagery Unit - East). ANI On-line Guide 76 Issue Number 140

Style Notes for Headmark 77 Printed by Everbest Printing SPONSORS: Company Australian Naval Institute Info 78 - RAYTHEON - BOOZ & COMPANY - AUSTAL ISSN 1833-6531 - THALES NAVAL GROUP - DMS MARITME - QINETIQ ANI Membership Application Form 79 Design & DTP by - AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION - ATI - LOPAC - SAAB Diane Bricknell www.diartist.com.au Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 A Common Platform for a New AO, AOR & Sealift Support Ship By Gavin Baker

he has a long history of operational success Tthat is based upon the professionalism of our people and the capabilities of our equipment. This success has been, for the most part, as a result of the capacity of the RAN to deploy into distant theatres and support our forces while they are there. As we look into the future, this need to be deployable is not going to change.1 However, the costs, both in financial terms and in human resources, are going to become increasingly more difficult to support. One way to reduce rising costs might be to adopt a policy of commonality Canberra-class at wherever possible. Recent discussions of each ship’s specific role, but the an engineer to progress through an launch (Department concerning this approach have capacity and capability that the basic entire technical career and never go to of Defence) focussed on the proposed Offshore hull provides will meet the RAN’s sea in any other Combatant Vessels.2 requirements for all five ships. ship. It is suggested that a similar The approach to commonality could R ecent Ran History problems with be adopted for the RAN’s fleet of this are obvious: amphibious and logistic support ships. Across the span of the RAN’s history the sailor Specifically, it is suggested that the we have been required to deploy ships in question adoption of a hull form; engineering far from our shores. To do this we have develops configuration; and command, control needed ships specifically designed to professionally & communications (C3) system for support those deployments. Without without the HMAS SUCCESS the new AO, AOR and Sealift Support exception, these essential ships have benefit of experiencing different undergoing final painting in 2007 Ship common to those of the Canberra been more different than they have systems and different ways of (Courtesy RAN) Class LPD would offer substantial been alike. One only has to look at life; problem solving approaches advantages over a fleet comprising the current disparate group of ships become entrenched; and personnel three or four completely different ship providing the critical, often high- management skills focus on “the way types. profile, support to operations both it has always been done here.” On the It is not suggested that we at sea and ashore to recognise the corporate side of the question, the should acquire five LPDs, but rather challenges to training and crewing that sailor can only be effectively employed that all five ships, that are likely to they represent. in one platform without substantial comprise the RAN’s amphibious The most obvious example of additional training and experience; and afloat support fleet, be designed these challenges is provided by drastically limiting posting options. and built upon a common hull and HMAS Success where, as a result of engineering layout. This is not to say her completely unique engineering T he Opportunity that all five hulls would (or should) be plant and the commensurately unique identical. Superstructure and internal training and experience required to Recently, the decision was taken to configuration are bound to change to operate that plant, it is possible (and acquire the two ships of the Canberra meet the operational requirements more efficient for the organisation) for Class. These are state-of-the-art ships Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 5

with modern propulsion plants and C3 operations specialists; four discrete ship-sets of equipment suites that offer great potential to be • postings and career fitted in five different platforms. For upgraded as required to meet changing progression; example, there is very little in common fleet requirements, while retaining an • maintenance and support; and between the training of an engineering essential fleet-wide commonality. The • whole-ship DC training. watch keeper for HMAS Success when size and layout of these ships, taken in compared to HMAS Sirius. concert with the fundamental flexibility An excellent example of using this Additionally, while simulators are offered by their modern systems, design philosophy to great advantage recognised as a cost effective method provides the RAN with an opportunity is provided by the US Navy through of providing training, the RAN would to adopt, over the course of the normal the decision to build Ticonderoga need four separate ship simulators just platform acquisition cycle, a common Class cruisers on the basic hull and to train the personnel posted to the hull, engineering configuration and 3C engineering layout of the Spruance five ships under discussion. Juxtapose suite across the entire amphibious and Class destroyer. this with the situation we have the afloat support fleet. If this opportunity opportunity to realise where all five were to be sacrificed on the alter of Training of marine engineers, electrical ships’ companies could be trained on short-term reductions, the enduring engineers and operations specialists one set of simulators. Suddenly, there detriment to the whole Navy would are real financial benefits to be had. affect us for an entire generation as we The fundamentals of any trade can be, Similarly, training provided continued to struggle with the financial and are, taught as part of the normal onboard to the vast majority of sailors and personnel costs of supporting an training and education of sailors at in the marine engineering, electrical unnecessarily diverse fleet. shore establishments across Australia. engineering and operations branches However, the specifics of operating and would be equally applicable to any one Advantages maintaining the systems peculiar to a of the other four common platforms in particular ship must be done either in the fleet. The benefits of having a single hull and a dedicated simulator or onboard the engineering configuration common to platform itself. Within the amphibious Postings and career progression all five ships would be enormous and and afloat support elements of today’s Royal Australian Navy vessel encompass four essential elements: RAN either approach is difficult and Beyond the obvious financial benefits HMAS Sirius • training of marine engineers, expensive to achieve simply because of all of this common training, (Photographed by electrical engineers and there are, with some exceptions, emerging both from simple economies Chris Sattler)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 A Common Platform for a New AO, AOR & Sealift Support Ship

of scale and from the commonality members get to know their ship. With and afloat support fleet based upon discussed above, there are also massive common systems and ship layout, to a common platform, we will over improvements that emerge in the go with the common procedures that the course of the next ten to fifteen realm of human resource management. we already teach, new crew members years gradually arrive at an end-state Posting options for career management will be much more combat ready where common training, experience, agencies increase by a factor of at much more quickly, meaning work-ups maintenance and support will realise least five, more if one allows for the should be able to progress more quickly substantial cost savings along with permanent manning of a simulator and less expensively. an overall increase in operational facility, as the fleet of common More importantly, however, effectiveness. The choice would, on the platform grows to its full potential. when (if) these ships ever do find face of it, appear to be an easy one to Equally, career options for individual themselves in action, crews trained and make. t sailors increase by the same factor. experienced in successive postings to Additionally, divisional staff would have common platforms would be far better options for dealing with a broad range positioned to deal with the unexpected of personal issues for which there are, results of combat damage and the today, no viable choices available that stresses of battle in a more familiar allow sailors to continue to progress environment. professionally. Disadvantages Maintenance and support It is acknowledged that the process of Economies of scale will offer a directing the hull form, engineering significant reduction in the costs configuration and 3C could dictate the to maintain and support all of the selection of the current shipbuilder systems in a group of five similar in contravention of aspects of the ships versus four ship types that are competitive bidding process. It is also Commander Gavin Baker, CD, RAN, completely different. The reductions accepted that this might bring with served for 22 years in the Canadian in the number of individual line items it some additional acquisition costs. Armed Forces before joining the RAN. within the stores system, across the However, in mitigation against these Seagoing service included Operations entire spectrum from circuit cards to cost increases, there are likely to be oil filters, will help to simplify RAN options for local industry to execute Officer inH MCS Kootenay; Weapons logistics. The number of maintenance Navantia plans, along lines similar to Officeror f Destroyer Squadron Two, manuals required would be on the the process employed when Australia and as Operations Officer inH MAS order of a quarter of that needed today. built the ANZAC class to a MEKO Canberra. He commanded HMAS Furthermore, as one considers the design. It should also be acknowledged Gawler from 2004 to 2006. life cycle maintenance and support that acquisition only represents a costs associated with a homogenous fraction of the overall lifetime costs of a fleet of five 25,000 ton ships, the warship and that the savings discussed Shore postings have included the overall financial savings are likely to be above will, in the long run, outweigh Directorate of Naval Officersostings, P tremendous. any short-term increases. and as Operations Officeror f Border In conclusion, the RAN is at a Protection Command, and as a Watch Whole-ship DC Training crossroads. If we carry on acquiring ships as we have done in the past, we Commander in the Joint Control This particular element of training has will continue to have to deal with the Centre. At the time of writing he was been separated out from that discussed issue of “orphan” ships and all of the Commanding Officer ofH MAS Penguin. above because it speaks not to training, logistic and human resource economics but to combat survivability. management baggage that comes along Inevitably, when a ship goes through with it. Alternatively, if we take the long (Endnotes) a posting cycle, there is a period of view, and deliberately embark upon a 1 RAN Doctrine 1, pp. 48, 142, 165 reduced effectiveness as the new crew programme to acquire an amphibious 2 Semaphore Issue 04, May 2010 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 7 Submarine Command Course – Sanitising the near field, Looking into the deep field By ‘Mops’

he Submarine Command Course (SMCC), colloquially known Tas ‘Perisher’, is suffering a crisis of confidence in the senior echelons of Navy. Mixed success in the last few years has placed extreme pressure on the Australian Submarine Force. The idea to repatriate the course, which is currently conducted by the Royal Navy (RNLN), back to Australia is once again coming into consideration, and the idea of having officers attend the course prior to being posted as Executive Officer of an Australian submarine is also going around the buoy. After the 2009 White Paper, we know that in the near future that we will have double the number of to find Commanding Officers for, so it is timely to ask – “Where next for our prospective Perishers?” The first Australian students attended the Submarine Command Course in 1995, in response to the Royal Navy decommissioning all their diesel- electric submarines and running an entirely-nuclear submarine force. Prior to 1995, Australia had sent its prospective submarine captains to the visits to relevant operational sites and to recognise their own limitations. That A Collins-class United Kingdom for assessment on modules as diverse as Bridge Resource is the core aim of the course. Whilst submarine from overhead (Courtesy the world-renowned Commanding Management. it is imperative that all graduates are RAN) Officer’s Qualifying Course (COQC). The course is conducted entirely able to safely operate independently In its current form, Perisher lasts in English, as a common language or in company, and a student will be for approximately five months, and amongst the international participants. immediately removed if found to be includes a dedicated week of at-sea Along with Dutch and Australian unsafe, the crux of Perisher is for a periscope safety, and four weeks students, the RNLN SMCC has submarine to recognise their at sea conducting a tactical phase students from South Korea, Brazil, own personal limitations in terms in the Clyde estuary, Irish Sea and Israel, Denmark, the United States, of fighting the submarine, and to be Inner Hebrides that is part of a much Canada and South Africa amongst able to define ‘clearing bearings’ for larger NATO exercise known as others. The ‘Teacher’ – a Dutch their team that stop short of the CO’s Joint Warrior. There are also several Commander – pushes the students personal ‘limiting danger line’. weeks of intense simulator training, both at sea and ashore as far as it takes During the course the students Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Issue 140 9 Submarine Command Course – Sanitising the near field, Looking into the deep field

operate a Dutch submarine closer to the edge than they have ever done before or are ever likely to do again short of war. In many scenarios the Perisher student has only five metres of water under the submarine as a passes five metres overhead. They conduct precise deep navigation using an echo sounder and stopwatch through shallow and busy shipping routes with up to seven knots of tidal stream, and deploy and recover special forces in high-threat areas. All the while, Teacher increases the workload on each student, so that the students bond as a team as well as developing as individuals. The students all attend the course A Seawolf-class fast- knowing that should they commit not think this would be too much of an is over four hours. This is a decrease attack submarine, a cardinal error that jeopardises the issue, but as of writing two of our three in dived time over a five-day working the USS Connecticut safety of the submarine then they will running submarines are commanded week of twenty percent. Inshore (rightly) be removed immediately by officers on their second command. operations are limited in scope due to – sometimes by helicopter within So why are our officers not passing the geographic extent of the shallow the hour. It is a harsh learning at the historic rate? There are a number continental shelf. The decrease in environment, often reinforced by the of possibilities. Only four of the 30 the quality of the dived hours in not helicopter strop that is strategically officers who have attended Perisher measurable, but it is clear by the placed at the back of the Dutch since 1995 were Collins-only qualified. ongoing paucity of available assets in submarine Control Room. But this The remainder were cross-trained the West that the days of multi-ship external pressure is nothing compared on both Oberon and Collins-class CASEXs occurring on a daily basis are to the internal pressure that our submarines. Of those four who were well and truly over. This availability officers place themselves under, and Collins-only, only two have passed goes two ways – submarines have coping with pressure is a part of the SMCC. This may be in part due to the always been fickle beasts in terms assessment. This is what they have built move of the Submarine Force from of serviceability, but the Oberon- themselves up to over 10 years. Sydney to Western Australia. When class submarine was essentially Despite the unforgiving nature the Submarine Force was based in farm machinery, with simple, farm of Perisher, Australia has had a very Sydney, submarines could be dived less machinery fixes. Collins-class defects good success rate on the Dutch than 90 minutes after leaving the wharf obviously range in difficulty, but have course. Between 1995 and 2010, at Neutral Bay. Surface ships were been known recently to have taken 30 officers have attended with 23 in abundance at , and submarines out of operation for six (77%) succeeding – an average well weekly running consisting of multi-ship months or more. The combination of above even the Dutch. So what is the CASEXs and Inshore Operations were the change in submarine home-port as problem? Unfortunately, of the seven the norm. Submarine watchkeeping well as the decreased availability of the officers who did not pass, four of those officers were very familiar and Collins-class (through both personnel attended the course in the last five comfortable with warships being in and materiel causes) over the years years. In the same period five officers close company whilst dived. has meant a substantial reduction in (56%) did succeed in completing the Once the Submarine Force moved actual dived time as well as the quality course (just under the Dutch average). to Fleet Base West, there were fewer of that time over a 15 year period. This With submariner retention rates over ships available (ASWEX 10 is a good translates to a reduction and narrowing those years resulting in only three hulls example of this) and the transit time of the experience of those who attend currently being manned, one would from the wharf to the diving position the Submarine Command Course due Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 Submarine Command Course – Sanitising the near field, Looking into the deep field to a clear loss of ‘in-contact’ time. These are not the only reasons our submarine officers have not been quite as successful on SMCC as was previously seen. Another factor has crippled our submarine seaman officers throughout their careers – the continuity of instructors at the Submarine School. With very few submarine officers posted ashore at any given time, the three Seaman Officer instructional positions at TA-SM have long been revolving doors. To give a pertinent example, in the last ten years, there have been more officers posted to the position of Head of Submarine Warfare Training, traditionally the ‘Teacher’ of Submarine Executive Officers Course, than there have been Learning the iterations of that course. manoeuvring at close quarters with above by the fall in the success rate trade...a photo taken Whilst that position has now been multiple warships, as occurs in a in the last five years, if we are not through HMAS’s renamed, it is still filled by an officer Fleet Concentration Period, then the preparing our officers adequately by the Oxley’s periscope of a returning from SMCC who is awaiting prospective submarine captain is at a end of their XO job (through whatever possible target command, and therefore has no disadvantage. If that Executive Officer reason) then we are certainly not doing continuity. It has again become vacant has spent those crucial months with them any favours by sending them on at time of writing after being filled for the submarine operating independently SMCC with two years less experience less than a year. The same is true for then his ingrained reactions are almost than they currently attend the course the junior Seaman Officer positions at the polar-opposite of the aggressive, with. TA-SM – the two billets are normally fighting stance that is required on the The astute reader will note that either vacant or filled on a short-term course. not once in this article have I said that basis. This means that training content Out of the four officers who have an officer has “failed” Perisher. To do has been seldom updated to reflect not completed Perisher in the last so would be a misnomer. To get to current tactics and practices. This is no five years, three have attended the Perisher is an achievement in itself. reflection on TA-SM – it is reflective of course alone rather than with another Nowhere else in the fleet is command the parlous manning state of submarine Australian. In the past there have been (and therefore promotion) linked to seaman officers. Unfortunately, the solo Australian officers on the course, passing a selection course. Anywhere few officers that we have are needed at but the mutual support of another else, and in any role apart from sea, which then hampers the training Australian officer when operating a submarine command, these officers are HMS Portland, as of new officers and a vicious circle foreign submarine in unfamiliar waters the cream of the crop. Two of the four seen through the develops where by attempting to is invaluable. It appears that we are that we have lost from submarines in periscope of attack increase submarine capability we are stacking the deck against our officers by the last five years have won the Kelly submarine actually degrading it. sending them alone. HMS The activities conducted by The review of the Maritime Warfare Trafalgar, on command an officer during their time as an Officer specialisation also stated that qualification Executive Officer, that is, the sea time officers could be selected to attend exercises off immediately before commencing SMCC before doing the Executive the north Perisher, may also be relevant to Officer job. This has occurred coast of the likelihood of passing the course. previously (once to the author’s Scotland Unless the submarine’s activities in the knowledge) and the student was (Courtesy UK Navy News) months leading to Perisher includes successful. However, as demonstrated Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 11

Shield by commanding the best Minor on Perisher results in a potentially fatal shore positions – War Vessel in the fleet. One of those decision, then he will leave the course. we must have our officers gained a CDF Commendation It is far better to have something like training positions for his outstanding leadership. that occur in a controlled environment filled by officers who How the RAN employs and where it can be ultimately prevented are posted long-term, manages these officers after they rather than a year down the track when not just those who are unsuccessfully return from Perisher that officer is in command and has no temporarily medically LCDR Gary Lawton (left) has been inconsistent. A successful safety net to save his crew. unfit for sea, or those and LCDR Mark Potter, job as XO of a frigate appears to Secondly, the Submarine Officer in a short holding pattern for their next after completion of warrant promotion to Commander Continuation Training week held sea posting. Giving our unsuccessful their Perisher in 2002 for a high-performing Seaman Officer on HMAS Collins in October 2010 Perishers a career path with real – not so for a submarine XO who has should be an annual event that is promotion prospects without having performed to an equal standard. Only supported with the appropriate level to revert to general service would go a successful completion of Perisher gives of assets. This period is designed to long way to solving this. a submarine Maritime Warfare Officer include exercises with warships at close So what about the near future? a fighting chance at promotion to quarters, opposed inshore operations There is quite an obvious temptation to Commander without having to leave and bottom contour navigation. In an react swiftly to recent events regarding the Submarine Force and forge a niche ideal environment, all those officers SMCC by calling for the course to elsewhere. This unofficial ‘hobbling’ is who are competitive for Perisher be conducted in Australia, so that why the Submarine Force immediately selection would be given conduct of the it meets ‘our’ requirements and our loses officers with 10 years plus of submarine under the watchful eyes of officers are assessed by one of our own. experience if they don’t complete the submarine CO and Commander This is not a good idea in the short Perisher – this experience could Sea Training–Submarines. What this to medium term, but is inevitable in be better used teaching our junior exercise is also useful for is to expose the deep field. Perisher already meets submariners and thereby increase our junior officers to what they can be ‘our’ requirements – how the Dutch submarine capability. expected to do in future years. operate and how the RAN Submarine The undeserved stigma associated Thirdly, we must tailor XO postings Force operates is not dissimilar. In used against with the unsuccessful Perisher is no to submarine activities, and the XO fact many of our current safety and a submarine from the air...an AQS-13 longer what it used to be, and the should expect two years in that job. navigation practises originated from Dipping Sonar being Submarine Force would gladly employ The first year of a submarine XO’s ideas garnered whilst on SMCC over lowered from an these officers meaningfully, but an tenure should see the officer posted to the years. The location of the sea SH-3D Sea King artificial impediment to promotion a submarine scheduled for independent phases of SMCC in the Clyde estuary helicopter (RAN exists to those officers who still wish operations. At the end of the first and surrounds present a range of well- photo) to continue to provide their hard- year, the XO should be moved on to a won expertise where it is desperately submarine conducting fleet support needed. It is acknowledged that only activities so that he or she is ‘fresh’ in a certain number of promotions are dealing with multiple ships at close available in any given year, and whole- quarters when they start SMCC. of-Navy workforce constraints dictate Fourthly there must be recognition the numbers of each specialisation that fleet assets are required to to be promoted. There is, however, produce submarine capability – not no mention in official policy that a just the other way around. Submarines submarine-qualified Maritime Warfare regularly travel to the east coast to Officer must have achieved a pass on support Fleet Concentration Periods SMCC to be promoted beyond LCDR. and individual surface ship activities, So how do we improve our pass rate but when was then last time a ship in the near future? Firstly, we shouldn’t travelled to the west to support a expect everyone to pass. That just isn’t submarine workup? realistic. Even the best-prepared XO Lastly, we must pay more than lip will have a bad day, but if that bad day service to submarine Seaman Officer Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 Submarine Command Course – Sanitising the near field, Looking into the deep field charted topography, both terrestrial there needs to be a shift in naval focus between one and three candidates for Perisher every two and subsurface, that we simply do not to concentrate on submarines. This years. It is far more cost effective to conduct the course have in Australia. means that we need to commit assets with the RNLN than it is to conduct in Australia until we The assets available for the NATO to realise this capability. can successfully retain enough Seaman Officers at Warfare Exercise Joint Warrior dwarf our entire How do we find these masses of Officer-level to man five hulls (as well as our shore positions). order of battle. I cannot imagine ever aircraft, ships and submarines? Well, This is because a full complement of Warfare Officers over having four , two submarines we already have them in part by five hulls has the flow-on effect of producing a demand for and several aircraft and helicopters virtue of our participation in Exercise three successful Perishers per year, and with the traditional annually dedicated to a Submarine RIMPAC/TALISMAN SABRE and success rate, that would therefore require four attendees per Command Course in Australia that USN Submarine Command Course year. So the simple answer is that we shouldn’t run our own lasted for four straight weeks. The (SCC). The concentration of assets Perisher yet because it is not cost effective until we can fully Dutch ‘Teacher’ offers a completely at RIMPAC/TALISMAN SABRE crew five submarines. objective assessment of an Australian provides an ideal opportunity for our In conclusion, the RNLN submarine command course officer, free of any workforce pressures prospective submarine captains to currently provides what we need in terms of curriculum, that would be laid upon an Australian demonstrate their prowess in ASuW, environment, assets and standards and is likely to for the ‘Teacher’. Without trying to insult ASW and Surveillance. Participation next five to ten years. It is our own preparation of prospective anyone’s professionalism, with such in the USN SCC would add a weapon- students that has been the issue. Asset availability, extended a small submarine force, where every centric phase. With only deep water transit times, inadequately manned training positions, a officer knows every other officer, can an surrounding the Hawaiian Islands non-structured approach to XO postings and unofficial Australian ‘Teacher’ really be objective? chain, a separate, inshore phase would impediments to the promotion of unsuccessful Perishers all The temptation to send unsuccessful also be required annually to ensure have contributed to a falling success rate in the last few years. officers ‘around the buoy’ I fear would that our candidates for command are In the long term it is inevitable that we will need to run be too great should the course be assessed in navigationally constrained our own Submarine Command Course if we are to have held in Australia in the near term. waters. This would mean the annual a sustainable Submarine Force, but this requires a firm This question is already being asked commitment of a second submarine, commitment of a substantial amount of ADF assets on a and the situation is permitted under two frigates, four helicopters and yearly basis, and the planning for this needs to begin soon. the new Maritime Warfare Officer two MPA for a two week period that The importance of Australia’s Submarine Force as the future review, but as previously stated, the would occur either immediately premier RAN combat force in the maritime domain needs crux of Perisher is to take prospective before or immediately after RIMPAC/ to be recognised early and credence (and budget) given to its Commanding Officers out of their TALISMAN SABRE. And a shift in development. The Commanding Officer of Australia’s first comfort zones so that in unfamiliar focus that recognises the necessity of SEA1000 submarine has joined the Navy this year – we need situations they can recognise their own producing an increasing number of to support this person (and their relief) in the best way we limitations and operate within those. Perishers needs to occur to make this can. t If an officer has previously done the happen. course, then he will be far less outside So why can’t or don’t we do this his comfort zone if he has experienced now? We simply do not have the the same situations previously. And demand to justify committing these as a recent unsuccessful Perisher said resources (military or financial) to “Who wants to be the only bloke ever an Australian SMCC at the moment. to spear-in on Perisher twice?” Stepping down the submarine Into the deep field, with a shift command ladder a couple of rungs, in naval focus to concentrate on as it stands the Submarine Force submarines, it is inevitable that we cannot fill all the Warfare Officer will have to run our own Submarine positions available on three operational Command Course. With 12 submarines. In two of the currently- submarines we cannot reasonably running submarines, because of this expect to send up to eight officers a shortage, the XO keeps watches 12 year to a foreign course as there simply hours per day. The shortage of Warfare will not be that amount of places Officers and Executive Officers means available. The important part is that that at present we can only supply Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 13 Beyond the Principal Warfare Officer B y RearAdmiral , RAN

Author’s Note: Earlier drafts of this article have had the benefit of review by a number of practitioners from across the entire thirty eight year range of the ‘PWO experience’ (and even before). With the agreement of the authors, two edited commentaries are attached. I would also particularly like to acknowledge the advice and comments of David Murphy and Geoffrey McGinley, both currently serving PWOs – one now closely associated with AEGIS and the other with the new ASMD upgrade. Some of their suggestions have been incorporated in the text but I am hoping that they will be able to contribute to the debate at more length in future issues of Headmark.

Principal Warfare his article argues that we need to a detection which would come Officer, Lieutenant Tto move beyond the current only a few minutes (if that) before Stefaan De Brauwer paradigm of the Principal Warfare weapon impact. British flag officers on his console in the Officer (PWO) in order to allow in the 1960s, most notably the then Operations Room on the production of a warfare officer (later Admiral of the HMAS ANZAC during development continuum which meets Fleet Sir) Edward Ashmore1 became Exercise Northern Trident the needs of twenty first century increasingly concerned that the sub- maritime warfare. In particular, the engagement, with specialist personnel specialist training system (which core of expertise in our future warfare closing up to take over as soon as produced, amongst other categories, officers must be centred much more possible. specialist ASW, Gunnery, Direction, on the set up and operation of sensor, The advent of the anti-ship missile Communications and Navigating battle management, weapon and (highlighted by the sinking of the specialists) did not provide the communication systems than in the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967) added a necessary expertise to its graduates in mastery of pre-planned responses, new urgency to the problem because areas other than their own and that the many of which can best be handled initial responses to even the least concept of going to action stations to by appropriately directed automated sophisticated of such weapons were bring in the ‘first eleven’ did not meet systems. not simple, while the Soviets and the response times required. After satellite nations were investing heavily representations from the flag officers in Why the PWO? The 60s Threat in anti-ship missile technology which the (then) Western and Eastern Fleets Environment was evolving rapidly. Furthermore, a working group was established in the It is important here to understand aircraft carriers were becoming fewer Ministry of Defence to develop a single some critical assumptions which in numbers (and for the Royal Navy stream warfare officer model, while the justified the PWO concept when it an endangered species with the 1966 concept was trialled in two Leander was implemented at the beginning of decision to abandon construction of class general purpose frigates. the 1970s. The motivations behind a conventional take off and landing Western navies were also working the creation of the PWO derived from carrier and phase out the existing hard at this time to establish pre- an increasing recognition in the mid- force). planned responses and procedures 1960s that maritime warfare was a 24 It was accepted that warships which would allow rapid reaction hour, seven day a week challenge and would have little or no beyond horizon without confusion. (The packages that threats could arise with little or range warning of attack unless they of pre-planned actions against no notice from any environment. This were under the umbrella of aerial anti-ship missiles were described situation had in fact been the case early warning aircraft – which were under and initiated by what became since the start of the Second World not going to be available in many designated the ‘Bingo’ and then War and, within the Commonwealth situations. Similarly, in ASW scenarios, ‘Zippo’ codenames.) In developing navies, the Principal Control Officer their first indication of an underwater these procedures, it became apparent (PCO), delegated authority by the threat was likely to be an attack from that they required a high degree of

Commanding Officer to fire the ship’s a covertly positioned submarine 1 Then serving as Flag Officer Second in armament had been the result. But the rather than its detection at long range, Command Far East Fleet, the RN’s principal seagoing flag appointment in the late 1960s. PCO concept in the 1960s was itself unless air assets were available. Thus, See his autobiography (with Eric Grove) The felt to be insufficient because it only the personnel on watch would have Battle and the Breeze. Sutton Publishing with the Royal Naval Museum, Stroud, 1997. applied to first contact and immediate to respond instantly and correctly Especially p. 170 & p. 175. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14

Beyond the Principal Warfare OfficerContinued... teamwork and considerable practice sub-specialist training to the ‘common’ the problems of the 1960s wholly appropriate to the twenty to execute effectively, as did equivalent course described above, or in efforts first century? anti-submarine measures, and the to place greater reliance on the Three tendencies are apparent in modern maritime PWO concept was viewed as being expertise of senior sailors, the latter operations. The first is that network enabled operation central to achieving the necessary being implicit in the original PWO provide units with much greater access to a galaxy of remote standards on a 24 hour basis. It was in concept. Indeed, the combination of sensors as well as the ability to share data (sometimes of fact acknowledged at the time that the the various warfare streams into a targeting quality even in an air environment) to a degree that only area in which real improvement combat systems operator and manager was only dreamt of fifty years ago. This means that units have could practically be achieved within category in more recent years may a much greater ability to develop a degree of awareness of a reasonable period was in personnel have partly undermined the latter the battlespace and of the threats that they face than did their rather than weapons or sensors, bound effort within the RAN at least. The predecessors and at much longer ranges. All this suggests as the latter were by increasingly truth is that the system knowledge of that the focus of warfare officers should be first on ensuring lengthy acquisition cycles. The core of PWOs has never really matched that that the picture available to them is as comprehensive as the PWO training program became of their sub-specialist predecessors possible and then on planning and operating accordingly. mastery of the responses, albeit with and it is arguable that this has become The second is the increasing challenges that modern a highly practical focus in terms of an increasing problem as the legacy systems represent, not so much in terms of reliability, rote memorising of the various actions of the old sub-specialisations and but in ensuring that they are appropriately tuned and involved and then, in simulators and at deep qualified senior sailors slowly configured to operate at the highest possible levels within sea, practising and proving the ability leached out from fleet and training given environments and situations. The SPY radar and to carry them out within the required establishments. The Course itself the associated AEGIS weapon system require significant times and in the correct order. has gone through a number of effort to ensure that they are properly set up and this set permutations, with associated or up is continually reassessed as conditions change. In a way, The PWO Concept at Sea separated sub-specialist modules and this is a reversion to the situation of the first half of the last The PWO concept was viewed, additional qualifications (particularly century, when sub-specialist officers were highly expert in despite some misgivings, as being focused on group or force as opposed the engineering and operation of their systems and, gunnery reasonably successful in service. It to single ship warfare officer duties) at officers in particular, devoted large amounts of time to the has faced only one real test of war different times becoming part of the alignment and grooming of their systems – and not just since its introduction and that was the continuum. In recent times, the RAN when emerging from refit or deep maintenance but as part of Falklands conflict of 1982. While there has adopted a single common PWO the daily operating cycle. were some system and tactical failures, Course with the intent that officers It is arguable that the PWO concept was possible at all these were generally not ascribable undertake further training after an because it came at a time when system reliability and tuning to any fundamental deficiencies in initial sea posting – a construct not became much less difficult to achieve than they had been PWO training but to wider issues of unlike the original RN PWO Course. since the start of the mechanical computer era in the first readiness, intelligence and equipment decade of the twentieth century. The mature solid state – and the misjudgements inevitable The Warfare Problem - Facing the systems which began to emerge in the mid-1960s were much under the intense pressures of battle. Twenty First Century easier to set up and maintain, particularly by comparison Indeed, the result of the conflict was In the light of experience, the RAN is with the complex valve technology of the 1950s2. In 2010, generally to increase confidence in the now moving back towards equipping the problem now comes in the software, since increased PWO system in the Navy as a whole its warfare officers at the outset of their computing power has allowed for much more sophisticated and in individual PWOs as far as PWO careers with more sub-specialist control systems directing much more capable systems than their COs and ships’ companies were knowledge by combining the initial in the past – in the case of radars, for example, allowing a concerned. course with a sub-specialist package much greater chance of detection than before possible with and this is all to the good. We need, an older set of the same power and bandwidth - but only if Implications of the PWO however, to ask whether we should the settings are absolutely right. There was, however, a price to be paid go further. There is no doubt that an The third effect is that command decision aids as well in the emphasis placed on equipping ability – and a readiness – to deal with as the sensor and weapon systems themselves increasingly the PWOs to handle threats with rapidly emerging threats will remain 2 To indicate the scale of the change. When the Plan Position a degree of confidence across all essential. Surprise has always been and Indicator display component of the 184 sonar (which had entered RN operational service in the early 1960s) was converted to solid environments, one that has never been will remain an abiding feature of war at state as part of a modernisation program in the 1980s, several completely offset by the addition of sea. But is thinking that derived from hundred valves were removed in an operation that only affected one third of the overall 184 system. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 15

provide a greater capability to deal with entire warfare ‘orchestra’ is essential and communication propagation. It is not so much about complex and short notice threats than to retain in order to ensure against getting the equipment serviceable or maintaining it in a can humans, however expert. Many of the stove-piping of information flows serviceable state – that remains a maintainer function vital the responses which had to be ordered and processes. Indeed, it is strongly (and challenging) in itself – but in being able to wring every by the PWO must now be managed arguable that the longer range battle, ounce of capability out of the equipment when it is being automatically – and probably managed involving the coordination of the force used by using it in absolutely the right way. In addition, a in a much more effective way and from as a whole as well as associated units deep understanding of the remote sources of information a better analysis of the threat priority within what are likely to be complex now made available to the forces at sea and their strengths than even the best trained human rules of engagement demands more and potential weaknesses must be a fundamental part of being could consistently achieve. The than ever the exercise of informed and our warfare officers’ skill sets, because without that no valid RAN has something of a paradigm shift expert human judgement. appreciation of the wide area picture can be made and no to achieve in this matter. But it does suggest that we accurate threat evaluation achieved. All this, given the limits need to restructure our approach on time and resources, will require very great changes in the The Future Warfare Officer so that our people develop a much way that we produce our warfare officers. All this is not to reject the idea of deeper understanding of systems This article will not attempt to propose a new training common warfare officer training, capabilities and limitations and of the continuum for warfare officers in detail – that task is nor some degree of focus on and ways in which those systems can be for others. But it does seek to start the debate about the preparation for dealing with rapidly manipulated and managed to achieve philosophy that should underlie that continuum. Times have arising and unexpected threats. best effect. It is not the expertise of the changed since the 1960s – it is time that the PWO changed Surprise is and will remain a constant soldering iron that is required in our as well. t of war at sea and the defence, unlike on warfare officers, but understanding of land, has no inherent advantage over the software and of its permutations, offence, unless it is constant vigilance. of the data flows and the factors acting Furthermore, the underlying concept on their rate and consistency and of the that the PWO is ‘conductor’ of the environment and its effect on sensor

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 Commentary by Commodore T.H. COX AM, RAN (Rtd) atea( RAN of G rthed uf irst RN PWO Course)

he PWO concept from the demands of a changing society mean never addressed; too much “Vabology” outset recognised that there was T that young RAN Officers spend less in my opinion and this lack of systems a diminished system knowledge for time at sea and do fewer PWO jobs knowledge was the most significant PWO’s. This was hardly surprising and, as time passes, XOs and COs are contributor to shortcomings in the when the previous Long Courses which finding their task more challenging. If South Atlantic - not the PWO concept. had a duration of about 10 months the PWO course is the basis for future All this not withstanding, the PWO were swept up into a single 40 week CO’s and Admirals there is a lot to take system is probably due for an overhaul. course which included modules on into account. It must reflect the contemporary systems. I believe it did a reasonable I believe that AEGIS brings standards and expectations of the job on gunnery (MRS3)1 and ASW challenges that most RAN Officers and practitioners – many of whom don’t (184 and 170 MM10 and NDB)2 ; Senior Sailors will find confronting; see 30+ years in the RAN as a desirable the weakness was on Radar EW and you should note the experience of or achievable goal. Comms from my memory of PWO 1 CAPT Rogers in the USS Vincennes RN. AIO and Ops Room management to appreciate the importance of was well covered but it is important to Systems and doctrine knowledge in remember the strength and experience AEGIS capable ships. With the RAN of Senior Sailors in the 1970’s in both family placing different demands on the RAN and RN. ‘PWOmanship’ was the system I believe that the Navy about team work and the contribution needs to adjust to Officers and Sailors of the skills of all members - not one in ships having less experience than person knowing everything. The the personnel who supported the system knowledge weakness was command teams in the past. To reflected by the introduction of the maintain the RAN’s fighting edge there AWO course in the mid 70’s (about the is a need for a tool set to compensate time of PWO 4 RN if my memory is for experience. I believe that this should good). be in the form of an RAN doctrine and I think the paper skirts the problem systems centre for AEGIS. for the RAN circa 2010. There are three Re-vamping PWO training based significant changes that need to be on AEGIS and area warfare probably addressed. Firstly and most importantly has merit. ADQUALS for Amphibious is the loss of a Systems Centre namely Operations may also be a useful the old NCDS focused Combat concept. Additionally, I think that Data Systems Centre (CDSC). From the Navy needs to make greater use that day forward our PWOs, COs, of its retired community to train the WEEOs and Senior Sailors have lost new generation RAN. They would the opportunity to really understand provide experience and knowledge systems and doctrine such as we had in in managing people and systems and FFGs and DDGs. For ANZAC system offer the continuity that should not knowledge we did it on the cheap and be dependent on the posting cycles of the results are extant. the front line teams but is essential to Secondly, I believe that our Senior effective Warfare Training and System Sailors are less knowledgeable than Centres. This is a concept the RN their 1970’s equivalents. Thirdly, the managed very well circa 1980 in my judgement. 1 MRS3: Medium Range System 3: Standard gunnery fire control system fitted to In closing let me just remind you RN (and some RAN) units in the 1960s, of the RN approach to ADAWS3 in associated wirh the 4.5” Mark VI. the 70’s where system knowledge was 2 184 and 170: UK medium range . The 170 introduced in the 1950s and the 184 3 ADAWS (Automated Data and Weapons in the 1960s. They were the hull mounted System). Fitted in different variants in ‘search’ sonar and were associated with the County class DLGs, and the Sea Dart the 177 sonar which was the attack sonar equipped Bristol and Type 42 associated with the triple barrel Mortar as well as the IKARA equipped variant Mark 10 (MM10 – known in its early of the modified Leander class. It was a variants as ‘Limbo’). The NDB was the highly complex system with alpha-numeric anti-submarine nuclear depth bomb with a keyboard inputs rather than the Variable variable yield. Action Buttons (VABs) of NCDS. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 17 Commentary by Commander J.A.A. McCoy, RN (Rtd) (‘Dagger’ Navigation sub-specialist)

n general I like this piece; but have to up as really competent OROs, with Lieutenant, or in the higher intellectual say that my assessment that the circle I a real feel for sensor performance, reaches of the Defence Signals continues to turn full round remains picture compilation and running the network. He never commanded a Fleet unchanged. In this I have to declare a Ops Room team. And we both did Escort as a commander, choosing to long-standing view – perhaps even a the equivalent of a Joint Maritime spend his commander’s time as captain prejudice. When the RN introduced Course (JMC) exercise in the frigate of the Far East Commander-in-Chief’s the PWO concept at the very start squadron based in Northern Ireland. ‘yacht’ (a converted frigate), the Alert,2 of the 70s, I was actually serving in Only then, for the last three months, rather than the destroyer Battleaxe Canada, as head of the Navigation did the Ds pick up their chinagraph which he was offered. And as Captain Section of their Fleet School.1 pencils and start to manipulate their F6 in Blackpool he was almost always Practically all the heads of sections intercept widgets, while we started broken-down!3 in the school were headed by RN indoctrination into the mysteries of The Ashmore edifice started to specialist officers on exchange – the N; the triangle PZX, the Nine Imaginary crumble almost immediately. Very the C; the TAS and the G. Only AIO Rods which govern the behaviour of a soon after the ‘through deck cruiser’ (as an art) was headed by a Canadian magnetic compass, and the arcane (if (light fleet carrier) Invincible was – and he had done the RN School of mostly irrelevant) diurnal and semi- ordered in early 1973, the Captain of Maritime Operations long Direction diurnal constituents which create Dryad asked a visiting fireman “Who course at HMS Dryad. tides. Finally (with ALL the other was going to navigate her?” and in short The Canadians themselves had long courses), we spent two weeks at order, I found myself conducting the of course opted a few years earlier the Tactical School doing exercises first PWO (N) sea-time in the frigate to specialise their seamen as either which were known as Operational Torquay in Summer ’74. The wheel “Operations” or “Weapons” officers, Team Training. This should have been continued to turn, and in short order one of each was supplied to each longer. we had “As”, “Us” “CEWs”; AWOs and escort, and in defence watches they It seemed to me at the time that the rest. did watch-and-watch. They were, in a scheme shaped along these lines Now I am seriously out of date, but broad terms, trained to a depth about could easily be evolved to provide all it seems to me that, notwithstanding 66% that of the RN long courses in long course officers with the basics to the changes in equipment, the basic each of the specialisations. When the become truly competent OROs – and arguments remain unchanged. There Canadians saw that we were taking thus, in effect PWOs – without either are two distinct requirements to be de-specialisation a stage further, and diluting the specialist knowledge and met from a single stream of executive, that all would be “PWOs”, produced expertise required to keep standards seamen or warfare officers, call them in about eight or nine months, they up in peacetime or requiring more whatever you like: fell about laughing. Who was going than two or perhaps three in each to teach these jacks-of-all-trades their ship. “Evolution not Revolution” was I (a) The ability to exercise effective subjects? Who was going to provide thought the watchword, and an article “control” of a ship’s sensor and the deep seagoing expertise required for the Naval Review along these lines weapon systems in a high-level to develop doctrine, tactics and was laid down on the slips. But of multi threat environment. This equipment? And teach it? It seemed course Admiral Ashmore had made (even including exercises) is we were making the same mistake as his mind up to destroy the influence unlikely to take up more than a tiny they had – in spades. of the specialist schools, and had it percentage of the average officer’s Thinking about it fairly hard, I bruited abroad that any who spoke career-span, and most will never concluded they were right to laugh. against his plan should be cast into do it “for real” at all. But if he/she While there had arisen in the 50s and outer darkness. Additionally, of course, cannot do it properly, then they are 60s a serious outbreak of parochialism we were perpetually short of officers, (an army phrase) a waste of rations. and tribal exclusivity as between the and so time saved on Long Courses specialist schools, by the end of the was manna to the bean-counters. So 2 For the decade after the Second World 60s this had to a large extent been the article still remains incomplete War, the British retained two frigates converted with additional accommodation eroded by the amount of common somewhere in what passes for my filing to act as yachts for the Commanders-in- training that long course officers system. Chief Mediterranean and Far East. They were now undergoing. The Ns and Why was Ashmore so viscerally were formally rated as despatch vessels Ds did a common course for the first opposed to the long courses? I believe but were largely used to convey the C-in-C concerned on port visits around the region, six months of their courses, ending it was because he was never long sometimes with his family. 1 Commander McCoy also undertook an enough in any one rank to understand 3 Admiral Ashmore’s autobiography The exchange posting with the RAN 1975-77 as the benefits of the system; his “C” Battle and the Breeze confirms this career Master Attendant at Garden Island. experience was all either as a Flag path and Admiral Ashmore’s views on the specialist schools. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18

Commentary by Commander J.A.A. McCoy, RN (Rtd) Continued...

It is really what the warfare officer entire seagoing career-span into the To my mind this calls for more is for… in the aforesaid high tempo, past. Since then what have we had rather than less training. I think multi-threat environment. to go on? A couple of fundamentally your proposed approach in the non-naval scenarios in the Gulf, in current era, to train officers to be a (b) The maintenance of professional which Gloucester did well, Stark and top-whack ORO/PWO capable of standards in the various warfare Vincennes did badly. fully comprehending not only what fields, the design and conduct of Where is this all going? Well I think their own ship’s systems are telling training, the analysis of future needs you have put your finger on it when, them but also the information being and all the other routine work which with weapon system engagements generated elsewhere – and perhaps he/she will – actually – spend the becoming at least semi-automatic; more importantly, recognising when greater part of their career upon are rather less shouting of “Zippo” and this information flow is being degraded in times of peace, it seems to me, blowing of whistles and so on, the key for whatever reason is the right way to almost as important. to the PWO or ORO’s job is keeping start. Then, I agree that the warfare the whole orchestra in perfect tune, officer must delve deeper into a chosen And he has to be a leader and a seaman keeping the individual musicians sphere – perhaps not as narrow as the as well. And perhaps even a Staff alert and interested and on their toes “old” specialisations, but I think there Officer. to react effectively when the “threat” are three: Above-water, Under-water, The Falklands experience proved materialises. “Network enablement” and C3I (or whatever it’s called these the PWO concept – to a certain extent. and the complexities of RoE are days) which need to be developed in But even so, it wasn’t quite the scenario additional factors for which you depth. the PWO was designed for. Why require a more thinking PWO than And so the circle turns. Go back to was Sheffield transmitting on SCOT an “instinctively” reacting one. I don’t paragraph three. with her UAA1 ESM switched off at a know enough about the SPY1/AEGIS time of day when the threat was at its system to add to your comments on it, highest? Her AAWO obviously didn’t but do recall that the Vincennes fiasco get it. The threat was, actually, limited was not caused by the system, but by to a few, well-defined modalities. And, the operators’ failure to comprehend of course it is now 28 years ago – an what it was telling them.

The threat must be countered at night as well as day - an SH-60F Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the “Black Knights” prepares to land aboard the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (Courtesy USN)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 19

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 20 The Indian Ocean through the Ages By Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

s the third largest body of water by Africa and Arabia.” He added: “All explorer Admiral Zheng He, who in the world, the Indian Ocean the depressions below 3000 fathoms sailed as far as the Persian Gulf, Red Abeholds a mystique and uniqueness are on the Australian side of the Indian Sea and East Africa. Similarly, the all of its own with an extraordinarily Ocean. While the greatest depths are Ottomans, Persians and the Mughals diverse and fascinating history. on the eastern side, the majority of also developed navies largely confined Presently, the Indian Ocean waters islands are in the western half, and are to certain regions within the Indian cover an estimated 73.5 million square either of coral or volcanic formation. Ocean to protect their respective kilometers, incorporating half the The two largest islands are Ceylon and interests along the East-West trade world’s latitudes, seven of the world’s Madagascar. Lesser islands are Socotra, route. time zones and 48 independent in the north, and Mauritius, in the hinterland, littoral and island countries south.” Era of European Supremacy consisting of 2.6 billion people Prior to the advent of Europeans, or 39% of the world’s population. for thousands of years much of the Eventually, the search for new markets Throughout the ages, the Indian Ocean commerce, inter-civilization contact in started to attract European powers, as has persistently attracted explorers the Indian Ocean was often facilitated seen by the voyage of the Portuguese and maritime powers from far and by Muslim, Indian and Chinese traders explorer Vasco da Gama in 1497, distant lands, eager to project their who sailed in Dhows and Junks and which rounded South Africa and influence in order to exploit its wealth populated the bazaars of key port entered the Indian Ocean. Vasco da and resources. In the struggle for cities. In fact, up until around 1700, the Gama’s voyage signaled the dawn of a supremacy, the Indian Ocean has been Indian Ocean’s thriving seaborne trade new era of European encroachment the continuing scene of a ‘Great Game’, was deemed to be the most significant that would eventually see European which has been played out for many in the world, which saw the exchange maritime powers dominate the Indian centuries and by many different actors of goods such as silk and porcelain Ocean for centuries. The superior making it a critical arena of great power from China, spices from Southeast organization, weapons, technology competition. Asia, pepper, gems, pearls and cotton and shipbuilding capabilities of the from India, incense and horses from Portuguese ensured they won the E arly History Arabia and southwest Asia; and gold, contest for supremacy off India’s ivory and slaves from East Africa. As a western coastline against the Arab- The early history of the Indian Ocean, result of this extraordinary commercial Islamic navies at the battles of Cochin especially with the development of and cross-cultural interaction, bustling in 1503 and Diu in 1509. Subsequently, human civilization, is as diverse and port cities emerged along the Indian within decades the Portuguese rapidly rich as any other region on Earth. The Ocean littoral, in places such as Aden expanded their influence throughout vivid historical works that have been in the Red Sea, Hormuz in the Persian much of the Indian Ocean littoral written on of the Indian Ocean, as Gulf, Kilwa and Mombasa on the East by establishing a string of trading seen by historian Stanley Rogers in his African coast, Calicut on the Western posts and fortified coastal hamlets in fascinating book The Indian Ocean, Indian coast, and the seaside port of places like Mozambique, Mombasa, (1932), who stated: “The Indian Ocean’s Malacca astride the Malacca Strait. Aden, Muscat, Hormuz, Goa, Ceylon greatest width is at forty degrees south, Consequently, to secure influence, (now Sri Lanka), Timor and Malacca, between the Cape and the southern access or control of the maritime enabling the Portuguese to dominate extremity of Australia, a distance of commerce and trade routes, naval the lucrative spice trade. 6000 miles.” He further explained, powers emerged in the 10th and However, it would not be long “In a northward direction it gradually early 11th centuries, as seen by the before other European rivals emerged becomes narrower, until on a parallel Sumatran Buddhist kingdom of Sri on the scene to challenge Portuguese seven or eight degrees above the Vijaya and the Hindu Chola Tamil hegemony, the first being the Dutch equator it is divided into two enormous kingdom of southern India. During who circumnavigated the Cape of gulfs by the triangular mass of India. the Ming Dynasty, particularly from Good Hope in 1595. By 1619 the Dutch The western ‘gulf’ forms the Arabian 1405-1433, China even sent forth established a foothold in Jakarta in Sea, and the eastern ‘gulf’ the Bay of seven large Indian Ocean diplomatic- the Indonesian Archipelago, which Bengal. Its western boundary is formed naval expeditions led by its legendary became the capital of the Dutch Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 21

East Indies. Similarly, by the mid- Pondicherry and later, in the early against the British from their colonial 17th century, the Dutch expanded 1700s, Madagascar, Reunion and strongholds of Madagascar, Reunion and their sphere of influence throughout Mauritius; these outposts served as the Mauritius. In his brilliantly written book Southeast Asia and had overrun the basis for the expansion of British and Storm and Conquest: The Battle for the Portuguese possessions of Malacca French influence throughout the Indian Indian Ocean, 1809, (published in 2007), in 1641 and Ceylon in 1658, and later Ocean. Towards the late 1700s, Dutch historian Stephen Taylor explained: in 1662, the Portuguese strongholds power had considerably weakened and “The trouble was the so-called ‘Gibraltar of Nagappattinam, Cranganore and the main contest for domination of the of the East’, the twin islands of Ile de Cochin in India. As a consequence, the Indian Ocean shifted, notably between France and Bourbon, or, as they are now Dutch supplanted the Portuguese as 1740-1815, to the growing rivalry known, Mauritius and Reunion,” he said. the dominant power in the northern between Britain and France. This “It is hard today, looking at a map of the and eastern Indian Ocean, leaving resulted in a series of fierce land and Indian Ocean and locating those tiny Portuguese power largely concentrated naval campaigns on mainland India specks – they lie due east of the vastness towards the Western Indian Ocean. and off its coastal waters, which led to of Madagascar like pebbles in the a decisive British victory at the Battle of shadow of a mountain – to imagine that Anglo-French Rivalry Plassey in 1757, which precipitated the at the time they appeared to threaten loss of the main French stronghold in the East India Company’s control of The dawn of British and French India, the coastal port of Pondicherry. India, and consequently Britain’s survival naval power in the Indian Ocean Even though, the French were as a great power,” he added. However, in the late 16th century signaled the ousted from India, the struggle for France’s defeat in Europe during the beginning of the eventual decline of domination of the Indian Ocean Napoleonic Wars meant that its colonies Dutch hegemony in the Indian Ocean. continued. The advent of the and expeditionary forces in the Indian By securing a foothold with several Napoleonic Wars from 1792-1815, Ocean could not rely on unhindered trading posts and coastal enclaves in saw further fighting between the access to supplies and reinforcements. India, the British in Madras, Bombay belligerents, where the French waged Eventually, the British overran Mauritius and Calcutta; and the French in a fierce and costly maritime war in 1810, which thereafter led to the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22

decisive decline of French naval power historically unprecedented conflict, the in and Iran through a southward in the Indian Ocean by 1815, turning likes of which were never previously German thrust from the Caucasus. it into a ‘British Lake’. The defeat of the seen in its waters. Equally important was the vital necessity French in the Indian Ocean led to the When mainland Europe fell to the for the Western allies to ensure that its ascendency of Britain to the helm of Germans, the land conflict shifted to land link to the Soviet Union, the Persian power, with other European powers Russia and North Africa, the latter Corridor, remained open to facilitate the retaining insignificant colonies and where a major campaign was waged by transfer of large quantities of weapons, posing no threat. the Germans for control of Egypt and ammunition and equipment, and other the Suez Canal. Due to the extreme risk logistical requirements supplied through Pax Britannica of using the Mediterranean Sea, Britain allied convoys to bolster the Russian war and Commonwealth convoys had to effort. The comparative safety of allied After Britain emerged victorious in the travel all the way from Britain, around convoys traversing through the Indian Anglo-French contest for hegemony South Africa to reach Egyptian ports Ocean made the Persian Corridor a in the Indian Ocean, its maritime through the Red Sea. Furthermore, considerably safer route than the more supremacy remained virtually Britain’s complete dependence on risky allied convoy route which travelled unchallenged for another 100 years, unfettered access and exploitation from Britain through the Arctic to reach until the First World War against of the vast oilfields in Iraq and Iran the northern Russian port of Murmansk. Germany, where the Indian Ocean bore for the continuation of its war effort, While Britain primarily focused on witness to the two German raiders, compelled it to invade both countries fending off the German assault on its the SMS Emden and SMS Wolf, which in 1940 and 1941 respectively, the latter homeland and defence of its colonial waged a historically unparalleled naval in a joint invasion with Russia. possessions in North Africa and the campaign against British merchant However, with the Germans Middle East, the entry of Japan into the shipping in the Indian Ocean capturing threatening to overrun Egypt and war in late 1941 was followed by a string and sinking dozens of ships. Similarly, southern Russia; the British faced the of unbroken victories against the US in during the Second World War the real prospect of losing Egypt and even the Pacific and the British in Southeast Indian Ocean was the scene of a potentially its access to the vital oilfields Asia, ultimately culminating in the fall Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 23

of Singapore in February 1942. The merchant freighters in the Bay of the Indian Ocean waters remained emergence of the Japanese threat Bengal and the waters off Ceylon. dangerous to allied maritime traffic posed a critical problem for Britain’s After the war, Britain’s Prime Minister with prowling Axis naval forces that dominance of the Indian Ocean, and Winston Churchill referred to the included German, Italian, Vichy French indeed its continued survival. The Japanese attack on India and Ceylon as and Japanese submarines that scoured Germans and Japanese were seemingly “The most dangerous moment”, where its vast expanses in a protracted and poised to breakthrough into the Indian he feared the loss of British Eastern bloody campaign that sunk an estimated Ocean and possibly link up. Britain Fleet and the consequent fall of India 1.7 million tons of allied shipping simply lacked the resources to resist to the Japanese, Britain’s most prized throughout the war. Although Britain both the Germans and the Japanese colony, would have led ended his significantly contributed to the defeat simultaneously. Worse still, Britain political career and forced Britain out of the Axis powers, the crippling costs was reeling from its worst-ever military of the war. and considerable human and material debacle at Singapore, and the Japanese Never in the history of the British losses it sustained seriously weakened its soon captured Rangoon in Burma, Empire in the Indian Ocean had prestige and influence, which compelled forcing the British Army in Burma to Britain’s hegemony been so seriously Britain to grant India its independence conduct the longest retreat in British challenged, however and fortunately in 1947, which was followed by the military history, leaving British-India for Britain, the Japanese chose to grant of independence to other colonies critically exposed. refocus their attention in the Pacific along the Indian Ocean littoral. Britain’s Subsequently, the Japanese Navy theatre against the US, and missed receding post-war maritime position in followed through with a massive a crucial opportunity to deal a the Indian Ocean was also reflected in its naval-air raid on Eastern India and potentially decisive blow against the drawdown of naval and military forces Ceylon in April 1942 and narrowly British Empire. By late 1942, through ‘East of Suez’. missed locating the British Eastern a series of stunning reverses and Fleet, but nonetheless caused major victories, the Western Allies were able Cold War damage by sinking nearly 40 British to stabilize their fronts and slowly and Commonwealth warships and regain the initiative. Regardless, In the wake of World War II from Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24

1945, the void left by the decline Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain, the US Although throughout the late 1970s in British power, was supplanted started construction on a major naval- and early 1980s the US remained the by the US and the Soviet Union, air base on the island of Diego Garcia, dominant power in the Middle East and which were engaged in a Cold War which generally reflected upon growing in the Indian Ocean, its influence was confrontation. In addition, the superpower rivalry in the Middle East seriously contested, notably after the emergence of newly independent and West Asia. pro-Western Shah of Iran was deposed states along the Indian Ocean littoral At around the same time, the by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, in the following decades, inexorably Soviets also sought to upgrade their the Iran–Iraq War (1980-1988), the altered the strategic geography of the military and naval presence in places Tanker War (1984-1988) and the Soviet region. Continued access to crucial like Berbera in Somalia, Asmara in invasion and occupation of Afghanistan sea lines of communication such as Ethiopia along the Red Sea, the island (1979-1989), all of which were seen as the Suez Canal, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, of Socotra near South Yemen and the destabilizing threats to US influence in Arabian Sea and the Malacca and island of Masirah near Oman. The the Middle East. Sunda Straits, which facilitated much enhanced superpower rivalry in the Hence, the Indian Ocean became of the world’s movement of commerce Indian Ocean precipitated the Indian the scene of a major US naval and and oil, made the Indian Ocean Ocean Peace Zone concept, most military buildup which also saw the increasingly important in Cold War notably throughout the 1970s-1980s, creation of the US Central Command strategic calculations. For example, the which was strongly and consistently in 1983, and latterly, in 1995 the US 5th major focus of US policy during the endorsed, particularly by countries Fleet, headquartered in Bahrain. The Cold War was towards safeguarding associated with the Non-Aligned dismemberment of the Soviet Union and strengthening its access to the Movement, namely India. However, in in 1991 left the US as the world’s only strategically vital Persian Gulf oilfields, view of rising superpower competition superpower leaving it at the apex of particularly from Soviet encroachment this effort failed to gain traction, and the global power order. However, its through the Middle East and Central after the fall of the Soviet Union in involvement in the Middle East and Asia. In the late 1960s, in addition to its 1991, the proposal for an Indian Ocean Central Asia became intractable with military presence in the United Arab Peace Zone receded into obscurity. the emergence of Islamist terrorist Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 25

groups such as Al Qaeda, which sought warships in a largely combined role to lessen China’s vulnerability and dependence on the passage to attack US interests worldwide as interdict maritime piracy, especially through the Malacca and Sunda straits. The ports of Gwadar demonstrated by the devastating 9/11 off the Horn of Africa. In 2001, this and Sittwe are particularly significant in that Chinese oil and suicide attacks, which served as the led to the creation of an international gas tankers and vessels transporting minerals can offload catalyst for US military intervention in naval task force - Combined Task their products directly at these ports and transport them both Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. Force-150 - consisting of 24 nations. by road, rail or overland pipeline direct to China’s western Such commitment from so many and southern borders. In addition, the Hambantota port Sino-Indian Rivalry countries is clear evidence of the in Sri Lanka, which is in the process of being built, will be strategic importance of the Indian used as a vital refueling and docking station for Chinese oil Over the last decade, the declining Ocean to all the world’s major powers and gas tankers. However, these unprecedented inroads by influence of the US has been and economies, which have a common China into the Indian Ocean have been seen by its strategic increasingly supplanted by the growing interest in the Indian Ocean, that is, competitors in the West and India as a strategy designed to strategic rivalry between the emerging their dependence on strategic sea encircle India, though at present this appears to be debatable. powerhouses of India and China, which routes as well as the world’s major oil Given the prevailing and forecasted activity, it is has raised the stakes in the Indian supplies emanating from the Persian increasingly evident that the Indian Ocean will be a key Ocean, in what many commentators Gulf. arena of great power rivalry for decades to come. Such views refer to as a ‘New Great Game’. Due to However, as seen in recent have been consistently brought forward as demonstrated the Indian Ocean’s critical significance times, the threat that is increasingly by the former Australian Defence Minister and now as a transmission belt for much of the overriding terrorism and piracy is Ambassador to the US, Kim Beazley, who recently affirmed, world’s energy supplies, its perennial the escalating India-China rivalry “In the long-term, the Indian Ocean is going to be massively importance to the world’s major in the Indian Ocean, which has led more significant in global politics than it has ever been economies strengthens as each year both powers to move aggressively to before and that is the function largely of the fact that the passes. Presently, estimates suggest secure influence. The growth of India’s Asia-Pacific region is massively more significant.” He added, that 70% of world’s petroleum products influence and presence in the Indian “The Asia-Pacific region covers both the Pacific and the and over half the world’s container Ocean has led the US to cultivate Indian Ocean littoral’s northern extension. Energy security ships transit the waters of the Indian and leverage India’s emerging power and resources are absolutely critical. The Indian Ocean Ocean. There are three strategically as a counter-weight to the growth region is immensely rich in that all developing societies vital choke points in the Indian Ocean, of China. The rapid expansion and need access to the new material produced around the Indian namely the Strait of Hormuz in the modernization of the Indian Navy, Ocean littoral. So these are now becoming vitally strategic Persian Gulf, where 90% of India’s now the fifth largest in the world, has trade routes,” he said. What this demonstrates, then, is that oil supply, a third of China’s and 70% enabled India to utilize its maritime the importance of the Indian Ocean will only increase with of Japan’s oil supplies pass through. advantage across the expanses of the each passing year, where the massively growing energy needs Similarly, there are indications that Indian Ocean to establish its influence. of India and China will spur greater competition in the 40% of world seaborne traffic and 80% This has been demonstrated by the developing new great game, for the access and exploitation of of China’s oil supplies presently transit establishment of Indian listening finite and diminishing natural resources largely based around through the Malacca Strait. Another stations in the Seychelles, Madagascar the Indian Ocean Region. t critical maritime choke point is the and Mauritius to monitor shipping Bab el Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea, and eavesdrop on communications in Note: This article is an extended version of the original which opens into the mouth of the Gulf the region. In addition, in late 2009, which was first published in Himal Southasian (September of Aden, a sea route used by tens of the Indian Navy added Maldives to 2010, Vol. 23 No. 9). thousands of container ships annually. its naval command, and has plans Other dominant concerns include to reopen an old British air base for Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is a the threat of Islamist terrorism and reconnaissance and surveillance Senior Analyst at Perth-based piracy off the horn of Africa, Bay of operations. think tank Future Directions Bengal and the Malacca Strait, which The rapid rise of China has also seen International. have taken on serious proportions. it heavily engage in the Indian Ocean, In the last decade, the increasing as demonstrated by the construction [http://www.futuredirections. instability that has been witnessed of port facilities at Gwadar in Pakistan, org.au/] along the Indian Ocean littoral has Sittwe in Burma, and Hambantota in seen a number of countries deploy Sri Lanka, all of which are designed to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 Qualities of Leadership by lieutenantcommander tom lewis

his series examines selected Inspirational see it, putting his telescope to his blind Ttraits of leadership to This leader inspires others to perform eye and exclaiming: «I really do not see compare Royal Australian similar deeds. Often this is shown by the signal». The British won the battle Navy leaders against a criteria. the leader’s actions in front of their with much help from Nelson’s use of The first of the articles took subordinates. Nelson inspired his initiative. Admiral Lord Nelson, the followers in being resolute, courageous hero of Trafalgar in 1805, as and honourable. It is one measure of Impressive Physical a model, as well as examining the man that so many did: Hardy, who Qualities the characteristics of other well- was with him when he died; his fellow This might be rephrased as “looking known leaders, both civilian and admiral Collingwood whose battle the part of a leader”. Would anyone military. line he raced to be first to engage at have said that Horatio Nelson achieved Seven qualities of leadership Trafalgar; ship commander Berry, who this? Yes – and no. A short, thin man measure the subject matter, followed him from ship to ship, and not blessed with good looks, he first suggesting a capable naval Captain Hallowell, who after the Battle entered the British navy in 1771 as leader is an achiever; expert in of the Nile made him a present of a a midshipman at 12 years and three his or her field; inspires others, coffin fashioned from the French ship months.1 Despite being prone to and takes initiative; impresses L’Orient’s mainmast – Nelson kept it in sickness: “I have had all the diseases by their physical qualities; his cabin and was indeed buried in it. that are”, he once said; he adapted well empathises with others, and is to the vigorous and often dangerous life an effective communicator. Initiative that was the Navy. Sometimes described as “going Nelson was a man of raw physical Achievement in where angels fear to tread”, this courage who led by example. He lost Did the person under discussion measure means to use judgement and an eye when an enemy shell, exploding improve their organisation? Did advance where necessary. The leader is during the siege of Calvi in Corsica, they leave it a better place by being a brave in psychological terms and takes drove splinters and dust and rock member? Promotion is recognised as the lead where necessary. It does not fragments into his face. He suffered a measure of achievement. With this mean going forward rashly. most terribly and often from wounds, and other measures which traditionally Nelson was a man who had the quite willing to lead from the front. mark out achievement – education; courage of his own convictions, who His right arm was amputated after the decorations; amassing of physical could often have left off and blamed battle of Santa Cruz in Teneriffe due to wealth perhaps – we gain some superiors for failure. Instead, he was his being hit by grapeshot. beginnings of whether a person is a a man who chose to use initiative and This is what is meant by “looking the success. advance when he knew the defeat of part of a leader”: behaving in such a the enemy was attainable and essential. way that people can be inspired. It Expert in one’s Field At the Battle of Copenhagen, walking means to look resolute and act with Anyone who aspires to be a leader and the deck while the guns roared their resolution – as did Nelson. To lead an example to others must obviously broadsides, and deadly splinters by example. To not show physical have expertise in their craft. In naval whistled about his ears, he confided cowardice. It might include «panache»; terms, that translates as being an expert to Colonel Stewart, commander of “the almost untranslatable expression “ship-driver”; an aviator par excellence; infantry, who was with him on the of dash, of valour, the ability to do an engineer possessing a wealth of quarterdeck, that he would not be things with an air of reckless courage theoretical and practical knowledge «elsewhere for thousands». Whether and inspiring leadership».2 Finally, we - and so on. Nelson, for example, was he was fearful or not – and who would might add that the bearing, carriage a master at strategy – which becomes not have been – Nelson led by example. and speech of a leader should be of the a commander of fleets – but also of And when his uncertain superior, highest standards. tactics, which behoves a ship captain. Admiral Parker, made the signal to He was also an inspired man-manager. leave off the action, Nelson refused to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 27

Empathy Communication to use words effectively to persuade The great soldier of the 18th century, One needs to be understood at others. Winston Churchill was a great Frederick the Great, had good advice all times. Nelson employed in his exponent of this. Eisenhower, then a on how to attain the next quality of the leadership style something unusual US General and later President of the leader – Empathy: for its day: the art of effective United States, experienced the British ...talk with the soldiers, both when communication. One characteristic Prime Minister in action: you pass their tents or when they was to invite others to contribute their Churchill was a persuader. Indeed, are on the march. Sample often to ideas for a campaign, or a battle, or a his skill in the use of words and logic see if the cookpots have something change of some sort; to educate his was so great that on several occasions good; find out their small needs and men and get them – and him – to when he and I disagreed on some do what you can to satisfy them; know each others’ minds. Nelson important matter – even when I was spare them unnecessary exertion. embarked upon the Battle of the Nile convinced of my own view and when But let fall the full vigor of law on the in 1798 by letting his captains engage the responsibility was clearly mine – I mutinous soldier, the backbiter, the in individual fashion. The French had a very hard time withstanding his pillager...3 fleet, anchored by the bows in a line in arguments.9 shallow coastal water, engaged in ship Empathy means to be able to imagine to ship fashion by five British vessels 12 yourself – as leader – in the role sailing inside the line and anchoring, of your people, and to show that. and the rest engaging from outside. A capable naval leader is an achiever; It is “the power of understanding Thus the French were caught between expert in his or her field; inspires and imaginatively entering into two forces. At the end of hours of others, and takes initiative; impresses another person’s feelings”.4 General fighting, the French had lost 1, 700 men by their physical qualities; empathises Montgomery said to his troops at to the British 200; their fleet was largely the Battle of Alamein: “We will stand pounded to pieces, and Napoleon with others, and is an effective and fight here. If we can’t stay here and his army were stranded in Egypt. communicator. We have seen many alive, then let us stay here dead”.5 Nelson had hoisted just two signals great leaders who exhibited those 7 Montgomery was entering into the through the entire battle. traits. This series examines how many feelings of all of his people, who feared For the autocratic manager this would of Australia›s naval leaders performed that they would die. Churchill’s speech have been disastrous: an authoritarian of WWII did the same: “We shall leader would not trust his subordinates in these fields. defend our island, whatever the cost to make momentous decisions and may be, we shall fight on the landing fight on their own. Nelson trusted his grounds, we shall fight in the fields and individual captains. So too, in the long 1 Description of Admiral Lord Nelson in the streets, we shall fight in the hills: pursuit of the French, years later in and his career are drawn from Kenneth we shall never surrender.” Alexander 1805, he had regular meetings with his Fenwick’s HMS Victory; Christopher Lloyd’s Nelson and Sea Power; Peter Padfield’s Broke the Great “shared in the men’s dangers, «Band of Brothers» – the name applied and the Shannon and Robert Southey’s The as the scars of his wounds testified…he to those who fought under him at the Life of Horatio Lord Nelson. 8 2 Welch, Ronald. Tank Commander. ate the same food as they did. He was Nile. During the long chase the officers London: Oxford University Press, 1972. highly visible….he fought hard himself would pool their ideas for forthcoming (135) 3 Connelly. (16) but he was ever on the watch for any battles; the best use of tactics; what 4 Collins English Dictionary. Sydney: acts of conspicuous courage in the face a following ship would do when its Harper Collins, 1991. (510) 5 Adler (116) of danger amongst his men.6 fellow was sighted engaged and so on. 6 Adler (232) Such statements say to you that Consequently even the necessity for 7 Ireland, Bernard. Naval Warfare in the your leader will be with you, no matter signals within the ensuing battle was Age of Sail. London: Harper Collins, 2000. (148-151) what the cost. dispensed with; the captains knew each 8 Thursfield, James R. Nelson and other others’ minds. Naval Studies. London: John Murray, 1920. (125) Communication means to be able 9 Adler (76) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28

Studies in Trait Leadership – Loved Leader

Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, kcmg, ao, ran by lieutenantcommander tom lewis

One of the most loved leaders of Left: David Martin as English, with well-developed officer-like a Sub Lieutenant the Royal Australian Navy, David qualities. All of his subjects showed Martin was a capable performer, but good progress, except for Engineering, his premier quality was his love of where it was thought ‘he could have his people. In conversations where done better’. Australian naval people discuss Martin proceeded to the UK for further courses on board the training their leaders, David Martin’s name cruiser HMS Devonshire, via the West shines as an inspirational officer who Indies and Scandinavia. His final report inspired his people, to give their best on leaving the ship described him as: for him and the Service, and who A pleasant personality who has sought to serve under him again been an asset to the ship. Capable and clear-headed and a good leader when they could. He excelled in his with plenty of confidence and naval career, but also beyond that, Martin instruction in sailing around initiative. Potentially an outstanding as an immensely popular Governor Sydney Harbour.3 officer. of New South Wales, who was sadly David joined the Royal Australian taken from us at the peak of his days. Naval College at its then-location of In 1951 he was promoted to Flinders Naval Depot, HMAS Cerberus, Midshipman and saw a little more of in 1947.4 His early days saw him the world via a troopship to Japan. avid Martin, an only child, was meet three other boys whose fathers There he joined the aircraft carrier Dborn on 15 April 1933 and first had served in the RAN and also lost HMAS Sydney which was engaged in educated at Glamorgan Primary School their lives in WW II. They were Mike operations in Korean waters, flying in Victoria. His family moved to Sydney Rayment, whose father had been killed against the Communist forces in in 1940, and the seven-year-old David during a kamikaze attack on HMAS the United Nations-led war.7 Martin entered Scots College. Australia; Eric Johnston, whose father was able to gain many useful insights The family traced its roots to the had been lost in Parramatta, and into naval procedures, including the First Fleet, with an ancestor on Martin’s John Waller, the son of the Perth’s flying of multiple strikes against the mother’s side being a Royal Marine commander.5 North Koreans, and in October 1951, officer, Major George Johnston,1 later Martin captained the College’s surviving Typhoon Ruth, a storm that a Lieutenant Governor of NSW.2 His Rugby Union team in his last year, generated winds of up to 130 kilometres father was Commander WH Martin, leading the side with a battle-cry of per hour and seas of eight metres.8 His who had himself been a trainee at ‘kill ‘em’. The College magazine later Captain in Sydney was DH Harries, the Royal Australian Naval College in commented that the side ‘must rank who had entered the Naval College in 1917. When David was nearly nine, alongside the best the College has the same year as Martin’s late father.9 Commander Martin was killed in produced’. Martin also participated in During 1952 the ship’s company action in March 1942 while serving in sprinting and rowing. Unfortunately of Sydney witnessed – at a safe and HMAS Perth, when that ship was sunk another aspect of his training wasn’t so considerable distance - a British atomic by overwhelming Japanese forces at the successful: Martin found he suffered test at Monte Bello island.10 In 1953, as Battle of the Sunda Strait. seasickness when his class proceeded a Sub-Lieutenant, Martin was posted Despite that loss, David Martin on their Training Cruise, and this to the frigate HMAS Murchison before had aspirations to join the Navy, and was an affliction he was to experience travelling once again to the UK for his mother encouraged him in his for all of his career.6 He became a more courses. In general, his reports ambition. She enlisted the help of one Cadet Captain, and graduated from from these were good, but one adverse of his father’s colleagues, POL Owen, the RANC in 1950. His final report comment was made, with a tick in nicknamed ‘Polo’, and this officer gave noted pleasing results in French and the ‘Inadequate’ column against the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 29

criterion: ‘Is he, in general, quick to One of Martin’s senior officers, Bruce learn?’ Ziegler, remembers of Martin at this The following year he was lucky time: ‘Even as a Sub-Lieutenant one enough to be in Britain during the could see the continued efficiency of Coronation of Elizabeth II, and he was this officer…’15 Another officer who able to view the parade, which he later knew him for a long time, Commander described as ‘breathtaking’.11 Notably, POL Owen, commented that ‘David Martin appears as an enthusiastic has a calmness about him and was supporter of royalty in his biography. never ‘rattled’. He had quite an aura…. At the end of 1954, he was He loved his fellow men and women. returning to Australia on board the I never heard him denigrate other liner Orcades, when he met his future people’.16 wife – Suzanne Millear – on board. A short appointment once again A shipboard romance ensued, and, to HMAS Sydney followed, and six once ashore, the couple wrote to each months later Martin was posted to other, with Suzanne working as a nurse shore and a position as a Reserve in Melbourne, and David posted to Training Officer in Adelaide. It was the carrier HMAS Vengeance.12 The noted in his Report that he ‘has carrier was on loan to the RAN while revitalised the Reserve by his ability the second carrier Melbourne was to organise, his capacity for work and David Martin at flag being readied for transfer to Australia. his outstanding power of leadership’. begin their family with the birth rank Martin joined the new ship for her Another significant comment which of two girls: Sandra, in 1958, and commissioning voyage in 1956.13 His characterised much of Martin’s later Joanna in 1959.19 At the end of 1961, reports were satisfactory but sometimes career was also made: ‘He has taken Martin was posted to the position blunt: ‘He is not over-endowed with an individual interest in each officer of Establishment Gunnery Office in brains and at times is a very slow and rating, and thereby increased to a Sydney. While there he reactivated thinker’. marked degree the interest, morale and the rifle club, and apparently was These two negative comments, efficiency of the Reserve as a whole’. involved in ‘controversial ceremonial from the UK course, and his time on Further UK courses in gunnery matters’, where he performed well. One Vengeance, are somewhat isolated in followed: the long course at Greenwich of his numerical scores for a report their appearance. However, it does and HMAS Excellent - he was rated was an ‘eight’, and it was noted that appear that Martin’s best characteristic as ‘satisfactory but not outstanding’, he was a ‘good advertisement for the was his ‘people skills’ – as we say and then six months on the staff of the Service’.20 Rear Admiral Neil McDonald nowadays. James Fahey remembers Gunnery School. He posted to a two- remembers him as ‘…a cheerful person meeting David Martin in 1955. A sailor year exchange position on board the with a little of the common touch. who had ‘changed over’, as the Navy destroyer HMS Battleaxe.17 In 1957 He could deal with anyone with the puts it, to become an officer, Fahey was Susan Millear and David Martin were greatest of ease….’.21 an engineer. Working with Martin, married.18 In August 1962 Martin joined the and becoming a friend, he was later to Battleaxe was to be an interesting destroyer HMAS Voyager and served in observe that his colleague was appointment. Anti-smuggling patrols her until late 1963.22 His duties included …caring, fun-loving, a born during the Cyprus emergency, and the usual Officer of the Watch duties, leader with a great capacity for extremely busy fisheries patrols against but he was also Forecastle Officer, communicating with people of all Iceland around the Arctic Circle in Wardroom Mess Treasurer, Gunnery ranks. He disliked pretension and 1960, were two extremes of service. Officer and Training Officer. His was never rude to others; instead, One of his reports noted that on reports were most positive: ‘absolutely he would simply avoid them if joining the ship he was ‘inexperienced’ outstanding in the performance of his necessary and would not allow but ‘soon learnt the hard way’, and duties’, commented one, and also noted anything or anyone to spoil his that overall he was ‘industrious and that he ‘has a fierce pride in the RAN enjoyment of every minute of every successful’. and its future’. day.14 The time in Britain saw the Martins In December 1963 Suzanne Martin Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30

Studies in Trait Leadership – Loved Leader Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, kcmg, ao, ran gave birth to the couple’s son William.23 and commenting that he should not be This happy occasion was followed by allowed to ‘stagnate in routine gunnery one of the saddest the Royal Australian jobs’. Navy has known: the sinking of Voyager In 1966 Martin was posted to the when she was rammed and sunk by Royal Navy Staff College at Greenwich. the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne His report there described him as ‘a off Jervis Bay in February 1964. Martin natural leader’. He went out of his way was involved in the second subsequent to make friends with the foreigners inquiry when he was called to give attending the course, discussing their evidence into the claim that the work with them and also entertaining Voyager’s Captain Stevens had health them at home.27 problems, perhaps relating to alcohol He went as a Lieutenant David Martin being “rowed ashore” off the abuse. Martin’s later biographer Maria Commander to the destroyer HMAS aircraft carrier Melbourne at the end of his Stenmark notes that this was ‘a great Vampire, where he served as Executive command test of character for him, and led Officer and First Lieutenant. Martin subsequently to a loss of confidence in then served in Jervis Bay as the Naval authority. In the process, a few Executive Officer of the RAN College enemies were made’.24 and HMAS Creswell, where his report The customs of 1964 were very described him as a ‘first rate executive different to today. This was a time when officer’ who in ‘bearing and manner alcohol was not perceived with the sets a fine example to the cadets’. attitudes of later years: random breath On 15 February 1969 he assumed testing of drivers was unthought of; command of the anti-submarine frigate health aspects were not as realised, and HMAS Queenborough. He brought his consumption of performance-reducing people-friendly attitude with him. His drinks was the norm, even at work: steward at the time, Petty Officer Leo drinking at lunchtime was common, for Duffy, remembers that ‘it was always of leadership at work. Shackleton Crewmen use flight example. The British essayist William ‘we’ rather than ‘you’ when a problem was Officer of the Watch during a deck tractors with Hazlitt once said: ‘The true barbarian had to be corrected. Duffy also noted: night at sea, and changed the course power brooms to sweep snow from an is he who thinks everything barbarous ‘He became like a father to me – I of the ship. The next morning he was unidentified carrier’s 25 28 but his own tastes and prejudices’. It looked up to him and respected him’. sent for by Martin, and asked if he flight deck during is a mistake to judge the people of the Martin’s relationship with his had manoeuvred the ship during the operations offK orea past by later standards. Admiral of the time, however, was not night. Shackleton remembered with circa early 1951 Nevertheless, the Voyager incident so positive. In his first report it was a feeling of impending doom what he imparted lessons for the Navy: today’s suggested that he was of a ‘nervous should have done, which was to inform seamen officers do not drink at sea, disposition’, and that even though the ship’s captain that he intended for example, and the processes of everything seemed well with his ship to change course. He confessed his counselling people following stressful ‘…he would say this even it were not’. guilt, and Martin said to him quietly: incidents is very much a part of today’s Furthermore, his immediate supervisor ‘You won’t do that again, will you?’ force.26 thought he ‘…could appear to be Shackleton, later relating the anecdote, An overseas appointment followed, cold and a little difficult for juniors to observed that although he himself in the position of Staff Officer understand’. This certainly seems to be was ‘six foot three inches tall, I felt (Warfare) to the Australian Naval the only time in Martin’s history that about three foot, and it was driven Representative, United Kingdom, a superior perceived him as being 180 into my brain what it meant to be liaising with defence authorities and degrees opposed to the reality of how accountable’.30 contractors in Britain and Holland. others perceived him.29 The first of July 1970 saw Martin Martin’s reports were glowing: It may have been during his posted to the position of Fleet recommending early promotion, time on Queenborough that a later Operations Officer. The new job meant commenting on the assistance given Chief of the Navy, Vice Admiral some involvement with industrial to him by his ‘charming young wife’, Shackleton, felt Martin’s quiet style relations problems that were besetting Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 31

the Navy at the time. Martin’s usual tact Australian Navy’.35 a sailor, recalls that on joining Martin’s and diplomacy served him well here, From 4 February 1974 through ship he encouraged his old shipmate and he also was adept at encouraging to 21 January 1975 Martin was to ‘Come in; sit down; tell me what the Navy’s own sailors in the Commanding Officer of HMAS you’ve been doing with yourself. He admittedly crowded and inadequate Torrens and Commander of the Third did not change with rank’.39 Lieutenant conditions some were experiencing Destroyer Squadron.36 When he had Commander Mike Larsen has similar at sea. His three reports while in the been on board for a month, the ship memories: he recalls Martin once position gained steadily in their average was visited by Queen Elizabeth II. attending Sunday Divisions at the RAN numerical mark.31 Martin did not know everyone’s names College. ‘He stopped at every person The combined PX-44 exercise by then, and apparently (he may have in the division – and not with just a carried out during this time saw the telling a facetious tale against himself) standard question – but questions to Rear Admiral of the United States told the ship’s company in an assembly get information out of them. After a component, George R Muse, write to beforehand that therefore, if he was bit he realised he was running out of the Australian Chief of Naval Staff, introducing one of them to the Queen time and sped up, but also apologised then Vice Admiral Sir , and made a mistake with the man’s to us for taking too much time. When and comment on the ‘performance name, they would have to keep it for he asked you what you were doing it and expertise’ of Commanders Eric the day. Anyone who corrected him wasn’t a rhetorical question’.40 Johnston and David Martin. Rear would be in serious trouble.37 For a period of seven months in Admiral Muse noted: ‘I commend During Martin’s command of the 1978 Martin became Acting Chief both these officers to you for their Squadron the ships were scattered in of Naval Materiel, based at HMAS obvious high caliber overall capabilities’. their geographical deployment, thus Harman in Canberra. His last report Coincidentally, both of these officers not allowing him the time to work with describes this time as ‘in difficult were to be united in another fashion them as a squadron for as much as he circumstances’ but notes that he made in later years in that both of them and his superiors might have wished. a ‘positive contribution’ and ‘has the achieved Vice-Regal distinction: Interestingly, his friendly manner potential for higher rank’.41 An earlier Johnston as the Administrator of the which often stood him in good stead report was glowing: Northern Territory, and Martin as the was criticised in his reports. One …in my view one of the Service’s Governor of New South Wales. The report suggested that he was a ‘boyish most promising young captains. well-known Rear Admiral William Captain with a pleasing personality and He leads by example, whilst giving Dovers also commented that Martin plenty of bubbling enthusiasm. He has clear and concise directions when was ‘an extremely able and very good ideas which he is not backward necessary. His sense of compassion hardworking officer who has carried in presenting; but some of them fizzle is more highly developed than in out all his duties with marked ability, out through lack of practicality and many of his contemporaries. confidence and cheerfulness’.32 lack of follow up’. The same report also During the latter half of 1972 mentioned ‘over lenient attitudes’. From July 1978 he was Commanding Martin attended the Joint Services Staff From 1 February 1975 to 21 Officer of HMAS Supply. The big College and completed the six-month October 1977 Martin was the Director, replenishment ship was a daunting staff course. His course report was of Capability Review for the Force proposition, and Martin’s handling of the opinion that he had a ‘sound, logical Development Branch of the Defence her was ‘slow but safe’, according to his approach to problems’ and was able to Department. One of his reports immediate supervisor. As usual, his express himself clearly when speaking here concluded that ‘…his chances handling of his men was his hallmark, ‘but is somewhat less fluent on paper’.33 of selection for flag rank are almost with his personal report noting that From December 1972, promoted certain’.38 ‘He takes a keen interest in the welfare to Captain, he was Director General of Lieutenant Errol Hunt, who served and training of his officers and ship’s Naval Reserves.34 There he ‘revived the in several postings with David Martin, company’.42 He posted off the ship in sense of purpose for the RANR’, with noted that he always had a time for the January 1979.43 the numerical scores of his report all ship’s company members, and took a Promoted to Commodore44 with sixes and sevens. His reporting officer genuine (maybe learned, but still there) effect from 5 March 1979, the next commented that ‘It is apparent that this interest in his people. After not serving appointment was the Commanding officer has a bright future in the Royal with him for several years, Errol, then Officer’s position in the flagship HMAS Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32

Studies in Trait Leadership – Loved Leader Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, kcmg, ao, ran Melbourne.45 The carrier was in the last years of her life with the RAN, but was performing well, and a replacement was expected. Tony Mills-Thom recalled his time as a midshipman in Melbourne, when David Martin was in command for the first time. As the ship proceeded out of Sydney Harbour for her ‘shakedown cruise’ a very large white letter ‘L’ – for Learner – adorned the back of the carrier’s island. It was one of Martin’s ideas, recalls Mills-Thom, and typical of the man, who was a ‘thoroughly nice bloke’.46 Peter Kelly, also a midshipman at that time, recalled one aspect, however, in which Martin was out of favour, although he didn’t know it. The male midshipmen were exasperated with and envious of their Commanding Officer’s attractiveness to the female jet fighter before making a course alongside, where he would summon midshipmen on board. ‘There we change in developing heavy weather. the duty midshipman and point out were, trying to charm these women’, The aircraft went over the side with a housekeeping matters, such as the remembers Kelly, ‘and all they could sailor, who was fortunately recovered presence of ‘Irish pennants’ – Navy talk about were his eyes, and his great extremely quickly by an escorting slang for stray bits of rope yarn caught smile’.47 destroyer. According to the biographer, around something.49 Although this Able Seaman Paul Denneny Martin turned the event into a Public was a reprimand, it was delivered in a remembers that Melbourne and Relations success: realising the story positive way. All on board worked hard her escort Brisbane were deployed would get out he had footage made for the ship: Lieutenant Commander to RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) of the weather and the ships dealing Don Sewell recalled of his time with exercises.48 When arriving in Pearl with it, and the story and footage was David Martin: ‘He loved the sailors, and Harbor, the Australian carrier passed released to the media, who covered it they loved him’.50 alongside the USN carrier Enterprise. as a good attempt at averting disaster. During 1980 Martin attended the The difference in size between the two It is a significant example of how Royal College of Defence Studies in ships was most apparent, and there Martin not only saw the positive side London. This included a study tour of was some laughter from some of the in everything, but also how he was northern Europe and the completion of American sailors. Martin saw this, and capable of taking opportunities to a thesis. Martin’s chosen topic was ‘The gave orders for the beer issue for the ‘sell himself’. However, that does not Development of the shape and size of day to be given out on the flight deck, diminish the fact that he had made the Armed Forces’. His personal report in full view of the US sailors. ‘That will a mistake, and his Service Record at the end of the course noted that he stop their laughter’, he announced, or ‘bluejacket’ carries the official was ‘A very sound officer with a good to some of the ship’s company, and ‘displeasure’ incurred from senior mind’.51 the sight of the Aussies enjoying their command. He became Director General of relaxation in full view of the ‘dry’ Martin showed good abilities to Manpower.52 The period was marked American ship, did just that. keep morale on board at a very high by several difficulties, in particular During his time in command of level, particularly by identifying himself in the field of civilian manpower Melbourne Martin made a decision closely with sporting activities and management.53 His personal report that resulted in the loss of an aircraft. encouraging the ship’s teams. This of this period noted: ‘He is very good According to his biographer, he even extended to Martin himself with people and gets very willing overrode a request to tie down a running to ‘work’ if Melbourne was cooperation with an interested and Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 33

frank approach’. His scores were all Canberra politics was the ability to attend a RANEL barbeque!’ This was sevens and eights with a sole six for tell untruths if necessary: ‘He was a at the shore base of HMAS Rushcutter, ‘organising ability’.54 ‘thoroughly nice man, but incapable of and the barbeque in question was for In 1982 the Martins’ daughter Sandy telling a lie’.58 Navy Emergency List members; not was married, to a naval officer, Vince di From 1984 to 1987 he was Naval a category of people for whom busy Pietro; later their son William entered Support Commander.59 His personal admirals would have had much time the Navy as a midshipman.55 report noted he had a ‘consensus to spare. But such attendance was a Martin was promoted to the approach to problems which ensures typical Martin touch.64 (Acting) rank of Rear Admiral with support at all levels from his staff’. The Review involved Martin more effect on 5 April 1982, with the However, one comment must have hurt closely as it approached. It assumed advancement becoming permanent a little: ‘…he is very good with people mammoth proportions, involving on 4 July. From April 1982 to January but he tends to be a little flippant and 66 ships and 23,000 sailors. Martin 1984 Martin was Chief of Personnel56 shallow in his staff work.’60 On Australia was at the fore with the publicity for in what his report described as ‘a Day 1985 he was made an Officer in the the great event, but one mistake saw very difficult period’ which included Order of Australia.61 him generate attention of the wrong inter-Service problems as well as Although the new position in itself sort. Interviewed on Channel Nine’s complicated matters within the Navy was a busy job, it was dominated by Today show, he was asked about the itself. He was noted as being ‘…a leader the need to plan the 75th Anniversary possibility of some of the ships carrying who is good with people’. At this time celebrations of the RAN, approaching nuclear weapons. Unused to television his report noted that he had difficulty in 1986. The most public aspect of this interviews early in the morning, and with emphysema and breathlessness was a Fleet Review. Martin sought out meaning to say ‘It is not inevitable’, after exertion. This was perhaps the a Navy Reservist friend, Commander he left out the ‘not’. The furore was beginning of his later problems that Ken Swain, who he knew as having a immense, but Martin simply admitted would eventually cause his death at a capable and forthright approach to his he had made a mistake, which led comparatively early age. management and organisational work. to headlines such as ‘An Honest Commander Don Forbes Swain was more than the right man for Admiral’.65 remembers David Martin at HMAS the job: he brought new and innovative The Review itself went very well. Watson, where Forbes was working methods to the position, such as The Royal Navy sent the aircraft carrier programming training courses. the seeking out of sponsorship from HMS Illustrious and her battle group; Martin had a rule about members corporations. the USN the giant battleship Missouri, not travelling to work ‘in rig’ – that is, During his time as Support complete with her 16’ guns, and the in the uniform of the day, when they Commander Martin took time to unforgettable memory that on her could be seen by the public. One day support more closely an organisation decks Japan had surrendered in WWII. when Forbes was car-pooling, the two of which he had been a member since Prince Phillip was the Reviewing members in the car – with Forbes in the 1970s: the Naval Historical Society. Officer, and the weather was perfect. uniform – were unexpectedly asked He made Tresco, his official Naval 1,700 shells were fired; thousands for a lift by their superior officer. He residence, available for their meetings, queued for ship visits, and the Navy made no comment on the uniform and himself delivered an address on received immense amounts of positive transgression, and the next day made naval gunnery.62 He was deliberate in publicity. At their home in Tresco, the a special point of thanking both of the his approach to maintaining contact Martins entertained the visiting First members for the favour. Forbes’s point across all levels of the Navy, often Sea Lord of the Royal Navy’s Admiralty, about the incident was that Martin was dropping into ‘Harry’s Café de Wheels’, Admiral Sir William Stavely.66 the sort of person who wouldn’t stoop the famous caravan just outside the Although offered the post of Head to mentioning a minor matter which gates at the end of Garden Island’s of the Australian Defence Force Staff would have done no harm and would pier, where he was able to purchase in Washington, Martin decided now not have normally been detected.57 a pie and have a talk with any of the to retire from full-time service in the Commodore Sam Bateman many Navy sailors who also patronised Navy by transferring to the Reserves. remembers that one quality that David the outlet.63 John Waller believes that He perhaps had not reached his Martin didn’t have which may have in his time as a Rear Admiral, David desired position in the RAN: in 1984 been useful in the cut and thrust of Martin ‘…was the only admiral to he had submitted a ‘dream sheet’ to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34

Studies in Trait Leadership – Loved Leader Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, kcmg, ao, ran the Directorate of Naval Officers’ on his first day as Governor: David Martin had three months left to Postings, for the attention of the Chief I said to the Governor, ‘You can live. ‘He came up to me and said ‘How of Naval Staff.67 In this he mentioned count on our support’, meaning are you Michael’ – he remembered my that: ‘One of my ambitions continues support for him in his very name after many years. He then said to be command of the Fleet’. This was responsible position as Governor. ‘Look I can’t stay here – I’m not well’, not offered however, and so he chose He looked me in the eye and said, and apologised to us all for his inability retirement instead. In parentheses ‘I hope I can count on your prayers to properly take time to talk to us’.74 The we might note that his service record as well’. I had not expected that ability to remember names, a quality carries the notation that as of 16 response from him….I realised for which Martin was well-known, February 1987 he was ‘unfit for sea then that we had a unique man is perhaps the best aspect of one of duty’, so that may have carried some serving this State as Governor. his best leadership qualities – that of weight in the decision being made. He had great understanding. He empathy. This is something that will David Martin’s last day of service in understood what was happening endear any leader to their people: the the Permanent Naval Force was on 5 in our State and Nation. He was legendary “Bobs” – Lord Roberts VC of February 1988, and he was farewelled prepared to give whatever the help the British Army, was also well known in two large and splendid ceremonies he could in his position, as was for it.1 attended by over two thousand naval the case when he held his position On 3 September 1989 Martin personnel.68 It was perhaps fitting that in the Navy. He was a Leader in made a speech at Tumbalong Park, his final day saw him in contact with accepting responsibility.71 Sydney, on the subject of the Australian so many Navy personnel: his personal Flag. He noted its proud history, and report of the time noted: “David Martin The role of Governor, with Martin’s encouraged Australians to support it will be sorely missed by the Navy. He is unique perspective, was changed to and raise it even higher, to celebrate ‘… a ‘people’ person who has not hesitated become a ‘governor of the people’. He our joy in being Australian!’75 to represent the concerns of others and was able to expand on his personal In April 1990, Governor Sir David he has been at the forefront of trying to philosophy of what the Vice-Regal Martin organised a Prayer Breakfast. improve conditions of service.”69 role entailed in a number of speeches. This saw some 1500 men and women Offers of new employment – In summary, he saw the role as three- meet at the Convention Centre at Martin was only 55 – came thick and fold: constitutional, ceremonial and Darling Harbour. He appealed to his fast. One of them was to become the community, with the community audience to ‘Give a lead; to declare Governor of NSW in 1988. Martin aspect being mainly addressed our beliefs, to care for our fellow consulted his family and accepted. through the involvement of members Australians when the going gets rough He was the first RAN officer to hold of the public at ceremonies. This saw for them’. The Archbishop of Sydney the position, and co-incidentally, children’s Christmas parties being held described the meeting as ‘not a plug for the last RAN officer to be knighted, at Government House; the Martins religion, or even a plug for God. It was receiving the KCMG. Over a thousand visiting every area of NSW, and a plug for the needy throughout our letters of congratulation from all community events embraced en masse. country…’76 aspects of Australian society were Sir David became involved in a number This enthusiastic and generous received at Government House, and of charities: the Muscular Dystrophy schedule came to an end after two characteristically, Martin answered Association, the Royal Australian Life years. In 1990 Sir David Martin was all of them by hand. His first speech Saving Society, and the Variety Club of diagnosed with mesothelioma, a lung evoked images of his time at sea, and Australia. In 1988 he was named Father disease caused by his exposure to outlined his personal philosophy of of the Year, with some suggestion72 asbestos during his naval career. On 7 how one should treat others: ‘Life at sea that this was merited chiefly by ‘… August he relinquished his governor’s has taught me that no person has any the care he gave to hundreds of young position.77 In his last days he was right to feel more important than any naval ratings under his command in 1 Later Earl Frederick Roberts of Kandahar, other, and each person must support various postings’.73 His contact with Pretoria and Waterford, (1832-1914), every other person if the ship is to be the Navy remained strong. Lieutenant “Bobs” was a sterling soldier of considerable safe, efficient and happy’.70 Commander Mike Larsen remembers skill both as a tactical and strategic leader, and was much beloved by his troops for Member of the NSW Parliament being on duty as the Guard officer at the concerns he showed for them. For Fred Nile remembers meeting Martin the Sydney Royal Easter Show, when an example, see Abbott, J. H. M. Tommy Cornstalk. 1902. (pp: 190-208) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 35

busy founding the Sir David Martin opinions of others throughout his Foundation for homeless and under- career? privileged youth. In adversity he did To begin as a cadet midshipman not surrender, saying: ‘The next task is and end as an Admiral must always to overcome this illness of mine; then I be a sign of mighty achievement. shall be looking for a new career’. However, Martin achieved all of that However, on 10 August, three days and more: the respect, admiration after he had retired, Rear Admiral and love of those who served with Sir David Martin died at St Vincent’s him and under him. He was a Hospital. A state funeral was held, with very capable seaman officer who 1200 mourners attending, amongst commanded a variety of ships, but them the Governor-General, State his unique gift of leadership was in Governors, and a host of distinguished understanding others’ situations. retired servicemen and women. After Martin had a gift of talking to those the funeral at St Andrew’s Cathedral, of lesser rank that made them Sydney, the coffin was placed on a gun feel, for that moment, an equal, carriage and pulled along George Street and that this superior officer by sailors from HMAS Nirimba. A understood them and cared for Royal Australian Navy band played Rod them. To many of those who came Stewart’s ‘Sailing’, and many thousands into contact with Martin, he must of people paid their respects to ‘the have touched them with a notion People’s Governor’ for the last time.78 of how they too could emulate his Martin’s legacy was a lengthy and personable style of leadership. He considerate one. On the day of his showed initiative in simply the death the Sir David Martin Foundation way he handled his people. His came into being and continues its gift of getting others to follow work today. Lady Martin has spoken him is enviable and worthy of at numerous events in its support, and emulation. continues to visit the Triple Care Farm By sometimes simple at Robertson, in the NSW highlands, actions - the ‘L’ for learner to inspect its progress. A charity golf on Melbourne, for example - day raises money for the Foundation: in Martin reached out and spoke November 1998, for example, $11,000 to his people in a unique way. was raised in this fashion.79 Lady Sometimes he spoke to people Martin is also co-patron of the HMAS in a way such as they would Melbourne Association. A Sydney never forget what he had said, ferry is named after him: the ‘Sir as witnessed by the incident with the David Martin’ is a 35 metre catamaran later Chief of Navy David Shackleton. passenger ferry, and can be regularly Not only by his appearance - he looked seen on the Harbour waters.80 the quintessential naval officer - but by Martin’s Vice-Regal successor was his bearing, Martin was impressive.82 also a naval officer: Rear Admiral In summary, one of the most loved Peter Sinclair. He followed in his leaders of the Navy, a fine officer and predecessor’s footsteps by also making Governor, and one who was taken too the officer of Governor one that soon from his life of service. t Lieutenant Commander Tom Lewis embraced the people. For the first time, PhD, OAM, RAN has served in a variety Government House was opened to the 81 of PNF and reserve roles within the public. How can we summarise Martin’s Navy. He led US forces on deployment leadership characteristics, given the in Baghdad in 2006. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36

Studies in Trait Leadership – Loved Leader Rear Admiral Sir David Martin, kcmg, ao, ran 30 Shackleton, Vice Admiral, David, 70 Blood, Jack, and Alan Zammit. (11) Chief of Navy. Anecdote related to New 71 Christian Democratic Party website. Entry Officer Course members at a training Speech delivered by Reverend F. J. Nile, (Endnotes) dinner, RAN College, 26 June 2002. (Author E.D., L.Th., M.L.C. in the Legislative Council 1 Milliken, Robert. ‘Obituary of Rear present) in tribute to the life and memory of Rear Admiral Sir David Martin’. Naval Historical 31 Personal Reports. Admiral Sir David James Martin, KCMG Bulletin. Undated extract supplied by 32 Personal Reports. AO. http://www.christiandemocratic.org. Captain William Cook to the author. (13) 33 Personal Reports. au/fed/mr/spaug1490.htm 2 Naval Historical Bulletin. ‘Home is the 34 Biographical file. Royal Australian 72 A Call to Duty. (27-28) sailor’. Volume 21, Number 10. November Naval College Historical Collection. 73 Naval Historical Bulletin. ‘Home is the 1990. (15) 35 Personal Reports. sailor’. Volume 21, Number 10. November 3 Owen, POL, Commander, RAN 36 Biographical file. Royal Australian 1990. (15) (Ret’d.) ‘Eulogy’. Naval Historical Bulletin. Naval College Historical Collection. 74 Larsen, Mike, Lieutenant Commander, Volume 21, Number 10. November 1990. 37 Milliken, Robert. ‘Obituary of Rear RAN. Anecdote related to the author at (11) Admiral Sir David Martin’. Naval Historical HMAS Albatross in October 2002. 4 Biographical file. Royal Australian Bulletin. Undated extract supplied by 75 Australian National Flag Association. Naval College Historical Collection. Captain William Cook to the author. (13) Transcript of His Excellency The Governor 5 Sir David Martin Research Project. 38 Personal Reports. of New South Wales Sir David Martin, A Call to Duty. 1995. (10) Pages are 39 Hunt, Errol, Lieutenant, RAN. Naval KCMG. AO. National Flag Day Address unnumbered in this publication. The member from 1961. Conversations, HMAS Tumbalong Park, Sydney, 3 September 1989 numbering herein has been taken by Creswell, 2000-2001. http://www.flagaustnat.asn.au/martin.asp labelling the first printed page as page 40 Larsen, Mike, Lieutenant Commander, 13 March 2003. number one. RAN. Anecdote related to the author at 76 Sermon of the Archbishop of Sydney, 6 A Call to Duty. 1995. (12) HMAS Albatross in October 2002. at the Funeral Service for Rear Admiral Sir 7 Biographical file. Royal Australian 41 Personal Reports. David Martin. Naval Historical Bulletin. Naval College Historical Collection. 42 Personal Reports. Volume 21, Number 10. November 1990. (7) 8 A Call to Duty. 1995. (13) 43 A Call to Duty. 1995. (22) 77 A Call to Duty. (27-28) 9 Owen, POL, Commander, RAN 44 Personal Reports. 78 Blood, Jack, and Alan Zammit. (12) (Ret’d.) ‘Eulogy’. Naval Historical Bulletin. 45 Biographical file. Royal Australian 79 Navy News website. http:// Volume 21, Number 10. November 1990. Naval College Historical Collection. www.defence.gov.au/news/navynews/ (11) 46 Mills-Thom, Tony, Lieutenant editions/1998/11_30_98/story10.htm 13 10 Biographical file. Royal Australian Commander, RAN. Conversations, HMAS March 2003. Naval College Historical Collection. Creswell, 2000-2001. 80 Incat website. http://www. 11 Stenmark, Marea. Sir David Martin. 47 Kelly, Peter, Commander, RAN. incatdesigns.com.au/pages/datasheet. NSW: Simon and Schuster, 1996. (47) Conversation about David Martin. HMAS asp?vessel=107 13 March 2003. 12 Stenmark. (48-49) Creswell. January 2003. 81 Blood, Jack, and Alan Zammit. (12-13) 13 A Call to Duty. 1995. (15) 48 Denneny, Paul. Lieutenant, RAN. 14 Stenmark. (58) Conversation, HMAS Creswell, October 15 Ziegler, Bruce M, Commander RAN 2002. (Rtd.) Letter to the author, 28 February 2002. 49 Kelly, Peter, Commander, RAN. 16 Owen, POL, Commander, RAN Conversation about David Martin. HMAS (Ret’d.) ‘Eulogy’. Naval Historical Bulletin. Creswell. January 2003. Volume 21, Number 10. November 1990. 50 Sewell, Don, Lieutenant Commander, (11) RAN. Conversations, HMAS Creswell, 2000- 17 A Call to Duty. 1995. (14) 2001. 18 Blood, Jack, and Alan Zammit. ‘A 51 Personal Reports. Caring and Compassionate Man’. Salute. 52 Biographical file. Royal Australian November 1991. (9) Naval College Historical Collection. 19 Stenmark. (52) 53 Personal Reports.. 20 Royal Australian Navy. Personal 54 Personal Reports. Reports of David James Martin, Navy 55 Stenmark. (74) Records, Canberra. 56 Personal Reports. 21 McDonald, Neil, Rear- Admiral, RAN 57 Forbes, Donald, Commander, RANR. (Rtd.) Letter to the author, November 2001. Conversations. HMAS Cerberus, September 22 Dennis, Jim. Retired RAN officer. 2001. Letter to the author, August 2003. 58 Bateman, Dr. Sam, Commodore RAN 23 Stenmark. (54) (Rtd.) Conversation. 17 May 2002. 24 Stenmark. (55) 59 Biographical file. Royal Australian 25 Howe, PP. (Ed.) The Complete Naval College Historical Collection. Works Of William Hazlitt. Vol. 9. 1932. 60 Personal Reports. http://www.quotesandsayings.com/ 61 Personal Reports. finquoteframes.htm 62 The Naval Historical Society 26 The documentary Unfit for Command, of Australia Inc. ‘30 Years On’. NSW: first screened in 2003, alleges cover-ups by Drawquick, 2002. (20) officers in their evidence-giving. However, 63 Blood, Jack, and Alan Zammit. ‘A the conclusions drawn in it seem tenuous at Caring and Compassionate Man’. Salute. best, and unsubstantiated allegations in the November 1991. (10) main. 64 Waller, John. (Retired officer of the 27 Royal Australian Navy. Personal RAN). Email to the author of 9 April, 2003. Reports of David James Martin, Navy 65 Stenmark. (82-83) Records, Canberra. 66 Blood, Jack, and Alan Zammit. (10) 28 Stenmark. (62-63) 67 Personal Reports.. 29 Personal Reports of David James 68 Stenmark. (94) Martin, Navy Records, Canberra. 69 Personal Reports.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Gulf Deployment - Through an Artist’s Eyes Bob McRae was there... 39 Gulf Deployment - Through an Artist’s Eyes 41 42 808 Squadron Support Arrangements to meet Navy MRH90 Operations B y LieutenantAndrew Newman

he introduction into service of the MRH90 aircraft represents Tnew and exciting challenges for the Australian Defence Force. This aircraft will be operated by both the Australian Army and the Royal Australian Navy in support of Air Mobile Operations, Special Operations and Maritime Support. The RAN will take delivery of six MRH90 aircraft over the next two years to operate from 808 Squadron at HMAS Albatross. These aircraft will embark on RAN Ships and provide Maritime Support to the fleet previously provided by the Sea King aircraft. The MRH90 aircraft has been MRH90 (Courtesy procured as part of the AIR 9000 management of the MRH90 Fleet. I achieve this mix the AIR 9000 Multi of RAN) Program with a focus on Australian will not consider the impact of JP2048 Role Helicopter (MRH) program industry involvement. This has led ‘Canberra Class Landing Helicopter was established as a sub-program to the through life support of the Dock’ ships or the way in which Army amalgamating Phases Two (additional aircraft being provided by a contracted is to be supported. Troop-Lift Helicopters), Four (Black agency. These contracted services The Sea King aircraft has been a Hawk Replacement) and Six (Sea King in the past have been provided stalwart of the Royal Australian Navy Replacement). by ADF organisation employing since its introduction into service in The six MRH90 aircraft to be traditional management models. The 1976. Operated by 817 Squadron, the delivered under the AIR 9000 MRH introduction of contracted services will role of the Sea King has changed over Program will not be supported by the require a revised management model time from an Anti-Submarine Warfare Navy Aviation System Program Office to be developed. In addition to the platform to primarily being employed (NASPO) as is the case with all other contracted services the joint operations in a Maritime Support Helicopter Role NAS Squadrons. This represents a will require a new command and (MSH).1 However, due to the age of the fundamental paradigm shift for 808 control arrangement to be employed airframe, and increasing supportability Squadron support arrangements. that will be further complicated by a cost, the feasibility and operational Instead, the traditional System shared logistic pipeline and rotable reliability of this platform requires it Program Office (SPO) arrangement pool Deeper Maintenance philosophy. to either undergo a complex upgrade has been contracted out to industry This article provides background program or to be replaced. requiring contemporary arrangements to the introduction of the MRH90 In the 2000 Defence White Paper to be established to support operations. and the unique nature in which it is it was identified that Army would Agencies - Overview to be supported. It will discuss the acquire “an additional squadron (about The MRH90 aircraft is supported 808 Squadron Shopfront concept 12 aircraft) of troop-lift helicopters by a number of organisations including and the new command and control to provide extra mobility for forces both Commonwealth and contracted. arrangements that will be implemented on operations.”2 Coupled with From a command perspective 808 to ensure the requirements of other projects within the Defence Squadron will be under the control both Navy and Army are met. Material Organisation the AIR 9000 of the Headquarters Recommendations will be provided Program was established to provide (HQFAA) who is responsible directly as to the best solutions to ensure the ADF with the most appropriate to the Commander Australian Fleet the overall effective operation and force mix of helicopters. In order to (COMAUSFLT). The principal Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 43

Commonwealth organisation for are procured are of a sustainment is the MRH Logistic quality fit for use in the Management Unit (LMU) who has a aviation environment. Sustainment contract with Australian This unit provides a Aerospace for the provision of Logistic Management engineering and logistic services. role to ensure that MRH Logistic Management Unit the Supply chain is The MRH LMU is part of the functioning efficiently Helicopter System Division within and effectively. DMO and is the Commonwealth Whilst the MRH agency responsible for the in-service LMU does not have a sustainment of the MRH90 aircraft and daily interaction with Sustainment contract. The primary 808 Squadron, it is a key roles of the MRH LMU is to provide support organisation contract governance and interface as it is the Sustainment management that is spread across contract authority and as three units, as illustrated in figure 1 such provides the means with each focusing on their respective in which contract changes area of expertise. The Sustainment may be processed and contract aims to provide optimised cost approved should the of ownership over the life of type of the support being provided aircraft and capability availability. by the contractor not Working on an meet Squadron needs. Support and Test Equipment (S&TE) MRH90 (Courtesy Director and Simulator services up to and MRH LMU RAN) Australian Aerospace including Design Approval. AA is also responsible for providing Business Engineering Materiel Management Management Management AA is the prime contractor for the AIR configuration management activities, Unit Unit Unit 9000 MRH Program for the delivery of publication management, maintenance the MRH90 into service and through requirement and determination, Figure 1: MRH LMU Organisation life support. AA is contracted under and Aircraft Structural Integrity and a performance based Sustainment Engine Structural Integrity Plans and The MRH LMU Engineering contract to provide an initial 10 years management. Management Unit (EMU) is the with options to extend through until Maintenance. AA is required sponsor for the AA Authorised the aircraft life of type. In essence AA to obtain and maintain Approved Engineering Organisation and provides is operating in what is traditionally Maintenance Organisation (AMO) the Design Acceptance process for referred to as the SPO and providing status2 for the duration of the contract designs developed by the AA AEO. the engineering and logistic services and is responsible for providing DM In addition to Design Acceptance is a commonly expected of an ADF servicings for the entire MRH90 Fleet. Compliance Assurance role to ensure organisation. In addition to its SPO This is to be provided on a rotational that the processes and products being function AA is also responsible for all pool basis, meaning that Navy and delivered are of a standard that will Deeper Maintenance activities. Army are operating a shared fleet and meet or exceed the requirements Engineering. Under the the aircraft returned for DM will not be defined in the ADF Technical Sustainment contract, AA is required the aircraft received back. Airworthiness Management Manual. to obtain and maintain AEO status1 Logistics. AA is required to The MRH LMU Materiel for the duration of the contract provide all repairable items and spares Management Unit provides a for Airframe, Avionics, Software, inventory management of those items Compliance Assurance role in a similar 1 An AEO is an organisation that has been that are specific to the MRH90 aircraft. manner to the EMU however; it is certified (awarded an Engineering Authority Certificate) by the Technical Airworthiness 2 An AMO is an organisation that has concerned with the logistic support Regulator (TAR) to provide design or been approved by the TAR to conduct aspects and ensuring those parts that engineering management services to the maintenance of State Aircraft and/or ADF. Aeronautical Product. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 44 808 Squadron Support Arrangements to meet Navy MRH90 Operations

Headquarters Fleet Air Arm particular, 808 Squadron at meetings structure, to be based out of NAS, The Headquarters Fleet Air Arm between Navy and DMO to provide which would provide those Navy is the responsible for the provision of direction on future capability specific support functions detailed in the aviation capabilities required to requirements. In this capacity the Plan Pegasus. fight and win at sea and contribute HQFAA is one of the most important The HQFAA Shopfront model to military support. In this function support agencies as it should drive the does not make the most effective Commander Fleet Air Arm assumes RAN’s aviation maritime requirements. use of personnel as the proposed the role of Operational Airworthiness roles of some personnel are captured Authority Representative (OAAR) The Shopfront Concept within the contract. Further it does and acts as the Sponsor for NAS not include the AA Product Support AMOs. In the OAAR role COMFAA In 2005 a Joint Helicopter Management Engineer (PSE) who provides a direct is responsible to the COMAUSFLT Study was commissioned by the Chief interface back to AA and will be as the Operational Airworthiness Capability Development Group and embedded within the Squadron (in a Authority (OAA) to provide advice Defence Capability and Investment similar role to the OEMR). Whilst this regarding the operational airworthiness Committee to report on a joint structure does provide an interface of particular aviation systems, and to structure that would enable an effective between the Squadron and its external exercise management responsibilities and efficient joint management of agencies its influence in managing as delegated by the OAA.3 As the the MRH90. A recommendation issues on the Squadron behalf will be Sponsor of NAS AMOs, COMFAA of this report was that the “SPO limited by locality and accountability is responsible for ensuring only should provide specialist engineering to those agencies. Figure 3 outlines a organisations approved by the TAR support to the sub-unit locations via proposed concept that would utilise are used to conduct maintenance and Shopfronts.”4 This Shopfront concept embedded RAN personnel within advising the Technical Airworthiness has carried through to Plan Pegasus those external agencies that will have Regulator of any adverse maintenance as a requirement by Navy to provide direct influence and an established issues that could affect technical a direct Commonwealth interface to line of accountability that will enable airworthiness. those external agencies and provide effective support to be provided to the The HQFAA is also the Navy specific MSH support functions. Squadron. representative of the RAN and in Figure 2 depicts the HQFAA proposed The Sustainment Contract MRH90 (Courtesy RAN) allows for the MSH establishment Platform Executive (LCDR) of Members Required in MSH Design MSH Technical MRH LMU Uniform positions Engineer Logistics O cer Contract Liason OEMR Team (LEUT) (CPOAT) O cer embedded within the contractor MSH Logistics MSH S&SE organisation Coordination O cer O cer (APS 5) (POAT) which may be utilised to establish a MSH Liaison Officer as one of the two Figure 2: HQFAA Shopfront Concept MRH x 2 aloft Engineering Officer positions. The

808 Squadron Locality

Squadron OEM AA Product Representative Support MRH LMU CLO Engineer AA

AA MSH Liason MRH LMU MSH NHI O cer Support O cer MRH LMU (LEUT) (LCDR)

Figure 3: Proposed Embedded Position Concept Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 45

AA PSE would report back directly to operating in East Timor whilst Navy required to provide; the MSH Liaison Officer who would has an embarked flight operating in • the priority system to be then be able to actively manage (on the Arabian Gulf, both aircraft are employed, not just for routine behalf of the Squadron) those routine unserviceable and require the same tasks but also the allocation of tasks within the AA organisation item to return to flying and support its resources through a defined set and prioritise them based on the respective operation. Who receives of business rules; and direction provided by the Squadron. the item? • key performance indicators for As a RAN member he/she would gain In consideration of this issue monitoring deliverables. valuable experience into the contractor the JHMS recommended “a Joint It is this document that is key to this procedures and processes and also Helicopter Fleet management cell transition period as not only will provide key design input about MSH should be created within Headquarters it define key individual and joint operations for design solutions. This 16 Brigade (Aviation) to provide responsibilities of organisations it also position would provide a strong basis airworthiness oversight whilst provides a framework for managing for growth of future Squadron Deputy efficiently managing and allocating the capability against which the Aerospace Engineering Officers. joint resources to the roles in operators can provide feedback on Currently there is the requirement accordance with ADF priorities. This the performance of the Sustainment for Navy to provide a uniformed should be enshrined in an ADF-wide contract. Without this agreement in person to support maintenance MOU for the Joint Fleet capability.”5 place the management of MRH90 fleet management operations embedded This recommendation has been could be significantly compromised within the MRH LMU. It is proposed endorsed and the Joint Helicopter from an RAN perspective. that this position could be modified to Management Agency (JHMA) will be In conclusion, the AIR 9000 MRH become the MRH LMU MSH Support established following completion of Program represents the changing Officer. This position would be a post MRH90 Acceptance into Operational way in which the ADF is managing Charge Qualification job that would be Service (AIOS).3 Chief of Army has its capability. The use of a contracted able to provide specific Navy Strategic directed the Directorate of Aviation organisation in an effort to reduce and MSH operational direction to the Capability-Army to manage the cost of ownership over the life of future contracting changes to ensure MRH90 through to AIOS. type has and will continue to present that the requirements of Navy are This arrangement leaves a new challenges to the operational satisfied. It would also provide an significant period where both services unit. They key to effectiveness is indirect communication line for the will be operating aircraft with no ensuring that we are not bound by AA MSH Liaison Officer formal agreement in place and subject traditionally thinking and allow the As embedded personnel these to the command and control of an change in support arrangements to be positions have a vested interest in Army organisation with minimal Navy matched by a change in management Navy and are ideally placed to ensure representation. The development of arrangements. both routine tasking and future a Service Level Agreement (SLA) is The MRH Program has personified requirements are appropriately vital to the effective management of the AIR 9000 Program philosophy captured and actioned. Both of these the MRH90 aircraft. The SLA is the of efficiently managing the ADF’s RAN positions can be sourced from working level agreement between Force helicopter fleets for the rationalisation positions currently allocated to the Sea Commands and their key enablers (i.e. of types. The JHMA represents a King Platform within NASPO. Headquarters 16 Brigade/HQFAA and pragmatic solution that will provide MRH LMU). This document would effective operational management Operational Command and Control detail: however, until this point risks Navy • the responsibilities of each being drastically under represented. The MRH90 aircraft is to be jointly agency and the inputs they are Without formal agreements in operated by Navy and Army who will place the ability of the Navy to meet 3 AIOS is the process by which both be supported by AA and the the Fundamental Inputs to Capability (FIC) operational commitments may be MRH LMU. This has the potential to comprising a Capability System are proven compromised by lack of control. to meet endorsed capability requirements, create a conflict of resources as each usually specified in an Operational Concept Finally, I recommend the HQFAA service vies to meet its needs. For Document (OCD), and assembled such that concept of a Shopfront needs to in all aspects the capability has been realised example, the Army has a MRH90 be revised to ensure the effective and is acceptable for operational service. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 808 Squadron Support Arrangements to meet Navy MRH90 Operations utilisation of personnel, and HQFAA Bibliography review its role in the transition Department of Defence 2000, Our Future command and control arrangement Defence Force–Defence White Paper 2000, through until AIOS to ensure it Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. is placed to meet its operational commitments. t Department of Defence 2002, Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management, ACPA, Canberra. Department of Defence 2005, Technical Airworthiness Management Manual, CSSSO, RAAF Williams. Department of Defence 2009, Plan Pegasus—Acceptance into Operational Service of Multirole Helicopters, ATH 912-3- 2, Version 3.2.2. DGAD/OUT/2006/144 Joint Helicopter Management Study (JHMS)—Final Report, dated 22 Feb 06 Royal Australian Navy 2009, Statement of Operating Intent–SK 50 Sea King Helicopter, HQFAA, HMAS Albatross.

(Endnotes) 1 Royal Australian Navy 2009, Statement of Operating Intent–SK 50 Sea King Helicopter, Nowra, p 1. 2 Department of Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force–Defence White Paper 2000, Lieutenant Andrew Newman RAN joined Australian Government Publishing Service, the Royal Australian Navy in January Canberra, p 82. 3 Department of Defence 2002, Australian 2002, graduating from the Australian Defence Force Airworthiness Management, Airworthiness Coordination and Policy Defence Force Academy in 2006 with Agency, Canberra, p 2. a Bachelor of Aerospace Engineering. 4 DGAD/OUT/2006/144 Joint Helicopter Management Study (JHMS)—Final Report Since this time he has completed a dated Feb 06, p 13. two year posting to the Navy Aviation 5 Ibid System Program Office and is currently posted to the NUSQN 808.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 47 Collective Amnesia in Whitehall 1981 – 2010: The 2010 UK Strategic Review of the Royal Navy. An antipodean perspective. By LCDR Desmond Woods

“ You can lose escorts, they are the Fleet Air Arm. Nott replaceable, they are expendable, which also announced that the is not a comfortable thought if you first of the new “through happen to be the manager of one, but deck cruisers” the light you know it, - you shouldn’t have joined fleet carrier, Invincible, if you can’t take a joke ! But carriers due to be ready for RN are not replaceable. Lose a carrier and service in 1982, would you are done for. If you lose the air the be sold to Australia operation is over, you may as well all as a replacement go home.” for the aging carrier Rear Admiral ‘Sandy’ Woodward - Melbourne. He had no 1983 use for her and therefore neither did the United “ The removal from service of this Kingdom. country’s only operational all weather interceptor, the Sea Harrier, makes The End of the Strike deployment of a naval expeditionary Carriers force against any but the most basic opposition, with no aircraft of its own, The last of Britain’s true the worst kind of joke yet dreamed up by strike carriers Eagle an incompetent government.” and Ark Royal, capable Admiral Sir John Woodward - 2005 of providing the fleet with Airborne Early wenty nine years ago, in 1981, Warning, had been de an announcement was made by commissioned in the Tthe UK’s then Secretary of State for 1970s, with decades Defence, Sir John Nott, that major of useful service cuts were to be made to the surface left in them. Their Nothing replaces fleet and that the RN was to become replacements, the strike carriers of moved closer to each other on the carriers - the Royal only an Anti Submarine Warfare navy the Queen Elizabeth class had been charts they showed the MoD to win Navy Invincible-class concentrating principally on its nuclear cancelled a decade earlier in the mid their argument. New carriers would aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious, and hunter killer submarine fleet designed 1960s as a cost saving measure by never be needed and therefore the first Nimitz-class aircraft to destroy Soviet ICBM and attack the Labour Government’s Secretary ship, whose keel was laid, was broken carriers USS Harry submarines. That role was all that the of Defence, Denis Healy. As the last up again in the builders yard – with S Truman and USS Pentagon asked of the RN and all that of the major African colonies gained incalculable consequences for the Dwight D Eisenhower Sir John Nott could imagine being independence he was convinced that future. transit in formation needed. aircraft carriers would never be needed Also up for disposal by the end of during Operation Bold Step (Courtesy Consequently, he slated for disposal again by the UK. The RAF convinced 1982, as part of the UK Defence Review Royal Navy) by the end of 1982 the last of post war him that its aircraft could provide were the landing ships Fearless and carriers still in commission, Hermes. cover over the sea from shore bases Intrepid. These ships, which the Royal She had been expensively refitted in in friendly countries if ever this was Marine Commandos depended on 1981 as a “Harrier Carrier” with a new needed. Two of these were Australia for their inshore amphibious landing ski jump bow for the Sea Harriers of and South Africa which the RAF and logistics capability, were seen as Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Collective Amnesia in Whitehall 1981 – 2010: The 2010 UK Strategic Review of the Royal Navy. An antipodean perspective.

“outmoded and unnecessary” by the in Argentinean history by seizing elsewhere. MoD, but not by the for the long lost “Malvinas” which they She lacked whom they were essential operational claimed as the successor power to personal platforms. Spain, their former colonial power. rapport with This would be a popular and, as they John Nott All the wrong signals being hoisted thought, risk free national triumph and failed which would save his failing Junta from to over rule The folly implicit in these the political consequences of its own his decision, announcements was compounded widespread dirty war against its own as she could by Sir John Nott when he announced dissidents, general repressive brutality and should, that the RN’s only Antarctic ice patrol and economic failure. Later, after they have done. ship, Endurance, would cease making had been defeated, a senior Argentine She must her summer pilgrimage to the British officer made this point explicitly when therefore share some of Antarctic Dependency Territories of he said: ‘We simply never dreamed for John Nott’s responsibility South Georgia, the South Sandwich one minute that you would, or could, for the catastrophic Islands and the Falkland Islands send a naval task force. Had we known consequences of his at the end of the 1982 season and then what we know now, the skeptics myopic, purblind would be disposed of. The reason in the Junta would have had powerful decisionmaking and for her withdrawal, he announced, evidence to counter Anaya’s proposals refusal to take the advice was that she cost two million pounds for invasion.’ In an age of virtually of his First Sea Lord and per annum, and was therefore too instant communication the responsible other strategic experts. expensive and not considered value officials in London and Buenos Aires The simultaneous The US Navy aircraft for money. The decision to dispose of mutually failed to send clear advance announcement of the withdrawal of carriers ‘Ike’ and Endurance was immediately opposed signals as to their likely responses to Endurance and the slating for disposal ‘Truman’ astern of by Sir John Nott’s senior cabinet the each others’ actions. The UK and of the three key ships with amphibious HMS Illustrious (USN colleague, the Foreign Secretary Lord Argentina blundered into a preventable capability, Hermes, Fearless and photo) Carrington, who warned him in a war which neither side sought or Intrepid, which succession of notes that this decision anticipated. alone in the RN would be interpreted in Buenos Aires order of battle as a clear sign of Britain’s reduced Unheeded warnings could provide commitment to maintaining her the nucleus sovereignty over the Falklands. It was Lord Carrington’s and Captain of a recovery an obvious inference from the point of Barker’s warnings in 1981 went equally task force, view of the Argentine government. unheeded by Sir John Nott, a merchant understandably banker by training, who made no convinced the An exercise in non-communication connection between the withdrawal of Junta in Buenos Falklands Sea Harrier bombing up a research ship from naval service and Aires that forcible occupation would (RN archival) This decision was so clearly, the volatile state of relations between be swift and simple. It could not be short sighted, politically naive the UK and the Argentinean Junta. met with anything other than outrage, and strategically provocative that He was apparently unaware, despite bluster and protest in London and at Endurance’s Commanding Officer, years of stalled negotiations over the the United Nations. Galtieri reasoned Captain Nick Barker, bravely broke sovereignty of the Falklands, that he that the decision to dispose of the most with the apolitical tradition of the was unintentionally sending a ‘green powerful ships in the fleet and the ‘silent service’ by publicly warning the light’ message to a neo fascist military withdrawal of Endurance could only Thatcher government that Whitehall regime that was watching for just such mean that there were no circumstances was giving all the wrong signals to the a sign of Britain’s weakening resolve in which force would be met with force. newly installed President Leopoldo to remain in the South Atlantic. The He was very nearly right. If it had not Galtieri of Argentina. Galtieri and Prime Minister, a former Minister of been for the Argentinean scrap metal his Chief of Navy, Admiral Anaya, Education and Science, was unversed merchants on South Georgia, who were itching to carve their names in strategic analysis. Her attention was through their patriotic folly in hoisting Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 49

HMS Ark Royal on the Argentinean flag, precipitated a Britain in 1983 and for the rest of the serious blow by this well rewarded act the final port visit British reaction and consequently the decade. The irrecoverable Falklands of international piracy. of her career, in premature invasion of Port Stanley in would have become in international Hamburg, Germany. Photo by Michael April 1982, instead of January1983 law ‘occupied territory’ and pointless Admission of ignorance Nitz as planned, Galtieri would have been and protracted negotiations in the ‘home free.’ For by then the RN would UN would have achieved no change All that prevented that set of outcomes have been shorn of its amphibious to that ambiguous status. Possession was the fortunate fact that Hermes, support ships and Hermes critical would have been ten tenths of the Intrepid and Fearless were not yet flight deck. Mrs Thatcher’s steely law. The captive Falkland Islanders de commissioned on 2 April 1982 determination would have lacked the would have been flown from their when Galtieri unwisely launched his means to become British resolve to homes, via Argentina, to resettlement premature invasion of Port Stanley. recover the lost territory. Her position centres in UK. Their demands for Lord Carrington, the British Foreign as PM would have been untenable compensation would, no doubt, still Secretary, resigned when the news and her forced resignation would have be grinding through the courts of of the invasion reached London. Sir been followed by electoral defeat for the UK and Argentina. Argentina John Nott offered to resign too but the Conservative party as British voters would today be in possession of the oil was protected by the PM from the castigated her and her cabinet for the deposits, minerals and fish stocks of the opprobrium which the House of national disgrace they had suffered Malvinas. The newly popular Galtieri Commons, the British press and public led Junta might have survived in office believed he richly deserved. Perhaps Consequences – if the Falkland’s as a brutal Pinochet style dictatorship she realized that she bore a good invasion had been in 1983 not 1982 for perhaps a decade or more after the deal of the responsibility for allowing triumph of 1983. Argentina’s transition all the wrong signals to be sent. In The consequence of Hermes being to a modern democracy would have retrospect it can be seen that the decommissioned at the end of 1982 and been indefinitely delayed. The rule of decisions jointly taken regarding the Invincible being sold to Australia would law in the international community future RN fleet were those of amateur have been international humiliation for of nations would have been dealt a politicians unschooled in the strategic Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Collective Amnesia in Whitehall 1981 – 2010: The 2010 UK Strategic Review of the Royal Navy. An antipodean perspective. reality of sea power and the enduring is reminiscent of a similar event intellectual requirement for the United Kingdom, earlier this decade. In October 2006, bankruptcy like all other medium naval powers, to following the North Korean testing of of the be capable of exercising sea control and a nuclear device, the UK Government whole sea denial wherever in the world it has announced that in the event of the purchasing interests, independently of the global USN enforcing a maritime quarantine and super power. In his autobiography, Here of North Korean ports the UK would acquisition today Gone tomorrow, John Nott wrote provide an RN presence in North policy has with revealing candour: Asia. This sudden announcement been laid was met with anger and dismay by bare by the ‘ I must confess that I wasn’t serving and retired members of the decision much aware of the Falkland Islands RN who had been protesting at the by the UK before the invasion. Of course I knew starvation diet that the RN had been PM and that we had some Royal Marines on since the arrival in office of the Blair Defence there, but I had to remind myself as government. Secretary to where the Falkland Islands were In the event the US has stayed its to ask the when the scrap merchants landed on hand and has not attempted such French Does Britain have no equivalent to the Iron South Georgia. a blockade of shipping heading for President for an agreement to jointly Lady? Time magazine I had a huge great globe in my North Korea but the revealing episode deploy the Charles de Gaulle – a carrier Cover of the 1980s room in the Ministry of Defence perfectly illustrates that not enough that rarely leaves port without having and I went over to it to rediscover has changed in Whitehall since 1982. to return due to technical problems the geographical position of the The same thoughtless assumption – in the event of a requirement by Falklands. I was a bit horrified to see that a naval capability can be created the UK to project power across the how far away they were…… When I and sustained instantaneously still world’s oceans. Since when did Paris was alone with Margaret Thatcher dominates those civil servants in consider British interests as being I expressed my scepticism about the Whitehall who choose not to learn more important than French sailors possibility of such an exercise. It was their lessons. Operational capability safety? Is it possible to imagine that 8,000 miles away and we didn’t have at sea is a plant that is developed, the Charles de Gaulle will deploy to proper land- based air cover.’ trained slowly and carefully nurtured. the South Atlantic, or anywhere else Nott’s phrase ‘proper land based air It cannot be continually pruned and yet at the behest of perfidious Albion? As cover’ epitomizes his ignorance of the still expected to produce useful fruit. the ship’s namesake was so fond of possibility and advantages of carrier Nor can it be pulled out by the roots declaring when faced with any request based aviation. Presumably a Secretary every couple of decades. UK politicians from UK, the answer must surely be, of State for Defence who did not know who are “hard wired” to the five year mais non ! where the Falklands were could hardly electoral cycle are apparently oblivious The problem is that a capability be expected to understand the utility of to this “inconvenient truth.” which is undeployable is also incapable the ships he had just decided to scrap of being a deterrent. That was one of either. His ignorance of the facts of Back to the Future the lessons of 1982. The Charles de maritime life and decisions he made, Gaulle is a giant nuclear powered fig despite being warned of his folly, were The 2010 decision to retire the entire leaf intended but failing to hide the expensive - they indirectly cost 340 UK Harrier force and yet to continue nakedness and impotence of the future British lives and over 1000 Argentinean to build the two Queen Elizabeth class Royal Navy. No one has yet explained ones. carriers is a classic example of standing how Frances, with a comparable logic on its head. The decision to economy to the UK, has been able Unlearned Lessons in Whitehall make the first carrier finished, Queen to maintain fixed wing flying from Elizabeth, into a giant 70,000 ton carriers when the British, who invented The recent shelling of South Korean temporary helicopter carrier before wings over the sea, have given that territory by Pyongyang in Nov 2011 selling or mothballing it, provides a capability away in a generation. and the relative impotence of the West new low for the MoD even on the Meanwhile the cuts to the surface to provide a joint maritime response “Sir John Nott scale” of stupidity. The fleet and its manpower begun under Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 51

Evacuation by sea of endangered citizens – Beirut 2006 the review entitled Galaxy 06 by news among the drug cartel operators successive PMs Blair and Brown can only be imagined. The RN frigate The UK, like all western societies has large expatriate continue apace. The final number on station in the Caribbean has for populations scattered across the world. This became obvious of Type 45 Daring class air warfare decades been a serious impediment in 2006 in the Middle East when a multi-national force had destroyers is half what was intended to the drug cartels swamping the to lift expatriate populations from the seafront at Beirut and needed. Relatively new frigates North American and European while Israeli bombs were devastating whole city blocks of and destroyers are being mothballed markets with unlimited quantities the city behind them. If the time comes when Whitehall or scrapped every year without of cocaine. In recent decades very is forced by public opinion to attempt a “hot extraction” of replacement. Officer promotions to significant quantities of hard drugs and these potential hostages, while under fire, by sea it will be commander and above will be frozen amphetamines have been seized at sea the absence of ships capable of defending themselves that till 2012 or beyond as a cost cutting by the RN. On just one patrol HMS will be sorely felt. Expecting friends and allies to carry one’s measure. This decision will be so Cumberland with RFA Wave Knight citizens to safety would diminish Britain into a third rate destructive to morale that it guarantees seized in three arrests a total of 11 power. The world is not, contrary to complacent Western that the officers who might be needed tonnes of cocaine. opinion becoming a safer place. Every power is a hostage to to take ships out of mothballs in an Unlike war and warlike operations fortune if it cannot defend its global interest, including its emergency will never be available these ongoing naval patrols to citizens, from terrorism and/or warfare. as they will have left the Navy long curtail drug trafficking attract little before the crisis which demands their attention from the UK press or public. The Legacy of Empire – residual responsibilities for law presence arrives. Another fifteen Nevertheless the RN working with enforcement hundred sailor redundancies are also the USN and the US Coastguard has likely once ships are mothballed. The played a disproportionate part in It may be an unpalatable fact for a generation of UK citizens Reserve manpower pool is to be cut by protecting the young, the addicted and taught to believe that Britain should be indiscriminately a further 20%. The closure of one naval the vulnerable in Western society from ashamed of its colonial history in Africa, regardless of the base is always being contemplated the fatal consequences of using hard injustice of this idée fixe, but the reality is that there are still or threatened as a necessary cost drugs. The minimal amount of cash situations and circumstances where the former colonial saving measure. These decisions, if saved by pulling an RN frigate patrol power has the only force available to step in, briefly, to implemented as described, will turn the from the Caribbean will no doubt have support the lawful government and prevent genocidal RN into an anorexic Navy which lacks to be spent many times over by the catastrophe. France has done this repeatedly. The African the strength to carry out sustainable UK National Health Service, the Police Union has its not very strong hands full in Congo. Britain blue water fleet operations except on and the Prison Service in dealing with is not exempt from its humanitarian responsibilities just an occasional surge basis. the consequences of uninterrupted because it has run down its capacity for intervention. The most concerning parallel with drug flows arriving in the UK. As the The last time that the British were called upon was by the John Nott’s 1981 announcement that availability of drugs rises inexorably government of Sierra Leone earlier this decade. Without he intended to sell off the surface fleet in Western cities no immediate cause amphibious support from the sea by the RN the British is that these reckless cuts will once and effect will be ‘sheeted home’ to the operation to stabilize the country, in the face of violent again invoke the “ law of unintended absence of a patrolling RN frigate by militia rampages, would have been impossible and Sierra consequences.” the US or the European public. Only Leone would have continued to hemorrhage while the the Colombian drug dealers will know world watched. This would have had serious consequences Fighting Drug runners at sea – the for sure what a difference the absence for the whole of West Africa. It was UK maritime capacity logical way – under threat from the of a frigate in the Caribbean has made that made this joint operation practical and underwrote its cuts to their profitability. eventual success. The unintended consequence of One immediate consequence is likely the reduction of the RN surface fleet Why have successive UK governments become sea-blind ? to be a threat to the RN’s Caribbean will be that the drug barons will have patrol, which has an unmatched once again have the freedom of the Leaving aside the question of cost, which is always a matter record of successful interception seas for their “unlawful occasions.” The of choice and priorities, what has happened to the British of drug runners. This patrol will be congratulations of UK Secretaries of establishment which has made it so heedless of its need made at best intermittent or at worst Defence will cease along with the drug for maritime power? There must be many reasons for terminated as being unsustainable. seizures which they celebrated. this failure to think through the likely consequences of The satisfaction in Colombia at this diminished sea power. One explanation is that historically Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 Collective Amnesia in Whitehall 1981 – 2010: The 2010 UK Strategic Review of the Royal Navy. An antipodean perspective. Hard power and soft power – tandem illiterate populist junior politicians available when the inevitable crisis comes which requires her and non specialist senior civil servants diminution presence. Two carriers with one full sized air group is the in Whitehall cannot imagine the Consequently, the diminished forces minimum necessary for a nation to claim with confidence circumstances under which modern that the UK has been able to deploy that it has a strike carrier capability. That is what the Navy surface ships might be needed and have been failing to impress the asked for, planned for and needs if it is to be expected to therefore dismiss the maintenance Pentagon and US State Department provide a strike capability or a combat air patrol over a beach of a credible surface fleet as being for the last fifteen years. Britain’s head. This lost decade when the RN is in a state of forced “surplus to UK requirement at this soft power and influence has been hibernation has serious implications for the whole position time.” This over confidence and under receding along with her hard power. of the Western Alliance at sea. The vacuum left by the RN spending is not new. Defence Secretary The diplomatic skies are black with will be filled eventually by others or advantage will be taken Denis Healy went so far as to predict chickens coming home to roost. of its absence. in 1965, when he cancelled the two Secretary of State Hilary Clinton on new fleet carriers, that the UK would, hearing of the scale of the damage Why does the decimation of the RN matter internationally? ‘never again be involved in any form about to be inflicted on the UK’s of amphibious operations without the armed forces by the 2010 Strategic The Royal Navy is not just an ornamental or heritage navy United States.’ Review expressed her deep concern left over from a past age of Empire and hegemonic war, with In addition to this lack of strategic publically. This unusual frankness is an no long term significance or role in the twenty first century. imagination the wars in Iraq and undiplomatic reflection of the Obama On the contrary, it has, despite the salami slicing down the Afghanistan have been continuing at a administration’s dismay at seeing a decades, maintained a record for consistent intervention and low tempo for a decade absorbing UK’s further whittling away of the remaining operational effectiveness unmatched among other European defence budget and intellectual energy. military and naval capability of its medium navies. The rest of Europe traditionally looks north Before these counter insurgency wars principal NATO ally. across the channel for naval leadership to the UK. However there were the costly blue helmet for the next decade at least the RN will be smaller than stabilization operations in the Balkans Power deferred is power denied the and as small as the Dutch and Italian. The dating back to the early 1990’s, European trident will perforce be passed to Paris. Without its followed by the Kosovo intervention Under the terms of the 2010 Strategic strike carriers the RN will swiftly be stripped of its capability from the air. War, even low intensity Review it will be 2020 at the very to undertake an operational or influential role in the world. operations, is expensive and provides earliest before Prince of Wales will be This will be a serious loss not just to the UK and Europe but no victories, no reasons to ring village ready to deploy with strike aircraft. also to friends of freedom of the seas and defenders of the church bells, only the slow, but regular In the meantime, without those “four Law of the Sea everywhere. procession of inexplicable body bags acres of floating steel, ” the UK will be coming home to an uncomprehending unable to project airpower from the ‘Command of the Sea’ should not be vested in only the USN public. The UK has been trying on an sea in any part of the globe for the unsustainably small percentage of its next decade. The RAF’s claim that it The complacent assumption in Western capitals, including still considerable GNP, and with under can and will use bases in Oman for Canberra, that the Western Alliance’s Command of the resourced and shrunken forces, to intervention in the Middle East is Sea will endure indefinitely without challenge is misplaced. punch above its weight. It has become a comical reprise of the folly of the In particular the belief that the USN is so powerful and all obvious that the cuts made by the 1960’s. Oman is not going to let the pervasive that no other navy will ever be needed to police John Major Conservative government UK bomb nuclear armed Iran from its this planet’s oceans and littoral waters is a pernicious and at the end of the Cold War, which bases and then depart. This is fantasy perilous assumption. There are realistic scenarios in which were intended to provide a “ peace and the fact that it has been seriously the US government may choose not to act, or is constrained dividend “ for the nation, in fact largely suggested by the proponents of the from doing so, but which nevertheless require intervention, destroyed the compact but powerful RAF’s anywhere anytime capability stabilization or force projection from the sea. Constabulary and balanced joint force that was able shows a worrying disjuncture between tasks such as mass evacuation of foreign nationals from a to deploy for One in 1990 by operational planners and strategic hot war zone by sea, as occurred in Lebanon in 2006, may land, sea and air. It no longer exists. reality. become more common, particularly in the Middle East. The decision not to maintain two These may not be unopposed as they were in Beirut in carriers, one operational and one in 2006. Conflict for remaining maritime resources and the refit, means that it will be pure chance requirement for protection of diminishing oilfields are more if the carrier is out of maintenance and likely than not. The capability for maritime intervention can Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 53

only be provided from ships capable and other NATO partners, in keeping deck skills that the RAN has not trained sailors for in over a of protecting themselves, those in the volatile Persian Gulf secure. The generation. company with them and also providing UK/US ‘special relationship’ depends, combat air patrols, helicopter airlift and in part, on this ability to fly the Union Collective amnesia in Whitehall – again seaborne landings of troops. Frigates, Jack in the Gulf at sea. escorts and ships taken up from trade The most immediate effect on the The often expressed mess deck remark that, “the British cannot provide that capability on their RAN of continuing cuts has already Navy can defeat any enemy as long as it is not the British own. Navies and nations with large been noticed in the numbers of trained Ministry of Defence” is once again proving prophetic. The responsibilities need a few large ships and experienced mid career RN officers ‘smaller but better Navy’ that the MoD is proposing will and many smaller ones with long reach and senior sailors who like their ships, quickly turn into a smaller and bitter navy as the operational to protect them. have been “up for disposal” over the last tempo remains and the ships and people to undertake decade and hence seeking a continuing them wear out. Twenty nine years on from Sir John The South Atlantic re-visited ? naval career in the RAN. Nott’s egregious errors of judgment and the preventable Throughout its history the RN and painful war for the recovery of the Falkland Islands, The three light fleet carriers of the has continued to supply a very useful collective amnesia and misplaced frugality seems to have set RN’s Invincible class have more or less augmentation of trained senior sailor in once again in Whitehall. provided this capability since the UK’s and officer ranks into the RAN. This One can only hope that the price for this latest attack on last true full sized fleet carriers were has been a most cost effective trickle the RN’s operational capability will be paid for only in cash, scrapped. Now Invincible is available of trained talent, all paid for by the UK not, as it was in 1982 in the South Atlantic, in the blood of for scrap and her sisters Illustrious and taxpayer and available for immediate young pilots, soldiers, marines and sailors. t Ark Royal are both being finally and service with a minimum of cross irrevocably de commissioned. The last training required. This recruitment Sea Harrier landed on Ark Royal for of RN officers and senior sailors was the last time in November 2010. With once a cause for concern among those the Sea Harriers the UK has lost its RAN members who worried that it only all weather seaborne strike fighter might impact on their promotion capability. Consequently as Admiral prospects. This concern is not well Woodward has pointed out publically founded. In practice RN transferees, the RN now has less capability for both senior sailors and officers, are either blue water or littoral operations constrained by the rank granted than it had in 1982. A handful of them, (often a demotion), and/or their RAF Tornados on the runway at Port seniority within that rank, from being Stanley, and the RN’s attack submarines immediately competitive with RAN are all the UK deterrent has left if the personnel. In the longer run they quite Argentine government reverses its properly rise to the rank commensurate policy of using diplomacy, not force, to with their talent, drive and expertise. recover the Falklands. The proverb that, “it is an ill wind that does not blow someone some Lieutenant Commander Desmond Woods RAN has served An antipodean perspective on the cuts good, ” would appear to true, for due to in the Royal New Zealand Navy; the Royal Navy, the British to the RN it the RAN has a “once in a generation” Army, and the Royal Australian Navy. He is currently serving opportunity to fill its shortage in Canberra. What do these draconian cuts to the categories with RN officers who have RN and its manpower mean to and for come to the end of their ability to stay Australia and the RAN in particular? in a fleet which is again under attack Clearly the operational contact from Whitehall. The aircraft handlers between the RN and the RAN in the made redundant from the decks of Ark Gulf may over time be affected, though Royal and her sisters would be a most in the medium term the UK is likely to logical target for recruitment given that prioritize the Gulf patrols in order to be the RAN’s LHD’s are taking shape in seen to be playing its part, with the US Spain and will need specialist upper Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 Adrift in a Think Tank: Insights from the Lowy Institute By Commander Justin Jones

etween August and December in April 2003 as the result of a gift by 2010, I was privileged to be Mr Frank Lowy AC, one of Australia’s Bseconded to the Lowy Institute as Navy leading businessmen, to mark the 50th Fellow. This was the first time that Navy anniversary of his arrival in Australia. had a visiting fellow placed at the Lowy The Institute is non-partisan and Institute. The army has had a Chief of is home to a range of policy ideas. Its Army Fellow since the early days of the staff and fellows speak with individual Lowy Institute’s existence. It was an voices. The quality of output is derived interesting, informative, enlightening from the insights and experience of and broadening experience. My aim policy practitioners, academic experts is to impart to the reader some of that and business people. It also seeks experience. to bring new voices and external The Lowy Institute is an viewpoints into the Australian debate, independent international policy think for example through an active program tank based in Sydney. Its objective is of internships for young people and to generate new ideas and dialogue the involvement of members of the on international developments and Australian diaspora. Australia’s role in the world. Its My personal involvement with mandate is broad. It ranges across the Lowy Institute started in 2006 White Fleet visits. Yet another, in 2009, all the dimensions of international when I became a regular attendee was convened to examine the maritime policy debate in Australia – economic, at the Lowy’s ‘Wednesday Lunch at implications of the Defence White political and strategic – and it is not the Lowy’ (WLL) series of lunchtime Paper. By the time of this latter event, I limited to a particular geographic presentations. The first WLL I was in command of HMAS Newcastle region. attended was given by Rahul Roy- and, looking for a potential job for the Chaudhury, a Senior Fellow at the period June – December 2010, hit upon The Institute has two core tasks: International Institute for Strategic the idea of a short attachment with the 1. To produce distinctive research Studies in London and well known Lowy Institute. The rest, as they say, is and fresh policy options for commentator on Indian affairs. At Australia’s international policy; the time, I was Commander Plans in and Fleet Headquarters and the RAN was 2. To promote wide discussion of enhancing its relationship with the Australia’s role in the world. Indian Navy. Thus, it was very topical. Before long, I was a regular attendee With these tasks in mind, the Lowy at Lowy events when opportunity Institute seeks to throw fresh light on permitted. issues of relevance to Australia through In 2008, as a speaker at the RAN rigorous research, and then to generate Sea Power Conference, I was invited workable policy ideas. The Institute to attend a Lowy Institute convened also seeks to contribute to wider closed door roundtable with Vice international debate. The Institute Admiral Anup Singh, Indian Navy provides an accessible and high quality Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. This forum for discussion of Australian kicked off what became a regular foreign policy and international invitation to attend other closed door relations, through debates, seminars, events hosted by the Lowy Institute lectures, dialogues and conferences. from time to time. Another occurred The Lowy Institute was established in late 2008 to commemorate the Great Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 55

history. My tenure at the Lowy Institute by various internal and foreign experts. benefit lay in the constant stream of was not necessarily the beginning I was honoured to be asked to write information flowing into either the of a brand new posting opportunity one of these, pertaining to AirSea computer or my Blackberry. In terms for Commanders. However, I do feel Battle. AirSea Battle is an operational of blogging, I had been surfing the vast that there is potential for further concept published in mid-2010 by the array of defence, defence industry and attachments by naval officers. More on Washington think tank, Center for defence pundit’s web sites and blogs in that later. Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. order to gain a sense of what was going So how was I employed and what I was also invited to co-author the on around the traps in the defence did I achieve while working at the Lowy major maritime centric paper for the and navy/maritime world to inform Institute? I was taken on primarily to project. The paper, untitled at the time my own blogging. It was a painstaking assist as the maritime adviser to the of writing, was launched by the Chief of process, even using RSS feeds. Twitter Lowy Institute MacArthur Foundation Navy at a joint Naval War College and obviated that need. Tweets come Asia Security Project. Now in its Lowy Institute conference in February. direct with pithy commentary and a second year, the Asia Security Project Additionally, I co-wrote and published link where appropriate. This medium (ASP) aims to formulate a practical a short paper on naval diplomacy and makes it easy to sort the interesting and agenda for security cooperation, taking engagement, with Rory Medcalf, the relevant from the uninteresting and as its starting point the realities of Program Director for International irrelevant. relations among the region’s powers. Security and a former diplomat When North Korea started shelling The region referred to is the Asia himself. Yeongpyong Island, the ‘Twitterverse’ Pacific and is defined as encompassing On the side, the Lowy Institute lit up. Through ‘re-tweeting’ of ‘re- the area from the western Indian was my introduction into the world of tweeting,’ it was clear that some Ocean through to the Western Pacific. blogging and also the use of Twitter. I information was coming out from The ASP is funded by a significant was invited to contribute to the Lowy’s on the ground sources. I’m sure grant from the MacArthur Foundation. reputable and prominent blog The intelligence officers and analysts are While the ASP emphasises the Interpreter (www.lowyinterpreter. all over this. From the think tanker’s promotion of cooperative relations org). Although tentative initially, I soon perspective, it makes for a rich among the major powers involved in warmed to the idea of contributing to source of information from which to East Asia, it also aims to incorporate debate online and had some interaction draw on and contribute analysis and the views of other regional actors. The with other commentators through commentary in various forms. opening phase of the project charted ‘Reader Ripostes.’ I had thought early How was I able to participate in the enduring constraints to security on that my posts were somewhat all of this, as a serving naval officer? cooperation in the Asia Pacific, while anodyne. However, it was pointed My only caveat was to comply with the second and third phases will out that what may seem dull to me DI(G) ADMIN 08-01 relating to public identify, and then promote, the most might be quite interesting for the blog comment. I did that throughout. The promising institutional and less formal followers without much maritime sources and information I used were arrangements for cooperation and knowledge or experience. Indeed, the all public. Where topics strayed close confidence building. These are often feedback from Lowy staff at all levels to sensitive issues I either drew it to referred to as second track dialogue or and from external contributors was someone else’s attention to blog about initiatives. positive and confidence boosting. This or discuss, or put the information out The initial phase of the ASP led me into the next social networking without any comment or analysis. completed in mid-2010 with the field – Twitter. Moreover, I did not delve into areas publication of Power and Choice: Asian I had noticed that a number of my that common sense dictated keeping Security Futures.1 For the remainder of colleagues were actively using Twitter well clear of. As with all publications 2010, the Lowy Institute’s ‘MacArthur for professional purposes. In fact, my and comment from the Lowy Institute, team’ coordinated the roll out of a wife was using Twitter similarly in the written and verbal product from staff series of ‘Strategic Snapshots,’ written education industry for professional does not represent the view of the 1 Andrew Shearer, Rory Medcalf and development, with much success. organisation. Under the terms of the Raoul Heinrichs, 2010. Power and Choice: Having signed on and registered, Defence Instruction, so it was for me Asian Security Futures, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney < http:// within three days I was following 150 too. www.lowyinstitute.org/PublicationPop. people and had 40 followers. The real The final aspect to highlight asp?pid=1306> Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 Adrift in a Think Tank: Insights from the Lowy Institute

from my secondment is the ongoing service related fellow given the recent program of visits by notable officials demise of the Chief of Army Fellow and academics to the Lowy Institute. position. However, I feel that periodic, In the short period of my tenure, I sat targeted and short tenure fellowships in on closed door discussions with: from the Navy could be realised into representatives from the US National the future. These ideally would be Intelligence Council; US Under undertaken by staff course qualified, Secretary for Defence for Nuclear post command Commanders who hold Deterrence; Foreign Minister Kevin appropriate postgraduate credentials. It Rudd; Professors David Shambaugh is a potential win-win for the Navy and and Robert Sutter from Georgetown for the Lowy Institute. University; Professor Aileen Baveira My short tenure at the Lowy from the Philippines; Dr Yoshihide Institute was a positive experience. I Soeya from Japan; Dr Matthew Levitt feel privileged to have worked with from the Washington Institute; and very high calibre people in a completely Linda Jakobson from SIPRI’s Bejing different context and environment to Commander Justin Jones, RAN is office, amongst others. Along the way, Navy. I know that I was able to lend a a Principal Warfare Officer with the WLL program included speakers different perspective to some matters, specialisations in Surface Warfare ranging from Professor Hugh White, to provide an actual practitioner’s and Advanced Navigation. He holds to Alan Joyce, CEO of Qantas, to appraisal of academic postulation and Ambassador Dan Kuertzer from the to ‘stick my head above the parapet’ a Master of Management Studies US, to Dr Simon Longstaff from the of public commentary and have a (Leadership), a Master of Arts (Strategy St James Ethics Centre. It remains an go. For the Navy, I have gained an and Policy), a Graduate Diploma eclectic, interesting and informative appreciation for how policy is shaped in Defence Studies and Graduate program. and influenced by think tanks, and Certificate in Maritime Studies.H e From day to day, though, I was also from the bureaucracy. I was able to interact with people of sharp forced to sharpen my writing skills to commanded HMAS Newcastle from intellect and diverse experiences. match the distinctive think tank style. December 2008 to July 2010, before Michael Wesley, the Executive Director I also vastly increased the network of taking up his tenure as Navy Fellow of the institute, is well known in experience from which I can draw in at the Lowy Institute for International foreign policy and academic circles. the future. Ultimately, my efforts at Policy, in Sydney. Commander Jones He co-hosted one of the streams at the the Lowy Institute complemented the 2020 summit. Martine Letts, Deputy aims and objectives of the Sea Power is currently Deputy Director Navy Director, is a former Ambassador to Centre. I believe that I was able to Experimentation in Navy Strategic Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay and raise the already high level of naval Command. adviser to Minister for Foreign Affairs and maritime debate amongst my Gareth Evans. Andrew Shearer, the colleagues. t Director of Studies, was John Howard’s foreign policy adviser. Rory Medcalf, Program Director for International Security and my immediate boss during my tenure, is a former journalist, ONA analyst and diplomat. These people, amongst many, bring rich knowledge, experience and insight to the Lowy Institute. I hope some of it brushed off! The fellowship was a remarkable opportunity. The Lowy Institute is unlikely to re-introduce a permanent Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 57 Last words... from HMAS Sydney 1941

Transcript of a letter written by LAC Keith Homard on 7 October 1941 (9 Squadron RAAF attached to HMAS Sydney). Homard was the ship’s flight photographer and was listed as Missing - Believed Killed in Action when HMAS Sydney was sunk on 19 November 1941.

HMAS Sydney II - The front of the gun housing of “X” turret, credited by the Germans with inflicting the mortal blow on Kormoran (Courtesy HMAS Sydney Search Pty Ltd)

Same Address 7.10.41 Dear Mum and Father, As we are due in port tomorrow I will write this letter now and post it by Air Mail as soon as we get in. I hope there is one waiting for me when we arrive or I’ll be very disappointed. We have had a very exciting trip this time. One day last week I was on the forecastle (top deck in front) having some rifle practice when ‘Action Stations’ was sounded. You should have seen the sailors move. In 3 minutes every man was at his post with all guns loaded and ready and in 10 minutes we had the plane ready to take off. We clapped on speed and raced to where the look out had sighted a ship but to our disappointment it was one of our own. That night as it was very hot we all slept on the deck and were soundly asleep when at ¼ past 1 ‘Action Stations’ was sounded again. It was a pitch black night but everybody hopped to it and in about 10 minutes we were ready to go again. Suddenly our searchlights were switched on and outlined in the beam some hundreds of yards away was another ship. While we were signalling to each other our ship was slowly cruising around the other one in ever narrowing circles and all guns trained and it was just like a cat playing with a mouse. I have often wondered how I would feel if we went into action and whether I would be scared or not, but I was very excited and feeling disappointed because if we did fight, as it was night time and I would not be able to get any photographs. However it turned out to be another false alarm as it was also a friendly ship, so back we went to bed to get what sleep we could before our usual ‘hour before dawn action stations’ which we always have in case a ship has trailed us during the night and is waiting for daylight before attacking. That same day about 4 we had another alarm and as this was the third within 24 hours we all thought that at last we were going to have a fight. What we had sighted though turned out to be a gunnery target, and we sent a sea boat off to pick it up. From the markings on it the officers assumed that it was from an enemy raider. They had apparently put it out for shooting practice, then spotted us coming and went for their lives without waiting to pick it up. As the target had only been in the water for about 3 hours and we knew an enemy raider was somewhere in the vicinity it looks as if that was the case. Like all the rest of the boys I was very disappointed, especially as we had apparently missed it by such a short time. However we might have better luck on our next trip and run into it. Sometime ago I took some photographs of a convoy and the Captain sent word that he would like to see proofs of the ones I had taken. He liked them so much that I had to get special paper and print him two 15 x 12 enlargements which he had framed and hung in his cabin. He complimented me on them and said they were particularly fine, then asked me to come up to the bridge the following day and take his photograph. I was certainly nervous but I took 4 of him and luckily for me they all turned out good ones. I did proofs of them today and sent them up to him and when he sends them back I will have some more enlargements to do I suppose. As long as he is satisfied that is the main thing anyway. We have had some very hot weather on this trip and I have mostly lived in shorts and sandshoes. I am enclosing a photograph that Dick took of me in the plane the other day. I look kinda lean don’t I, but am feeling pretty good considering, and not feeling the loss of weight and scrap. I am getting quite a good colour up also. We have had some beautiful moonlight tropical nights up here and I have been putting a blanket down and sleeping on the deck. I’m getting that way now that I can sleep anywhere. I forgot to mention that when ‘Action Stations’ went on the second day I was having a bath. I must have looked darn funny racing through the ship all wet and only a pair of shorts on. On day man was all lathered up with soap and he raced out just as he was in his birthday suit. Believe me when that alarm goes you drop everything and go for your life no matter what you are doing. We are arriving back at Fremantle tomorrow. Fremantle itself isn’t much of a place as it is a very old city and a typical sea-port, but Perth, about 12 miles away, is a very modern place and is quite a busy city. They have some very nice shops in it and Cox Bros. also have a branch but I haven’t been in to it yet. You’ll be surprised to know that the other night in Perth, a chap tapped me on the shoulder, and when I turned around it was Mr Parsons. He was on one of the ships that we had with us. I certainly got a shock to run into him and he looks very well which is hardly to be wondered at since he is away from that ‘beaut’ wife of his. He probably thinks this war will be a picnic by comparison. 7.10.41 We arrived safely this morning and as the mail closes in a few minutes I will finish this now and write again later. Your Loving Son Keith

PS. Give my love to Lance and all the others. (Letter supplied courtesy of Greg Swinden)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 The Global Maritime Partnership and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Australia at the Crossroads of the “Maritime Century” B y CaptainGeorge Galdorisi, US Navy (retired) and Scott C. Truver, Ph.D.

Perspective

The nexus of world power is shifting decidedly to the Asia-Pacific region and Indo-Pacific Ocean, Robert Kaplan explains in Monsoon. “The Greater Indian Ocean,” he writes, “stretching eastward from the Horn of Africa past the Arabian Peninsula, the Iranian plateau, and the Indian Subcontinent, all the way to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond, may comprise a map as iconic to the new century as Europe was to the last one.”1 Its shores washed by both oceans, Australia in 2011 is poised to be a critical player – some would say the critical player – in the security and prosperity of the entire Indo-Asia region. And, as Australians know, the oceans – not the land – define the region, and those oceans and the global commons are more important to Australia’s security and prosperity than ever before. These themes were echoed by Air Vice-Marshall Kym Osley, AM, CSC, Australian Defence Attaché and Head of Australian Defence Staff Washington in an interview for The Year In Defense 2010. “The world of the future will be increasingly multipolar and more focused on the Asia Pacific Region,” he said.2 nearly a decade, represents the highest- trade having more than quadrupled “I think we’re now seeing that the level document describing the way in the past four decades – bringing power is shifting to the Pacific and ahead for the Australian Defence Force. prosperity to Australia and the Indian oceans and will continue to community of nations. However, do so in the next two decades…. Globalized Regional Threats and with the dependence on reliable Hence the Defence White Paper is Challenges oceanic commerce to undergird world most appropriate given its title of prosperity come vulnerabilities. Those Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific As globalization has accelerated, who would disrupt trade and the rule Century.” This Defence White Paper, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, of law on the global commons have the first such document issued by the it has generated a step-function many opportunities to attack vessels on Australian Department of Defence in increase in maritime trade – seaborne the high seas or coastal waters. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 59

The dramatic increase in piracy is relationships that enhance our Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, but one manifestation of the threat own security and allows us to Australia and the Royal Australian to the global commons.3 Climate work with others when we need to Navy (RAN) have been prominent change, burgeoning populations pool our resources…this defence in addressing threats and challenges and demographic shifts to coastal policy means that we must have the as part of regional and global and near-coastal regions, and ever- capacity to lead military coalitions partnerships. And increasingly, those greater pressures on marine resources when we have shared strategic nations that threaten Australia and are focusing attention on a broad interests at stake with others… other nations on the global commons spectrum of irregular challenges that and make tailored contributions possess ballistic missiles armed with navies and coastguards must deal with to military coalitions when we weapons of mass destruction. today.4 Natural disasters – hurricanes, share wider strategic interests with tsunamis, coastal flooding, volcanic others.5 Australia’s Leadership in Regional events, earthquakes and a host of Maritime Security others – bring suffering to millions. As Jack McCaffrie and Chris Often, naval and maritime forces are Rahman point out in the U.S. Naval Australia and the RAN have been the only ones capable of responding War College Review, during the leaders in the global maritime in a timely fashion and in the volumes past decade Australia has shifted partnership (GMP) as well as regional necessary to bring assistance and relief. from fielding a defence force with a partnerships throughout the Indo- Australia is among the most continental focus to building one that Pacific region. Indeed, the need for proactive nations in ensuring the is predominantly maritime.6 Part of global and regional partnerships is rule of law on the global maritime this dramatic strategic shift stems from likely to increase in the future. The commons. And the Royal Australian the fact Australians live in a decidedly emerging international environment Navy has been prominent in this and dangerous neighbourhood. Tensions after the end of the Cold War is especially in teaming with regional on the regional maritime commons are evolving around the concept of global and global partners in accomplishing high. interconnectedness and the need this task. This has been embedded at Whether it is North Korea lobbing for nations to work in “cooperative the highest levels of national policy. missiles over Japan in 1998, China’s action” to maintain the stability of the Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific repeated skirmishes with many of the global economy.7 The 2010 Australian Century: Force 2030 puts it this way: ASEAN nations in the South China Maritime Doctrine notes: Sea during the past decade, or perhaps Australia’s defence policy… most egregiously North Korea’s sinking Australia’s strategic entails the maintenance of of the South Korean warship Cheonan environment is most fundamentally alliances and international defence in May 2010 and the shelling of shaped by the global distribution of

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 The Global Maritime Partnership and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Australia at the Crossroads of the “Maritime Century”

power...the strategic environment Force 2030: “There is increasingly complex and is no greater interconnected, and the boundaries responsibility for a between international and national government domestic security issues are than the defence of progressively more blurred.8 the nation, its people and their interests. And as defense budgets internationally Australia has an come under increasing stress (witness enduring strategic the U.S. DoD mandate to save almost interest in the US$200B during the next five years stability of the wider and the United Kingdom’s draconian Asia-Pacific region, defense reductions impacting all UK which stretches defence components, but especially from North Asia to the Royal Navy with cutbacks in ships, the Eastern Indian aircraft and personnel), nations and Ocean.”9 Air Vice- especially their navies are likely to seek Marshall Kym Osley, even more savings while generating AM, CSC, Australian greater effectiveness via collective Defence Attaché and regional if not global security. Head of Australian But while the concept of the GMP Defence Staff has been embraced by the international explained it a tad community since the then-U.S. Chief differently: “Australia of Naval Operations Admiral Michael is really a middle Mullen first unveiled the “Thousand power; one that Ship Navy” in September 2005, and considers itself as regional maritime partnerships have part of the broader world community, be installed in each of the air warfare sprung up to do important work such and who certainly sees itself as very destroyers.”12 as anti-piracy patrols and humanitarian relevant on the world stage.”10 The capability of the Aegis weapon assistance and disaster relief, the “high- Australia’s decision to purchase the system to be the “shield of the GMP end” of naval warfare has not been Hobart-class Air Warfare Destroyer fleet” and defend against manned part of the concept of operations of the (AWD) equipped with the U.S. Navy and unmanned aircraft and cruise GMP. Aegis weapon system and the RAN’s missiles has spawned an Aegis As Australia moves forward to exploration of potentially equipping Global Enterprise (AGE) through make the RAN a world-class navy, these ships with ballistic missile defense which increasing numbers of navies however, national, defence and RAN capability reflect the commitment to are embracing the Aegis solution. officials are mindful of the potential for field a navy that is clearly poised to Moreover, the success of Aegis the RAN to be involved in “high-end” take a more prominent leadership role ballistic missile defense (BMD) – 21 warfare in the future, either solely or as in the Indo-Pacific region. Acquiring successful test intercepts in 25 tries part of global or regional partnerships. this capability could open the door since January 2002 – has resulted Accordingly, as the RAN looks ahead, to enhancing Australia’s leadership in several navies embracing as well one aspect of “high-end” warfare, of the GMP in the area of “high-end” the BMD component of Aegis. The dealing with ballistic missiles armed warfare, specifically, defense against President’s Phased Adaptive Approach with weapons of mass destruction ballistic missiles armed with WMD.11 (PAA), announced in September 2009 (WMD), represents a crucial aspect of As Air Vice-Marshall Osley notes; “The to protect Europe from the threat of the RAN’s capability and capacity. air warfare destroyers will deliver to ballistic missiles armed with weapons This is consistent with Australia’s the Navy a significantly enhanced air of mass destruction (WMD), is but one strategic worldview, as articulated defence capability primarily through manifestation of the growing global in Defence White Paper, Defending the acquisition of the U.S. Aegis missile reliance on Aegis BMD. Indeed, one Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: and weapons control systems that will of the major themes underpinning Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 61

NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon ballistic missiles deployed, compared to Pacific Rim, but much more. With summit was collective defense against only nine countries in 1972. Potential each success of the Aegis BMD test ballistic missiles. enemies possess ballistic missiles and program, other states have realized the Clearly, the type of navy a nation weapons of mass destruction and enormous potential of Aegis BMD to acquires has an enormous impact on today’s rogue leaders view WMD as defend against short- mid- and long- what kind of warfare that country weapons of choice, not of last resort. In range ballistic missiles. is equipped to undertake. For the 2007, the last year for which complete Part of the attraction of the Aegis Australian Defence Force (ADF) in records are available, potential weapon systems in general – and Aegis general and the RAN specifically, there adversaries launched 120 ballistic BMD specifically – to an increasing is compelling evidence that Australia missiles in tests and demonstrations, a number of nations is that Aegis BMD will build a navy equipped for high- significant total compared to previous takes maximum advantage of more end, coalition warfare. As McCaffrie years. This spike in foreign ballistic than $80 billion of investment in the and Chris Rahman point out: missile launchings, especially in the sensors, weapons, command-and- short- to intermediate-range category, control systems, ships, people and Recent, ongoing, and future was particularly pronounced in China, facilities that comprise the Aegis (Force 2030) ADF capability North Korea and Iran. weapon system. The early success developments will dramatically In the Indo-Pacific region, China’s of Aegis BMD is not surprising enhance the potential for impressive inventory of missiles considering the history of progress Australian maritime forces to underpins its anti-access/area denial fueled by substantial and steady contribute to U.S.-led coalitions (A2/AD) capability, an emerging investment in developing the baseline in future contingencies. The capability and capacity so dangerous to and upgraded systems: nearly 50 air warfare destroyers and, it has led directly to urgent calls to deal years of Aegis weapons system and especially the new frigates – with with it. As pointed out by Marshall more than 60 years of missile research, their LACMs, SM-6 missiles, Hoyler in the Naval War CEC, possibly theatre-ballistic- College Review, “China seeks missile defence, and advanced the capacity to find U.S. aircraft antisubmarine warfare systems carriers roughly a thousand – would add measurably to any miles from the mainland and U.S. Navy-led maritime force…. to attack them with homing The white paper proposes a ASBMs (antiship ballistic robust future defence force with missiles).”14 Among the most a very strong maritime emphasis, troubling aspects of this threat including a sea-based strike is China’s development of the capacity and the ability to deploy, world’s first anti-ship “carrier protect, and sustain a substantial killer” ballistic missile, the DF- land force.13 21D, leading commentators to note; “The DF-21D is the But, like other nations and navies, ultimate carrier-killer missile.”15 the RAN’s resources are constrained, The half-century of and the need for Aegis BMD must be progressive Aegis system and balanced against other defence needs. Standard Missile development So at this juncture, it is fair to ask, just that enabled the U.S. President how compelling is the threat of ballistic to make his decision to pursue missiles armed with WMD and how, a Phased Adaptive Approach and why, should the RAN be prepared for ballistic missile defense to deal with this threat? in Europe signals not only a reliance on Aegis BMD to T he Need for Effective BMD defend Europe and the Middle East, as well as its previous In early 2011, some 30 countries have mission to protect much of the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 The Global Maritime Partnership and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Australia at the Crossroads of the “Maritime Century” development, testing and real-world does not threaten Russian performance. And as Australia and interests the way President the RAN look to the future and Bush’s fixed-missile defense consider the efficacy of Aegis BMD system seemed to.”18 for this Canberra’s defence needs, it is instructive to look to what is happening AGE as the “Glue” of the GMP half a world away in Europe. Few aspects of the emerging Aegis BMD Foundation for PAA global maritime partnership have grown more rapidly The Phased Adaptive Approach for than the increasing desire Europe is being built around the Aegis of the United States and its BMD system and the Standard Missile- allies and friends to unite Three (SM-3) to defeat the short- to together on the global intermediate-range ballistic missile commons to provide the threat.16 The PAA, in 2011 being capability for collective implemented only in Europe, could defense against ballistic eventually be adapted within other missiles armed with WMD. regions, particularly the Middle East This capability has grown and East Asia. It can also be specifically quietly as nations that have tailored to the threats unique to those made investment decisions regions, including their scale, the scope based primarily on national and pace of their development, and the interests have then found capabilities available and most suited that these investments also for deployment. The U.S. President enable them to combine determined that the Aegis/SM-3- their resources in collective centered BMD option, complemented defense. As the 2010 U.S. Government U.S. Aegis program – initially Japan by other, ground-based missile defense Ballistic Missile Defense Review and Spain and later Australia, Korea systems, was sufficiently mature for acknowledged: and Norway – has laid the foundation near-term operations and had the for an AGE. The United States growth potential to perform this Other allies already own or are began with a foreign military sales critical mission as missile defense working with the United States to relationship with Japan, moved to an requirements increase in complexity acquire specific capabilities, such expanded relationship with Australia and danger. as naval vessels equipped with the and Korea, and then to a commercial An Aegis-enabled European Aegis defensive system, that could relationship with Spain as well as BMD is now embedded in NATO’s be adapted to include a missile an enterprise between Norway and new strategic concept, as a “core defense capability…. A primary Spain. Several other governments have element” with the document going U.S. emphasis is on ensuring expressed interest in the Aegis weapon further to state, “NATO will actively appropriate burden sharing. The system and Aegis BMD. seek cooperation on missile defense Administration recognizes that In 2011, the foundation for an Aegis with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic allies do not view the specifics of BMD-based GMP has evolved as allies partners.”17 Indeed, the new PAA- the missile threat in the same way, build Aegis warships. The Australian NATO BMD approach has been and do not have equal resources to MOD became interested in using the instrumental in turning Russia’s apply to this problem, but there is Aegis architecture to connect other previously strident criticism of general recognition of a growing maritime assets into an integrated NATO BMD to a desire to join in threat and the need to take steps architecture as well. South Korea has this collective defense. For example, now to address both existing announced plans to build six 5,600-ton President Medvedev stated, “A phased threats and emerging ones.19 KDX-IIIA Aegis-equipped destroyers system of mobile radars and missiles beginning in 2019, to complement proposed by the Obama administration The participation of allied navies in the the three Sejondaewan Ham KDX-III Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 63

destroyers that will be in service by most imminent – and growing – threat 2012. to nations and navies on land and sea Several navies have participated alike, the threat of ballistic missiles in the U.S. Aegis BMD Flight Test armed with WMD. Mission (FTM) program. The Japanese The AWD will be an enormously Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) capable ship. According to Defending Aegis Destroyer Kirishima (DDG Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: 174) was the first foreign warship to Force 2030, “The Government will participate, in FTM-10 (2004). The proceed with the acquisition of three HNlMS Tromp (F 803) was the first Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD). In European participant in the test order to enhance the air defence program, with the ship’s modified capabilities of the AWDs, the George Galdorisi is Director of the Corporate Strategy Group SMART-L systems tracking the ballistic Government will equip them with missile target in FTM-11. The Spanish the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) long- at the Space and Naval Warfare System’s Center Pacific, the Navy’s Mendez Nunez (F 104), outfitted range anti-aircraft missile. The SM-6 US Navy’s C4ISR laboratory and Center of Excellence. Prior to with a BMD software modification, missile is the most advanced weapon joining the lab as a Navy civilian, he served for 30 years as a tracked a ballistic missile target in of its type, with a range of more than naval aviator, commanding two helicopter squadrons, USS FTM-12. Four times over the past 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres) Cleveland, and Amphibious Squadron Seven. He published several years, JMSDF ships launched and effectively extends the air defence SM-3 missiles at medium-range, protection offered by these advanced “Naval Cooperation for the Future Force” in Headmark (Dec. separating-warhead targets. ships. As they enter service, the AWDs 2009) will be equipped with a sophisticated The Way Ahead for RAN BMD Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which enable each vessel to Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific act as part of a wider ‘grid’ of sensor Century: Force 2030 is unequivocal: and weapon platforms that can share “Maintaining a credible defence surveillance and targeting information. capability is a crucial contributor to Clearly, the robustness of the planned our security, as it can serve to deter AWD would make a BMD capability a potential adversaries from using force natural transformational capability.22 against us or our allies, partners and Aegis BMD is making the Global neighbors.”20 Deterring the burgeoning Maritime Partnership girded for high- ballistic missile threat is likewise a end warfare a reality. Should Australia crucial part of this strategy. This elect to add this significant capability commitment by Australia is real, as Air to its fleet it would quickly become one Dr. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, Vice-Marshall Osley explained, “We of the most important partners in the Gryphon Technologies LC, and since November 2007 has see it as very important that we invest Aegis BMD enterprise, and in so doing, in security, and as a consequence, we further serve to achieve the goals of the managed Gryphon Technologies’ strategic planning and have maintained a relatively high rate Defence White Paper. t communications efforts. In addition to his corporate of investment, by world standards, in responsibilities, he supervises and carries out research, our military forces.”21 analytical and advocacy efforts relating to international And it is this growing worldwide security, homeland security and defense, and naval and commitment to Aegis BMD – a capability that Australia may well maritime requirements and programs. Since 1972, Dr. Truver embrace for its three Air Warfare has participated in numerous studies for government and Destroyers – that promises virtually private industry in the United States and abroad, and he has unlimited potential to field an also written extensively for U.S. and foreign publications. international global maritime partnership that is well-capable of defending against what is clearly the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 64 The Global Maritime Partnership and the Aegis Global Enterprise: Australia at the Crossroads of the “Maritime Century” (Endnotes) in each of the air warfare destroyers.” “Using the Land to Control the Sea: Chinese 1 Robert Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Interview: Air Vice-Marshall Kym Osley,” Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Ocean and the Future of American Power op.cit. Missile,” Naval War College Review, Autumn (New York: Random House, 2010). See also, 12 Ibid. 2009, Volume 62, Number 4, pp. 53-86; Kaplan, “Center Stage for the 21st Century,” Marshall Hoyler, “China’s “Antiaccess” 13 “Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper: Ballistic Missile and U.S. Active Defense.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009. A Maritime Force for Uncertain Times,” 2 See John Gresham and Susan Kerr, op.cit., pp. 73-74. 16 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, op.cit. “Interview: Air Vice-Marshall Kym Osley, 14 Marshall Hoyler, “China’s “Antiaccess AM, CSC, Australian Defence Attaché Ballistic Missile and U.S. Active Defense,” 17 “EUCOM Missile Defense Plan ‘Ready and Head of Australian Defence Staff Naval War College Review, Autumn 2010, to Present’ by Spring 2011,” Inside the Navy, Washington,” The Year In Defense 2010 Volume 63, Number 4, p. 84. Importantly, December 13, 2010. See also, “Missile (Tampa, FL, Faircount Media, 2010). Hoyler’s article notes the crucial role Defense Tops NATO Summit Plan,” Defense 3 David Goodman, “Piracy Reached of Aegis BMD in addressing the threat News, November 15, 2010. Record Level in 2010, Monitors Say,” The of Chinese ASBMs. For an Australian 18 Steven Erlanger and Jackie Calmes, New York Times, January 19, 2011. See perspective on China’s capabilities, “NATO Sees Role After Afghan Combat,” also, Bruce Elleman, Andrew Forbes, and including China’s ASBMs, see Brigadier New York Times, November 21, 2010. See David Rosenberg, Piracy and Maritime General John Frewen, “Harmonious also, Paul Rowan, “Peace Breaks Out as Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies, Ocean: Chinese Aircraft Carriers and NATO Asks Russia to Join Missile Shield,” (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, the Australia-U.S. Alliance,” Joint Forces London Sunday Times, November 21, 2010 2010) for a comprehensive history of piracy Quarterly, Issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, pp. and Nikolaus von Twickel, NATO to Offer on the maritime commons. 68-74, accessed at: www.ndupress.ndu. Medvedev A Warm Embrace,” Moscow 4 Adm. Gary Roughead, USN, Chief of edu. Frewen notes: “China is, therefore, also Times, November 19, 2010. Naval Operations, “The U.S. Navy’s Vision pursuing complementary technological and 19 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, for Confronting Irregular Challenges,” asymmetrical capabilities that could counter op. cit., p. 32. The success of Aegis BMD Washington, D.C., January 2010. or neutralize overwhelming U.S. military afloat and the promise of Aegis Ashore have advantages.” 5 Australian Defence Force, Defending also garnered interest from a wide range of Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 15 Michael Wines and Edward Wong, non-traditional partners such as India (Amy 2030, Australian Department of Defence, “China’s Push to Modernize Military is Kazmin and Farhan Bokhari, “New Delhi Canberra, 2009, . See Bearing Fruit,” New York Times, January 6, Weighs up US Missile Shield,” Financial also, George Galdorisi, Stephanie Hszieh 2011; David Fulghum, “Numbers Matter,” Times, January 8, 2009). and Darren Sutton, “Naval Cooperation Aviation Week and Space Technology, 20 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific for the Future Fleet,” Headmark, Issue January 3, 2011; and Mark Stokes and Dan Century: Force 2030, op.cit., p. 11. 134, December 2009, for a discussion of Blumenthal, “Can a Treaty Contain China’s Missiles?” Washington Post, January 2, 2011. 21 “Interview: Air Vice-Marshall Kym Australia’s contributions to the global Osley,” op.cit. maritime partnership. See also, Andrew Erickson and David Yang, “On the Verge of a Game Changer,” U.S. 22 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific 6 Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman, Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2009, pp. Century, op.cit., p. 71. “Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper: 26-33; Andrew Erickson and David Yang, A Maritime Force for Uncertain Times,” U.S. Naval War College Review, Winter 2010, pp. 73-74. 7 Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine: RAN Doctrine 1 – 2010, Sea Power Centre, Canberra, , (13 July 2010), p. 42. 8 Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine, op.cit., pp. 40-41. 9 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, op.cit. 10 “Interview: Air Vice- Marshall Kym Osley,” op.cit., p. 11. 11 For example, Air Vice-Marshall Osley notes, “The air warfare destroyers will deliver to the Navy a significantly enhanced air defence capability primarily through the acquisition of the U.S. Aegis missile and weapons control systems that will be installed Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 65 Book Reviews

running of the Navy Department and age and no pension on which to in Taaffe’s words was essentially Welles’ retire, so officers tended to serve as Chief of Naval Operations. The chain long as possible. Combined with that, of command was simple in that Welles promotion was strictly by seniority had direct access to Lincoln – but as and while that may have sufficed in Taaffe points out repeatedly, he was not peacetime, Welles saw quickly that it the only one in the Navy who did. would not do in war. The uniformed leadership Welles also saw that if he stayed comprised the commanders of the six with the status quo he would be geographically-based squadrons, which continually appointing officers in their included the North Atlantic Squadron sixties to squadron commands. Taaffe and the East and West Gulf Squadrons. provides the example of Captain Silas Initially these officers were all captains Stringham, aged 64 when appointed or commanders, but during the War to run the Atlantic Coast blockade some of them were promoted to be squadron, and points out that despite C ommanding Lincoln’s Navy: the first Union Navy Rear Admirals. In his good qualities, he simply found Union Naval Leadership during the all, 19 officers served as commanders managing and leading a squadron of the six squadrons and at least six in wartime beyond his capacity. The Civil War of them were relieved for inadequate author exposes the challenges faced By Stephen R. Taaffe, Naval Institute Press, 2009, 324 performance. As a group, their defining by Welles in trying to appoint younger pages, hardcover, illustrated. characteristic was almost certainly and more junior officers. Taaffe, for their human frailty – most of them example, notes the outraged reaction to ISBN 978-1-59114-855-5 were flawed characters in many ways the appointment of Captain Frank Du Reviewed by Commodore Jack McCaffrieR AN (ret’d) and many seemed unable to rise above Pont to squadron command when he the pettiness of organizational politics was ranked 51 of 65 available captains. Quite naturally, most writings on the American Civil War even in time of war. Some saw it as a plot by Welles to force deal with the land campaigns and those who led them. Taaffe’s analysis of the Union Navy their retirement. Even so Du Pont was Stephen Taaffe’s book Commanding Lincoln’s Navy, instead leadership highlights several major not far short of being 60 when selected. focuses on the Union Navy in the Civil War and in particular problems faced by Welles and Fox Perhaps not surprisingly, health on those who led it. This is not a chronicle of the Civil War at during the War. First among these was another problem that dogged the sea and on the rivers. Instead it is a penetrating examination was that of assembling a corps of squadron commanders. As Taaffe of the political and operational leadership of the Union Navy loyal officers, given that about 25% points out, however, it was not just a in the context of the major naval campaigns of the War. of Union officers resigned or were factor of age and it did affect primarily The Navy’s contribution to the War was significant and dismissed at the outset of the War and those officers serving at sea. The was exercised through some 58, 000 officers and sailors many of them went or returned to the main causes of illness were the stress manning and supporting up to 680 ships and other craft of South. Those born in the South were associated with long and sometimes various kinds. The major campaigns included the blockade removed from sea commands at the tedious deployments, climate in the of Confederate ports on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico outset and even those who professed Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean where coasts, protection of Union sea lines of communication from and demonstrated loyalty were treated yellow fever was a constant worry and Confederate raiders and riverine operations, especially those with suspicion. As Taaffe points out, of course wounds in action. All told, to take control of the Mississippi River, which was so vital to the situation early in the War was eight of the 19 squadron commanders, the South for transport and the unity of their territory. especially difficult for Welles because including the incomparable Farragut, The Union Navy leadership which Taaffe analyses was of his limited knowledge of the officer suffered serious illnesses, enough in headed by the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, a New corps. several cases for them to be relieved England newspaper proprietor, once a Democrat, one of Age, seniority and competence were of their commands. Having to relieve Lincoln’s political appointments and a man with some prior also significant problems for Welles commanders because of poor health experience within the Navy bureaucracy. For virtually all in his attempt to find senior officers was yet another unwanted pressure for of the war he had as his Assistant Secretary of the Navy capable of prosecuting the naval war. Welles, for whom, as Taaffe points out Gustavus Fox, who had served in the Navy before succeeding The essence of his problem was that keeping good commanders at sea was a in business. During the War, Fox took care of the day to day there was no mandated retirement constant struggle. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 66 Book Reviews

Taaffe devotes considerable that respect. Some of the squadron had little introspection or self-awareness. Something of attention to the matter of courage commanders were well known by the a martinet, he expected immediate obedience from his among the squadron commanders. President and as the author points out, subordinates, but he also interpreted his orders from Physical courage was rarely if ever in Lincoln did promote Dahlgren to Rear his superiors as suggestions…this hypocrisy, combined short supply; with Farragut in his attack Admiral, against the wishes of Welles. with his greediness, unhealthy ambition, and unthinking on Mobile possibly the finest of many Unsurprisingly, the reaction among wilfulness gained him few friends’. examples in the book. Moral courage Dahlgren’s peers and subordinates was on the other hand was, by the author’s strong, as many believed the promotion A rare individual no doubt. account in shorter supply. That is to was not merited. Others were also well This is a very useful book and it will reward careful say, while some squadron commanders connected in Washington and thought reading. Few of us have much of an idea as to what makes were quite prepared to stand in the nothing of having family members a good leader when we begin our climb of the greasy pole. line of fire, they were not prepared to lobby President and Congress, not How would we approach the task if we knew just how far make the decisions needed to launch always successfully, on their behalf. from perfect some of our predecessors were? operations, on the success of which Some of the squadron commanders their promotions would depend. were also quite happy to undermine Captain John Dahlgren was the their fellow officers by writing to foremost example of this. Taaffe Welles, in the hope of taking their provides much detail of Dahlgren’s jobs. David Porter was one of these. efforts to secure a squadron command, When called to account for a different together with his subsequent and discretion, he simply left Welles’ office constant inability or unwillingness and walked across the street to the to launch an effective attack White House, saw Lincoln and left with against Charleston. According to a job more to his liking. Perhaps it is as Taaffe, Dahlgren placed personal well that there is a lake between Russell aggrandisement before the winning of and Parliament House. the war. The author describes Dahlgren Overall, Taaffe has provided a as having a great work ethic and detailed examination of the operational forceful personality, but lacking entirely leadership of the Union Navy at war a sense of humour and social insight. and how it responded to political Taaffe also notes that Dahlgren direction. He has exposed a ‘senior was insatiably ambitious and had a leadership group’ which was by no Gu ests of the Emperor thirst for glory which unfortunately means perfect, but which in the end overshadowed the excellent work got the job done. His descriptions By Linda Goetz Holmes he did as the Chief of the Bureau of of squadron commanders really do Naval Institute Press 2010; hard cover, 128 pages, Ordnance before the war. Captain illustrate just how individual and illustrated, USD $29:95 Samuel Du Pont was another whose imperfect we humans are and possibly fortunes slumped in the face of the equally important, how imperfection ISBN 978-1-59114-377-2 need to take Charleston. He recognized does not necessarily mean inability. Reviewed by Commodore David Hobbs RN (ret’d) the difficulties involved but, according Clearly, not everyone can be a David to the author, lacked the moral courage Farragut. Fortunately, however, not Linda Holmes spent over 20 years researching the to speak to Welles about them. This everyone is a Charles Wilkes either: experiences of American, Australian and British prisoners of kind of hesitance greatly frustrated war who were held at Mukden in Manchuria, occupying the Welles, who at times desperately Wilkes was a lean, erect, largest fixed camp of its kind in the Japanese Empire. The needed some naval success, given the clean-shaven man…among men were treated brutally and, contrary to international laws lack of it in the field early in the War. the most unpopular officers in endorsed by the Japanese Government, they were forced Unlike the Union Army, the the Navy. He was quarrelsome to work on components for combat aircraft in the nearby Union Navy did not have to endure and contentious, opinionated Mitsubishi factory. senior officers who were promoted and critical, and carping and The author describes how the majority of Red Cross through patronage alone. But the Navy complaining…although he was officials were deceived by the Japanese authorities into leadership was not entirely pure in quick to find fault with others, he thinking that conditions in the camp were far better then Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 67

they really were. The comparison the survivors to better comprehend between the poor standard of fitness of what happened to their fellow the Americans held in the Philippines prisoners. and the better state of British and Guests of the Emperor is a work Australians who had been held in of clarity that sheds new light on a Changi is interesting and the attempts subject that has not, until recently by officers to get messages out the been studied in sufficient depth. It is camp in statements authorised by the pleasing that it has proved possible to Japanese are analysed in detail. The publish it while some of the former hidden messages were not always prisoners are still alive. All too soon comprehended by Allied Governments the events described will have passed or the Red Cross and apparent praise from living memory and it is important for the Japanese led to resentment that future generations can read a work against their officers among other that was researched and written with prisoners. the aid of people who were there. It is Passport Not Required By focusing on this single camp, the illustrated with contemporary sketches, By Eric Dietrich-Berryman, author is able to trace the prisoners’ photographs and maps and makes Charlotte Hammond and R E White experience from the cramped hold a positive addition to the available of the SS Tottori Maru which carried literature on the suffering of Allied 170pp; extensive bibliography and page notes; 28 1, 993 American prisoners from the prisoners in the hands of Japanese. I photographs; Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 2010. Philippines, through the desperate thoroughly recommend it. Reviewed by CMDR David Hobbs MBE Royal Navy (retired) journey to Manchuria in which many died and on to liberation by This delightful, well-researched book tells the story of twenty- a resourceful OSS team that was two American citizens who volunteered to serve in the Royal dropped by parachute nearby in Navy between 1939 and 1941 when America was neutral and August 1945. the British Empire fought alone for the cause of freedom. Unusually the author continues the The authors have clearly enjoyed their research and story into the post-war era describing produced a wealth of information about an aspect of World War the need for rehabilitation when the II that has not, previously, attracted the attention it deserves. prisoners returned home, the evidence The Naval Institute Press is to be congratulated for recognising some gave at war-crimes tribunals and the importance of the subject matter and publishing it. even the return by a small number to In addition to the central story the book contains a wealth one of the surviving buildings which of fascinating asides which are not strictly relevant but which has recently become a museum. The add colour to the account and help the reader understand city is now known as Shenyang and still the contemporary situation. Among them is the story of has a major aircraft production facility an American-manned Home Guard unit in London which on its outskirts. equipped itself with 100 ‘Tommy’-guns, 100, 000 rounds of Linda Holmes has a reputation as ammunition and its own motor vehicles. the leading American authority on Americans who joined the RAF’s ‘Eagle’ Squadron were Allied prisoners of war and this work constantly in the limelight; their countrymen who joined the fully measures up to the standard RNVR were just as determined to fight for a cause they believed that one would expect from her. She in as part of a foreign armed service but achieved rather less describes Japanese brutality not merely publicity at the time or subsequently. for its own sake but attempts to explain This book redresses that imbalance and presents the reader the mental attitudes that led to it and with a group biography that is a joy to read and which serves the effect it had on the prisoners. It as a fitting tribute to the memory of a group of brave men who is the first book to shed light on the ‘bent’ their country’s rules to join up and fight. It is a fascinating medical experiments carried out on story, well told that will, I hope, appeal to a wide readership some American prisoners and the in both the USA and the Commonwealth; I thoroughly author’s research has allowed some of recommend it. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 Book Reviews

aircraft on task with the minimum The ‘swarm’ can be protected against flight deck requirement for launches interception by fighters from the carrier and recoveries. air wing and its long-term presence The first UCLASS unit is expected over a designated area gaining ‘real- to join a carrier air wing in 2018 using time’ information for the network four or six air vehicles based on the centric ‘picture’ can force an enemy Northrop Grumman X-47B which is to fight when he might not otherwise being prepared for carrier-suitability choose to do so. trials. It will displace a conventional UCAV are not cheap and can manned strike-fighter squadron and certainly not be considered as will have operational capability from expendable but they clearly have an the outset which is expected to grow important future and it may well be rapidly as experience is gained. This that the present generation of manned is not some futuristic ideal but a strike fighters will be the last. practical scheme that is close to being There will be readers who disagree demonstrated at sea. In a little over a with the importance the author Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A decade we are likely to find unmanned ascribes to UCAV operating from New Kind of Carrier Aviation air operations at sea increasingly warships in the near future but they By Norman Friedman commonplace. This book is an excellent will have to argue against the potent first step towards understanding their economic and operational arguments Publisher: Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland; potential. contained in this book which are pp: 248 pages plus index. Friedman explains how the ‘swarm’, difficult to refute. There are certainly potentially spread over a wide area, few other weapons systems in prospect Reviewed by Commander David Hobbs MBE RN (ret’d) can feed an ‘ever-changing array of that offer a genuinely enhanced Norman Friedman is a frequent speaker at naval conferences potential targets’ into a network- capability at a significantly reduced in Australia and needs no introduction to members of the centric grid and use the information operating cost. ANI. His incisive works on naval weapons technologies and to attack them without delay as they The book has two Appendices, the their employment have an international reputation and his appear. UCLASS does not focus on first of which describes the UCAV ‘state latest work is a timely introduction to the rapidly evolving the individual air vehicles but on the of the art’ and the second a most useful world of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV). The new system or ‘swarm’ as an entity, leaving and comprehensive directory of the book is written in a style that is clear, easy to understand but it to choose which airframe has the world’s military unmanned air vehicles deeply informative. optimum weapon and is best placed to with notes on their development. The author describes the present generation of UCAV, attack; which needs to refuel in flight In summary this book explains why which mainly comprises individual aircraft, each controlled and so on. the US Navy believes that a transition by a single, remote, pilot. The aircraft have become There are many operational from an entirely manned to largely commonplace in the skies over Afghanistan and the North capabilities to be considered before unmanned aircraft fleet is an attractive West Frontier of Pakistan. He then explains what the making the best use of the ‘swarm’ but prospect. That is something none of US Navy and its contractors plan to do next. The new the author points out that there are also us can afford to ignore. It also gives a generation is typified by the Unmanned Carrier-Launched sound economic reasons for developing valuable appreciation of the state of the Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS). This UCLASS. Unmanned air vehicles do art which will help readers understand will consist of a number of air vehicles which can operate not need to maintain flying currency the vast range of UCAV used in together as a group or ‘swarm’ over a designated area. The like human pilots, they do not need to current operations. The book is bound activities of the ‘swarm’ will be monitored by specialists in rest between sorties and they remain to generate interest and debate and the carrier’s combat information centre who can intervene sharp throughout potentially long, dull deserves to be on the Royal Australian if necessary but much of the system’s activities are to be or dangerous missions. Operating Navy’s Reading List. I thoroughly autonomous including recovery to the carrier deck. Thus from a carrier enhances the flexibility recommend it. humans will function as they do best defining reconnaissance of UCAV since distances from ship objectives or targets leaving the air vehicles to capitalise on to target can be varied as necessary what they do best, staying sharp on potentially long, dull and aircraft can be refuelled and re- sorties. The system will decide when to refuel or replace armed on deck quickly if necessary. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 69

shared with the Cold War warrior. It degrees] twice by an iceberg. was in her more glorious engagements On the positive side, she was in the from the Battle of Jutland the Battle lead in the pioneering days of British of Matapan that she excelled and SSNs despite being the third SSN to outshone all the rest. join the Royal Navy. Dreadnought, Iain has passed all this on to us in our first SSN, had an American a thoroughly readable manner. Of her power plant and was fairly noisy, several near terminal experiences, the relying mainly on active sonar for her German glider bomb attack in 1943 anti-submarine work. By 1969, the came closest to ending her illustrious emphasis had shifted towards the quiet, career – an event not widely known passive sonar mode of operations and or publicised at the time for obvious a very different tactical scene. Valiant, reasons – leaving “a hole the size of our second and “all British” SSN, had a double-decker bus” in her bottom, largely concentrated on the Cold War she still survived to fight another day warrior speciality, leaving me deeply HMS Warspite: From Jutland Hero – altogether a remarkable survivor, she involved in developing much of the to Cold War Warrior even tried to avoid being the breaker’s more stealthy anti-surface ship and By Iain Ballantyne yard when she met her end by losing antisubmarine tactics now possible her tow and grounding in Prussia by this new way of operating as well Pen and Sword Books; paperback 224 pages; ISBN: Cove, close to in Cornwall. as indulging in a bit of the Cold War 9781848843509 This was as remarkable as so much of warrior scene between times. In my her previous career if a good deal less 18 months, the seventh Warspite Published: 22 September 2010 glorious. covered all the roles and skills of SSNs Reviewed by Admiral Sir John “ Sandy” Woodward RN My initial interest in this book in an exhilarating kaleidoscope of was primarily to see what Iain had operations, exercises and trials ranging I was asked to review Iain Ballantyne’s excellent book to say about the seventh Warspite. from trailing the Soviet Helicopter Warspite – from Jutland hero to Cold War warrior, but feel The submarine had been as close to carrier Leningrad at 21 knots from I should start by revealing where I am coming from, since it disaster as her predecessor at least 70 feet directly underneath her, via may bias my views. Firstly, I know Iain Ballantyne and have three times before I joined her as ‘sinking’ all the surface ships twice over worked comfortably with/for him occasionally. I follow his Commanding Officer. She nearly sank in a large ASW exercise without being publication of Warships International with close attention, in the wet docks at Barrow-in-Furness counter-detected, to establishing the seldom disagreeing with what he has to say there. Secondly, when proper procedures for removing ‘safety envelope’ of angles of heel and I was the Commanding Officer of the “Cold War warrior a hull valve were not adhered to by pitch for the class – events not entirely Warspite” from late 1969 to just before she went into refit in the builders; her ‘eggbeater’ auxiliary unrelated. 1971, indeed, I am probably in the photo on page 205. propulsion motor had fallen out of But all that may yet be the subject So, while in no way trying to diminish the “Jutland Hero”, its bearings leaving a large hole in the for another Warspite book, hopefully as I am a touch sad that the seventh Warspite, the Cold War bottom of her hull while alongside at good as this one. warrior, had to be so summarily dealt with – as Iain reminds Faslane; disaster was averted on these us, the Official Secrets Act has a very long arm even 40 years occasions only later. We are effectively left with the amazing and fascinating by very prompt history of the sixth Warspite with the other five predecessors action on the and the one successor rather sidelined. part of ship’s While the early Warspites before the famous super crew members; dreadnought have their honoured places in history, it is the and she was battleship of 1913 to 1945 that takes the limelight in this knocked over book. Rightly so, for she had a remarkable life in her 32 to 65 degrees years of service before a sad but perhaps suitable end. She of heel [the was among the first of a new type of ship; she was a “capital notional ‘safe’ ship” with a revolutionary propulsion fuel, she had a massive limit for the broadside and her share of violent misfortunes - all these she reactor was 44 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 70 Book Reviews

in China, just like the West, Mahan emerge. For example, over the last 65 represents different things to different years American naval superiority has people. made it possible to strike down the Chinese maritime ascendency ‘archer’ before they could fire their need not follow the naval race of the ‘arrow’ at the fleet. This approach, Imperial German precedent, especially however, can no longer be guaranteed, as China is in a much more fortunate and therefore surface combatants must strategic position than Germany ever be able to ‘take a hit’ and suffer battle was. The Anglo-American cooperative damage. Past generations of naval model may be a useful alternative, but architects designed combatants with at this time it still seems improbable ‘staying power built into their very that the United States would willingly structure’ but this is no longer the case. surrender its sea supremacy to the Even if enhanced passive survivability Chinese like the British did during the requirements were adopted overnight early part of the 20th century. it would take some decades before such Red Star over the Pacific: The reality is that modern China warships would dominate the fleet. has moved away from the capability- Indeed, the US Navy’s Littoral Combat China’s Rise and the Challenge to based naval thinking typical of Ship (LCS) has been designed with just U.S. Maritime Strategy continentally-minded powers and has the opposite philosophy in mind. already moved into the intellectual One of the most important chapters by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes realms of a fully-fledged maritime in the book is on China’s soft power Naval Institute Press, Annapolis Maryland, 2010 power. Chinese scholars are developing at sea. The idea that the Chinese their own forms of thinking on have developed a ‘usable past’ that Reviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert – Air Power Chinese sea power, and they now talk combines Confucian pacifism, cultural Development Centre about sea control instead of sea denial. management and a cult of defence, Yes, Mahan is influential but so is Mao into a new Chinese maritime identity, “We should endeavor to build a powerful people’s navy that Zedong – whose thoughts on active is fascinating. The historical message can adapt to its historical mission during a new century and defence dominate Chinese People’s has been used for both internal and a new period.” Liberation Army–Navy (PLAN) external consumption – to emphasise President Hu Jintao, December 2006 doctrine – and there are a plethora of China’s presence and power in more recent Chinese strategists who maritime Asia before the arrival of Australia’s strategic outlook has changed significantly in have influenced the push for China to Europeans but also to highlight China’s the last ten years and the systematic rise of China has been turn itself into a sea power. ‘peaceful diplomacy when it was a one of the main drivers for this change. Red Star over the The strategic debate cannot exist in big power’. China has declared its Pacific is an excellent overview of China’s emerging naval isolation, without some understanding peaceful intentions. ‘It is an inevitable capabilities, doctrine and strategy. It places China’s rise in of how aspects of China’s rise are choice based on China’s historical and context. influencing naval tactics. For the cultural tradition that China persists Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have used Chinese practically minded Red Star over unswervingly in taking the road of language sources extensively, including strategic discourses the Pacific includes chapters dealing peaceful development’. Of course and official statements, to improve our understanding of with Chinese fleet tactics, missile such a benevolent use of Chinese sea modern China’s strategic culture. By examining China’s rise and antimissile interactions, and power has not been accepted without from the Chinese perspective the authors have distilled the China’s nuclear deterrent at sea. comment by many nations such as essence of Chinese thinking on sea power for a wide English The importance of antiship ballistic India and Japan. speaking audience. missiles (ASBM), submarines, and Red Star over the Pacific takes the This book adds to its predecessor, Chinese Naval aircraft carriers are discussed although debate one step further in discussing Strategy in the Twenty-First Century: The Turn to Mahan, by anyone after detailed analysis will need the impact that China’s rise is having examining the apparent popularity of Alfred Thayer Mahan to consult the sources listed in the upon American maritime supremacy among Chinese strategists. The discovery that the Chinese associated notes. in the Pacific. The tactical and have competing schools of thought when it comes to sea The full implications of such operational implications of Chinese sea power should not have come as a surprise but perhaps weaponry are only just starting to power are not limited to the Taiwan Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 71

Strait or the so-called First Island The extent of China’s maritime Chain. Chinese maritime strategy transformation, characterised by and PLAN doctrine now emphasise modern warships, submarines, and the importance of sea lines of missiles, is now beyond debate. Today communication (SLOC) and the South we need to question how to interpret China Sea. If a PLAN fleet is able to China’s rise, and what can be done to operate independently at a distance avoid a future confrontation between from China, then that fleet could China and the West. For Australians, operate across the Pacific or even our understanding and response to globally. How should America and its China’s rise will be critical for our Allies react to a PLAN operating from future prosperity. Red Star over the the Second Island Chain – should Pacific will help to inform the debate. they be treated as friends, enemies or For this reason alone, this book will neutrals? The impact on US maritime be an important source for anyone strategy in the Pacific is still hotly working in the fields of international debated. The Cooperative Strategy relations, strategic studies or defence. The Battle For Norway – for 21st Century Seapower offers an For naval professionals it is essential April-June 1940 avenue for a peaceful future with many reading. naval forces working together to police By Geirr H Haarr the global commons, but it is unclear Seaforth Publishing £30.00 whether China will pursue this post- (distributed in Australia by Peribo Books) modern approach to maritime power. Either way, America’s response to 369pp, extremely well illustrated with photographs & China’s rising sea power in the Pacific maps plus appendices, glossary, references & source notes will be critical to the future security of Australia and our neighbours. Reviewed by CMDR David Hobbs MBE Royal Navy (ret’d) One can only agree with the authors’ suggestion that Americans need to Those who have read Geirr Haarr’s previous volume, which ‘pay special attention to the human covered the German assault on Norway in April 1940, will dimension of maritime strategy’ and need little introduction to this masterly sequel which describes ‘avoid projecting their own assumption subsequent events at sea and on land. This is a book about the onto societies with vastly different projection of power from the sea, its possibilities, strengths, traditions, experiences, and habits of weaknesses and the potential need for protracted operations mind.’ after the initial, successful, amphibious assault. During the late 1990s and early The Norwegian campaign was the first in which naval, land 2000s most Western Defence analysts and air forces were required to work together harmoniously believed that China was a technically in a joint venture and the failure of the British to do so led to backward nuclear power, capable a re-appraisal of operational concepts that had far-reaching of massed land offensives within its consequences. The Royal Navy’s Home Fleet included the first region, but unlikely to win in a conflict operational carrier task force in history and it was used to fill at a distance over Taiwan. For many the gap left by the land-based aircraft of the RAF which lacked China was a sleeping giant which the range to operate over Norway from the UK for more than would take decades to wake up. By a few minutes. 2005, however, it was clear that China’s The small number of RAF fighters deployed to Norway maritime modernisation was much relied on the fleet’s aircraft carriers to transport, sustain and, more than just the introduction of ultimately, evacuate them. Naval aircrew found themselves new ships and weapons – it was the fighting a war for which they had not been trained and logical outcome of the Chinese effort for which new tactics had to be evolved to meet every to become a sea power with influence situation. They had the flexibility to rise to the occasion across the Pacific. but suffered heavy losses and the author gives them due Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 72 Book Reviews credit for their achievements. Flag well considered and accurate. Haarr’s officers and their staffs faced new and selection and use of photographs are uncertain challenges and modern impressive and he seems to have located communications equipment allowed the ideal image to illustrate every facet Whitehall to interfere in decisions of his narrative. which should have been left to the men There is a tendency among on the spot, adding to misunderstanding historians to look back on the victorious and confusion. campaigns that ended previous conflicts The author writes with unique and to pay less attention to the earlier insight and gives due weight to stages when men, equipment and Norwegian perspectives, absent in experience were in short supply and previous accounts, that show how understanding of appropriate action Allied fears that ‘fifth-columnists’ was often absent. It was these early or ‘Quislings’ were present in large campaigns, however, that offer the numbers complicated the relationships biggest lessons for future generations. between some British senior officers This was certainly the case with the HMA S Bataan, 1952: and their Norwegian counterparts. Norwegian campaign; without it, the For their own part, Norwegian senior enormously successful undertakings An Australian Warship in the officers could not understand either the at Normandy and Okinawa might well Korean War British refusal to take advice or their have proved more costly. The difficulty By Anthony Cooper timid plans to operate independently. of providing air cover from distant fixed Haarr makes the interesting observation bases in the UK; the success achieved by Sydney NSW: University of New South Wales Press, that a simple error in translation may carrier-borne aircraft with their reduced www.unswpress.comm.au, 2010 have had a major impact on policy when transit times and maximum time over Norwegian ski-trained soldiers with the forces ashore stand out but the 295 pp, illustrations, maps, appendices, notes, good local knowledge were described as need for skill, training and effective bibliography, index. ‘militiamen’ by a translator to a British equipment in all arms are also lessons AUD $ 49.95, paper, ISBN 978-1-74223-118-1. general who elected to use his own that should not be forgotten. untrained ‘territorials’ on foot instead. In a generation when the projection Reviewed by Greg Swinden Operations at sea are recognised of power from the sea is assuming such for their fundamental importance; in importance in Australia, this publication When Able Seaman Geoff Cooper wrote letters home to his addition to the carrier task force, the is more than just a well-researched work mother, from Tribal class destroyer HMAS Bataan off the author describes the operations of about a campaign fought 71 years ago; coast of Korea in 1952, he probably never suspected that requisitioned local fishing boats used it provokes thoughts on how best to one day they would form the basis for a book concerning to move men and stores inshore, the achieve the desired effects with HMA the Australian warships role in the war. His son Anthony importance of surface ships such as Ships Canberra and Adelaide when they Cooper has used his father’s letters as the background for an cruisers, destroyers and sloops in giving enter service. Would similar mistakes excellent description of the ship’s service during its second anti-aircraft coverage for the troops be made? deployment to Korea during February-August 1952. ashore and the task force and the tragic This is an outstanding work This is, however, no ordinary ship history working its surface action that resulted in the loss of of scholarship with significant way through the day by day events of the ship and its crew. HM Ships Glorious, Ardent and Acasta. contemporary relevance and a Cooper prepares the scene well outlining how Australia His description of the dilemma that very readable account of how our became involved in the war and describing the trials and faced Admiral Cunningham in HMS predecessors coped in the opening tribulations of preparing a ship and the RAN for the conflict. Devonshire on receiving a call for help stages of an unexpected war that The story flows easily through the experiences of the Lower from Glorious as he secretly carried will be of interest and value to a Deck, Wardroom and Commanding Officer (Commander the Norwegian King, Crown prince wide readership. I whole-heartedly Warwick Bracegirdle, DSC and Bar, RAN) alike and makes and Government to the UK is the best recommend it. comprehensive use of first hand sources such as the ship’s account that I have read on the subject, Reports of Proceedings, Captain’s Night Orders as well as and his insight into the failures of both private letters. Allied and German Intelligence are Cooper breaks the book down into interesting chapters Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 73

analysing various aspects of shipboard his full dress uniform jacket which was and second deployment to the war life and operational deployments fortunately the only casualty of the zone. such as liberty in Japan, shipboard action! Books describing the Australian living, leadership and morale, air and The author also discusses the experience in the Korean War are few sub surface threats, navigating in similarity and differences between the and those dealing with the RAN in hazardous water, shore bombardment RAN warships operating off Korea the conflict are even fewer. This well and refueling and ship-handling. The with that of the Royal Navy, United researched and very easy to read book mundane tasks of plane guard duty are States Navy and the Royal Canadian may signal the start of more written described as well as the few moments Navy. The Canadian Navy comes work concerning the Australian Navy of sheer terror when Bataan came into reasonably close analysis, both during this often forgotten war. Highly under enemy fire. This resulted in good and bad, because the Tribal class recommended to all naval historians the ship being straddled be several destroyers HMC Ships Athabaskan, or those just interested in what it was enemy shells; one of which one hit the Cayuga and Sioux also served in like to serve in a warship during the Captain’s day cabin and tore a hole in Korean waters during Bataan’s first Korean War.

HMAS SYDNEY (FFG03) at anchor for the Royal Australian Navy’s Fleet Review 2009

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 74

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 75

Bridge tragedy tests divers

n the evening of 5 January the cars were also killed. At 0430 described as ‘appalling’. In addition 1975, the bulk carrier MV Lake on 6 January a 14-man detachment to the hazards of strong currents and OIllawarra collided with the Tasman from Clearance Diving Team 2 flew minimal visibility they had to contend Bridge, which spanned the Derwent into Hobart for search and recovery with falling bridge debris and live River in Hobart. The impact collapsed operations. They were soon joined by power cables. This picture shows two pylons, and 127 metres of bridge two additional divers from CDT 1 with diving operations underway at the base decking, together with four motor a one-person recompression chamber. of one of the collapsed pylons. t vehicles, fell into the water. Seven Over the next ten days the divers of Lake Illawarra’s crew died when cooperated closely with Tasmanian she sank and another five people in police, operating in conditions

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 76 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

Our new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). Figure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member

ID and password. Figure 8

Figure 7

Participating in the forum Figure 2 Figure 3 In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login Logging in to your account and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with and your reply will not be added to the topic. the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

Figure 4

Logging out of your account Figure 9 In order to protect your identity and to prevent malicious use of your account by others, you must log out of the site when you are finished browsing. This is especially important on public computers. In order to log out, click the “Logout” link in the grey status bar (figure 4). Figure 10

Further questions If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a Figure 5 Figure 6 feature request, post a topic in the “Website Questions” forum and a site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 140 77 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work So: the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. prefer not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. on yourself, to a maximum of 50 words, including any Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. qualifications you would like listed, and any interesting spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around biographical aspects. If possible please supply a colour or stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. greyscale head and shoulders e-photo of yourself for use Conventions: If citing web sites please use the alongside the article title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words convention: Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. sending a separate file as well. If supplying photographs use and italics. Book and Journal titles use 17 February, 2004. Forwarding your article: Citations: So, web site name. Article title. Full Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: footnotes to explain any points you want Bylines: The Editor eservesr the right to amend articles where the reader to notice immediately. Book Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to titles follow Author surname, first name, beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations. title if any. Title. Place of publication: Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack publisher, year of that edition. Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 78 Australian Naval Institute

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute First lines are passed as HMAS Melbourne berths at Fleet Base East. Hundreds of family and friends welcomed the 230 crew of HMAS Melbourne home to Sydney after a six month deployment in the Middle East. (ABIS Evan Murphy, Navy Imagery Unit - East).