Evangelicals, the Liberal State, and Canada’s Family Values Debates: The Struggle to Shape Selves

By

Brian Carwana

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of doctorate of philosophy, Graduate Department for the Study of Religion, in the University of Toronto.

© Copyright by Brian Carwana (2021) Evangelicals, the Liberal State, and Canada’s Family Values Debates: The Struggle to Shape Selves Brian Carwana Doctorate of Philosophy, 2021, Graduate Department for the Study of Religion, University of Toronto One of the most pervasive challenges for liberal democracies is the ongoing tension between religious conservatives and the liberal state. Using as my central case study, the highly-charged debates over “family values” in Canada circa 1985-2015, I argue that despite claims that liberal democracy enables religious freedom, its values and extensive reach prove challenging to conservative religiosity. Heightening the stakes is that the rival worldviews I examine – liberalism and evangelicalism – are ambitious, struggling not merely over matters such as same-sex weddings but ultimately for the ability to shape selves. My research focuses on certain central nodes of family values politics, namely three conservative evangelical lobbies – the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, Focus on the Family Canada, and the Canada

Family Action Coalition – as they enter political debates, confront state bodies and legislation, and try to gain a hearing in the country where liberal pluralism has achieved a cultural power perhaps unmatched anywhere else. This study examines the lobbies’ discursive output in order to: trace the ideological drivers of evangelicals’ family values focus; question liberal democratic theory’s emphasis on reason and freedom at the expense of affect and compulsion; and contribute to a rethinking of a central question in secularization theory, by suggesting that persistent disputes over American versus European exceptionalism overlook the most important factor – that Western societies’ ability to resist secularization has rested chiefly on

ii the relative strength of its evangelical community. In short, America’s relative religiosity has depended primarily on the strongly held commitments that foster evangelical exceptionalism.

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Acknowledgements

All dissertations are difficult. I can only say I found this one pushed me to my limit as I worked to complete it while working full-time and raising a family. Sacrifices were made by many people; encouragement came from many corners.

First, I wish to thank the late J.W. Windland who introduced me to the world of religions and, in so doing, altered my life’s trajectory. He was a dear friend, a mentor, and a surrogate grandpa to my kids. We all miss him.

Second, I want to thank Dr. Rita Lester who first planted the idea that I should pursue academia. She opened that world up to me in our earliest discussions and became a mentor, an intellectual partner, and a dear friend. She plays such a unique role in my life both personally and academically and her wit and large heart make my life richer.

My Masters supervisor, Dr. Ruth Mas, pushed me to think harder than I’d known possible. I grew immensely under her tutelage and she was extraordinarily dedicated and invested in my progress, continuing to provide advice years after I’d left her supervision. She gave me the foundation for so much of what came after.

I am grateful to my PhD colleagues, especially Drs. Edith Szanto, Kate Gibbons and Jennifer Bright who were kindred spirits on the journey. I thank too Dr. Peter Schuurman, a friend, a fellow scholar, and immensely kind man who I feel privileged to know. There are too many friends to mention but one more I must highlight is Marion Smith. Marion has been a kind and wise voice in my life, encouraging me when I needed it, and putting wind in my sails. When I first doubted whether following my heart down this crazy path made sense, she made me realize following your heart is the most practical move possible.

It took me a while in my doctoral studies to find my direction but Dr. Joe Bryant and Dr. Simon Coleman both graciously agreed to take me on. They were immensely patient with my, at times, ponderous progress and pushed me to think more deeply and critically at several junctures. They were encouraging when I felt defeated and I was simply lucky to have them supervising my work. Dr. Phyllis Airhart agreed to come onto the committee late in the

iv process, kindly extending past her retirement date. Phyllis schooled me in Protestant thinkers earlier in my career and returned to help me think about Canadian religious history at the end. Dr. Stephen Scharper was equally generous, aiding me in both the early years and joining as our internal committee member. Dr. Donovan Schaefer, my external reader, provided wise, probing questions that led me in the final weeks of this project to realize its full potential. It is a strange and wonderful feeling to see the whole picture emerging with new clarity so late in the game. I have always admired Dr. Schaefer’s work and feel immensely privileged to have benefitted from his insights over this final month.

I am especially grateful to my two families, Carwana and Atkinson, for support through all these years. My parents, in particular, ensured I could never question if I was loved. My kids put up with their harried and sometimes stressed father and always encouraged me, believing in me even when I doubted myself. And finally, to my wife Jane whose love is as certain and warm as the morning sun. It’s been a long journey. How lucky I’ve been to have you with me.

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Contents Acknowledgements ...... iv Introduction ...... 1 Evangelicals and the Liberal Secular State ...... 1 Nodes of Activism: Evangelical Political Lobbies ...... 7 An Affective Lens ...... 13 The Unique Canadian Context ...... 16 Chapter Breakdown ...... 20 Chapter 1 – Canada’s Political and Religious Context ...... 24 Canadian Political Culture ...... 24 Statist and Collectivist Leanings ...... 24 Tolerance ...... 28 Unstable Nationalism, Strong Regionalism, and Centralized Governments ...... 29 The Charter Shift: Multicultural Nationalism and an Ascendant Liberalism ...... 34 Backlash: Western Alienation and Realignment on the Right ...... 41 Summary ...... 48 Protestantism and Evangelicalism in English Canada ...... 49 Historical Development ...... 49 Institution Building Amidst Obstacles ...... 56 Evangelicals’ Political Lobbies ...... 62 The Character of Canadian Evangelicalism ...... 65 Conclusion ...... 72 Chapter 2 – Introducing the Lobbies ...... 74 Evangelical Fellowship of Canada ...... 74 Overview ...... 74 Political Activism ...... 79 Focus on the Family Canada ...... 84 Overview ...... 84 Political Activism ...... 87 The IMFC – Overview ...... 88 The IMFC – Political Involvement ...... 91 Summing up Focus & the IMFC ...... 98 Canada Family Action Coalition...... 99 Overview ...... 99 vi

Political Involvement ...... 103 Conclusion ...... 113 Chapter 3 – The Power of the Canadian State ...... 115 Tolerance, Multiculturalism and the Liberal Secular State ...... 120 The Charter ...... 123 Courts ...... 124 Human Rights Commissions ...... 128 Parliaments ...... 131 Other Government Bodies ...... 133 Tax Dollars Funding Liberalism...... 137 Cultural Agencies ...... 141 Education ...... 145 Conservative Reprieve ...... 155 An Activist State ...... 155 Conclusion ...... 157 Chapter 4 – ‘Muted’: Speaking a Foreign Language ...... 160 The EFC – Mixing Alignment, Assimilation, and Muted Resistance ...... 164 Coda on the EFC: Trying to Shape Canadian Evangelical Identity ...... 178 CFAC – High Conflict and its Consequences ...... 181 Focus/IMFC – Strategic Adoption ...... 192 The IMFC ...... 203 Canada’s Lobbies and their American Counterparts ...... 209 Conclusion ...... 211 Chapter 5 – The Traditional Family: Nursery of an Evangelical Habitus ...... 214 Evangelicals’ Family Values: Amplifying an Ancient Inheritance ...... 216 Biblical Values or Theological Orientations? ...... 223 The Traditional Family as Incubator of an Evangelical Habitus...... 227 An Ontology of Difference and Hierarchy ...... 230 An Ethic of Duty and Obligation ...... 235 An Anthropology of Relatedness and Dependency ...... 241 Recap: Protecting the Nursery of an Evangelical Habitus ...... 250 Chapter 6 – The Struggle to Shape Selves ...... 253 Freedom – The Birthright of Two Siblings ...... 256 Rival Concepts ...... 256

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Rival Policies ...... 260 Rival Rhetorics ...... 271 The Moral Debate ...... 275 Rival Policies, Rival Rhetorics ...... 275 My Values are Public, Yours are Private...... 281 Liberal Democracy: Reasoning and Freedom or Socialization and Compulsion? ...... 288 Chapter 7 – The Reach of Sovereignty ...... 297 The Goal of Expansive Sovereignty ...... 297 Recapping the Rhetorical Approaches Taken ...... 302 Contesting Identities ...... 306 Swimming Against a Secular Tide: The Future of Canadian Evangelicalism ...... 310 Bibliography – Primary Sources ...... 329 Bibliography – Secondary Sources ...... 354

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Introduction

Evangelicals and the Liberal Secular State

Evangelicals occupy an interesting space in Western democratic politics. As Western democracies have become more secular and liberal since the 1960s, evangelicals have been a notable bulwark resisting these changes. In the United States, they form the Republican party’s bedrock and have attracted significant scholarly study. Canada’s evangelical community is much smaller and far less studied but has played a significant role in the country's politics. In recent decades, they have helped restructure Canada’s political right by contributing to the birth of a new political party, been key actors on every socially conservative issue, and been core supporters of conservative governments including the decade long Harper federal government and numerous current provincial administrations (Press Progress 2019).

Representing only around 10% of the population,1 Canada’s evangelicals undoubtedly punch above their weight. Evangelicalism also stands out in that it challenges liberalism so directly, it is sometimes deemed liberalism’s “other” (Harding 1991, Salomon and Waltron 2012;

Sherwood 2015). This dissertation takes the political conflict between Canadian evangelicals and their liberal opponents – including often the liberal secular state – as its launching point for examining both evangelical politics and liberal secularism.

Evangelicals can be defined in multiple ways including denominational affiliation or self- definition. I use Bebbington’s (1989) quadrilateral, a long-standing but still useful definition

1 There are no exact numbers for Canadian evangelicals. For best estimates, see Grenville 2006; Hoover et al. 2002:354; Reimer 2010; Malloy 2011:145; Reimer and Wilkinson 2010, 2012; Penner et al. 2011. 1 that sees evangelicals as Protestants who adhere to Biblicism (believing the Bible is the source of spiritual truth and the word of God), crucicentrism (emphasizing the doctrine of atonement as the means of saving humanity), conversionism (belief that human beings need to be converted), and activism (believing that faith should pervade and influence one’s whole life).

Bebbington’s approach captures evangelicals who do not fit into denominational silos and is a broad tent that includes fundamentalists and Pentecostals.2 A broad tent is most appropriate since on issues of social conservatism, the various evangelical sub-communities tend to find common cause and thus distinguish themselves from the more Mainline Protestant traditions.

In this dissertation, we will examine not only evangelicals but also the liberal and secular ideologies that evangelicals confront in the dominant Canadian culture and in the state itself. By liberalism, I refer to a politics, ethics, and anthropology that sees the human subject as essentially and naturally free (stated negatively, “restrictions on liberty must be justified”

(Gaus et al., para. 3). The liberal tradition is broad and deep, encompassing thinkers from

Locke and Mill to Rawls and Habermas and includes disputes such as whether to favour negative or positive liberty (discussed in more detail in chapter six). My use of “liberalism” is intended to be broad and includes both negative and positive visions. That said, some facets of

2 I decided to use Bebbington’s definition as it suits my purposes and is widely accepted. One caveat is that his approach is very doctrinal, focusing on consent to certain propositions. An argument of this dissertation is that affective and emotive elements often play a definitive role in shaping religious and secular identities and, thus, in the political clashes examined in this work. On this front, an interesting alternative approach to the definition question is offered by religious scholar Todd Brenneman. In his work on the sentimental and affective elements of evangelicalism, Brenneman calls the tradition an “aesthetic as much as a set of doctrines or beliefs” (2014:14). He defines evangelicalism as an “aesthetic worldview fashioned by belief in the truthfulness of the Bible, by experience of new birth into the Christian community, by emotional relationship between individuals and God through Christ, by concern to share the message of Christ with others, and by interest in shaping human society into the kingdom of God” (ibid.:16-17). Again, Bebbington’s widely accepted approach works for my definitional purposes, but we should keep in mind Brenneman’s description of the tradition as an “aesthetic,” a “concern,” an “emotional relationship,” etc. These affective elements are, I contend, pivotal to evangelical identity, just as other affective elements help define a liberal or secular identity. These arguments are fleshed out especially in chapters 5 through 7. 2 liberalism play no role in this study while others are front and centre. On the former, there are intra-liberal debates about the role of private property and whether it is necessary for personal liberty or, conversely, whether its accumulation fosters injustice and inequality (Gaus et al., para. 23). These issues are not relevant to this study nor is there any discussion of neo-liberal economics. The lobbies have varying positions on such matters – CFAC generally favours neo- liberal economic policies while the EFC leans toward economic redistribution and social safety net policies – but these matters are not central to the lobbies’ identities, did not motivate their formation, and do not drive surges in activity or fundraising. Conversely, what is sometimes called “New Liberalism” plays a leading role throughout the dissertation (Gaus et al., para. 21).

New Liberalism refers to the social justice initiatives of the past century focussed on personal and civil liberties, including feminism in its various waves, LGBTQ rights, the sexual revolution and pluralism/multiculturalism. This social justice aspect of liberalism looms large in our analysis for it is this stream of liberal thought that so challenges the lobbies’ socially conservative values. I should also be clear that, except when explicitly noted, “liberal” will not be indicating liberal theology or liberal Protestantism. In the years of materials that I have accumulated from the evangelical lobbies, they simply do not address liberal Protestantism.

For that matter, they almost never address liberal lobbies such as the Abortion Coalition of

Canada or EGALE (Canada’s LGBTQ lobby). For that reason, liberal lobbies are but rarely discussed in this work. For the evangelical lobbies, liberalism is a dominant social and political philosophy and what threatens them is not a liberal Protestant denomination nor even a liberal lobby group – instead the threat is from dominant social actors and a dominant social force that controls the state, the courts, the media, and the education system. These

3 manifestations of liberal power are what threaten them, what they comment on in their discourses, and what will therefore be central to this work.

The aforementioned liberal social justice movements are entangled in a culture war with social conservatism. Social conservatism aims to “conserve” so-called traditional values on matters of family and sexuality.3 This includes strongly supporting the traditional family, conservative sexual ethics, traditional notions of gender, and protecting the sanctity of life. Key political stances include seeing gender as fixed and based in biology, being pro-life on abortion and euthanasia, anti-pornography, and opposing sex outside of heterosexual marriage including sex before marriage, common law marriages, same-sex coupling, and polyamory.

Obviously, social conservatism is not limited to evangelicals nor is evangelical politics confined to social conservatism – evangelical politics can address a wide range of other issues, such as taxes, social housing, and foreign affairs and, in addition, some evangelicals are not socially conservative, as some support same-sex marriage to take one example. In short, I have chosen to focus on socially conservative evangelicals and their political interactions in a country where secularism and liberalism are dominant culturally and via the arms of the state. I made this choice as evangelicals are arguably the most prominent voices for social conservatism in

Canada and these issues have proved uniquely galvanizing for evangelical activists and constituents, fostering surges in the number of lobbies, in fundraising, and in appearances in the media and before state bodies (e.g. courts, parliaments). Again, the lobbies do address other issues, but socially conservative topics foster more heated political debate and this

3 Such traditional values stem largely from changes in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which is discussed more fully in chapter five. 4 friction offers a valuable window for understanding aspects of both evangelicalism and liberal secularism in Canada.

The term “secular” and its variants has numerous meanings and, hence, I draw on

Canadian religious scholar John Stackhouse’s succinct fourfold definition wherein secular means non-religious (for example, secular reasoning), secularization refers to a process of religious decline, secularity describes a condition where religion plays little role in society, and secularism labels an ideology that seeks to marginalize religion (2013).4 Both Stackhouse and political theorist Jeffrey Stout (2005:11) emphasize that secular political discourse need not lead to secularization but I am more persuaded that while the former may not necessitate the latter, it is conducive to it.5 The secular state refers to an institutional separation of church and state while the liberal secular state refers to secular governments that also uphold key civil liberties around freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion. Canada is a particular type of liberal secular state, namely a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch, Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain, who is represented in Canada by a governor general. While Canada certainly qualifies as a secular state, we should clarify that a wholly secular state is often an ideal type amongst liberal

4 The lobbies’ own terminology differs often from the usage outlined here as they do not often parse these distinctions. Hence, their own literature often uses secularism in ways that combine the above definitions for secularity and secularism, thus meaning the marginalized position of religion in society and the ideology that promotes this state of affairs. 5 Petit, in his review of Stout, makes a similar point, arguing that a secular democracy is a kind of comprehensive doctrine that de-transcendentalizes authority and thus poses a challenge to religious authority (2006). I find this perspective aligns in many ways with the thrust of Stout’s work which emphasizes the role of praxis in shaping values. As such, the use of secular reasons in national decision making does, I think, work to establish what kinds of arguments have authority. This perspective also fits better with Asad’s description of secularism as a “transcendental mediation” that makes citizenship the primary identity above those of class, gender or religion (2003:5). Whether this mediation succeeds is debatable, but Asad captures some of the agonistic relationship between certain forms of religion and secular liberalism owing to the ambitions of each. I discuss this struggle in chapter seven. 5 democracies and that the Canadian state has a long history of alignment with institutional religion, although more so in the past than today.6 I will also in this study cite liberal secularism which is an ideology that, at minimum, supports the liberal secular state but commonly goes beyond this, promoting a liberal and secular society where an individual’s religious freedom is protected but where religion’s role is ideally privatized and marginalized.

The liberal secular state is often posited to aim for a certain neutrality towards religion.7 One of the arguments of this paper is that the liberal secular state can accommodate liberal religiosity (i.e. privatized religion) quite easily but struggles to deal with conservative religiosity, such as that of evangelicals.8 The resulting clash between evangelicalism and liberalism exposes significant issues around liberal political theory and the secular state. In this study, I home in on evangelical politics to examine the conflict’s two sides – on one hand, what evangelical politics reveals about evangelicals’ values and their perception of their place in a modern liberal democracy; and on the other hand, using evangelicals as a test case that exposes the limits of liberal neutrality when it confronts conservative religiosity. The degree of conflict lessens when the Conservative party, which is more sympathetic to evangelical issues, is in power but these liberal and secular values extend beyond the prevailing ruling party and are somewhat baked into state structures. In Canada, these structures include the

6 The historic church-state partnership in Canada is described in chapter two. Vestiges remain such as the Ontario government running a Catholic school system, the observance of religious holidays and the granting of tax advantages to religious organizations which some would charge is state favoritism (Stackhouse 2013). 7 One famous example of this sought-after neutrality is the First Amendment of the United States Constitution which states that congress shall “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The relationship between the liberal state and religion is explored more fully in chapter three. 8 Evangelicalism is not uniformly conservative as it can be innovative in forms of worship, in forging new denominations, in adopting emerging technologies, etc. By “conservative religiosity,” I refer to socially conservative religion, a form which I believe conflicts with liberal conceptions of the person and of freedom, as described in this study. I will not always specify “social” conservatism but the reader should understand “conservative” religiosity in this manner. 6

Constitution, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the courts and various other state bodies.

Hence, evangelicals encounter liberal secularism doubly: first as ideological opponent but, second, as the theoretical and structural underpinning of the state itself, which sets the rules and establishes the terrain on which the ideological struggle is conducted. These complications foreground the state’s values, the question of neutrality, and the openness of the public sphere.

Studying liberalism and evangelicalism is clarifying because they are very related traditions. Their antagonism in contemporary politics aside, both traditions were born amidst the same geographies and timeframes, specifically the eighteenth century Anglo-American world (Hatch 1991). As such, I describe them not as strangers who, encountering one another, discovered points of conflict but rather more like siblings, fighting with the intensity of close relations inhabiting a single home, and quarreling over who is true to the family legacy. As siblings, despite their disagreements, they nevertheless share many traits including individualism and a focus on freedom and personal agency. I believe as we watch these struggles play out, we may learn something about the emphasis on freedom and agency in both traditions and thus in Western societies generally.

Nodes of Activism: Evangelical Political Lobbies

To examine evangelical politics in Canada, I turn to a particularly salient interface between evangelicals and the public sphere, namely evangelical political lobbies. The lobbies are hives of evangelical politics, playing a leadership role and producing discourses aimed at both evangelicals and the general public. The lobbies also embody a series of fascinating

7 paradoxes concerning themselves but also concerning key binaries central to liberalism. The first such paradox involves liberalism’s religion/secular binary. On one hand, the lobbies are creatures of a secular state, emerging in response to state actions and drawing on features of secular law (e.g. incorporation, tax benefits for non-profits, political lobbying practices). On the other hand, their raison d’être is often countering secularity by injecting religious commitments back into secular law and legislation. As such, they tack back and forth across the secular/religious binary as secular vehicles that promote religious perspectives within secular state structures. Another primary division of Western politics the lobbies transcend is between public and private. They are privately funded entities operating in the public square, focused overwhelmingly on public laws concerning so-called private life (i.e. sexuality and family). Their existence reminds us how public laws create the legal concepts of privacy and help forge its contours. The lobbies are also ambiguous in their relationship to Canada’s evangelicals. At some level, they represent evangelical interests on the public stage. And yet, they are not elected representatives but corporate entities who answer first to their financial backers. Those backers range from denominational support, to audiences of a famed American evangelical’s media empire (i.e. Focus on the Family Canada), to grassroots funding amongst a subset of evangelicals. As such, the lobbies’ representativeness is never entirely clear.

Furthermore, these lobbies are run by evangelical elites who speak not only on behalf of their constituents, but also to their constituents, trying to win over supporters and shape how

Canada’s evangelicals perceive themselves, the nation, and the faith’s relevance to political issues. Evangelicalism has no magisterium in Canada but the lobbies partly occupy this vacuum as significant voices claiming to speak with some credibility or authority. Thus, the lobbies simultaneously serve as vehicles for grassroots activism and for propagating the views of 8 evangelical elites. Lastly, the lobbies also exhibit a paradoxical relationship to evangelical communal boundaries. On the one hand, they reach out to the broader culture (i.e. engaging in public debate) but, simultaneously they work to erect and reinforce boundaries, consistently urging constituents to vigilantly maintain distinctiveness from the wider society. Overall then, the lobbies are fascinating nodes bringing together several different networks or aspects of

Canadian and evangelical culture. They link civic culture (e.g. churches) with the state, act as conduits between citizens and the state, represent both populist impulses and elite influence, connect evangelicals to national political discourse while also encouraging separation and distinctiveness, transcend the public and the private binary, and are a complicated amalgam of both secular and religious elements within the society. As such, the lobbies provide a valuable opportunity to think about Canadian identity, evangelicalism, and the interaction of conservative religion and liberalism in Western societies.

In choosing specific lobbies, I target those most active on socially conservative issues.

Social conservatism is the most powerful driver of evangelical politics – see the surge in activism described below – and is especially instructive as it underlies the conflicts with liberalism.9 Socially conservative evangelical lobbying emerges in Canada in the early 1980s, stemming primarily from two factors.10 First was the emergence of powerful American

Christian lobby groups that provided exemplars and templates for undertaking such efforts.

9 Another possible conflict is that some social justice perspectives (such as those championed by Citizens for Public Justice or the Mennonite Central Committee) exist in tension with capitalism. However, this tension does not play nearly as large a role in the politics of Canada or its evangelical communities. 10 Prior forms of evangelical lobbying exist including the temperance movement but the phenomenon I study is distinct from these earlier forebears. Hence, few direct ties exist to those earlier endeavours as the lobbies studied herein are newer in origin, draw from different constituents (i.e. no reach into mainline Protestant churches) and see themselves as fighting newer cultural problems (e.g. sexual revolution, second wave feminism, LGBTQ movement, secularism). 9

Second was major constitutional changes in Canada including repatriating the constitution and creating the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. Canada had been trending towards a more liberal and secular society, but the constitutional changes turbo charged these trends and genuinely transformed Canadian political culture (Lipset 1990; Smith 2005; Wiseman 2007;

Petter 2009; Russell 2009). Courts were strengthened, rights discourses took centre stage in

Canadian politics, law became more secularized and multiculturalism was ensconced in the constitution as a key Canadian value. Some of these structural changes even altered national identity, especially for anglophone Canadians. Partly in response to these changes, Canada’s two largest evangelical lobbies took shape: the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (EFC) which had existed for decades but shifted at this time into political lobbying, and Focus on the Family

Canada, a branch plant of a powerful American lobby. Focus eventually created an offspring office called the Institute of Marriage and Family Canada (IMFC) which existed from 2006-

2016. In this study, I examine both lobbies (including the IMFC offshoot) and add a third organization, the Canada Family Action Coalition (CFAC). CFAC emerged in the mid 1990s and became one of the most prominent voices for the next twenty years. These three organizations have been prominent on socially conservative topics, appearing in media reports, filing briefs at court, presenting to parliament, and mobilizing their base to write letters and attend rallies.

In selecting these three lobbies, I left other options aside. Most vitally, I focussed on evangelicals and not Catholics though the latter play a significant role on socially conservative issues. Catholicism in Canada is more mainstream (less of an “other”)11 and the laity is far less socially conservative than the ecclesiastical hierarchy whereas evangelicals are more

11 Part of this othering is that evangelicalism in Canada is associated with the American Religious Right whereas Catholics are not. More on this complication is below. 10 consistently socially conservative and thus challenge liberalism more substantively. Hence, I do not examine the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops nor organizations that draw on both

Catholics and evangelicals such as Campaign Life Coalition (predominantly Catholic) or Cardus.

I also bypassed organizations on the evangelical left such as the Mennonite Central Committee and Citizens for Public Justice who were less visible on socially conservative issues. These left leaning organizations call for economic justice but do not pose the same challenges to liberalism per se as the social conservative lobbies do. They also did not witness the surge in activism experienced by the lobbies I study and are not nearly as present in the media, in front of parliament, or at court.12

My analysis focuses on the lobbies’ public discourses. Discourse lays at the heart of democratic politics with its emphasis on reasoned deliberation and is central to evangelicalism with its oft-noted linguistic focus (Crapanzano 2000, Harding 2000, Bielo 2009). The lobbies’ discursive output is voluminous and shows how leading evangelical actors employ logics implicit and explicit, stir affective registers, frame issues, portray political opponents and the wider culture, and make strategic decisions about speaking and presenting to insiders within the community versus outsiders in the public sphere. The materials I draw on includes communication to members and followers (emails to membership bases, newsletters, magazines), their public websites (offering individual documents but also a sense of priorities via website design and topical arrangement), think tank activities (policy papers, conferences), public statements (media interviews, press releases), and official contact with the state

(parliamentary appearances, court submissions). I systematically combed through this material

12 Citizens for Public Justice has also morphed from its Reformed heritage to a more mixed Christian makeup. From 2009-2019, the organization’s executive director was a Catholic. 11 in relation to the broad questions I was posing while also endeavouring to let the material speak. Many of the categories organizing chapters three through five arose from themes that emerged from this analysis. In the course of this study, individual lobbies will come in and out of focus. Systematically relaying what each lobby says on each issue would become repetitive and, hence, I select examples strategically for representativeness or to highlight different paths taken. At times, I will distinguish amongst the lobbies but in other chapters I am more interested in their shared arguments against liberal ideas and values. I did not conduct interviews as my interests were in public discourses with constituents and the broader populace, including the topics chosen and the frames and tactics employed.13 These discourses elucidate much about democratic politics, evangelical attitudes on socially conservative topics, and how conservative religionists engage a liberal public sphere.

We will attend primarily to the period from 1995-2015. The first decade of this period witnessed a perfect storm for evangelical political lobbying including the birth of new lobbies

(e.g. CFAC), increased institutional presence in Ottawa including a new EFC office and the

IMFC, a powerful new political party friendlier to evangelicals than its predecessor (the

Reform-cum-Conservative party), evangelicals’ most galvanizing issue in recent decades as

LGBTQ rights posed a new threat to the traditional definition of marriage, and the development of a new conservative religious voting block not previously present in Canada

(Grenville 2006; see also Todd 2016; Gruending 2011:38-40, 49-52; Malloy 2010:9). This era also facilitates research since these organizations took advantage of the internet beginning in

13 It is also doubtful that interviews would yield much value. The lobbyists are practiced presenters, well versed in media relations and giving public interviews. I am an outsider (i.e. not an evangelical) which is unlikely to foster trust or provide an incentive for open sharing. 12 the late 1990s, fostering a dramatic increase in materials produced and accessible for study.

Occasionally, I include earlier material for insight into longitudinal change while the latter years of this study shed light on the post surge era as evangelical political lobbying in Canada cooled noticeably when same-sex marriage became politically settled sometime after 2006.

An Affective Lens

This study draws significantly on the field of affect theory. My employment of affect theory is not dominant in this dissertation, especially in the early chapters, but it recurs periodically and most especially in key analytical summations in the concluding chapters.

Owing to these critical junctures, I will spend some time here outlining some of the central insights from this growing academic field and how they inform my own work.

Definitions of affect theory vary but general outlines would include the following: it prioritizes bodies and the prelinguistic; it emphasizes our intersubjective natures over interiority, which some scholars (though not all) use to distinguish affect from emotion; it emphasizes performative elements rather than the transfer of ideational content; and is considered fundamental to politics, power, and group identity, be it religious, nationalistic, familial, etc., as it binds people to one another and helps form an “us” and a “them” (Ahmed

2004a, 2004b:8-12; O’Neill 2013; Schaefer n.d.). Within these general traits, I need to highlight two specific aspects relevant to my use of affect theory. First, leading affect theorist Donovan

Schaefer highlights that there are two main schools in the field, one of which aggressively sidelines language – noted in the first descriptive point above – and a second which sees affect as interwoven with discourse, both oral and via texts (2015, 2018, 2019). As my research

13 concerns discourses and texts, I clearly draw on the second school of thought. I will urge us to pay attention to the affect of language, including what Ahmed calls the “Emotionality of Texts”

(2004b:12). Ahmed scrutinizes the affect of written hate speech and of political speeches while

Schaefer shows how even tasks particularly associated with reasoning – such as reading academic texts – display plenty of evidence of emotional content (Ahmed 2004a; Schaefer

2018).14 The point is that affect is never absent and, hence, I will highlight affective elements of the lobbyists’ language but also in performative events such as legislation passing or a supreme court ruling that grants newly acquired rights to LGBTQs. These events are not just technical changes in law as they shift the felt place of LGBTQs in society – from excluded to included, from margins to mainstream, from immoral to exemplifying the supposed triumph of love over hate – and, as such, the institutional imprimatur can help change a nation’s sense of reasonableness, decency or appropriateness. To understand family values politics, this felt sense of morals, of nationality, of belonging, and justice must be foremost in our minds.

The second point is related, but slightly different. Specifically, I draw on the claim by affect theorists that reasoning and affect are always entwined. I think a cognitive bias continues today in the way we speak of politics and religion both conventionally and in academia. In his popular work, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, the prominent, award-winning neuroscientist Antonio Damasio writes that “emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion of reason” but rather “may be enmeshed in its networks, for worse and for better” (italics in original, 2005:xvi). The italics are critical – Damasio argues

14 On the reading of academic texts, Schaefer points to marginalia, underlining, and highlighting that display the strong emotional responses that such texts evoke. He also examines the work of the New Atheists, especially the so-called “Four Horsemen” (Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, and Richard Dawkins), to show how their demands for the supremacy of reasoning are filled with passion and apocalyptic affects of “fear and scorn” (2018:81). 14 that research in his academic discipline shows that emotion is “indispensable for rationality,” and further that feelings themselves are “just as cognitive as other precepts” (ibid.:xvii, xix).15

Social psychologist Jonathan Haidt argues that research in psychology also points to the primacy of emotions. He cites studies indicating that humans rely heavily on “motivated reasoning,” where our emotional instincts often steer the courses that our reasoning faculties pursue (2012). Haidt contends that we overestimate how much our reasoning abilities operate as a judge or scientist carefully weighing evidence, and underestimate how much these capacities function like a lawyer working to defend a client.16 To this end, I concur with

Schaefer’s assessment that affect is “epistemic,” or entwined with knowledge (2018:79).

Schaefer also contends that affects are “terminal,” or ends in themselves. On this latter argument, he suggests that while traditional models ask how words “use emotions to bring forth an argument,” affect theory reverses the equation, asking how words use “ideas, concepts, and beliefs to create emotions” (2018:87). From this perspective, the point of a

Trump rally is not to employ say, racism or xenophobia, to stir a crowd towards some political end – rather, the point of racist ideology is to create the surge of emotion, the sense of power

15 Damasio’s text summarizes research from a vast field but one interesting data source that informs his thinking is his own work with people whose brains have been compromised by injuries, strokes, or due to tumour removal. Damasio shows that impairment to areas of the brain responsible for emotion compromises these individuals’ reasoning capacities. Through a battery of tests, he and other researchers, find these victims can have fully functioning intellectual capacities to understand a problem, outline its impacts, deduce numerous possible approaches, and list the pros and cons of each such alternative. But the ability to decide or even to stay on topic is lacking without the emotional capacity to assign value that something matters or that certain felt values take priority. Damasio adds that the linkage of reasoning and emotional capacities in the brain’s very wiring makes sense in terms of natural evolution. Survival, he avers, would have depended enormously on the joint use of emotions and reasoning as feelings of empathy, anger, and fear are vital to reasoning our way through critical social situations and to compelling us to respond in life-saving ways in the face of dangers and opportunities (see chapters 3 and 5 in particular). 16 In Haidt’s metaphor, our emotional or affective response, which is often rapid and instinctual, frequently drives our decision-making and our reasoning mind then works to “defend” the choice by seeking rational justifications, much as a lawyer defends their client. 15 and dominance that can feel so satisfying. The affect is the desired end; the ideology its servant.

I am therefore interested in how family values debates are not just rival conceptual schemes but rival affective repertoires. If “Canadian” identity rests partly on the values of pluralism and moderation (discussed in chapter one), these values are partly affects, learned emotional dispositions that create a felt sense of fairness and decency, a feeling of being moral and good. Insofar as these dispositions connect to national identity, they may bring forth other affects, such as pride and a feeling of moral superiority, especially in relation to the country’s powerful southern neighbour, which is often portrayed as lacking these qualities. I think the emotional repertoire of how to feel about diversity and the moral superiority that comes with it is an integral part of being “Canadian,” at least for the dominant liberal culture. Evangelical lobbyists must contend with these affects, while bringing their own repertoire into the public sphere. My point is not that reasoning is irrelevant but per Damasio, Haidt, and Schaefer, I will encourage us to think that politics – especially when dealing with such morally charged issues as those examined herein – is often about changing gut instincts and what just feels right.

The Unique Canadian Context

Canada offers a fascinating venue for studying evangelical politics. The country lies between the United States and Europe in its degree of religiosity, the size of its evangelical community, and in the right-versus-left tenor of its overall political culture. More importantly,

Canada stands out for the unique way it entrenches pluralism as a core value (Kymlicka

2003:4). Doctrines around diversity and inclusion are present in many Western democracies

16 but numerous polls suggest that these ideas have a singular hold in Canada.17 The country has a long tradition of emphasizing tolerance as early French and English colonists had to compromise to co-exist in a single state. This heritage received an enormous boost with the doctrine of multiculturalism which, in Canada, became ensconced in the nation’s constitution

(owing partly to the latter’s recent provenance). ‘Diversity’ and related words like tolerance and pluralism are now core values for many Canadians, even forming central aspects of national identity.18 Pluralism discourses are integral to modern liberalism and create conflicts with evangelicalism in multiple contexts but Canada offers an unusually strong form of the diversity doctrine. As such, it provides a challenging milieu for evangelicals who can sometimes use diversity to their advantage (i.e. since they are a minority) but, more often, are seen as threatening it and thus disloyal to a core national doctrine. Since arguably no Western country is as ensconced in the diversity discourse as Canada, the country offers valuable and unique terrain for studying evangelical politics.

Lastly, Canada is interesting because of its relationship to the United States. Canadian culture is deeply influenced by, and yet constantly defining itself against, its large southern neighbour. Crucially, part of what Canadians reject about the United States is the American

Religious Right. This can put Canadian evangelicals in a tricky situation. They are heavily

17 More evidence is offered in chapter one but as just one example, a recent Pew Forum study found that among eighteen nations, Canadians had the most positive outlook towards immigrants (2019). The finding is even more revealing because Canada has an unusually high immigration rate (approximately 50% higher than the rate for the United States in a recent analysis) (Porter and Russell 2018). The country still struggles of course with racism and xenophobia but its combination of a high immigration rate and a very positive outlook is distinctive. 18 A 2018 poll found two-thirds of Canadians saw diversity as a defining characteristic of the country and 70% expressed pride in this aspect (Scotti 2018). Also of interest is that Canada has been notably less receptive to the anti-immigrant wave currently hitting many Western nations. The last decade-long Conservative federal government mostly avoided fear-mongering around immigrants and instead, patiently and persistently built and maintained connections with immigrant communities whom it saw as natural allies and constituents, as they believed immigrants to be a generally conservative constituency both fiscally and socially. 17 influenced by American evangelical ideas, language, models of engagement and institutional forms yet also genuinely differ from their American counterparts culturally and, at times, politically. But both real and perceived connections with their American co-religionists means

Canada’s evangelicals must fight an image problem often stemming from the actions of their southern neighbours (who they cannot control) and must defend their status as “true”

Canadians and not American imports, while continuing to affirm a seemingly “American” faith.

The lobbies therefore must not only find winning arguments but must also establish themselves as legitimate Canadian voices in the public sphere.

Canadian evangelical politics has received only modest scholarly attention. The rise of a religious right in Canada has grabbed the attention of journalists and commentators (Harvey

1999; Geddes 2000; Boag 2005; Todd 2005; Doyle 2006; McDonald 2011) and increased attention from academics. Scholars have produced valuable studies on Canadian evangelicalism, including important insights on politics as a subtopic (Rawlyk 1997; Stackhouse

1993; Reimer 2003; Noll 2007). Edited volumes on religion and politics in Canada (Van Die and

Lyons 2000; Lefebvre and Beaman 2014) or on sexual diversity politics (Rayside and Wilcox

2011) have allowed scholars from diverse fields to comment on religion, the state, and social conservative politics. Other monographs from sexual diversity studies have examined conservative religious activism including by Miriam Smith (2008b) and David Rayside (2008).

Studies addressing social conservative politics in Canada include two comparative works with the American scene: James Farney’s (2012) analysis of party politics and Lydia Bean’s (2014) bottom-up ethnography of four churches (two Canadian, two American) that tracks how ordinary congregants on each side of the border fashion religious and political narratives. Both provide useful context for my work though the overlap with my endeavours is slight. Closer to 18 my efforts are some important works on lobbies including Hoover (1997), Malloy (2010; 2011), and Patrick (2011). Hoover’s comparative American-Canadian study employs social movement theory to describe and analyze conservative Protestant politics in both nations. Both Hoover and I examine evangelical lobbies but his work was completed in 1997, covers a prior time period,19 and centres on social movement theory which is not my emphasis (on such theory, see also Smith 2008a, 2008b). Malloy focuses primarily on the effectiveness of the lobbies, assessing relative strengths and weaknesses of the religious right in Canada, an important question but not my own. Of all the recent works, the most germane is Patrick’s 2011 dissertation. Patrick’s analysis focuses on one lobby, the EFC, from 1983-2006, and poses questions regarding the lobby’s longitudinal evolution in light of growing secularism. Patrick also examines public discourses but is equally drawn to the influences and personal intellectual journey of EFC presidents. She employs interviews and tackles theology in a work she describes as intellectual history. Her work overlaps some of my efforts and I will draw on her study in analyzing the EFC, although her concerns are more about the lobby’s internal evolution

(especially its presidents) and does not address the central questions I pose around freedom and agency or regarding liberal secularism. I also hope to add to her work by bringing in a wider range of lobbies to help situate the EFC and provide a broader assessment of evangelical activity on these issues. No scholar has analyzed either CFAC or Focus/IMFC in any sustained manner. I believe closely examining the discourses of Canada’s most prominent evangelical lobbies provides insight into how evangelical political actors can respond in a modern Western

19 Neither CFAC nor the IMFC, two of the main organizations I examine, existed when Hoover compiled his work. 19 nation, what challenges they pose to secularism and how it, in turn, challenges and shapes them.

Chapter Breakdown

Chapter one provides relevant background information, describing the Canadian cultural context in terms of the nation’s political history and then its religious history. This sets the stage in chapter two to examine the lobbies central to this study. The lobbies are situated within the Canadian context established in chapter one and each lobby is fleshed out in terms of its history, make-up and distinctive characteristics. Chapter three examines the power of the

Canadian state and some of the implications this has for evangelicals. My aim in this chapter is not to make normative judgements about “fairness” but rather to document the extent of the state’s reach and how that is experienced by evangelicals. This study emphasizes that the

Canadian state cannot be neutral (many issues are zero-sum) and that liberalism and secularity are both culturally dominant and deeply embedded in state structures in ways that leave social conservatives feeling constrained, infringed upon, and sometimes even unwelcomed. This chapter will be somewhat encyclopedic, outlining the myriad ways the lobbies find their social conservatism butts up against state interventions, and thus also providing data for the analysis of later chapters. Chapter four looks at how the lobbies respond given a dominant culture that does not share their socially conservative views. I draw here on Edwin Ardener’s theory of

‘muted groups’ to analyze the tactics and compromises employed and the impact and consequences such muting might have (1975). This chapter also delineates between the lobbies very clearly whereas the prior chapter considers the lobbies collectively.

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Chapter five opens by citing numerous scholars who note how central family values issues are for evangelical politics. I then explore why the traditional family and conservative sexual practices are so vital to evangelicalism. I outline some larger historical and cultural factors but the chapter’s central thrust is that evangelicals see the traditional family as a structure as not only godly but as a kind of nursery for evangelical living (or what academics might term an evangelical habitus). In making this claim, I draw on secondary and primary sources to highlight three core theological tenets concerning ontology, ethics, and anthropology, showing how the family structure not only aligns with these tenets but is seen to instantiate them in daily life. In short, I argue that the traditional family is a school for evangelical praxis.

Whereas chapter five delved deeply into a core aspect of evangelicalism (i.e. the traditional family), chapter six dives deeply into some core concepts of liberalism, most notably freedom. I first show that freedom is integral to both evangelicalism and liberalism but that each tradition developed different understandings of freedom as well as of morals. Different understandings have led to different policies and to the political conflicts we witness. The chapter also looks at the rhetorics employed in these debates as freedom, morals, and the terms “public” and “private” all prove to be useful discursive tools in trying to marginalize opponents. The chapter concludes somewhat boldly by questioning two pillars of liberal democratic theory, namely the primacy of freedom and reasoning. I suggest that despite the parties’ emphasis on freedom and how central freedom and reasoning are to liberal democratic political theory, the debates are better understood through affect theory and sociological theories that prioritize socialization, emotions, identity and compulsion. These theoretical lenses emphasize how upbringing and social norms cause certain ways of thinking 21 and being to feel right and, hence, the parties in these debates ultimately fight to control powerful government levers that help shape selves to think and feel in certain ways and not others.

Chapter seven concludes the study by first building on chapter six to argue that liberalism and conservative religiosity are ambitious ideologies that fight for sovereignty where sovereignty goes beyond legal power to encompass a sovereignty over selves – that is, to mould habits of thinking, feeling and acting. Seeing the debate this way compromises notions of separate private and public spheres along with other categorical distinctions within liberalism. The chapter’s second part recaps the various rhetorical strategies employed by the lobbies and their opponents to provide a concise summary. And the chapter’s closing sections consider the consequences of these political debates – on the one hand, asking how the debates may provide identity building resources (e.g. rhetorics, institutions, and an “other”) for both sides; on the other hand, addressing a driving question for evangelical political actors, namely whether Canadian evangelicalism can maintain distinctiveness amidst a steadily secularizing society. As part of this discussion, I revisit the secularization debate, including the argument over whether America or Europe is the “exception,” and posit that our analysis suggests a third solution may better fit the data.

We are offered here a rich juxtaposition – we have an opportunity to examine the religious community that has perhaps weathered Western secularization better than any other, and to do so in the country that likely champions liberal pluralism more than any other.

This combination opens opportunities to explore the various binaries undergirding liberal democracy (e.g. religion and secular, private and public, etc.) while also shedding valuable light on fundamental concepts around freedom and agency. Hence, this study aims to contribute to 22 an understanding of evangelical values and politics, to secularism and liberal political theory, and even to Western conceptions of the person.

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Chapter 1 – Canada’s Political and Religious Context

This chapter considers the lobbies’ context, examining the historical development of

Canada’s political and religious culture. My investigation targets pertinent areas around cultural norms, the political opportunity structure, and attitudes towards secularism and religion. The political analysis attends disproportionately to English Canada since evangelical politics operates only in English Canada (draws from this community, addresses this community, and often only communicates in English). The religious analysis focuses on the lobbies’ heritage, namely Protestantism and evangelicalism. Cumulatively, this chapter outlines the evangelical lobbies’ opportunities, the challenges they face, and the shifting terrain of recent decades.

Canadian Political Culture

Statist and Collectivist Leanings

Canada lives in a shadow. A small country (population wise), the nation is constantly compared to the American juggernaut next door owing to proximity, cultural similarities, and the enormous influence the larger neighbour exerts through people, trade and media. When comparing the two countries’ political cultures, Canada is typically depicted as more Tory, emphasizing the collective, tradition and deference. American sociologist Seymour Martin

Lipset drew from myriad sources (economic activity including entrepreneurial risk taking and unionization; national myth making in literature and founding documents; political structures and processes; law breaking statistics; religious forms and attendance rates; and social safety

24 nets) to claim that Canada is “more class aware, elitist, law-abiding, statist, collectivity oriented…and group oriented” than the United States (1990:8). He is not alone in this view.20

Scholars often attribute this distinction to the two nations’ distinct histories as the American

Revolution forged “two countries, not one” by exporting Loyalists to Canada, making the northern country more Tory and British than its neighbour (ibid:xiii, 1). Conservative values also prevailed in Francophone Canada (Quebec) as conservative priests fleeing another revolution (1789 France) stepped into leadership positions in the colony and established colleges and parish schools in a decidedly conservative, anti-republican fashion (Lipset:47;

Horowitz 1995:22; Noll 1992:251). Thus, both Anglo and Francophone Canada were led by conservatives fleeing the eighteenth century’s two great liberal revolutions.

Despite the Loyalists’ Tory leanings, they still brought some liberal sentiments from their exposure to American ideas, sentiments reinforced by itinerant American Methodist preachers who taught an individualistic, democratic faith. However, the War of 1812 reinforced Toryism by curtailing this flow of preachers, engendering some hostility to all things

American (including radical populism), and defining patriotism as loyalty to the crown (Christie

1990:41; Murphy 1996:139).21 The Protestant churches shifted their gaze somewhat towards

British models that emphasized decorum and friendly relations with the state. British ties strengthened further when a million British immigrants came to British North America (BNA) between 1815-1850. These immigrants multiplied Upper Canada’s population tenfold before

20 Theorists sympathetic to Lipset’s main conclusions include Horowitz (1995), Wiseman (2007), and Campbell and Christian (1996). 21 Bell (1992:66ff) counters that the settlers in 1812 were not very loyal and were unsupportive of the war. He suggests loyalty emerged later due to extensive British immigration and revisionist myth-making. The new colony sought an identity to distinguish it from America and loyalty to the crown filled the need, causing the war to then be mythologized. Essentially Bell argues timing, but still believes English Canadian identity formed around loyalty and deference to the crown in contrast to American individualism. 25 the political culture’s “point of congealment,” thus seeding a strong British flavour to Canadian political thought (Horowitz 1995:26). Two rebellions styled after the American Revolution flared up in the 1830s but both were paltry affairs quickly put down, further demonstrating the colony’s conservatism and deference to the crown in contrast to Americans’ zeal for individual liberty.

This deferential, conservative outlook came paired with a more statist leaning, partially stemming from practical realities. Both English and French Canadians saw themselves as threatened “minority cultures: English Canadians against Yankees, French Canadians against

Anglophones,” causing elites in both groups to seek government protection (Lipset 1990:9).

Merchants and economic elites similarly asked government to protect the fragile economy from the aggressive juggernaut next door (ibid:51). Demography also contributed as a sparse population spread over immense distances naturally looked to government to provide services and establish order (ibid:17-18). Lipset claims that even the frontier differed, for whereas

American settlers opened new lands and became their own law, Canadian settlers arrived after the Royal Mounted Police so that government came first, with settlers looking to government for protection (including from expansionist Americans) (1990:51).

The two countries’ early differences fostered dramatically different founding documents. The American Constitution is idealistic in tone, declares freedom from foreign monarchical rule, and draws legitimacy from the people. But the 1867 British North American

Act (BNA Act) establishing Canada was conservative and dry in tone, urged upon somewhat reluctant colonies by a mother country anxious to lessen its responsibilities, and was enacted in England and proclaimed by the monarch (ibid:xiii, 43). The BNA Act’s “Tory sheen”

26

(Wiseman 2007:70) defers to a monarch and even created an unelected senate of wealthy men appointed for life to ensure their independence from populist pressure (Campbell and

Christian 1996:27-8). Campbell and Christian claim parliamentary government has continued to foster Tory values as it allows the cabinet to dominate the legislature and derives legitimacy from the crown rather than the people (1996:11-12). They argue this Tory institution has shaped the political outlook of Canadian citizens and politicians for generations.

The claims so far – that Canada is more collectivist and statist – manifest across the political spectrum. Canada’s political right has been more statist than the American right as

Canadian conservative governments established railways and canals in the nineteenth century, created several state corporations in the twentieth,22 and brought in the Canadian New Deal.

(Campbell and Christian 1996:10, 31-33). Canadian liberalism was moderated by Toryism, becoming “less individualistic, less ardently populistic-democratic,” and more accepting of state intervention in the economy and imperial symbols in government (Horowitz 1995:35).

And lastly, Canada has developed socialist parties which are absent in the USA. Canada’s socialist parties have formed provincial governments, founded national health care, and offered a credible third alternative in federal politics for most of the period since WWII.23

22 Examples include Ontario Hydro, the Canadian National Railway, the Bank of Canada and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (Campbell and Christian 1996:10). 23 The claims of some scholars above that Canada has historically been more conservative than the United States may seem to conflict with the development of socialist parties in the former and not the latter. However, Canadian conservativeness has been in matters of deference and in being less inclined towards radical, populist politics. Louis Hartz described socialism as a response to liberalism that synthesizes liberal equality with collectivist outlooks taken from Europe’s older traditions (Toryism and feudalism). He posits that the USA failed to develop socialist options because the nation had purged itself of collective traditions. Its sectarian Protestant founders left Europe to escape a deferential, collectivist society and the Revolution completed the process by purging Loyalists and fusing individual liberty with nationalism. America’s liberalism was thus intolerant towards collectivist politics, labelling them un-American. Horowitz described Canada as more European, having both liberal and collective traditions. The collective traditions were Anglo Toryism and Quebec’s semi-feudalism (Quebec was cut off from European immigration post 1759 and thus slow to adopt the liberal ideas that 27

Overall, Canada’s more socialist, statist and collectivist culture manifests across the political spectrum, presenting the lobbies with citizens who look to government more readily than in

America to foster justice and protect the vulnerable.24

Tolerance Tolerance is an enduring theme in Canadian politics and yet has surged in importance in recent decades, dramatically impacting family values debates. Tolerance’s long presence in

Canada stems from concrete realities. The first reality is the country’s founding. Unlike the

United States, which was born amidst nationalistic fervour, Canada was formed hesitantly and reticently by colonies that felt little connection and differed greatly by geography and size.

Confederation was a practical arrangement, almost a concession, driven by fear of American power (economic and military) and urged by Great Britain which was tiring of colonial obligations. Enthusiasm was so lacking, some colonies were even bought off with certain promises (Bell 1992:102, 137; see also Christiano 2000:73). Hence, confederation required virtues of compromise and pragmatism. A second reality encouraging tolerance is the ever- present existential threat to the country’s existence, namely the profound French/English divide encompassing language, religion, culture and geography. Valuing diversity and tolerance has been critical for dissimilar peoples facing the stark reality of trying to co-exist and cooperate. This history of valuing toleration found new uses when non-European immigration increased after WWII, especially when immigration laws became more open in 1967. To

developed in Europe thereafter). Thus, both English and French Canada had collectivist strains amenable to socialism (Horowitz 1995:22ff; see also Bell 1992:33 and Campbell and Christian 1996:20). 24 The Tory thesis has broad support but for a dissenting view, see Ajzenstat and Smith (1995). They draw on J.G.A. Pocock to contend that republicanism, not Toryism, was the true challenger to liberal individualism in Canada. Smith still sees Canada as more communal and statist but simply attributes it to different causes while Ajzenstat sees little difference between Canada and the United States (2, 268-9, 279). 28 recognize the growing diversity, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau adopted a Multiculturalism policy for Canada in 1971, thus marking a move from tolerance as a virtue or moral practice to a feature connected to national identity. Since the Charter was enacted in the 1980s (discussed below), tolerance rhetoric has become supercharged, dramatically affecting the type of language that has currency in Canada. Tolerance is a potent rhetorical tool in many modern contexts but its saliency in Canada is hard to overstate. Canada’s evangelical lobbies frequently find moral debates can be decisively shaped by the language of tolerance and intolerance.

Unstable Nationalism, Strong Regionalism, and Centralized Governments

Besides having a left-leaning statist political culture and highly valuing tolerance, another feature of Canada is its weak nationalism. Recall the lack of nationalist conviction in the BNA Act, described as “utilitarian,” devoid of “principles” and “ideals” (Christiano 2000:73), and otherwise “dull, uninspiring, [and] virtually devoid of symbolic aura” (Wiseman 2007:70; see also Bell 1992:71). This weak nationalism persists long beyond the nation’s founding as

Anglophones’ allegiance was to Britain and, hence, Canadians simply remained British citizens until 1947. Only in the 1960s did Canadian nationalist symbols emerge as federal departments were renamed to drop imperial language and a new Canadian flag and anthem replaced the

Union Jack (1965) and God Save the Queen (1967, and not officially until 1980) (Lipsett

1990:46; Bell 1992:71-2).25 In short, Canadian identity is quite young and has been in play in

25 Other dependencies on Britain included that the final court of appeal for Canadians was in Britain until 1949, Britain maintained control over Canadian foreign policy until 1931, and only the British parliament retained power to alter the BNA until 1982 with the patriation of the Constitution (Bell 1992:158). Lipset adds that British citizens living in Canada could vote until 1975 without obtaining Canadian citizenship (1990:46). 29 recent decades during which constitutional and cultural changes altered the political landscape for evangelicals (discussed below).

Occupying the void of a weak nationalism is a strong and potent regionalism. Multiple works highlight deep-seated regional identities and sometimes question whether Canada constitutes a nation (Wiseman 2007; Young and Archer 2002; Bell 1992; Schwartz 1974). In

2006, Canada’s prime minister actually passed a motion acknowledging one region, Quebec, as its own “nation” in order to curry favour there. Quebec has by far the most unique regional culture but even English Canada lacks unity to many scholars. Theorists believe regionalism emerged because with no strong national myth to absorb newcomers, settlers in new regions established distinct local cultures (Cooper 2002:104; Wiseman 2007:30-34). For example,

Alberta – a growing force in Canada – has a strong American influence “unparalleled in

Canada,” because the province was settled in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century by a large number of Americans (Wiseman 1996:440; Bell 1992:130-1).26 Demography furthers disunity as the provinces are large, allowing them (or sometimes a few combined) to become entire “ecopolitical systems” while the “thinness of population between provincial centres” isolates one region from another (Bell 1992:140). Trade plays a role by mostly moving north and south (between Canadian provinces and American states) rather than east to west across the country.27 Politically, the first-past-the-post electoral system favours regionally concentrated parties by rewarding parties that finish first in concentrated areas while

26 In 1911, 22% of Albertans were American-born which Wiseman estimates was the largest contingent of Americans outside the United States (2007:244-5). He claims American influence was stronger in Alberta than anywhere else in Canada and that British influences were never enough to overcome the more American populist, evangelical emphasis particularly in the rural areas that shaped the province’s politics. 27 Intra-Canada trade is hampered by substantial and baffling interprovincial trade barriers which make trade freer with the United States than between provinces, a fact decried by international trade organizations, think tanks, and business lobbies (National Post 2007; O’Neil 2012; Blue 2011). 30 penalizing parties that finish second or third in riding after riding. This motivates parties to champion regional grievances in order to win those seats even though these tactics aggravate such tensions (Wiseman 2007:3). Reform emerged as a Western based grievance party which used that base to erase the Progressive Conservatives and then move eastward over time.28

This regional character helps make provincial governments very powerful. In the United

States, regional interests get expressed federally through state representation in the Senate and routine free votes in Congress but in Canada, the federal government offers few avenues for regional voices to be heard (Lipset 1990:199).29 Regions have soft power through cabinet representation but lack hard power (i.e. votes) to affect federal legislation.30 Provincial governments have stepped into this void, becoming regional spokespersons. Indeed, in 2012, the province of Alberta opened an office in the nation’s capital to lobby the federal government for the province’s interests (Wingrove 2012).31 Provinces have added legitimacy because Canada’s largest minority group (Francophones) has a provincial government as its

28 The impact of first-past-the-post on regionalism manifested profoundly in the 1997 federal election. The election was pivotal for seeing if the Progressive Conservative Party (PC), a historically dominant (and Tory) party decimated in the previous election, could regain its position or whether it would be permanently displaced by the upstart neo-liberal Reform Party. Both Reform and the PCs received 19% of the vote but the regionally concentrated Reform Party, which fed on Western alienation, won 60 seats in Western Canada and formed the Official Opposition whereas the PC vote was more dispersed in ridings across the country, yielding them only 20 seats and fourth place in the House of Commons. This sounded the PC’s death knell as they soon lost their young, popular leader and were swallowed by Reform in 2003. 29 Australia, a nation sharing Canada’s combination of vast geography and sparse population (though not its linguistic divide), also displays far more political homogeneity partly because the regions have a voice in the national government through powerful upper houses and a mixed electoral system that requires endless bargaining (Sayers 2002:209-210). 30 Canadian federal governments typically choose cabinets with an awareness of regional representation and are aware of the regional dynamics at play when making legislation. But they do not need regional buy-in and can simply override regional wishes. The Liberals enacted a National Energy Policy in the 1980s that was extraordinarily unpopular in Alberta while the most recent Conservative government quashed a gun registry over the objections of Quebeckers. 31 Adding to the irony is that the ruling Conservative party was born as a regional protest movement founded in Alberta and the prime minister self-identified as an Albertan. 31 principle representative. In contrast, in America, the most prominent minority acquired their rights when the federal government quashed states’ rights both in the Civil War and during the

Civil Rights Movement (Lipset 1990:197-9). Provinces are also powerful due to a favourable division of powers between levels of government. The BNA Act gave provinces control of areas like health, education and welfare that seemed not vital at the time but which became major spheres of government activity while, conversely, provisions in the Act designed to centralize power in the federal government were later overturned in court, fell into disuse, or were changed by successive governments (Bell 1992: 136). Today, provinces’ substantial taxing and spending powers are such that “political scientists agree that Canada is…more decentralized than any other industrialized country” (Lipset 1990:194; see also Rayside 2008:29; Schwartz

1974). For the lobbies, regionalism means often dealing with provincial governments rather than the federal regime in areas like education or health care. Additionally, regionalism means evangelicalism is a potent political force in Alberta and a non-existent one in Quebec. The shifting fortunes of regional power (in terms of demographic weight and wealth) can significantly alter the national culture.

Finally, before turning to recent developments, we should note the extraordinary power of Canadian governments inhibits all lobbies’ influence. Parliamentary democracies centralize power in the caucus, making lobbying more challenging. This tendency is magnified in Canada due to party leaders’ control over their caucus,32 a first-past-the-post electoral

32 In some parliamentary systems, caucuses or members of parliament choose the party leader which incentivizes the leader to pay attention to the MPs. In Canada, party leaders are chosen by party members at large which means the members of parliament or the caucus have no leverage over the party leader (Sayers 2002:209-10). 32 system which facilitates majority governments, and unicameralism33 (Sayers 2002:209-10;

Young, Stewart and Archer 2002:6; Schwartz 2002:ix; Rayside 2008:31). Indeed, a study of twenty-seven parliamentary democracies ranked the Canadian prime minister as the most powerful national leader (Russell 2009:299). The same structure exists provincially, greatly hampering lobbyists’ power (Malloy 2010:6). While American lobbyists can target individual politicians, party discipline in Canada and the leader’s iron grip means lobbies must instead sway or pressure whole parties or party leaders. Grassroots pressure is thus less effective in

Canada and suasion is typically more useful than threatening force.

So far, several issues are relevant to our study. First, compared to the United States,

Canada’s political tone is more Tory, less ardently populist, more collectivist, more statist and open to mild forms of socialism. Cumulatively, this means Canadians look to government more to solve problems, to protect the marginalized, and to create a more egalitarian society.

Second, the country’s ongoing existential French/English tension has made moderation and tolerance highly prized virtues since the country’s founding. Third, heads of government (i.e. premiers and the prime minister) have enormous power, inhibiting the leverage of pressure groups and creating a less inviting political opportunity structure. Fourth, Canada is very regionally oriented with growing influence from Alberta, an ongoing fear that regional loyalties may overwhelm or even tear the national fabric, and provincial governments acting as key players in Canadian politics.34 Cumulatively, these factors make Canada less fertile terrain for

33 As noted earlier, the BNA Act created a non-elected senate. This persists today as the prime minister appoints senators, typically choosing prominent Canadians or former party members (i.e. patronage appointments). Due to its unelected nature, the senate has little legitimacy in Canada and, with rare exceptions, acts mostly as a symbolic, rubber-stamping body (Wiseman 2007:85). Parliament’s power is thus unchecked to a degree quite unique in Western democracies. 34 Claiming both massive centralization and powerful provinces may seem contradictory but should be kept distinct. Centralization refers to the prime minister’s (or provincial premier’s) substantial power over their own 33 evangelical lobbies than the admittedly verdant fields of American politics. But adding to such longstanding challenges are more recent developments.

The Charter Shift: Multicultural Nationalism and an Ascendant Liberalism

Substantial changes in recent decades have affected the enduring traits of Canadian political culture. Constitutionally, possibly no Western nation witnessed as much change, proposed change, and disruption as has Canada. Just since 1980, the nation survived a vote for

Quebec separation (1980), repatriated the Constitution (1982), established the Charter of

Rights and Freedoms (came into full effect in 1985), witnessed two failed attempts to “fix” the

Constitution – the Meech Lake (1987-1990) and Charlottetown accords (1992) – and survived a second Quebec referendum by less than one per cent of the vote (1995). These disruptions caused surges of pride and existential fear, altered the political and legal foundations of the nation and transformed party politics.35 Canada also negotiated a free trade agreement with the United States in 1987 that dramatically liberalized trade, was the focus of a heated national election, and stirred up fears of being swallowed up by the United States (culturally and economically if not politically).

For our purposes, these changes mark several important and powerful shifts in the political culture that also helped shape a new Canadian nationalism. I will focus on four very

members and cabinet and their ability, when they have a majority, to ignore the opposition (and the senate which is de facto powerless). The federal government, however, must contend with powerful provinces. Indeed, commentators have occasionally referred to the premiers as the real opposition to a prime minister with a majority government. 35 Besides the emergence of the Reform Party, a separatist federal party (the Bloc Québécois) emerged in Quebec, playing a dominant role in that province from the early 1990s until it was decimated in the 2011 federal election. The party did poorly in the 2015 election as well and faces an uncertain future. 34 pertinent shifts: i) moving from a quasi-British identity to a purely Canadian one; ii) moving from a Christian nation to a secular one; iii) moving from a European heritage to a multicultural population; and iv) moving from a more Tory past to a more liberal rights oriented future. To take these in turn, the shift from a British identity received major impetus in the sixties. Earlier we saw that domestic symbolism flourished in this period with a new anthem, new flag and renaming federal departments to drop royal labels. Expo ’67, the 1967 exposition held in

Montreal, coincided with the centennial of confederation and fostered a surge of nationalistic pride. The new Constitution and Charter in the early 1980s marked the final legal change (and carried great symbolic weight) such that thinking of Canadians as British citizens became unimaginable. On the religious front, Quebec’s Quiet Revolution transformed an exceedingly devout, clerically dominated community into the most secular in North America (Noll

1992:255; Bibby 2002). Secularization also decimated church attendance in English Canada, which we examine below when discussing Canada’s religious history. Ethnically, Canada’s immigration laws opened up in 1967 (Department of Justice 2012a), changing the face of the nation both literally and figuratively. Canada’s percentage of foreign born (22%) is much higher than in the United Kingdom or the United States (both at 14%) (Migration Policy Institute nd;

Bloemeraad 2012:2; Office for National Statistics 2018; Tavernise 2018; Statistics Canada

2018).36 More significantly, multiculturalism is not just a demographic fact in English Canada, it has become ideology. Religion scholar David Seljak (2016:546) refers to this as Canada’s

“multicultural, civic nationalism,” something renowned Canadian political theorist Will

36 Among Western nations, only Australia has a higher proportion of foreign-born and Canada’s immigrants are more ethnically diverse than Australia’s (i.e. less from other Western nations and larger percentages from Africa and even Asia despite the latter’s proximity to Australia) (Migration Policy Institute nd; Australian Bureau of Statistics 2018). 35

Kymlicka explains by observing that while Canada may not be uniquely accommodating or tolerant, it has uniquely “constitutionalized” multiculturalism by including the value in the

Charter (reflecting the text’s recent provenance) (2003). Thus, Kymlicka claims English Canada is “unusual” because multiculturalism is not just legislation but instead is central to its very

“symbols and narratives of nationhood” (4).37 This championing of diversity greatly impacts political lobbies’ credibility in the Canadian public sphere, favouring those who can employ a diversity angle while compromising those who seem less pluralistic or who espouse versions of truth deemed more exclusive and absolute in their claims.

Lastly, Toryism seems to be weakening in Canada. Pollster Michael Adams (2003:5) claims that from 1980 until 2000, Canadians became more individualistic and less deferential to sources of authority (organized religion, the patriarchal family and political elites).38 The polling data meshes with observations from political scientists such as Peter Russell (2009:300) who claims the Charter’s rights-emphasis has made Canadians “certainly less deferential,” while Miriam Smith describes “a new legalized rights consciousness to English Canadian political culture” (2005:346). Some theorists feel these changes have somewhat

“Americanized” Canadian culture by replacing Tory sentiments with individualism, rights and court cases (Lipset 1990; Wiseman 2007:5; Petter 2009:33). This is not to suggest collectivist sentiments disappeared entirely. Though a liberalizing document, the Constitution has

37 Kymlicka’s claims are supported by both David Rayside and Irene Bloemeraad. Rayside (2007:358) concurs that “diversity has been incorporated into the Canadian self-image” and provides interesting empirical support from a Pew research study. The study found Canada was the only nation of 44 sampled where a majority answered ‘yes’ when asked if immigrants were a good influence. Even more striking, 77% of Canadians responded ‘yes’ while no other nation scored 50%. Bloemeraad’s polling data also shows “Canada is far more open to, and optimistic about, immigration than its counterparts in Europe and the United States,” while additional data shows how Canadians integrate multiculturalism into national identity (2012:1, 2, 8). None of this ensures Canada treats immigrants better but it supports Kymlicka’s “narratives of nationhood” claim. 38 Neil Nevitte found similar trends using polling results from 1981 and 1990 (1996). 36 collective elements relative to its American counterpart,39 and Canada maintains higher taxes and a more generous social safety net including the universal health care system which, unusually, is revered as a symbol of nationalist pride. But if some collectivism survives (a socialist leaning), deference towards elites, either political or religious, seems dramatically weakened by the new individualism. These changes have facilitated rapid secularization and liberalization while elevating individual rights at the expense of traditional institutions

(institutions which the lobbies often value).

The Charter has also dramatically affected nationalism and the political opportunity structure. On nationalism, the Charter has become a potent symbol with “overwhelming public support,” with a late 1980s poll showing this to be true for both Anglophones and

Francophones (Russell 2009:293; see also Pierceson 2005; Morton and Knopff 2000:17).

Russell claims the Charter has high support in Quebec but is less central to “civic identity” whereas in English Canada it has “iconic status,” whereby “love” for the Charter is akin to “flag waving and anthem singing” (2009:301; see also Rayside 2008). The Charter has been instrumental in forging a new Anglophone identity, defining Canada in terms of rights, tolerance and the aforementioned multiculturalism. Multiculturalism (or pluralism) is rhetorically rich for the diverse nation as it performs double duty – it includes Francophone,

Anglophone, Indigenous peoples (for which there is growing guilt at the nation’s historic and current atrocities), and immigrants while simultaneously reinforcing boundaries and

39 There are concessions towards collective rights in the Canadian system for the French language and for Indigenous peoples (Campbell and Christian 1996:14). 37 differences vis-à-vis the supposedly less tolerant and more racist United States.40 This identity is recent but powerful and it dramatically impacts evangelicals who are a statistical minority, but who carry the baggage of the previously dominant white Christian community and its perceived historical sins of intolerance.

The Charter’s impact does not stop there. The document also wrought practical changes pivotal for lobby groups. Most crucially, the Charter’s emphasis on rights strengthened the courts. We have seen that centralized political power in Canada makes lobbying challenging, but courts now offer a backdoor solution – win a court judgment that forces the government’s hands. Petter explains how pre-Charter, advocacy groups rarely used the courts but today, the practice is common (2009:39). One study of Supreme Court cases shows that in the Charter’s first decade, the number of cases challenging government legislation greatly increased, the success rate doubled, and the number of laws struck down grew correspondingly (Knoff and Morton 1992:20; see also Pierceson 2005:166-7). Prime Minister

Pierre Trudeau, who instigated the Charter, also created a Court Challenges Program offering government grants to interest groups fighting for minority rights (Kelly and Manfredi 2009:13).

The Charter combined with the Courts Challenges Program thus transformed the political opportunity structure for groups pursuing rights activism as they could now go to court

(backed by government money) and, if they won, essentially force governments to adjust.

Commentators from both left and right have decried this “judicialization” of Canadian politics

40 English Canadians’ need to define themselves in opposition to the United States has continued from the pre- Charter era. Elke Winter did a contemporary study of Canadian newspaper articles that address Canadian identity and found “almost every second article mentions the U.S. at least once” (2007:486). 38

(Manfredi 2001:4; see also Knopff and Morton 1992).41 All of this, Petter contends, shifted political advocacy towards the courts while diminishing the importance of public education, lobbying and grassroots initiatives (2009:39-40).42

I want to take a digression here to explore how this juridicalization has been especially important for gays and lesbians, whom Russell deems the “biggest beneficiary of the Charter’s equality rights” (2009:303). Gay rights debates were pivotal in mobilizing conservative

Christians since the mid-90s and are central for understanding the lobbies’ perspectives examined in later chapters. A major chronicler of Canada’s LGBTQ movement, Miriam Smith, concurs with Russell’s assessment, and documents several ways the Charter benefitted the gay and lesbian movement (2005). First, it organized LGBTQs as the movement was “a weak and fractured network of activists” until the national hearings conducted around the Charter gave birth to Egale, Canada’s national gay-rights advocacy group. Second, Egale’s “resources were thin”43 but progress came mainly through the valuable “policy resources” the Charter provided by opening up enormous legal avenues for advocacy. Third, the Charter encouraged using

“human rights” as the movement’s dominant frame which proved very fruitful (2005:333, 336-

7, 347; 2008:190; Farney 2012:106).44 Finally, Smith recounts that the Court Challenges

41 Manfredi sees courts as primarily conservative, using their new power to entrench the interests of business and the powerful. Morton sees the court as the preserve of the liberal “intelligentsia” and a tool for (liberal) special interest groups to overwhelm the interests of the people. 42 While I emphasize the Charter’s role, some scholars trace a longer evolution while still noting the Charter’s massive import. Clément (2013) and Seljak (2016:548) both highlight the significant change from the creation of the Ontario Human Rights Commission in 1962 – which focussed on race and religion only – to the modern day where Ontario has expanded the list to include at least nineteen factors Seljak listed including age, record of offenses, sexual orientation, gender identity, and disability, to name a few. 43 Egale was unable to hire a full-time employee until the early-mid 1990’s at which time its budget was $300,000 per year. Even in 2004, at the height of the SSM debate, Smith (2005:347; 2008:160) says Egale’s budget was $350,000. David Rayside reports a figure closer to $500,000 (2008: 62). 44 Smith (1999:99) shows that earlier frames focused on civil rights rather than equal rights, where the former indicates a total reorganization of society economically, socially and politically to facilitate liberty in all choices of 39

Program provided vital funding to enable litigation (Smith 2005:339). Rayside adds an additional factor, namely that the Charter “amplified opportunities” by granting gays new legitimacy by fostering a “celebratory language of diversity” in urban Canada (2008:26, 93).

The incentive to use a rights frame and to employ the courts (backed by federal grant money) paid off immensely. The gay rights lobby won far more cases than they lost. In one vital case (Vriend v. Alberta), the Supreme Court added or “read in” sexual orientation into the

Alberta Human Rights Code though the drafters had deliberately left it out. The case is considered one of the most aggressive or activist cases by legal commentators who both favour and disavow the outcome (Manfredi 2001:3; Russell 2009:297; Knopff and Morton

1992:15, 19). Indeed, multiple commentators suggest the rapid advance of gay rights in

Canada was driven primarily by the courts for two decades. J. Scott Matthews claims court decisions over a crucial decade (from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s) were instrumental in moving and shaping public opinion towards legalizing same-sex marriage (2005:849). He says the courts’ credibility legitimated an ‘equal rights’ framing not hegemonic at the time. Further, court decisions forced governments to enact “a torrent of legislative activity” to comply with judicial rulings,45 thus reinforcing the courts’ view until it became “politically hegemonic.”46

Matthews claims these legal and legislative events helped shift public opinion by framing the issue around equality, a value at the heart of post-Charter Canadian identity (2005:842).

Others share Matthews’ view. Jason Pierceson concurs that the rapid change in Canadian

sexuality, family, etc. The equal rights frame absconded on wholesale societal reorganization and simply sought equality. 45 Matthews (2005:849) particularly highlights the landmark 1999 case of M v. H which defined same-sex partners as common-law spouses and forced massive legislative changes. 46 Matthews (2005:846) cites studies showing Canadians hold the Supreme Court in high esteem and thus says the court – particularly when it cites the Charter with its central place in the national myth – can influence public opinion. 40 attitudes in “a few short years” points to institutional drivers (2005:165). Smith also supports a

“historical institutionalist” perspective, arguing countries without “strong courts” like Britain did not grant homosexuals the same rights (2005:348).47 Clearly LGBTQ international gains transcend particularities of Canada’s legal structure, but Smith argues the cumulative institutional advantages created by the Charter (i.e. stronger courts, funding for legal rights claimants, and a new rights culture) help explain why “Among the Anglo-American common law countries, the substantive revolution in lesbian and gay rights over the last thirty years has gone farthest and deepest in Canada” (2005:332).48 Thus, deferential “Tory” Canada became an unlikely trail-blazer on gay rights. Toryism’s conservative ethos has not completely evaporated, but the new values around rights, tolerance, and multiculturalism sweep most obstacles aside. Many of these ascendant values sit uncomfortably with evangelical doctrines and political aims and hence, whereas American evangelicals often claim ownership of

America’s identity and founding narratives, Canadian evangelicals can confront the opposite scenario – facing accusations of being un-Canadian (Bean, Gonzalez, Kaufman 2008).

Backlash: Western Alienation and Realignment on the Right

Lastly, these dramatic changes bred a rightward counter-movement against the pluralism mantra and the erosion of traditional values. This movement is fed by burgeoning western provinces whose high rates of population growth (Alberta and British Columbia

47 Today, Britain does grant similar rights to Canada but the process was much slower. Same-sex marriage, for example, was passed in 2014, about a decade after it was achieved in Canada. The British comparison is particularly interesting because Britain, unlike the United States, has no religious right to speak of. The faster progress for gay rights in Canada relative to Britain thus cannot be ascribed to less opposition from religious conservatives as in the US case. 48 Rayside and Wilcox think the institutionalist argument regarding the impact of the Charter has some merit but may be overstated (2011:8). They nonetheless agree that the pace of change was remarkable and that, though there are some parallels in northern Europe, the rapid shift happened “nowhere as clearly as in the Canadian case” (2008:4). 41 specifically) and relative wealth grants increasing clout.49 Alberta especially, with its strong

American roots, leans furthest right, and has often felt ignored by a federal government seemingly overly preoccupied with Ontario and Quebec (Burkinshaw 1997; Wiseman 2007).

This “Western alienation” spawned the Reform Party and its early rallying cry, “the West wants in.” As indicated earlier, Reform transformed the political landscape by displacing and swallowing the Progressive Conservatives (renaming themselves the Conservative Party eventually) and, in the 2011 election, nearly obliterated the Liberal Party which had dominated federal politics for a century.50 The Reform-turned-Conservative Party leans more rightward than any of Canada’s historic parties. Wiseman claims the unique elements in Reform’s early policy platforms drew from American models: free votes for MPs; referenda; triple-E Senate; recall of MPs; legislative hearings for judicial appointments; and adding property rights to the

Charter (2007:247). Notably, as Reform morphed into the Conservatives and eventually won power, one compromise was they dropped these elements. Nonetheless, red Toryism’s collective ethos had been replaced by a neo-liberalism that sees government as the problem and not a tool for nation-building. The Conservatives did however retain and revive deference for tradition including reinforcing authority (law and order legislation), building up the military, respect for religion and the traditional family, and even bringing back symbols tied to the

British monarchy. Tellingly, they did not celebrate that newer cultural symbol, the Charter: on the Charter’s thirtieth anniversary, media outlets covered the occasion extensively but

Harper’s government downplayed it. Reports surfaced that the government rejected

49 Alberta’s 2016 GDP per capita was 41% above the Canadian average and 69% higher than Quebec’s, Canada’s most left-leaning province (Canadian Taxpayer’s Federation 2012). 50 In 2015, the Liberal Party made a startling recovery and won a majority government. 42 bureaucrats’ plans for an official televised ceremony, opting instead for a short press release

(Levitz 2012; see also Cotler 2012).

Reform is especially relevant for this study as unlike the Progressive Conservatives,

Reform became a home for social conservatives. This did not happen immediately. Despite some of Reform’s most prominent members being evangelicals (including Deb Grey, Chuck

Strahl, and leader Preston Manning), the party was originally populist and fiscally conservative but did not incorporate social conservatism into its platforms (Farney 2012:100). Instead,

Reform carried over the Progressive Conservative view that moral issues were not for partisan politics. The Progressive Conservatives advocated free votes for matters of conscience, which

Reform gave a more populist twist, saying abortion should be decided by referendum and, lacking this, MPs should vote the will of constituents on such moral matters (i.e. true populism)

(ibid.:96).51 Indeed, Farney shows when advocates pushed to add a pro-life stance to the party’s platform at a 1992 policy convention, they were loudly condemned while a counter motion quashing their efforts got a “rousing ovation” and passed with overwhelming support

(95%) (2012:104). So what changed? Farney points to LGBTQ issues. Abortion, Farney explains, was driven mostly by Catholics while LGBTQ issues stirred up evangelicals more (ibid.:104).52

Reform contained many more evangelicals so when LGBTQ issues emerged, the alignment was there – Reform was evangelical, evangelicals opposed LGBTQ issues and hence Reform now took a definitive stance on a socially conservative issue. In addition, abortion offered no partisan gains but opposing LGBTQ rights in the early 1990s seemed promising for the party

51 Farney shows that this populist stance was not mere tactics but reflected Manning’s beliefs (as spoken even in multiple Christian settings) and were accepted by the party (ibid.:143n6). 52 Notice the lag versus the United States, where evangelicals were politically pro-life well before 1992. 43

(ibid.:105). However, even in opposing LGBTQ rights, Reform’s language in party platforms and in House of Commons debates initially took a populist rather than socially conservative approach – not making moral arguments but saying courts were overstepping and overriding the will of the people on matters best left to legislatures, or that LGBTQ issues sought special rights and were thus undemocratic (ibid.:108-110). As the 1990s progressed, however, more

Reformers began grounding arguments in social conservatism, selling morality and explicitly citing religious beliefs (ibid.:108-111). This was new for social conservatives – they had a partisan home and their views were openly espoused in the House of Commons. The capstone on this transformation was when Stockwell Day, an evangelical espousing explicit social conservative platforms (rather than Manning’s populism), won the leadership of the reconfigured Canadian Alliance Party in 2000 (ibid.:114). Day courted pro-lifers and social conservatives openly. From Day onward, Farney shows, populism (e.g. referendums for moral questions) was replaced by social conservatism in policy platforms and House of Commons speeches on social issues. Here then, is a fascinating chain of events. The Charter and the Court

Challenges Program helped the LGBTQ movement to organize, directed that movement towards rights arguments and using courts, which thus secured massive victories. These victories and the process (i.e. judicial activism rather than parliamentary debate) motivated

Canada’s social conservatives to organize and helped them find a partisan home.

The Conservatives’ quest to undo social liberalism in Canada was an uphill battle as social conservatism became increasingly unpopular and its advocates came under suspicion.

Stockwell Day was pilloried in the press during the election for reportedly denying evolution and, consequently, his tenure as party leader was brief and dismal (Bean et al. 2008: 923;

44

McDonald 2006:31-2). When Stephen Harper succeeded Day, he loudly opposed same-sex marriage in parliament but otherwise backgrounded social conservatism. When same-sex marriage later became law and public support grew, Harper deliberately took steps so his party could move past the issue. He had promised a revote on gay marriage if elected but when they won a minority government, traditional marriage supporters encouraged him to hold off the vote until he had a majority. Instead, Harper held the vote in December 2006 with little notice and, after it was predictably defeated, Harper declared the issue closed, allowing him to bury a position hindering the party (Warner 2010:236; Malloy 2011:158; Rayside 2011:284). The

Conservatives faced perpetual accusations of having a “secret agenda” on topics like abortion that they would unveil if ever given a majority government. Hence, Harper moved incrementally, making small and moderate changes that were cumulatively significant while eschewing dramatic actions that might seem too radical. Harper downplayed his faith and only implemented carefully chosen moral policies that resonated with the base without raising too much opposition.53 Harper was especially reluctant to touch abortion. In 2012 a Conservative

MP introduced a private member motion on abortion that was intentionally modest, not seeking to criminalize abortion but (mimicking Harper’s incremental style) simply calling for a committee to examine when a foetus legally becomes a human. Harper led a majority government by this time but seeing the issue as a landmine, he strongly opposed the motion as did the party whip. Lacking Conservative support, the motion was defeated in parliament

53 Two examples of such policies are on age of consent and income splitting. The Conservatives raised the age of consent at which minors can have sex with persons over 18 (raised to 16 from 14). Social conservatives felt strongly that the younger age limit made it difficult to prosecute sexual predators who targeted 14- and 15-year- olds. Income splitting allows couples to divide their income evenly for tax purposes, tremendously aiding families with a stay-at-home parent since this puts their income in a lower tax bracket. Both policies fulfill wish list items for conservative lobbies but arouse less opposition than tackling abortion or same-sex rights. 45

(Selley 2012; Hébert 2012). In short, social conservatives have found a home with the

Conservatives but they do not own the home. They are one member of a family (along with fiscal conservatives, libertarians, etc.) and cannot jeopardize the party’s electoral prospects even for the issues they hold most dear.

Concerning this conservative backlash, there are two final points. First, in many countries conservatives have decried immigration but in Canada, where pluralism is so powerful, this has been more tempered. Indeed, whereas Reform initially promised to abolish the Multiculturalism Act and its related ministry, the Conservatives, once in office, accepted it and maintained large immigration numbers, though they added their own tweaks: they tightened rules for refugee claims, added a vigorous statement of “Canadian values” to the citizenship process, and mandated people show their face during citizenship ceremonies

(targeting niqab wearers) which became a political flashpoint in the 2015 election (Bloemraad

2012:13). In addition, Harper had his trusted advisor Jason Kenney spend years courting immigrant votes, seeing these new Canadians as natural havens of conservative values (Malloy

2010:12; Bloemeraad 2012:13). When Harper lost power, the Conservative leadership race spawned some anti-immigration candidates but they lost dramatically. Pluralism is so potent in

Canada, even the right routinely embraces it.54

Second, conservative efforts have benefitted from shifts in the media landscape. Since the 1990s, right-leaning organizations have dominated ownership of English language newspapers. With the collapse of this market, one organization, Postmedia Network, possessed 14 of the top 21 English language newspapers in 2015, although not the top two

54 At least on ethnic diversity. Conservatives still often reject diversity on sexuality or gender. 46

(News Media Canada 2015).55 This right-leaning network (along with Sun News described below) conducted a sustained multi-year critique of the CBC (the public broadcaster) as a biased left-wing organization funded by tax dollars and that should be disbanded. The attack left the public broadcaster on the defensive and the Conservatives significantly cut funding and held hearings tarnishing the broadcaster (Globe and Mail 2011). However, the right’s power in the media has limits too. On newspapers, one study on the same-sex marriage debate claimed the two national newspapers showed bias by ignoring evangelical lobbyists’ main talking points

(three secularly reasoned arguments) in three quarters of stories over a three-year period.56

And outside of newspapers, the right holds no advantage. Talk radio leans right but lacks power and is offset by left-leaning CBC Radio. The CBC is a powerful entity whose funding was restored when the Liberals won power in 2015. The three television networks are generally centrist with the CBC leaning left and Global TV leaning right. In 2010, Quebecor boldly launched Sun News (dubbed Fox News North by pundits) to provide hard right-wing news analysis. Hailed as a “game changer” by a major pro-life website (Craine 2011, 2012), Sun News provided an unparalleled outlet for more conservative views and had the IMFC’s staff on as regular guests. However, viewership was “minuscule” and relied on an unfavourable older demographic (Canadian Press 2012). In 2015, the network closed down.

55 In many markets, PostMedia owns both local dailies (e.g. Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Ottawa). Newspapers are shrinking rapidly but were certainly significant during the 2005 same-sex marriage debate and perhaps during elections. During the 2008 election, 17 of 18 major newspapers endorsed Stephen Harper with the Toronto Star being the only exception (Moore 2010). 56 Focused on the two national papers, the study (Haskell 2009) ignored the many city-based dailies that Postmedia owns (the study is detailed in chapter 4). Haskell also tracked bias in TV news. His claim that evangelicals are ignored was broadly accepted while his claims of bias received more criticism (see Ferré 2010; Smith 2010). Cooper and Miljan also produced a mid-1990s study showing liberal media bias, saying journalists’ liberal values exert more influence than the owners’ conservative values (2003). Critics claimed their data did not support their conclusions and their research is prior to the media landscape changes I describe (Robinson 2007; Harada 2005). 47

Summary

Canada’s evangelical lobbies operate in a political culture left of American politics with stronger support for government intervention and social programs (though still to the right of some European socialist nations). National identity (especially Anglophone identity) highlights difference vis-à-vis the United States as evidence of Canadians’ more caring society and so notions of fairness and equal treatment invoke powerful tropes. Second, tolerance narratives are a growing force. Holding disparate colonies together and surmounting a substantial linguistic/religious/cultural divide grounded Canada in pragmatic compromise and accepting difference. In recent decades, tolerance has assumed mythical status, becoming central, along with the Charter and its corresponding multicultural ethos, to the newfound Anglo-Canadian nationalism. Tolerance and diversity fits with the egalitarian social ethos to create strong support for the rights of minorities or oppressed populations, vital to topics like abortion, same-sex marriage, and the lobbies’ own freedom as a religious minority. These socialist and multicultural trends generated counter responses beneficial to the lobbies, especially the birth of Reform which eventually transformed into a new Conservative Party that welcomes evangelicals more than any previous party in Canada.

In terms of the political opportunity structure, Canada’s centralized governments concentrate extraordinary power in the prime minister’s hands (or premiers at the provincial level), such that pressuring individual members of parliament bears little fruit. Hence, lobbying opportunities are fewer compared to the United States. Lobbies also target provincial governments who control vital areas like education, but again, the premier’s dominance makes

48 lobbying challenging. Conversely, courts have become key arenas for lobbying but this depends on the lobby’s politics – the courts judge according to the Charter’s liberal values, which can undermine evangelical lobbies’ goals and also facilitate societal and legal changes without requiring the will of parliaments. In short, the lobbies need to shift culture, to win at court, and help like-minded political parties win power to get their agenda approved – common goals for lobbyists but with the added subtlety that the piecemeal pressuring of individual elected officials rarely pays off in Canada.

To further situate the lobbies, let us now turn to Canadian religious culture.

Protestantism and Evangelicalism in English Canada

Historical Development

We will first discuss the larger milieu of English Canadian Protestantism and then focus on the history, institutional development and character of Canadian evangelicalism.57

Historian Nancy Christie claims in British North America (BNA) “popular evangelicalism was clearly dominant by 1812” (1990:21). Rawlyk suggests Canadian evangelicalism was even

“more radical, more anarchist, more democratic and more popular” than its American counterpart (1994:146; see also 1997:xv). As noted earlier, American Methodist preachers

57 In the previous chapter, I noted that “evangelical” is a notoriously difficult term to define. Complicating matters, the term’s meaning changed across eras. Marsden shows that in America the term covered virtually all Protestants in the nineteenth century, was replaced by the labels Progressives and Fundamentalists due to the Protestant split at the turn of the twentieth, and then re-emerged during the 1940s to indicate conservative Protestants who were more open than fundamentalists (2006:234-5). (I noted that today, the term sometimes implies distinction from fundamentalists but sometimes includes them if applied more broadly.) My use will largely follow Marsden so that the term indicates virtually all Protestants in the nineteenth century but comes to mean conservative Protestants in the twentieth, typically including fundamentalists. 49 regularly visited Upper Canada (present day Ontario) bringing a “direct importation of

American republican values” (Christie 1990:22).58 By 1812, the Methodists were the largest denomination in Upper Canada and Canadian evangelicalism was on course to follow the sectarian, populist path of the United States.

However, as described above, the War of 1812 shifted Canadian Protestantism onto a more conservative path by aligning patriotism with anti-American and anti-republican sentiments while bolstering ties to Britain. Anglicanism, previously on the defensive and held by only a narrow elite, received new vitality and the renewal of high-church traditions countered more populist, egalitarian impulses (Christie 2002:10-11, 41; Gauvreau 1990:56-7;

Murphy and Perin 1996:136, 139; Noll 1992:247, 267). The war’s aftermath tempered the populist evangelicals by cutting off the artery of American itinerant preachers and shifting evangelicals’ gaze towards Britain’s more domesticated and orderly faith (Murphy 1996:137;

Christie 2002:41, Noll 1992:266). The British government even financially backed British

Methodism in BNA to counter subversive American strains, and overwhelming British immigration in ensuing decades cemented ties to British Methodism and British

Presbyterianism (Christie 2002:42; Murphy 1996:139; Noll 1992:262-3; Van Die 1994:256-7).

Evangelicals also acquired wealth in both Upper Canada and the Maritimes which fed Tory tendencies of decorum, professionalism and conservatism (Christie 2002:42; Noll 1992:262-

266; Gauvreau 1990:61). By 1840, Murphy describes a “growing evangelical consensus” as a kind of middle ground was reached – the Anglicans lost their privileges as the established

58 Christie notes that Wesley personally leaned towards British Toryism, but his ideas were radical in emphasizing emotions and the individual conscience over rationalism (2002:26). This implied that social order stemmed from “mass inner discipline” granted to the individual believer by God and not from social elites or governing institutions. 50 church in the 1840s and 50s and adapted to voluntarism while populist evangelicals became moderated by new denominational colleges, increased demand for theologically trained ministers, and more controlled camp meetings run by professional revivalists.59 The new consensus retained some of the earlier populist movements’ devotion but in more moderate form – a kind of reformed, professionalized revivalism (Murphy and Perin 1996:174, 184;

Gauvreau 1990:63, 65, 88).

Here, two paths diverge for while American Christianity remained entrepreneurial and fecund, spawning innumerable splits and inherently populist start-ups, in Canada an evangelical oligarchy formed with ninety percent of all Protestants in just four denominations

(Anglican, Methodists, Presbyterians and Baptists) (Gauvreau 1990:65; Noll 1992:265; Clarke

1996:262-3).60 This hegemonic oligarchy became a quasi-establishment, joining with government in a “unity of throne and altar” that aspired to shape the new society (Van Die

1994:6-7; see also Martin 2000:23; Beyer 2000:207; Malloy 2010:4).61 Two characteristics illuminate how religious and political cultures aligned. First, political Toryism with its collectivism and deference to elites, was mirrored religiously by the church oligarchy dominating English BNA.62 Second, the pragmatic, compromising tone of the political sphere

59 Legislation in the 1790s had granted the Anglican church establishment privileges including a substantial portion of the land of Upper Canada, government funding for clergy salaries, the right for Anglican bishops to sit on legislative councils, and allowing only Anglican ministers to solemnize marriages (depriving rival ministers of an important income stream). All of this was revoked in the 1840s and 50s (Christie 1990:17). 60 Noll adds that replacing Baptists with Catholics accounts for 80-90% of all citizens (not just Protestants) living in Ontario throughout the nineteenth century (1992:266). Unitarians, Congregationalists, Quakers, Mormons and even Lutherans (a large group in other nations) arrived after 1815 but their numbers were small (Murphy and Perin 1996:139; Gauvreau 1990:65). 61 Klassen and fellow contributors to an edited volume coin a neologism “churchstateness” to capture the intermixing of church and state in the Americas (Johnson, Klassen and Sullivan 2018). While they apply this term to multiple national contexts, it fits nineteenth-century Canada especially well. 62 Similarly, Francophones inhabited the deferential and elite-favouring religious culture of ultramontane Catholicism (Noll 1992:250-256). 51 was paralleled by a compromising ecclesiastical spirit whereby churches partnered across denominations to form temperance societies, Sunday schools, anti-slavery crusades and to promote sabbatarianism (Murphy 1996:157-9, 173). This cooperative spirit prevented sectarian splits and even led the oligarchy to consolidate further. Thus, denominations’ regional bodies united to form national bodies while sub-denominations of Baptists or

Presbyterians, separated by theological splits inherited from the home country, joined to form unified denominations. From the 1860s through the 1880s, “all of the larger Protestant bodies” experienced consolidations (Clarke 1996:267; see also Airhart 1990:99-100). Out west, the denominations often worked together due to sparse resources. Such collegiality and cooperation eventually led to the idea of uniting across denominations, which finally happened in 1925 when the United Church formed by uniting Presbyterian, Methodist, and other congregations cumulatively representing 20% of the national population (Wright 1990, cited in

Fetner and Sanders 2011:92; see also Airhart 1990:100; Noll 1992: 282). Canadian

Protestantism’s Tory spirit – its unity and cooperative attitude – thus differs sharply from

American sectarianism and populism.

This cozy, collaborative spirit was disrupted, however, by new tensions imported from abroad as biblical criticism and Darwin’s ideas began challenging the Protestant consensus.

Clarke suggests the main denominations generally accepted these new ideas, but dissenters rebelled and divisions arose at church colleges (1996:344; see also Airhart 1990:111-113).

Other imports undermining the oligarchy included the Holiness movement, John Darby’s dispensationalism, and new denominations born of conversions and surging immigration post

1900 (e.g. Salvation Army, Plymouth Brethren, Mennonites, Lutherans, and Pentecostals)

52

(Airhart 1990:108-110; Clarke 1996:322-324). Thus, the tensions between progressives and conservatives that Marsden traces in America were replicated in Canada, though less dramatically (2006). Fundamentalism affected all major denominations in the 1920s but was a smaller movement in Canada and hence only Baptists experienced actual splits (Wright

1990:158-161; Clarke 1996:344; Airhart 1990:117-124; Stackhouse 1993:198-200). Since most denominations did not split, the Toronto Bible College, Ontario’s pre-eminent Bible college during the twentieth century, drew mostly from mainline conservatives until the 1950s and still recruited from these traditions at the time of its 1968 merger (Stackhouse 1993:68-9). In contrast, America’s progressive-fundamentalist wars split denominations in the 1920s, thus prohibiting anyone from keeping a foot in both camps. Conservative Christianity in Canada was thus less strident, viewing liberal Christians more generously and maintaining ties with them unlike in the USA. Here too, then, one sees the more tolerant and compromising Canadian ethos.

Critically, however, the consensus had fractured and new pieces emerged or broke off that might one day coalesce into a minority tradition. These pieces included conservatives in mainline congregations, Baptist splinter groups, and numerous sectarian movements and independent fundamentalist churches. Among the sectarian movements, Pentecostals grew quickly as did the Salvation Army though the latter waned during the Great Depression (Wright

1990:162, 168-9). Post 1920, Mennonite immigration became substantial and in mid-century

Dutch Reformed immigrants arrived in greater numbers, all adding to the Baptists and the conservatives in the mainline churches (Wright 1990:168-9; Guenther 1997; Hoover 1997:13).

53

Since WWII, Canada has become increasingly liberal and secular. The main Protestant churches were decimated by massive secularization. The growth of the state in key areas like health care, education, and welfare provision deprived the churches of both functions and relevance (Airhart 2013: 204-6). This was particularly detrimental to the mainline denominations whose identity was tied up in being a kind of cultural glue, the generator of civic commitment and the beating heart of communities and indeed of the nation. In this way, being a Christian had been integral to Canadian identity, but this period witnessed a

“decoupling of Christianity and culture” (which helped set the stage for a later increase in the legal separation of church and state in the Charter era) (ibid.: 223). This decoupling manifests in two key government commissions – the 1951 Massey Commission and the 1967 Royal

Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism – which emphasized culture as defining Canada in place of the historic link between Christianity and national identity (religion was barely mentioned in the latter report) (ibid.: 208-9, 214). At the same time that Christianity lost its hold on civic identity, it also lost its claim to being the source of moral values as people began arguing for secularly-grounded values, leaving Christianity as more of an individual right and practice (ibid.:222). In sum, Christian identity became more private and optional and many opted out. During the 1950s, national population growth hid proportional declines in adherents although signs were evident as Protestant attendance rates fell (from 60% in 1946 to 43% in 1956). Post 1960, the main Protestant churches experienced actual numerical decline in adherents while weekly attendance eroded every decade, falling from 35% in 1957 to 14% by 1999 (Stackhouse 1990: 206, 238-239; Bibby 2002:20). The Cooperative Commonwealth

Federation (CCF), a socialist party formed mostly by Protestant ministers, became the most secular and socially liberal party, renaming themselves the New Democratic Party in 1961 54

(Stackhouse 1990:207). Thus, the country’s most prominent political voice for social justice sang a secular tune. Quebec’s shift was very similar though its magnitude was even more dramatic, acquiring the apt title the Quiet Revolution. Quebec prior to 1960 may have been the most clericalized society on earth with one of the highest ratios of priests per capita in all of

Roman Catholicism (Noll 2007:37; see also Beyer 2000:209).63 Post-1960 however, Catholic influence collapsed rapidly as group identity shifted from the Church towards language and nationalism.64 All of this fading religiosity facilitated the liberalizing of Canadian laws around sexuality. In 1968, then justice minister Pierre Trudeau introduced laws liberalizing divorce, partially liberalizing abortion, and de-criminalizing homosexuality. As discussed, the Charter in the 1980s amplified this trend as courts struck down the Sunday shopping law (1985), the abortion law (1988), and granted new rights to gays and lesbians.

Amidst sweeping liberalization and secularization, evangelicals have been a bulwark of resistance. Exact numbers are elusive, but Bibby estimates evangelicals at about 8% of the population in 2000, the same percentage he deduces from 1871 census data (2002:72).65 Most scholars put evangelicals at 10% to 12% of the population today and either slightly shrinking or slightly growing (Grenville 2006; Hoover et al. 2002:354; Reimer 2010; Malloy 2011:145;

Reimer and Wilkinson 2010, 2012; Penner et al. 2011). Evangelical commitment also shows in

63 Quebec’s conservative, religious ethos made the province the last jurisdiction in North America to give women the vote (1940), the last to make childhood education compulsory (1943), and as late as 1960, the provincial government had no ministry of education, health or social welfare, as this was all left to the church (Anglophones set up their own organizations) (Noll:2007 25; Baum 2000:150). 64 Sociologist David Martin notes that Catholic practice tends to be higher when Catholicism confers identity to a disadvantaged minority group (2000:24-25). However, once the group achieves a certain parity, the distinguishing religion can then seem a hindrance and may recede quite rapidly. He also claims Catholicism suffers more from state expansion where the Church has stood in for basic social services. In Quebec, both issues applied and the Church collapsed massively (see also Beyer 2000:209; Baum 2000:150). 65 Bibby tracks the key denominations that today comprise evangelicalism. As noted, the mainline Protestant denominations had strong evangelistic tendencies in the nineteenth century that have since dissipated. 55 their attendance rates. Between 1957 and 1999, Bibby found church attendance nationally decreased from 53% to 24%, affecting all major sub-categories except his “Conservative

Protestant” category which held steady (going from 51% to 49%) (2002:20).66 The future also appears bright as young Conservative Protestants attend as often as older members (ibid.:77) while a newer study shows that five major evangelical denominations report as many attendees under age 18 as they have over age 65 (Reimer and Wilkinson 2015:83-4). Indeed,

Bibby attributes Canada’s higher attendance rates versus Europe almost entirely to Canada having more conservative Protestants (1993). Evangelicals are displacing the old oligarchy churches as Canada’s Protestant voice – a 1979 paper suggested evangelical attendance had likely passed the United Church and Guenther suggests that during the 80s, evangelicals passed the cumulative Sunday attendance of all the mainline churches (Stackhouse 1993:5;

Guenther 2008; see also Rawlyk 1997:xviii). In short, while secularism decimated the powerful mainline Protestant traditions and weakened Catholicism, Canada’s evangelicals successfully resisted these trends to become one of Canada’s most prominent Christian voices.

Institution Building Amidst Obstacles

Evangelicals’ resistance to secularism owes something to their successful development of an institutional network. However, Canadian evangelicals confronted obstacles that made the evangelical infrastructure generally weaker and slower to develop than in America. Size has been the foremost challenge as the Canadian community totals only 3-5% of its American

66 Bibby’s “conservative Protestants” are mostly evangelicals as denominationally defined plus some smaller groups like Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Note that Reimer and Wilkinson surveyed numerous attempts to count evangelicals and found the community’s population had seemed stable in recent decades up into the first decade of this century (2010). 56 counterpart (Hoover 1998:74; Rayside 2008:35-6). In addition, Canadian evangelicalism has been poorer with a smaller donor base and lacking the extremely wealthy benefactors of

American fundamentalism (Stackhouse 1993:201-2; Burkinshaw 2008).67 Canada’s evangelicals also suffered from their outsider status, which stemmed from several factors. First, the

American fusion between Protestantism and national identity never occurred in Canada with its large Catholic presence (Francophone especially but Anglophone too)68 and generally weak nationalism, so Canada’s evangelicals could never claim to be the heart of the nation (Noll

1992:246; Harrison 2008:220). Second, Canada had a strong Protestant voice but it was mainline and Tory rather than populist and sectarian. Third, evangelicals’ outsider status was magnified by immigration and ethnicity. While American fundamentalists came from long- settled and established populations, the sectarian groups that would eventually lead Canadian evangelicalism were immigrants still arriving and getting settled in the twentieth century. For example, the Mennonite Brethren, one of Western Canada’s largest evangelical constituencies, arrived in the late 1920s and post WWII with linguistic barriers on top of the usual inward- focus of newcomers. The Reformed tradition, another core constituency of modern Canadian evangelicalism, arrived in the 1950s and 60s (decades later than in the United States) and did not begin building institutions and engaging with the public sphere until the 1970s and 80s.

More established communities faced other challenges: Baptists were most prominent in the

Maritimes which lacks both economic and political power, while Pentecostals were newly emerging and relatively poor until more recent decades. Mennonites and Pentecostals have

67 Individual wealthy Americans have played seminal roles such as the millionaire oilman who paid to publish the influential texts The Fundamentals (Marsden 2006:118). 68 A 2001 census showed the largest Anglophone province, Ontario, was 34% Catholic. In the USA, a 2008 Pew Forum study showed Catholics comprised only 24% of Americans (Statistics Canada 2001; Pew Forum 2008). 57 also had apolitical theologies and only began seriously considering engaging in public debate in recent decades (Burkinshaw 2008; Janzen 1991).69 In short, evangelicals were smaller, poorer and less politically engaged than their American cousins and existed further towards the margins of Canadian life.

Canadian evangelicals also confronted state-based obstacles in two spheres pivotal for subculture creation, namely media (radio and television) and education. The Canadian government has regulated radio and television since the 1930s and continues to do so via the

CRTC. Until 1993, the CRTC prohibited single-faith radio or television stations as too divisive and unrepresentative of the diverse communities they reached. Hence, during the 1980s the

CRTC rejected several requests for single-faith broadcast licenses and instead, in true multicultural fashion, declared a preference for a multifaith channel. Some religious groups

(realizing any station was better than none) banded together to form Vision TV in 1988, billed as the world’s first multifaith station (Mount Saint Vincent 2012). Restrictions softened in

1993, but religious applicants for broadcast licenses still face obstacles including rules prohibiting on-air fundraising (which helps stations with small, devoted audiences), and mandated diversity requirements whereby Christian stations must reserve weekly time slots for programs featuring other faiths.70 Even post-1993, broadcast license applicants must allot enough time to other faiths or get turned down (Meed Ward 1995; Nelles 1996; Neufeld

2007). Individual shows on mainstream networks can also be affected as one Christian

69 The Salvation Army was another large presence in the early 1900s that leaned towards political non- engagement (Burkinshaw 2008). The group is much smaller today but they also contributed to delaying evangelical engagement with the broader political culture. 70 Thus, the weekly programming schedule in 2012 for Christian network Crossroads Television Station (CTS) included Call of the Minaret, The Spirit of Islam and The Voice of Hinduism. In 2014, Crossroads relaunched as yes TV which has more secular programming. Since the new format has less religious programming, it has fewer shows for other religions, although some remain. 58 program on a secular station received pressure to “present a more balanced view” on abortion

(Faith Today 1990c).71 Being unable to broadcast a national voice since WWII has immensely hindered evangelicals’ ability to create a national evangelical identity and to mobilize adherents for action (Malloy 2011:147).

Evangelicals have also faced state-based restrictions in education. On universities, higher education was monopolized by government institutions in many provinces (i.e. public universities). Ontario prohibited private institutions from granting arts and science degrees until 1998 and Canada’s premier evangelical university, Trinity Western, fought political and legal battles in British Columbia in the late 1970s, 80s and 90s to gain university status and the right to train public school teachers (Burkinshaw 2008; Stackhouse 1997:58; 1998:64).72

Evangelicals, sometimes partnering with other faith communities, have repeatedly called for government funding for their elementary and secondary schools but successes have been rare

(Stackhouse 1997:58; Rayside, Sabin and Thomas 2012).73 Evangelicals thus have long operated in a highly regulated environment they find hostile.

Although these obstacles have slowed the evangelical community’s development and mobilization, evangelicals have nonetheless created an impressive and growing infrastructure.

The most vital early move was establishing Bible colleges. With progressives dominating the

71 American shows broadcast on Canadian airwaves have also been censored. James Dobson of Focus on the Family and Dr. Laura Schlessinger have both had shows censored for comments on homosexuality (Hoover 2000; Reid 1998). 72 Trinity’s attempt to create a law school was recently quashed by law societies that would not recognize its graduates. This issue is discussed later in this dissertation. 73 The greatest defeats have been in the largest province, Ontario. Catholic schools receive full government funding but a multifaith coalition seeking equal treatment for other religious schools was rejected by both governments and the courts who defend the preferential treatment of Catholics as reflecting the nation’s historical roots (Seljak 2005:186-7). Evangelicals have had success elsewhere, notably in Alberta where their private schools receive about 60% of the funding of public school students. 59 universities in the early twentieth century, Canada’s evangelicals adopted the Bible college model pioneered in the USA. Bible colleges sprang up between the 1920s and 1940s with

Western Canada alone containing 85 Bible schools by 1952 (Airhart 1990:126-7; Wright

1990:166; Burkinshaw 1997:369). Nationwide attendance at these schools was never large – likely between 7,000 and 10,000 at any one time74 – but the perhaps 200,000 graduates over the twentieth century frequently became ministers and denominational leaders (Burkinshaw

1997:369-377).75 In addition, to drum up recruits, the schools hosted missions and rallies and sent out speakers, music teams, and literature to local churches. These activities turned the schools into regional coordinating centres, fostering Canadianization and a more shared evangelical outlook as graduates led their church communities to drop ethnic identities, adopt

English in sermons, and take on broader evangelical doctrines prevailing at the schools.

Meanwhile, at secular universities, the evangelical minority formed the Intervarsity Christian

Fellowship (IVCF) just after WWI, becoming a national organization by 1928. It was the only national evangelical organization until the 1960s and grew rapidly after 1950 with over 50 full- time staff by 1968. Thus, on education, evangelicals forged post-secondary pedagogical institutions and formed a country-wide fellowship organization at secular schools.

74 Exact figures do not exist. Burkinshaw notes that a partial list of some 27 schools in the Prairies counted 2,090 students in 1947 (1997:369-70). A 1960 report counted 3,300 students in 44 reporting institutions and in the mid- 1980s, the most comprehensive data likely collected showed 8,300 students in 76 schools (5,000 in Western Canada, 1,300 in Ontario and 700 split equally between Quebec and the Maritimes). Numbers dropped to 7,000 in the mid-1990s likely due to growing attendance at evangelical universities. 75 A 1963 Mennonite Brethren report showed the outsized impact of Bible school graduates. The report indicated 90% of the Brethren’s foreign missionaries, 86% of its domestic missionaries, 67% of its Sunday school teachers, and 59% of its ministers had Bible school training (371). Burkinshaw also details two examples (a western Baptist group and a Churches of Christ denomination on PEI) where a small but steady flow of Bible school graduates shifted whole denominational groups from more liberal or moderate theologies to more conservative positions over a few decades (1997:372-4). 60

Evangelicals also built infrastructure in media and party politics. Radio ministries were important for although evangelicals could not form their own stations, they occasionally ran commercially viable shows. Most notable was Alberta-based “Bible Bill” Aberhart whose audience in the 1930s was estimated at 350,000 (Stackhouse 1993:39). Aberhart adopted dispensationalist ideas from American fundamentalist Cyrus Scofield’s correspondence course and popularized them throughout Alberta and beyond (Elliot 2012). Aberhart (exemplifying another form of institution building) parlayed his popularity into a new political party called

Social Credit, eventually becoming Alberta’s premier. Wiseman (2007:248) describes the party’s meetings as revivals with actual hymn singing. The party’s unusual platform included social policies such as medicare and labour reform but then turned rightward, identifying socialism as the enemy (previously it had been banks).76 The right leaning party was enormously successful, governing continuously from 1935 to 1971 in Alberta and from 1952 to

1991 (except for a three year hiatus) in British Columbia (Wiseman 2007:248). Another

Depression-era Western party spawned by conservative ministers was the Cooperative

Commonwealth Federation (CCF) (Wright 1990:177, 182-4; Stackhouse 1997:42). The CCF attracted evangelicals with a left-leaning economic platform, a combination absent in the

United States since perhaps William Jennings Bryan. In Saskatchewan, the party formed North

America’s first socialist government in 1944, pioneered universal health care on the continent, and dominated provincial politics until 2007.77 These two parties show evangelicalism’s

76 Banack suggests that Aberhardt’s premillennial dispensationalism contributed to the province’s individualist and anti-statism (2014:264-6). 77 The right leaning Saskatchewan Party, formed in 1997, has won four back-to-back majority governments in concert with Saskatchewan’s rising economic fortunes and perhaps a further sign of a general rightward shift in the Canadian electorate. Wiseman (2007:238-40) notes that traditionally, Alberta and British Columbia have leaned right whereas leftist prairie populism has done better in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. 61 strength in the West and a populist impulse ripe for new political movements. This is especially true in right-leaning Alberta. Indeed, when Aberhart died in office, he was succeeded as premier by Ernest Manning, the first graduate of Aberhart’s Bible Institute. Manning followed

Aberhart as a popular radio preacher and preached throughout his twenty-five uninterrupted years as premier. It was Manning’s son, Preston, who founded the populist Reform Party which launched in Alberta. This combination of evangelicalism, populism and right-leaning politics is uncommon in Canadian history, but Alberta, with its heavy American influence, has consistently been the movement’s beating heart.

Evangelicals’ Political Lobbies

One final form of institution-building concerns creating political lobbies such as the ones in this study. The first evangelical lobbies appeared in the 1960s when the Mennonite

Central Committee (MCC), the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada (EFC) and Citizens for Public

Justice (CPJ) were all founded. Interestingly, these groups rarely fit the social conservative

Christian lobby mold. The MCC has grown immensely from a $150,000 budget in 1964 to

$10MM by 1980 and $62MM by 2016, but focuses on relief aid and encouraging government to assist the poor (Jantz 2001:337; Mennonite Central Committee 2016). CPJ has Dutch

Calvinist roots but has drawn from multiple Christian traditions and currently has a Catholic executive director and substantial backing from a Catholic religious order (Stackhouse

2000:118; Citizens for Public Justice 2011). CPJ began on the evangelical left and garnered attention in the 1970s by highlighting how Canada’s energy policy impacted aboriginals. Since then, key issues have included funding confessional schools, refugee issues, international trade, poverty, ecological justice, abortion and homosexual rights. They are pro-life on

62 abortion but were early evangelical advocates for some homosexual rights (though not full marriage). Their budget has fluctuated, dropping from a half million dollars in 1998 down to

$250,000 in 2004 before rising to between $600,000 - $800,000 since then (Hoover 1997:69;

Stackhouse 2000:119-121; Citizens for Public Justice 2004, 2006, 2011, 2016). Neither the MCC nor CPJ were originally located in Ottawa but the Winnipeg-based MCC opened an Ottawa office in 1975 and CPJ moved there from Toronto in 2007 (Ottawa Mennonite Church; Kits

2007). The EFC was started in Toronto by mostly conservative evangelical pastors from mainline traditions. Its origins are detailed in the next chapter but the term “lobby” hardly fits its early years as it focused on evangelism and providing a forum for cooperation and mutual support, with the political shift happening only in the early 1980s. In short, none of the organizations founded in the 1960s initially engaged in the morally conservative lobbying associated with evangelical politics.

The first socially conservative evangelical voice focussed on lobbying belonged to Ken

Campbell, a fundamentalist educated at an American Bible college and friend to Jerry Falwell

(Hoover 1997:70). Campbell founded Renaissance Canada in 1974 and was very vocal although his effectiveness seems limited (Malloy 2011:148).78 The early 1980s however saw a blooming of lobbyist strength, a kind of echo of the Religious Right’s emergence in the United States

(Hoover 1997:70, 78). In just 1983-4, three significant developments occurred: the EFC hired its first full-time executive director, Brian Stiller, to push its new political focus; Focus on the

Family Canada opened its doors as the offspring of the successful American organization; and

78 In a telling anecdote about Canadian-American differences, Hoover relates even the fundamentalist Campbell found Falwell to be too far right as Campbell opposed capital punishment and criminalizing homosexuality (1997:126). 63

REAL Women, an anti-feminist group, was founded in Toronto. None of these organizations were Ottawa-based although Focus began holding annual conferences there in 1988 (Ibid:70-

2). By 1996, Hoover counted about fifteen national evangelical lobbies using a fairly wide net that included single-issue groups (e.g. National Religious Broadcasters, Home School Legal

Defense Association, Group Against Pornography) and the heavily Catholic Campaign Life

Coalition (1997:74, 212). After the mid-1990’s evangelical lobbying continued to gain strength such that Hoover contends that by 1996, Canadian evangelicals were actually “better” (italics in original) organized than their US peers relative to size of community (1997:74).79 His conclusions are not widely shared. Rayside says American evangelicals are “more organized,” and calls Canadian efforts a “pale shadow” in comparison (2008:37, 39). Fetner and Sanders also claim Canadian evangelicals are less organized (2011: 89). Hoover provides more hard data but focussed on national organizations, whereas American evangelicals have innumerable local or state level organizations unparalleled in Canada (Wilcox 2011:95). In short, socially conservative lobbies are a new institutional presence for Canada’s evangelicals, emerging post-

1980 to rebut secular and liberal trends and gaining strength in the mid-to-late 1990s with the

LGBTQ movement and the openings provided by the Reform Party.

79 Hoover says that the size of the evangelical community in the United States versus Canada was 23:1 (1997:74). However, there were not 23 times as many groups in the USA nor did they enjoy a proportional advantage in size (whether measured by membership base, staff count, or budgets). In staffing levels, the American lobbies’ advantage was very small (1.2:1) whereas the highest gap was average membership base size with a 13:1 ratio. 64

The Character of Canadian Evangelicalism

Having examined the history of Protestantism and evangelicalism in Canada, including evangelicals’ institution building efforts, let us consider some broad characteristics of Canadian evangelicalism.

In some ways, Canadian evangelicalism reflects Canadian political culture. For example, regionalism matters in Canadian evangelicalism. In Quebec, evangelicals have little presence

(usually unmentioned in scholarly works) and no political presence at all.80 Atlantic Canada has a significant evangelical presence with many congregations and Bible colleges but, mirroring the region’s political marginalization, Stackhouse claims Atlantic Canada has contributed little to national evangelical identity, remaining somewhat culturally isolated and establishing few links to transnational movements (1993:185). The West, however, has assumed leadership.

Alberta and British Columbia have been central, spawning arguably Canada’s most prominent

Bible college (Prairie), first and largest evangelical university (Trinity Western), first evangelical graduate school (Regent College), and two of the lobbies studied herein (Focus on the Family

Canada and CFAC).81 Additionally, these provinces spurred the broader revival of Canadian political conservatism through the Reform Party, the Fraser Institute, the Canada West

Foundation, the “Calgary school” of political thought based at the University of Calgary and influential local media vehicles like the Alberta Report and the BC Report. Lastly, Ontario has a massive population82 and contains the nation’s capital and hence houses virtually all major

80 Reimer and Wilkinson sum up that “evangelicalism is an English-speaking phenomenon in Canada” with evangelicals at “likely less than one per cent” in Quebec (2015:81). Notably, national evangelical lobbies rarely make their materials available in French. 81 CFAC grew to have a presence in Toronto also but was founded and always based in Calgary. 82 The province has over a third of the nation’s population and about half of the population outside Quebec. 65 evangelical organizations not hailing from Alberta or British Columbia.83 Ontario and the West are thus key for evangelicalism although the two regions’ evangelical communities differ in personality. Stackhouse describes the Ontario community as “churchish” (one might say Tory) as evangelical members of mainstream traditions played a strong role for much of the twentieth century and were only eclipsed by evangelical denominations in recent decades

(1993:189-90). In contrast, he portrays Western evangelicalism as more sectarian and populist.

Another Canadian political trait replicated in Canadian evangelicalism is a pragmatic, co-operative attitude. Recall this co-operative ethos led mainline Protestants towards mergers rather than sectarian splits. Evangelical mergers have not occurred, but Mark Noll (1997:6), a leading scholar of American evangelicalism, noted Canada’s evangelicals have less “ideological boundary-marking” and more easily traverse “ecclesiastical and theological boundaries” (cited in Patrick 2011:127n182) even across traditions as diverse as Reformed and Pentecostals, something he does not witness back home. Stackhouse adds that because Canadian evangelicalism lacked the money and big donors of the USA, organizations naturally emphasized evangelicalism’s broad middle to attract a sufficiently large donor base (1993:201-

2; see also Patrick:45). The cooperation described above between sectarians and conservative mainliners also contrasts with America’s harsh divide between progressives and conservatives.

Whereas EFC members could belong to the liberal Canadian Council of Churches (even

President Stiller was invited to join in 1987), the American National Association of Evangelicals

83 The major exceptions to this are Bible colleges (which are spread throughout English Canada) and the Mennonite Central Committee which has an Ottawa office but began in Winnipeg. The dominance of the three largest Anglophone provinces is not entirely surprising given their demographic and economic weight. 66

(NAE) forbid cross-membership (Stackhouse 1993:287n33, 294n43). The growing cooperation with Catholics (described in later chapters) further supports this accommodating ethos.

This co-operative spirit points to a broader trait, namely that Canada’s evangelicals are more politically moderate overall. Moderation here includes greater tolerance towards outsiders, greater acceptance of the state, a stronger presence for the evangelical left, and being less politicized overall. Canadian evangelicals’ greater moderation is widely attested but the best evidence comes from Sam Reimer’s survey research (Rawlyk 1996:6-7; Stackhouse

1993:196ff; Reimer 2003). He showed Canadian and American evangelicals were remarkably similar in orthodoxy and orthopraxy but differed most in their political views as Canada’s evangelicals showed less alignment (as of the mid-90s) between religious conservatism and political conservatism and more tolerance towards difference (be it racial, political, religious or moral) (2000:235). Lydia Bean’s comparative ethnography of American and Canadian congregations a decade later adds support by showing Canadian evangelicals’ religious narratives were not politicized nor linked with partisanship to the degree found in the United

States (2009; see also Bean, Gonzalez and Kaufman 2008).84 A number of factors may have contributed to this. Historically, in America religious and civic identity became fused, fostering a politicized religion whereby religio-moral disputes became fights over who owned the nation.

Recent history exacerbated matters because 1960s political cleavages (i.e. Vietnam and the

Civil Rights movement) tended to split along the same lines as the new religious/moral

84 In another work, Bean, Gonzalez and Kaufman interviewed a small and non-random sample of clergy and lay leaders in Alberta and Texas and found similar results – namely that Canadians had a less politicized faith (2008). 67 cleavages (i.e. abortion, sexual liberalism, gays).85 Hence, the religious divide could build on and reinforce an existing political rupture. In Canada, however, the dominant political divide has always been the French-English issue which never fit the newer moral cleavages around abortion, feminism, and gays (Smith 2008, cited in Bean 2009:39-40). Thus, on Canada’s most salient political issue, religious identity was a non-factor.

As for Canadian evangelicalism’s more statist and left-leaning flavour, denominational composition is frequently cited. Mennonite and Reformed traditions – with their strong social justice traditions, belief in social welfare, and Reformed’s positive view of the state – are much larger in Canada. Conversely, fundamentalism, which disdains compromise, distrusts government, and associates leftist politics with atheistic communism, has been far less prevalent (Hoover et al.). Hoover (1997:188-9) adds that the Canadian political system’s parliamentary traditions and committees for public discussion may have isolated and marginalized strident populist voices while favouring collaborative approaches. Regulation of television and radio also contributed by preventing distinctive evangelical voices from being heard, thus facilitating more assimilation to cultural norms (Hoover 1997; Malloy 2011:147).

Additionally, since the rise of America’s Religious Right, Canadian identity has rested partly on opposing America’s politicized religion. Canadian evangelicals are Canadian and some research suggests that many of them draw boundaries against both secular Canadian society and

American evangelicals, seeing the latter as too consumed with political power (Bean, Gonzalez,

Kaufman 2008:925-927).

85 That is, those on the left of Vietnam and the Civil Rights movement were also left on abortion, feminism, and gay rights. Ditto for those on the right. Hence, religious differences (on social conservatism) could layer on top of these other cleavages. 68

Canadian evangelicals are thus not American evangelicals, a mantra regularly espoused by scholars (see Stackhouse 1993; Noll 1997; Hoover 1997; Bean 2009; Malloy 2010; Patrick

2011). While true, scholars’ desire to counter a lazy collapsing of the two communities may foster a tendency to overlook what important links there are. Being beside the world’s most established, powerful and wealthiest evangelical community while sharing societal traits like language (in English Canada), liberal democratic values, and overlapping media and consumer cultures creates fertile ground for borrowing. And borrowing there has been.

Foremost is the borrowing of people and ideas. Canadian evangelicalism took off prior to 1812 partly owing to the impact of American itinerant preachers and the evangelical fervor south of the border. While British influence dominated thereafter for some time, American influence re-emerged including imports like fundamentalism and Pentecostalism. Alberta especially, owing to American immigration, adopted American populism, evangelicalism, and laissez-faire economics (Wiseman 2007:245). During the twentieth century, American influence on Canadian evangelicalism grew rather than abated. Hoover and den Dulk (2004:15) describe

Canadian evangelicalism as an “echo” of the American version, repeating American patterns in softer forms that occur later. This claim fits the data well: Bible colleges took off in the USA in the 1890s through WWI but gained traction in Canada in the 1920s through the 1940s; the

American NAE formed in 1942 whereas the Canadian EFC formed in 1964; the surge of

Christian American lobby groups preceded the emergence of similar groups in Canada (Hoover

1997); and evangelicals’ plunged into party politics in America circa 1980 but in Canada, significant party engagement began only with the gay rights debates of the mid to late 1990s

(Farney 2012:104-6).

69

American influence also manifests in the history of key institutions. In education,

American influence pervades the founding of Canadian evangelicalism’s most revered institutions. Prairie Bible Institute, Canada’s pre-eminent Bible school for much of the twentieth century, had an American as its first principal and later president for five decades.

From 1950-75, Americans were a majority of the students, bringing American Christian ideas to the school’s Canadian graduates for a quarter century (Stackhouse 1993:76, 84).86 One of

Ontario’s two most prominent early Bible colleges – the London College of Bible and Missions – was founded by a graduate of Chicago’s Moody Bible Institute at the urging of Moody’s president. Throughout its history, most of the school’s faculty came from two prominent

American schools, Dallas Theological Seminary and Wheaton College. In 1968, the school merged with another Bible school to form Ontario’s largest Bible college which is now Tyndale

University, the country’s second largest evangelical university (Stackhouse 1993: 121-2).

Canada’s largest evangelical university, Trinity Western University in British Columbia, has even stronger American roots. Founded by a denomination with both American and Canadian congregations, the Canadian churches were uncertain about the project while the American churches “strongly backed” the school providing most of the money, the entire team of initial administrators, and five of the seven initial faculty members. American students outnumbered

Canadians for the first decade (Stackhouse 1993:147). Regent College, Canada’s premier evangelical graduate school also had a disproportionate number of Americans amongst its founders (ibid.:155). Cumulatively then, arguably Canada’s four most influential evangelical educational institutions have all had partial to overwhelming American influence. Given these

86 In addition, many Canadian evangelicals have attended American Bible colleges. It is common in biographical details (e.g. see Ken Campbell above) but I know of no source that has tracked numbers. 70 institutions have trained generations of evangelical leaders, American influence here is hard to overstate.

Canada’s evangelical lobbies also reflect American inspiration. The EFC’s founder, Harry

Faught, first saw the benefits of evangelical cooperation at Dallas Theological Seminary and was inspired by NAE meetings to launch a Canadian equivalent. The NAE president was supportive and even attended some early Canadian meetings. Another prominent NAE founder, Carl F. H. Henry, travelled the country with Faught, using his (Henry’s) name recognition to promote the EFC and encouraging Canadian evangelicals to join the new organization (Fieguth 2004). The EFC differs from the NAE but the NAE model inspired a

Canadian-styled version. Fundamentalist Ken Campbell, as noted above, was schooled in the

USA and was friends with Jerry Falwell. Focus on the Family Canada is a direct American import which dwarfed every other transdenominational organization in Canada by the mid-1990s

(Stackhouse 2000:118). Later chapters explain how Focus Canada relies on its US parent for radio broadcasts and magazines and even Focus’ IMFC offshoot mirrors the Family Research

Council, a Focus USA offshoot (Meed 1992; Faith Today 1990b). CFAC attempted to copy the

US based Christian Coalition and its founders travelled to meet Ralph Reed when launching the organization. CFAC’s President, Charles McVety, was also friends with Falwell and brought

Falwell, Reed and Karl Rove on separate visits to Toronto (Todd 2007). Thus, Canada’s three largest evangelical lobbies all looked to American models with one being a direct import. As discussed later, the USA also provides speakers, talking points and ideas to the Canadian lobbies. Canadian evangelical lobbying is unimaginable absent American influence.

71

Lastly, evangelicals have found a home in the most American-styled party, the Reform- cum-Conservative Party with its Albertan base and American influences in its initial platform.87

The Conservative Party marries social and economic conservatism in the manner of American politics, a mixture previously unknown in Canadian federal politics. American influence in

Alberta politics stems not only from early nineteenth-century immigration but from ongoing contacts from the oil patch and general trade. Wiseman describes a history of economic links noting that nine of the fifteen presidents of the exclusive Calgary’s Petroleum Club between

1955-1970 were Americans (2007:43). Bean found the same American influence in congregations, ultimately choosing not to use Albertan congregations in her cross-border ethnography because “many of the leading pastors and laypeople in Albertan churches were

American expatriates” (2009:42-3). In short, although Conservatives are not Republicans, the

American influence is certainly not inconsequential. In the same way, Canadian evangelicalism is no copy of the American community, but the influences are far too great to ignore.

Conclusion

Compared to their American peers, the lobbies operate in a more statist and left- leaning political culture and one emphasizing tolerance and moderation to hold the patchwork country together. Hence, strident tactics face an uphill battle – they jar against the cultural preference for moderation, and the political opportunity structure frustrates high pressure

87 As noted earlier, electoral success was achieved partly by leaving some of these unique elements on the editing floor. Referenda, recalling MPs, and more free votes for MPs are just some of the populist elements that faded as the party expanded its base. In this way, Reform had to adopt American ideas to Canadian parliamentary democracy and to Canadian political culture. We shall see that the lobbies, who seek similar broad-based acceptance, face quite similar challenges. 72 tactics, instead rewarding conciliatory approaches like suasion. An openness to state intervention means the public often supports the state stepping in to ensure fairness and tolerance. The terrain has shifted uncomfortably for evangelicals since the Charter’s birth as it has aided secularism, strengthened individual rights (at the expense of tradition and communal norms), and elevated multiculturalism in ways that challenge the community perceived as

Christian orthodoxy’s guardians. Evangelicals have benefitted from the conservative backlash to these liberal trends including a fairly evangelical-friendly Conservative political party though even Conservatives refrain from tackling evangelicals’ top issues around LGBTQs and abortion.

As for evangelicals themselves, they too exhibit aspects of their cultural setting. Versus their American peers, Canada’s evangelicals are less populist, more moderate and more conciliatory. There are clear fissures with the dominant culture, however, and populist impulses are particularly strong in Alberta. In addition, despite the differences with American evangelicals, there are numerous deep links and debts to the American community including ideas, the educating of leaders, and institution building. Overall, Canada’s evangelicals face the challenge of trying to thrive in a culture where their place often seems strained.

73

Chapter 2 – Introducing the Lobbies

Having discussed the national cultural context in chapter one, this chapter introduces the lobbies, discussing each one in terms of their history, size, key staff, and the modes of political activism they pursue given the Canadian milieu. I will distinguish each lobby’s unique features and distinct approach for while they generally share policy goals, they differ in how they confront the societal challenges they encounter as they seek to win public approval for their positions.

Evangelical Fellowship of Canada

Overview

In 1964, the EFC was founded at a meeting of “a couple hundred” Toronto area pastors from both mainline (e.g. Anglican, Presbyterian) and nonconformist churches (Fieguth 2004, para. 5). The first president, Henry Faught, was a Pentecostal who, as noted in the prior chapter, encountered the USA based National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) while studying at an American seminary. The organization was not especially political with the name

“Fellowship” reflecting modest goals of fostering co-operation and joining in worship (Patrick

2011:50). In 1967, the EFC became a national organization as Faught undertook a cross- country promotional tour with prominent American theologian, Carl F. H. Henry (Fieguth

2004). Mainline conservatives played important roles early on, providing three of the four presidents after Faught, but eventually their participation waned as the increasingly liberal

Mainline churches found fewer points of commonality with the non-conformist churches

(Stackhouse 1993:166; Patrick 2011:50-1). Since the mid-1970s, all EFC presidents have been 74 evangelicals with three denominations playing particularly large roles, namely the Pentecostal

Church of Canada, the Mennonite Brethren, and the Christian Reformed Church of Canada

(Stackhouse 1993:172; Patrick 2011:50-1). Stackhouse suggests these three shaped the EFC’s character: a revivalist/evangelical spirit from Pentecostalism, a peace and justice emphasis from the Mennonites, and political and social engagement from the Reformed, the latter blossoming when the Christian Reformed Church joined in 1979 (cited in Patrick 2011:51).88

Importantly, these three denominations are not natural bedfellows and, as Patrick highlights, for such disparate groups to work together required a tolerant and ecumenist spirit. Such cooperation was not always easy. Pentecostal involvement was contentious early on (e.g. meetings in the Maritimes were twice cancelled because evangelicals refused to hear Faught speak) and Pentecostals feared men like Faught might downplay Pentecostal doctrines to fit in

(Kydd 1997:299). Additionally, the Christian Reformed Church was reticent to join and needed convincing that the EFC was not fundamentalist and was serious about “cultural engagement and intellectual rigor” (Patrick 2011:51). But, critically, they did join whereas the Christian

Reformed Church in America separated from the NAE in 1951 precisely because they found the

NAE too fundamentalist. Thus, just as Canadian moderation arose from the need for

French/English cooperation, Stackhouse contends the EFC developed a moderate, tolerate and ecumenical tone because the diverse denominations had to compromise in order to work together. Stackhouse adds that the EFC’s magazine, Faith Today¸ rarely addresses theology

88 These three denominations’ prevalence also manifests in personnel. Pentecostals contributed four EFC presidents (including Faught and Stiller). Reformed spurred the EFC’s political outlook as Stiller was heavily influenced by Citizens for Public Justice, Paul Marshall and the Institute for Christian Studies (ICS) (all from the Reformed tradition) and current president Bruce Clemenger is also an ICS graduate. Stiller’s other main political influence was Mennonite John Redekop while other Mennonites occupied key leadership roles (Jantz 2008:334; Patrick 2011). 75

(which might raise disagreements amongst members), instead emphasizing evangelicalism’s

“broad middle” (1993:201-2) so the lobby can appeal to many diverse evangelicals and maximize its fundraising constituency. The EFC is thus a big-tent, centrist organization within the evangelical world.89

Prior to 1980, the EFC was tiny, a “largely unnoticed” entity with no full-time staff and measly budgets, essentially running a magazine called Thrust and holding an annual conference to bring evangelical leaders together (Patrick 2011:52).90 As late as 1977, the EFC still defined its work in “largely pastoral terms” (ibid.:53) but change came in 1981 as, likely inspired by

American evangelicals’ political organizing, the EFC revamped its constitution to newly emphasize political engagement (Stackhouse 1993:168). To that end, Brian Stiller was promoted from vice-president to executive director and became the first full-time employee in

1983. Patrick describes Stiller as a broad-minded evangelical whose mixed background (he was a Pentecostal minister, with graduate studies at an Anglican theological college, and former president of the cross-denominational Youth for Christ) appealed to the ecumenical group

(2011:53; see also Stackhouse 1993:168). Stiller led the EFC for fourteen years, a transformative and defining time as he reorganized the lobby, developed commissions on different topics, and re-launched the magazine (renamed Faith Alive and soon thereafter Faith

Today). More importantly, he pursued political advocacy. Patrick (2011) and Stackhouse (1993) credit the EFC, and Stiller especially, for helping push Canadian evangelicalism towards political engagement. While the EFC and Stiller were important, I think evangelicals were likely poised for such a shift as other lobbies sprouted at this time (i.e. REAL Women, Focus on the Family

89 As discussed later, the EFC is even left-leaning on many economic and social justice issues. 90 The measly budgets were $1,000 in 1966, $20,000 in 1971 and $30,000 in 1976 (Stackhouse 1999:167). 76

Canada) and the American example was impossible to ignore.91 Polls show Canadian evangelicals’ resistance to politics declined from the mid-70s to mid-90s and that they became more politically active than other Canadians (working in elections, contributing to campaigns, etc.) (Hoover 1997:67). Shifting to political activism paid off for the EFC as an early 1990s survey of Faith Today’s readers showed over half joined the EFC specifically because of political issues and over 90% thought it very important the EFC speak as a “national voice for evangelicals” (Meed 1993, cited in Hoover 1997:67).92 Most tellingly, the shift reaped financial rewards almost instantly as the budget mushroomed from $60,000 in 1983 when Stiller was hired to $1.3MM just four years later. By 1990, it surged to $2MM and reached $3.5MM by

1997 (Stackhouse 1990:171; Fieguth 2004). The EFC understood the source of this windfall and, hence, for many years, its standard fundraising ad in Faith Today showed Stiller standing in front of the Ottawa parliament buildings (rather than a church or a cross). The emphasis on politics moulded Faith Today as Dennis Hoover’s content analysis found from 1986 to 1994 political issues and evangelical political engagement were the most prevalent themes, covering

22% of articles (1997:213).93 When Stiller resigned, the organization chose Gary Walsh as its next leader but this “pastor to pastors” had a short tenure specifically because he lacked media savvy and mishandled some public issues (Stackhouse cited in Patrick 2011:75). The lobby learned its lesson and replaced Walsh not with another minister but with Bruce Clemenger,

91 A measure of America’s influence on Canadian evangelicals is that in 1985 Canadian evangelicals donated $18 million to American televangelists and $21 million to Canadian television ministries (Stiller, Mitchener, and Dorsch 1985, 12). Of course, Canadian evangelicals did not have to follow American patterns but, at minimum, they could not avoid weighing them. 92 Stackhouse, arguably Canada’s premier chronicler of evangelicalism, also believes most evangelicals see the EFC’s primary mission as government engagement (cited in Patrick 2011:61n77). 93 The number could be even higher as Hoover listed abortion and education as the next two most prominent themes although separating these issues from political engagement is debatable. 77 whose resume touted political education and activism. Clemenger had led EFC’s Ottawa office

(discussed below, the office focussed on political action) for several years, has a Master’s degree from the Institute of Christian Studies, and is pursuing a PhD in political theory from the same institute (Evangelical Fellowship of Canada 2012b). Under his leadership, the EFC’s finances continue to track with contentious political issues as the mid-to-high $2MM budget in the early 2000s leapt to $4.5MM in 2006 during the controversial same-sex marriage debate, held that level for a few years, and then receded to about $3.6MM in 2010 and plateaued thereafter (EFC 2001-2017). Staff levels have predictably followed suit, as the lobby has about

24 full time equivalents (FTEs) in 2017, down from a high of 36 FTEs in 2009 (Canada Revenue

Agency 2000-2015, 2017). In short, the shift to political advocacy birthed the modern EFC, turning it into a powerful national entity for Canadian evangelicals. While the EFC engages in other activities including pastoral, research and congregational support, political activism is the lifeblood that has nourished its growth.94

The EFC claims to represent Canada’s evangelicals with some credence although assessing representativeness is tricky. The EFC membership comprises most major organizations on the Canadian evangelical landscape, including about 40 denominational bodies, 100 organizations and educational institutions, and 1,000 congregations as well as about 15,000 individuals (Evangelical Fellowship of Canada 2012a, 2017a). These numbers seem stable and are similar to numbers provided by the EFC’s magazine in the mid-1990s.95

94 The EFC’s major activities outside of politics include ministerial support, evangelism, and a research centre on Canadian evangelicalism that provides statistics on the Canadian evangelical community and practical research for congregations on how to grow, attract the young, etc. 95 A 1996 Faith Today article claimed the EFC represented 14,000 individual members, 28 denominations, 100 parachurch organizations and thousands of churches. There has been growth in the number of denominations which likely helps the EFC’s finances but most other numbers are stable (cited in Patrick: 54). The budget as well is similar in 2016 to what it was when Stiller left in 1997 despite some fluctuations in the interim (EFC 2001-2016). 78

Patrick (2011:46, 54) and Stackhouse (1993:171) estimate the EFC represents cumulatively about 1MM out of Canada’s estimated 3-4MM evangelicals with representation meaning the individual, their congregation or their denomination is a member. A different measuring tool comes from a 1990s poll that showed about half a million evangelicals had actual contact with the EFC meaning they saw the lobby on television, read about it or received materials

(Grenville 1997:421, 428). The EFC’s reach is greater with evangelical leaders as Hoover’s 1996 survey of evangelical leaders found that the EFC and Focus on the Family Canada acted as

“hub” organizations whereby 80% of the leaders surveyed were affiliated with the EFC and

69% with Focus (no other organization reached even 40% of respondents) (1997). In sum, the

EFC has a legitimate claim to being the most influential organization in Canadian evangelicalism and thus helps set the tone for the community in general. It is a broad tent organization for evangelicals and surged to national prominence owing to its decision to engage in political activism.

Political Activism

The EFC has predominantly pursued an insider strategy of forging relationships with key government personnel and utilizing state institutions to pursue its goals (Volman 2009; Patrick

2011). This strategy may reflect the EFC’s roots and head office being in Ontario (Canada’s centre of power), or the lobby’s moderate tone, or simply that Canada’s political opportunity structure is resistant to outsider pressure tactics (see prior chapter). This insider strategy began with Stiller who, just prior to being hired full-time, worked successfully with Ken

Campbell and Pentecostal TV evangelist David Mainse to help convince the Trudeau

79 government to include a reference to God in the new Constitution’s preamble (Egerton

2000:102).96 Once hired, Stiller cultivated relationships with MPs and cabinet members, acquiring particularly good access once the Progressive Conservatives won power in 1984

(Hoover 1997:71). Over the 1980s, major issues included homosexual rights, religious freedom, child care, pornography and calling for a day of rest per week (Stackhouse 1993:170). With the

EFC’s main office in Toronto, in 1996 Stiller opened a new Ottawa office – in the same building as the Conservative Party – to further facilitate interacting with Parliament Hill (Stackhouse

2000:118). Stiller hired Clemenger to lead the new office and since Clemenger became the EFC president, the Ottawa office has maintained a professional staff of 3-5 people and facilitated the EFC’s approach of working within the system as the lobby became regular presenters at parliamentary committees. Patrick counted 23 parliamentary presentations in just a five-year period (from 1998 to 2003) (2011:78-9).

The EFC’s insider strategy later grew to include the courts. Hoover and den Dulk say

Stiller was seminal in pushing Canadian evangelicals towards court activism (2004:26; see also

Patrick 2011:164). The EFC’s engagement is almost startling, participating in about 40 cases as an intervenor between 1987 and 2009, with about one-third of these cases focussed on religious freedom and often fought in coalitions with other Christian groups or with Muslims and Sikhs (ibid.:165; EFC 2001c). The mounting legal work led the EFC to hire a full-time

96 The preamble reads: “Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law” (Department of Justice 2012b). Note also that constitutional discussions helped form evangelical lobbying. It is no accident that, at this time, the EFC changed its own constitution to emphasize political engagement and hired Stiller full-time. Just as Miriam Smith explained that the GLBT lobby Egale was formed around these discussions (see prior chapter), the EFC’s emergence stems from the same set of events. Drafting and enacting the Charter altered the political opportunity structure which in turn affected political actors. 80 lawyer97 in 2000 and a second lawyer in 2008, based out of the Ottawa office (Patrick

2011:76n105). In 2009, in-house counsel Don Hutchinson boasted that the EFC’s 20 Supreme

Court appearances likely exceeded all other religious groups in Canada (Patrick 2011:4, 75,

155, 174n261). The EFC’s frequency of court interventions has lessened since the same-sex marriage issue was settled and hence, since 2015, they no longer have in-house counsel, instead hiring lawyers when needed. Cumulatively, the above factors have helped shape the

EFC’s predominantly Tory insider approach – its roots are in Ontario, close to the centre of power; its ecumenical history encouraged a conciliatory work-out-your differences attitude; it has a moderate and professional executive staff with elite educations who are comfortable navigating the highest levels of the state; and it has the deep pockets to pursue costly tactics like court appearances. As a result, the EFC’s level of engagement with the Canadian state apparatus – via appearances before parliamentary committees and the courts – is unparalleled among conservative Christian groups and perhaps by religionists generally in Canada.

The lobby supplements its strength in insider tactics by encouraging grassroots mobilization. It urges members to vote, write MPs and get involved. The magazine Faith Today leads this effort as demonstrated by the above-mentioned content analysis showing political issues are the magazine’s most prominent theme. In addition, the reigning president writes a column in every issue that almost always tackles political concerns.98 The EFC also educates members and galvanizes action through Canada Watch, a political newsletter published

97 The lawyer was Janet Epp Buckingham. After leaving the EFC in 2006 she became director of the Laurentian Leadership Centre, an Ottawa political training organization sponsored by Trinity Western University that offers political education and internships for Christian university students. 98 Some entries respond to current events, while others address the nature of secularism, religionists’ right to participate in the public sphere, and the contribution they can make. 81 irregularly,99 and through its Centre for Faith in Public Life (i.e. the Ottawa office) which blogs, videos and emails regular updates on key issues.

Lastly, the EFC also engages with the media. Most engagements are predominantly in

Christian media outlets (e.g. TV shows such as 100 Huntley Street or Context with Lorna Dueck, or the Drew Marshall radio show) where the EFC hopes to connect with evangelicals, guide their thinking on certain issues, encourage taking actions, and be perceived as their main voice in Canada. The lobby also seeks to represent the evangelical community to outsiders and does interviews in the mainstream media (TVO, CBC, the National Post). For many years, the lobby has also diligently written letters to the editors of mainstream newspapers and magazines to correct and challenge statements that it feels slander evangelicals or Christians. The EFC has the resources to pursue a more engaged media strategy but, as noted, has focussed instead on insider tactics like court appearances, likely viewing this strategy as more effective within

Canada’s parliamentary democracy.

In terms of tone, the EFC projects a moderate tone reflecting its ecumenical nature and big-tent appeal. Stiller accentuated such moderation by tirelessly distancing the EFC from fundamentalist views, even criticizing fundamentalism and the American Religious Right

(Patrick 2011; Stackhouse 1993). Stiller pressed the media to drop the term fundamentalist when describing evangelicals – he compared it to calling a black person a nigger – insisting the media should use a community’s or group’s self-description (Stackhouse 1995b:28).100 During

Stiller’s reign, Faith Today generally ignored or even criticized prominent American Religious

99 Canada Watch was originally intended to be quarterly but some quarters were missed (including all of 2008). Since 2013, the newsletter has been published bi-monthly. 100 The EFC continues to reject the term and complained to the CBC Ombudsman in 2016 about a CBC program that described the EFC as “fundamentalist” (Hiemstra 2016). 82

Right figures (i.e. Jerry Falwell and Rush Limbaugh), while complimenting the more benign Billy

Graham (Patrick 2011:55-56; Stiller 1994c). Stiller claimed the large Mennonite presence had moderated Canadian evangelicals who were thus “less conservative and less homogenous in their politics” (Stiller 1996). Moderate rhetoric was sometimes backed by moderate policy stances, such as the EFC’s controversial support for a Progressive Conservative bill in the early

1990s legalizing abortion until a certain gestation period but forbidding it thereafter. The

Supreme Court had struck down the previous abortion law leaving abortion completely unregulated during any gestation period. Some Christians vehemently opposed the bill, insisting all abortion must be condemned but Stiller’s EFC maintained a partial restriction was better than nothing. When the bill was defeated in the Senate on a tie vote, Stiller attributed the bill’s demise to “two forms of fundamentalism: secular and religious,” thus denouncing some pro-lifers’ uncompromising stance (Stiller 1991). This tone continued when Don

Hutchinson, the EFC’s long time chief counsel, disparaged the hard-hitting Charles McVety of

CFAC for being too “fundamentalist” (Gruending 2008b). The EFC’s politics sometimes lean left of the other groups analyzed herein since its social conservatism is not always paired with economic conservatism. The Mennonite presence (and their social justice emphasis) may again be significant here as the EFC has advocated for government programs to support peace and justice initiatives including domestic poverty, global poverty, international religious freedom, and a modest environmental stance.

The EFC truly seems to marry evangelicalism with aspects of (especially central)

Canadian culture mentioned in the prior chapter. With its ecumenical composition, Ontario roots, and professional staff, the EFC espouses a moderate tone, uses more Tory insider

83 approaches to politics rather than populism, and shows concern for the collective in their attention to poverty.

Focus on the Family Canada

Overview

Focus on the Family Canada exemplifies American influence in Canadian evangelicalism as the lobby is an offshoot of the similarly named American organization founded by Dr. James

Dobson. Focus USA expanded massively during the 1980s and 1990s and Dobson’s sway over millions of American voters made him a powerful political force who had the ear of Republican politicians including President George W. Bush. The past dozen years, however, have been hard on the American organization as both revenues and staff have been cut by more than half

(staff dropping to 650 in 2013 and revenues down to around $90MM in 2016).101 Interestingly, some media reports suggest that Focus USA’s leadership attributed the setbacks to overemphasizing politics. Hence, Dobson left in 2010 and began his own radio show geared towards political issues while Focus USA became less political and refocussed on family and ministry (Kumar 2011; Riley 2010; National Public Radio 2010; Goodstein 2010; McKinley 2011;

Focus on the Family 2011).

Dobson’s vision expanded into Canada when Focus USA opened its first international office in Vancouver in 1983 (Focus on the Family 2012a). The Canadian organization started modestly with a single employee working two half-days per week but grew rapidly to a full-

101 CNN’s religion reporter in 2010 claimed the organization was not attracting the next generation and that Focus’s radio listeners’ average age was 50 (National Public Radio 2010). 84 time person plus four part-time staff by 1984, and hiring the first president, Geoffrey Still, in

1986 (Focus 1999c). Over time the Canadian seed has certainly born fruit. By 1998, the

Canadian office had a staff of 53 and a budget of $7MM “thus dwarfing” all other Canadian evangelical parachurch organizations (Stackhouse 2000:118).102 By 2004, revenues had climbed again to $11.4MM and remained in the $10-$12MM through 2017 (Canada Revenue Agency

2000-2011; 2017; Focus 2016). Staff counts went from 70-80 full time equivalents in 2004-

2011 to 56 in 2017 (Canada Revenue Agency 2000-2011, 2017). In 2011, Focus relocated to a new $9MM facility in Langley, British Columbia they purchased with cash (Stirk 2011).

Focus aims to support and guide evangelicals by producing Christian content and workshops for mass evangelical consumption. The heart of this effort – what former president

Darrel Reid (1999) called the “ministry’s major outreach” – has been Dobson’s daily radio broadcasts. These broadcasts (now done by other Focus USA leaders) reached 375,000

Canadians in 1992, just over 1% of the national population (Meed 1992a). By 2011, Focus offered seemingly lower numbers stating that the broadcasts reach “143,000 families” daily and that 1MM people (just under 3% of the population) hear at least one program per week

(Focus 2011).103 The radio program made Dobson and Focus household names and established a loyal following.104 Focus capitalized on this captive audience, becoming a gateway for a wide variety of products promoting Christianity or the family (e.g. CDs, DVDs, books, magazine

102 Roughly similar numbers to Stackhouse’s are available from Focus. They claimed 55 employees in 1999 and an $8MM budget in 1996 (Focus 1999c; Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 1996). 103 Focus’ president also claimed 1MM listeners per week in 1999 (Reid 1999). Note that I use the term “seemingly” in the sentence above because the latter number references families whereas the former uses audience size. I presume these terms are equivalent. 104 Dobson’s original fame stems came from a 1970 book. The radio program built on this foundation, furthering his reach and popularity and, I suspect, facilitated more of a relationship with listeners through the daily or perhaps weekly contact and the comfort and intimacy of a speaking voice whose rhythms, cadence, and main themes become familiar. Dobson’s on-air presence is folksy and paternal, exuding both warmth and strictness. 85 subscriptions). Focus offers its flagship magazine for free though, like the radio program, audience numbers have declined significantly, with circulation dropping from 150,000 in 1999 to 70,000 by 2007 (Focus 1998a, 1999c, 2007).105 In addition, Focus holds seminars and workshops which have included Love Won Out (encouraging gays to turn away from homosexuality), the Truth Project (evangelism), and others on parenting, marriage or deepening one’s faith. The organization also has distress counsellors available online or by phone, and accepts prayer requests. During 2002, Focus said their office took 14,000 prayer requests and 11,000 people attended their marriage seminar After Happily Ever After (Focus on the Family 2008a, 2008b). Lastly, Focus attends to “clergy care” with programs, seminars and an Albertan retreat centre to help ministers recharge and protect their marriages (Epp

2012). In short, Focus aims to support and guide evangelicals with a steady stream of media content that promotes Focus’ vision of evangelical values.

While Focus Canada is legally independent, it relies heavily on the American parent.

Focus stresses its independence from Focus USA as it receives no direct funding from the US office and has relied on Canadian contributions to pay for airtime and office staff, including the

IMFC (Jantz 2008).106 When a reporter uncovered that across four years, Focus had cumulatively received $1.6MM of services rendered (i.e. computer, telephone, etc.) from

Focus USA, President Terence Rolston ably countered these were small amounts relative to the budget (2005). However, this distracts from the real issue – what Focus USA provides is

105 Oddly, while the numerical drop for both the magazine and the radio program mirror the American parent’s struggles, the Canadian organization’s finances have been puzzlingly strong. Focus’ revenues show solid and robust growth until about 2004 and have only dropped slightly since, even though the audience size numbers Focus provided (above) showed significant declines. Indeed, Focus’s revenues puzzlingly do not correlate very well with either audience size or the travails of the American entity including Dobson’s retirement. 106 Focus’ revenues are 80-90% from contributions and the rest from sales and subscriptions (Canada Revenue Agency 2001-2016). 86 content. It produces the pivotal radio show, the magazine, resources sold on the Canadian website (e.g. educational DVDs, books), seminars, and some (though importantly, not all) of the web-based articles on political issues (Holman 2005; Focus USA 2003, 2011). Rolston maintains Focus Canada independently decides what to use from the American parent but this is only partly true (there are no other options for the radio show) and even where choice exists, the parent still establishes what the options are (Jantz 2008). And Focus USA’s interest in the Canadian organization is obvious as two of Focus Canada’s ten board members are executives from the Colorado offices including Focus USA CEO Jim Daly (Canada Revenue

Agency 2001-15). Focus is undoubtedly the major organizational influence of American evangelicalism on Canadian soil.

Political Activism

Focus has pursued political activism on several fronts especially since the late 1980s when the organization achieved sufficient heft to get involved. They initiated, in 1988, regular pro-family gatherings in the nation’s capital by organizing annual Ottawa conferences (Faith

Today 1990b). The 1990 conference had 90 attendees including 28 MPs whereas, by 1998, it had grown into a three-day event held in conjunction with the Christian Legal Fellowship

(Hoover 1997:71n66; Sclater 1998c). To supplement these efforts in the nation’s capital, Focus tried to form grassroots organizations by holding 80 “community impact” seminars in cities across the country during the early- to mid-90s. The full-day seminars aimed to create a national network of local political action groups that could mobilize on important issues (Focus

1999a). Although Focus occasionally reported examples of such activism, it appears the

87 strategy faltered and was suspended around 1998 before another, similar initiative was launched in 2000 (Sclater 2000). In 1989, the organization became involved in legal cases for the first time (two years after the EFC) and by 1999 they had established a separate legal fund for which they solicited donations until 2008 (Focus 1999b).107 Focus also keeps readers and listeners informed and galvanized about political issues. Concerns are raised in radio broadcasts, the flagship magazine, or other politically focussed publications such as the eight- page newsletter the Citizen which was published ten times a year from 1991 until 2001, and

Today’s Family News (now called Focus Insights) which has been an e-newsletter and a space on the website dedicated to social and political issues since the late 90s (Focus 1998b). Focus’s largest venture in political activism, however, was the IMFC.

The IMFC – Overview

In 2006, Focus altered the evangelical lobbying landscape by opening the Ottawa-based

Institute of Marriage and Family Canada (IMFC). Focus first spoke of establishing a family research institute in Ottawa during its inaugural 1988 conference in the nation’s capital and even interviewed potential leadership candidates at the time (Faith Today 1990). The American parent had shown the way by launching a similar outfit, the Family Research Council (FRC), in

Washington D.C. in 1981. However, introducing a Canadian version stalled until the arrival of

Darrel Reid. Reid left his position as Chief of Staff to Official Opposition Leader Preston

Manning to become Focus’s third president in 1998.108 He has a Ph.D. in history from Queen’s

107 This time period coincides with the debate on LGBTQ rights and same-sex marriage. 108 The first two presidents were Geoff Still (1986-1995) and Bruce Gordon (1995-1997) (Sclater 1998c; Dobson 1997; Focus 1999c). 88

University and brought greater political experience and connections than his predecessors.

Reid believed an Ottawa presence was vital to anyone wanting a voice in the national political discourse and began planning the IMFC, which officially opened in February 2006, a year and a half after Reid resigned (McDonald 2010:87-90).109

Reid chose Dave Quist to be the IMFC’s executive director. Although the IMFC positions itself as a research institute and “think tank,” Quist’s background speaks to politics rather than research. He has a Master’s in Public Administration from Queen’s University, served as a

Reform MP’s executive assistant for six years, ran unsuccessfully as a Conservative in the 2004 election, and spent a year as Stephen Harper’s Director of Operations when Harper was opposition leader (Dreher 2006; Gruending 2009b; Institute of Marriage and Family Canada

2012). The IMFC promoted itself as “very much non-partisan” and, according to Quist, delayed opening the doors until after the 2006 federal election to avoid looking like an extension of the

Conservatives (Stirk 2006). The non-partisan claim chafes against Reid’s and Quist’s deep ties to the Conservatives and a journalist at the IMFC’s opening gala noted Conservative cabinet heavyweights Jason Kenney and Stockwell Day attended along with 20 MPs (McDonald

2010:89).110 In addition, the IMFC had connections to many other conservative lobbies, to the

Manning Centre, and even shared the same building as the Conservative Party (and the EFC).

109 After leaving Focus, Reid ran for the Conservatives in the 2006 federal election but lost. Instead, he became the top aide to Conservative Environment Minister Rona Ambrose, then became Prime Minister Harper’s director of policy and later his deputy chief of staff before leaving in 2010 to become Executive Director of the Manning Centre, Canada’s premier political conservative think tank (founded by former Reform leader Preston Manning). Reid left the Manning Centre in June 2012 to become an executive at Royal Dutch Shell (Gruending 2009; Manning Centre 2012b). Terence Rolston, an internal promotion, succeeded Reid as Focus’ president and remains in the role to this day (Wood 2005). 110 The institute had one Liberal and one Conservative MP act as respondents to the main speaker. The Liberal MP was John McKay, a Baptist with good relations and deep connections with conservative Christian groups. When conservative Christian media shows, lobby groups, etc. need a Liberal voice, he is regularly sought after. At an 89

The other major figure at the IMFC was Andrea Mrozek. Mrozek joined the IMFC in its first year as Manager of Research and Communications and succeeded Quist as executive director in 2013.111 Mrozek combined polished writing skills, intellectual credibility, and right wing political chops as she has a Master’s degree in History from the University of Toronto, previously worked in journalism and corporate communications in Prague, Toronto, and at the right-leaning Canadian magazine The Western Standard, and also interned at the Fraser

Institute, Canada’s premier economic conservative think tank (Institute of Marriage and Family

Canada 2012; Cardus 2012). At its height, the IMFC had four professional full-time staff (Quist,

Mrozek and two researchers reporting to Mrozek), affiliations with two research fellows (one a

University of Calgary professor and one a retired statistician from Stats Canada), and occasionally partnered with a policy analysist named Rebecca Walberg on specific projects. In addition, the IMFC kept quiet about its relationship with a third research fellow, Glenn

Stanton. Stanton, a Focus USA executive based in Colorado, listed himself as an IMFC research fellow in his biography but his name never appeared in any IMFC materials or on the institute’s website, a matter to which I will return (Focus on the Family 2012b; Protect Marriage 2012). In terms of funding, McDonald revealed the IMFC received a $500K seed fund from two donors prior to launching but this small amount would not cover operational costs for long (2010:89).

The organization requested donations only sparingly and seemed to rely primarily on Focus to fund its budgetary needs. In 2016, Focus, likely responding to ongoing financial pressures,

evening celebrating the IMFC’s fifth year anniversary, McKay was again the only Liberal MP noted in attendance along with five Conservatives (including Jason Kenney) (IMFC 2011a). 111 Quist became a vice president at the Manning Centre at the same time that Reid left (seemingly assuming his role). The IMFC has thus always had good ties to the Manning Centre and their executives have been regular speakers and panellists at the Manning Centre’s annual conferences. 90 transferred the IMFC to Cardus, a Christian think tank, where the IMFC became Cardus Family.

Cardus is not an evangelical group and hence I only cover the IMFC’s tenure as part of Focus.

The IMFC – Political Involvement

The IMFC’s mission was to employ social science research to defend the traditional family and social conservatism. The Institute rested entirely on one premise, namely natural law.

Natural law is the teaching that certain moral laws are discernible simply from observing human nature and the natural world. These laws exist independently and prior to any positive law and – critically – can be deduced by using reason alone, making them independent of any religious commitment. Thus, while natural law has been adopted as Christian doctrine by many

Christians (especially socially conservative ones), these laws are theoretically available to anyone and justifiable as simply according with human well-being. Christians can read the will of God in such laws (i.e. they show God’s design and moral plan for us) but the evidence and conclusions will appear as simple human (or secular) truths to others.112 In this vein, the lobby conducted and disseminated social science, confident such research would uphold Christian positions on key issues. Quist reveals this logic to a Christian magazine, declaring that “The research, when it's good research, always stands up to a Christian worldview” (Storey 2009).

Natural law allows Christians to promote their views to non-Christians not as religious doctrine but simply as good social policy. While the Institute produced some original research

112 Natural law differs from Divine Law in that the latter comes directly from God via revelation and does not rely on human reason. For the Institute and the lobbies generally, natural law is relevant for achieving their political goals since social science and other analyses of human life should reveal these laws in ways valid for a pluralistic public. 91

(conducted alone or in partnership with others),113 it mostly aggregated and packaged others’ research as Mrozek and her staff read, digested and reported in accessible and well-written prose the take-aways from work done by other researchers, think tanks or organizations. Their main sources were a stable of prominent American researchers and spokespersons, thus revealing another place where the American evangelical community looms large. These individuals possess academic credentials and lead family-based think tanks, serving as knowledgeable experts who provide statistical data and other research to bolster the traditional family outlook.114 The research the IMFC put forward unfailingly advocated for the traditional family across numerous topics including fighting against criminalizing spanking, opposing a publicly funded national day-care system, pro-life, anti-euthanasia, using policy to strengthen marriages and discourage divorce, and lowering families’ tax burden. Less obvious topics like poverty and criminality were also addressed but solely through the lens of family breakdown.

However, despite the IMFC’s research emphasis, its raison d’être was not research but advocacy. As indicated by its senior staff (a political operative and a journalist), research was really the fuel for enabling its main function of informed advocacy. This advocacy targeted two main audiences. The first were consumers of their reports which included government officials, politicians, and other decision makers as well as subscribers to the IMFC. The Institute established relationships with MPs behind closed doors (recounted in the IMFC’s and Focus’

113 These in-house research reports tackled topics like estimating the financial costs to Canadians of family breakdown, the negative effects of cohabitation, and a study on children’s mental health. 114 Key figures include Maggie Gallagher, Kay Hymowitz, Mark Regnerus, Bradford Wilcox and Jennifer Roback Morse. These individuals generally support one another’s work. The IMFC had all five of these people as guest speakers at their conferences, cited their research and had some of them write articles for the IMFC magazine. 92 promotional literature) and presented at parliamentary committees including on criminalizing spanking, child care, and age of sexual consent (Storey 2009). They also became a resource for supportive politicians, journalists, etc. by providing research backed arguments for socially conservative stances. For the first three years, the Institute publicized their findings in the quarterly IMFC Review, which included magazine length articles on topical issues written by staff and invited contributors. In 2008, the expensive magazine format of the Review was replaced by more frequent and inexpensive e-Reviews, biweekly email blogs to members reporting on research from abroad, summarizing the IMFC’s own work, providing book reviews and recommendations, commenting on topical political issues, and frequently challenging the research or advocacy statements of opposing positions (e.g. either challenging opponents’ basic arguments or delving into details around methodology and sample sizes). The e-Reviews were a unique offering for Canada’s social conservatives, combining evidence-based discipline with the IMFC staff’s political-journalistic roots to create pithy 700-1100 word blogs that compellingly blended data and footnotes with wit and satire. The Institute also held conferences, replacing Focus’ earlier Ottawa conferences. The IMFC held the event annually from 2006 through to 2011 (excluding 2008). Starting in 2009, the conferences coincided with the Manning Centre’s yearly conference which is the premier gathering for Canada’s political conservatives. The conferences were day-long affairs featuring politicians, researchers or think tank leaders from Canada, the United States and other Western nations. The 2009 conference I attended had a peak attendance of approximately 120 for the plenary talk of former British

Conservative Party leader Iain Duncan Smith.115 Several in attendance belonged to other

115 The lobbies do not hold many public events, rather they produce public discourses through the media and via electronic mediums. Hence, my study focusses on these materials and is not ethnographic. However, there are 93 evangelical or conservative lobby groups including John Williamson of the Canadian Taxpayers

Federation (who spoke at the event),116 CFAC’s Brian Rushfeldt, and Preston Manning, the aforementioned founder of the Reform party and the Manning Centre. As mentioned, Quist or

Mrozek regularly spoke at the Manning Centre’s conference. At the one I witnessed, Quist linked economic and social conservatism, a shortened version of which appeared in the

National Post (Quist 2009a).117 However, in 2012, the IMFC stopped holding a conference and instead sponsored a plenary talk at the Manning conference and sent Mrozek as an annual speaker at the event.118 Overall, the institute provided social conservatives with a treasure trove of intellectual, research-based arguments that had no parallel in Canada.

Whereas the first part of the IMFC’s work targeted insiders (i.e. providing research to fellow social conservatives), the second part aimed outward, targeting the media and the public. The Institute rarely appeared on Christian shows or networks, focussing instead on the mainstream media. The IMFC faced a formidable obstacle here for, in Canada, an evangelical outfit risks being dismissed by much of the public whereby even social science claims may seem tainted and biased by a theological agenda. To sidestep this problem, the IMFC did something extraordinary. The institute essentially hid its Christian identity and that it was an office of Focus. Any casual visitor to the IMFC webpage found no ties to Focus or Christianity

some rare exceptions including the IMFC’s annual conferences, the IMFC annual appearances at the Manning Conferences and McVety held a few events at his college in Toronto. I attended one IMFC annual conference, one Manning conference and two events at McVety’s school. 116 A few months after this conference, Williamson would become Stephen Harper’s Director of Communications. Williamson also has connections to the Manning Centre and the Fraser Institute and became a Conservative MP. 117 Quist’s talk shed insight into the dynamics of the political right as Quist was one of five on a panel presenting different views of conservatism. While economic conservatism was shared by all five panellists, the IMFC’s social conservatism had both advocates and challengers, most notable among the latter being two libertarian panellists (Karen Selick and journalist Terence Corcoran). 118 Further demonstrating the IMFC’s links to the Manning Centre, the IMFC was one of five institutes the Manning Centre chose where the winner of a student competition could elect to intern at (Manning 2012b). 94 mentioned anywhere. With effort, I found two fairly obscure webpages on the IMFC’s site that mentioned Focus but these were hard to locate.119 The IMFC did acknowledge they were “an initiative of Focus on the Family Canada” in their inaugural IMFC Review (2005:4) and in media stories announcing the 2006 launch. But after the launch, the link to Focus disappears. If you know of the connection and intentionally go looking for it, you can find, via the internet, reports referencing it. But anyone innocently visiting the website and, more importantly, the many readers, listeners and viewers of their TV, radio and newspaper pieces were completely unaware of the connection.120 Above I noted the IMFC website omitted mentioning Glenn

Stanton, the Focus USA executive, whose own biography said he was a research fellow directing a “major research project” at the institute (Stanton 2012; see also Stanton 2010b).

The IMFC listed its two other research fellows but hid Stanton surely to further conceal the connections to Focus and to Christianity. The two junior researchers had theological degrees at

Christian colleges but other than parsing the biographies of second level staff, the IMFC’s

Christian motives are simply absent. With Christian media, the IMFC openly discussed their

“Christian world view” and its Focus ties but with other media, the IMFC’s secular persona proved very effective as the links to Focus and Christianity were unacknowledged and unreported by journalists (e.g. Storey 2009, 2012; Jantz 2008; Schultz 2006; Stirk 2006).121

119 Interestingly, at the IMFC’s five year anniversary celebration, Terence Rolston, President of Focus on the Family was invited to speak and while the IMFC posted his talk on youtube, the page on the IMFC website commemorating the event did not show Rolston’s talk although there were videos of seemingly all the other speakers (seven besides Rolston) (IMFC 2011a, 2011b). 120 Surely many Ottawa politicians knew who backed the IMFC but the cloaking seemed aimed at the IMFC’s media engagement strategy where the institute could promote its findings without the audience knowing about the IMFC’s Christian motivations and commitments. 121 A blogger at the Vancouver Sun’s website discovered these omissions and criticized the lack of transparency. The Sun’s religion reporter, Douglas Todd, also questioned whether the IMFC’s approach was ethical (Skelton 2010; Todd 2010). 95

Listeners simply encountered a family research institute discussing social science, with no notions of Christian mission.

This approach proved very successful as the Institute generated far more media attention than any other evangelical lobby.122 Focus claimed the institute tallied 324 “media hits” in 2007 and over 400 in 2009 (a “hit” includes op-eds, interviews, or being quoted or cited) (Focus

2008c; Quist 2009b). Sun News Network’s advent in 2011 dramatically increased their TV presence, especially on Byline with Brian Lilley, one of Sun News’ more popular talk shows. But their exposure was also broad. Using 2012 as an example, the IMFC appeared on all three of the major TV newscasts (CTV, Global, CBC) plus Sun News, did many radio interviews including on CBC radio’s popular national program, The Current, and wrote articles or were quoted by numerous newspapers including both national publications (IMFC 2012b). While some coverage stemmed from media interest in the IMFC’s own research, more commonly the IMFC responded to issues that cropped up in the news cycle. While all four of the professional staff appeared in the media, Mrozek appeared by far the most. Mrozek and the other staff drew on research they had previously digested on the topic and a familiarity with key talking points to give a well-argued position in a timely manner. Mrozek’s journalistic savvy, her grasp of the research, and the secular nature of her arguments provided a unique voice espousing social

122 Just looking at newspapers, in the five years starting January 1, 2007, the IMFC had 290 mentions in Canadian papers whereas the EFC, the next most prominent organization, had 209 mentions, almost a 40% gap (source: Factiva database). The gap is even greater if one considers the quality of the exposure as the IMFC frequently contributes op ed articles. In 2007, the EFC had 35 mentions, which were of three types – either the organization was named by the journalist, an executive was quoted, or the EFC wrote a short letter to the editor, usually protesting something the paper had published. The IMFC had 47 mentions (a third more than the EFC) and included nine op ed articles in major newspapers like the National Post or the Ottawa Citizen where the IMFC could outline its whole position on issues like daycare, income splitting for families, abortion or spanking. I do not have equivalent data on other forms of media, but the gap was even larger in terms of appearances on mainstream television or radio outlets. 96 conservative positions. Overall, the IMFC thus had a dual purpose: i) to provide sympathetic politicians and decision makers research to back their views and; ii) to engage in a mainstream media campaign to help sway public opinion by providing social science research from a seemingly secular institute. On this second task, the IMFC is completely unique in pulling this off and in being crafted specifically to do so.

Lastly, like its parent, the IMFC downplayed its American links. When an interviewer asked Quist and Reid about replicating Focus USA’s Family Research Council (FRC), both leaders denied the connection, pointing instead to the Canadian-based Fraser Institute as the true model for their efforts (McDonald 2010:88-89). Quist added he had never met Dobson and that his bosses were in Vancouver and not Colorado (ibid.). But Quist omitted many connections including: one of his two researchers had attended Focus’ Leadership Institute in

Colorado; an IMFC conference speaker had been a long-serving executive at the FRC; the relationship with the aforementioned Stanton; and, of course, that while the IMFC is not controlled by any American office, the Institute stemmed from Dobson’s dream, paralleled the

FRC in conception and basic goals, and was a project of Focus Canada that owes its business model, much research, and indeed its very existence to American entities (Focus USA 2010,

2012; IMFC 2012; Heritage Foundation 2012; Marshall 2012). Admittedly, many Canadian organizations have been influenced by American models, but the links here are deeper (i.e. the direct tie to Focus USA) and are also intriguing because of evangelicalism’s unique role in defining the national identity of both countries (i.e. helping define what America is, and constituting a part of what many Canadians say their country is not). As such, American

97 influence is particularly toxic for evangelical legitimacy in Canada and explains why connections with Focus USA were downplayed.

Summing up Focus & the IMFC

Hoover’s aforementioned survey of leaders of Canadian Christian advocacy groups showed that Focus and the EFC were “hub” organizations that connected with most other groups (1997:72). Interestingly, despite Focus’s budget advantages over the EFC, Hoover’s mid-

1990s study showed the EFC was more prominent. In 2000, Stackhouse wrote that EFC

President Brian Stiller was better known than Focus’s personnel and much more prominent in the media (2000:118). However, for over a decade, Focus’s strength flourished as it grew in size (even relative to the EFC)123 and established the IMFC, giving Focus a noticeable parliament hill presence and unquestionably the most frequently cited (if unrecognized) media voice among evangelical lobbies. Since the IMFC’s departure, Focus’s voice again seems quieter. Although it is possible the IMFC will mark a highwater point for evangelical media engagement, Dobson’s Canadian foray has unquestionably given Canadian evangelicals much greater organizational capacities than they would otherwise have had.

123 In 1997, EFC had a $3.5MM budget, roughly half of the $7-8MM figures provided earlier for Focus’ 1996 and 1998 budgets. But by 2011, Focus’ $11.4MM budget tripled the EFC budget (unmoved at $3.6MM). The gap has narrowed however as in 2016, the EFC was still at $3.6MM whereas Focus had declined to $9.9MM (Focus 2006, 2011, 2016; EFC 2001-2016). 98

Canada Family Action Coalition

Overview

CFAC was borne of prairie populism, founded in Calgary by Brian Rushfeldt and Roy

Beyer in 1997. Beyer, an Albertan, attained a diploma from a Saskatchewan Bible college before serving as a Pentecostal pastor and board member for Victory Churches of Canada

International (Beyer 2012a; Geddes and Kar 2000). He took correspondence courses from

Charles McVety’s Canada Christian College (CCC) in the mid-1990s – McVety later awarded him an honorary doctorate degree – before co-founding CFAC as its first president (Beyer 2012b;

McDonald 2010:69). Rushfeldt spent fifteen years as an air traffic controller before studying social work at the University of Calgary and working as an addictions counsellor for the next decade. He then became a Pentecostal pastor in the same denomination as Beyer and Dean of

Victory Bible College in Calgary, acquired a Master’s in Theology by correspondence from

McVety’s CCC in 1996, and finally co-found CFAC as its executive director (Rushfeldt 2012b;

Heinrichs nd; Geddes and Kar 2000). Rushfeldt also has an honorary doctorate, likely from

McVety’s CCC.124 Joining Beyer and Rushfeldt was Peter Stock in Ottawa who became CFAC’s

National Affairs Director. Stock has a geology degree from the University of Toronto and a mining background but, more importantly, brought political connections and experience from having served as legislative assistant to Reform MP Ed Harper (Moore 2002).125 McVety was the last key founding figure. McVety is president of the 1,100 student CCC, a Toronto-based

124 I cannot confirm where Rushfeldt got his degree but McVety frequently gives out honorary doctorates to Christian leaders (e.g. T.D. Jakes, Franklin Graham, John Hagee). Some of these degrees are doctorate in law degrees which is what Rushfeldt holds and also what CCC awarded Beyer (Beyer 2012b, Canada Christian College 2012b; Rushfeldt 2012b). 125 Stock’s biography lists him as a co-founder of CFAC but most sources point only to Rushfeldt and Beyer. For an example of the former, see Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2004 and for the latter see Heinrichs nd. 99 school his father founded, and was a founding board member (Canada Christian College 2012a;

Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage 2006).

Rushfeldt and Beyer say two government actions provoked them into creating CFAC:

1996 federal legislation granting new rights to homosexuals (bill C-33); and a 1997 Canadian

Radio and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) decision rejecting four different Christian

TV channel applications (including one involving Beyer) while granting a channel to Playboy

Television (Focus 1999; Geddes and Kar 2000; Heinrichs nd; Family Action Radio 2009). Fearing the country’s moral foundations were under attack and that ordinary Christians had to act, they strove to create a “grassroots” organization to get Christians involved by “running as a candidate, working on a campaign, phoning or…voting” (Heinrichs nd; see also CFAC 1997b).

The Alberta-based Rushfeldt and Beyer fit the prairie populist mould personified by Aberhardt and the Mannings as they championed the commoner against the elites, fused economic and social conservatism, and employed grassroots tactics. Since tax rules restrict charities from politics, the two founders opted to not make CFAC a charity (unlike the EFC, Focus and the

IMFC), thus preserving complete freedom to undertake political advocacy. Indirect American influence is evident as Rushfeldt and Beyer visited Christian Coalition leader Ralph Reed to seek his advice on building a successful grassroots political organization and later implemented some of his tactics

CFAC’s early moves were shrewd. They launched a petition drive denouncing the CRTC decision which put this under-the-radar bureaucratic ruling onto the political map. Twenty-six different MPs presented the petitions in parliament and spoke on the issue. They tasted success as the CRTC reversed course and approved the first major Christian television station

100

(Crossroads Television) after having rejected 14 of the 15 applications submitted since religious broadcasting became legal in 1993 (Family Action Radio 2009; CFAC 2001b; Stirk nd). CFAC’s profile also grew from their deft response to an Alberta provincial election call. CFAC created report cards that graded politicians according to conservative values and mailed 90,000 of these free guides to households. The tool, borrowed from Reed, immediately garnered attention, media interviews, and credibility for the fledgling organization. In the federal election later that same year, CFAC mailed out half a million such guides (Family Action Radio

2009; Heinrichs nd).

Rushfeldt initially dreamed of establishing local CFAC chapters in every riding to mimic the mobilization machine Reed had created south of the border. By 1998, chapters existed in four cities and the organization claimed 10,000 members and a modest $80,000 annual budget that paid for three staff, Rushfeldt, an administrator (his wife), and Stock (Heinrichs nd). By

2001, CFAC had chapters in over twenty-five cities126 but the number plateaued thereafter and eventually declined. Rushfeldt’s riding-by-riding organization never materialized and although remnant chapters could be unearthed by a diligent internet search, by 2012 CFAC’s website no longer promoted forming chapters nor linked to any that remained (CFAC 2001b; CFAC

2012).127 Despite this disappointment, CFAC’s stated membership numbers grew, reaching

35,000 by 2007, 41,000 by 2008 and 45,000 by 2009 (CFAC 2007a, 2008c; Rushfeldt and

126 Chapters existed across English Canada but were concentrated in the West. In 2001, three chapters were in the Maritimes, zero in Quebec, six in Ontario and sixteen in the Western provinces. The provinces with the most were British Columbia (seven) and Alberta (six). 127 Recall that Focus similarly failed at two attempts to create a national system of local groups. This kind of organization yields little fruit in Canada’s parliamentary system because so little power resides at the local level, with decision making centralized at the province and federal level. Alternatively, one might aspire to sway a local MP but the custom of party loyalty (as well as the party leader’s power over the MPs) means the party leader and their inner circle of advisors make all decisions. Organizing locally will do little to affect this. 101

Rushfeldt 2009). By 2007, CFAC also boasted an email list of 200,000 and 250,000 annual visitors to their website (CFAC 2007a). CFAC relies on this kind of electronic communication with members since the organization holds no annual events, has no physical presence, and failed to establish the chapter organization it originally envisioned. CFAC does not reveal their financials but they have always been lean and Rushfeldt divulged that 90% of their funding comes from small donations (McDonald 2010:70). The organization’s membership base is older as Rushfeldt, in 2009, described CFAC’s “typical supporter[s]” as people with “mature children” or who are “perhaps grandparents” (Family Action Radio 2009). This aging membership resonates with another study that found CFAC’s frequent ally and closest peer, the conservative Christian group REAL Women, has an older membership base and a similar dynamic exists on the American Religious Right (Blakely 2008:107-8; National Public Radio

2010; Kazin 2012). CFAC looks weaker in recent years (more on this below) and is likely experiencing declines in membership and finances.

CFAC’s personnel has varied over the years, with Rushfeldt being the most consistent presence (as executive director) until his departure in 2014. Beyer left the organization to help with Stockwell Day’s leadership candidacy for the Canadian Alliance Party (more on this later), then returned to CFAC until leaving amicably in 2003. McVety then became president but as a part-time role as he continued running his college (the CCC) in Toronto. McVety remained president until 2011 when he became board chairman and Rushfeldt added the president role to his executive director duties (CFAC 2003a; CFAC 2012). Stock left in 2004 after his third unsuccessful election campaign, having lost while representing the Reform Party in 1997, the

Canadian Alliance in 2000, and the Conservative Party in 2004 (Canadian Broadcasting

102

Corporation 2004).128 In 2009, Nathan Cooper joined as assistant to the president, appearing with Rushfeldt at press conferences, and spearheading both a CFAC internet radio program and a Youtube series featuring Rushfeldt, although both projects withered.129 With its tight budget, CFAC has had minimal office space, starting in Rushfeldt’s basement before moving to a two room office in a Calgary strip mall (Rushfeldt and Rushfeldt 2009; McDonald 2010:67;

CFAC 2008b, 2010a). In 2014, Rushfeldt retired and leadership passed to Doug Sharpe, a former executive assistant to Stockwell Day. Sharpe acts as executive director and now runs

CFAC out of a strip mall in Penticton, British Columbia.

Political Involvement

CFAC acts on three fronts. First, they try to shape policy by engaging much more deeply than the other lobbies in party politics. CFAC officially espouses non-partisanship but the evidence contradicts this (Stock 1999; CFAC 2012; Rushfeldt 2009). Having examined approximately 700 CFAC items (e.g. emails, web postings, flyers, speeches, articles, media interviews, advertisements), I have never found a single positive comment about the NDP or its

MPs and only very rare pieces compliment a Liberal MP or acknowledge “a good number” of

Liberal MPs are “concerned about family issues” (Heinrichs nd). CFAC routinely favours the

128 Stock’s losses reflect the Reform Party’s struggles to expand beyond its Western roots. The parties Stock represented won respectively zero, two and twenty-four seats out of Ontario’s approximately 100 ridings in these three elections. 129 Neither venture appeared successful. The radio program produced twenty-five episodes over a twelve month period before ending in February 2010. The YouTube postings ran from August 2011 until December 2011 and had low viewer counts between 50 and 300 as of September 2012 (CFAC 2011d). The videos have since been taken down. 103

Conservatives, condemns the Liberals, and ignores the NDP.130 More importantly, freed from charitable restrictions, CFAC and its staff have been extensively involved with the

Conservatives including campaign work, running as candidates, and establishing ties to the party elite. We learned above about Stock’s involvement (running in three elections) and how

Beyer left CFAC to work for Stockwell Day’s Alliance leadership campaign. Beyer’s Families for

Day campaign registered around six thousand new party members which media reports suggest helped Day secure the party leadership (Geddes and Kar 2000; Heinrichs 2000;

Callaway 2002). Beyer remained on Day’s team for the federal election where Day lost badly and was mocked for his conservative religious beliefs.131 McVety also backed Day by signing up new party members through his college (Heinrichs 2000), later supported Jim Flaherty’s132 unsuccessful 2002 bid for the Ontario Progressive Conservative leadership (Mackey 2003), and backed Doug Ford’s successful bid for the same office in 2018. This persistent involvement bred connections. When McVety brought Ralph Reed to Toronto, Flaherty was one of five

Conservative candidates who attended despite an election underway (Flaherty became

Canada’s new finance minister only weeks later). That May, Flaherty delivered his first budget with McVety as his guest in the House of Commons’ VIP gallery (Gruending 2008b). Journalist

Marci McDonald (2010:71) claims Rushfeldt came to know Stephen Harper when Harper ran

130 CFAC will criticize the Conservative Party for waffling on conservative principles but in any comparative commentary and especially at election time, the preference is not subtle with articles titled “Prime Minister Stephen Harper: A Great Vision for Canadian Leadership” or, alternatively, “No Separation of Church and State in ‘Liberal Land’” (CFAC 2004f, 2006g). 131 A report surfaced that Day had stated at church that the world was 6,000 years old. Day’s refusal to address the allegations lent credence to the claim and attracted significant media attention. One Liberal aide appeared on CBC television with a Barney dinosaur and mockingly joked that the Flintstones were not a documentary (Clark and Mahoney 2000). That Day’s religious beliefs were made public by others and used to discredit him in the media is one of a number of episodes over the past twenty years often retold by conservative Christians that illustrate to them the discrimination or even contempt they face in Canada. 132 Flaherty is a conservative Catholic but the lobbies align with all social conservatives. Jason Kenney is another socially conservative Catholic with ties to the lobbies. 104 the National Citizens Coalition in Calgary and CFAC used photos of Rushfeldt and Harper together in its publications (see CFAC 2007a, 2012 as examples). The lobby also knows former cabinet minister and Harper insider Jason Kenney who spoke at CFAC’s 1998 faith and politics forum, later worked alongside Beyer on Day’s team, and attended McVety’s 2012 pro-Israel event (CFAC nd; Christians United for Israel - Canada 2012). Flaherty, Kenney and Day were probably Prime Minister Harper’s three highest profile cabinet members and CFAC, despite its small size, had ties to them all.

However, CFAC does not just support conservative parties, they seek to mould them.

CFAC resolutely opposes centrist and moderate voices including denunciations against centrist

Conservatives like Belinda Stronach, Gerald Keddy, and Garth Turner, the latter engaging in a public spat with McVety (Ben-Ami 2006; Coren 2009; Hueglin 2004; O’Malley 2005; CFAC

2006i). McVety flexed some muscle by successfully mobilizing enough supporters to replace a moderate Conservative candidate in Toronto with Rondo Thomas, a vice-president of McVety’s college (Thomas lost the 2006 election to the Liberal candidate) (Gruending 2008b; Turner

2006; Arron 2006). Similarly, CFAC signed up members and delegates to the 2005 federal

Conservative Party convention to fight a motion suggesting the party relent on same-sex marriage. CFAC used revealing language about stopping the “hostile takeover” of “our party”

(McVety 2004, italics added; see also O’Malley 2005). When the Conservatives veer from social conservatism CFAC has published MPs’ votes on certain issues, warned that social conservative voters will stay home at election time (CFAC 2006i), and written editorials on their website against “Red Tories,” of a “dangerous crack” emerging between fiscal and social conservatives, or saying that social conservatives are “beginning to heartily detest the Conservative Party”

105

(CFAC 2008c, Hueglin 2004).133 The lobby less consistently enters provincial politics (likely due to limited resources) except in Alberta and Ontario where they are physically located and have tried to influence leadership campaigns (McDonald 2010:69-70). Aside from provincial jurisdiction over education, most matters (e.g. abortion, euthanasia, gay rights, pornography laws, etc.) are settled federally, including selecting Supreme Court justices. Versus the other lobbies, CFAC stands out for its vigorous party engagement - trying to get Conservatives elected, cultivating relationships with key party operatives, and even shaping the party by backing social conservatives and opposing centrists.

A second way CFAC tries to shape public policy is via the state apparatus. CFAC cannot afford costly court interventions (as the EFC and Focus have done) so it focuses mostly on parliamentary committees. As early as 1999, CFAC appeared before one parliamentary committee on an immigration bill that would redefine the term “spouse,” and another looking at child care and how the tax code affects families (Standing Committee on Finance 1999;

Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration 1999). Other presentations include

Rushfeldt’s 2003 parliamentary committee appearance on same-sex marriage, McVety’s 2004

Senate presentation on hate crime legislation around sexual orientation, and Rushfeldt’s 2011 speech before a committee examining paedophilia (Standing Committee on Justice and Human

Rights 2003, 2011; Senate of Canada 2004). The lobby also authors briefing papers including on child pornography in 2009 (presented to two Conservative cabinet members) and another on family income splitting in 2011 (presented to Finance Minister Jim Flaherty). Although courts

133 Rushfeldt’s belief that abandoning social conservatism hurt the Conservatives at the polls counters conventional wisdom. Most commentators believe Harper’s downplaying of social conservatism was strategically shrewd and helped him finally win a majority in 2011. 106 are too expensive, CFAC still comments on legal matters and derides judicial activism, filing a complaint to the Canadian Judicial Council against Supreme Court Justice Beverley McLachlin, and often urging readers to use lawsuits to challenge policies.134 CFAC did join one case with

Focus and REAL Women to appeal the Halpern case legalizing same-sex marriage in Ontario

(reflecting the case’s importance and perhaps the ability to share costs with allies). (CFAC

2003c).

CFAC’s third and last effort to shape public policy focuses on mobilizing populist political pressure. Versus the other lobbies, CFAC embraces populism more, galvanizing

Christians via the most sensational issues or angles, and using public reaction and media attention to pressure politicians. CFAC’s early success was via populist tactics – namely the voter guides and the CRTC petition. CFAC has created other petitions, including one with

700,000 signatures calling for harsher rules on child pornography, which CFAC says the Library of Parliament called “one of the largest petition campaigns in Canadian history” (Rushfeldt and

Rushfeldt 2009). The petition was part of a decade-long populist campaign on child pornography including brochures, specially dedicated websites and newspaper ads – though the campaign ultimately failed when a 2011 bill on the matter was defeated. CFAC has run other multi-year campaigns including raising the age of consent (a success as the government raised the age of consent from 14 to 16 in 2008), toughening laws on paedophilia, and opposing same-sex marriage. For same-sex marriage, CFAC’s populist approach included 1.2 million brochures, 500,000 postcards, 5,000 lawn signs, advertising in newspapers and on billboards, spearheading a coalition of like-minded groups, and touring the country in a brightly

134 The complaint against McLachlin alleged that she violated procedures when awarding the Order of Canada to abortion activist Henry Morgentaler. The complaint was dismissed (Smith 2008). 107 painted “Defend Marriage” bus that garnered press and local interviews (CFAC 2007b).

Sometimes CFAC employs populist tools the EFC and Focus do not, such as rallies and boycotts.

On gay rights, CFAC held rallies numbering in the thousands in several major cities culminating with a one-day cross-nation rally with Christians praying in front of the riding offices of most

Canadian MPs.135 In 2005, CFAC initiated boycotts against the Royal Bank for asking all employees to display pink triangles in support of GLBT persons (which CFAC felt unfairly pressured and perhaps ostracized Christian staff) and against Famous Players Theatre for allowing a pro-same-sex-marriage commercial at its theatres. The bank later withdrew the program (and apologized to CFAC (CFAC 2017)) and Famous decided thereafter to decline ads on advocacy issues although both organizations said these changes were not due to the boycotts (CTV 2005; CFAC 2005g). To encourage such activism, CFAC has utilized a steady stream of information via website postings, emails, flyers, and its Call to Action newsletters.

Some of CFAC’s communications advocate a worldview, some urges action (e.g. phone an MP, sign a petition), and some educate on how to get politicians’ ears, how to report abuses to regulatory bodies, and how small numbers in party politics can shift important matters like who represents a riding. In terms of issues, CFAC focuses on three key areas: i) defending religious freedom (i.e. from the courts, legislation, and other government bodies like the CRTC

135 CFAC claimed 100,000 participants covered 220 of Canada’s 301 ridings although the numbers may be exaggerated. CFAC’s own press release right after the 2003 rally claimed “approximately 100,000” with a couple of ridings over 1,000 participants and others at 300. However, one local London organization reported the city’s three ridings averaged only about 90 people each. Overall, these numbers do not gel as getting to 100,000 requires an average per riding of 450. Estimates also grew over time. By 2007, CFAC claimed “well over 120,000,” attended with a high of 2,500 in Halifax and many other ridings with more than 1,000. By 2009, CFAC claimed the rally had “over 140,000.” The lack of consistency in the numbers is worrisome because most other numerical estimates about CFAC (such as their membership base or web traffic) rely on CFAC’s own claims (Rushfledt and McVety 2003; CFAC 2007a; Rushfeldt and Rushfeldt 2009) 108 and the Human Rights Commissions),136 ii) opposing certain forms of sex and its consequences

(e.g. age of consent laws, homosexuality, pedophilia, abortion, pornography), and iii) defending populism and democracy against liberal elites’ perceived control of the media, the courts, the schools, etc. These issues matter to all the lobbies but are noticeably more prominent in CFAC materials. CFAC’s populism has extended to trying to mobilize conservative churches during elections by sending out church bulletin inserts, offering sample sermon outlines, encouraging distributing CFAC’s voter report cards at Sunday services, and preparing guides for pastors on keeping congregants informed and likely to vote without jeopardizing their charitable status (CFAC 2004d). In sum, CFAC has been the most grassroots oriented of the lobbies by employing petitions, rallies, and consumer boycotts, often pursuing goals in long multi-year campaigns.

One aspect of CFAC warranting special mention is Charles McVety’s role. Although

Rushfeldt has been a more constant presence, McVety garners more attention via his controversial, outspoken nature and knack for publicity. It was McVety, for example, who chartered the “Defend Marriage” bus and toured the country in it. He also brought major

American personalities to Toronto to speak including Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, Karl Rove and

Glenn Beck, attracting both media attention and prominent conservative politicians. McVety has a taste for the sensational and skillfully capitalizes on political opportunities such as when he criticized taxpayer funding for controversial art productions (e.g. movies like Young People

Fucking, Masturbators, and another CFAC felt verged on child pornography as well as a musical album called Holy Shit – The Poo Testament featuring a Christ image made of excrement)

136 The Human Rights Commissions are government bodies (both federal and provincial) that administer the human rights codes including adjudicating disputes using special tribunals. 109

(CFAC 2011b, 2011c). In 2010, McVety single-handedly created a public stir about Ontario’s new sex-ed curriculum, charging that explicit information and immoral values were being pushed on young children. Once McVety raised the issue, media stories multiplied and public backlash mounted until the McGuinty government had to recall the curriculum (CFAC 2010b;

CBC News 2010). McVety also spawns both real organizations and virtual fronts. He and CFAC frequently set up campaign-specific websites (e.g. consentage.ca on raising the age of consent; defendmarriage.ca and sanctityofmarriage.ca to fight same-sex marriage; and several on paedophilia, child pornography and sex education including stopcorruptingchildren.ca, childsafenation.ca, stoppedophiles.ca and findapedophile.com137). Beyond websites, McVety has created numerous entities including The Canadian Times (a Christian news website), Word

TV (his television program which was cancelled in 2011), Christians United for Israel – Canada

(CUFI), and the Institute for Canadian Values (ICV), the latter launched to great fanfare in 2005 with a $250,000 seed donation and a banquet featuring Reed as keynote speaker (McDonald

2010:81). Which hat McVety is wearing at a given time (whether for Canada Christian College, the ICV, CFAC, etc.) is often unclear and can seem opportunistic138 and somewhat arbitrary as the ICV, The Canadian Times, Word TV, and CUFI have all shared the CCC’s address and phone

137 CFAC’s Findapedophile.com site (since renamed stoppedophiles.ca) includes the names, photos (where possible) and information on the crimes committed of those previously convicted of paedophilia. The announcement of the new site in February 2012 garnered attention from the national media including the National Post, Quebecor’s Sun newspapers, and both Global and CTV on television (stoppedophiles.ca 2012). 138 When Rushfeldt was present, McVety tended to represent one of his other entities which allows their voices to represent two organizations. Thus, McVety and Rushfeldt both appeared at a parliamentary committee hearing in 2006 with McVety representing Canada Christian College and Rushfeldt listed as CFAC. Hence, even though McVety was president of CFAC, both he and Rushfeldt had a chance to speak (Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage 2006). Rushfeldt and McVety also held a joint press conference together representing different organizations in 2003 and the media dutifully counted this as two groups joining together to take a stand (Cheadle 2003). The request for Justice Beverley McLachlin to be disciplined was particularly instructive in this regard as it listed 42 organizations as signatories but this included four organizations that McVety represented, plus multiple local CFAC chapters, as well as other examples of number padding including listing several companies owned by one person (Bird 2008). 110 number. During McVety’s stint as CFAC’s President, his actions seem integrated with CFAC’s and hence, I include his political advocacy work during these years as part of CFAC since an organizational name was not always provided and when provided, seemed to reflect tactics more than substance. Overall, McVety has been an effective lead for CFAC’s populist ambitions.

CFAC’s grassroots emphasis and relatively smaller size means it has frequently partnered with other Christian groups, particularly Focus and REAL Women (its closest ideological peers). Together, these three organizations appealed the Ontario case legalizing same-sex marriage, joined with the Home School Legal Defense Fund in 1998 to form the

Canadian Family Tax Coalition (CFAC 1998), and also joined the EFC and others for a 2005 national prayer weekend during the same-sex marriage debate (CFAC 2005g).139 CFAC also allies with Catholics, including Calgary’s outspoken Bishop Fred Henry and to oppose the

Ontario government’s decision to force publicly funded Catholic schools to accept gay-straight alliance clubs despite church doctrine (Geddes and Kar 2000; Leslie 2012; CFAC 2005f). On same-sex marriage, CFAC led the mixed Christian Defense of Marriage Coalition (Defend

Marriage Coalition 2006). CFAC readily allies with Jews to defend Israel.140 McVety is executive director of CUFI, giving speeches and holding events towards this end,141 and hired Fred

Dimant, former executive vice-president of B’Nai Brith, to work at McVety’s college (Dimant calls McVety the “leading friendly Christian voice” to Israel in Canada (Word TV 2011)).142

139 This national prayer weekend is distinct from the cross-nation rally described earlier (these were different events occurring in different years). 140 CFAC’s explicit pro-Israel stance is unique among the lobbies. The EFC, Focus and the IMFC do not address the matter (although Dobson’s radio broadcasts occasionally affirmed a pro-Israel sentiment). 141 In June of 2012, McVety held a Stand with Israel benefit featuring Glenn Beck and Jason Kenney with an audience of 3,000 (Canadians for a United Israel - Canada 2012). 142 Dimant also has an honorary doctorate from McVety’s school (B’Nai Brith Canada 2012). 111

When I attended Karl Rove’s and Ralph Reed’s talks at CCC, Israeli flags were prominent as were booths promoting trips to the Holy Land though neither event even remotely addressed

Israel. McVety also chose orthodox Jewish activist Joseph Ben-Ami to originally lead the ICV although the arrangement fell apart.143 Very rarely, CFAC has reached beyond Jews and

Christians, collaborating with Sikhs to oppose gay friendly materials in some British Columbia primary schools (late 1990s) and holding a 2009 press conference with a liberal Muslim group to oppose legalizing polygamy (Geddes and Kar 2000; Ivison 2009).144 In short, CFAC is a small player that has hit above its weight and compensates for its small size by spawning numerous organizations and by partnering with other conservative religionists, especially its close allies at

REAL Women and Focus.

CFAC was birthed in Alberta145 and evokes the prairie populism of Aberhart and Ernest

Manning. The lobby champions the commoner against the elites, sees economic and social conservatism as inextricably linked, and uses grassroots tactics to make its voice heard. A small organization with a restricted budget, it failed on gay rights and same-sex marriage, but found success in campaigns against child pornography, CRTC restrictions, raising the age of consent,146 ending the court challenges program (discussed in chapter one), and significantly

143 Ben Ami was operations director for Stockwell Day and worked for Harper after Harper took over the party leadership. Ben-Ami left the ICV after a year which McDonald (2010:83-85) attributes to disputes with McVety over money as McVety controlled the institute’s funds. 144 The polygamy press conference was another instance where McVety and Rushfeldt both appeared representing different organizations and were counted as such by the media (though McVety was CFAC’s president at the time) (e.g. Ivison 2009). 145 Ontarians (i.e. Peter Stock and Charles McVety) have also played important roles but are clearly sympathetic to prairie populism given their support and work for Reform and the Canadian Alliance even when these parties were unpopular in central Canada. 146 Age of consent refers to how old someone must be to legally consent to sex with someone older than 18. The law in Canada was previously 14, which CFAC said allowed pedophiles to target 14 year olds. CFAC’s multiyear campaign, begun in 2001, included over 500,000 brochures and collected 75,000 signatures. The EFC and others supported this cause and in 2007, the Conservatives raised the legal age to 16 (CFAC 2006d). 112 delayed changes to Ontario’s sex education curriculum. Through populism, media savvy and close ties to the Conservative Party – connecting with the party but also pressuring it – CFAC is the voice of uncompromising social conservative principles.

Conclusion

Canada’s three major evangelical lobbies pursue their policy goals with quite varied tactics. The EFC demonstrates a Tory impulse, led by lawyers and political theorists whose insider strategy means they engage with the courts and parliament through their Ottawa office. Focus, also recognizing the value of insider work, hired executives with elite

Conservative ties and opened its own Ottawa office (the IMFC). Recognizing the need to reach beyond evangelical circles on public policy matters (and that evangelicals faced credibility challenges in doing so), the lobby made an ends-justifying-the-means decision to hide the

IMFC’s Christian motives and identity. The secular-looking institute could present social science arguments free of religious associations and could aggressively seek out media engagements with a former journalist as its most public face. Lastly, CFAC is the most grassroots organization, mobilizing supporters via rallies, boycotts and petitions. The lobby is also unique for its deep involvement with the Conservative Party. Notably, both CFAC and Focus tried to create local riding-by-riding chapter organizations but this kind of activism never took root. The political opportunity structure discourages such community organizing since local officials (and voters) have less power in Canada (versus the USA), being unable to change school curriculum, select judges for the courts, or otherwise significantly influence policy. Even swaying the local

MP is difficult as the party leader dominates Canada’s parliamentary system and MPs almost

113 never veer from the leader’s program. Hence, the lobbies have focussed more on getting the desired party elected, influencing the governing and judicial elite, and trying to win public support.

While this chapter emphasized each lobby’s distinctiveness, they are members of the same species. Cumulatively representing the spectrum of Canadian evangelical lobbying they nonetheless espouse very similar policy objectives from gay rights to euthanasia to income splitting for couples. They draw on similar conceptual tools like natural law, the sanctity of life, and the heterosexual married family as the foundation for a healthy society. They also levy similar criticisms against secularism, the marginalization of religious voices in public discourse, and a corrosive individualism they believe threatens society by favouring selfishness and hedonism. On rare occasions, the lobbies have briefly criticized each other for leading the flock astray but have more often partnered together to pursue goals. In the next chapter, we will explore another similarity – the shared context and the challenges they face in confronting

Canadian secularism and its parliamentary democracy.

114

Chapter 3 – The Power of the Canadian State

Political theorists spend much energy trying to sort out the tension between the reach of a liberal democratic state and the place of religion. Part of this tension arises because both can be ambitious systems.147 The liberal state has maximum scope with power over every citizen, although ideally limiting the depth of its impact by granting space for individual agency.

Religions can have uncertain scope, relevant only to adherents (though some aspire to reach an entire society), but can sometimes aim for a pervasive impact that guides all aspects of a person’s life. Such ambitious religions can quickly butt up against the liberal state’s considerable power. The theoretical solution seems clear – the liberal state is intended to protect freedom, thus granting religionists the space required to live as they choose. The problem, however, is in practice, where conservative religionists often do not experience the state as liberating, encountering instead what feels like a powerful marginalizing force. The problems for conservative religionists seem threefold: i) that the liberal state undermines the religionists’ way of life, partly by privileging of autonomy and individualism; ii) that religionists cannot enter the public sphere authentically, instead having to adopt a secular idiom that requires they set aside their most deeply held commitments, a unique pressure not faced by feminists, environmentalists, or other activists; and iii) that their main rivals advocate for liberalism – notably the social justice issues described as “New Liberalism” in the introduction

– meaning that liberalism, in varied forms, is both rival and referee, an ideology they contest but that simultaneously establishes the rules structuring the public sphere. While this poses a

147 Addressing religion’s ambitiousness, religion scholar Naomi Goldenberg calls religion a “vestigial state,” meaning a “once and future state” that is the liberal secular state’s rival, seeking as much sovereignty as it can acquire (2013). I address Goldenberg’s claim in chapter seven. 115 practical problem for conservative religionists, it poses a legitimacy problem for liberal governance since the liberal state’s justification is its supposed fairness, by maximizing liberty for all and granting the space for personal agency – the very things many religious critics say they are denied.

Liberal theorists have struggled to reconcile these issues. Most theorists agree that the liberal state aims towards some kind of neutrality. Thus, noted scholar Jürgen Habermas says the state must exercise “neutrality towards competing world views” (2006:9). John Rawls, the most influential political theorist of the past half century, similarly notes a “common theme of liberal thought is that the state must try to be neutral” (1988:260). Andrew Koppleman, a scholar of law and political science, states especially clearly that “Any liberalizing argument will be an argument for some kind of neutrality” (2014:1244). Exactly what kind of neutrality and how it fits with simultaneously affirming liberal political values is a tricky problem. Political philosopher Glen Newey suggests that theorists generally pursue one of two paths to address this issue, each generating its own critique (2001). In the first path, philosophers frame liberalism as a “meta-ideology” that sits above other ideologies, thus granting a position of neutrality. This framing opens liberalism to the charge of being relativistic and morally vacuous. Multicultural questions loom large here such as whether a liberalism so conceived can condemn clitoridectomy or any other cultural practice. The second path posits a thicker liberalism that condemns certain practices or stances. This approach, however, turns liberalism into a “ground-level ideology” like all others, sacrificing its privileged position and compromising any claim to fairness. This angle deprives liberalism of its justification and reduces conflicts into straight power plays between rival worldviews. Simplifying, the two

116 approaches depict liberalism as either neutral and vacuous or principled but partisan. Newey’s description is apt and indeed, one often finds liberal philosophers struggling with these two poles, tacking back and forth as they assert values on the one hand while maintaining some form of impartiality on the other. Rawls tries to achieve this by distinguishing political liberalism, which he defines as merely political values, from “comprehensive doctrines” which includes religious and philosophical systems that go beyond political values (1988:252-3, 2005).

Rawls acknowledges that liberalism can be a comprehensive doctrine – one he associates with individualism and autonomy as per Mills and Kant – but he separates it from the political liberalism he calls for. Per Newey, Rawls’ solution is to create two liberalisms – political liberalism as the overarching umbrella and comprehensive liberalism as one of the contending doctrines within that umbrella (1988:252-254). Even if we grant Rawls his distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism, his argument for political liberalism concedes much.

Where some theorists claim liberal politics is procedurally neutral, Rawls acknowledges that this is not really true, since political values contain substantive values. This seemingly calls into question the umbrella’s fairness which Rawls appears to confirm when he grants that political liberalism is not neutral in effect, instead inevitably favouring some comprehensive doctrines over others. Most tellingly, he even allows that children schooled in liberal political values will likely be more inclined to accept liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine (ibid.:261-7). Needless to say, if the space granted non-liberals is such that the system is oriented to pull your children away from your own values, it will not likely seem fair nor reasonable to such citizens.

Habermas follows Rawls’ path, “decoupling” the thinner political culture from the thicker majority culture so that the political culture, itself liberal, once again is said to grant room for plural conceptions under its canopy (1995:852). Political science scholar Chantal Mouffe takes 117 a stronger stance. She largely dismisses any idea of liberal neutrality and argues that the liberal state carries substantive values and must defend them. It can be – indeed, must be – agnostic only on any religious claims that do not challenge those values (2006:324-5). I think Mouffe may describe the situation best but the dismissing of neutrality, the partisanship of liberalism that she affirms, gets at the heart of the problem for conservative religionists. Cumulatively then, we see that liberal theorists themselves acknowledge that liberal democracy impacts the success and viability of certain forms of religiosity. Conservative religionists have watched religiosity in all Western nations decline massively in recent decades and they feel and often declare the liberal state to indeed be oppressive, rejecting any rhetoric concerning the state’s protection of liberty or its supposed fairmindedness or impartiality.

In this chapter, I wish to examine how this theoretical quandary plays out by examining some of the impacts the liberal secular state has on Canada’s evangelicals and the social conservatism they favour. To do this, I will first examine the doctrines of liberal tolerance and multiculturalism that underlie the generous space that Rawls avers and which are quite central to Anglo-Canadian identity. Drawing legal and political theorists, I argue that tolerance and multiculturalism convey substantive liberal values that reveal liberalism’s power. They perform dual duties, creating space for a certain degree of pluralism irrelevant to liberal dominance while simultaneously quashing any diversity that might challenge liberalism, thus partly fitting the descriptions by Rawls and Mouffe above. Hence, while these values are often portrayed as solutions to managing cultural conflict, we will see how they can contribute to cultural conflict by asserting liberal dominance while ostensibly simply ensuring room for all. With this theoretical background in mind, we will then examine at a more practical level how the lobbies

118 experience the state. Here, we will detail how the Canadian state enacts a liberal agenda, overwhelmingly espousing liberal values ensconced in the Charter, upheld by courts, and carried out via legislation and myriad government bodies. This methodical and data heavy analysis will occupy the bulk of the chapter and its comprehensiveness provides a foundation for the analysis in following chapters. Third, I want to sow some seeds I will return to in later chapters. For now, I ask the reader throughout this chapter to consider how the state’s actions produce what I call an affective overflow. That is to say, the state does not simply set rules, for its combined powers to legislate, adjudicate, and educate also shift sentiments of just and unjust, and define national identity as well as pivotal social concepts like marriage, family and religion. Cumulatively, these powers can affect our notions of fairness, intimacy, pleasure and disgust. In later chapters I will return to these powers to argue that the state invariably crafts subjectivity by shaping the way we think and feel.

Whereas the prior and following chapters delineate differences between the lobbies, this chapter covers their shared criticisms of the state. The criticisms have enormous overlap which I demonstrate by citing the perspectives of the EFC, Focus and CFAC. The IMFC appears only briefly in this chapter as the lobbies’ main complaints concern religious freedom where the IMFC, true to its secular persona, rarely wades in, leaving this task to its parent (Focus) instead. The similarities among the lobbies shows that while they take different paths, they confront the same challenges from the Canadian state.

119

Tolerance, Multiculturalism and the Liberal Secular State

A fundamental capacity of the state is its monopoly in setting law. Canadian legal theorist Benjamin Berger observes that much political and legal theory treats law in liberal democracies as an adjudicator of cultural conflicts (2008:246-7). In this understanding, law – the combined apparatus of constitutional documents, legislation, accumulated case law, and the courts – acts as a referee of multiculturalism in Western countries, purportedly solving social quarrels fairly. Berger contends however that this approach masks law’s ideological nature. He posits that law is less cultural adjudicator and more cultural player, never neutral but laden with values that, in Canada, are liberal and secular. However, positioned as a referee, the legal apparatus can uniquely hold its liberal and secular values above the fray, immune to criticism. Canadian Catholic legal scholar Iain Benson concurs, arguing that secularism is a kind of implicit faith, a metaphysics that, by being unacknowledged, puts explicit faiths at a disadvantage since the latter appear parochial where the former becomes general or universal (2000:521). Benson highlights how this plays out in Canadian law. As one example, he cites a Supreme Court case on pornography where the judgement claimed that it is inappropriate for law to “advance a particular conception of morality,” but later said that it is legitimate to base decisions on “some fundamental conception of morality” (ibid.:525). Benson countered that the Court’s “fundamental conception” would, of necessity, be some kind of

“particular conception” – the very thing the Court had deemed inadmissible (ibid.:526). This, again, recalls the tacking back and forth Newey highlighted, what Benson deems the

“incoherence of modern justice.” (ibid.). Thus, Benson’s view supports Berger’s claim that law simultaneously assumes a position above culture while actually actively propagating culture by

120 imposing liberal values onto claimants and communities holding other norms.148 Tolerance discourses can thus sideline real difference while insisting that groups simply get along, including accommodating to the existing political system and the reigning hegemonic values.149

And of course, what is never tolerated is any substantial challenge to the dominance of liberal values – such a challenge will be deemed intolerable and outside of the law. Put differently, liberalism itself is never one of the cultures captured by the term multiculturalism. The term’s currency owes something to what Newey described, liberalism’s positioning as somewhat of an umbrella or uber-culture sitting above the rest.150 Armed with this perspective, Berger

(ibid.:246) contends that when law confronts conservative religiosity – via court cases or in legislation/law making – it is a cross-cultural encounter.151 Law is not a referee but a partisan.152 However, the structure of this encounter does not facilitate exchange and mutual learning but rather one party simply decides the outcome. Liberal law, he adds, has much at stake in these interactions and works to protect its ground (ibid.:247).153 There are appeals to supposed universals like “reason” and “freedom” but as I show in chapter six, these concepts

148 Legal and religious scholar Winnifred Sullivan also critiques the Western tendency to see law as "autonomous, universal, and transparent" (2005:153). 149 Political theorist Wendy Brown reveals how tolerance language can moralize conflict itself while obscuring causes (2008:118, 127). Such language elevates political quietism whereby those benefitting from the status quo (i.e. wants “peace”) become good (tolerant, thinking, civilized) while those fighting the status quo (i.e. causing conflict) become bad (intolerant, unthinking, uncivilized). As such, Brown posits tolerance discourses can hide power by privileging "reasonableness. 150 Echoing Newey, Brown elaborates that Western democracies often perceive liberalism as simultaneously the apex of culture and yet universal and above culture (2008:21). 151 Some scholars describe religion as liberalism’s other including Sherwood (2015), Sullivan (2005:155) and Salomon & Walton (2012). 152 Berger's text somewhat reifies "law" which I reproduce here in fidelity to his arguments. What he references, however, is how both agents (lawyers, judges, legislators) and systemic variables (constitution, Charter, existing case law) cumulatively enact and promote liberal values. 153 Berger acknowledges courts do occasionally rule in religionists’ favour (e.g. striking down laws or chastising the state) but only when specific legislation or actors are seen to have violated secular liberal principles. Those liberal secular principles are themselves never subject to evaluation (2008:249). 121 actually have parochial and contextual variations. The courts do not merely preserve freedom, they define it in liberal ways, and hence their judgements enact liberal power while dismissing rival conceptions.154

Indeed, the courts' power extends to defining “religion” itself. Berger traces how

Canada's highest courts have defined "religion" according to liberal and secular principles, classifying it as private rather than public, individual rather than communal, and an arena for choice and autonomy (2007; see also Seljak 2016:557-560; Benson 2012:21). He stresses that these views have been imposed whether or not they fit a specific tradition’s doctrines or adherents' views. Thus, Berger maintains law not only settles cultural disputes in liberals' favour, but is “epistemologically colonial,” establishing the very categories available for groups’ self-conception (ibid.:312). In so doing, the law “kills other normative arrangements”

(ibid.:312), leading American scholar Robert Cover to describe law as “jurispathic,” (cited in

Berger ibid.:312). Berger’s portrait gives background for understanding why the lobbies find the state aggressive and threatening rather than fair and tolerant.

Below, we look in detail at how the lobbies encounter the Canadian state. The following analysis is topically thorough, exploring interactions on the legal front (e.g. the Charter, the courts, human rights commissions), the legislative front (i.e. parliament), an array of other state bodies (e.g. broadcasting regulator, the Court Challenges Program, the CBC, grant

154 In a somewhat similar vein, Craig Calhoun cites Eduardo Mendieta’s claim that religion exposes a tension for liberals between seeing reason as a universal standard versus a historically and socially bound activity (2011:87). If liberal reasoning is a universal method, then the liberal freedom it supports becomes equally universal. Such views prevent opportunities to understand rival positions more thoroughly. 122 funding bodies, etc.), and concluding with the ever-important education file run by provincial governments.

The Charter

The foundation of the Canadian state apparatus is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

As described earlier, the text’s importance is difficult to overstate: it has strengthened the courts, bolstered individualism and rights discourse, ensconced “multiculturalism” as a

Canadian value, and has itself become a core symbol of Canadian identity. Despite the

Charter’s popularity in Canada, the lobbies are less enamored. For CFAC, the Charter overall has “ironically” caused “an actual loss in personal freedom” by increasing judicial power and restricting religious freedom (Stirk 1997, emphasis in original). On CFAC’s website Rushfeldt coaches readers not to “worship the Charter” for while the earlier BNA Act was “for people’s power, the Charter of Rights is for state control” (CFAC 2003c; Rushfeldt 2001). To reinforce

Rushfeldt’s contention that the Charter erodes democratic power, CFAC republishes articles from a coterie of sympathetic journalists who declare “out-of-control judges” are using the

Charter to create a “juridical dictatorship” (Leishman, 2002), of making themselves into

“Platonic philosopher kings” who trump the will of the people (Morton 2003; for the same metaphor, see also “Goodbye Voting, Hello Plato” by Robson 2003). The EFC shares CFAC’s dissatisfaction. On the Charter’s 25th anniversary, legal counsel Don Hutchinson, writing in the

EFC’s Faith Today magazine, claimed the Charter was “instrumental in altering the social fabric of Canadian society” as “the balance shifted to individual rights” and away from “societal rights” (2007).155 He said the new text became a “sword to slash through our laws in order to

155 Hutchinson’s claim that the Charter favours the individual over society may seem to counter CFAC’s claim that the Charter favours the state over the people (i.e. Hutchinson claims power for the “individual” but CFAC suggests 123 impose change on long-held societal values” (ibid.). In the same issue, Hutchison’s predecessor

Janet Epp Buckingham lamented that “prior to 1982 Parliament was supreme” but the transfer of power to courts and judges has given “many evangelical Christians….hesitation and concern about the Charter” (Buckingham 2007). Focus executives strike similar notes. In a 2001 interview with Focus USA’s magazine (discussing how Canadian precedents threaten

Americans’ laws), Focus President Darrel Reid opined "Since the Charter came in, we’ve seen a huge shift in influence from our legislatures and elected representatives to the courts," while

Focus’ political action coordinator, Jim Sclater, added "The Charter gives our liberal thinkers, politicians and activists something that can literally trump our laws" (Jewell 2001). To the lobbies, the Charter is the decisive undemocratic tool for undermining aspects of the social order they cherish. By prioritizing individual rights over social norms, they see the Charter altering our very notions of justice.

Courts

As evident above, the lobbies’ Charter concerns lead to worries over judges and courts, where their criticism is actually harsher and more consistent. The lobbies portray judges as activists who intentionally veer far from the written law. An infamous example they cite is when courts “read in” sexual orientation to the Charter and to Canadian human rights codes

the “people” are denied). This is a misreading however. For the lobbies, CFAC’s “people” equates to Hutchinson’s “society.” The lobbies regularly portray community or the social (i.e. “society” or the “people”) as organic and natural and threatened by a state-driven hyper-individualism. This binary pitting the state-plus-individual against organic social structures is further explored in chapter five. For now, CFAC’s state-trumps-the-people claim refers to a statist process whereby hyper-individualized rights emerge not due to democratic will but from the courts and human rights commissions (i.e. unelected state officials). Hutchinson’s individual-over-society describes the statist outcome whereby hyper-individualistic selfishness erodes the social glue and fosters family and societal breakdown, in turn necessitating statist solutions (e.g. welfare). 124 thus declaring it a prohibited ground of discrimination even though it had been deliberately left out by the documents’ drafters (Hurley 2005, 2007).156 The courts’ capacity to reshape these texts astounded CFAC leaders who wondered “Why is it that…judges can change our

Constitution when it is almost impossible for citizens to do so?” (CFAC 2006a). McVety claims that “judicial lawmaking is antithetical to democracy” (McVety 2010) and a “dictate [from] the bench” (McVety 2005b). CFAC reprinted newspaper columns on its website that called gay rights “judge-made law from start to finish,” which undermines Canadian democracy since “it’s the courts that impose all crucial laws” (Morton 2003; Leishman 2003).157 EFC’s President

Bruce Clemenger is more measured but espouses similar sentiments in a National Post op-ed on the Supreme Court’s decision to legalize swingers’ clubs (which advertise group sex). The

Court overruled existing decency laws, claiming they impose value judgements on individuals whereas laws should only consider questions of harm. Clemenger retorts that the judges are making their own value judgement in striking down the law – which, he says, they acknowledge in their write-up of the decision – and remarks that "It seems the court would rather have judges engage in value judgments than trying to discern the values of Canadians”

(Clemenger 2005e).158 He asks party leaders to take action to show they believe parliaments and voters should have a say (ibid.). CFAC took particular umbrage at Supreme Court Justice

Beverly McLachlin’s controversial 2005 speech in which she suggested judges must apply

156 The most important cases on this front were the 1990s decisions in Haig v. Canada, Egan v. Canada and Vriend v. Alberta. 157 Recall from chapter one that scholars such as Miriam Smith, J. Scott Matthews and Jason Pierceson also believe Canadian courts were vital in making Canada a world leader in advancing gay rights. This is not to suggest these scholars would concur fully with the statements above but provides context for understanding the claims of CFAC and their journalistic allies. 158 This judgement perfectly captures the technique of claiming not to impose values (i.e. neutrality) while of course imposing values nonetheless (here prioritizing autonomy and freedom). 125

“‘unwritten constitutional principles,’” when written constitutions are lacking (McVety 2010, emphasis added). Hence, she concluded, the “‘lawmaking role of the judge has expanded dramatically’” (ibid.). The speech sparked much criticism in the national press about what an

“unwritten” constitutional principle was and the enormous power this concept granted to judges.159 To the lobbies, McLachlin’s speech nakedly reveals how judges are not impartial arbiters but liberal agents pushing their own views rather than applying the law.

Equally frustrating for the lobbies is that what they value most in the Charter goes unused. For example, the Charter includes a very unusual “notwithstanding clause” allowing legislatures to override certain provisions of the document.160 However, the clause has been very rarely used despite the lobbies and many conservative allies begging parliaments to invoke it to override court decisions on same-sex marriage, child pornography and, if necessary, against polygamy (Focus 2002a; CFAC 2009d; CFAC 2005e).161 The lobbies also value the Charter’s preamble which declares “Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of law,” but they claim this preamble is unfairly ignored and given no weight. A British Columbia judge supported this view, labelling the preamble a “dead letter” only the Supreme Court could breathe life into and prompting Sclater to call on Focus members to pray (Sclater 1999). The EFC – whose own President Brian Stiller pressured Pierre

159 Examples of the criticism can be found in Canada’s two national newspapers (Gibson 2005; National Post 2005). 160 American-born academic Melissa Williams relates that some scholars consider the clause as “Canada’s most distinctive contribution to constitutionalism” (2000:217). The clause allows legislatures to override key sections of the Charter thus giving potentially exceptional power to governments (CBC 2005). There are limits as certain rights cannot be overridden, and any override expires automatically in five years and thus must be perpetually renewed. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau opposed the clause but the provincial premiers demanded it to protect against the document usurping what they considered provincial prerogatives. 161 Until recently, the notwithstanding clause was almost never used but in 2018 and 2019 governments in Ontario and Quebec respectively used the clause though neither instance was for social conservative issues. 126

Trudeau to include the preamble – repeatedly cites the preamble in its court and parliamentary submissions (e.g. EFC 1990, 2000, 2001b, 2008a).162 However, neither the preamble nor the notwithstanding clause have profited the lobbies, as the notwithstanding clause remains the third rail of Canadian politics163 and the preamble has not fostered substantial judicial victories. Thus, though the lobbies believe the Charter is flawed, judges – by reading in ideas not written, and making a dead letter of ideas that are written – exacerbate the problem immensely. Hence, McVety and Rushfeldt held a press conference calling on

Prime Minister Harper to appoint “strict constructionist” judges, and CFAC has also backed

REAL Women’s demand that judges be elected (McVety and Rushfeldt 2010; Landolt 2011).164

The EFC and Focus also decry judicial bias without explicitly calling for elected judges. The IMFC was quieter on these issues but occasionally urged parliament to act before an “unelected, unaccountable judge” set precedent, and chastised the Supreme Court for “hubris” and

“overstepping bounds” when it ruled Quebec parents could not exempt their children from religion classes they objected to (IMFC 2012c; Quist 2011). In short, to the lobbies, courts are not neutral arbiters but powerful actors promulgating a liberal agenda while bypassing the democratic will of the people.

162 EFC submissions in more recent years do not mention the preamble, perhaps reflecting a realization that citing it does little good. 163 This likely reflects the popularity of the Charter and, to a lesser extent, the Supreme Court. Overriding these would likely prove politically detrimental and perhaps especially so if done by the Conservatives on the lobbies’ socially conservative issues. 164 REAL Women is a frequent ally of CFAC mentioned in chapter two. They are a long-standing player in Canada discussed a few times in this chapter. I have not made them central to my study as they do not diverge significantly from CFAC and are a less influential group. 127

Human Rights Commissions

Despite the lobbies’ criticisms of the courts, they are even more frustrated by the human rights commissions (HRCs). The HRCs are special oversight and judicial bodies at both federal and provincial levels that enforce compliance with federal or provincial human rights codes. While the HRCs are intended to provide ease of redress for people whose rights are violated (i.e. without having to deal with a full court process), the lobbies and many on the political right see the HRCs as an unjust liberal tool. Liberal because they promote a Charter- inspired rights agenda that often undermines traditional notions of the common good. Unjust because the lobbies believe the HRCs unduly favour the complainant by employing a lower standard for evidence (i.e. permitting evidence not admissible in court) and by providing free legal services to complainants but not to defendants (thus facilitating a risk-free accusation process). Several HRC cases are infamous among the lobbies and the political right generally and are worth recapping to understand the lobbies’ perspectives.

One of the most frequently cited cases concerns Scott Brockie. Brockie owned a printing business in Toronto and declined a print job for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay

Archives. He willingly served gay customers but declined to print pro-gay materials contravening his faith. When the Archives brought charges against him to the Ontario HRC,

Brockie was ordered to pay $5,000, apologize in writing, and never again refuse such work. He appealed to the regular courts which dropped the written apology and acknowledged he could refuse some work, though it upheld the fine and forced him to fill the letterhead and stationary job as the court deemed these materials inoffensive (Gunter 2002). Christian lobbies

128 say he sustained $170,000 in legal fees and eight years in court (Christiangovernance.ca 2010).

Some Christian and mainstream media outlets claim Brockie was targeted as Toronto has innumerable printers (ibid.; Gunter 2002). Whether true or not, this perception contributes to

Christian activists’ sense of persecution, especially since Brockie was not an aggressor or protester but merely a Christian quietly operating his private business.

A second well known case involves British Columbia (B.C.) school teacher Chris

Kempling. Kempling wrote a letter to his local newspaper that criticized teaching acceptance of homosexuality in schools to very young children (primary and kindergarten kids) and argued that, at minimum, parents should be informed. The B.C. College of Teachers disciplined

Kempling, which inflamed conservative Christian groups particularly because Kempling had acted on his own time in his role as a private citizen. The College barred Kempling from speaking on the matter publicly (even in his private time), disciplining him again after he granted an interview to the CBC. When the College spokesperson publicly supported homosexuality, Rushfeldt decried the “hypocritical” stance of arguing that “‘citizens who happen to be teachers by profession are not permitted to publicly express their beliefs or opinions,” while “the college echelon can express theirs?” (CFAC 2003b). While the lobbies vehemently oppose the HRCs, in an unusual twist, this incidence features a conservative

Christian (Kempling) appealing to the B.C. HRC for relief. However, Kempling lost his case, reinforcing to many Christians the commissions’ bias and he later lost his appeal in the regular courts. After writing further articles against gay marriage, he was suspended by the College without pay for a month and eventually left the public system to teach at a Christian private school (ibid.; ECP Centre 2005a). Kempling is an ominous example for evangelicals as merely

129 stating his views in a public forum (an act central to democracy) threatened his employment and income. On its website, CFAC was left pondering: “what about policemen, or health care workers or even politicians…can they speak their views?” (CFAC 2003b).

While Brockie and Kempling are probably the two most cited cases, others have also garnered attention. These include: marriage commissioner Orville Nichols fined $2,500 for not performing a same-sex wedding (though he provided the name of another commissioner who would); a Knights of Columbus Hall fined for not renting their space to a lesbian couple; a

Prince Edward Island couple forced to shut down their bed and breakfast business for refusing two gay customers; and a British Columbia city councillor fined and forced to publicly apologize for private remarks that homosexuality was “not natural” (Coren 2007; see also Galloway

2005; CFAC 2005b; CBC 2009). Hence, while the HRCs ostensibly help the marginalized, the lobbies believe they facilitate marginalization by making it too easy to target ordinary people who must either cave in or invest substantial time and money to defend themselves. CFAC calls the HRCs “the best tools for bullying” since they only require that something “‘indicates discrimination’” or “‘is likely to expose to hatred or contempt’” (CFAC 2007c, emphasis in original). On their website, CFAC declares “Canadian human rights commissions have proven themselves a greater danger to human rights than any other government entity” (Parker

2001). The EFC likewise says the commissions “have been twisted into weapons directed toward those who disagree or disapprove” (CFPL Blog 2011). To fight these decisions, the EFC intervened in the Brockie case and in the well-known Hugh Owens case165 as part of the

165 Hugh Owens placed an ad in the Saskatoon newspaper citing Bible verses that condemn homosexuality and showed a pictograph of two stick men holding hands with a superimposed red circle and diagonal slash (the symbol for forbidding something). The provincial HRC condemned Owens and ordered he pay $1,500 to each of three complainants. The EFC did not condone Owens’ actions but was deeply concerned the judgment 130

Canadian Religious Freedom Alliance, a partnership between the EFC, the Christian Legal

Fellowship and the Catholic Civil Rights League (Canadian Religious Freedom Alliance 2001; EFC

2006a). The EFC has referenced the cases above in their government presentations to show that religious freedom is threatened (EFC 2003c). Focus (2003) similarly cited three of these cases in its glossy 33-page booklet “Marriage and Homosexuality: A Christian Response” under a section called “Religious Freedom at Risk,” hoping to mobilize constituents to take political action (e.g. voting, writing MPs, etc.). The HRCs wield substantial power as Christians have sometimes actually lost employment (e.g. Chris Kempling). All three lobbies note that whereas early LGBTQ rights claims focused on employment discrimination, the advance of LGBTQ rights often now jeopardizes Christians’ employment (CFAC 2004a, 2004b; Paddey 2011; Stirk 2000).

Cumulatively, these cases lead the lobbies to believe the HRCs threaten Christians’ very freedom to work, to state their views, and to act out their conscience.

Parliaments

The lobbies’ aversion to courts and HRCs means they prefer parliamentary debates where they hope for democratic accountability. However, they lament when liberal parliamentarians provide tools for supposedly activist courts. A substantial concern for the lobbies over the past twenty years has been hate speech legislation aiming to protect sexual orientation, but which the lobbies feel often infringes on religious liberty. Hence, in

condemned a Christian for pointing to biblical injunctions (CFAC and Focus expressed concern as well). However, Owens appealed to the courts and won final victory at the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal (EFC 2006a). Another Christian, Stephen Boisson, was similarly fined for using the Bible to condemn gays by a provincial HRC (this time in Alberta) but was exonerated by the courts (Bloedow 2009). In both cases, the courts ultimately defended religious freedom but they highlight the lobbies’ concerns with the HRCs and possibly a growing willingness to target the Bible itself. 131 submissions to the justice minister (Clemenger 2002) and the Senate (EFC 2004), the EFC stated that while it abhors all hatred, the legislation’s ambiguous language combined with prior court decisions raised the question of whether legitimate disagreement could be expressed at all.166 The EFC claimed previous court judgements had “fused” the “behaviour and identity of gays and lesbians” so that “a moral critique of behaviour is interpreted as a moral critique of the person” (ibid.). The lobby feared that adding sexual orientation to the human rights acts (as done by bill C-250) might make any critique of homosexuality “judged to be promoting hatred” towards persons (ibid.). The EFC’s submission included anecdotes of prominent spokespersons already making hate accusations including: a senator who accused the bill’s opponents of giving “comfort to those who hate” and using “faith to mask hatred;” the American director of the Human Rights Campaign, who said anyone advocating reparative therapy for gays was “hateful;” a leading Canadian pro-same-sex marriage site that described the Vatican as “where the hate is;” and hate allegations made against an MP who objected to same-sex marriage (ibid.). The lobby also warned the bill’s wording cast too wide a net, ensnaring not only those advocating violence but others whose language might be judged to cause unintended “incitement” (ibid.). EFC lawyer Janet Epp Buckingham felt the bill might cause the Bible to be condemned, noting the dangerous precedent in the Hugh Owens case

(Senate 2004). CFAC’s Charles McVety also addressed the Senate on the same bill, echoing the concerns about the expanding definition of hate.167 CFAC’s Rushfeldt summarizes these

166 Similarly, the EFC worried a 2018 anti-discrimination bill referencing Islamophobia would curtail the free speech right to critique Islam. The EFC’s submission advocated addressing “anti-Muslim” hatred rather than referencing Islam (EFC 2017c). The lobbies consistently fear freedom of expression is in danger for those veering from liberal orthodoxy. 167 The final bill did provide an exception for religious opinions expressed “in good faith” although the lobbies claimed the term was ambiguous. 132 concerns in his critique of a Quebec government definition of homophobia that referenced

“feelings of aversion” (CFAC 2007). Since the state cannot access feelings, Rushfeldt claims defining hate this way (i.e. beyond violent acts) risks creating “thought police” and “feeling police,” which are the true “intolerant at work” (ibid.). In short, the lobbies prefer parliamentary democracy and the will of the people over courts, but oppose parliaments providing further tools to activist judges.

Other Government Bodies

The lobbies’ concern over free speech also stems from interactions with other government bodies. Perhaps most notably, the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) warned the EFC and the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops before the 2004 federal election not to take stands on election issues and “specifically on same-sex marriage” or risk losing their charitable designation (CFAC 2004c). At a parliamentary hearing, Focus revealed they too had

“difficulties” with the CRA owing to their traditional marriage campaign (Parliament of Canada

2005). CFAC claimed it smacked of “totalitarianism” and “the old Communist regime” (CFAC

2004c). In fairness, Canadian charities are restricted from political advocacy but CFAC countered that the CRA “did not apply these supposed rules…to at least one church/denomination who came out strongly supporting homosexual marriage during the election,” namely the United Church of Canada (ibid., emphasis added). A year later, CFAC reported that a leaked Liberal party memo advised using the CRA to “silence” McVety by

133 having the agency warn him that his political activism threatened his college’s charitable status

(CFAC 2005h).168

The lobbies have also had persistent problems with the Canadian Radio and

Telecommunications Commission (CRTC). As detailed in chapter two, the CRTC prevented single faith media channels for most of the twentieth century. The reasons for this policy morphed over time – in the late 1920s, some incendiary religious programs caused a public backlash whereas by the 1950s, the policy stemmed from a physical lack of available licences which would have meant granting licences to some groups and not others. By the 1980s, the justification shifted to a belief that single faith channels would lack balance. Multiculturalism here does not facilitate a diverse minority evangelical view but prevents it. Facing accusations of being anti-religious, the commission proposed that a multifaith channel would fit the balance requirements and hence a licence was granted to Vision TV in 1987. But criticism continued until the Broadcasting Act was amended in 1991 to allow single faith licences.

Despite this regulatory change, the results were still meagre – the CRTC granted only one licence in the ensuing years to a small local broadcaster in Lethbridge, Alberta in 1993 while rejecting fifteen other applicants on grounds of not being balanced enough (i.e. providing a wide variety of religious views). The EFC condemned this “censorship and blatant bigotry”

(Nelles 1996). Some frustrated Christians bought broadcasting equipment and illegally rebroadcasted American programs. EFC’s Faith Today remarked that:

168 Recall that CFAC was specifically not set up as a charity so it could engage in political activism with no restrictions. The threat here is thus made against McVety’s college. 134

In the past six months, Soviet officials (not known for their tolerance of religion)

have issued broadcast permits to Radio Blagovjest (Good News), a Catholic

station, Christian Liberty Broadcasting Network, an evangelical television station,

and Christian Television Radio Network, run by Canadian Hannu Haukka. During

the same period in Canada (known for its tolerance to all faiths), Christian-only

broadcasters received “cease and desist” orders from the country’s broadcast

regulator on threat of fines or court action. In the past, the body has also rejected

religious radio applications. What’s wrong with this picture? (Meed 1992a)

Besides denying licences for stations, the CRTC also threatened individual religious programs like 100 Huntley Street. Facing CRTC pressure on abortion, the show reluctantly “toned down its pro-life statements on the air in order to ‘present a more balanced view’” even though many evangelicals are fervently pro-life (Faith Today Staff, 1990). Indeed, the lobbies contend their clear pro-life voice would add “balance,” since such perspectives are rare in the media.

The lobbies repeatedly contend that liberal advocates of tolerance and pluralism ironically want to silence evangelicals’ unique, distinct voice. Recall one of the events launching CFAC was the CRTC’s 1997 decision to license Playboy TV while turning down four separate religious broadcasters (Beyer 1998). CFAC was incensed the CRTC approved a “pornography channel” but rejected religious stations because it needed “‘to be careful what influences we permit into the country,’” since religion is “‘close to people's hearts’” (Beyer 1998).169 Even when CFAC’s

169 The CRTC comments imply an intriguing juxtaposition the lobbies find rife amongst their liberal opponents: stated boldly, sex has no consequences but religion is dangerous. Whereas the lobbies feel religion is felicitous and will show statistics and studies backing this up (e.g. Walberg 2008; Hiemstra 2009; EFC 2017c), the CRTC’s comments suggest religion is potentially dangerous, a sentiment shared by other media portraits discussing religion and politics (see Allemang 2011; Geddes 2000; McDonald 2006, 2010). Conversely, the lobbies believe changes in sexual life – liberalizing divorce, decriminalizing pornography, validating homosexuality – have been 135 lobbying pressure forced the CRTC to finally grant a licence (see chapter two) to a substantial

Christian broadcaster in 1998, the broadcaster, Crossroads Television System (CTS), was required to provide time slots to other religions which strikes the lobbies as bizarre. On CFAC’s website, Beyer explains:

It should be noted that the 'balance' requirement is only applied to the religious

broadcaster. It would be like requiring 'Much Music' to broadcast commentary

from academics and music critics condemning rock music or the 'Shopping

Channel' being forced to provide 14 hours a week of programming for anti-

consumerism groups who advocate boycotts of the very products the channel is

trying to sell during the rest of the broadcast week (ibid.)

The EFC similarly decries this bias, claiming diverse views should exist not by station but

“across the whole spectrum” by offering licences to entities with different perspectives (Meed

1992b). The CRTC’s restrictions against on-air fundraising also hinder evangelical radio and TV stations that might otherwise tap a smaller but committed audience (Stirk nd.). Not having a media voice for several decades has undoubtedly hampered evangelicals’ identity formation and mobilization in Canada. The lobbies find insult added to injury when they contrast the

CRTC’s perceived heavy–handedness on religion with its permissiveness in regulating sex or violence on television (EFC 2002; Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage 2002; Beyer

1998).170

done without fully considering the long-term consequences. Examples of these latter views pervade the lobbyists’ materials including Grossman 2010; Roback Morse 2007; Focus 2003, 2004b; Rushfeldt 2002. 170 The CRTC also oversees an industry watchdog, the Canadian Broadcast Standards Council (CBSC) which has also irked the lobbies, censoring both Focus and McVety for comments about homosexuality on radio and television 136

Tax Dollars Funding Liberalism

So far, this chapter has shown government restricting the lobbies’ freedom via courts, the Canada Revenue Agency, the CRTC, or the HRCs. A separate form of government action the lobbies oppose is deploying state revenues (i.e. taxpayer money) to promote or fund liberalism. A prime example is the Court Challenges Program (CCP) discussed in chapter one.

The program, which was cancelled by the Conservatives in 2006 but then reinstated by the

Liberals in 2017, gives government funding to disadvantaged groups who believed their

Charter rights were being violated and wanted to pursue the matter in court (Court Challenges

Program 2012). All the lobbies analyzed in this study opposed the program but CFAC and its ally REAL Women were especially vocal.171 The lobbies were irate public money was funding one side of controversial issues. Heather Hughes, representing CFAC at cross-country hearings on same-sex marriages, stated “All of the court cases challenging the current definition of marriage have been funded by tax dollars under the 'Court Challenges Program” whereas “pro- life, pro-family groups don't get any of that money” (Henschel 2003). REAL Women’s

Gwendolyn Landolt told parliamentary hearings that EGALE (Canada’s national LGBTQ lobby)

respectively. Focus complained to a parliamentary committee about the review process, explaining that the CBSC, after a complaint from a single listener, condemned Focus and publicized the decision without even telling Focus they were under review or offering a chance to respond (Parliament of Canada 2002). McVety similarly protested he was not even aware he was under review nor given a chance to defend himself. McVety violated the standards more than once and the network (the aforementioned Crossroads Television System) eventually cancelled his show (Word TV 2011). The CBSC is an industry run monitor but the CRTC oversees it and, for the lobbies, it repeats a familiar pattern: hostility to conservative Christianity and lenience on most other matters (i.e. sex and violence). 171 As CFAC and REAL Women both appear to live on shoe-string budgets, government funding their ideological opponents may be particularly galling for these groups. REAL Women claimed its annual budget was $120,000 in 2006 (Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage 2006). CFAC’s budget is unstated but its lean structure suggests something similar. 137 acknowledged this debt in its own magazine, saying “No group has benefited more from Court

Challenges funding than the queer community” (Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage

2006).172 Landolt further criticized institutional bias as “members of…Egale sit both on the board of directors and on the advisory board” of the Court Challenges Program, while the executive director of the National Association of Women and Law (NAWL) (a liberal feminist group that REAL Women opposes) “is a former executive director of the court challenges program” (ibid.). McVety backed Landolt at these hearings, complaining “the advisory group is made up of people who receive the funding,” and hence, “some are more equal than others”

(ibid.).173 Both McVety and Rushfeldt underscore how religious organizations never qualify as disadvantaged groups and McVety adds his college’s student body is overwhelmingly comprised of minorities but, as Christians, are unlikely to have their views funded (ibid.).

Similarly, the EFC’s Epp Buckingham suggested the CCP had outlived its usefulness and that

Christians never “fit the criteria” for funding (EFC 2005a). Focus objected in the late 1990s when the program funded groups in Ontario and Saskatchewan challenging the spanking laws.

In Focus’ Citizen newsletter, the lobby supported an evangelical MP’s private member bill to defund the program (Sclater 1998a; Focus 1998).

The lobbies levy very similar criticisms against a second government agency that gives out taxpayers’ money, namely the Status of Women (SOW). SOW funds programs that promote women’s equality but evangelicals believe they need not apply. REAL Women, for

172 Landolt says this was in an October 19 EGALE publication though she omits the year of publication (likely 2005 from the context). Scholar Miriam Smith also says the Court Challenges Program significantly aided LGBTQ causes (2005:339). 173 At the hearings, a representative of one of the feminist organizations, NAWL, acknowledged that members of NAWL and LEAF serve on the CCP’s advisory boards but said they have no decision-making authority (Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage 2006). This is cold comfort for Canada’s evangelical lobbies who see the process as extremely biased. 138 example, has been unable to access funding. Landolt claims the liberal feminist organization

LEAF (Legal Education and Action Fund) received close to $2MM from 1985-2002 (Standing

Committee on Canadian Heritage 2006) and that NAWL, the feminist group mentioned earlier, receives “$200,000 to $300,000 every year,” more than REAL’s annual budget. REAL appealed numerous times for such funding but to no avail, saying the Status of Women (SOW) “wouldn’t even send us application forms” until Landolt called pretending to represent lesbian mothers:

“Within two weeks we got a response, and the application forms, with a little handwritten note saying, welcome to the Status of Women” (Blakely 128). The government program advocates women’s equality and follows an internally consistent logic that sees certain programs as advancing this equality more than others. The internally consistent logic, of course, is liberal in orientation. REAL, however, can represent tens of thousands of women but are denied funding because a state agency decided that being pro-life disqualifies them as legitimate representatives.174

The lobbies have also criticized SOW regarding polygamy. At a 2003 parliamentary committee, SOW’s president said no reason existed for keeping polygamy illegal, and the group’s 2006 report advocated partial legalization, thus garnering extensive national media attention.175 The lobbies condemned this attack on traditional marriage, highlighting how the report validated their predictions – i.e. that same-sex marriage would open the door to polygamy. Another government body, the Law Commission of Canada, produced a 2001 report

174 The underlying question is which position grants women liberty and freedom and which restricts them. Many liberals may find this question fairly straightforward but the lobbies believe their positions bring true freedom. Chapter six explores this question more thoroughly. 175 The report was more nuanced as it recommended legalizing polygamous marriages conducted abroad (i.e. immigrants) but did not advocate allowing polygamous marriages to be conducted in Canada (Bailey et al. 2006). 139 called Beyond Conjugality that suggested all “interdependent” personal adult relationships be treated the same regardless whether the relationship involved a married couple, an older parent living with an adult child, or two sisters sharing a home. Thus, the report advised government to move beyond same-sex marriage and indeed, beyond conjugality altogether.

The report even gained notoriety amongst prominent American traditional family advocates who pointed to it as the next stage in erasing traditional marriage (e.g. Kurtz 2003; Roback

Morse 2005a). In Canada, Focus cited the claims of these government-funded bodies (the Law

Commission and SOW) in their two major same-sex marriage publications as proof that same- sex marriage initiates a slippery slope of continually weakening marriage (2003, 2005a). The

EFC likewise issued a press release stating it was “very concerned” with the Beyond Conjugality report and featured the Law Commission’s and SOW’s recommendations in documents for parliament and its own constituents (2003c, 2003d). To some, these various reports may seem natural products of a diverse society where democratic debate fosters multiple perspectives and where arms-length government bodies are supposed to conduct independent investigations. But from the lobbies’ points of view, these diverse and open-ended investigations are never so diverse as to espouse a Christian, religious or even pro-traditional family perspective. Instead, they see these reports as stemming less from popular demand than from liberal elites who not only espouse different values, but – more gallingly – who use state power and money to establish and fund these liberalizing projects. Those favouring the traditional family or conservative religious values must fund themselves.

Salt was added to the wound in 2017 when Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government changed the Canada Summer Grants program. The program, which provides funding to

140 businesses and non-profits to hire summer students (about 70,000 students annually), was altered so that applicants had to vouch that they supported a women’s reproductive rights.

Faith leaders erupted in protest. McVety quickly held a press conference and called it

“draconian” and “communistic” (Harris 2018) while the EFC joined dozens of signatories in releasing an interfaith statement of opposition. The government claimed it was protecting

Charter rights but CFAC found the logic perverse, arguing “the Charter is not a tool for government to use against citizens; it is a tool to protect Canadians from their government”

(2018). This shift was particularly insidious to the lobbies for while the earlier examples involved funding political activists of only one stripe, the Summer Grants program had been an innocuous apolitical granting arrangement available to all; those now deprived were not lobbies, but church run summer camps unable to hire life guards. Some Christians wondered if student loans or other government monies would soon have similar values tests. The move shocked many, seemingly setting a new precedent (a values test) for depriving social conservatives of equal treatment. In these circumstances, liberals’ tolerance discourses seem like sheer hypocrisy to evangelicals.

Cultural Agencies

Similar to the Summer Grants controversy, some of the lobbies believe the Canadian government promotes liberal and even anti-religious values through arts grants and via the public broadcaster, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). In 1996, EFC President Brian

Stiller described how growing up with the CBC made him nostalgic towards the broadcaster, but noted that evangelicals could no longer call the CBC their own seeing as “the ideological

141 assumptions of CBC producers invariably lead to an exclusion of points of view like mine”

(Stiller 1996). Evangelical faith, he claimed, never appeared on the CBC except to “profile a religious fraud or highlight the circus-like atmosphere of a particular church” (ibid.). He related that when iconic host Peter Gzowski interviewed him on the premier radio program

Morningside, the show was a huge success (“more letters in a six-month period than any other program that season”), but follow up discussions about a religion panel died because he was told “CBC officials had decided that faith issues have no place on the CBC” (ibid.).176 In more recent years, the lobby’s interactions with the CBC are almost wholly negative:

 In 2011, the EFC filed complaints against a CBC documentary on Radio-Canada

(CBC’s French language radio service) that claimed evangelicals had privileged

access to the Conservative government. The EFC said the program violated the

broadcasting ethics code via substantial factual errors, sweeping generalizations,

and packaging this misinformation with “ominous music and dramatic imagery”

(Sonier 2011a, 2011b). The EFC wrote multiple letters against the show’s

“vilification of evangelicals” and kept their constituents informed of the complaint

process via updates (Hutchinson 2011a). A Quebec MP cited the show to criticize

the Conservative Party in the House of Commons (Cuoto 2011).

 In 2016, the EFC again complained to the CBC ombudsman when an affiliate, Trinity

Western University, was labelled fundamentalist in a CBC article (Hiemstra 2016).

176 I came across a small anecdote that suggests these perceptions continued at the CBC for decades afterwards. Lorna Dueck, then host of a popular evangelical show, was renting space in the CBC’s Toronto headquarters in 2011, but informed me she could not display a sign on the outside door or walls of the rental space because the sign would face the inner courtyard of the CBC and thus violate the broadcaster’s stance of neutrality towards religion (Dueck 2011). 142

 The EFC favourably reviewed Through a Lens Darkly, a book arguing that Canada’s

media treats evangelicals unfairly and that “the CBC is hardest” on them (Godkin

2009).

 EFC’s Don Hutchinson cited the above book’s claim of a CBC anti-evangelical bias in

his National Post op-ed, when responding to CBC coverage of the Conservative’s

proposed new Office of Religious Freedom. The CBC publicized panellists’ names

(including Hutchinson) invited to discuss the proposed office, and questioned the

representativeness and selection process of attendees (CBC 2011; Elliot 2011).

Hutchinson mocked a confession, admitting he had been “outed by the CBC” and

that “it’s true” he participated in the panel, given his long-term involvement with

multiple organizations fighting religious persecution, while also noting

representatives from other faiths were present (Hutchinson 2011b). He found the

CBC’s accusation of “secrecy” and “hidden agenda” awkward given the office had

been publicly announced, was part of the Conservatives’ published election

platform, and had been mentioned in other CBC stories (ibid.).

In short, the EFC sees the CBC as yet another state organ promoting liberal views and anti-

Christian bias. CFAC is outright hostile and steadily campaigns against the public broadcaster.

In 2006, “Kill the CBC” was one of CFAC’s nineteen “fixes for Canada” (CFAC 2006b). CFAC frequently highlights the broadcaster’s anti-Christian sentiment including claiming a CBC writer called conservatives “‘white trash’” (CFAC 2008a) and that the broadcaster aired a “Christmas comedy special showing Christ uttering vulgarities from the Cross” (Woodard 2001). In sum, evangelicals oppose the CBC not for creating legal constraints but for its affective power to

143 marginalize and smear by silencing their voices, treating them as comedic fodder, and seeing sinister intent behind their legitimate political ambitions.

Another area CFAC critiques, though ignored by Focus and the EFC, is government arts funding. CFAC condemns the sheer waste of taxpayer money, claiming the Canadian Heritage

Ministry spends $3.7 billion annually including $1.1 billion for the CBC but also believes this pool of taxpayer money supports immoral and sometimes anti-Christian productions (CFAC

2011c). Through their website, in meetings with cabinet ministers, and while addressing the

Canadian Senate, CFAC has highlighted numerous examples of movies, music and visual art they deem immoral or anti-Christian (e.g. the movies Young People Fucking, Masturbators, and an album called Holy Shit – The Poo Testament with an image of an excrement Christ) (Doyle

2008; Senate of Canada 2008; CFAC 2011c). CFAC does not demand censorship but objects to taxpayer support for these projects. The lobby also criticizes government arts funding on sexual diversity. The lobby’s actions on this front include: they opposed the Conservative government providing $400,000 to the Toronto Pride Parade (supposedly to promote tourism and culture) (Craine 2009); denounced funding the AIDS Committee of Toronto which ran

“Virgin Tours” of bathhouses for 18 to 25 year-olds (Carey 2005; Rushfeldt 2005); and questioned why St. Stephen’s House received almost $8MM while producing a “Little Black

Book” for 14 year-olds that McVety called “a virtual ‘how to’” for homosexual activity including

“instructions on how to perform oral, anal and other sex acts,” the proper use of dental dams, and a chapter titled “My First Time Fucking a Girl.” (McVety nd.; see also Ward 2006).177 It should be noted that McVety’s arguments can be seen as one-sided – he never acknowledges

177 Shortly after McVety publicized the booklet’s contents, it was removed from multiple websites and McVety claimed it disappeared from St. Stephen’s House as well. 144 the substantial tax breaks religious groups receive, nor how the Harper government provided millions of dollars to evangelical colleges and universities (not McVety’s) through an infrastructure program that invested in upgrading facilities at Canadian post-secondary institutions (Industry Canada 2012). Admittedly, such investments have been uncommon with a president of an evangelical university calling the Harper money “a historic change and nothing short of amazing” (Baglow 2010). In totality, McVety sees taxpayer money for “arts funding” promoting an ideology that is pro-homosexuality, sometimes anti-Christian and virtually never supporting religious projects.

Education

An area of special concern for the lobbies is education. The matters discussed so far are mostly federal jurisdiction (although the courts and the HRCs have federal and provincial bodies), but education is solely a provincial matter. Education is vital to the lobbies given its power to socialize children. They believe the system often undermines their values and denies parental rights over their child’s education. Their criticisms fall under the following categories:

 Religion has been eliminated from the public system;

 Sexual education curriculum is too explicit, introduced too young, or omits any

discussion of values or relationships;

 Schools affirm homosexuality and not just accepting homosexuals;

 Government pushes children into education systems at ever earlier ages via full day

kindergarten or universal daycare plans (whose costs increase taxes, making

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staying-at-home harder to afford, thus further encouraging early institutionalized

care);

 Parental concerns over sensitive curriculum are disregarded; and

 Parents lack choice as: a) private schools receive no funding; b) parents are not

given the chance to opt out of sensitive curriculum; and c) occasionally, even

homeschoolers’ freedom is threatened.

Beginning with the EFC, their government and court submissions reveal a three-fold strategy. First, they try to gain government funding for private religious schools. The EFC has long pursued this issue, intervening in the Bal (1994) and Adler cases (1996) (both dealing with government funding for private religious schools), and making submissions or appearing at hearings on funding denominational or private schools in Newfoundland, Quebec and Alberta

(EFC 2001b). While the Alberta government funds up to 70% of private school costs and the other Western provinces and Quebec fund 50%, zero funding is provided by the Maritime provinces and most notably by Ontario where almost 40% of Canadians live. Ontario is unusual

(along with Alberta and Saskatchewan) as it fully funds a Catholic school system in parallel to the public system, an arrangement made at Confederation to ensure fairness for Protestants and Catholics. Over time, the public system dropped Protestantism, making Catholics the sole religious group to receive government funding. In 1999, the United Nations Human Rights

Commission declared this approach violated international human rights agreements. Seizing the opportunity, the EFC made a joint submission (with the Ontario Multi-Faith Coalition for

Equity in Education or “OMCEE”) to the Ontario Progressive Conservative (PC) government

146 asking they rectify the situation and fund private religious schools (EFC 1999b).178 When the provincial government refused, the EFC and OMCEE asked the federal government for a tax credit or other deductions for parents using private religious schools, but were again rebuffed.

In 2002, the provincial PCs finally offered a tax credit but the Liberals cancelled it a year later after being elected. During the 2007 provincial election, Conservative leader John Tory endorsed funding private schools but the issue sank Tory’s campaign. The Liberals attacked

Tory’s plan, saying it would religiously balkanize the province’s children by financially incentivizing parents to send their children to distinct single-faith schools, thus preventing them from socializing and developing friends in other communities. The election thus revealed some forms of diversity were unwelcome. Hence, the Catholic system is still fully funded but other religious schools (including private Christian schools) receive nothing. What is especially disturbing for the lobbies is that this outcome starkly reverses the same-sex marriage dispute, for here the lobbies are: a) calling for equality by b) appealing to the Charter and c) are backed by a prominent HRC (from the United Nations)…and yet they still lose, rejected by multiple levels of government, denied by the courts, and thwarted by the electorate. All of this convinces evangelicals that diversity rhetoric and minority rights is a pretense that does not include them.

Facing such roadblocks to funding Christian schools, the EFC has embarked on a second strategy, namely trying to make the public system more comfortable for evangelicals. Hence, the EFC intervened in a prominent 2002 British Columbia case concerning introducing

178 OMCEE represented Muslim, Sikh, Hindu and Christian groups. The EFC was a member of OMCEE but made a joint submission with the umbrella group, which likely reflects the EFC’s substantial professional and financial resources relative to the other communities represented. Joining with the multi-faith group lends credibility in multicultural Canada. 147 homosexuality in the primary grades. The Surrey school board prevented a gay kindergarten teacher from using gay friendly materials in his classroom (e.g. children’s books such as One

Dad, Two Dads, Brown Dad, Blue Dads). The teacher sued the board, the case eventually reaching the Supreme Court. The EFC prepared a joint factum with the Catholic Archbishop of

Vancouver,179 contending that overruling the school board would “reverse the outcome of a democratic process” – since school boards are elected – and second, that “far from being neutral” the materials “inculcate…a specific view” (EFC and Archbishop of Vancouver 2000).

When EGALE (the national LGBTQ lobby) responded that silence on homosexuality is unjustifiable since “silence itself is discriminatory,” the EFC queried if silence on religion is also discriminatory (rather than neutral). Further, the factum states, if silence is not warranted, fairness requires the school “expose 5 and 6 year olds to various perspectives on the debate” and not just one “specific view” (ibid.). The lobby asserted the question was not whether or not to discriminate but whether to choose sides or to defer the debate until “later in the educational process” or perhaps not at all, letting the community address it as is done with religion (ibid.).180 The ruling favoured the school teacher, which the EFC’s Epp Buckingham contended “left no room for [religious parents] to have any meaningful accommodation” (EFC

2012e).181 This case highlights the persistent clash of rights between homosexuals and religionists in education. After the Surrey case, the EFC twice made submissions to provincial

179 The Archbishop was interested because the B.C. government does not fully fund the Catholic school system as in Ontario and so most Catholic students attend public schools. 180 Although the factum was submitted by both the EFC and the Archbishop, I believe its content accurately represents the EFC’s perspective as the lobby offered the factum’s arguments as their own in a press release ahead of the case and again after it ended, paraphrasing the language almost exactly (EFC 2002a, 2002b). 181 This case is nonetheless important to the lobbies for the Supreme Court defined secular as including religious perspectives and not meaning atheistic or agnostic outlooks should be privileged. This inclusive definition of secularism was a vital win for the lobbies, one they reference often in court cases, in parliaments or in communications to supporters. 148 governments (British Columbia and Ontario) developing anti-bullying policies on sexual orientation (EFC 2007a, 2012d). The EFC supports anti-bullying but asks such policies address bullying generally, not focus on sexual orientation. Singling out sexual orientation means

“some students are receiving preferential treatment” and their “suffering is more valid than the suffering of others,” whereas religionists may be bullied and intimidated by unjust accusations of “homophobia” merely for disagreeing (EFC 2012d). The EFC laments that religionists are dismissed even in the Catholic system as when the Ontario government in 2012 forced the publicly funded Catholic schools to accept gay-straight alliance clubs (GSA clubs) despite Catholic doctrine.182 Thus, the EFC believes public schools routinely undermine evangelical faith whenever LGBTQ rights arise and lament that even acknowledging religious bullying is denied.

The EFC’s third strategy exhausts evangelicals’ options on education. Having failed to secure funding for evangelicals’ private schools (strategy one), and failing to ensure the public school curriculum does not directly undermine their faith (strategy two), the lobby’s third option is that parents should be notified of controversial curriculum so they can remove their children from those classes. The court case here involved a Quebec couple seeking to remove their child from a new Ethics and Religious Culture curriculum. The Catholic couple said the course went beyond educating about religion by preaching a normative relativism that denied exclusive truth and thus undermined their faith. When the provincial authorities rejected their request, the dispute went to the Supreme Court. The EFC submitted a factum contending that

182 Banack’s research in Alberta broadly supports the portrait of a non-neutral education ministry. He found both local religious education groups and their opponents viewed Alberta’s education “ministry itself as an important ‘progressive’ player” in education (2016:944). 149 whereas the “purpose” of the class – stated as creating a more tolerant society – was legitimate and did not infringe on religious freedom, the “implementation” did infringe as it established “mandatory state-determined education in religion…from a noninclusive secularist or relativistic perspective” (EFC 2011, emphasis in original). The lobby’s factum cited Charles

Taylor and drew on John Gray’s advocacy for “accommodation pluralism” rather than

“convergence pluralism,” to argue that “True tolerance” does not ensure uniformity but “the protection of difference and disagreement” (ibid.). The couple lost the case on a technicality as the court ruled that since the course was new, actual harm had not yet occurred and was speculative (leaving the door open to future challenges). The EFC found the judgement bizarre for implying one must allow one’s child to be harmed before acting. They urged the Quebec government “to develop curriculum to educate about religion and culture from a descriptive perspective, without providing ‘religious education’ by engaging in an assessment of the truth of religious beliefs” (EFC 2012e). Other evangelical attempts to opt of sexual education curriculum have also been thwarted,183 so that this third strategy has again borne little fruit.

The failure of the EFC’s three strategies forge a kind of dead end on education policies.

Religious parents cannot use their own tax dollars to set up their own schools, are ignored when asking that public school curriculum not directly subvert their religious teachings, and, lastly, are denied the freedom simply to exempt their children from content they cannot prevent. Cumulatively, the EFC believes the supposedly tolerant, liberal state denies evangelicals influence even over what is taught to their own children.

183 Evangelicals secured this right in Alberta in 2009 but had it rescinded in 2015 (Banack 2015). 150

Similar themes emerge from CFAC. CFAC believes the school system is dominated by an exclusive secularism with “anti-Christian attitudes” (CFAC 2003). Rushfeldt argued at a public rally on the Surrey school board issue mentioned above (i.e. offering gay friendly books in kindergarten) that “public education is NOT as one court… suggested – a secular system” since

“many children of religious faith attend…and their parents pay taxes and fees also” (Rushfeldt

2006b, emphasis in original).184 CFAC repeatedly complains that gay rights trample religious freedom. The lobby was particularly incensed when the B.C. government settled with a gay couple who had filed a HRC complaint. Under the settlement, the government agreed to three changes: first, to introduce sexual diversity curriculum in kindergarten through grade twelve; second, to make it “more difficult for students and parents to opt out” of the curriculum; and third, granting the gay couple a say in the new curriculum’s content (Hansen 2006; National

Post 2006). CFAC bristled against the “atrocious cave-in” and blatant favoritism that granted the gay couple influence over the curriculum but made no similar allowance for parents (CFAC

2006f).

Parents’ lack of freedom is a recurring theme for CFAC. They reprinted a Christian news site article denouncing the “mandatory same-sex sensitivity training” of the Toronto District

School Board which denied “any exemptions – even for Muslim children whose parents object”

(Lifesitenews.com 2004). They criticized another Ontario school board with a similar policy

(CFAC 2005f) and advocated for an Alberta bill ensuring opt out opportunities for parents

(CFAC 2006c). On their website, they advised parents to create a “Parent’s Directive” or

“Declaration of Spiritual Values” and to insist the school put the form with their student’s file

184 The meaning of “secular” matters and varies by lobby (tackled next chapter). Here, Rushfeldt is objecting to evangelicals having to contribute financially to a system that excludes them. 151

(BC Parents and Teachers for Life 2005; Hamilton-Wentworth Family Action Council 2004). On occasion, CFAC has tasted success such as when McVety created a media storm over the new

2010 Ontario sex education curriculum (see chapter two) by highlighting content many found too explicit and/or introduced at too young an age (CFAC 2010b; CBC News 2010). Even the

IMFC was vocal on this issue, declaring “parents are the primary sex educators” and know best how and when to broach the topic with their children (Kosalka 2010). The government soon retracted the curriculum, reworked it, reissued it, and now the new Progressive Conservative government (whose leader McVety backed in a very tight leadership race) has rescinded it again in 2018. CFAC has even raised the spectre of government infringing on homeschooling (a last resort safe haven for many evangelical parents) by noting disturbing international trends such as a European Union court upholding Germany’s ban on homeschooling, and an American academic urging greater state oversight of homeschooling since “the state must ensure” children can choose values “different from those of their parents” (Duigon 2003).

Focus on the Family shares CFAC’s perspective. Focus decries seeing the education system as “an extension of the State” rather than “an extension of the home” (McKay 1998).

This fosters the presumed “right of the so-called professionals to usurp the role of the parents” given “they know what is better for our children” (ibid., emphasis in original). For evidence,

Focus quoted a dean at the University of British Columbia’s Faculty of Education who claimed

“Educating children in a manner compatible with family values is fundamentally miseducative” since the goal is “to get children to examine their values” (ibid., italics in original). They also criticized Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka who advocates for limiting parental control of education since children “‘matter’” to “‘the State, equally with their parents’” (ibid.).

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The lobby also complains that teachers’ unions push gay-friendly curriculum rather than focussing on literacy and numeracy (Rogusky 2001), and criticized the Surrey school judgement for showing “complete intolerance” as “the rights of parents have been steamrolled by an activist judiciary” (Focus 2002b). All of this paints a picture of an aggressive and hostile state usurping rather than supporting parents.

One final arena the lobbies connect to education is daycare. To the lobbies, public daycare extends the state’s reach to earlier and earlier ages while weakening parents’ influence and their ability to instill their own values. Both CFAC and the IMFC strongly oppose a national universal daycare system as a money pit that will drive taxes higher, thus increasing the financial pressures on parents to become dual income families. Hence, this approach discriminates against certain family forms as the stay-at-home parent not only foregoes the second income, but now must pay taxes to fund their dual-income neighbour’s daycare. During the 2005 federal election, universal daycare was a significant topic as the Liberals promised such a system while the Conservatives offered instead to give money directly to parents, claiming this treated all families equally and increased parental choice. Liberal minister Ken

Dryden derided the Conservative plan saying stay-at-home parenting “is not daycare”

(implying that parental care is inferior) (Brodbeck 2005) while another Liberal remarked that some parents would waste the money on “beer and popcorn” (ibid.). These comments hurt the

Liberals and reinforced CFAC’s view that liberal elites distrust parents and are “attempting to remove children from homes and put them into institutional care” which is “extremely anti- family” and “costly” (CFAC 2005e). The lobby says this “socialist ‘care’” mimics the “monopoly” system of public education which CFAC describes as a “disaster” (CFAC 2006e). The IMFC’s

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Mrozek similarly wrote in the Vancouver Sun that parents are already “being forced to spend less time with their children” due to high taxes, and that national institutional daycare will further exacerbate this problem (Mrozek 2010). Additionally, she contends that the desire of educational experts and liberal political elites for an expensive national daycare system counters the wishes of parents since “parents choose institutional care as the least desirable option” according to the lobby’s own commissioned 2006 poll (which they say corresponds with existing research) (Mrozek and Mitchell 2011). Similarly, “parents were never consulted” when Ontario made plans for all day kindergarten (Mrozek 2010). Instead, the IMFC laments in an op-ed titled “New meaning to ‘nanny state,’” that “we hear talk from qualified experts and smart people with degrees – as if parents aren’t quite up to snuff” (Mrozek and Mitchell 2011).

To the lobbies, a national tax-funded system unfairly extracts money from single income families and erodes their financial capacity to raise their kids as they see fit.

Overall, the education file is a disaster for the lobbies as liberal norms permeate the education system and are introduced to evangelicals’ own children. Evangelical attempts to establish their own schools with their own tax dollars or to have their views taken into consideration in curriculum development or even in anti-bullying policies are consistently thwarted. Universal daycare, they believe, will impose further costs, forcing some couples to be dual income families with their children handed over to the state and its curriculum goals at earlier and earlier ages. At stake is the very formation of one’s own children.

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Conservative Reprieve

The federal Conservative government’s reign from 2005 until 2015 provided significant gains for the lobbies. The Conservatives cancelled the Court Challenges program in 2006, severely cut funding to the Status of Women (also 2006), and repealed section 13 of the

Canadian Human Rights Act (2012), which the lobbies and other conservatives found particularly offensive (although provincial codes remain unaffected). The government also reduced the CBC’s funding although its attempt to change arts funding procedures to screen out offensive projects was soon retracted amidst the ensuing public backlash (Canadian Press

2008). The Conservatives’ 2005 election victory also derailed plans for a national daycare system and the Conservatives’ decision to give money directly to parents leaves less money for a future national system to be erected. These are substantial gains for the lobbies although they still feel they are fighting an uphill battle due to the Charter, the courts, and increasingly the overall public mood. Attempts to have abortion debated in parliament were quickly shut down even by the Conservatives (Prime Minister Harper viewed the issue as toxic) and there is little hope of reversing the gains made by sexual diversity advocates. The issue of sexual orientation particularly threatens as it regularly collides with religious freedom and, in such collisions, religionists rarely emerge victorious.

An Activist State

It is tempting given the above analysis to see evangelicals as opposing an activist state in favour of a reduced and less invasive state. Evangelicals, including the lobbies, frequently say as much and some scholars lend theoretical support (Fields 1991). The claim seems apt as

155 evangelicals’ family values politics certainly respond to a shifting state, or what José Casanova calls the third disestablishment (i.e. the secularization of public norms that took off since the

1960s) (1994:135-157). However, I want to challenge this view. The shift in the state is not from being hands off to being hands on but rather from upholding Christian norms to upholding secular ones. Evangelicals harken back not to a stateless time but one where the state had restrictive divorce policies, criminalized abortion, and enforced heterosexual monogamous marriage as the only socially and legally recognized romantic union.185 Going forward, the lobbies continue to show interest in an activist state as even lobbies explicitly condemning state intervention per se (Focus and especially CFAC) actually call not for a reduced state but for a supportive one. Thus, on gay marriage, the lobbies did not ask government to abandon regulating marriage, but rather to uphold and enforce heterosexual monogamy as the only legally recognized form. On abortion, the lobbies’ position is especially clear since Canada is in the unusual position of having no abortion law at all (see chapter two).

However, the lobbies abhor this instance of a limited state since what they seek is criminalization. The same pattern occurs on other issues. The IMFC, for example, opposed the

Ontario sex education curriculum, advocating such topics be left to parents which thus fits the idea of a less active government (SunNews Primetime 2011; IMFC Staff 2015a).186 But in other pieces, the IMFC declared educational curriculum should instruct youth about the benefits of marriage and include statistical information about the harmful effects of living as common law

185 If one goes further back, the state forbade interracial marriages and birth control (Cott 2000:212; D’Emilio and Freedman 1998:233ff). These examples show state intrusion on matters of family and sexuality is hardly novel. 186 In the United States where evangelicals wield more political power, they do not call for government to withdraw from sex education but rather ask government to support programs promoting the benefits of chastity until marriage. The IMFC has a practical bent and knows, I think, that government-supported chastity programs are not realistic in Canada and so they aim for what is plausibly achievable on sex, namely that schools be as silent as possible on the topic and leave it for parents to tackle. 156 couples or of other familial forms (Miedema 2010:8; IMFC Staff 2015b:8; Mitchell 2015). Even

CFAC, which most consistently opposes government overreach, advocates for a sexual education to its liking, specifically one using the term “sodomy” as the “only factual and correct term,” and which highlights health risks they associate with homosexuality (Rushfeldt

2008). In this way, the discourse opposing an “activist state” seems like savvy rhetoric since opposing government interference in private citizens’ lives is likely more persuasive than arguing the state should promote one’s own views instead. In fairness, perhaps this angle is not so strategic – it may just be that it resonates emotionally for many evangelicals who have watched government shifts continually counter their goals, thus making government action feel activist and interventionist in ways not noticed when government enforced their own views, which may have felt like simple decency or common sense. Regardless, the real issue is not that Western governments have suddenly begun intruding on sexuality and family life, but rather that governments are making new choices and ensconcing different values than before into the public. What both sides want is a state that upholds its views and teaches them as the moral standard.

Conclusion

Christians are sometimes quick to adopt victimization and martyrdom tropes as the tradition has a reservoir of narratives for this stance. At the same time, there is little doubt evangelicals are encountering genuine repercussions from the culture’s liberalizing and secularizing trends and from how the state and its manifold arms bolster these shifts. State actors may not intentionally set out to persecute religion or evangelicals in particular but the

157 state’s liberal logics carry values that make its actions anything but neutral. The bedrock shift that changed the rules of the game from the lobbies’ perspective was introducing the Charter.

This text gives, they contend, inordinate power to the individual while showing little concern for the common good. This new playing field has been further tilted by biased referees in the form of judges who “read in” sexual orientation and then privilege these new read-in rights over the written right to religious freedom. In protecting LGBTQs, the EFC accuses judges and human rights commissions of creating a “Charter of Rights and Feelings” that so radically expunges any opposition to homosexuality that Christians can lose jobs as marriage commissioners, teachers, bed and breakfast operators or as owners of a printing business

(Hutchinson 2011c). To the lobbies, evangelicals are the weaker party confronting powerful liberal interests and yet government bodies relentlessly protect and even fund liberal groups while showing no concern for religionists’ increasing marginalization. Talk of diversity and pluralism seems hollow, masking an intolerant and imperialistic liberalism that seeks to silence and ideally eradicate truly divergent views. At times, even democratic impulses seem compromised to the lobbies. The abortion law was overturned in the courts, LGBTQ rights proceeded primarily through the courts, and even plans for all-day kindergarten and universal daycare appear to them as statist one-fits-all solutions propagated by liberal elites unconcerned about what parents actually say they want. This situation culminates in something particularly dear to evangelicals’ hearts, namely that the education system increasingly inculcates their own children with values that undermine evangelical faith. For the lobbies, Canadian diversity is Orwellian, masking a monochromatic liberalism that marginalizes evangelical living.

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The lobbies therefore confront a society not well suited to them and seemingly aggressive in pursuing a conflicting agenda. This is the reason the lobbies formed, attempting to make a case to slow or even reverse these trends. But to have any success in democratic politics, one’s voice must be heard and taken seriously which is not always easy in a culture that views evangelicals with suspicion. In the ensuing chapter, we will see how the different lobbies have responded to the challenge of making themselves heard despite a culture that may not welcome their voice.

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Chapter 4 – ‘Muted’: Speaking a Foreign Language

“Don’t you know how, in talking a foreign language, even fluently,

one says half the time, not what one wants to, but what one can?”

The Verdict, Edith Wharton

In the introduction, I described the lobbies as occupying a liminal place, the outward face of an inward-looking community, the evangelical voice in a public square often suspicious of evangelicalism. While the lobbies try to make a case for their political stances, they face an additional hurdle in that they must gain public credibility as speakers in a society whose dominant values are often in such conflict with their own as to leave them marginalized. In this chapter, I examine how the lobbies tackle this situation through both methodical strategies and visceral responses. To aid my analysis, I draw on Edwin Ardener’s theoretical concept of

“muted” groups (1975). Ardener suggests subordinate populations struggle not only from numerical inferiority but also because the dominant group inevitably structures the society’s communication system around its values, worldviews, notions of authority, and perceptions about who constitutes a legitimate speaker. This dominance impacts who speaks, in what forums, and how they speak including inflection, speech patterns, vocabulary, and which models of society are considered viable. To be deemed credible, one must master the normative communication system and employ it properly and yet, for a subordinate group, the communication system itself embeds some of the very values they seek to overturn. Members of the subordinate group are thus constrained in speaking or ‘muted,’ unable to express themselves genuinely in their own idiom and forced instead to adopt the hegemonic system’s norms and rules (much like the opening quote describes speaking in a foreign language). 160

Muting has an external aspect – the constraining of speech and conscious adapting of dominant norms – but it can also foster an internal aspect as having to use the dominant group’s categories and idioms can lead subordinate persons to internalize these modes of thinking and speaking, potentially influencing their self-understanding. Mastering the system,

Ardener suggests, thus requires partly alienating oneself consciously and potentially unconsciously.

Ardener’s concept captures the lobbies’ predicament as, facing the clout of liberal- secularism, they often must express themselves using secular or liberal frames and distance themselves from their religiosity. One example of this mutedness comes from scholar David

Haskell's media analysis of the lobbies during the same-sex marriage debate (2011). Haskell showed how Focus, CFAC and the EFC all emphasized three secular reasons why same-sex marriage should be denied.187 The lobbies told Haskell they gave secular reasons because religious reasons are invalid in Canada (thus muting their own voices) (2011). In addition,

Haskell analysed media coverage of the lobbies – i.e. two national newspapers and two of the three main television networks – and discovered the media largely ignored these secular reasons, instead reporting Christian theological objections the lobbies did not raise.188 Haskell accuses the journalists of bias, intentionally stressing theological matters to discredit the lobbies in many Canadians’ eyes. While possible objections exist with aspects of Haskell’s

187 Specifically, they argued same-sex marriage was not in children's interests, would open the door to polygamy and other behaviours detrimental to family stability and children's well-being, and would undermine religious freedom. 188 The theological issues were not quotations of the lobbies but issues the reporters raised. Haskell contends journalists can elaborate if they feel the source is not giving the whole story (i.e. that secular reasons were masking theological ones), but journalistic codes require press members at least report the source’s version before offering a critique. He contends the data shows the media simply ignored the lobbies’ talking points and substituted their own commentary on theological issues. 161 study,189 the main narrative seems correct that the lobbies were muted in having to speak in the culture's dominant idiom and, then, muted in a different way when reporters ignored their reasons and substituted more parochial ones less likely to be well received.190 Haskell’s study shows Ardener’s relevance for examining Canada’s evangelical lobbies.

Haskell’s informative study has some limitations for my purposes. These limitations include grouping the lobbies while ignoring their differences, focusing on the single issue of same-sex marriage, considering just one form of muting (i.e. replacing religious reasons with secular ones), and examining a short duration of three years. My analysis in this chapter broadens the scope on several fronts. First, I look at four areas where liberal discourses pressure the lobbies to mute their own voices, namely: i) secularity; ii) moderation; iii) pluralism; and iv) being un-American.191 These areas arose from my analysis of the lobbies' own discourses as these issues – values central to Canadian identity – repeatedly surfaced as problems that posed challenges for them. Second, I examine discourses across more issues than same-sex marriage, providing a wider lens of the discursive pressures to conform that the

189 One caveat on how the media treated the lobbies is Canada’s print media includes many conservative city- based newspapers which Haskell could not track for reasons of scope size. 190 One might counter that the media coverage effectively unmuted the lobbies by giving theological reasons. I think, however, this misreads the situation. Unmuting is about being able to speak authentically without losing credibility in the act. The citing of religious reasons in this instance serves to disqualify the lobbies. 191 I use the term “un-American” to mean more than simply “not American,” as the latter can be reduced to a technical question of citizenship. What is being described here is that a central aspect of Canadian identity is specifically being not like Americans. Canada does not have this relationship with other countries – citizens may simply be “not British,” or “not Germans,” but national identity is not defined in opposition to these countries. I described some of this ethos in chapter one (including the study by Winter showing that half of Canadian newspaper articles on identity draw contrasts with the United States), but it is even captured in popular culture. To give just two examples: Canada’s most successful domestic comedian this century has almost surely been Rick Mercer who became famous for a skit called Talking to Americans, where American interviewees always came off as uninformed and clueless. Similarly, one of the most successful television commercials of the century was the award-winning I Am Canadian ad aired by Molson Breweries, in which a seemingly ordinary man gets on stage and enumerates endless contrasts with the United States (to an almost ridiculous degree) for the entire length of the ad. In short, Canadians are “not Germans,” and “not British,” – both technical questions – but their identity is to no small degree that they are “un-American.” 162 lobbies face. Third, I include more discursive forums to compare messages aimed at insiders

(i.e. members and other evangelicals) versus those aimed at outsiders (i.e. public forums like parliament, the courts, or the mainstream news media). This approach reveals where the lobbies tactically adjust for audience versus where muting may be leading them to slowly internalize (or assimilate) certain liberal values. A fourth difference is that I cover a much longer time frame, spanning roughly 20 years.192 These longitudinal data sometimes reveal significant trends and adaptations that underscore processes of assimilation. Fifth, I assess the lobbies individually to observe their separate responses, which cumulatively show what paths they believe are possible and how these choices have played out. Lastly, I move beyond message content to examine the lobbies’ affective display. Struggling to be heard requires not just ideational adjustments but also communicating attitudes, emotions, and aesthetics that might resonate with the hegemonic culture. Moderation and secularity are to be performed, not just assented to and pressures to adopt the predominant affective style is part of the muting process.

My analysis shows that the lobbies face significant muting pressures and have responded in diverse ways. Their main responses include: comfortable alignment (i.e. the lobby’s values fit a cultural norm); adaptation over time (i.e. engaging with and inhabiting public values, which eventually facilitates internalizing or assimilating dominant norms); tactical translation (i.e. appropriating dominant norms and discourses solely for addressing outsiders); and overt resistance or rejection. The second and third responses, adaptation and translation, particularly fit Ardener’s theory. However, I also highlight when the lobbies

192 For the EFC, I actually have material for about 35 years and for the IMFC, for the 10 years it existed. 163 occasionally subvert Ardener’s theory by employing mutedness towards their own ends, innovatively co-opting influential speech modes or using invisibility to their advantage. Despite these varied approaches, success has been elusive and the fourth path of strongly rejecting cultural norms particularly seems to compromise the long-term viability of Canadian evangelical lobbies. The lobbies face a difficult bind of wanting to uphold their values while pressed to make concessions in order to be heard. The clearest takeaway is that none of the paths chosen have been especially successful as the lobbies fight an uphill battle in Canada given the comparatively greater influence of liberal tropes, discourses, values, concepts and structures (partly detailed in the prior chapter). While the future is always uncertain, currently the lobbies face an unpleasant combination of marginalization, assimilation, and extinction.

The EFC – Mixing Alignment, Assimilation, and Muted Resistance

The Evangelical Fellowship of Canada aspires to be the representative voice for

Canada’s evangelicals and indeed to help define Canadian evangelicalism. To this end, achieving Canadian bona fides is vital to the EFC, fostering pressure to find cultural resonance.

In truth, the lobby is the most aligned with the Canadian ethos ideationally and affectively which makes muting in some instances unnecessary owing to a shared outlook. But on other fronts, the EFC faces significant pressures to mute to powerful cultural frames. The EFC’s responses vary on multiple fronts, some anticipated by Ardener’s theory and others showing creativity in mingling compromise with the desire for authentic Christian expression. Notably, the EFC does not merely represent evangelicals but tries shaping them as, with its Tory ethos

164 and top-down structure, the lobby encourages constituents to follow the EFC’s lead of what

“Canadian evangelical” should mean.

In chapter two, we documented that the EFC’s leaders have long promoted two of the values key to this chapter, specifically moderation and being “un-American.” For evangelicals, these two claims are entwined since Canadian moderation is set against the perceived immoderateness of America, the latter seemingly almost personified by its Religious Right. An evangelical wanting to be seen as moderate must therefore reject the Religious Right or at least maintain a healthy distance. The EFC has consistently affirmed both moderation and un-

Americanness since Brian Stiller became president in 1983. In his inaugural interview as president, he called the public “confused” in associating Canada’s evangelicals “with the Moral

Majority or fringe groups” (Faith Alive Staff 1983a:37). He thus differentiates Canadian evangelicals from their American peers and dismisses the powerful Moral Majority as a

“fringe” group.193 Stiller revamped the EFC’s magazine – the prime vehicle for communicating to evangelical constituents – to showcase Canadian evangelicals rather than Americans and often used this vehicle to disparage the American Religious Right (ibid., Patrick 2011:55). In a

Canadian liberal idiom, he denounced their television and radio programs that “assault [the unchurched] with manipulative, American-patriotic and narrow fundamentalist presentations”

(Stiller 1986:24-5 in Patrick 2011:56). He also employed common nationalist tropes that

Canadians are more tolerant and “promote peace,” (ibid. 1996:70). Post Stiller, explicit criticism of the American Religious Right subsided somewhat but the EFC continues to defy

193 Stiller’s criticisms of the American Religious Right are no doubt genuine, but the EFC’s rejection of American influence is perhaps also in the lobby’s interests as American leaders are rivals for Canadian evangelicals’ attention. See the coda on the EFC later in this chapter for more on how the EFC might see American leaders this way. 165 being grouped with their American counterparts. Hence, Janet Epp Buckingham objected in

Maclean’s magazine, a mass-market publication, to one of its articles, insisting “We are not an

American organization, nor an American-style organization” (2006, italics added). “American- style” here highlights not just legal independence but rejects American groups’ aggressive and confrontational affect. A more moderate vision and affect continues to be promoted by current president Bruce Clemenger who, in a Faith Today column, encourages readers to

“propose” and not “impose” their views (2008a). In another important Faith Today piece, a staff writer interviewed Clemenger upon becoming the EFC’s new president. The interview is a statement piece to insiders (i.e. evangelicals) about the new leader’s vision for the EFC and

Canadian evangelicals.

We seek to participate in the legal and political debates, advocating the application of biblical principles to deliberations on a variety of issues. Sometimes our approach is more prophetic; like the sentinel in Ezekiel who warns others of the implications of the paths they are pursuing. At other times it’s a diplomatic dialogue. And in any conversation, the tone and timbre of our voice are very important. We try to be constructive, thoughtful, persuasive, and in all that we say and do to be good ambassadors of Christ. Sometimes it’s discouraging. Other times it’s exhilarating. It is important to take a long view, which is what faithfulness requires (Stiller 2003).

Clemenger both encourages moderation and affectively models it. He acknowledges their task is “frustrating at times,” but counsels a tempered wisdom in remembering to “take a long view.” He coaches his readers about affect, encouraging them to watch the “tone and timbre”

166 of their voice.194 The EFC engages in hot button issues of utmost concern for evangelicals and yet Clemenger’s vocabulary evinces politesse, advocating “diplomatic dialogue” and acting as

“good ambassadors” by being “constructive” and “thoughtful.” He exhibits that “faithfulness requires” not just correct stances but a correct disposition.

The EFC therefore seems mostly aligned – rather than muted – on both moderation and un-Americanism, although they may also be assimilating one of the values (moderation) by becoming more moderate over time. An American study showed American evangelical elites’ discourses on homosexuality have been moderating for fifty years despite American evangelicals’ immense cultural power (Thomas and Olson 2012). The study tracked articles on homosexuality in America’s leading evangelical magazine, Christianity Today, and found growing moderation on three fronts: increased use of authoritative sources other than the

Bible; fewer negative comments on homosexuality; and increased acceptance of pro-gay political issues (e.g. accepting partner benefits or civil unions, and in some cases accepting same-sex marriage for the state though not for the church). Parallel shifts are evident at the

EFC over a much shorter time frame when we compare the lobby’s 1986 position paper on homosexuality with EFC discourses in the 1990s and 2000s. In the 1986 paper, the EFC’s affect conveys indignation and repulsion, bristling at the suggestion that homosexual orientation is a neutral characteristic (4-5), criticizing homosexuals for seeking “special status” (7), and disparaging homosexuality as a “sexual disorientation,” while citing biblical condemnation (7).

Later texts, however, show the three changes noted in the American study. First, citations of religious authorities like God or the Bible become increasingly rare. Second, the number of

194 Even the phrase “tone and timbre” is affectively soft compared to telling constituents to manage their temper or to avoid yelling or being shrill. 167 negative comments drops precipitously – the term “sexual disorientation” never reoccurs and later texts advocate for traditional marriage without condemning homosexuality. Third, the lobby shifts its policy stances, eventually accepting benefits for same-sex couples (the very topic rejected in 1986) and, by 2003, describing such benefits at court as a “legitimate and important societal interest,” thus repudiating the 1986 claim that such benefits granted

‘special status’ (Interfaith Coalition for Marriage 2003). Eventually, the EFC went further, accepting relationship recognition for same-sex couples and, on civil unions, shifting from opposition to neutrality due to a lack of consensus amongst its membership (Parliament of

Canada 2003b).195 The combination of dropping biblical commentary, avoiding negative criticisms, and shifting policy stances mirrors the American study and over a much shorter time period, thus showing the EFC moderating on one of evangelicals’ most sensitive political issues.

Is this a kind of muting? It certainly seems so. Other factors should not be discounted – over time, new staff may join, bringing different views – but even during Stiller’s own tenure, the tone of the 1986 paper is never again repeated. Even beyond Stiller, the EFC presumably would willingly continue to cite the Bible but such language in Canada increasingly becomes perceived as a non sequitur. In the same way, pluralism discourses in Canada (more on this below) emanating from the Charter made harsh language condemning sexual minorities beyond the pale. The EFC thus maintains opposition to same-sex issues but must proceed with the language frames of the more dominant liberal society, which necessitates a more

195 Relationship recognition differs from civil unions as the former refers to creating a registration system for economically dependent relationships, which could include both same-sex couples and non-conjugal relationships (e.g. adult sisters living together, parent and adult child, etc.). This structure recognizes same-sex relationships on economic grounds and groups these relationships with other non-marital arrangements, thus preserving a unique status for heterosexual marriage. Civil unions, however, rest on conjugality and bring same-sex relationships closer in status to marriage. The EFC accepts the former but not the latter. 168 moderate and respectful approach.196 In totality, the EFC seems largely aligned with Canadians’ valuing of moderation and un-Americanism. On moderation, the lobby not only espouses the value but affectively models it, and shows evidence in recent decades of being muted into further moderating on one of their most important issues.

The Fellowship’s relationship with the other two political values – pluralism and secularity – is more complicated. Tensions appear as the EFC gives a qualified acceptance to both values but only by interpreting them a particular way. On secularity, the EFC’s executives support separating the institutions of church and state197 but reject secularism, defined as excluding religious voices from the public sphere.198 The EFC’s stance evolved over time from

Stiller’s originally jumbled position. Stiller always rhetorically rejected Christian nationalism which differentiates him and the EFC from the American Religious Right (1992:70; 1994b:70;

Stackhouse 1993:43). However, Stiller wavered on the practical implications of this rejection, lamenting when morning prayers were pulled from public schools and when references to

Christ were removed from the House of Common’s prayers (1989; 1994a). Patrick (2011: 104) explains that Stiller was originally quite dualist, seeing a monolithic secularism as opposing the church, a notion he inherited from American theologian Francis Schaeffer.199 Slowly however, key EFC mentors trained in theological and political thought led Stiller to see the state more

196 This change happens during Stiller’s tenure and does not stem from a change in leadership. Rather, Stiller is simply having to adopt, or mute, to the growing power of certain liberal frames. 197 All the lobbyists support the institutional separation of church and state. The real questions concern whether religious perspectives should exert influence in shaping laws and moral norms and whether or not the nation’s identity is Christian/Judeo-Christian. 198 I defined “secular” and “secularism” in the introduction whereby the former means non-religious and the latter is an ideology that seeks to marginalize religion. The EFC here makes similar distinctions but I did not use the EFC’s emic labels because their terminology is inconsistent even though they repeatedly make the conceptual distinction. 199 Schaeffer, incidentally, is one link connecting Stiller to the American Religious Right, for whom Schaeffer was a major influence. 169 positively and to see secular governance and Christianity as interrelated (ibid.:67-70). This culminated in Stiller starting to distinguish the secular (assessed somewhat positively) from a secularism that unfairly excludes religionists from the public sphere.

Since Stiller’s departure, this secular/secularism distinction has continued due to

Clemenger.200 Patrick (2011:80, 107) reports Gary Walsh, Stiller’s successor, relied on

Clemenger – then head of EFC’s Ottawa office – for political guidance and, in 2003, Clemenger himself became president. In his regular Faith Today columns to insiders, Clemenger reiterates

Stiller’s later views, calling Canada a “post-Christian and secular society” (2008a) whose

“secularist” outlook was “birthed out of Christendom” (2008b). Clemenger, like Stiller, accepts an institutionally distinct church and state but rejects that religious voices must be silent on public issues. He explains (2003) to outsiders (i.e. the press and parliament) that separating church and state takes many forms and excluding religious voices from public deliberation

“misunderstand[s] Canadian constitutional history, our traditions and our practice” and is “a form of secularism that is foreign to Canada” (EFC 2005d, 2005c).201 Addressing insiders in a

2006 Faith Today column, he strikes a similar chord, brushing aside any call for “a return to

19th century Christendom” and asking instead for an inclusive dialogue where “a plurality of perspectives” can be heard (2006a). Critically, Clemenger here argues to outsiders and to insiders for religionists’ right to speak, but makes his points using secular frames by calling for a “plurality of perspectives” to be heard. Clemenger and Don Hutchinson (another EFC

200 Another factor in this continuity is Paul Marshall’s mentorship. Marshall was one of the key influencers on Stiller referenced in the prior paragraph and was also Clemenger’s Masters supervisor at the Institute for Christian Studies in Toronto, from where Clemenger continues to pursue his doctorate (Institute for Christian Studies 2003). 201 I list two sources for the quotation because Clemenger used the same phrase in a press release and while speaking to the House of Commons legislative committee. 170 executive) acknowledge this need for secular arguments, saying that laws require public policy justifications and not religious rationales (Haskell 2011:314).202 Thus, on secularity, we witness multiple things happening. The EFC engages in muting as, while the organization would surely happily continue citing Bible verses as in the 1986 document cited above, this approach is not viable in the Canadian public square. Hence, the EFC continues to engage in public debate but must do so by adopting the dominant frame of exclusively secular reasoning, as per Haskell’s findings. Ardener also suggests that such processes can lead to internalization and we see evidence of this occurring as the EFC has become more receptive to secularity over time, adopting secularist frames with both insiders and outsiders (making such language more than tactics).203 Lastly, the EFC at least once, creatively subverted muting when they employed secular arguments at court that helped convince the judges to define secular governance inclusively (i.e. such that religious views are not excluded) (EFC and the Archdiocese of

Vancouver 2000; EFC 2010a, 2011a). This is a particularly fascinating episode as the EFC uses

202 The EFC’s use of secular reasoning draws on the natural law doctrine described earlier which suggests following God’s will, as adduced through reasoning about human nature, facilitates social well-being (see chapter 2). Hence, the lobby cites both religious and secular logic with insiders (i.e. evangelicals) but easily pivots to just secular reasons with outsider audiences, a muting move somewhat tempered by how natural law frames such secular reasons as further proof of the wisdom of following God’s order. This process is evident on same-sex marriage. The EFC’s (2006) main marriage document for insiders lists both biblical and secular justifications for defending traditional marriage. But when addressing outsiders such as the press (2005), parliament (Parliament of Canada 2003a; EFC 2003b), or the Supreme Court (Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and the Family 2004), the EFC mentioned their Christian perspective on marriage very briefly (Parliament of Canada 2003a), not at all (e.g. EFC 2005), or as one part of an interfaith coalition (Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and the Family 2004) while focussing primarily on secular reasons. Outsiders can interpret these arguments as secular logic while insiders can read them as evidence of natural law and thus as reinforcing their cosmological worldview. Natural law reasoning does not prevent muting but makes it theologically palatable and restores some agency for working within mutedness in a way that may feel less compromising. 203 These frames and rhetoric are espoused to insiders primarily via Faith Today and to outsiders via letters to the editor (2005c, 2006c), the press releases and parliamentary appearances noted above, and court cases (EFC and the Archdiocese of Vancouver 2000; EFC 2010a, 2011a). 171 dominant discursive frames204 not simply to argue a socially conservative position, but also to defend the right to make religious arguments – muting at court in order, paradoxically, to win a judgement that says muting is not legally required. In short, secularity reveals the EFC increasingly using the dominant non-religious idiom in a combination of muting, assimilation but also subversion, the latter helping to increase evangelicals’ agency.

A similar story unfurls on the fourth value, pluralism. Stiller originally felt pluralism was used to marginalize Christians but later embraced it as integral to defending religious freedom

(Patrick 2011:104-5). By 1990, a positive tone is trumpeted in a Faith Today article telling evangelicals, “Let’s make pluralism work” (Posterski 1990:21). Here, the lobby recognizes a dominant frame and shifts from opposition to adoption, realising that such dominant framing is the path to being heard. A seminal development in this transition was the EFC Social Action

Commission’s 1997 policy paper Being Christians in a Pluralistic Society. The policy paper itself is an artefact of muting – it addresses how to speak given this increasingly hegemonic language

– but moreover, it does something very interesting. The document criticizes liberal pluralism because it “trivializes difference” and demands liberal “homogenization,” whereas

“Christian…pluralism” grants space for genuine and potentially irreconcilable difference. This move plays with Ardener’s concept as the subordinate group adopts the dominant frame but then tries to change the frame’s meaning to allow more authentic expression, thus mingling muting with subversion. The lobby makes a similar move when it challenges the meaning of

“tolerance.” In the same Faith Today interview above where the newly promoted Clemenger

204 Two dominant discursive frames were used, namely secularity and pluralism. The lobby advocated for a secular Canada where no single religion or ideology has a monopoly on the conversation and also advocated for pluralism whereby all parties have a voice. Liberal frames were paramount to the EFC’s court presentation. 172 spoke to insiders about the state of affairs, he addressed interpretations of tolerance and how it impacts evangelicals:

Our society’s common notion of tolerance is being reshaped in Canada. It has evolved from a recognition of difference to a celebration and affirmation of diverse faiths and lifestyles. In this current understanding of what tolerance and respect entail, evangelism and the belief that others should be converted to one’s faith are understood to express intolerance and a challenge of the dignity and identity of those we seek to evangelize. The presumption that someone else’s faith might be in error or that Jesus is the only way is seen as disrespectful and intolerant, and sharing one’s faith is understood as a hostile act (Stiller, K. 2003).

Clemenger again affectively models moderation, patiently explaining how changing perceptions of tolerance leave evangelicals trapped between their theology and social norms.

His qualm is not with tolerance per se, but how tolerance’s meaning is morphing.205 In the paragraph subsequent to the quote above, Clemenger actually encourages muting by urging readers to speak in the dominant group’s idiom. He skillfully sells this idea by reminding Faith

Today readers that the Apostle Paul used the “philosophy and theology” of the Roman world as an “entry point” to preach about Jesus and, hence, “We need to learn the language of engagement for our time and in our society” (Stiller, K. 2003). Clemenger’s approach here intrigues in relation to Ardener’s theory: on the one hand, he encourages adopting dominant frames precisely as Ardener predicts but then Clemenger performs a kind of twist by describing such muting as a historically Christian tactic – it’s what Paul did. Thus, it is not only savvy but

205 Clemenger’s view on tolerance partially resonates with political theorist Lars Tonder. Tonder argues tolerance used to mean enduring what is unpleasant rather than reframing difference as a positive (effectively denying that difference might be unpleasant) (2006). 173

Christian to speak in the language of pluralism and tolerance, the dominant discourses of the society, perhaps evoking the biblical admonition to be wise as serpents and innocent as doves.

The EFC follows Clemenger’s lead and regularly speaks in the language of tolerance/pluralism to make its case – thus following Paul but not citing him. During the same-sex marriage debate,

EFC executives wrote numerous letters to newspapers rebutting accusations of intolerance by insisting on their right to hold a different opinion (e.g. Buckingham 2006; Clemenger 2006b,

2006c). Indeed, the lobby often reversed the accusation as with Clemenger’s letter to the editor of the Globe and Mail where he asks whether same-sex marriage support was now a

“McCarthy-like litmus test” for social acceptance (Clemenger 2006c). Clemenger thus uses pluralism and tolerance against political opponents. EFC’s in-house lawyer Faye Sonier similarly employs pluralism, rather than Christian theology, to criticize the Ontario government for forcing Ontario Catholic schools to accept gay allied student clubs despite Catholic doctrinal objections. Sonier claimed denying conservative religionists’ views in the only publicly funded religious school system enforced a “non-diverse diversity,” whereas Canadians should foster a

“diverse diversity” instead (2011a).206 Thus, Sonier argues for religionists’ rights using the dominant framing of pluralism. Likewise, the EFC’s Centre for Faith and Public Life blog, directed largely at insiders, wrote that marriage commissioners unwilling to perform same-sex marriages should keep their jobs, since a pluralist state should mirror the nation’s diversity by

206 Again, the EFC speaks consistently to both evangelical and public audiences. Sonier’s comments above appear in the EFC’s political blog which likely attracts more insiders than outsiders. However, in public venues she likewise claims that diversity must include evangelicals. Thus, in a letter to the editor of a national newspaper she (2010) accused an article’s author of treating religionists pejoratively, retorting that a “truly diverse society” must include the religiously devout. A second example is Sonier’s (2011b) public letter to the Saskatchewan Minister of Justice (also published in the National Post) where she says the minister’s decision regarding marriage commissioners falls short of being “truly committed to a diverse multicultural society.” The EFC has thus internalized pluralist language (a hallmark of Canadian liberalism), employing it comfortably and repeatedly with both insiders and outsiders. This adoption of dominant frames exemplifies the concept of muting. 174 including public servants with divergent views (Centre for Faith and Public Life Staff 2011). In court cases as well, the EFC frequently appeals to pluralism (EFC 2001b, 2010a, 2011a). Thus, we see the EFC using pluralist appeals with constituents, the media, and in state settings like courtrooms. Surely, EFC executives are not driven to speak so frequently of pluralism or to call for a “diverse diversity” due to gospel traditions. Rather, in Canada, diversity discourses are so powerful that the lobby simply must adopt these frames to credibly voice their objectives. This liberal language occurs with insiders and outsiders, showing that such discourse is not just public posturing but a normal feature of the EFC’s language.207 Per Ardener, the lobby has internalized these liberal norms into their own ways of reasoning and talking.

Lastly, internalizing pluralist norms is both evident in and reinforced by new behaviours. Social acts affect cognition and the EFC has been driven by the hegemonic power of Canadian multiculturalism to engage in interfaith alliances. In 1990, Faith Today trumpeted the EFC’s “ground-breaking” decision to work with Catholics on abortion (FT Staff 1990a). It was not ground-breaking for long: within a few years, the EFC allied with Muslims and Sikhs to fight for government funding of religious schools. Pluralism equally became instrumental to the EFC’s same-sex marriage fight. While the lobby’s first legal intervention on the issue was in

207 When Patrick analysed the EFC, she said the lobby embraced pluralism owing to Paul Marshall, who drew on Christian political thought (i.e. Christian Reformed’s Kuyperian “pillarization” model) (2011:69-70). Patrick’s analysis might undermine my claim that the EFC’s pluralist shift reflects liberal muting since she attributes it to Christian sources. However, I think Patrick’s claim can be reconciled with my own if we consider context. If Christianity is a kind of toolkit (Swidler 1986), then the EFC’s finding Christian pluralist tools likely stems from the pressure in Canada to address pluralism – hence, America’s evangelical community has not adapted similarly since they do not face the same pressures. Evangelicalism often absorbs cultural norms by redefining them as Christian (e.g. see Gallagher 2003 on how evangelicals internalize gender egalitarianism). The issue here is not authenticity as cultural adaptations are normal for religions – rather the issues are: i) how the cultural context presses certain developments (in this case discourse and theorizing around pluralism) while making alternative speech forms less viable (i.e. a form of muting); ii) how such shifts are legitimated within the community (i.e. by digging through Christian history for models); and iii) how such shifts can enhance agency as when the EFC uses pluralism to counter anti-evangelical prejudice (i.e. subverting mutedness). 175 an evangelical coalition with Focus, REAL Women, and others, thereafter the lobby tried leveraging Canada’s multicultural ethos by forming an Interfaith Coalition with Catholic,

Muslim and Sikh groups (Patrick 2011:45, 190, 206; see also Interfaith Coalition for Marriage

2003; Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and the Family 2003, 2004).208 This interaction has impacted the EFC. Clemenger (2008c) attests in Faith Today that these new partnerships taught him that other faith communities share his concerns with secularism and during

Clemenger’s presidency, Faith Today has been editorially generous to other religious communities by contextualizing Sikh political violence in light of the community’s past persecution (Beverley 2004), cautioning readers against blaming Muslim immigrants for issues like polygamy (Clemenger 2008c), and even suggesting Muslims worship the same god as

Christians (Perry 2006). In recent years, the interfaith cooperation begun on social conservatism has spread onto other issues. Thus, the EFC attended a 2010 international interfaith summit in Winnipeg, a forum on poverty, launched a recurring twice yearly dialogue with the Roman Catholic bishops in 2011, and now, stunningly, plays a lead role in the

Canadian Interfaith Conversation, a dialogue of over 40 faith communities about religion’s contribution to Canadian life (Faith Today Staff 2010; Faith Today Staff 2011). Pluralism here has evolved from discourse to practice. In marked distinction from its 1983 stance, the EFC now advocates for pluralism, has decades of interfaith experience, and lists “Interfaith and

Interchurch” as a main topic on its website (EFC 2017b). On pluralism, Ardener’s predictions are fully realized with the EFC adopting and internalizing liberal frames into their reasoning, rhetoric, and even behaviours.

208 Even when Focus intervened on the same case as the EFC, the EFC avoided partnering with its evangelical peer and instead continued to lead the Interfaith Coalition while Focus spearheaded a separate evangelical coalition. 176

In summary, the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada is an excellent test case for examining the concept of muting as the lobby’s responses are both varied and, at times, innovative. One dynamic evident is the interplay of alignment, conscious muting, and internalization. Relatively high alignment can make public acceptability seem within reach which, in turn, encourages muting to achieve such inclusion. Such conscious muting, however, risks the slow internalization of certain values which thus fosters greater alignment, and so on.

This process creates a path for assimilating certain cultural frames such as secularity. The lobby’s responses also varied significantly by the value considered. On being un-American and on moderation, muting was barely evident as the EFC mostly fit these values (the one exception being evidence of moderation over time on LGBTQ issues). However, on secularity and especially pluralism, the EFC has had to accommodate itself to the dominance of these frames. Muting constrains both by what it prevents and what it necessitates. In terms of prevention, muting means drawing on the Bible or religious sources of authority has virtually been eliminated from the EFC’s public speech as it easily serves to delegitimize the speaker.

What muting necessitates is voicing one’s goals through the dominant discourses and so the

EFC rethought its relationship to the secular and readily frames its arguments in pluralistic terms. On the latter, the EFC has gone beyond language by adopting new behaviours, first working with Catholics on a court case but now with an ongoing and significant presence in

Canada’s interfaith circles. The lobby is certainly not passive, however, in adjusting to muting pressures and shows ingenuity on several fronts. We witnessed the EFC using pluralism discourses at court to help win a judgement that justifies religious participation, thus muting subversively specifically to prevent further legal pressures to mute. We also witnessed the lobby taking on terms like the secular and diversity but only subject to redefining these terms 177 to make them more consistent with Christian doctrine. Here we see both muting and resisting muting since the frames are imposed by the dominant culture but the lobby tries to rework them to allow more authentic Christian expression. And with natural law and the notion of mimicking Paul, the lobby mutes to dominant frames but aligns this behaviour with Christian thinking and example. Again here, the pressure comes from the dominant culture and forces adjustment, but the lobby finds a way to soften the sense of constraint. Overall, muting pressures have altered the EFC’s language and even its behaviours as per Ardener, but the lobby has been anything but passive in trying to find authentic expression within the restrictions it faces.

Coda on the EFC: Trying to Shape Canadian Evangelical Identity

Scholars note that while the EFC is supposedly a representative body for evangelicals, it is more leadership-driven than membership-driven (Patrick 2011:89; Stackhouse 1995a:173-

77). Put differently, Patrick and Stackhouse claim the lobby’s leaders do not merely reflect members’ concerns but seem to push evangelicals in certain directions. Patrick and Stackhouse zero in on how EFC leaders promote ecumenism and political activism but the lobby also promotes the values outlined above – moderation, being “un-American,” and the EFC’s version of pluralism and the secular. Early issues of the EFC’s Faith Alive magazine (directed at insiders) repeatedly describe Canadian evangelicals as not American, moderate and politically diverse

(e.g. Faith Alive Staff 1983b; Jantz 1984; Stiller 1986). Studies confirm there is some merit to these claims but the EFC’s insistent tone aims to persuade, not merely report (Reimer 2003;

Bean 2009; Rawlyk 1996). The effort seems only partly effective for while Stiller was criticizing

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American Christian leaders during the 1980s, Canadian evangelicals nonetheless watched

American Christian programs as much as Canadian ones and donated generously to American ministries (Stiller, Miller and Dorsch 1985). In the 1990s, scholar George Rawlyk found

Canadian evangelicals recognized prominent American evangelicals more than Canadian leaders (1996:140). A member-driven organization would reflect Canadian evangelicals’ interest in the American evangelical community but, aside from criticism, the EFC ignores

American evangelicalism, with no alliances or partnerships with U.S.-based organizations, and no discussion of American evangelical politics, leaders, or think tanks.

The EFC also repeatedly informs (persuades?) Canada’s evangelicals that they are politically diverse. Political diversity reinforces the EFC’s ideal of Canadian evangelicals as both moderate and distinct from the American Religious Right and, hence, the lobby insists such diversity exists (e.g. Stiller 1991, 1996; Today Staff 1994; Hutchinson and Hiemstra 2009).

Indeed, Canadian evangelicals are more politically diverse than their American peers but the

EFC clearly promotes this view. Consequently, Faith Today was decidedly cool to the founding of the Christian Heritage Party and Reform Party in the late 1980s as both were populist vehicles for harnessing evangelical conservatism, thus undermining claims that evangelicals are politically diverse (Tarr 1986; Orvik 1987; Marshall 1991). The magazine warned that such parties risk a “dreary repetition of extreme right-wing politics” that would be a “disservice to responsible evangelicals” and of “no service to Canada” (Tarr 1986:14). Such hostility toward two new political parties with significant evangelical presence in both their membership and leadership shows the EFC’s aversion to American models. The Reform Party’s subsequent success again exposes a gap between the EFC’s idealized vision of evangelicals and reality as

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Canada’s evangelicals do show a pronounced rightward lean, although less so than among

American evangelicals.209 Most intriguing was the EFC’s 2009 study, mentioned in chapter two, in which the EFC wrote that evangelical voting patterns from 1996-2008 prove Canadian evangelicals do not lean conservative – however, the data shows precisely the opposite, namely, a pronounced rightward lean that may even be growing over time (Hutchinson and

Hiemstra 2009).210 Of course, important differences exist between Canadian and American evangelicals, but the EFC desires these differences, magnifies them, and promotes them as identity markers. None of the other lobbies studied herein – which all lean more rightward – share this vision. In fact, when faced with an evangelical who clashes with the EFC’s portrait, such as CFAC’s Charles McVety, EFC’s Don Hutchinson overtly distances McVety from Canadian evangelicals, telling the National Post:

While there are points where Rev. McVety's opinions and those of the broader Canadian evangelical community intersect, it would be a mistake to conclude that either he or his opinions are representative. I've said before that Charles' theological position is at one end of the spectrum of Canadian

209 I have data on evangelical voting for the 2004, 2006, and 2015 elections which show they voted disproportionately for Conservatives with the gap versus the Conservatives’ overall vote share being 21 points, 27 points and 20 points respectively (Todd 2005; Gruending 2008; Todd 2016). In all three elections, the Conservatives secured a majority of evangelical votes (ranging from 51% to 63%), a notable accomplishment given there were three major parties and minor parties as well. Evangelicals’ support for the Liberal Party was below the Liberals’ national results in those three elections by 5 points, 14 points, and 20 points respectively (Todd 2005; Gruending 2008; Todd 2016). Interestingly, the Liberals won the 2015 election but their evangelical support was even worse than in earlier periods. Pollster Andrew Grenville adds a final data point which is that in 2008, fully three-quarters of church-going evangelicals voted Conservative, leading Grenville to conclude that evangelicals’ have shifted strongly towards voting Conservative in the new millennium (Todd 2008; see also Gidengil et al. 2009 for similar conclusions). 210 The study is complicated as it gives regional, not national, numbers and the parties on Canada’s right change names and merge over time. If we focus on the two regions with the most evangelicals, the study shows that out West, evangelical support for Reform was 13 points above the average in 1996, growing to a 20 point gap for the successor Conservative Party in 2004 and a 29 point gap in 2006. In Ontario, evangelical support for Reform was 8 points above the average in 1996, growing to a 20 point gap for the Conservatives in 2004 but down to a 10 point gap in 2006. Overall, the numbers show a fairly significant double-digit lean and other commentators similarly noted this disconnect between the data and the EFC’s conclusions (Gruending 2009b; Todd 2009b). 180

evangelicalism and his American perspective draws attention and stirs up conversation (Lewis 2010).

Critical here are not just Hutchinson’s views but his proclaiming them in a national newspaper.211 The public disclosure combined with the adjective “American” – a term that grates with the EFC when others apply it to Canadian evangelicals – ostracizes McVety and shapes evangelical identity around what they are not. Here, the EFC reinforces the national mythos that immoderate means un-Canadian while insisting (to the public and its own constituents) that it means “not Canadian evangelical” either. In short, the EFC pushes evangelicals to see themselves as moderate, politically diverse, and un-American.

CFAC – High Conflict and its Consequences

The Canada Family Action Coalition occupies the opposite pole from the EFC. Where the latter leans towards alignment and even adopting core Canadian political values, CFAC is the least muted lobby, starkly rejecting dominant liberal norms both ideationally and affectively. CFAC’s leaders stand on principle, unyielding in resisting cultural shifts they believe threaten the nation’s moral fabric. This strategy creates predictable friction with the culture and may compromise CFAC’s long term viability as an organization.

On the question of moderation, the EFC and CFAC take almost diametrically opposed approaches. Whereas Stiller championed moderation and derided “fundamentalism,” (finding the term insulting), CFAC’s Brian Rushfeldt defended non-violent religious fundamentalism as

211 Hutchinson made similar comments about McVety on another occasion (Canwest 2008). 181 principled (2006a).212 Similarly, where Clemenger (2008b) encouraged “civility,” CFAC’s McVety strikes a different tone, warning in a National Post interview that “appeasement” will not suffice in fighting “evil” (Lewis 2010). The EFC encourages moderation and temperance but

CFAC fears apathy and passivity. This distinction fits each lobby’s organizational model. The

Tory-oriented EFC encourages moderation and dialogue, privileging an elite-driven insider approach that suits the organization’s executive lawyers and political theorist president. CFAC, however, does not share the EFC’s central Canadian Tory heritage, emerging instead from

Albertan populism. Populism’s lifeblood is not moderation but grassroots outrage and hence

CFAC frequently demonizes opponents and stokes fear, which suits its leaders’ personal convictions and drives fundraising by stoking donors’ concerns. Accordingly, CFAC targets the most emotionally charged issues, particularly those pairing children with sex including child pornography, pedophilia, age of consent laws, and sex education. All the lobbies address these topics but they dominate CFAC’s agenda. The lobby’s tone is negative and critical so that on gay rights, for example, CFAC describes the gay lifestyle213 as fraught with physical and emotional health risks including high rates of AIDS, anal cancer, depression, suicide, substance abuse, and a substantially shorter lifespan (2009c).214 The lobbyists also deprecate morally, claiming homosexuals are intrinsically promiscuous and prioritize “sexual gratification,” indicating “selfishness, not love” (CFAC 2008e). In the following piece on CFAC’s website (thus targeting insiders) provocatively titled “Justice Minister caves to homosexual whiners,” Brian

212 CFAC staff’s comments are usually drawn from the organization’s website where it continually posts articles that are publicly available but directed largely at insiders. For simplicity, I ask readers to assume materials are web-postings unless otherwise indicated. 213 CFAC and Focus often presume a uniform “gay lifestyle.” 214 CFAC and Focus draw on a discredited American researcher named Dr. Paul Cameron to support many of these claims. 182

Rushfeldt complains about the British Columbia Attorney General’s ruling permitting the province’s Ministry of Education to contract with two gay men to review school curriculum for heterosexist biases:

In an atrocious cave-in to homosexual activists the BC Attorney General caters to the whims and agenda of homosexuals to indoctrinate children.

Teaching children that homosexual behavior is equivalent to heterosexual acts is a lie - it is misleading, deceptive and should be illegal in a public school.

Society would not tolerate the medical profession trying new unproven vaccines on children, but we allow unproven and false social engineering to be forced upon our children. Teaching partial information knowingly excluding certain other facts is tantamount to fraudulent activity….For instance if the risks and facts that male homosexual acts have the highest rate of AIDs and many other diseases is not included in the lesson, then the school is guilty of giving false information. If children are told that sodomy (and that term ought to be used as it is the only factual and correct term for that kind of act), causes physical harm to the human body then the teacher and school ought to be sued for false and misleading information. (CFAC 2008d, italics in original)

The tone differs sharply from the EFC’s. Patient moderation is replaced by an anger affect conveyed via “sodomy,” labeling opponents “homosexual whiners” in the title, and through antagonistic terms like “fraudulent,” “illegal,” and “cave-in.” Even italicizing the whole paragraph expresses stridency. These affective elements bolster Rushfeldt’s call for uncompromising actions like suing teachers and schools. This piece is typical of CFAC on homosexuality, affectively moving past respectful disagreement to portray gay sexuality as repulsive through harsh vocabulary such as “perverted,” “sick,” “sodomy,” and “buggery” (ibid.

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2007e, 2004d, 2009a). CFAC is an intervention, disrupting values of moderation, tolerance and accommodation via affects of fear, disgust and urgency. The lobby’s approach mimics the

Christian jeremiad, warning against moral decay and impending civilizational collapse. This aura of threat leads the lobby to advocate for punishment including tougher criminal sentencing (unique among the lobbies) and, as mentioned in chapter two, creating a website that tracks convicted pedophiles. The lobby’s appetite for confrontation over moderation extends to lobbying methods as McVety and Rushfeldt have readily used pressure tactics including publicizing MP votes, announcing a “hit list” of MPs to defeat in elections, and working to oust moderate Conservatives in nomination battles (Naumetz 2003; Arron 2006).

Recall that CFAC also initiated corporate boycotts in Canada and urged supporters to join in the

American Religious Right’s boycotts,215 while Rushfeldt encouraged suing educators. Thus, from issue selection to tactics to rhetorical style, CFAC’s lobbyists decisively reject the

Canadian privileging of moderation.

Just as CFAC rejects Canadians’ valorization of moderation, the lobby also rebuffs pluralism. Admittedly, their comments on pluralism occasionally resemble the EFC’s by claiming tolerance and diversity have been deformed and rendered hypocritical. Thus, CFAC cites articles that claim “diversity orthodoxy” is being used to persecute rather than to protect

Scott Brockie (Gunter 2002), and they denounce the label “homophobia” as an attempt to silence a “diversity of views” (Rushfeldt 2008b). Rushfeldt summarizes on CFAC’s website that

“While Canada boasts of her tolerance, diversity and plurality, it excludes, discriminates

215 CFAC initiated boycotts against Royal Bank, Canadian Tire and Famous Players Theatres, and joined in the American boycotts against Proctor & Gamble and Wal-Mart. In all cases, the corporations were targeted for perceived support of gay rights. 184 against and is now persecuting Christians” (CFAC 2007d). Like the EFC, CFAC claims true diversity or tolerance would protect Christians’ right to disagree.

However, despite these occasional similarities, CFAC’s overall response to pluralism differs substantially from the EFC’s. Some of CFAC’s rejection dovetails with their opposition to moderation as their tendency to categorize adversaries as unequivocal enemies precludes supporting diversity, instead forcing a win-or-lose binary, a sort of war for the nation’s soul.

Rushfeldt demonstrates this when he criticized the Quebec Human Rights Commission for defining homophobia and heterosexism as “feelings of fear and aversion” towards homosexuals, a move he calls totalitarian:

Interestingly enough the intolerant sex activists are not satisfied with having the actions of those who harm others outlawed (which they are and have been). They want everyone who has "thoughts" of opposition to sodomy outlawed. And now in fact a move to have anyone who has "feelings" that may not align with certain sex desires or behaviors should persecuted if not prosecuted (sic)….So now we need thought police and feeling police to go after all those bigoted, homophobic, hateful, intolerant people who will not cower or cave into endorsing, affirming, or even engaging in such a thing as sodomy.

Interestingly the so called human rights commissions, champions of human rights, don't care about anyone's right to feel or have aversion to sodomy, a behavior destructive to the human body and very prolific at spreading diseases - some of them deadly. (CFAC 2007h, underlining in original)

There is no room for pluralism here – Rushfeldt’s menacing portrayal of “thought and feeling police” combined with his denigrating vocabulary (i.e. “sodomy”) excludes diversity, as either

185 an ethical or pragmatic solution to moral conflict. CFAC’s ideological opposition to pluralism also manifests in its attitude towards Muslims. McVety brought famous anti-Muslim Dutch politician Geert Wilders to Canada to speak on the Islamic threat (Hume 2011). In interviews concerning Wilders’ visit, McVety publicly attacked Islam through both ideas and affect, describing it as a “political and cultural system” with a “mandate” for a “hostile takeover”

(Hume 2011). As with Rushfeldt above, McVety’s military metaphors foreclose diversity as an option. Rushfeldt (2012a) shares this hostility to Islam, verbally backing two harsh critics of

Islam – Ezra Levant and Mark Steyn – and, after an honour killing involving a Muslim immigrant, calling for tighter immigration since immigrants “want to bring their own beliefs,” to Canada (Patriot Update 2011). Despite CFAC’s immense hostility to diversity language, the diversity discourse is so powerful that even they cannot avoid working within it at times.

Hence, CFAC occasionally switches directions and opportunistically uses diversity to bolster religious persecution claims. For example, CFAC charged that pro-gay policies marginalize

Muslims (CFAC 2004g) and the lobby also held a joint press conference with a liberal Muslim group to oppose legalizing polygamy, successfully gaining media coverage owing to the legitimacy garnered by the multi-faith front.216 Most tellingly, as the 2005 House of Commons vote on legalizing same-sex marriage approached, the lobbyists muted their feelings about other religions and formed a loose multi-faith alliance with Muslims, Buddhists and Sikhs, called the Defend Marriage Coalition which quickly dissolved after the vote (Gordon 2005). In short, CFAC’s leaders strongly oppose pluralism but this frame is so powerful that, on some issues, the lobby feels compelled to use pluralist language and imagery to pursue its goals.

216 Media articles focussed on the unusual combination of the two groups as the visual of them side by side successfully captured attention. (e.g. Ivison 2009; Gyapong 2009). 186

CFAC approaches the third value – secularity – similarly, pivoting between rejecting secularity and ‘muting’ because of it. CFAC echoes the EFC’s complaints about secularism but without the EFC’s nuanced parsing of redeeming versus problematic interpretations of the secular. Like the EFC, CFAC accepts institutionally separating church and state, but, unlike the

EFC, affirms Christian nationalism. Hence, CFAC’s website consistently declares Christianity (or

Judeo-Christianity) is “foundational to Canadian society,” and they regularly hark back to a better era when Christian hegemony set public norms (2000, 2003a, 2013, 2016). Rushfeldt, for example, contended in a public speech and on the website that neither Canada nor the school system should be understood as secular (2006c, 2010).217 Despite this ideological stance, however, secularity, like pluralism above, exerts enormous cultural power and much as it may frustrate CFAC, at times the lobby finds it must adapt to this reality and background (or mute) its religious commitments to express itself through the societally dominant language.

This manifests on multiple fronts. One example is CFAC’s name. The initial Religious Right organizations that emerged in America circa 1980 chose names displaying their religious and moral mandate including the National Christian Action Coalition, Christian Voice, the Religious

Roundtable and the Moral Majority. However, by the mid-1980s, organizations dropped references to Christianity, the Bible or even morality and opted for more secular concerns like the family, realizing that overt Christian references hindered their reach. Newer organizational names included the Family Research Council, the Liberty Federation, and the American

Freedom Coalition (Moen 1992:128). CFAC follows this pattern with a name highlighting family

217 Rushfeldt here is not claiming schools should be confessional but that they should not exclude religion and religious perspectives. 187 and Canada, thus foregrounding more secular concerns.218 A second example of muting comes from Haskell’s study cited earlier where he showed that all the lobbies, including CFAC, gave only secular reasons when opposing same-sex marriage in their media interactions. Given

CFAC’s Christian nationalism, its biblical objections to same-sex marriage as violating God’s law, and its strong rejection of secularity, this clearly demonstrates the kind of necessary compromise Ardener describes. Muting is also evident in how CFAC turns to natural law, speaking to insiders about “natural law” (CFAC 2008e) or equivalent terms like “biological reality” (CFAC 2008d), and leaning on this notion in public forums. Thus, Rushfeldt opens his parliamentary appearance on same-sex marriage by advocating for the “natural family…not as a matter of…divine revelation…but as a matter of natural law” (Parliament of Canada 2003a).

Natural law is an intriguing term with respect to muting since it is actually part of Christian theology but can sound more secular to a partly non-Christian audience at Parliament.219

Secular muting also manifested in Peter Stock’s biography when he ran as a Conservative candidate in 2004, as Stock listed only that he worked for an unnamed advocacy group since a

Christian lobbying background is a liability (Globe and Mail Staff 2004). Overall, CFAC approaches secularity as it approaches pluralism, ideologically opposed but sometimes having to adopt these powerful frames in outsider settings in their search to achieve political ends.

On the fourth value, CFAC defies Canada’s un-American cultural norm. Recall CFAC’s founders sought Ralph Reed’s advice when launching the lobby and how McVety has invited

218 Note this is an example of muting on secularity that applies even in the United States. Indeed, one such American organization that adapted to this new trend is Focus on the Family whose Canadian branch shares the parent’s more secular-friendly name. 219 Unlike Focus, which we will see later in this chapter systematically mutes itself in public forums, CFAC is inconsistent with such public muting. Later in this chapter, we will explore CFAC’s 2004 appearance before parliament where CFAC’s presenter, Dr. Andre Lafrance, made no such concessions. 188

Reed and other prominent Americans to speak in Canada (i.e. Jerry Falwell, Glenn Beck, and

Karl Rove). McVety shared in an interview that his models were Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and John Hagee (all Americans), explaining that whereas “Canadians love to appease," his

American mentors taught him differently (Lewis 2010).220 Rushfeldt also regards American evangelicals as worth emulating, telling an American magazine that Canadian evangelicals were “10 years behind” their American brethren (Spendlove 2002). Unlike the EFC, CFAC tracks and reports on American events, publishes American Religious Right articles on their website, joins in their boycotts, and clearly sees them as allies or even exemplars in a transnational struggle.

In sum, the Canada Family Action Coalition is the least muted lobby, overtly rejecting all four of the values identified. Yet, tellingly, the lobby nonetheless makes concessions on secularity, moderation, and pluralism at different times. Indeed, the multi-faith Defend

Marriage Coalition that McVety cobbled together to fight same-sex marriage was rather striking given the anti-Muslim rhetoric and Christian nationalism spouted in other settings. To be clear, muting here is merely tactical and reveals no evidence of internalization for secular or pluralist discourses are not used with insiders as the EFC does, but only with outsiders on occasions where the ends justifies the means. That CFAC, which most vociferously rejects liberal values, nonetheless feels the need to sometimes mask their views, speaks to the great constraints the lobbyists face in gaining a hearing.

220 In this respect, McVety may fit the “American” label Hutchinson gives him but we should recall many Canadian evangelicals look to American preachers for leadership as shown by Canadian evangelicals’ viewing habits and willingness to donate to these ministries. 189

Lastly, CFAC presents an interesting study on the consequences of rejecting core

Canadian political values and muting as little as possible. This path has yielded some success as the lobby claimed 40,000 members at one point and McVety shows talent at garnering press attention, occasionally embarrassing governments and forcing them to respond (CFAC 2011a).

However, the lobby’s stance may also compromise its long-term viability. CFAC’s budget has always seemed threadbare and may be declining. Whereas at the height of the same-sex marriage debate, CFAC had Rushfeldt and two administrative staff (plus some of McVety’s time),221 today the organization consists solely of Rushfeldt’s replacement, Doug Sharpe.

CFAC’s activity level in terms of emails, parliamentary appearances, and press conferences is significantly down. Earlier, we saw Rushfeldt disclosed that CFAC’s supporter base is also quite old and the combination of a lean budget, bare staff, and elderly membership all suggest a precarious future (Family Action Radio 2009). Tying CFAC’s organizational weakness to its political stance might seem unsubstantiated based on a sample size of one organization, but further confidence comes from knowing that the lobbies most analogous to CFAC face or have faced similar challenges. REAL Women, CFAC’s most consistent ally that mirror’s CFAC’s tone and stances, was the subject of a dissertation that concluded the lobby had an aged membership, no bench strength (i.e. was a one-person shop) and an uncertain future (Blakely

2008). A second intriguing comparison is Tristan Emmanuel who founded Equipping Christians for the Public Square (ECP) in 1999, taking on full-time leadership in 2005. Emmanuel garnered attention as a young, well-educated, and charismatic preacher whose oratorical skills and polemical content quickly put him on the map and secured him media attention including a

221 To parliament, McVety said he was a “volunteer president” (Parliament of Canada 2008). 190 feature article in the Globe and Mail (Valpy 2005). Like CFAC, he rejected many Canadian norms by heavily condemning Islam222 and overtly expressed solidarity with the American

Religious Right.223 Despite early successes organizing some well attended rallies, influencing some Conservative nomination outcomes (Valpy 2005), and expanding into radio, Emmanuel quickly ran into financial troubles. Emmanuel left the organization in 2008 and it survived as a mere website managed by Tim Bloedow until closing in 2010. That a talent like Emmanuel could not make this confrontational approach work for more than a few years, speaks to the cost of brazenly defying dominant cultural discourses on moderation, pluralism, secularity and being un-American.224 Cumulatively, Emmanuel’s failure, REAL’s weakness, and CFAC’s challenges suggest that refusing to mute, rejecting dominant Canadian norms and being unwilling to speak in these idioms, may alienate younger evangelicals raised in the Charter era.

Evidence exists that younger evangelicals are indeed more liberal225 meaning the lobbies’ subordinate population may be drifting under the pull of the dominant ethos. Muting, it seems, is required in order to be a viable voice – CFAC mutes the least and its viability is threatened.

222 Emmanuel also occasionally muted himself for Canadian pluralism. Despite persistently condemning multiculturalism and Islam, Emmanuel organized a multi-faith rally to defend traditional marriage which included a Muslim speaker (ECP Centre 2005b). I encountered no harsher critic of Canadian pluralism than Emmanuel but even he felt the need to compromise on this value to gain public credibility. 223 Emmanuel’s book Warned: Canada’s Revolution Against Faith, Family and Freedom Threatens America targeted Americans and he did an American book tour to promote it. 224 I have not detailed Emmanuel’s positions but he clearly defies all four normative values. 225 Bibby’s 2004 study showed a significant generational gap on homosexuality as support among weekly attending evangelicals was only 2% for those over age 35 but 18% for those under 35. More recent data are not available but given American trends, it is likely these numbers have since climbed. Reimer notes that his research shows younger evangelicals are taking more liberal views on same-sex marriage, on gender issues (like women working outside the home) and on the environment (Longhurst 2019; see also Wilkins-Laflamme and Reimer 2019:873). 191

Focus/IMFC – Strategic Adoption

While Focus on the Family (Canada) is ideologically close to CFAC, its systematic muting means its public response to core Canadian political values lies between CFAC’s and the EFC’s.

Focus routinely re-encodes their message for different ears, often performing two levels of translation. First, they translate their American parent’s message for Canadian evangelical ears by filtering for Canadian sensibilities. This process likely reflects differences in outlook between the Canadian and American operations, and tactical decisions about how certain content plays in Canada. The lobbyists also translate their message a second time for outsider audiences for purely tactical reasons. All the lobbies mute – silencing aspects of themselves; expressing their aspirations using dominant frames and values – but none pursues it as systematically as Focus.

What really sets Focus apart, however, is the apex of these efforts: the IMFC. For a decade, the

Institute acted as a seemingly non-religious family think tank, wrapping its message and its public identity in a strictly secular package. The stark contrast with Focus USA’s family think tank, the overtly Christian Family Research Council (FRC), shows Focus’ views not only about what kind of speech can be heeded in the Canadian public sphere but even what kind of speaker.

Turning to our first value, on moderation, we find Focus shares CFAC’s concerns and not the EFC’s alignment. Whereas numerous EFC executives (e.g. Stiller, Clemenger, and

Hutchinson) identify evangelicals with Canadian moderateness, former Focus president Darrel

Reid saw moderation as a problem. Addressing the public in a 2002 Globe and Mail editorial,

Reid criticized Canada’s most right leaning political party at the time, the Alliance, for moderating its stances to enhance electability, denouncing the move as unfortunately a “very

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Canadian solution” (Reid 2002).226 Again, at a banquet raising money for Focus’s traditional marriage campaign, Reid warned his Christian audience against being “passive spectators, typically Canadian” (Woodard 2004). Similar sentiments come from Focus Vice President of

Public Policy, Jim Sclater, who in a Citizen article aimed at evangelicals, urged readers to “shake off their Charter-induced lethargy and strongly defend the basic concept of the family” (1998b, italics original). Sclater’s reference to “Charter-induced” and Reid’s “typically Canadian” comment both fit the EFC’s view that being conciliatory is considered Canadian, but whereas the EFC sees this as a virtue, Focus sees it as a weakness (i.e. passivity and lethargy). To combat such passivity, the lobby’s Citizen newsletter – directed at insiders – frequently aimed to raise readers’ emotional intensity. Mimicking CFAC, the Citizen stirred passions via alarming stories such as alleging Canadian medical researchers buy and sell abortion-procured fetal parts on a black market, thus linking abortion to illegal profit-taking (McGovern 2000). Focus’s take on moderation is especially evident in Jim Sclater’s interview just after he assumed new duties as

Coordinator of Church Relations and head of the Christian Citizenship Initiative (i.e. Focus’s political activism arm). This piece mirrors the earlier Clemenger interview (upon becoming the

EFC’s new president) as both lobby executives upon taking up new roles, use their in-house

226 Focus usually condemns moderation only to insiders but here Reid responds in a national newspaper to attacks on social conservatives’ place in Canadian politics and also to criticize the most socially conservative political party (the Canadian Alliance Party) for softening on family values issues. Reid’s audiences are the general public and all Alliance Party supporters including its many social conservatives. Note also whereas the EFC’s Bruce Clemenger cautioned evangelicals to never “impose” their views, here Reid castigates Canadian Alliance leadership hopefuls for being “at pains to assure Canadians that they will never ‘impose their views’” which he derides as “I hold my views, but not strongly enough to act upon them, so you don’t have to worry. Elect me.” Clemenger framed not imposing one’s views as civility, but Reid calls it spineless. Reid’s comments are valuable since they: i) highlight the gap between Focus and the EFC on moderation; ii) show Reid criticizing a conservative political party’s leadership candidates specifically for muting their social conservativism to increase acceptability; and iii) sit awkwardly beside the decision by Reid’s organization to start the IMFC a few years later, whereby Focus itself mutes, not on social conservatism but on Christianity. In sum, Focus, the Alliance Party leadership candidates, and Clemenger all react differently but all must cope with the muting constraints a subordinate group faces to hide aspects of themselves and speak (& sometimes think) within the dominant group’s idiom. 193 publication to address insiders regarding the state of affairs and their vision going forward.

Sclater’s view differs noticeably from Clemenger’s:

…I have been thinking about whether most Christians view the world as a home that just needs a little fixing up, or a war zone where things will never be as we really would like them. I think that question sums up one of the main divides in the Christian world -- at least in the west. We either think that we are here to enjoy the world as our natural home (while perhaps doing a little "rescue" work), or we think we are here as part of God's invasion force.

If it is the latter, we should never to get (sic) overly comfortable in our circumstances or we will too easily opt out of the battle. A few years ago I wrote that I didn't feel there were any sidelines to which we could retreat. We can't just watch the war as spectators. I am still convinced of that. Either the Scriptures are right and God has an ongoing purpose for his now expanded beachhead, or we are left to float in our own version of utopianism. (Sclater 2001)

This passage locates Focus relative to the EFC and CFAC. In contrast to the EFC’s moderation,

Sclater’s military metaphors and partitioning Christians into two camps echoes CFAC and leaves no room for compromise. Clemenger coaches followers on the tone and timbre of their voice but Sclater cannot worry about tone when a war is underway. However, although Focus’s message content aligns with CFAC’s, the affective packaging differs, lacking the overt revulsion or disgust of CFAC’s vocabulary (e.g. sodomy, buggery, perverted). This pattern generally holds for Focus. On homosexuality, for example, Focus’s material for insider audiences (i.e. website, reports and blogs) often comes from Focus USA and mirrors CFAC’s harsh criticisms – claiming homosexuality compromises physical and mental health (e.g. STDs, depression, suicide, drug

194 and alcohol dependency), and is characterized by more promiscuity, rape, domestic violence and pedophilia (e.g. Focus on the Family Staff Writer 2003; Sprigg 2003).227 But even with this disturbing content, the tone differs. The following website article (i.e. aimed at insiders) emotes a cool and rational affect, offering supposedly factual answers to a list of “myths:”

Myth #3: Homosexual relationships are no different than heterosexual ones….

Fact: Homosexual male relationships are rarely monogamous and those involved are more at risk for life-threatening illnesses. Studies indicate that the average male homosexual has hundreds of sex partners in his lifetime. The median number of partners for homosexuals is four times higher than for heterosexuals. A study on the sexual profiles of 2,583 older homosexuals, published in the Journal of Sex Research, found that only 2.7 percent claimed to have had sex with one partner only. Research has also found that few homosexual relationships last longer than two years, with many men reporting hundreds of lifetime partners. Check out these findings:

o 24 percent of gay men had over 100 partners

o 43 percent of gay men had over 500 partners

o 28 percent of gay men had over 1000 partners18

Solid, irrefutable evidence proves that there are lethal consequences to engaging in the defining features of male homosexuality—that is, promiscuity. Active homosexuals are vulnerable to dozens of sexually transmitted diseases.19 According to one report, the risk of anal cancer rises by an astounding 4,000 percent for those engaging in homosexual intercourse and doubles again for those who are HIV positive.20 AIDS remains the fifth

227 Both sources come from Focus’ American counterparts, the first from Focus USA and the second from the Family Research Council (Focus USA’s think tank). 195

leading cause of death among those aged 26 to 44, and 60 percent of new cases are contracted by men who have sex with men. (Focus on the Family Staff Writer 2003)

Note the crucial juxtaposition of alarming information with a reasoned or scholarly affect. The article merely claims to state a “Fact,” clinically reports “solid, irrefutable evidence,” cites

“studies” and “research,” lists precise statistics, and names a journal. Indeed, the measured tone – performing the disciplined, careful, analytical approach of scholarship – enhances the distressing conclusion’s credibility that the “defining features (sic) of male homosexuality” is a promiscuity with “lethal consequences.”228 Focus thus conveys the same information as CFAC but via a professional style that lays out arguments dispassionately. Alarms are being raised in a serious and concerned way displaying how high the stakes are without CFAC’s overtly denigrating vocabulary. Thus, with insiders, Focus’s content regarding moderation mirrors

CFAC but with a different affective style.

However, when assessing moderation in how Focus addresses outsiders, similarities with CFAC dissolve. During appearances before parliamentary committees on sexual orientation bills in 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2005, Focus executives showed reserve in their comments, omitting inflammatory claims regarding promiscuity, pedophilia, rape, and domestic violence (Parliament of Canada 1996, 2000, 2004, 2005b). The four parliamentary appearances show interesting longitudinal trends as Focus’s leaders increasingly moderate their speech over time, adjusting to Canadians’ growing acceptance of homosexuality during this period. Thus, in the earliest appearance in 1996, Sclater paints homosexuality as

228 Stunningly, the excerpt claims 95% of gay men have over 100 sexual partners and 71% have over 500 partners. These claims are conveyed with precise statistics and the stoic language of science. 196 destructive, fostering “a great deal of pain” amongst gays via emotional struggles and disease.

He also invokes the controversial ex-gay movement,229 declaring many homosexuals “want to leave that lifestyle” (ibid., 1996). Sclater is already carefully amending his speech (dropping references to pedophilia or rape and instead expressing compassion for homosexuals’ suffering) but he nonetheless censures an active gay life as harmful. By 2000, Sclater curtails such negative commentary and avoids mentioning homosexuals’ physical or emotional health, stating only that homosexuality counters people’s “inherent nature” (ibid., 2000). By 2004 and

2005, criticism of homosexuality has vanished and traditional marriage is defended without any accompanying condemnation. Indeed, by 2005, sensing they were losing on same-sex marriage, Focus’s Director of Family Policy, Anna Maria White, recommended civil unions, calling the solution an international “consensus” that respects homosexuals while upholding marriage (Parliament of Canada 2005b). In short, on same-sex marriage, the pressure to moderate constrains what Focus can say. The provocative accusations on gays (e.g., rape, pedophilia) Focus freely expressed to insiders are not expressed to outsiders. On gay marriage,

Focus has moderated over time in both language and policy stances (i.e. recommending civil unions as a compromise) but these shifts are just adaptations to the changing culture and thus merely for outsiders as Focus’s insider language underwent no correlating change.230 Focus’s parliamentary presentations were highly edited for a more gay-friendly audience.

229 The ex-gay movement encourages “conversion” to a straight (or a celibate) lifestyle. 230 Focus accepting civil unions was clearly tactical and was paralleled by CFAC during the latter’s parliamentary appearance just weeks before the 2005 same-sex marriage vote (Parliament of Canada 2005c). The acceptance was voiced by Roy Beyer who presented with McVety, both representing the Defend Marriage Coalition. Although Defend Marriage is not technically CFAC, the Coalition was clearly directed by CFAC as McVety and Rushfeldt were the two listed spokespersons on Defend’s website, and CFAC’s staff represented the Coalition in media interviews and at the parliamentary hearing described herein. The civil unions issue is telling regarding the three lobbies. CFAC’s and Focus’s shifts to accepting civil unions were: i) made at the last minute; ii) inconsistent with their overall discourses on homosexuality; and iii) communicated only to outsiders and not to evangelicals. In contrast, 197

Before we move on from moderation, in a revealing 2004 parliamentary hearing on hate crime legislation, all three lobbies appeared jointly at the same session as did REAL

Women (Parliament of Canada 2004). I relayed earlier that, on moderation, CFAC oscillates when addressing outsider audiences between muting and stating their views boldly (just as on pluralism CFAC alternates between sporadic multi-faith co-operation and anti-Islamic remarks).

On this day, CFAC’s presenter, Dr. Andre Lafrance,231 spoke boldly and minced no words: drawing on statistical research and his professional experience treating sexually transmitted diseases, he declared homosexuality physically dangerous and said gay males are “notoriously promiscuous” (ibid.). Affectively, Lafrance displayed CFAC’s confrontational style, actually challenging the senators and the media to find any specialist to debate him on television. The response of the other lobbies was interesting. REAL Women’s Gwendolyn Landolt, a close ally of CFAC, supported Dr. Lafrance and backed his arguments, even raising the stakes by joining with a sympathetic senator (Senator Anne Cools) to raise the explosive issue of pedophilia.232

Tellingly, however, Focus’s Vice President Derek Rogusky stayed completely silent even though discussing these controversial topics (pedophilia, diseases, promiscuity, etc.) takes up seven pages on the transcript with multiple back-and-forth discussions. These very concerns had populated Focus’s website for years and been shared in Focus’ Citizen newsletter but Rogusky

the EFC shows far more congruence between insider and outsider messaging. Hence, despite being left of the other two lobbies and being less condemning of homosexuals (e.g. no mention of pedophilia, etc.), the EFC never compromised by advocating for civil unions at parliament. While the EFC’s views shifted across time the lobby has been consistent in its internal and external messaging except for replacing religious justifications with secular reasons as noted earlier. CFAC and especially Focus will more commonly alter their language in public forums, searching for more palatable forms of expression. 231 Dr. Lafrance does not show up in other materials by CFAC. He was a pro-life activist (now deceased), likely put forward owing to his medical credentials. 232 Only Senator Cools directly linked pedophilia to homosexuality, which is the more provocative claim. Landolt waded in however by arguing the hate crime legislation might allow groups promoting “intergenerational” sex to silence opposition (ibid.). 198 lent no support to CFAC and REAL. Focus leaders carefully and rigorously manage their speech and hence Rogusky voiced no support for these views at parliament. This provocative discussion subsided when the EFC’s Janet Epp Buckingham interrupted and redirected the argument to the safer harbour of defending religious freedom. Her opening line overtly distances the EFC from the conversation just passed, stating “You need to recognize that we are four different organizations, with different perspectives” (ibid.). This rarity of having all the lobbies at one parliamentary appearance reveals how each responds to the pressure to present as moderate. The EFC affirms and embodies moderation; CFAC and REAL Women do not and sometimes display this publicly; and Focus criticizes moderation to insiders but camouflages this sentiment when addressing outsiders. On moderation, Focus is the most consistent in intentionally muting for outsiders, adapting to cultural norms and holding back on authentic expression.

On the second value, pluralism, Focus’s leaders again seem driven by tactical considerations, opportunistically embracing pluralism only to defend religious freedom. Thus, while speaking at parliament against same-sex marriage, Focus’s executives take up the pluralist frame, citing multi-faith opposition to argue that same-sex marriage violates minority communities’ religious freedom (Parliament of Canada 2005c). Focus’s staff also condemned

Quebec premier Pauline Marois for pledging a Charter of Secularism that would ban public employees from wearing religious symbols (except for small crucifixes), which Focus said affronted “multiculturalism” and religious freedom, and a Focus website writer criticized

McVety for opposing a proselytizing Muslim subway advertisement (since, the writer alleged,

Christians should enthusiastically defend any religious group’s right to proclaim universal truth)

199

(Sztersky 2012; Johnson 2012). Owing to the power of pluralist discourses, the lobby never directly criticizes Islam unlike CFAC, Tristan Emmanuel, or even Focus USA. For years, Focus

USA’s website had a section featuring several highly critical pieces on Islam, but Focus Canada neither carried nor linked to these articles (Focus USA Staff 2004).233 Researchers describe

Canadian evangelicals as more “irenic” or tolerant than American evangelicals, and Focus’s leaders seem attentive to these sensibilities (Reimer 2003; Rawlyk 1997).

However, despite employing pluralism opportunistically and omitting Focus USA’s anti-

Islamic pieces, Focus certainly does not share the EFC’s enthusiasm for pluralism. In fact, when not using pluralist language to defend religious freedom, Focus critiques pluralism to insiders.

The EFC’s Brian Stiller rejected Christian nationalism but Focus’s president and chairman penned nostalgic portraits of a once-Christian Canada (e.g. Boehmer 1997; Gordon 1996a,

1996b). Lamenting this loss, Focus’s Sclater denounced pluralism in the insiders’ monthly newsletter as a “brave new multicultural world” where “no Christian activity” is tolerated

(1998a). In more recent years, Focus has rarely mentioned pluralism other than when defending religious freedom but, in 2011, Derek Rogusky blamed “radical multiculturalism” for eroding the “shared moral basis” of Canada’s human rights tradition. Earlier I mentioned that muting can lead to the subordinate group internalizing the dominant group’s values and framing, something we witnessed in the EFC’s embrace of pluralist discourses which they likely would not have turned to if not for the discourse’s prevalence in Canada.234 But this aspect of muting is not replicated by Focus. Focus’ expressions of longing for Christian hegemony and

233 This section no longer exists but Focus USA and its public policy arm Citizenlink continue to publish negative articles on Islam which have no parallel at Focus’s Canadian operations. 234 Although we also saw that the EFC tried to do this on its own terms by defining pluralism in ways they felt fit their values. 200 calling multiculturalism a solvent to our common bonds rejects Canada’s secular and pluralist ethos. Instead, with Focus we find only muting’s more external aspect, tactically adopting language in order to be heard, especially in order to defend religious freedom.

Focus is especially vulnerable on Canadians’ un-American identity. The EFC affirms un-

Americanism while CFAC treats the American Religious Right as allies but Focus occupies a tricky position as an American Religious Right offshoot that wants to be seen as genuinely

Canadian. Ideologically, Focus likely shares CFAC’s enthusiasm for the U.S. Religious Right but, conscious of their image, Focus avoids mentioning the United States. Ardener’s theory suggests that muting concerns not just forms of speech but also who can speak and here,

Focus knows, that links to the American Religious Right are politically toxic. In fact, Focus’s opponents often intentionally highlight the lobby’s American connection to discredit them.235

In response, Focus executives highlight domestic management and funding and insist Focus is

Canadian even to evangelical media (Lloyd 2005; Schweyer 2012).236 However, Focus shares none of the EFC’s un-American ethos and occasionally reveals envy of America. Thus, in a

Focus USA magazine article warning Americans that liberal Canada could contaminate the

United States, Reid and Sclater both compared Canada negatively with America, disparaging

Canada’s “passive” nature (Jewell 2001). Rogusky repeated this complaint to the Boston Globe

235 One example is the newspaper report from chapter two alleging the American parent was funding Focus’s traditional marriage campaign. A second example occurred during a 2005 parliamentary hearing (Parliament of Canada 2005b). An MP kept probing Focus’s executives about the lobby’s international connections, trying to force an acknowledgement of Focus’s American parent to open up an angle of attack. Focus’s executives countered by giving vague answers. Unspoken in the exchange is both the MP and Focus’s executives know the American link is a liability. Muting here takes the form of hiding identity since an evangelical group linked to the American Religious Right will be, in many ways, deemed illegitimate. 236 As mentioned in chapter two, Focus is highly dependent on its parent for content, especially the daily radio program and free magazine which are the heart of Focus Canada’s regular contact with its audience. 201 by decrying Canadians’ regrettably “compliant” attitude (Nickerson 2003). Focus’s lobbyists insist on their independence from American evangelicalism but somewhat seek to emulate it.

So far then, Focus ideologically fits more with CFAC than with the EFC although Focus mutes itself far more than CFAC by restraining its discourse. This willingness to mute extends to the fourth and final value, secularity. Focus consistently criticizes secularity237 to insiders but, like the other lobbies, employs more secular reasoning in public settings, a move once again facilitated by the natural law doctrine.238 What is completely new here, however, is that

Focus went beyond employing secular arguments by taking the unprecedented step of creating a secular-looking organization in the IMFC. We will look at the IMFC as Focus’s premier

237 With respect to terminology, the lobbies’ usually condemn “secularism” rather than “secularity.” Their use of secularism combines my definitions of secularity and secularism. That is, they oppose the condition of religion being marginalized and the ideology that seeks this. When not quoting them, I have generally stuck to my own definitions to not confuse the reader. 238 Focus’ relentless bifurcation of its message (between insiders and outsiders) reveals the natural law doctrine most clearly. Thus, on same-sex marriage, in a piece aimed at insiders (i.e. on Focus’ website and emailed to their database list), Focus’s Glenn Stanton defends traditional marriage using ten points where nine are theological (e.g. sin; Jesus’ opposition to homosexuality; male and female “complete God’s image on earth”) (2015). Focus’ main marriage document, also for insiders, uses both theological and secular reasons by opening with theological points before turning to secular reasons, the latter justified since marriage is “a part of natural law,” (2003.:4). The secular section employs social science to show the “Social Benefits of Marriage,” claiming traditional marriage benefits both adults and children whereas homosexuality fosters harms (i.e. higher levels of sexually transmitted diseases). So, in the two insider documents, theological reasons are central with some social science support. However, when addressing outsiders, natural law facilitates switching to strictly secular reasons. Hence, when Focus’ Jim Sclater addresses parliament and an opponent targets his theological commitments, Sclater pivots away from theology entirely, responding that while his opponent “asked about theology. I would ask about psychology, sociology, anthropology and history” (Parliament of Canada 1996). He continues, “where are the physicians and psychiatrists….and the people who have studied human nature?” (ibid.). Sclater and his interlocutor both know that Sclater’s Christian motives must be buried in this setting. Natural law helps Sclater to fluidly adjust to an outsider audience since it helps ease any sense of theological compromise in citing secular arguments. Finally, in the courts, the very arbiters of secular justice, Focus again posits strictly secular reasons claiming heterosexual marriage fosters long-term cooperation between the sexes, fosters the perpetuation of the species via the “most stable unit for family formation,” and provides children with a mother and father whose parenting styles are “different, yet complementary” (Association for Marriage and the Family in Ontario 2003:13, 16). I suspect that reasons like fostering long-term cooperation between the sexes has been driven by the Christian lobbies’ need to find ways to reframe their opposition in secular terms and for secular arenas like courts. Cumulatively then, natural law doctrine is the toggle the most muted lobby, Focus, relies on to switch between secular and religious reasons depending on audience type, while mitigating any sense of theological compromise. 202 example of secular muting while also considering how the IMFC responds on all four values, since the IMFC is both part of Focus and distinct.

The IMFC

Focus raises muting to a new level with the Institute of Marriage and Family Canada. A year before opening the IMFC, Derek Rogusky suggested Focus learn from the economic think tank, the Fraser Institute, about how to put “ideas forward in a way that talks to lay people”

(Stinson 2004). “Lay people” here means not class distinctions (elites vs. commoners) but rather reaching non-evangelicals. His comments echo Clemenger’s remarks about following

Paul, thus encouraging evangelicals to formulate their ideas in the dominant secular idiom as per Ardener. Focus designed the IMFC for this very task and, hence, it became Focus’s main media interface, largely displacing Focus in the public realm. Thus, in the six years prior to the

IMFC’s opening (from 1999 through the end of 2005), the Factiva database of Canadian newspapers shows Focus was cited in 153 articles. However, in the following six years (from

2006 through the end of 2012), Focus was cited only 54 times while the IMFC amassed 302 citations. The IMFC was equally prevalent on radio and television, greatly surpassing its parent’s presence in these mediums.

There is some logic to Rogusky citing the Fraser Institute as a model given its success and proximity (like Focus, the Fraser Institute is Vancouver-based) but he also seems to be downplaying another influence. Specifically, he omits mentioning Focus USA’s own family research institute, the Washington-based Family Research Council (FRC). Focus likes to hide

American influence but the FRC model cannot be ignored. However, in a clear display of muting, Focus’s leaders radically transformed the model to fit Canada’s context. As a result,

203 the FRC and the IMFC combine clear parallels with striking contrasts. Hence, whereas the FRC’s stances and affect most resemble CFAC’s, the IMFC’s persona is moderate and unremittingly secular, thus conforming to two of the dominant Canadian values. For example, on secularity, the FRC unabashedly declares that it “promotes the Judeo-Christian worldview,” explains its roots in Focus USA (a known Christian entity) despite being legally separate, and wades into religious issues such as rebutting Christian pro-gay theology. In contrast, the IMFC operates in a very different cultural context and thus, even though it lacks the independent legal existence the FRC enjoys and is merely an office of Focus, the Institute never mentions Focus nor even

Christianity. Here then is Ardener’s suggestion that muting can constrain not only permissible speech but permissible speakers. The IMFC demonstrates this angle, hiding its affiliations and presenting a strictly secular face in an effort to be taken seriously. The shift is from presenting an acceptable mode of argument to distancing oneself from the subordinate group entirely to gain credibility. The IMFC thus presents as a secular organization and, unlike the FRC, only addresses secular topics. In fact, its two senior executives, Quist and Mrozek (2009), warn social conservatives against resorting “too often to a faith dimension.” This warning surely stems not from Quist’s and Mrozek’s views on motives but from their take on what qualifies as effective political speech in contemporary Canada. On moderation, the FRC’s affect and stances show aggression and severity including long analyses condemning sharia as “religious fascism” and “stealth religious jihad,” and a fifteen-page piece methodically tying homosexuality to pedophilia. With its secular and moderate persona, the IMFC never criticizes a religion nor disparages homosexuality. The Institute’s academic affect performs both

204 secularity and moderation by referencing data, statistics, studies and research.239 Even in the

IMFC’s many media appearances, the lobby’s tone aims for research-backed common sense.

The excerpts below are from a pro-life op-ed in the Ottawa Citizen:

…Being pro-life is a distinctly pro-woman stand; it is only for a lack of freedom of speech in Canada today that the debate is rarely framed this way.

The abortion debate is only partly a question of rights. It is, more often, a question of life. With each repetition of "my body, my choice," women's rights to complete information, to intellectual integrity, to the scientific roots of life, furthermore to her own physical and mental health, are denied.

….If abortion is strictly a question of "a woman's right to choose," who could possibly be against it? But if abortion actually hurts women, precisely because the choice revolves around taking human life, does it then contribute or detract from women's rights? And if women don't know what the debate is, how are their rights served at all?

Seeing an abortion in real life or on video prior to having one is not something that many women get to witness. Planned Parenthood says it won't resort to "hysterical" videos like that. That's like telling a student who wishes to learn about China and has an opportunity to travel there that she is actually better off staying home and reading her Lonely Planet.

….Asking why a woman wants an abortion highlights the real problem. Is it because her parents will throw her out of the home? Is it because she was raped? Is it because her culture demands she produce a boy, yet she knows she is carrying a girl?

In each of these cases, abortion does not address the problem, but sweeps it under the carpet. Abortion clinics can't ask the whys of it all: That's an infringement of women's rights -- the unalienable right to suffer in silence.

239 Natural law again serves as the linchpin so that the secular research the IMFC cites can be read as straight social science by outsiders and Christian truth by insiders. Indeed, the IMFC’s mission put simply: use social science to demonstrate natural law. Note however that the IMFC does not cite or discuss ‘natural law’ in its materials as the term’s theological connotations do not fit with the IMFC’s public face. 205

Pro-lifers support women, not abortion. Freedom of information has been curtailed such that no one understands how this could work. If abortion is not about another person, as well as the woman, none of this debate matters. If the fetus is a person too, then offering women one life-and-death choice without first fully discussing what is at stake is a denial of women's rights beyond comprehension.

The column is thoroughly secular in tone and lists the author, Mrozek, as the “manager of research and communications at the Institute of Marriage and Family Canada.” Neither religious reasons nor religious motives nor religious identity are detectable. Instead, Mrozek articulates a “pro-woman” position that defends “intellectual integrity,” “freedom of information,” and women’s mental, physical and emotional health. The article aims to defend women, to protect the common good, and affectively argues for reason and openness. The point is not that any of these arguments are not genuine but that religious justifications disappear and that Focus has hired someone who can frame arguments in the feminist idiom of being “pro-woman” and via a strictly secular lens, all spoken as the manager of a secular- seeming research institute. With evangelicalism or Christianity nowhere to be found, the IMFC executes a sophisticated level of muting (and potentially a subversive power) that only it among the lobbies can achieve. The IMFC is a savvy response to constraints on the kind of speech and the kind of speaker that can be heard. The FRC became a pillar of the Religious

Right, but the IMFC launched the most engaged media strategy of any Canadian evangelical lobby by veiling its evangelicalism altogether (Wilcox and Robinson 2011). By founding the

206

IMFC, Focus shifted from translating its message to creating a translated institution for

Canadian culture.240

The IMFC’s uniqueness is also instructive on the last two values, namely pluralism and un-Americanism. Notable here is that the IMFC is largely silent on both values. Pluralism is a powerful frame that the other lobbies must all address and yet the IMFC comfortably ignores it. This highlights a singular fact – the lobbies address pluralism primarily in just one context, namely it helps when advocating for religious freedom. Pluralism is not an emic discourse for evangelicals but rather a dominant etic frame they are constrained to work under, including adopting it for its cultural currency. Since the IMFC’s secular persona means it rarely addresses religionists’ right to speak, pluralism is ignored. When the IMFC does defend like-minded parties against being unfairly silenced, they utilize secular freedom of speech arguments rather than religious pluralism. The IMFC similarly sidesteps Canada’s un-American ethos. They draw on American think tanks and academics for research and keynote speakers for their conferences but this raises no controversy owing to the IMFC’s status as a research institute

(Canadian researchers appeal to American studies and experts across many fields).

Additionally, the IMFC never draws from the American Religious Right. Even the FRC, a kind of cousin organization given its ties to Focus USA and its vast store of pro-traditional family

240 Space prevents a fuller explanation of the IMFC’s moderation but the lobby addresses many issues outside the Religious Right’s agenda including autism, homelessness and poverty (none of which the FRC addresses). On gays, the lobby never mentions any of Focus’s critiques of homosexuality (i.e. regarding mental and physical health, domestic violence, or pedophilia) and instead stays focused on traditional marriage’s benefits. Most surprisingly, nine months after the Conservatives held a parliamentary revote that upheld same-sex marriage, IMFC Director Quist announced the IMFC would cease fighting on the issue (Ottawa Citizen staff 2007). Quist framed it as a dead political issue and somewhat inconsequential given how few same-sex marriages there had been. It was a supremely pragmatic concession (i.e. a moderate move), highlighting the IMFC’s need to “pick our battles” and adjust its message (i.e. muting) to its audience (ibid.). None of the other lobbies, including Focus, made a similar announcement. 207 research, is never referenced by the IMFC.241 Recall too, the IMFC omitted mentioning its relationship with Glenn Stanton, Focus USA’s Director for Family Formation Studies, whose own biography for years claimed he was a research fellow at the Institute or was “directing a major research project” for them. Thus, the IMFC staff sidesteps the “un-American” norm by omitting their relationship to Focus, to Stanton, indeed to Christianity, and by never overtly drawing on the American Religious Right.242 Again, the form of muting shifts here from focusing on legitimate discourse to focusing on presenting as a legitimate speaker. Note too the fascinating trade-off on display: where the other lobbies, as evangelical speakers, faced pressure to mute on pluralism and being un-American, the IMFC, by hiding its evangelical identity, can advocate for social conservative politics while avoiding any similar pressures regarding pluralism or one’s relation to the United States. Hence, we encounter two strategies, one muting more on speech while retaining identity and one muting identity in order to gain greater leeway on speech. The latter path certainly allowed the IMFC to take the most media engaged strategy of any of the lobbies but either way, evangelicals have to contort themselves in the face of these dominant cultural norms.

The IMFC takes the unusual path of presenting an entirely secular face to the public. By muting as far as possible on secularity – meaning both identity and speech – the lobby gains unique breathing space to ignore muting pressures on pluralism and un-Americanness. (This tellingly reveals how the lobbies’ engagement with pluralism is fundamentally about protecting

241 It is possible the IMFC has somewhere footnoted an FRC report I missed but through years of discussing the books, ideas or reports of American organizations and individuals at some length (including interviews and invites to speak in Canada), such engagement was never been done with the FRC (or any member of the American Religious Right). 242 I say “overtly” because, in its relationship with Stanton, the IMFC did draw on the American Religious Right. 208 religious freedom and is otherwise irrelevant.) By muting their very identity as Christians, the

IMFC is a fascinating end product of Canada’s evangelicals trying to find a voice the broader public will hear.

Overall, Focus’s lobbyists are the most active re-encoders among the groups studied.

Focus personnel edit American content for their domestic insider audience and then perform a second translation for materials presented to outsiders. No other lobby so pervasively monitors its outsider speech thus fostering the greatest discrepancies between communications to evangelicals and those to the public. This approach culminates in the IMFC

– which Focus created as its main interface with the media – employing secular speech, secular reasoning, and a secular identity. With the institute, Focus birthed an entity that takes conscious muting to its limit.

Canada’s Lobbies and their American Counterparts

Given American influence on Canadian culture (both as model and as “other”), it is worthwhile comparing the lobbies with their American counterparts. Space prohibits a detailed comparison so I will just share my conclusions from assessing the following pairs: the EFC with the American National Association of Evangelicals (NAE); CFAC versus the Christian Coalition

(which CFAC modelled itself on); McVety versus Jerry Falwell, McVety’s friend and mentor and, like McVety, the founder of a Christian college; and Focus/IMFC with Focus USA/FRC.

In short, three things are apparent. First, the Canadian lobbies either move left relative to their American counterparts or risk viability for not doing so. The EFC lies left of the NAE and

Focus lies left of its parent (as shown above). CFAC and its allies like REAL Women stand more 209 in line with their American counterparts (with some exceptions on pluralism discussed below) but have paid by being marginalized in a way their American peers are not.243 This orientation fits with seeing Canadian evangelicals as a subordinate group that must accommodate a dominant liberalism in ways American evangelicals do not experience.

Second, more conservative lobbies in the US wield more power within their national evangelical scene. The NAE, which is left of other American lobbies, has often been overshadowed by more powerful groups to its right including Falwell and the Moral Majority in the 1980s, Ralph Reed and the Christian Coalition in the 1990s, and James Dobson and Focus in the 2000s. The NAE has a paltry $1MM budget (compared to Focus USA’s $75MM budget) and occasionally faces public criticism from those more right-leaning groups for not being orthodox or conservative enough (NAE 2012; Sojourners 2008). In contrast, in Canada, the EFC’s $3.5MM budget makes it a giant (with only Focus and, in more recent years, CARDUS, as peers) and the lobby never faces any serious criticism from its more right-leaning counterparts.244 Indeed, it was the EFC’s Hutchinson who publicly criticized the more right-leaning McVety.

Third, and last, the most telling difference is on pluralism. Pluralism is not really a visible force in American evangelicalism. The NAE has only taken the tiniest steps in this direction since 2000 by allowing inter-Christian ecumenism with the liberal National Council of

Churches and merely having an opening dialogue with Muslims in 2007 (and both moves generated significant evangelical criticism [NAE 2012; Sojourners 2008]). In contrast, the EFC

243 McVety has far less influence than Falwell did, CFAC has never approached the Christian Coalition’s impact, and REAL Women is more marginal than Concerned Women of America. 244 CARDUS has grown significantly in recent years, after the primary time window this study focusses on. CARDUS was described in the introduction as a conservative Christian think tank that is part evangelical and part conservative Catholic. 210 allowed cross-membership with the Canadian Council of Churches since its founding, and is now a well seasoned practitioner of interfaith cooperation in courts, in thinking about religion’s role in public life, and via membership in interfaith groups. The EFC today regularly incorporates pluralist language even in its insider speech. Indeed, pluralism is so powerful in

Canada that even CFAC (and, more surprisingly, Emmanuel) have dabbled in pluralist language and form multifaith alliances to gain credibility, a concession culturally powerful American evangelicals do not have to make. The lobbies mute on secularity, moderation, and being un-

American, but pluralism, in particular, is a powerful credibility card in the Canadian milieu that both forces and tempts the lobbyists in their hopes to get a legitimate hearing.

Conclusion

The EFC and Focus have both made substantial compromises with Canadian culture.

The EFC has the most complex relationship to Ardener’s theory. On some fronts, the EFC fits the theory very well, most especially on pluralism, where the lobby has adopted the language and reasoning in both external and internal forums, encouraging evangelicals to follow their lead. We have seen that this frame is immensely powerful in Canada and the EFC sees its utility for the minority they represent. Pluralism, an etic concern stemming from Canadian liberalism, is now a core way the EFC represents itself and its community in the Canadian public sphere.

On other fronts too, we see the EFC aligning with Ardener’s concept such as moderating on gays and routinely encouraging constituents towards moderation. At the same time, the EFC creatively uses muting subversively such as by trying to redefine what powerful key terms like pluralism or diversity mean. This approach is an intriguing angle on muting, simultaneously

211 adopting the dominant language while trying to shift its meanings – thus muting by adopting the frame while simultaneously trying to reduce muting by altering the definition to allow a more authentic voice. The EFC also tries to reincorporate the muting process itself by suggesting that adopting cultural frames follows Paul’s example, thus repositioning muting from a concession into a traditional Christian missionary strategy. Neither of these moves, I think, quite negates the compromise of having to adopt pluralism and the subsequent joining of interfaith organizations but perhaps they reduce the cost of muting to the tradition.

Adjustments are made but hopefully incorporated within a perspective that while altered, is still credibly Christian. The natural law doctrine used by the lobbies functions similarly, facilitating the use of secular arguments but enclosing the move within wider Christian doctrine. Muting pressures are forcing language and reasoning to adapt but the lobbies use their agency to minimize the compromises made. Focus stands out not only for being the most rigorous re-encoder for outsider audiences, but for demonstrating how muting can morph from speech forms to kinds of speakers. Hence, Focus: has a non-Christian, non-religious name; downplays or hides its connection to its Religious Right parent organization in any public setting since such connections are disqualifying; and culminates with the IMFC, an outlet that churned out strictly secular reasoning, secular arguments, and via a secular face. CFAC, on the other hand, presents the most defiant case, fiercely resisting muting as much as possible although even it must make concessions in some public forums or when the stakes (e.g. same- sex marriage debate) are high. The lobby’s more uncompromising message may also make it culturally out of step and seems to have left the group (and similar-minded allies) with a questionable future. In Canada, evangelical groups face powerful pressures around secularity, moderation, pluralism, and being un-American and no such group can operate without 212 thinking about how to negotiate these dominant cultural values – where concessions are necessary, where they must be resisted, and how or if they can be artfully employed in useful ways.

Having examined the lobbyists’ ability to speak, the next chapter scrutinizes what they find most important to say. Specifically, we will look at why evangelical politics focusses overwhelmingly on family values.

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Chapter 5 – The Traditional Family: Nursery of an Evangelical Habitus

Many observers note evangelical politics seem singularly focussed on so-called family values issues. Michael Warner claims that simply surveying the American Religious Right’s key issues illustrates that it “needed sex in order to exist as a movement” (2008). D’Emilio and

Freedman (1998:352-3) suggest “the sexuality of youth,” especially, has characterized Religious

Right activism, a notion supported by Griffith who writes that “sex education proved a brilliant political strategy in the nascent forging of a new Christian right” (2017:199). And Amy

DeRogatis boldly states that anyone studying evangelicalism in America “knows that…[they] cannot stop talking about sex” (2014:1). Canada’s evangelical lobbies fit these claims. While the lobbies address other matters – the EFC encourages social justice and CFAC calls for fiscal prudence – it is impossible to ignore the preponderance of issues around sex and family life.245

The lengthy list of topics includes public daycare, family taxation, pornography, transgender rights, sex education in schools, divorce laws, gay rights, and age of consent laws to name just a few.246 In addition to quantity, the two most galvanizing debates for Canadian evangelical lobbying over the past forty years were both family values issues: the 1980s abortion debate and the decade-long same-sex marriage debate that peaked in 2005. This family values preoccupation dates only to recent decades as nineteenth and early twentieth-century

245 The scholars above foregrounded sexuality whereas the lobbies speak first of family. I prefer “sex and family” as, despite significant overlap, neither term on its own captures the full range of issues the lobbies tackle. 246 One issue that is often grouped with these sex and family values topics and yet which fits, at best, uncomfortably is euthanasia. Euthanasia is an exception, not easily belonging with sex and family values issues and yet the lobbies often raise it alongside these other issues or group them together on their websites. For the lobbies, euthanasia forms part of the same values fight against liberal autonomy and individualism, since they see it as prioritizing the individual’s will over God’s will. It thus violates the lobbies’ sense of the sanctity of life and fits into their “pro-life” ethic. 214 evangelicalism had some related concerns (e.g. birth control, female suffrage) but lacked the same single-minded focus. Even in the decades immediately after WWII, sociologist Christian

Smith names American evangelicals’ key issues as anti-communism, sabbatarianism, and anti-

Catholicism (1998:144).

In this chapter, I want to examine the causes behind this change and which continue to make family values issues so pertinent. These causes are multiple and complicated and, hence, the chapter opens with a historical narrative that employs secondary sources to help explain why evangelical politics became so focussed on the family. The chapter’s longer second part mines the lobbies’ primary materials to show how the connection between evangelical identity and family values works. Cumulatively, I contend evangelicals’ focus on family values stems primarily from the following factors. First, Christianity has a history of regulating sexual and family life that provides a foundation for modern Christians to build on. Second, key developments in the West since the eighteenth century shifted cultural understandings of both family and sexuality. These enormous cultural shifts altered the opportunity structure for religions, curtailing religious influence in some realms (e.g. economics, law, statecraft) while broadening religion’s opportunities in the familial and sexual realms. Third, evangelicalism emerged in tandem with the shifts just described and hence, in comparison to other religious forms, was especially well adapted to this new opportunity structure. This cultural fit has enabled evangelical growth but makes evangelical identity more reliant on the familial and sexual realms than Mainline Protestant or lay Catholic identity. Lay evangelicals accordingly grip these issues more tightly than other Christians. Evangelicals’ family values fights are partly defensive, since the familial and sexual spheres are seen as the vital incubators for fostering

215 evangelical living and thus social reproduction. Finally, and most importantly, I will augment the mostly historical narrative outlined above with an investigative primary source analysis that drills deeply into the lobbies’ policy stances and their justifications to tease out the specific mechanisms tying evangelicalism to family values issues. My analysis reveals that three key aspects of evangelical theology, what I call “orientations,” link to family values issues, namely ontology, ethics, and anthropology. These linkages, I contend, go deeper than cognitive coherence by promoting a home life whose repertoire of practices and routines instantiate habits of thinking, feeling and comportment that cultivate an evangelical ethos or what, drawing on Bourdieu, we might term an evangelical habitus.247 At their core, family values issues and evangelical politics are mostly about defending this habitus as the necessary nursery for developing evangelical selves.

Evangelicals’ Family Values: Amplifying an Ancient Inheritance

Christians have long been interested in regulating sexual behaviour and family life. In one of Christianity’s earliest documents, the Apostle Paul valorizes lifelong chastity, allowing married sex for Christians almost as a concession (1 Cor 7). Other New Testament texts lend more support to married family life but, overall, early Christian scriptures are interested in

247 Bourdieu’s definition of habitus is quite verbose but sociologist Loïc Wacquant summarizes it as “the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions, or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel and act in determinant ways, which then guide them” (2005:316). Bourdieu’s concept fits family life well as it socializes us into forms of thinking, feeling and comportment that help shape notions and practices around order, gender, morals, sexuality, reverence, etc. Bourdieu’s notion has faced criticism for being overly deterministic – he describes habitus as “structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (1977:72) – and for emphasizing the subconscious, all of which reduces agency. For our purposes, we need only accept that the family wields substantial influence over subject formation and, second, that evangelicals likely believe the family exerts such influence and hence, are so committed to defending its traditional form. 216 sexuality, though they often espouse views very different from modern family values discourses. Renowned historian of early Christianity, Peter Brown, explains this attentiveness to sex went beyond scripture, claiming that in Christianity’s first few centuries attitudes to sexuality and family were pivotal dividers among Christians that helped define rival sects

(2008). This high interest in sexuality and family life continues throughout Christian history including the development of monasticism, debates and reform efforts concerning clerical celibacy, and later via the Protestant Reformation which sanctified family life and partially rehabilitated sexuality while attacking clerical celibacy. Entering the modern period then,

Christians had a long inheritance of such concerns. However, sociologist Linda Woodhead observes that recent centuries witnessed a renewed emphasis on sexuality and family as

Christianity became “domesticated” (2007). By this, Woodhead means that as Christianity lost influence in areas like government, law and economics, it sank even deeper roots into the domains of home and family. This change occurred in tandem with larger cultural shifts in how family life was understood in Western societies. Numerous scholars maintain Western family life in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries became more sentimentalized, affecting both the marriage bond and perceptions of childhood (Heywood 2010; Cott 2000; Fliegelman

1985; Bailey 2010; Hunt 1993; D’Emilio and Freedman 1998; Foyster and Marten 2010).

Though family life always carried emotional weight, the new emphasis on sentiment increasingly redefined the family primarily in terms of providing emotional fulfillment.

Structural factors also contributed, as the nineteenth-century family shed many of its practical functions (i.e. economic production, health care, and education all became less based in the home), further distilling the family’s essence to emotional contentment (Heywood 2010:14;

217

Marten 2010:19; Irvin Holt 2010).248 The well-known result separated the social world into two spheres, an outer public sphere of competition and market economics and a private sphere of domesticity and sentiment, a “haven in a heartless world” (Heywood 2010:14). While religion never completely vacated public life, these changes and the rise of secular governments that separated church and state increasingly located religion’s essence in the home, a potentially powerful sphere for forms of piety that could capitalize on the sentimentalized family portrait.

Evangelicalism emerged in this milieu and the presence of the above factors during evangelicalism’s formative years meant the tradition incorporated these cultural transformations in its DNA (de Bellaigue 2010:149-150).249 Evangelicalism was steeped in sentiment and emotional expression,250 captured by the idea of being “born again” whereby salvation itself depended on having had a personal, emotionally charged religious experience.

Even in worship, emotional displays moved from being indecorous to tangibly proving the Holy

Spirit’s presence (Hatch 1991:9-10). Additionally, the types of emotion that were encouraged changed. Whereas earlier New England Puritans favoured an affect of discipline and control,

248 The scholars cited highlight several factors as contributing to the new sentimentalization. These include: new democratic values that seeped into family life to soften authoritarian values (Fliegelman 1985; Hunt 1993; Bailey 2010:15; Cott 2000; Marten 2010:28); romanticism (Bailey 2010:27); a revaluing of natural human emotions in moral philosophy stemming partly from Locke and Rousseau which replaced earlier notions of original sin and natural emotions as dangerous (Heywood 2010:10; Bailey 2010:15; Coudert 2010:148-152: Irvin Holt 2010:44); shrinking family size which shifted the focus to child-rearing from child-bearing and a concomitant sentimentalizing of childhood (Marten 2010; Heywood 2010:3); increased privacy as dwelling sizes grew, families gained autonomy from the community, and family celebrations and rituals replaced communal ones (Bailey 2010:18; Marten 2010:21); and numerous others. These changes do not occur simultaneously, often happened in certain nations (e.g. England, the United States, France) before spreading to other Western countries, and often happened earlier, or were more prevalent, in cities than in rural areas. These variations and gradations are left aside here for brevity, but the general trends – elevating childhood, viewing marriage through a more egalitarian “companionate” model, and emphasizing the family’s emotional importance over its other functions – is widely attested by the scholars cited herein as a general change in Western cultures. 249 Historians Mark Noll (2005) and Nathan Hatch (1991) highlight how evangelicalism shared several elements of the individualistic and democratic age in which it was born, including valuing softer and more expressive human emotions. 250 Evangelicalism continues to effuse sentiment as captured in Todd Brenneman’s 2013 monograph, Homespun Gospel: The Triumph of Sentimentality in Contemporary American Evangelicalism. 218 evangelicalism came to emphasize softer, warmer emotions aligned with the new perception of the family.251 Thus, multiple stars aligned as: i) Christianity’s historic interest in sexual regulation combined with; ii) a growing domestication of Christian faith and; iii) a redefined home emphasizing sentiment and emotional richness.

A fourth factor was cultural changes regarding sexuality. While societies commonly regulate sexual behaviour, Foucault suggested Western society uniquely came to view sex (or more properly, sexuality) as integral to identity (1990). He particularly foregrounded the nineteenth-century medicalization of sexuality for helping transform sexual behaviours into sexual identities. Charles Taylor, who has substantial issues with Foucault’s oeuvre, concurs with this part of Foucault’s narrative and tracked a similar developmental history (2007; see also Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2004, 2008; Cott 2000:255).252 However, these changes did not make sexuality central to nineteenth-century evangelical politics, because evangelical values aligned with contemporary mainstream norms and thus did not foster conflict. This values

251 Fliegelman suggests Christianity’s changing emotional tenor altered Bible printing in late eighteenth-century America as printers transitioned from full Bibles to publishing just the New Testament and the Psalms (dropping Old Testament texts that could be stricter and sometimes harsher). Fox observes American Christian sermons and devotion changed in the same period from focussing more often on a stern and judging God the Father to his more loving and sacrificial Son (2005). The earlier period’s most famous sermon is Jonathan Edwards’ “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,” and Fox suggests the sermon’s harshness becomes far less common later in the century, increasingly replaced by the softer, more forgiving and more optimistic tone of a John Wesley (this kinder tone continues to hold for more modern preachers like Billy Graham, Rick Warren or Joel Osteen). Philosopher Charles Taylor adds that evangelicalism bolstered the “feminization of piety,” now emphasizing warmth and tenderness over the sterner, more unyielding emotions previously valued for disciplining our sinful nature (2007:451). Taylor’s gendered language indicates these religious changes also marked a shift in the gendered understanding of virtue. Where virtue was previously perceived as particularly a male attribute (women being more vulnerable to temptation), from the late eighteenth century onward, virtue becomes identified especially with females while men are seen as inherently more wayward (Bloch 1987; Hunt 1993). These shifts cumulatively alter the emotional tenor of both family and religion in ways that emphasize warmth and sentimentality. 252 Foucault has many critics but this specific claim that sexuality became integral to identity seems widely accepted. This point is accepted not only by Taylor (whose criticism of Foucault is outlined in Taylor 1984), but also by Camille Paglia. Paglia is scathing of Foucault but she concurs with this specific point (1991:143-4). She suggests this observation was not new and hence argues Foucault added little but debates over the provenance of the observation are not germane to my purposes. 219 alignment started to weaken in the 1920s as evangelicals became animated about loosening sexual mores and birth control, but the big rupture occurred with the 1960s’ sexual revolution.253 Thus, Taylor and Foucault concur that sexuality became more essential to personal identity in the West. Hence “homosexual” morphed from behaviour to identity while many other modern labels such as “feminist,” “liberal” and “secular” rely partly – sometimes largely – on one’s stances on so-called “family values” issues. In this manner, evangelical identity’s reliance on family values issues is not entirely a cultural anomaly but rather a variation on a theme, a point overlooked by the scholars cited in this chapter’s opening.

However, the intensity of evangelicals’ focus on these issues still intrigues because it distinguishes them from other major North American Christian groups, with whom they share both the Christian inheritance and the cultural transitions.254 Sociologist Brad Wilcox demonstrates that Mainline Protestants, despite experiencing the same broad cultural transformations, are not as defined by these issues around sex and family (2004). His analysis showed family and sexuality are not core organizing elements of Mainline Protestant identity, nor do they contribute to the firming up of religious boundaries.255 Wilcox’s research is

253 Taylor says the seismic 1960s cultural shift came as sexuality linked with “expressive individualism,” an aesthetic and ethic of personal expression and self-definition (2007:69, 498-502). He suggests this ethos marries individualism with a democratized Romanticism that emphasizes feeling and experience. Recall, again, how the key aspects of sexual liberalism identified here – individualism, feeling, and privileging emotional experience – are all defining traits of evangelicalism as well, thus highlighting evangelicalism’s deep fit with the culture even in areas of heated conflict, such as on family values issues. 254 Importantly, Mainline communities mostly did not emerge during these transitions. Lutherans, Presbyterians and Episcopalians, for example, all predate these shifts whereas the evangelical movement, by emerging during this time, incorporated these elements into identity. 255 Wilcox’s American study uses three prongs. First, he examined the content in two leading magazines, the Mainline Christian Century and the evangelical Christianity Today from 1970 to 1990, and found Christianity Today had four times as many articles on family issues as did Christian Century (the latter journal focussed on social justice issues) (ibid.:52). Second, he cites secondary ethnographic research on sermons, showing Mainline pastors do not cite family issues nearly as much as evangelical pastors (ibid.:39-41, 52). Finally, he analyzed large national polls in America and found regularly attending evangelicals veered from social norms in both attitudes and behaviours concerning family life more than Mainline Protestants or Catholics. In sum, Wilcox shows that 220

American but it aligns with Pamela Dickey Young’s Canadian analysis showing that, during the same-sex marriage debate, liberal Protestant churches produced fewer and briefer documents on the contentious topic than Canada’s evangelicals (2012:92). Nancy Ammerman makes similar claims about Catholics, pointing out that pro-life groups cannot use Catholic parishes as organizing bases for political activism because parishioners are too divided on these issues

(2011).256 Despite the strong views of the Catholic hierarchy on family values topics, social conservatism is not a central feature of lay Catholic identity, whereas evangelicals tend to church shop for social conservative views, turning evangelical congregations into “communities of political discourse” (ibid.:64, 67n23).257 For evangelicals then, family values issues are definitional and often connect to fears around social reproduction including the ability to convey their values to their children. Gary Bauer, a prominent Republican and former leader of a prominent American evangelical lobby, claims protecting children and being able to raise them in the faith are the central concerns of evangelical politics (Oldfield 1996:62-65). This concern also manifests in the lobbies’ recurring warnings about how particular policies will

evangelicalism’s leading journal, clergy, and lay people emphasize distinctiveness on family and sexuality in a way not matched by other major Christian denominations. 256 Ammerman notes that Catholicism is more ascriptive than voluntarist, and hence lacks political cohesion among its members, which prevents such factors from becoming identifying criteria. 257 The links between a tradition's historical emergence and its level of alignment with Western modernity can be illustrated by considering Catholicism alongside another form of Christianity influential in the West, namely Mormonism. The Catholic Church predates modern Western institutions and has shown discomfort or displeasure with key features of modernity, remaining critical of capitalism to this day and only reconciling itself to structural separation slowly and haltingly over time, notably with Vatican II (Casanova 1994:135-157). Mormonism, on the other hand, was born in geographical and temporal circumstances similar to evangelicalism and, despite the undemocratic tendencies of early leaders (which continues to influence Mormon ecclesiology), the tradition has no criticisms of structural secularism nor of capitalism. Like evangelicalism, Mormonism internalized the locating of religion in the private sphere and so the tradition's power manifests inordinately in its ability to shape the familial and sexual spheres of adherents. Thus, despite the enormous theological differences between evangelicals and Mormons – many evangelicals do not even consider Mormons to be Christians – adherents of the two traditions are far more similar to each other on social issues like same-sex marriage or even support for the Republican party (which generally ties well with support for capitalism and social conservatism), than evangelicals are with their closer theological cousins in Mainline Protestantism or Catholicism (Pew Forum 2016; Jones 2015). 221 impact one’s children, a tactic they especially favour when trying to motivate supporters to provide financial support or to take civic action (e.g. sign petitions, contact MPs, etc.). Echo

Fields describes conservative religious politics as reactionary, responding to a growing

“colonization of the [religious] lifeworld” as liberal and secular structures increasingly pervade religious communities’ subcultures and make it difficult for them to pass on their way of life

(1991). Indeed, the American Religious Right’s birth was largely a response to government action rather than to cultural shifts, including the Equal Rights Amendment and particularly the

IRS threat under President Jimmy Carter to revoke tax exemptions for Christian colleges that prohibited inter-racial dating (Balmer 2007). Race is important here, but for our purposes, note that conservative Christian activism was a response to feeling they could not manage their own private schools and their own subculture as they desired. In Canada too, we saw that evangelical political activism – the lobbies’ founding, surges in their finances, and heightened levels of activity and visibility – often coincide with the secularizing or liberalizing of Canadian politics or law including creating the Charter, and later legal shifts regarding abortion and

LGBTQ matters. Many of these shifts unavoidably affect evangelicals’ own lives, be it the removal of Sunday shopping laws that denude the day of its sacred status, or new school curriculum around sex and diversity. In the political football of evangelical lobbying, the lobbyists play offense in sometimes seeking cultural dominance (perhaps particularly in the

United States), but they play defense – and, I believe, are perhaps more often motivated – by their fear of being unable to pass on their faith to their children.

So far then, I have contended that Christianity’s historic interests in sexuality and family life were enhanced by cultural shifts that: i) made sexuality central to personal identity; and ii)

222 domesticated religion into an increasingly sentimentalized home. Evangelicalism evolved amidst these cultural changes and is therefore especially defined by the intimate sphere of familial life more so than other major schools of Western Christianity, except for Mormonism which also evolved in this era. The Christian family’s centrality to evangelical identity means that cultural changes in the familial and sexual spheres threaten many evangelicals, spurring some to form lobbies and mobilize constituents. What remains then are two tasks. First, to augment my historical argument regarding why evangelicalism became entwined with family values issues, I will analyze contemporary discourses to examine how this connection works

(i.e. tease out the specific mechanisms or internal logics that empower and maintain this bond). Second and simultaneously, we will see if these linkages illuminate not only evangelicals’ investment in the intimate sphere but also why they take the specific stances they do on various policies.

Biblical Values or Theological Orientations?

While both evangelicals and outside observers routinely suggest evangelicals’ family values stances are grounded in the Bible, this claim does not consistently hold. On some issues, the biblical claim fares well – for example, sex outside of marriage clearly contravenes the

Bible and violates the text’s norms. However, declaring the Bible as the foundation of every stance can be a trope as the text is often less instructive than the lobbies imply. On some issues the Bible provides virtually no guidance (e.g. the lobbies’ opposition to publicly funded daycare or transgender rights). In other instances, evangelicals’ own positions change too drastically to be anchored to an unchanging scripture. The most telling example, ironically, is

223 the lobbies’ top priority: abortion. Substantial documentation shows American evangelicals held varied opinions on abortion when the Roe v. Wade judgment occurred (Alan Wolfe, cited in Pew Forum 2006; Munson 2009:76-95; Wilcox 2004:46-47). Notably, America’s largest evangelical body at the time, the Southern Baptist Convention, issued a statement explicitly supporting the judgment (Wilcox ibid.). Alan Wolfe suggests Baptists accepted abortion partly because it is notably not condemned in the Bible, with some passages explicitly valuing an unborn child’s life less than that of a born person (Pew Forum 2006).258 The staunch pro-life position was a Catholic phenomenon until evangelicals warmed to it during the 1970s, though the Bible itself had obviously not changed (Pew Forum 2006; Munson 2009).259 Evangelicals’ shift on abortion illustrates a larger principle, namely that claiming loyalty to a text still grants enormous power to the malleability of scriptural interpretation. Theology, of course, does not spring fully formed from the text but emerges through a process of selection, amplification, omission and interpretation. This malleability is in evidence today as younger evangelicals are more likely to believe supporting gays and lesbians (including gay marriage) actually aligns with biblical principles regarding love and inclusion.260 And the Bible itself is far more contradictory on family matters than evangelical literature typically acknowledges.261 Given Jesus’ focus in

258 Exodus 21:22-25; Leviticus 27:6. 259 A similar dynamic occurs in Canada. The early pro-life movement was driven by socially well-off Catholics in Toronto who tied the issue to social justice rather than social conservatism. By the late 1970s, a more grass roots social conservative movement emerged and a split developed. Campaign Life Coalition, a Catholic run entity, continues to be the major pro-life organization in Canada, but evangelicals beginning in the late 1970s and growing over time have become significant actors in promoting the pro-life cause (Tatalovich 1996; Farney 2012). 260 Younger evangelicals’ views on social conservatism are revisited later in the chapter. 261 Scholars observe that neither the Bible nor Jesus seem particularly “family values” focussed (Ault 2004:110; Ehrman 2012:289; Sanders 1993:125-6). The Old Testament has diverse family forms and many commands evangelicals ignore. The gospels, too, are not very helpful, as family is not a central concern for Jesus. The rest of the New Testament is more helpful although used selectively (e.g. side-stepping passages that advocate celibacy). This reading does not require revisionist thinking as these ideas were reflected in early Christianity. Peter Brown explains that Christians in the first centuries viewed celibacy as the ideal (2008). This ideal, Brown states, was shared across the many early sects who quarrelled, instead, on whether marriage was simply less ideal or if it 224 the gospels on the poor and the sick, it is not difficult to imagine how evangelical politics and identity could have gone in a different direction, prioritizing the care of the sick (i.e. healthcare) and the feeding of the hungry.262 The Bible is clearly relevant to evangelical politics, but mantras of biblical adherence are an opening for analysis, not its conclusion.

Instead, I suggest that both the lobbies’ stances as well as the justifications they offer reveal a desire to protect the traditional family as a structure or institution; a desire driven by key affinities between the traditional family and vital orientations drawn from evangelical theology. On the surface, it is not immediately clear why evangelical faith requires a particular family structure. Could a single mother not impart evangelical faith to their offspring just as easily as a married heterosexual couple by taking their children to church, enrolling them in

Bible camps, and teaching them to pray and read scripture? But the lobbies’ arguments indicate the traditional family as a structure or institution inculcates evangelical truths in a way

disqualified one as a true Christian (the dominant groups decided it was just less ideal). Brown adds that early church historian Eusebius said this tension – between an idealized celibate life and a more attainable married one – characterized Christianity’s first two and a half centuries (ibid.:205-8). Privileging celibacy persisted right up until the Protestant Reformation. Hence, equating the Bible with “family values” is not axiomatic, but rather a modern move grounded in specific and culturally ensconced textual interpretations. 262 An interesting contrast can be drawn with the Sikh community. A core component of Sikh identity is “langar,” the provision of free food in every gurdwara or temple. It is mandatory that food be provided and that no money is requested. The Golden Temple in Amritsar, Sikhs’ most sacred religious building, provides tens of thousands of free meals daily. When the Parliament of World Religions was held in Toronto in 2018, the Sikh community provided free lunches to about 8,000 attendees for all six days of the event, funded by Sikh benefactors and staffed by Sikh volunteers from many countries. At regular gurdwaras, young and old volunteer to cook, serve and clean. Langar is not only an act of generosity – in many ways, it is constitutive of Sikh identity, discussed in information talks to the public, found in pamphlets the community produces, and seemingly functioning as a kind of pedagogy about what the community stands for. I am writing during the coronavirus epidemic in 2020 and prominent Sikhs on Twitter are tweeting examples of their co-religionists organizing to provide meals for the elderly, for front line responders, and for others who cannot venture out. Of course, evangelicals have many programs for the needy just as many Sikhs care deeply about protecting traditional marriage, but I maintain that traditional marriage is not as definitional for Sikhs as it is for evangelicals and that the reverse holds on feeding the hungry. Given the recorded sayings of Jesus, it is not hard to imagine a different outcome. All of this is to say that the Bible is a compendium of many books that contain innumerable points of view and to attribute family values to the text and to theologies claiming to simply explicate its clear truths is, I think, an unsatisfactory analysis. 225 other family forms cannot equal.263 To demonstrate this point, I will combine secondary sources on evangelical culture with my own primary source analysis of the lobbies’ discourses to show three fundamental orientations where the traditional family is claimed to resonate with evangelicalism, namely on ontology, ethics and anthropology. To clarify terms: by ontology, I mean evangelicals’ worldview or cosmology, their concept of the natural order including ultimate reality, the kinds of beings that exist and how they relate to each other; by ethics, I refer to moral principles and behaviour; and by anthropology, I mean not the academic discipline but rather evangelicals’ conceptions of human nature, including our needs, tendencies and what fosters flourishing versus harm. In sum, these three orientations address the nature of reality, moral behaviour, and what fosters human well-being. These orientations are hub concepts, so central to evangelical perspectives that they configure how one responds on so many fronts from family life to social trends, political issues, etc. These issues might also be labelled “frames,” but I chose “orientation” for two reasons. First, whereas both terms capture the idea of changing what we see and how we perceive things, an orientation goes further as it places oneself, and provides us with our bearing and sense of direction.264 To lose this sense leaves us feeling “disoriented,” no longer certain about right and wrong. My contention is that these three factors play this kind of fundamental role, crafting much of the evangelical perspective and sense of placement. Second, by “orientation,” I wish to encompass two notions: that these outlooks are indeed cognitive frames but also that they shape one’s emotional registers. Thus, when I raise notions of authority below while discussing evangelical

263 I focus here on how the lobbyists depict the traditional family and bracket assessing the depiction’s accuracy. 264 The term “sexual orientation” similarly captures that what is being described is not just an outward way of looking, a gaze, but rather something that defines the subject themselves. It is this structuring of the self that I am aiming at here. 226 ontology, I am contending that these notions are both cognitively understood and emotionally given force, making certain behaviours feel honourable and others offensive.265 Crucially, the family’s immense socializing power means the family not only aligns with these orientations but actually models habits of thinking, feeling, and comportment that internalize these orientations in the crucible of ordinary life. In essence, the (idealized) traditional family’s daily rhythms become a pedagogical school for an evangelical habitus. These affinities are so critical, the lobbies believe veering from this structure threatens the tradition’s very core. Thus, the family’s ability to embed these vital affinities into daily living makes the family integral to the tradition’s survival and turns these issues into essential boundary markers of evangelical identity.

The Traditional Family as Incubator of an Evangelical Habitus

To demonstrate my argument above, I will trace the affinities between the traditional family and evangelical theology by examining the evangelical orientations on each of ontology, ethics and anthropology. For each orientation, I begin with a theoretical section which draws on other researchers’ scholarship to describe the orientation. I then follow this by analysing the lobbies’ materials to show that the data validates the theoretical claims. The orientations on the different topics are not mutually exclusive and so, the discussion does feature some overlap. Note too that while the previous chapter traced differences (i.e. between the lobbies

265 Per my discussion in the introductory chapter of the work of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, absent the emotional force, concepts have little pull. Evangelicalism’s success has depended not just on beliefs or theologies but on its ability to stimulate emotions of belonging, of feeling loved by a kind God and a genuinely caring community, and by the kind of cohesion formed by abhorring the same behaviours and ideas as others in your community. 227 and between insider speech versus outsider speech), this chapter, like chapter 3, sets such distinctions aside as the orientations on these three factors are so pervasive, the lobbies all employ them in front of all types of audiences. Indeed, this is the point – the orientations are so foundational to evangelical politics on family values issues, that they shape the lobbies’ discourses regardless of variations in tone or whether religious or secular justifications are employed.

Before we launch into analyzing these three factors, a note about individualism. A thread running through all three of the orientations is evangelicals’ struggle against liberal notions of the individual that stress personal autonomy. There is irony in this conflict for, as explored more fully in chapter six, Western individualism derives in significant ways from

Protestantism.266 But, per the sibling analogy in this study’s introduction, the struggle between evangelicals and liberals is partly over a shared inheritance, where that inheritance consists of terms like individualism or freedom. In a classic work on individualism, political and social theorist Steven Lukes distinguishes various facets of the concept. He identifies “religious individualism” as focusing on the individual’s direct, one-on-one relationship with God, with no role for an intermediary.267 This view stresses agency, but within the context of one’s relationship with God. Lukes differentiates this from other forms of individualism, two of which are most applicable to our discussion, namely “abstract individualism” and “political individualism.” Abstract individualism emphasizes that the individual is primary, while social and political entities are secondary. The latter are considered malleable and to be adjusted to

266 Troeltsch claimed that Western notions of the individual owed more to religious impulses than secular ones, to the Reformation more than the Renaissance (Lukes 1973: 94). 267 By “religious individualism,” Lukes addresses Christianity, not religion generally as his work focuses on Western thought. 228 suit individual needs (1973:72). Political individualism aligns with abstract individualism by again prioritizing the individual over larger social groups – i.e. that individual interests are what matter, not those of larger wholes like social classes. But political individualism goes further by positing that government’s role is therefore to simply try to satisfy individuals’ interests rather than trying to influence, curb, or shape those interests (ibid.:79-80). Both abstract and political individualism counter more conservative notions that individual desires must give ground in respecting natural hierarchies (e.g. gender for some evangelicals) and in accepting the wisdom of long-standing traditions and institutions (ibid.:85). In truth, much of family values politics can be distilled into a struggle against these latter forms of individualism. On social issues, conservatives more often want to curb individual wants – marked as selfishness – and expect the individual to submit to the structure of the traditional family, where the latter is framed as an indispensable, time-tested institution that is critical to maintaining society.268 Lukes’ portraits are somewhat ideal types – in truth, liberals often do wish to reform or educate individuals into particular ways of thinking and feeling, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.

But in the discussion below of the three orientations, we will frequently see evangelicals fighting against the perspective that individual desires are primary and that the individual’s autonomy must take priority over the kinds of social wholes that conservatives value most. We will begin then, by analyzing ontology.

268 I specifically noted that this comment applies to social issues. On economic issues, conservatives tend to prioritize individual liberty and to reduce government interference (e.g. taxation, regulation, forced contributions to social safety nets). 229

An Ontology of Difference and Hierarchy

In a detailed study using anthropological and sociological data, Sally Gallagher found that evangelicals’ views on family life reflect their ontology. Specifically, she observed that evangelicals’ family concepts link to their notions of the “social and moral order” and ultimately to “ideas about the person of God” (2003:169). Drawing on national survey data and interviews, she identified two key elements of evangelicals’ family conceptions, namely “ideas of gender hierarchy and difference,” as mirroring their understandings of the divine order

(ibid.:174, emphasis added). The divine order consists of God, angels, humans, and animals, with each type of being having its proper place in a hierarchy based on natural differences between the categories. Thus, God exerts dominion over humans while humans exert dominion over the animals. Gallagher suggests the family is similarly understood so that difference, such as distinctions in gender or between adults and children, mark some as holders of authority and thus responsible for demonstrating love and guidance to those under their care (ibid.:174). The result, Gallagher posits, is that family becomes “the central metaphor for the ontological world view” of evangelicals (ibid.:174, emphasis in original).

Gallagher is not alone in her conclusions. Julie Ingersoll, a leading religious scholar on American conservative Christians, genealogically traced evangelicals’ ideas about family values to roots in

Christian Reconstructionism. Like Gallagher, she also concluded that gender and ontology are organized around difference and hierarchy, so that “the family, with the father as authority, mirrors the cosmos with God as authority” (2009:191).269 Sociologist Brad Wilcox also concurs

269 Although Gallagher and Ingersoll are mostly aligned, a slight difference is that Gallagher has the family as the metaphor for ontology whereas Ingersoll reverses the direction, implying that ontology structures how family is understood. I do not read Gallagher to be saying that the family is prior to ontology (which makes no logical sense) but rather that the metaphor of family, given one’s daily contact and experience of family life, is used to grasp the ontological reality of God and the universe, since these larger realities are not so easily encountered in 230 that evangelical family discourses legitimate difference and authority by turning to the created order (2004:52-3, 56-9). We can reasonably apply these American theorists’ findings to Canada given the shared theology, shared consumption of evangelical media, and Reimer’s findings that Canadian evangelicals share the family values and moral conservatism of their U.S. peers

(2003).

What lends real weight to these theoretical insights is that the two lenses of difference and hierarchy prove immensely valuable in explaining which issues the lobbies focus on. Before demonstrating ontology’s relevance for explaining the issues the lobbies tackle, let me first address the lobbies’ own claims – namely that their activism stems from biblical adherence and a secular claim to simply advocate for the welfare of families and children.270 Both claims are relevant but ultimately seem insufficient in explaining where the lobbies choose to spend their limited resources. Addressing the latter (secular) motive first, the lobbies’ actions frequently defy secular utilitarian assessments of the potential benefits and harms specific policies hold for families. For example, health care is vitally important in Canada with many aspects from well-being to affordability that greatly affect families, but the lobbies never address these issues. Similarly, the IMFC never addressed the many issues facing children in divorced homes despite calling itself a research institute for the well-being of family and children.271 Conversely, the IMFC often focused on issues that seemingly affected far fewer

the mundane of ordinary life. Ingersoll’s framing is perhaps more accurate but the main point is that both scholars independently identified a resonance between ontology and how the family is perceived. 270 The lobbies sometimes portrayed their defense of families and of children in secular terms. Of course, this does not mean the lobbies were not still motivated by Christian commitments but rather that when entering the public sphere, they could easily reframe their concerns in non-parochial secular language that would have general appeal. The IMFC, in particular, systematically presented its arguments this way since it fit the Institute’s persona of a secular-looking think tank focussed on the well-being of families. 271 The IMFC advocated policies they thought would help prevent divorce but said little about the many children already in divorced homes. Public policy issues for such children are numerous, including how to foster less 231 people or were less pivotal to familial health including transgender washrooms, the right to spank one’s children (the subject of a costly joint legal intervention by Focus and CFAC), and multiple pieces on the emotional struggles some adult children of sperm donors feel at not knowing their biological father (Fraher 2006c; Fraher 2007; Andreasen 2010). From a utilitarian standpoint of protecting families and children, it is difficult to understand how the adult children of sperm donors garnered more attention than the enormous number of children living in divorced homes or any number of health care issues. Since utilitarian considerations do not adequately explain the lobbies’ policy priorities, we could turn to the lobbies’ other stated motive – biblical fidelity.272 However, as noted above, claiming biblical fidelity sometimes hides as much as it reveals. It may seem axiomatic that Bible-believing lobbies will fight vigorously on spanking and not on policies impacting children in divorced homes, but this likely reflects how socialized we are to modern evangelical norms rather than careful assessing the biblical text and contemplating how particular themes become emphasized or downplayed. Given the New Testament’s advocacy for the needy and its silence on spanking,273 it is easy to imagine how evangelical advocacy groups might prioritize children in single-parent homes and pay little heed to corporal punishment. My point here is not moral – I do not suggest evangelicals ignore the needy as statistics on charitable giving and volunteering show precisely the opposite – but rather that evangelicals’ political activities around families

acrimonious divorces, whether dual custody is best and how to facilitate it, child support, and other income and daycare support issues for the parents. The IMFC ignored these issues or, on daycare, addressed the broad topic but without considering the challenges of divorced families. This is generally true of all the lobbies. 272 This corrective is less relevant for the IMFC as it claims to be strictly research based. 273 Online Christian resources around spanking rely inordinately on a single Old Testament text, the book of Proverbs. There are almost no New Testament references and those which are cited are not nearly as clear as those found in Proverbs. 232 are not explained by simply citing the Bible or by utilitarian statements about upholding the well-being of families and children.

In trying to understand what other motivations are at play, the work of Gallagher,

Ingersoll and Wilcox prove telling for discerning which issues garner attention and which do not. The lobbies’ choices start to make eminent sense if evangelical family life is believed to rely on maintaining difference and hierarchy. Thus, since transgenderism threatens notions of difference, it must be opposed, while health care, which affects neither difference nor hierarchy, is essentially ignored. The right to spank is important because it establishes the proper assertion of authority stemming from hierarchy and raises the specter of having God’s ordained family hierarchy undermined by a secular state – hence the cause justifies expensive legal interventions by Focus and CFAC. Using sperm donors is quite rare but it must be opposed on principle as it facilitates single motherhood, implies fathers are superfluous, and thus undermines the traditional family structure of hierarchy and gendered difference.274 But issues affecting already single-parent families, such as daycare and income support – where

274 Tellingly, despite the IMFC's concern about sperm donors not knowing their biological father, the lobby supports adoption (as does the evangelical community generally). The lobby's support for adoption is intriguing since both adoptees and sperm donor children often do not know their biological parents and yet the lobby supports one procedure while critiquing the other (Fostering Adoption 2011). However, the contradiction resolves if we begin from the three orientations I have highlighted. First, evangelicals see adoption as replacing abortion and abortion violates two of the evangelical orientations, namely on ethics (discussed later) and on ontology, since the relationships of hierarchy come with duties of care towards those over whom one has oversight – in this example, parents’ obligation to unborn children. Second, adoption fits into evangelical ontology since it can be imagined as "completing" an infertile heterosexual family or providing a proper traditional family to a child lacking one. In contrast, while sperm donation can help infertile heterosexual couples, it is popular amongst lesbian couples and single women. These latter family forms challenge evangelical attachment to gender difference – sometimes called "gender complementarity" – by implying a man and woman are not absolute necessities for family formation. Indeed, the sperm donor children will know at least one biological parent (their mothers) which adopted children do not but the lobbies nonetheless oppose sperm donation and accept adoption. Comparing adoption and sperm donation shows the IMFC assesses a practice not by whether it enables knowing one's biological parents but whether it reinforces the traditional family form of difference and hierarchy as required by evangelical ontology. 233 support might easily qualify as following Jesus’ teachings to care for the needy – do not affect difference or hierarchy and thus are ignored. Same-sex marriage and numerous other issues also fit the pattern indicated by this lens. So while the lobbies speak generally of “adhering to the Bible” or “acting in the best interests of families,” the specific driver is protecting God’s order – or ontology – manifested in a family marked by difference and hierarchy.

The importance of difference and hierarchy is further validated by the fact that the lobbies themselves reference these traits to defend their positions. For example, all the lobbies insist on substantial gender differences and fight against social constructivist views. The lobbies vigorously insist that men and women are biologically, emotionally and psychologically different. Thus Focus criticizes social constructivists for assuming men and women share the

“same core, just interchangeable body parts,” a position which Focus mockingly calls the

“‘Mister Potato Head theory’ of gender difference” (Focus 2004a:9). The other three lobbies echo this critique including a CFAC posting titled “21 Reasons Why Gender Matters,” and lengthy IMFC arguments against social constructivist perspectives (Hatfield 2007; Fraher

2006b; Mitchell 2006). Essentializing gender differences undergirds the lobbies’ reasoning on numerous topics, including their opposition to transgender legislation, their belief that single parenting and gay parenting deny children the need for both mom and dad (since they posit men and women parent differently), and their arguments that hook-up culture particularly harms young women, whose emotional and physiological responses to sex are deemed different than men’s (Grossman 2007; Stanton 2010a). Similarly, in opposing same-sex marriage, the lobbies often insist that one of marriage’s vital roles is reconciling the two genders and that such “gender complementarity” – i.e. difference – is integral to marriage’s

234 definition (Stanton 2010a; EFC 2006; Rushfeldt, quoted in Parliament of Canada 2003a). Even when the lobbies turn from secular arguments to employ biblical metaphors on marriage, the imagery chosen highlights both difference and hierarchy, describing marriage as “symbolic of

God’s relationship to His people and Jesus Christ’s relationship to His Church,” both of which pair unequals in a hierarchical relationship (EFC 2006:4; see also EFC 2008b; Martens 1999;

McVety 2005a). The combination of difference and hierarchy does not explain every issue, but it sheds light on why a fairly marginal topic like student unions encouraging gender neutral washrooms on a few university campuses can warrant attention from the IMFC, a national institute dedicated to the family (Fraher 2008). Finally, it is critical to remember that the affinity with ontology is not just cognitive. The family not only reflects the divine order, it is the most directly experienced contact with that order. It weaves that order into the most fundamental social unit which nurtures and raises us, and does much to confer our identity and our perception of our world. Traditional family life becomes the experiential vehicle through which evangelicals come to feel this order as natural and right. As such, any amending of the traditional family structure risks undermining confidence in the larger portrait God has ordained.

An Ethic of Duty and Obligation

The second area where affinities exist between the traditional family and evangelicalism is the orientation on ethics. James Ault investigated the interplay between evangelicals’ ethics, politics, and family life in his ethnography of a Massachusetts Baptist church (2004). He concluded that Religious Right politics stems from the desire to protect a

235 family-based view of ethics that emphasizes duty and obligation. His subjects saw family responsibilities as “sacred duties against the tide of individualism and individual rights”

(ibid.:201). Ault posited this outlook emerged from both doctrinal firmness and socio- economic necessity, as his subjects inhabited a lower socio-economic demographic and frequently faced economic marginalization, most especially when elderly, starting young families, or suffering unemployment. In these circumstances, the church community functioned like an extended family where reciprocal giving – supporting one another through financial and other means – was considered a sacred obligation rather than a choice, since the vulnerability and interdependency meant help must not depend on personal whim. Ault extended his findings to evangelicals generally as they disproportionately inhabited lower socio-economic strata during the culturally formative 1960s and 1970s.275 The liberal counterculture, on the other hand, emphasized the individual’s rights and autonomy and, hence, thrived especially on university campuses among young people who, free from family oversight and with strong economic prospects, valued their independence. Reflecting on his own more liberal context, Ault saw that individualism and moral relativism were mutually supportive, as the increasingly individualistic lifestyle emerging during the 1960s required moral tolerance to allow individuals the leeway to chart their own personal values and life choices (ibid.:328). Obviously not everyone with low socio-economic status chose evangelicalism, nor did everyone at university become tolerant of others’ moral lives – but Ault suggests context mattered and different ethics prospered in different socio-economic soils.

275 Ault provides supporting evidence from Nancy Ammerman and others that reinforce how socio-economic differences often predict whether Christians become more conservative or liberal on social issues (Ault 2004:380n14-15; Ammerman 1987). 236

The traditional family, Ault argues, understood as a fixed form, was the model for this ethic of duty and reciprocity owing to its set obligations and mutual responsibilities. Making that family form malleable – through liberalized divorce laws, cohabitation, same sex couples, etc. – makes the duty-based ethic optional and thus pulls apart the nursery designed to inculcate these values in the next generation.

Brad Wilcox (2004) complements Ault’s findings. Wilcox concurs that evangelicals’ commitment to moral order and a duty-based ethics drew from historical class issues and economic marginalization (ibid.:32-33). Wilcox also agrees that these values lay at the heart of evangelical discourses on sexuality and family, forming an alternative narrative to a more freedom-oriented liberal ethic. Wilcox completes Ault’s picture by bringing it forward – he shows the socio-economic differences between evangelicals and the broader society have dwindled in recent decades, but that the gap in ethical narratives has continued owing to strong ideological work done in congregations, evangelical media, and the subculture generally

(ibid.:61-2).276 As with ontology, although this story comes from American academics, it fits the

276 There is an interesting debate here over ideological versus sociological causation. Ault’s sociological lens leads him to critique historian George Marsden’s seminal work on American fundamentalism for being too cognitive (2006). Ault believes sociological differences between liberals and conservative Christians, and not different ideas, drove different choices. However, Ault’s mid-1980s fieldwork (done at an economically challenged congregation) does not capture how evangelicals closed the socio-economic gap with mainstream culture. Wilcox responds with more of a dialectic between ideological and sociological factors. Sociological factors helped foster the initial divide but ideological work by the evangelical subculture helped to maintain distinct narratives and outlooks, thus perpetuating difference even as social distance narrowed. Wilcox’s combination of ideological and sociological factors seems more compelling analytically and comports better with the available data. A consequence, however, is that while distinction has been maintained as Wilcox indicates, erasing the sociological distance has fostered greater alignment with the broader culture (as anticipated by Hunter 1987). For example, women’s career aspirations, once contentious for evangelicals, are now so uncontroversial, the lobbies themselves have multiple female executives. Another example is young evangelicals’ warming to gay relationships (see later in this chapter). In short, the dwindling socio-economic gap matters. Maintaining distinction becomes harder as evangelicals pursue the same education level, career paths, and urban homes as non-evangelicals. Consequently, this shrinking socio-economic gap may heighten the stakes of upholding distinct family norms as the family becomes a rare crucial bastion for preserving difference. 237

Canadian scene well. Canadian evangelicals have also faced historic socio-economic marginalization and also fostered institutions distinct from the rest of the culture including congregations, Bible colleges and Bible camps (and consumed different media via American evangelical television, radio and magazines). And as mentioned earlier, Reimer’s findings demonstrate American and Canadian evangelicals are strongly aligned on socially conservative ethics (2003).

Most importantly, Ault’s and Wilcox’s conclusions fit the primary source data from the lobbies. Ault uses ethical binaries that pit: i) individual versus group/family; ii) choice versus responsibility/duty; and iii) relativism versus absolutes. In the IMFC’s inaugural year, staff researcher Kate Fraher drew heavily on these binaries, writing that, “greater individual choice clashed with the obligations and social norms that held families and communities together”

(2006:28, underlining and italics added to highlight distinct binaries). Elsewhere she again taps into the individual-versus-group and choice-versus-duty binaries, writing that “expressive individualism” emphasizes a “moral obligation to look after themselves first and foremost,” which was “detrimental to families” as “individual needs and desires trump those of the collective, in this case, the family” (ibid.:27,29). A second article published within the IMFC’s first year embraces similar language, claiming that the rise of a “companionate” model of marriage shifted the institution “from a duty-driven child-centered institution” to one where children became mere “additions” that “enhance or detract from a chosen lifestyle,” (Sugrue

2006:2, 3). This latter statement presents a contrast made by all the lobbies which pits the alleged proper view of children – that they are a sacred duty – against a purportedly growing tendency to reduce them to a mere choice or lifestyle accoutrement. They depict the intact

238 family as a daily lesson in duty, self-sacrifice, and commitment to the greater whole, whereas divorce privileges adults’ needs over children’s and thus teaches “it is normal to be unreliable, untrustworthy, narcissistic, self-centred, pleasure-seeking, and irresponsible” (ibid.:8). The examples above all come from the IMFC’s magazine and electronic publications but the same ethical binaries permeate the other lobbies’ materials. Thus, the other lobbies also describe children being reduced from a sacred duty to a “consumer good,” a “discardable lifestyle option,” or even “trophies to be ‘awarded’” to gay couples to confer “status” or make a

“political statement” (Roback Morse 2005b; Warren 2011; Focus 2003:16). Framing divorce as selfish and privileging adults’ needs is also common (e.g. Dawes 2001; Dueck 2004:3). And the

EFC in their main booklet on marriage even create a schema comparing marriage models that mirrors the IMFC’s, repeating the same mantra that the modern model tragically privileges

“choice,” which again echoes one of Ault’s binaries (EFC 2006:7).

The examples above illustrate how Ault’s first two binaries permeate the lobbies’ discourses but the lobbies also replicate the ethical polarity of Ault’s third binary: moral- relativism-versus-absolute-truth. The lobbies describe how prioritizing choice inevitably creates “moral relativists,” “arbitrary principles,” and a sense that “Truth is self-made,” or “a matter of personal opinion” (CFAC 2007e; Sclater 1999; EFC 2006:13; Sclater 1999).277 Choice is particularly targeted because while the lobbies value choice, they believe liberals over- emphasize it. Individual autonomy in particular is heavily criticized by all four lobbies.

Evangelicalism includes individualistic strands such as an Arminian view of salvation,278

277 Of the four citations in this sentence, two are from Focus, one from the EFC, and one is from CFAC. As indicated earlier, the lobbies’ discourses are remarkably consistent in demonstrating the affinities detailed herein. 278 Arminianism is the theological view that individuals freely choose to follow Christ or not, a decision that fundamentally affects one's eternal destiny. This perspective emphasizes human agency in contrast to Calvinist 239 populism, voluntarism, and valorizing personal emotional responses; however, evangelical individualism is contained by and subordinate to a larger outlook, whereby individual choice and personal will must submit to God’s will. Submission axiomatically subordinates choice to duty and responsibility. The biblical marriage metaphors cited earlier reflect this ethic as the imagery of God’s commitment to his people and Christ’s love for his Church emphasize fixed relationships (i.e. “covenant”), and sacrificial love rather than choice and changing preferences.279 The lobbies underscore these lessons to their readers, writing that “God’s dogged faithfulness to his children…and Christ’s tenacious love of his church…give us the content for the vow of fidelity” (EFC 2006:8; see also Heffernan 2002). Overall then, the lobbies portray the traditional family as grounded in a married couple that stays together, remains committed through adversity, and dutifully fulfills their obligations to their children and each other. As we saw in ontology, the family is vital because it does not merely align with these ethics – as the most persistent and deeply ingrained feature of social life, it habituates these ethical values and practices among both adults and children. Living the family ethic of duty and responsibility on a day-by-day basis trains us in the kind of relationship we are to have with God where we must follow, as unswervingly as possible, the commandments he gives us. To the lobbies, normalizing divorce, common law marriages, or gay marriages erodes these crucial lessons. Making these obligations conditional, allowing the structure of these relationships to be customizable, undermines the entire edifice of duty and obligation that evangelical ethics require.

perspectives that affirm pre-destination, a doctrine which maximizes God’s sovereignty but at the expense of human agency. Both views exist in evangelical communities but the newer Arminian theology predominates. 279 The lobbies often call marriage a “covenant” to specifically reference God’s covenant with his people in the Bible and to reject cultural conceptions they feel lack commitment. 240

An Anthropology of Relatedness and Dependency

Finally, the third evangelical orientation with vital affinities to the traditional family is what we might call “evangelical anthropology” or concepts of the person. Aspects of this affinity were evident in our earlier discussions of ontology and ethics since these categories entwine with anthropology. Thus, emphasizing gender difference (discussed under ontology) displays an anthropology of hard biological distinctions between the sexes. Here I will go beyond sex differences to highlight evangelicals’ core anthropological concern – namely that liberals’ fetish with autonomy misconstrues human nature by ignoring our dependencies and relationality.

Earlier, I mentioned that scholars have identified deep historical ties between

Protestantism and Western individualism. This individualistic emphasis carries over into Anglo-

American evangelicalism. However, recall that Lukes distinguished religious forms of individualism from what he termed abstract or political individualism. Lukes describes ideal types but these latter forms are closer to the notions of individual autonomy that grounds many liberal policies and which Lukes indicated are often opposed by conservatives who find that these forms act as solvents, dissolving the web of social bonds and structures necessary for human flourishing (1973:79-85). Lukes’ description fits well with the critique of the lobbies who both espouse individualism and yet find liberals’ emphasis on autonomy goes too far.

Anthropologist Omri Elisha suggests that evangelicals’ individualistic tendencies must be understood to sit alongside a countervailing tendency towards a "radical interdependency"

(2015:42). One area where Elisha suggests this interdependency emphasis manifests is the

241 community’s penchant for organizing small, regularly-meeting groups that are characterized by norms of radical openness, confession of failings, and vulnerability. Inside such groups, participants feel safe to share personal shortcomings and private wounds and, in turn, receive both loving support and peers to hold them accountable. Operating independent of such support is seen as arrogant and makes one susceptible to pride, to Satan, and to sin. The anthropology implied is that human flourishing occurs only in the web of community – in communion with other Christ-followers – where we gain from being part of the body of Christ, dependent on God and on fellow Christians to correct us along the way.280 Elisha does not study family life per se, but his observations on evangelical anthropology apply generally and not just in these group settings.

Elisha’s theoretical observations are again borne out by the lobbies’ discourses. Hence, the EFC’s parliamentary submission on abortion summarizes that the “Failure of Liberalism” is

(an anthropology) that overemphasizes “individual autonomy” (1990). Clemenger similarly charges in the EFC magazine that liberals wrongly believe “the individual is sovereign and has meaning apart from all other attachments” (2005c). The lobbies’ critique also emerges in the adjectives they select to describe mainstream culture. In 2006, a single page on Focus’s website had articles labeling society’s values as “intense individualism,” “radical individualism,” or prioritizing the “naked individual, the isolated individual,” and so on (Somerville 2003;

Young and Nathanson 2003; Roback Morse 2005b). The lobbies’ anthropological critique of

280 Elisha (ibid.:53) notes these small group dynamics have been documented in a number of well-known ethnographies examining various types of evangelical groups including Bible study groups (Bielo 2009), evangelical women's groups (Griffith 2000), and ex-gay organizations (Erzen 2006). In all cases, strong relationships built on mutual sharing, dependency, and accountability were central to the transformation and salvation sought, thus affirming an anthropology of deep interdependence. 242 liberalism actually grounds the earlier ethical critique as they believe liberals’ moral error of prioritizing individuals’ independence is founded on an analytical error of misunderstanding human nature. The lobbies do not explicitly spell out a counter anthropology, but their critiques consistently depict people as more relational and dependent than liberals acknowledge. While the lobbies sometimes caricature liberalism, their critique does partly resonate as the liberal tradition does view the individual’s autonomy or freedom as a fundamental goal and perhaps even the goal in some understandings.

An added component of evangelical anthropology is their belief in natural law.

Evangelical doctrine portrays people as sinners who cannot achieve true wholeness apart from

God. Well-being in this life (and salvation in the next) thus stems from acknowledging our dependence on God and following his intentions for us. However, as discussed in earlier chapters, God’s intentions for us are evident not just through divine commands, but also in natural aspects of our world – the design of our bodies, nature, and organically occurring social institutions, cumulatively called “natural law.” Evangelicals believe that our dependent and reliant nature is such that we rely on enduring social institutions to support us, and primary among such institutions are the family and religious communities. Since natural law is accessible to human reason, they trust that social science will validate these socially felicitous choices. Hence, they contend that biology, sociology and cross-cultural anthropology reveal our actions are rarely autonomous either in their causes or consequences (Interfaith Coalition on the Family 2003; Sclater quoted in Senate of Canada 1996; McVety quoted in Senate of

Canada 2004).281 This argument about personhood and human dependency pervades the

281 Note the sources cited in this sentence stem from the EFC, CFAC and Focus, showing once more how common these arguments are across the different lobbies. 243 lobbies’ discourses on sex and family. To illustrate this point, let us examine the lobbies on three topics – feminism, sex, and their understanding of marriage and family life – where they claim liberal conceptions of personhood are culturally dominant but deeply flawed.

On feminism, the lobbies uphold women’s basic equality, but believe liberal feminism’s fetishization of autonomy harms women. The IMFC, in an article published in its magazine titled “What do Women Want?,” reviewed a prominent study by two economists showing

American women in the 2000s self-reported less happiness than women had in the 1970s, even though men’s happiness increased over the same time frame (2008a). This decline belied decades of improvements in seemingly objective measures of female well-being such as educational attainment, employment, income, etc. The IMFC concluded that while liberal feminism achieved many of its tangible goals, the decline in well-being showed it had failed to consider the possible negative consequences of such goals. Another article in the IMFC’s magazine fleshes out this theme by arguing that “Friedan feminism” (referencing Betty

Friedan, author of the 1963 feminist manifesto The Feminine Mystique) fails because it

“diminishes mothering” and ignores “fundamental female desires” to have children (Mrozek

2007:24). Friedan and her feminist disciples are said to misunderstand most women by over- emphasizing freedom and autonomy – career advancement, easier divorce options, day-care, etc. – while overlooking that women can and often do thrive in marital relationships and child- rearing commitments, where such relationships are based on dependencies and self-sacrifice that nonetheless convey meaning and value. The lobbies affirm clear biological differences and deride strong forms of social constructionism that they feel ignore women’s particular needs

(e.g. Mitchell 2006). They charge feminists and liberals with devaluing biology and falling for

244 what one article called the “mythology of the Blank Slate” (IMFC 2008b:8). In contrast, Focus’s

Glen Stanton (writing on Focus’ website and email listserve) cites multiple studies and books to argue that male and female brains are inherently different (Stanton 2010a). Feminism’s undoing, from this perspective, is its failure to comprehend gender differences, including women’s inherently relational nature and psycho-physiological desire to find meaning in the circle of family life.

The lobbies identify similar mistakes in liberals’ perceptions of sex. Sex, they maintain, is not about choice and autonomy but about relationship, vulnerability and dependence. They accuse liberals of reducing all sexual questions to the issue of consent, which fits the “culture’s obsession with personal autonomy perfectly” (Colson 2003). The lobbies believe liberals’ over- emphasis on autonomy fosters multiple forms of harm. Some harm stems from physical effects such as casual sex facilitating the spread of STDs and unplanned pregnancies that cause abortions or single-parenthood. The rhetoric of freely pursuing your desires, the lobbyists argue, discourages weighing potentially serious consequences. But the lobbies especially criticize liberals for failing to consider the emotional implications. The lobbies draw on brain studies and sociological surveys suggesting that because sex fosters emotional bonding, a

“hook-up” culture championing attachment-free sex creates serious mental health consequences (e.g. Stanton 2011b; EFC 2006). Students end up “dissatisfied and depressed,” which fosters later infidelity and divorce with all their attendant deleterious effects (Mrozek

2008). In short, by reducing sexual ethics to autonomy, liberals plant seeds of future harm.

Thus, when Canada’s Supreme Court struck down decency laws prohibiting a “swingers” club from legally operating a sex business that included group sex and partner swapping

245

(mentioned in chapter three), the EFC’s Bruce Clemenger, writing an editorial in a national newspaper, criticized the judgment specifically for narrowly focusing on protecting

“autonomy” (2005e). He claimed the judgment ignored the web of harms that would arise from human relatedness and interdependence, including the “psychological harm resulting from exploitation and objectification, harm to relationships and families, [and] harm to children whose parents swap sexual partners” (ibid.; see also CFAC 2005d). To the lobbies, liberals’ naïve fixation on autonomy means they overlook that “sex is not always a victimless pleasure” (Harvey 2004).282

Lastly, the lobbies believe liberals miscomprehend marriage for similar reasons. By prioritizing autonomy, liberals view marriage as a mere choice or contract. Marriage thereby serves the individual and can be customized to individual desires and needs, whether homosexual or heterosexual, common-law or wedded, open marriage or closed, polygamous or monogamous, for now versus forever.283 This willingness to mold the institution to individual wants fits Lukes’ description of political individualism almost exactly, but the lobbies believe it grounds the relationship on self-centredness, destabilizing the marriage and increasing the odds of eventual dissolution with negative consequences for both adults and their offspring (Lukes 1973:79-80). In contrast, the lobbies present marriage as a thick institution that produces its own “self-generated norms” (Sugrue and Cere quoted in Fraher

282 Aspects of this paragraph touch on the question of sexual ethics for, as mentioned before, anthropology overlaps with the previous two frames. I include this discussion under anthropology rather than under ethics because on sexuality, the lobbies’ discourse addresses human nature more than moral commitment. Some of the lobbyists, especially EFC leaders, see that liberals have strong ethical feelings on sexuality (including on consent and support for gays’ right to marry) but believe liberals’ ethical judgment is deeply misguided owing to poor assumptions about personhood. 283 Of course, not every liberal favours open marriages and polygamy is still illegal in Canada, but the lobbies believe society is moving towards greater acceptance of these arrangements. 246

2006b). Marriage, they insist, is not an adjustable tool for individuals to adapt a la carte, but rather a fixed structural form that individuals depend on and submit to in order to gain the nurturance and guidance the form provides. This thick institutionalist approach is perhaps best captured by a Dietrich Bonhoeffer quotation evangelicals cherish and which the EFC cites in its main marriage document: “it is not your love that sustains the marriage, but, from now on, the marriage that sustains your love” (EFC 2006:11). This and similar writings imply the institution has a life and logic of its own that goes beyond the plans or wishes of two autonomous individuals. The IMFC argued on multiple occasions that marriage is the opposite of autonomy

– rather it is a “constraining” institution that restricts a couple’s economic, sexual, and moral options (e.g. Mrozek and Mitchell 2008; Allen 2007).284 In short, marriage is not a contract, amended and negotiated between autonomous parties (and later exited if commitment wavers) but a shedding of choices to submit to a time-tested institution’s inherent norms that nourish our relational and dependent nature.

Thus, on women, sexuality and marriage, the evangelical lobbies strongly believe that liberal misconceptions about human nature cause harm by violating natural law. The lobbies claim our inherent relationality and dependence makes the family rather than the individual the “basic unit of our society” (Szabo 1998; see also Sclater 1996; Rushfeldt 2011). The relationships of dependence within the traditional family – children’s reliance on parents, spouses on each other, and even elderly parents’ reliance on adult children – are valorized as the model of life attuned to our natures (Crowley 2010; Roback Morse 2007a). In its

284 The IMFC portrays the married couple as losing financial autonomy owing to the economic commitments of family life, losing sexual options as a result of committing to fidelity, and losing moral freedom because the couple answers to one another about behaviour and hold each other to account (e.g. regarding gambling, drinking, etc.). 247 submission to a government committee, the EFC writes that individualism creates the “illusion that we live and die to ourselves” but families reflect the “reality” that people need others for

“emotional, physical or financial support” (EFC 1999c:1). The lobbies add that familial care for children, the disabled, and the elderly surpasses institutional care because personal relationships motivate human actors in ways paid employment in daycares and hospices cannot match. In this way, the family is the institution sine qua non for modelling the richness of both relationship and dependence.

The lobbies’ defensiveness that I touched on earlier is rooted in a realization that the institutions of marriage and family themselves are not autonomous but rather reliant on cultural support. When the first gay couple married in Canada in 2002, they offered the familiar refrain that anyone opposed to same-sex marriages should simply not have one, but to the lobbyists, such claims evince a naïve and “superficial kind of individualism” (Bourassa and

Varnell 2002; Benne and McDermott 2004). “No marriage is an island,” counters the EFC because cultural and legal norms matter (2003b). In 1996, Focus’s Jim Sclater told parliament that while gay marriage would not affect his marriage, given his age, it would significantly affect the institution available to his grandchildren (Parliament of Canada 1996). It would be conceived differently, he argued, and thus would be a different kind of thick institution, generating different norms for its participants. The liberal doctrine of autonomy thus does double duty: it justifies altering the marriage institution and then suggests such amendments will not affect your neighbour, since they too are autonomous. The lobbies disagree on both fronts.

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Across so many issues, the lobbies believe legal and cultural changes are eroding familial patterns of dependence and relational support by gutting society’s fundamental unit in favour of individual autonomy. Examples abound in their literature: universal daycare increases adults’ autonomy to pursue careers, but deprives children of a full-time parent; the modern custom of putting elderly parents in institutional care enhances adult children’s independence, but at the expense of vulnerable seniors; abortion increases sexual and career options, but does so by rendering children a mere lifestyle choice whose nascent life can be ended through easily available surgery; and the rise in single parent families via divorce, pre- marital sex, and sperm donation extends the autonomy of adults, but ultimately harms them while robbing their children of the full web of support provided by two adults who share economic resources, time, and parenting skills. Liberal individualism’s atomizing effects are thus judged to corrode society. In contrast, the lobbies believe the traditional family schools us in human dependence and the value of relationships by obliging us to care for elderly parents, look after children, and make our marriages work even when confronting life’s challenges.

Thus, the family skilfully works on two fronts, educating us about our dependent and relational nature via these constraints and self-generated norms, while simultaneously addressing pressing needs arising from this nature by enmeshing us in a web of relationships.

Undermining the traditional family or supplanting it with alternative family forms instills harm stemming from an ignorance of “who we really are.”

Importantly, the autonomy focus harms us not only in utilitarian ways but also by undermining the kind of training that prepares us for a relationship with the Christian god.

That relationship is predicated on human sinfulness or brokenness and consequently one’s

249 complete dependence on God’s grace and forgiveness to heal us and make us whole. Exalting autonomy, choice, and freedom makes the individual sovereign which Brian Rushfeldt (n.d.) argues reflects the flawed notion that humanity is innately good, a concept he decries as the primary “deception of humanism.” Championing independence blinds us to our vulnerability and needs, which Christian doctrine suggests can only be filled in relationship with God. The traditional family’s lessons in relationality and dependence prepare us to seek fulfillment through becoming part of God’s family.

Recap: Protecting the Nursery of an Evangelical Habitus

Evangelical orientations on ontology, ethics and anthropology show the lobbies’ focus on sexuality and family is best understood not through the lens of biblical adherence nor simply as a general concern for children. Rather, the lobbies are trying to protect the institution whose daily patterns and rhythms instil and reinforce the faith’s fundamental norms. These norms demonstrate to us our place in a larger order based on difference and hierarchy, provide a moral education grounded in duty and obligation, and warn us through the family’s ordinary routines that we are not autonomous but dependent and relational beings (both with respect to each other and with God). These affinities in ontology, ethics, and anthropology yield real explanatory value in determining which items garner the lobbies’ interests and the stances they take.

While I have used these orientations to decipher the pattern of what garners the lobbies’ attention, the orientations may have broader utility in thinking about evangelicals and family values, including possible future trends. A telling example is that these orientations offer

250 more explanatory value than biblical adherence in deciphering young evangelicals’ diverging paths on same-sex marriage, where they are becoming more liberal, and abortion, where they are resolutely conservative.285 Recall that being pro-life lacks strong biblical support. However, it accords very well with all three orientations identified herein – for pro-lifers, the unborn child epitomizes our dependence and vulnerability and should never be sacrificed on the altar of individual autonomy (anthropology); reflects a hierarchical relationship between mother and child (ontology); and thus compels a moral obligation or duty on those with power to those under their care (ethics). Turning to same-sex marriage, the reverse pattern holds. Here, biblical opposition is actually much clearer but there is not the same across-the-board clash with the orientations I have identified. Same-sex relationships only clash with one orientation, specifically on ontology with its emphasis on gender difference and the complementarity of the sexes. On the other two orientations, gay marriage arguably finds support. On anthropology, it fits the emphasis on dependence and relationship, since insisting on lifelong celibacy may seem cruelly isolating. Similarly, marital devotion aligns with the moral orientation espousing duty and commitment. In short, younger evangelicals’ solid opposition to abortion and their more fluid views on same-sex marriage further substantiates the argument that the orientations we have examined may exert greater influence and have greater predictive value in examining evangelical politics than can be discerned by looking for biblical adherence.

285 The data showing young evangelicals’ greater acceptance of same-sex marriage was provided in chapter four, footnote 225. Young evangelicals’ conservative views on abortion are discussed more fully in chapter seven but a key source is Pew Forum 2015. 251

More speculatively, I think the orientations might have utility for scholars examining other forms of conservative religiosity. Other religions can also emphasize family and sexual life, tendencies that may be increasingly exacerbated as secular forms of government spread and work to domesticate religiosity into the familial and intimate spheres. I noted in the introduction that evangelicalism offers a valuable test case for how liberalism interacts with conservative religiosity. No two interactions will be exactly the same, but liberalism may pose fairly similar challenges by insisting on an equality that undermines traditional social hierarchies, privileging an ethics of choice and freedom over duty or obligation, and emphasizing autonomy rather than relational interdependencies. I do not suggest these orientations are a universal tool, but scholars examining other traditions (perhaps especially

Christianity’s sister monotheisms of Islam and Judaism) may find them useful in examining family values conflicts.

For evangelicals, the traditional family prepares the ground for true faith by establishing the right kind of relationship with the divine, while also fostering better social outcomes by adhering to natural law. Other aspects of the evangelical subculture such as congregations or Bible camps can teach evangelical perspectives on these issues, but none shapes our world like the daily lessons taught by traditional family life. At stake for the lobbies is the very nursery of an evangelical habitus.

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Chapter 6 – The Struggle to Shape Selves

The previous chapter examined some underlying mechanisms driving evangelicals’ family values focus. In this chapter, evangelicals will share centre stage with liberal opponents and the liberal ideology evangelicals so often confront. Topically, we will focus on freedom, morality and the public/private divide as these are prominent issues in family values discussions and often tend to foster a series of recurring arguments. These arguments are tackled more substantively throughout the chapter but to begin, I will offer a brief summary of these recurring debates. The lobbies and their supporters, such as likeminded politicians and conservative media personalities, frequently claim the following: liberals have “abandoned morality”; liberal freedom “goes too far”; the public sphere is morally bereft; religion belongs in public debates; and sexuality is properly a private matter. Their opponents offer corresponding counter-arguments: evangelicals and other conservative Christians want to

“impose” their morals on others; evangelicals “infringe” on people’s freedoms; the public sphere should be morally neutral; religion should be kept private; and sexuality should be an arena for openness and freedom rather than one marked by prudery and shame. In this chapter I will re-examine these ideas concerning who advocates for freedom, who for morals, and how the terms public and private are employed. While prominent speakers in these debates – on both sides – often pit moral or moralizing evangelicals against freedom-loving liberals, I want to explore liberals’ and evangelicals’ rival visions of both morality and freedom.

Evangelicals and liberals each have traditions prizing freedom, but have substantive disagreements over what constitutes freedom, how to achieve it, and who to free. These competing perspectives on freedom require the forceful backing of law and, since law 253 restrains, we find both parties actually proposing rival combinations of freedom and constraint. Put differently, the debate does not pit freedom versus constraint, but rather whether to advance the liberal paradigm of freedom or the evangelical perspective. In addition to considering their substantive differences, we will also see how evangelicals and liberals deploy the term “freedom” rhetorically. In Western democracies, freedom is a rhetorical bulldozer capable of plowing over many competing arguments and hence evangelicals and liberals try to claim ownership of it and/or use it to marginalize their opponents.

Evangelicals and their liberal opponents likewise offer rival moral visions. Liberals often justify their positions on the basis of fairness – with even liberal theorists emphasizing a

“neutrality towards competing worldviews” – while accusing evangelicals of seeking to impose their parochial morals on others (Habermas 2006:9). Conversely, evangelicals often claim that liberals have abandoned morality altogether. We will examine instead how each side puts forward moral positions that they hope will prevail and ultimately shape the public sphere.

Even liberals’ call for autonomy, which can be framed as simply asserting fairness by preventing any moral position from being imposed – prioritizing the “right over the good” in

Rawls’ terminology – is better understood as its own moral discourse (1988). As with the issue of freedom, we will consider the morals debate substantively and rhetorically.

Building on the rhetorical arguments around freedom and morals, we will also examine the rhetorical use of the terms “public” and “private.” I will demonstrate how these terms function less as descriptive labels and more as ideological tools in the conflict over rival freedoms and rival moral systems. These terms combine potency with malleability, meaning that their capacity to insulate, dismiss, and/or privilege can serve varied ends.

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I conclude the chapter by examining two load bearing pillars of liberal politics: reason and freedom. Deliberative democracy emphasizes the “giving of reasons” between free agents who discuss, make decisions, and then choose how to act. Drawing on social theory, notably including affect theory, I contend this portrayal idealizes the independent reasoning subject and misses how the way we reason is shaped by social cues, training regimens, and affective associations. Reasoning is far more conditioned and even parochial than this traditional portrayal acknowledges. Similarly, on freedom, Western society idealizes the free agent who acts autonomously, a depiction that hides forces of compulsion and power. Family values conflicts frequently tug at people’s identities and fundamental moral commitments, making actors feel not free to choose but compelled to act. Seemingly aware of this, advocates often cite freedom rhetorically but pragmatically struggle for control over the levers of socialization – i.e. state powers over legislation, adjudication, and education – that help shape the identities and moral foundations that compel behaviour. Whoever controls these levers can influence how we understand freedom, what feels reasonable, and what is simply unthinkable.

Ultimately, the struggle may not be decided by providing superior logical arguments about freedom per se but by having the power to establish norms that define freedom and reasonableness, thus fostering, encouraging, and even compelling certain paths and not others.

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Freedom – The Birthright of Two Siblings

Rival Concepts

In the previous chapter, we briefly noted that theorists connect Western notions of individualism to Protestantism. A somewhat similar dynamic plays out in terms of freedom for, despite the clashes between evangelicalism and liberalism in modern politics, both traditions are partly rooted in this pivotal concept. These roots again trace back to the Protestant

Reformation and once more reveal foundational connections between Protestantism and liberalism.

Political theorist Sheldon Wolin suggests that constitutionalism, a fundamental building block in Western notions of liberty, was prefigured by Luther when he gave ultimate authority to a text rather than a person (i.e. replacing the pope with the Bible and not another human)

(1960:146, 153). Wolin adds that Calvin transferred these ecclesiastical ideas to the civil realm, insisting magistrates and kings had to obey the rule of law (ibid.:189-191). Julian Franklin tracks this influence in detail, identifying specific disciples of Calvin whose influential writings in

France and Switzerland helped “constitute a…transition from medieval to modern constitutionalist ideas” (1969:11). Michael Walzer makes even bolder claims, suggesting that

Calvinist Puritans helped found modern politics by emphasizing contractual, voluntary arrangements – thus stressing freedom and individual agency – in marriage contracts, ecclesiastical affiliation, and civil government (1982). Similar conclusions were deduced from a very different context in anthropologist Webb Keane’s examination of the colonial encounter in Indonesia. He found that the Dutch Protestant missionaries brought with them Protestant presuppositions, including the Reformers’ foregrounding of agency that Walzer highlights. As a

256 result, these Protestants urged locals to trust their own judgment (e.g. reading scriptures for themselves) and to reclaim agency wrongly alienated to clergy, rituals and icons. Prioritizing reading practices and personal belief privileged interiority, underscoring a free interior self unconstrained by material and social contexts, which “expand[ed]…the possibilities for individual self-creation” (ibid.:55). Keane aligns himself with other scholars who concur that the Protestant focus on interiority and agency contributed to the liberal subject including the

“abstract, disinterested participant in the public sphere” and the “rights-bearing, morally accountable citizen” (ibid.:55, drawing on Comaroff and Comaroff 1997:32, 61 and Warner

2002). Cumulatively, these concepts – interiority, agency, and constitutionalism – are bedrocks of Western freedom. The deep ties between liberalism and Protestantism are only magnified for the subset of Protestantism known as evangelicalism since the latter emerged in the same eighteenth century Anglo-American world where liberalism first blossomed. Hence, evangelicalism’s very genes, so to speak, incorporate individualistic tendencies in ways outlined earlier: its populist spirit; its critique of priestly power and church hierarchies; privileging personal emotional expression in worship over clerics or rituals; shifting from

Calvinism to Arminianism; voluntarism; and centering salvation on an individual and subjective religious experience, i.e. being “born again” (Hatch 1991).286

286 Hatch claims that during the Second Great Awakening, these new Christian forms in America not only reflected new democratic and individualistic impulses but helped impart them to the masses (1991). The new political form (democracy) and the new religious forms were thus mutually-reinforcing. Hatch cautions us not to underestimate religion’s influence, noting that the federal government was weak at this time with little presence in daily life, whereas religion had far more influence in structuring patterns of speech and emotion in the new republic through churches, travelling ministers, open air sermons, and some of the world’s largest publishing enterprises (ibid.:4-16, 141-44). Here then, in the land of liberal democracy’s birth, evangelicalism is also surging with the two movements entwined and even shaping one another. 257

Despite this shared inheritance, freedom remains a flashpoint between evangelicals and liberals owing to subtle distinctions in how each tradition understands it. Multiple prominent scholars such as Talal Asad, Saba Mahmood, and Keane suggest liberal thought tends to conflate agency with autonomy, often idealized as casting off tradition or social norms to go one’s own way. This conflation neglects how agency can include surrendering to a discipline (Asad 2003; Mahmood 2005; Keane ibid.). Choosing to submit also exhibits agency even though the agent chooses to curtail their own freedom, perhaps because liberty is not what they value most. Of course, many liberals submit to disciplines that sacrifice freedoms such as the training regimen required for excellence in athletics, music or academics. But while liberals may view these paths as avenues to individual fulfillment or self-actualization, Asad and others posit religious disciplines are rarely perceived this way.287 Indeed, scholar Winnifred

Sullivan suggests religion’s disciplinary essence makes religion the “freedom not to be free,” so that adherence is “not to be free, but to be faithful” (2004:156). Thus, through a liberal autonomy lens, religious agency can seem like an oxymoron eroding true agency.

While Sullivan, Asad, and others discuss religion generally, evangelicalism requires extra nuance as its liberal DNA means it especially values agency and choice. In particular, in

287 Sacrificing to achieve excellence in music or a profession can be reconciled with autonomy since the person can be seen as honing their individual uniqueness by developing their talents or pursuing self-growth. These pursuits and talents are not universal (not everyone plays football or gets a graduate degree) and so such decisions enhance notions of individual distinctiveness and the pursuit of personal identity. In contrast, religious devotion may seem to subsume the individual to external wills and rules – belonging to clerics or supernatural agents – which may claim universal applicability. Perhaps for this reason, religious devotion is not generally viewed in a similar light by liberals or indeed by North American evangelicals themselves who routinely equate individualism with the broader culture’s sins and not with their own religious pursuits. Problems abound with this portrait but for our purposes, the key is that liberals often perceive non-religious choices as free acts whereas religious ones are seen to diminish individualism. 258 evangelicalism freedom manifests not only in choosing to become a Christian288 (the choice manifesting agency as per Mahmood or Asad) but as the fruit or end product of that choice.

Indeed, Christian discipleship is viewed as the only road to true freedom.289 Thus, evangelicals prize freedom, perhaps more than in some religions, but conceive of it differently from liberals.

Jay Fliegelman remarks that within the Anglo-American evangelical tradition, “liberty is the fruit of incorporation and renunciation and not of separation and self-assertion” (1985:174).290

This view rejects liberal notions of autonomy since for Christians, “the choice is always between true and false masters, never between a mastered and masterless condition,” (ibid.).

Scholars studying modern American Christian fundamentalists similarly claim that freedom is understood to come from obeying and submitting to God, whereas casting God aside leads to licence and destructive hedonism (Garvey 1993:35; Ingersoll 2009:197).291 Most importantly, this scholarly take resonates with the lobbies. Recall their anthropological critique that liberals’ autonomy obsession – what we might now call “masterless” freedom – fosters vice, leaving people not free but compromised by a selfishness that betrays our relational and dependent selves. The EFC’s Bruce Clemenger captures the “true master” perspective succinctly in a Faith

288 Of course, many Christians are born into their faith, but evangelicalism emphasizes the agent’s choosing the faith once they reach an age of sufficient maturity. Hence, there is no infant baptism and the born-again experience is generally expected of post-pubescent teens or from adults. The key point is that even for those born into the faith, Christian identity is to be freely chosen, typically via a very public and ritualized sacrament. 289 In contrast, Mahmood and often Asad write on Islam where, I posit, freedom may be less central than in Anglo- American evangelicalism. Please note, evangelicalism’s emphasis on freedom is not de novo within Christianity (i.e. precedents exist such as Martin Luther’s The Freedom of a Christian or even from the Apostle Paul in Gal 5:1) but evangelicalism develops this theme more thoroughly. 290 Contrasting renunciation with self-assertion echoes the agency-versus-autonomy distinctions made by the previously cited scholars. But new here is the emphasis that choosing the faith enhances liberty. In Mahmood’s study, her Muslim subjects may be enacting agency but they do not seem particularly focused on liberty as an outcome. 291 Wendy Brown notes that similar views have been espoused by figures revered as freedom-fighting icons in the Western imagination (i.e. Socrates, Martin Luther King, Gandhi) (2015: 328-331). For these figures, their religious convictions emboldened them to fight for freedom against powerful civil authorities. All three also believed that submitting to the divine will/wisdom could free one from enslavement to the passions. Here, then, religiosity fosters true liberty. 259

Today column where he concludes that the ultimate question is “whose we are” (2013).292

True freedom, then, from the evangelical perspective, emerges ironically by acknowledging our dependence on God and submitting to his will. The goal of freedom shifts radically: instead of casting off restraints, we seek the right disciplines and commitments that bestow the self- control, inner resources, and quality relationships that yield a truly free self. In short, evangelicals do not argue with liberals over whether to pursue freedom, but over what freedom actually is and how best to attain it.

Rival Policies

Given their different conceptual understandings of freedom, the lobbies and their opponents push for different freedoms and, to protect those freedoms, ask that different constraints be imposed.293 On matters concerning sexuality and relationship forms, liberal gains have been substantial. These gains include: liberalizing divorce laws; equal legal and tax treatment of common law relationships relative to marriage; decriminalizing homosexuality; legalizing same-sex marriage and same-sex adoption; legalizing abortion; and providing sex

292 Two prominent Canadian evangelical researchers, Reimer and Wilkinson, further bolster Fliegelman’s claim. Summarizing several researchers’ studies, they conclude that regular attending evangelicals differ from the culture, and even from loosely affiliated evangelicals, by affirming an "external locus of authority" outside of themselves (i.e. God or Fliegelman’s true master) (ibid.:55). Reimer and Wilkinson declare that rejecting liberal autonomy or “individual authority,” is the fundamental driver of evangelical identity’s robustness (2015: 55-57). 293 In considering the lobbies’ adversaries, this dissertation has not focussed on liberal lobbies. The reason for this is that my focus is on the evangelical lobbies and they pay almost no attention to their liberal opposites. Instead, their critiques make clear who they consider their main adversaries – the courts, the HRCs, the CRTC, education ministries and, to a lesser extent, the media, and leading politicians. Liberal hegemony in Canada is such that liberal politics are often advanced by state actors. For example, the courts struck down the abortion law, the Sunday shopping law, and bans against same-sex marriage while education ministries are introducing gay friendly curriculum to evangelicals’ children. However, in the section that follows, we will be looking at liberal advocacy and, thus, while I will still draw on the detailed outline of state actors presented in chapter three, this will be supplemented by looking at key politicians’ speeches around the pivotal same-sex marriage debate, and by the positions of significant liberal lobbies such as the Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada, the Canada Women’s Foundation, and EGALE. 260 education in schools that stresses autonomy, consent, and the acceptance of homosexuality.

More recently, liberal politics have shifted to freeing sexual minorities from social rather than legal discrimination, through anti-bullying and hate speech legislation and via the human rights commissions (HRCs). Thus, in recent decades, the freedom agenda of liberals has focussed on enhancing autonomy for women, sexual minorities, and those living in non-traditional families.

Protecting such freedoms necessitates constraints that often impact evangelicals and other conservative Christians. We discussed these implications in earlier chapters. They include free speech restrictions, such as the William Whatcott and Hugh Owens cases recounted in chapter four (both convicted of hate speech by judicial bodies), and the Kempling episode (the teacher disciplined for opposing gay friendly kindergarten materials in his letter to the editor).

Recall too how state entities like the CRTC censored evangelicals (i.e. Focus and CFAC’s Charles

McVety), refused to grant broadcast licenses to Christian stations, or granted licences subject to mandated air time for non-Christian religious voices. Other constraints impacted employment and private business practices including marriage commissioners, Scott Brockie’s years of litigation, and Christian Horizons (a Christian charity that operates homes for the disabled and receives government funding, but which can no longer fire staff who violate their sexual behaviour codes).294 Professional organizations can also exert pressure, as when

Kempling had to leave the school board or when the College of Physicians and Surgeons of

Ontario issued guidelines stating that doctors could not decline to perform abortions.295

294 Christian Horizons requires employees to sign a faith statement and behavioural code. The charity fired an employee who violated the code by entering into a lesbian relationship. She sued and the courts decided the charity’s code was legal but that they could not fire her because her specific duties were not related to spreading the faith. Many commentators found the decision puzzling as it meant a Christian charity could not create a workforce committed to its understanding of Christian calling (Coggins 2010). 295 The College originally supported guidelines from the Ontario Human Rights Commission which said a doctor declining to perform an abortion was discriminating on the basis of sex, since only women can get pregnant. 261

Finally, we also saw constraints in education where Christian parents cannot influence curriculum and often cannot even pull their children from material on sexuality they find objectionable. In higher education, Trinity Western University’s law school was denied accreditation because of their student pledge prohibiting homosexual relations. From the above policies, it is clear that liberals advocate for a specific notion of freedom based on autonomy and they call for restrictions and impositions that often impact conservative

Christians negatively.

Turning to the evangelical lobbies, we find they do not oppose freedom per se, but rather advocate for different forms of freedom and, correspondingly, different constraints.

Foremost to them is religious freedom, which manifests on several fronts. One front is free speech where evangelical demands have included: an end to censoring religious views; freedom to launch Christian television and radio stations without imposed diversity requirements; and freedom to criticize homosexuality without being labelled “homophobic,” since they contend that legitimate disagreement should not be conflated with “hatred.”296

Another religious freedom issue is freedom of conscience at work, as illustrated by court cases involving Christian marriage commissioners, doctors, and business owners. The EFC has also opposed Quebec’s Bill 21 which prohibits public employees from wearing visible religious symbols, such that teachers, nurses, police officers, and other government employees are

Opposition to this policy eventually led the College to merely insist medical providers had to offer referrals, which some doctors object to and are challenging in court (Leishman 2008; Gunter n.d.; Grant 2014). Similarly, some doctors, with the aid of Christian legal organizations including the EFC, are challenging the requirement to make referrals for euthanasia. 296 For examples of the lobbies arguing the “homophobic” label is unfair and slanderous, see Hutchinson 2012, Rushfeldt 2008b. 262 being barred from wearing hijabs, turbans, or kippas.297 The lobbies believe religious freedom is foundational to liberty and advocate for what the EFC’s Faye Sonier termed “diverse diversity” (mentioned earlier), where both liberal and non-liberal voices can speak and be heard in public life (2011a).

It is important to note that the lobbies believe they promote freedom broadly and not merely for co-religionists. Ironically, the lobbies and their adversaries sometimes both claim to advance freedom on the same issue despite taking opposing stands. This may, at times, be tactical given the enormous political currency of the word “freedom,” but often both parties believe their position promotes it. One example of these duelling “freedom” claims concerns national daycare. Liberal groups in Canada, most prominently, the Child Care Advocacy

Association of Canada, have called for state-funded national daycare to enable women to pursue career goals and to support single mothers as they seek desperately needed income

(2013, 2014; see also Anderssen 2013). National daycare, they aver, thus enables women’s freedom. The evangelical lobbies counter that view by pointing to polls showing that most families prefer a stay-at-home parent but simply cannot afford this path.298 Hence, the lobbies see national daycare as a typical one-size-fits-all approach crafted by liberal elites. This elite plan, they argue, ignores the stated wishes of Canadian families’ and actually hinders freedom since it imposes additional tax funding burdens on ordinary Canadians, which makes having one parent at home or working part-time more difficult. The lobbies believe that genuine

297 Focus on the Family and CFAC have been silent on Bill 21, a policy which, by focussing on religious dress, does not impact evangelicals. The EFC is opposed, seeing it as more secular intolerance towards religion. Interestingly, many liberals also oppose Quebec’s moves although on pluralism grounds, believing they target minorities (e.g. Sikhs and Muslims). Thus, some evangelicals and some liberals took the same position for different reasons. 298 The IMFC cited external polls but also commissioned their own in 2005 and 2013, which received wide coverage by national media outlets (Edmiston 2013; Proussalidis 2013). 263 freedom requires giving money directly to parents who can best choose whether to use daycare or to decrease their employed hours (Mrozek 2011). The freedom angle might seem disingenuous, since the lobbies clearly prefer one choice – that of having a parent at home – but they sincerely believe a universal plan restricts parental options while serving the agenda of liberal elites and left-leaning lobbyists (ibid.; Focus 2005b). On daycare, the lobbies clamour for choice.

A second example of duelling views on freedom occurs on abortion. Abortion advocates ground their stance in freedom, as captured in the moniker “pro-choice.” However, the lobbies also believe they promote genuine freedom on abortion. First, they point to abortion violating the unborn’s freedom to live. But additionally, they argue that abortion does not facilitate women’s freedom either. They contend that many women abort not amidst a range of options but in desperate situations where they feel like a “trapped animal” (Gordon Earll 2003). CFAC reposted a Canadian Physicians for Life article stating “choice” rhetoric conceals how abortion is “rarely the woman’s choice alone” and often results when a woman “feels abandoned rather than empowered and supported,” due to pressures to terminate from boyfriends, parents, peers, etc. (Hollingshead 2003). Focus’s website carried an article from its American parent in which famous women voiced their regret at having aborted when they were young, declaring

“Abortion is no choice for a woman who thinks that it is her only choice” (Gordon Earll, 2003).

The piece depicts women who had abortions not as empowered, but rather as victims saddled with the consequences of guilt and mental health issues including depression. In an Ottawa

Citizen op-ed, the IMFC’s Andrea Mrozek observed that the emotional and physical repercussions of abortion mean “Being pro-life is a distinctly pro-woman stand,” since abortion

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“actually hurts women” (2006). Mrozek went on to start a weblog in 2007 of female writers espousing this perspective called ProWomanProLife (Mrozek and former EFC lawyer Faye

Sonier are its most frequent contributors). Abortion, in evangelicals’ view, thus often stems from a lack of choice which scars women emotionally and psychologically, hindering their capacity to live freely and fully.

Even when women have abortions absent such pressures, Mrozek maintains their freedom is compromised because they are denied access to reliable and unbiased information.

She has repeatedly claimed pro-choice dominance in media and professional organizations skews an honest reading of the research. She notes that: an important longitudinal study on the negative consequences of abortion on mental health was ignored (2006); that the

American Psychological Association stacks policy writing panels with pro-choice advocates who skew what research is included or dismissed (2009); and links between abortion and breast cancer are hidden from women (IMFC 2010; see also Hollingshead 2003). The IMFC and the

EFC also objected when the Ontario government in 2012 made obtaining abortion statistics more difficult (Klammer 2012; EFC 2012b). It is a maxim of the lobbies and the wider pro-life movement that pro-choice advocates oppose an honest and free discussion, to the point that damaging statistics must be hidden, graphic abortion images must not be seen, and the issue cannot be discussed in parliaments nor even at universities, where pro-life groups are subjected to bans other clubs do not face (EFC 2010b; Focus 2011b; Quist 2008).299

299 On abortion’s impact on women, the opposing positions map onto Isaiah Berlin’s two types of liberty (1958). Berlin distinguished between negative liberty, or freedom from constraints imposed by others, and positive liberty, or freedom to, which requires not just the opportunity but also the ability to pursue desired goals. Berlin cautioned that pursuing positive liberty can ultimately undermine freedom as the state or elites may justify intrusive restrictions on the grounds of preventing people from making choices that may be detrimental to themselves. On abortion, pro-choicers focus on negative liberty while the lobbies often emphasize positive liberty, 265

A particularly illustrative example of distinct angles on freedom comes from the issue of sex trafficking, a prominent concern for both feminists and evangelicals. A 2010 article in

Christianity Today stated “It’s hard to think of a social justice issue that’s hotter for evangelical

Christians right now than human trafficking” (Olson 2010). This statement fits my own anecdotal observations over the past decade. All the lobbies address this topic at length, and it receives a lot of attention in evangelical media and at congregations including guest speakers who address the issue, fundraising for victims, and awareness-raising events.300 Feminist organizations also address this serious issue but a noticeable discrepancy exists versus evangelicals in terms of how much attention this issue gets relative to that given to another issue especially pertinent to women: domestic abuse. Evangelical organizations give domestic abuse far less attention than human trafficking even though the former topic likely affects far more women. As one example of this disparity, the EFC – Canada’s most prominent evangelical organization – lists no resources since 2000 on its website under the domestic abuse category

(‘resources’ here includes submissions to courts or government bodies, open letters to

whereby one reason to ban abortion is that it harms women and will thus compromise their ability to have a full life. In fact, the lobbies’ stances on many fronts fit Berlin’s description of positive liberty. Thus, on divorce laws and common-law relationships, the lobbies ask government to discourage these practices by a series of measures. Such measures include denying marital tax advantages to common law couples, mandating that couples considering divorce receive information on how divorce may impact their children, and providing relationship education in schools on how social outcomes correlate with relationship forms such as marriage in comparison to cohabitation. These government actions sometimes reduce negative liberty but are justified, the lobbies maintain, because research shows married people are more likely to “live longer, have better physical health, be happier, experience more stable relationships, have less mental and emotional health problems, be better off financially, experience less domestic violence and have more satisfying sex lives” – i.e. an almost template positive liberty argument where restrictions are justified on the basis of promised positive outcomes (Focus 2003:5; see also EFC 2003a; EFC 2006c:13-4; Focus 2003:5; Rogusky and Penninga 2005). This trend is general, not universal, as the lobbies sometimes call for negative liberty, such as when advocating to protect the life of the unborn. But across most issues from same-sex marriage to euthanasia, the lobbies call for positive liberty. 300 Evangelical media has thoroughly addressed the topic with: numerous pieces in Faith Today including a cover story in 2009; repeated attention from Canadian evangelical television host Lorna Dueck on her program, her blog, and in her Globe and Mail column; and numerous pieces in the American magazine Christianity Today (particularly in 2013 and 2014, including substantial articles on the topic for every month of 2013 except December and July) (Fieguth 2009; Dueck 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2012, 2013, 2016; Thomas 2017) 266 ministers, issue briefs, webinars, congregational resources, advocacy aids like letter templates for writing the government, etc.). Instead, the lobby shows just two older resources dating from the early 1990s, and domestic abuse does not even warrant its own category under the

“Issues” listing.301 In comparison, the EFC devotes substantial resources to human trafficking and profiles the issue with its own prominently shown category and where in just the last decade the lobby has a submission to parliament, booklets to raise general awareness, three lengthy reports (ranging from twenty to thirty-two pages), a three minute online video for showing to congregations, a webinar, blog posts, and articles in Faith Today including one by

President Bruce Clemenger. Feminist organizations, however, are not weighted so heavily on human trafficking and prioritize domestic abuse.302 Evangelicals and feminists undoubtedly care about both issues, but for evangelicals, human trafficking marries their concern for women’s well being with their view that loose sexual mores do immense harm. It also fits their opposition to prostitution, given that prostitution has direct links with human trafficking, again reinforcing the line that “sex outside of marriage harms women.” Although evangelicals oppose domestic abuse, domestic abuse involves suffering and harms caused by family members, overwhelmingly male, and thus erodes the message that traditional marriage is sacred and conveys immense benefits, especially as concerns women. As such, when considering the freedom and well-being of women, evangelicals and their lobbies gravitate towards freeing women from the harms of sexual slavery rather than the harms of domestic life. Human trafficking thus offers a striking illustration of how liberals and evangelicals may

301 On the website, domestic abuse is relegated to a subcategory under “Abuse.” Furthermore, even the abuse category is not prominent as it is found only after clicking a “more” button. 302 See for example, the Canadian Women’s Foundation which addresses both domestic abuse and sex trafficking, but whose website has far more materials on the former relative to the latter (2019). 267 share a desire to free women, but how this desire manifests differently for evangelical lobbies than for liberals leading a feminist organization or a women’s shelter.

In addition to promoting women’s freedom, the lobbies feel especially passionate that they promote children’s freedom – most notably the freedom to grow up in a healthy, whole, and nurturing home. They believe shifts in Canadian law, including liberalizing divorce and treating common-law relationships equal to marriage, have destabilized families, disproportionately harming children. In lengthy documents replete with social science, they claim living in divorced, single parent, and common law homes harms children emotionally, psychologically, cognitively, and behaviourally, and exposes them to higher rates of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse (EFC 2003a, 2006c; Focus 2003; Dueck 2004). Thus, they contend that adults’ freedom to divorce or to have children outside of marriage typically compromises children’s right to have the safe, nurturing environment they need. One speaker at the IMFC’s annual conference, Roback Morse, summed up that the traditional family “create[s] systematically better life chances for children” relative to peers in alternate family structures

(2005a:26). The lobbies believe the traditional family enables children’s freedom by providing the healthy, nurturing home required for a fair chance in life.

Lastly, the lobbies posit they promote freedom because an intact traditional family fosters independence from government. The lobbies believe the traditional family teaches self- sacrifice, duty and self-discipline. At the IMFC’s 2010 Family Policy Conference, Brian Lee

Crowley explained that intact families teach “self-governance” because family obligations and duties pressure us to “master our selfish instincts,” while parents, in turn, foster self- governance in their children by setting limits and expectations (2010). This self-restraint

268 undergirds political liberty since, without such self-restraint, the state must impose discipline

“from the outside” (ibid). The lobbies see government increasingly entangled in private life because family breakdowns necessitate court interventions – to settle divorces, decide custody, ensure child support payments – and government agencies to tackle the resulting problems of poverty, mental health, and crime. Another IMFC conference speaker, Roback

Morse, said the state “does not and can not respect the privacy of ‘alternative’ families,’” because such family forms lack traditional norms and hence require the state to intervene by establishing rules and dealing with any resulting problems (2005a:26).303 A professor at a

Catholic university, Seana Sugrue, while writing in one of the IMFC’s first magazine issues, encapsulated these arguments well, charging that because liberal policies require increasing government involvement, “the radical individualism” of modern liberalism is ironically

“profoundly statist” (2006:11). The lobbies conclude that maintaining intact families will “settle to a large degree how free we can be” (Crowley 2010).

The lobbies clearly believe they advocate for freedom, but just as liberal freedoms constrained evangelicals, so the lobbies’ preferred freedoms bring their own set of constraints.

LGBTQ individuals could neither marry nor adopt and they would lose partner benefits, according to some of the lobbies.304 They would also be subject to more public criticism via enhanced freedom of speech rights, and face more discrimination in the marketplace as wedding photographers, print shops or bed and breakfast proprietors declined their business.

303 Roback Morse claims “alternative” family arrangements need government to determine what constitutes a parent or a family, including LGBTQ relationships, step-parents, and one case in London, Ontario where three people – a lesbian couple plus the sperm donor – successfully petitioned the court to allow the recognition of three parents for one child. Hence, she argues, such families necessitate government intrusion. 304 Even those lobbies which might allow some partner benefits rights may have come to this position due to LGBTQ lobbying. Recall the EFC, the most liberal of the lobbies, opposed such rights in the 1980s but later changed its mind (1986). 269

School age LGBTQs (or those in LGBTQ families) might find they or their families deleted from school curriculum – for example, because curriculum could reflect traditional families but not a family with two moms – and LGBTQ students might encounter more restrictions, particularly in the Catholic school system. Heterosexual couples, too, would find relationship options narrowed once the state made living common-law economically disadvantageous and made divorce more difficult to obtain. Women would find abortion outlawed, likely increasing potentially dangerous black-market abortions and perhaps pressuring pregnant couples to marry when they otherwise might not. Access to daycare would not improve which tends to especially impact women. Some of the lobbies, especially CFAC, would also reduce the welfare state which might compromise the freedom of lower income people including single mothers.

We can see from the evidence presented that liberal and evangelical conceptions of freedom are in direct competition. My point is not to argue for one vision versus the other nor whether some ideal balance is being struck, but simply that choices must be made in what are often zero-sum games. In the case of Scott Brockie (the printer approached by the Gay and

Lesbian Archives), even if the state and its agents in the courts would ideally prefer that

Brockie be able to run his business according to his conscience while also ensuring that no

LGBTQ organization would have its business request declined, this is not an option. Instead, as the court or the state more broadly chooses one freedom, they inevitably must negate another. To date, there has been a clear “winner” in this competition: liberals – through the courts, in parliament, via bodies like the CRTC and the HRCs, and by means of school curriculums – have succeeded in increasing sexual and relationship freedom and in restricting

270 the speech, commercial activities, and educational freedom of conservative Christians. One requires the other.

Rival Rhetorics

Having looked at how different conceptions of freedom foster different policies, let us now examine the fight over “freedom” as rhetoric. The mantle of freedom is a powerful force each side seeks to claim while denying it to opponents. Many of the lobbyists’ arguments were outlined in the section above. In some cases, the claim for liberty is clear and straightforward such as fighting for religious freedom or the right of the unborn to live. In other cases, evangelicals’ call for freedom is complicated and not so easily apparent. Central here are two dividing lines where the lobbies regularly argue with liberals: the one between liberty and licence and the other between individual autonomy and negative spill-over effects that impact others. In both cases, the lobbies typically advance a freedom argument, but indirectly. Thus, they argue that denying a woman an abortion will spare her psychological and possibly physical harm, leaving her more free in the long term (an example of Berlin’s positive liberty) – but you get there by first denying her options (rejecting negative liberty). They also contend that gay marriage hurts children since it culturally redefines marriage around couples and not offspring, a move they maintain will inevitably harm children by sidelining them. But precisely how this harm manifests is unclear and certainly debatable and, once again, the stance begins by restricting the options available (i.e. forbidding same-sex marriage). Similarly, contending that the traditional family makes you freer because such families inculcate self-discipline and ultimately make you less dependent on government is not an impossible claim but it is a

271 somewhat complicated one. It implies that other families do not inculcate similar habits of self- discipline and ignores how families can be entrapping rather than freeing. More importantly, it lacks the clarity or directness of a liberal call to ‘let us marry whomever we want.’ In addition, on many issues, freedom is just one part of the picture for evangelicals and sometimes not even its most central aspect. For example, on euthanasia, liberals call for freedom of choice but the lobbies call for preserving the sanctity of life and protecting the vulnerable. On pornography, liberal advocates again clamour for individual autonomy while the lobbies argue it degrades women and leads to violence. On same-sex marriage too, the lobbies speak about gender complimentarity whereas liberals have a clarion call to free people in their most intimate and important choices. All of this reflects evangelicals’ view that liberty pursued without full recognition of the social consequences of our actions is harmful. Hence, the lobbies value freedom and believe their path ultimately provides more of it, but rhetorically, liberty arguments do not typically take centre stage.

For liberals, freedom more often lies at the heart of numerous stances. Liberal arguments for abortion, pornography, euthanasia and same-sex marriage are all grounded in straightforward autonomy claims. In fact, freedom rhetoric is commonly the favoured trope for liberal advocacy organizations. The Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada’s mission statement, for example, states clearly that they aim to “ensure reproductive freedom” for women (2018).

On euthanasia, Dying with Dignity Canada’s tagline declares ‘It’s your life. It’s your choice”

(2019).305 Egale, Canada’s national LGBTQ organization, similarly begins its mission statement by calling for a Canada “free from hatred and bias” (2018). Egale’s parliamentary submission

305 Notice the contrast between “it’s your life” – a declaration of individual autonomy – and the external locus of authority cited by Reimer & Wilkinson (2015) or captured when Clemenger (2013) asked “whose we are?” 272 on same-sex marriage references the “freedom to marry” in its opening sentence and has entire sections on the ethical imperative of enabling freedom of choice (2003). This language carries beyond activists and is especially well demonstrated by Prime Minister Paul Martin in his House of Commons speech defending his bill legalizing same-sex marriage. His talk was a veritable ode to freedom, referencing “free” or “freedom” sixteen times, describing the need to extend “liberties,” and adding nationalist rhetoric that immigrants come to Canada because the country offers freedom and eschews “tyranny” (Parliament of Canada 2005a). The nationalist and freedom rhetoric was further heightened as Martin cited the Charter a full thirty times, repeatedly bringing up the document most associated with Canadian identity and

Canadian liberties. Even Martin’s nod to religionists emphasized the importance of protecting their religious freedom. A rival party leader, Gilles Duceppe added to the narrative by connecting the legalization of same-sex marriage to women’s suffrage as part of the progressive march of freedom (Parliament of Canada 2005a). The prime minister’s speech amply demonstrates the affective excess in these debates, for Martin does not modestly seek a technical change in law (i.e. LGBTQ’s right to marry) but is rhetorically ambitious, seeking to define freedom along liberal conceptions – and, vitally, aligning this freedom definition with

Canadian identity. The role of affective alignment becomes clear when we contrast Martin’s speech with how the Liberal government acted six years earlier when it took the exact opposite stance and upheld the traditional definition of marriage, including a supportive vote from then Finance Minister Paul Martin. In that 1999 address to parliament, Minister of Justice

Anne McLellan never references the Charter or invokes Canadian identity, focusing simply on the importance of traditional marriage to societal order (Parliament of Canada 1999). Neither the diversity angle nor the freedom angle could be easily grafted onto the government’s then 273 pro-traditional family position. Martin’s 2005 speech reflects the affective opening for LGBTQs owing to shifts in concepts like freedom, rights, and Canadian identity. Recall from chapter one that several scholars believe same-sex marriage advanced so rapidly in Canada because the courts framed it as a Charter issue, thus connecting gay marriage to an icon of national identity based on protecting rights and freedoms (Pierceson 2005; Matthews 2005; Smith 2005). In

Martin’s speech, this three-link chain – gay marriage  freedom  national identity – is strengthened, as the prime minister reinforces a growing view that same-sex marriage is about freedom, about the Charter, and thus about who we are as Canadians. Conversely, to oppose same-sex marriage is thus to oppose freedom and the very values that define Canadian-ness.

The contingent nature of these associations is evident by looking at the United States, where same-sex marriage has not been woven into national identity in the same way, and where freedom invokes very different connotations, most notably to bearing arms and being freed from government and taxation. At stake in the same-sex marriage debate in Canada was not only LGBTQ relationships but freedom itself – what it is, who defines it, what it feels and looks like, and who therefore defends it and who threatens it. If the image of a happy gay couple evokes not only the idea of freedom, but the felt sense of it, then evangelical opponents begin to feel like freedom’s opponents. Liberals, via their clear unencumbered calls for freedom in these debates, are often able to paint their opponents as threatening this cardinal value.

Overall, the lobbies and their opponents are significant inheritors of a long tradition of discourses about freedom, but they understand and develop that inheritance in divergent ways. These differences offer a series of potentially intriguing debates about freedom. Is freedom a masterless condition or about following true masters? Where is the line between an

274 individual’s freedom and negative spill-over effects that impact others? Is women’s freedom enhanced by providing daycare, access to abortion, and relationship options, or is it best achieved by encouraging a traditional family structure whose stability and security correlates with better social outcomes? What is the role of positive versus negative freedom? And of course, all of this leads to different ideas of who to free and how to free them as well as who to constrain from infringing on others. However, politics being rarely the friend of nuance, these potentially substantive debates are often reduced to partisan rhetoric about protecting freedom from the opponents of liberty. Liberals have been far more successful at this kind of marginalization, perhaps partly owing to liberals’ consistent and clear advocacy for removing restrictions, whereas evangelicals incorporate freedom more obliquely, balance it more often with other values, advocate for long-term positive freedoms achieved by initially restricting options, and ultimately subordinate freedom to God’s will. In this way, liberals have often left evangelicals scrambling to defend their commitment to freedom and to rights, thus making evangelicals’ political goals an uphill battle in an increasingly secularized and less Christian society. At the end of the day, liberals and evangelicals both value freedom but on family, sexuality and religion, they rarely agree on what frees and what hinders.

The Moral Debate

Rival Policies, Rival Rhetorics

Paralleling the freedom debate is the conflict over morals. Whereas liberals have somewhat owned the freedom discourse, on morals both sides find ways to impart marginalizing tropes on their opponents. For liberals, the rhetorical claim is that evangelicals inappropriately impose their morals on others. Such accusations have been made on same-sex

275 marriage (Canadian Press 2003), on abortion (Kline 2013), and were central to journalist Marci

Macdonald’s book (2011) accusing the Harper Conservatives of injecting American Religious

Right politics into Canada. Even in Prime Minister Paul Martin’s same-sex marriage speech, discussed above, he subtly condemns the bill’s religious opponents for wanting to impose their morals, declaring that people come to Canada specifically because “No homogeneous system of beliefs is imposed on them” (Parliament of Canada 2005a). Gilles Duceppe, the Bloc

Québécois leader, reaffirmed this sentiment, stating “religion must not impose its own principles on society” (ibid.). The EFC faced this accusation so regularly during the same-sex marriage debate, they felt it necessary to repeatedly counter it in op-eds and letters to the editor of various Canadian newspapers in 2005, 2006, and 2007 (2005b; 2006b; 2007b).306

By making these claims, liberals imply that they themselves do not impose their own morals. The EFC’s Bruce Clemenger disputes this, however, insisting that political actors from the left and the right all seek to impose their morals, a legitimate desire since every society must establish laws against offenses deemed immoral and injurious to the public (2005c). From this perspective, liberalism, counter Rawls, enters the public sphere with a comprehensive moral doctrine, one which prioritizes personal autonomy over rival conceptions. The other lobbies have been less consistent on this front than the EFC, sometimes echoing the EFC’s claim that liberalism is not neutral but a partisan perspective, but at other times deriding liberalism as relativistic and lacking any morals. Thus, CFAC (n.d.) declares “Secular humanists are NOT neutral,” but elsewhere labels the political left “non-judgemental, freedom-loving, moral relativists” (Barber 2007). Focus’ Derek Rogusky charges “secular humanism” with

306 The EFC does not catalogue their letters to the editor and op-eds prior to 2005. Thus, the accusation of moral imposition comes up in each of the first three years in which they provide publicly accessible records. 276

“dismiss[ing] the existence of objective morality” (2011). In this portrait, liberalism allegedly offers no rival moral vision, instead combining non-neutrality with moral vacuity – essentially, advocacy for licence. Despite these differences between the lobbies, they all agree that liberals only value individual autonomy (Clemenger 2013; Dykxhoorn 2000; Roback Morse 2007b;

Stanton 2011a). Interestingly, this accusation has partial resonance with Rawls’ claim that liberalism offers no “comprehensive doctrine,” thus allowing people to order their life as they wish (Rawls 2005).307 Here then, the lobbies’ accusations and some liberal arguments prove complementary, as both suggest evangelicals advance a substantive moral framework while liberals offer only a much thinner framework that grants more freedom to all – but where liberals thereby condemn evangelicals for wrongly imposing their morals into what should remain an open and free public sphere, the lobbies contend that morals do belong but that liberals simply fail to provide any.308

Since there is some resonance from both sides of these debates that liberalism avoids thick moral content, this convergence might make the notion seem credible. While I understand these perspectives, I find more fertile soil by pursuing the EFC’s contention that liberals offer a rival moral vision (Clemenger 2005c).309 The key is that rather than pit individual

307 The situation with Rawls is a bit more complicated. Rawls made his claim concerning political liberalism, which he distinguished from liberalism as a comprehensive doctrine. One could argue that the lobbyists’ critiques are on the latter (obviously, the lobbyists address no such distinctions between thicker and thinner liberalisms). However, recall that Wenar challenged that Rawls’ theory was itself at least a partially comprehensive doctrine and also that Rawls himself acknowledged that political liberalism may indeed lead youth towards the adoption of comprehensive liberalism (Wenar 1995). Given these points as well as the shared values between supposedly thick and thin liberalism (especially in terms of valuing autonomy), I suspect that even if Rawls’ distinctions satisfied him, they might seem like no more than a theoretical slight of hand to the lobbyists. The alignment between what Rawls is calling political and comprehensive liberalisms and the way they pull youth out of competing perspectives are exactly the forces the lobbyists are fighting. 308 The EFC would amend this to say liberals do not provide enough moral content, reducing so many issues to the single value of autonomy. 309 The framing by evangelicals such as Rushfeldt and Rogusky that liberalism is relativistic ignores many areas where liberal Canadian principles create absolute standards, such as opposing hate speech, sexism, child abuse, 277 autonomy versus morals, autonomy should be considered its own moral claim.310 Promoting greater personal autonomy in the public sphere neither demotes morals nor establishes neutrality – it is hardly neutral to competing visions – but instead privileges the particular principle of individual autonomy. For liberalism, autonomy is really its moral underpinning, tracing back to Kant who identified it as the very ground for moral behaviour. At a practical level, Western liberals’ signature causes over the past couple centuries – abolition, women’s suffrage, the American Civil Rights movement, second wave feminism, LGBTQ rights – all take the subject’s autonomy as a moral imperative. Hence, the discursive evidence reveals liberals and evangelicals both trying to impose their morals, disagreeing only on which morals to impose and over what constitutes morality. Evangelicals and liberals must weigh autonomy against potential rival values such as piety, religious freedom, familial duties, care for others, and sexual modesty. In certain instances, liberals and evangelicals agree to overrule personal autonomy, such as if a parent neglects their children, since the duty of care overrides the concern for autonomy. In other cases, increasing personal autonomy compromises rival moral claims. Thus, same-sex marriage is not about whether to moralize but which morals should prevail. When Canadian courts and legislatures try to protect LGBTQs from discrimination – at the altar, in tax codes, in matters of employment – these efforts show a strong moral stance that sexual minorities should not face unfair treatment, and a willingness to impose this moral

etc. On sexuality and gender – where the lobbies particularly decry moral vacuity – liberals readily moralize on consent, sexual harassment, and sexist commentary or behaviour. As I argue below, liberal support for same-sex marriage is also a moral argument. The issue is thus not relativism but rival moral visions. 310 In truth, freedom is really a type of moral. As such, it can conflict with other morals. For example, libertarians might prioritize freedom over the moral value of equality or, conversely, others might prioritize the moral of safety over freedom while arguing for gun laws. My whole discussion of freedom and morals could be written simply as a moral debate. I separated freedom off because it plays such an enormous role and because it is so frequently pitted against morals in public discourse. 278 position into the public sphere, including in education, private commerce, speech, etc. Other family values debates also boil down to which rival moral position to impose. Whether to liberalize divorce laws pits the values attributed to an intact family against the view that people should not be trapped in unhappy marriages. Abortion pits women’s freedom and bodily control versus obligations towards the unborn. Hence, just as evangelicals and liberals were not really pro or contra freedom but argued over its nature and how to achieve it, a similar dynamic operates on morality.

Combining our analysis of freedom and morals replaces the “freedom versus morals” account that opened this chapter with a portrait of opponents advancing rival moral systems, dependent on how they understand freedom and how much weight they give it. Liberals conceptualize freedom through the prism of individual autonomy and grant it moral primacy; evangelicals view freedom differently and believe it is ultimately achieved only in balancing it with other enabling values. In sum, different folk anthropologies foster different conceptions of freedom and produce rival moral systems.

These substantive differences fuel different rhetorical strategies. Much liberal rhetoric on family values issues employs the freedom/morals juxtaposition to insist that liberals merely protect people’s freedom but never impose their morals on others. The key manoeuvre, here, is framing autonomy as if it were not a moral claim on its own. Liberal activists do not disavow any values in their efforts but their language frames those values in terms of “freedom,”

“rights,” or “justice” – all of which invoke ideas of a universal stance, granting a kind of neutrality and fairness in contrast to parochial morals. Hence, the websites of the Abortion

Coalition of Canada and of EGALE (Canada’s LGBTQ lobby) are replete with references to

279

“rights” and “justice” but the word “moral” is almost completely absent. On EGALE’s site, while references to freedom proliferate, the term “moral” is found only in materials the organization posts from its political opponents. The linguistic differences may seem like trivial word choices, but if we recall how the CRTC would not grant a broadcast licence to religious stations because they were too divisive – while granting a licence to the Playboy Channel – or how the Canadian government altered the Canada Summer Grants program so that many religious organizations would not qualify, then we can see how much hinges on the liberal framing of neutral and universal justice versus parochial and unfairly imposed morals. This strategy allows liberals to denounce evangelical moralizing while ironically achieving a kind of moral high ground by claiming to protect individual autonomy, here deemed value-neutral. In turn, evangelicals draw on a tradition steeped in claims of being the moral leaven in an otherwise selfish and immoral world and, hence, the lobbies also use the freedom/morals pairing but do so to claim evangelicals alone stand for moral principle while their opponents lack morals entirely. When liberals in these debates – on euthanasia, abortion, same-sex marriage, and sexual education curriculum – advocate for people’s freedom, the lobbies undercut the moral urgency of such claims by depicting liberals’ freedom obsession as licence, thus denying the liberal position’s inherent moral content. Ironically, as we saw above, the opposing sides can compliment and reinforce each others’ biases, so that liberals’ denunciations of evangelical moralizing lends credence to evangelical accusations that liberals are morally vacuous. In turn, evangelicals’ claim to be the sole moral actors is amplified by liberal accusations that evangelicals are moralizers, unjustly imposing their views on others. In sum, these marginalizing tropes reduce a more nuanced and substantive debate over how freedom is achieved and which morals

280 should take precedence to a contest that rhetorically pits freedom versus morals, a portrayal which, at times, ironically serves the interests and self-image of partisans on both sides.

My Values are Public, Yours are Private

A second key rhetorical struggle focuses on the “public/private” distinction. These notions pervade family values discussions and populate the discourses of the evangelical lobbies and their opponents. Social theorist Michael Warner explains that these concepts are especially pertinent to family values discussions, because any attempt to “transform gender or sexuality is a public questioning of private life” (2005:31). Warner’s reference to “public questioning” invokes the formative work of political theorist Jürgen Habermas, who posited that “argumentative dialogue” in the public sphere is a defining feature of modern democracy.

Warner, however, cautions that Habermas’ view is too “idealized” (2005:51). Instead, he describes a less rational public sphere where publics and counter-publics are created via a kind of “poetic world-making” (2002:114). His argument is that public norms are shaped less by rational dialogue than by affective elements – “forms of intimate association, vocabularies of affect, styles of embodiment, erotic practices, and relations of care and pedagogy” (ibid.).

Donovan Schaefer, a leading affect theorist cited in the introductory chapter, similarly posits a less rational public sphere, contending that shifting people’s views is about “transforming the way the world feels, rather than simply absorbing knowledge” (2015:67). Warren and Schaefer contend that our political and religious views are shaped more by affective cues than by reasoning. That some Americans find Donald Trump to be obviously disgraceful while others see him as an obviously exemplary leader, owes something to the way that reasoning is conditioned by our sense of who is “us,” and “them,” about whether a source feels 281 authoritative or “fake news,” and instinctual reactions about which speakers deserve respect or contempt. My study concentrates on how language conveys affect and power in the ways that Warner and Schaefer describe, using it to evoke feelings of threat, intrusion, fairness, or purity. To that end, we will scrutinize “private” and “public,” not for descriptive content but for their emotional impact and ideological utility. Warner claims these terms carry a “visceral force,” and I will trace how the lobbies and their opponents use this force to convey affects of shame, unimportance, sensibleness, privilege, and decency (2005:23). The terms public and private are powerful “vocabularies of affect” for poetically making a world that perceives freedom and morals in particular ways (ibid.:57).

The utility of public/private terminology stems from their rare combination of potency with malleability. The terms can serve varied ends, allowing advocates to clamour for privacy in one instance and public-ness in another. Historian Nancy Cott, for example, traced how feminists since the 1960s have alternated between calling for privacy or public-ness, invoking marital privacy when arguing for reproductive rights, but calling for public intrusion into marriage when fighting domestic abuse (2000:210; see also Casanova 1994:216-7). Gains in

LGBTQ rights have similarly drawn on both privacy and publicness. When the Canadian government legalized gay sex in 1968, cabinet minister Pierre Trudeau invoked privacy, claiming the state had no business in the bedrooms of the nation. The gay marriage push, however, employed both privacy rights (i.e. the right to marry whomever one chooses) and a demand for public state recognition (i.e. by conferring the status of marriage). In this manner, political actors are rarely either/or on the public/privacy distinction, but instead employ these terms in varied ways for tactical advantage.

282

This adaptability of public and private manifests in the lobbies’ interactions. One example is debates over individual autonomy, where privacy rights are pitted against public interest. Across numerous family values issues, liberal advocates cite privacy to gain exemption from public scrutiny. So used, privacy is phrased as a “right,” a powerful cultural designation that invokes liberty and rhetorically corners opponents. For example, on same-sex marriage, advocates claimed that choosing one’s partner is a private right requiring no outside approval, while the lobbies countered that marriage is a public institution that creates public goods and has public repercussions. Thus, Glenn Stanton wrote in Focus’ major same-sex marriage document “marriage is not just a private affair,” but “a public virtue” (2004a:14, italics added).

The EFC’s major same-sex marriage document employed virtually the same phrase: “marriage is not just a private matter” (2006c:6). Similarly, on issues like pornography, abortion, and euthanasia, liberal advocates invoke privacy to legitimize personal choice and liberty, thus reinforcing the autonomy ethic. Privacy claims can pre-empt counter-arguments by making the very act of questioning illegitimate – i.e. rather than defending the actual decision to euthanize, to abort, or to use pornography, the liberal position can argue that the questioning itself crosses the privacy line and is thus rendered invalid. The Abortion Rights Coalition of

Canada takes this one step further, arguing that even the questioners are invalid, and thus argue that pro-life groups should have their charitable status revoked (2019).311 Evangelical lobbies counter with their relational anthropology, stating that these kinds of issues involve too many public consequences to be considered merely private. On pornography, CFAC’s Peter

311 Recall, too, that many pro-life groups on university campuses have been stripped of rights commonly enjoyed by all clubs, such as being able to book meeting space or to establish public displays. These unique restrictions stem from the same idea – namely that privacy rights are fundamental and, hence, the very act of questioning them is an illegitimate move. 283

Stock, in a press release, stated such images “influence both public and private perceptions” and encourage pedophilia, a matter with grave public consequences (1999). Focus concurred on its website that “pornography is not a private issue” but one that “affects the public safety of women and children,” points which Focus reiterated when commenting on court decisions and in their public relations campaign (1997). On abortion, the EFC declared in its magazine

“abortion involves more than the interests of the pregnant woman,” pointing clearly to the life of the nascent child (Berend 1988:19). On euthanasia, CFAC republished an article on its website by ethicist Margaret Somerville, where she suggests it is not just a private decision, because it declares publicly how society values the elderly or the ill, and, furthermore, may convey to such vulnerable individuals and to the rest of us that they are a burden and no longer warrant living (2009). Hence, on all four issues – pornography, abortion, same-sex marriage, and euthanasia – the public/private distinction functions not merely as a stable descriptor, but as normative terms coding the autonomy debate about the proper limits of individual liberty. In short, public and private in these instances replicate the anthropological and values disputes outlined in this and the prior chapter around autonomy.

A second use of privacy aims to preserve existing social norms. Warner noted that transforming gender or sexual ethics requires a public questioning of what are sometimes considered private aspects of life. Given this recognition, when declarations of privacy succeed in barring public scrutiny – marking something as private and thus immune to external criticism

– such declarations can impede potential transformations and inhibit change. This use of privacy is thus an inherently conservative move, and one we can witness on matters of sexual mores. As we have seen, the lobbies opposed privacy claims on abortion and same-sex

284 marriage, because privacy coded individual autonomy. But on sexuality more broadly, the lobbies reverse course and become privacy advocates. Numerous liberal activist groups (e.g. feminists, LGBTQs) have worked to change attitudes on sexuality through public display and by submitting private mores to public scrutiny. These moves exhibit Warner’s poetic world- making by shifting feelings around shame and decorum via parading, exposing, and celebrating. The lobbies regularly contest these moves – they have opposed public displays of nudity and eroticism at gay pride parades, spoken against women who went topless to challenge decency laws, and urged excising explicit content in provincial sex education curriculums. Evangelical privacy, in other words, does not code autonomy but rather preserves traditional norms by invoking shame and decorum. Note also the co-constitution of public and private since calling for privacy is itself a statement of public values. The lobbies’ appeal for greater privacy attempts to maintain traditional public norms that cherish modesty over sexual openness and favour heterosexual dominance over recognizing sexual diversity. These are affective expressions about decency and normality versus what should be deemed shameful and kept hidden. Here is clearly revealed the malleability of public and private, for whereas these terms coded for autonomy in the earlier examples, now they code a preference for either change, via public scrutiny, or preservation, by maintaining privacy.

In the illustrations above, the terms public and private are deployed to marginalize or privilege certain viewpoints on autonomy or social change. But in our final set of examples, public and private become blatant claims for social primacy. This is most evident when religion and sexuality are discussed together. Focus’ legal representative, Cindy Silver, demonstrates this when addressing the Canadian Senate about same-sex benefits (Senate of Canada 1996).

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While answering questions, she addresses the privatizing of religion, complaining that “The courts have defined religion…in such a way that it has been basically marginalized right out of the schools and out of the public square” (ibid.). After objecting that religion is being privatized, a few sentences later she turns to homosexuality and makes the opposite claim, asserting that it “is a private issue and not something that should be brought into the public sphere. It is not morally neutral” (ibid.). Silver’s claims – homosexuality should be private but religion deserves a public voice312 – are overtly about social dominance. Other lobbyists replicate Silver’s pairing of religion-should-be-public and homosexuality-should-be-private.

Thus, CFAC’s Brian Rushfeldt, in a letter to the editor, protests religion’s privatization, asking why liberal activists (e.g. feminists, atheists, gays) can voice their convictions in public debate while religious people are uniquely expected to shelve or “keep private” their own convictions when making public arguments (2003b). Rushfeldt continues, “True private matters like sexual behaviour should not have a public place, not in Parliament, in parks or paraded on streets.” Rushfeldt employs tropes of decency and shame while clarifying the stakes – namely which values are public and normative and which are private and relegated to the hidden cultural margins. Intriguingly, LGBTQ advocates often group precisely the same concepts

(religion and homosexuality with public and private) but reverse Rushfeldt’s positions, seeking to make homosexuality public – via pride parades, coming out of the closet, and state recognized marriages – while calling religion a private affair with no bearing on public law. Per

Warner, claiming public-ness attempts to make a world, versus the private and hidden which

312 As an aside, Focus appears to know it has already lost the latter argument (i.e. that religion should be publicly credible). In the same hearing, Silver’s colleague Jim Sclater brushes aside a question about theology from Liberal Senator Warren Kinsella, saying he wishes to speak not about “theology” but about “psychology, sociology, anthropology and history” (Senate of Canada 1996). As noted earlier, people on both sides of these difficult issues know religious reasoning discredits a speaker addressing politics in Canada. 286 makes not worlds but closets. Legal theorist Paul Kahn offers additional insight by asserting that public and private in liberal democracies are metaphors for reason versus choice respectively (cited in Berger 2007:302). Reason implies objectivity which has universal relevance appropriate for public debate. Choice, however, implies subjectivity and personal relevance suitable only for the private sphere. Kahn suggests domestic life and religion are deemed arenas where people create meaning in their lives that reflects personal interest rather than reason, making these arenas largely exempt from public oversight, but also irrelevant to policy making. For public policy, reason is required; choice or interest becomes irrelevant. Kahn suggests when liberals label religion “private,” they cast it outside the realm of reason and thus inapplicable to public policy, which is precisely what Cindy Silver and the lobbies dispute. Conversely, LGBTQ gains came from persuading the majority that accepting sexual minorities and their practices is not mere preference, but simply reasonable. These views became increasingly normative, helping to make a world where dissenting views can be privately held but must not manifest publicly – a development that reintroduces shame but reversed its target. Public and private in these instances establish reason and unreason, social primacy and private insignificance, world-making and closeting.

To sum up, we see that public and private have been employed in at least three ways in the family values debates: as code for autonomy; to insulate social practices from scrutiny and change; and to blatantly assert which values should dominate and which be subordinate. In all three modes, the terms are more normative than descriptive, seeking to shift both thoughts and feelings around decency, shame and acceptance. As such, liberals and evangelicals deploy these terms’ “visceral force” to establish the primacy of their views on morals and freedom.

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Liberal Democracy: Reasoning and Freedom or Socialization and Compulsion?

In the concluding section of this chapter, I wish to examine what family values debates can teach us about liberal democracy, focussing on two central pillars of liberal democratic theory: reason and freedom.313 In examining these pillars, we will also consider the contending conceptions of human nature that are involved.

The first pillar is the primacy democratic theory gives to reasoned deliberation.314 This primacy rests on two premises. First, reasoning is seen as causative, driving human agency.

Second, reasoning is conceived in universal terms (Calhoun 2011:87). This liberal democratic take on reasoning differs from Bourdieu’s work, whose theorizing on habitus emphasizes the power of socialization (1992). To Bourdieu, reasoning tendencies are learned, shaped by environmental factors, disciplines, and forms of implicit training. In short, reasoning can be an effect more than a cause and more context-dependent than universal.315 In Canada’s family values debates, Bourdieu’s perspective fits well since reasoning rarely seems universal – instead, we encounter rival forms of reasoning stemming from different socialization

313 Freedom has already been prominent in this chapter but I pursue a different angle here. 314 Alluded to briefly earlier in this chapter when discussing Warner’s critique of Habermas. 315 In questioning reason’s universality, I don’t mean to imply that human reasoning has no shared, communicative elements. Disciplines like cognitive science or even the simple act of discussing a point requires there be some common substrate. My claim is that reasoning tendencies – especially on the innumerable issues where values, morals, ideology, or identity are involved – are heavily shaped by socialization, where such socialization teaches us how to feel about an argument. Thus, climate science, the complexities of which are beyond most lay people’s knowledge, may be received as logical expertise from dispassionate scholars or, conversely, perceived as ideologically-driven nonsense from “experts” who seek to dominate society and overrule the common sense of ordinary people. Both parties have “reasons,” but how compelling these reasons feel depends on affective and social cues that open or close us to arguments, determining in many ways what we find “intelligent,” what appears as “common sense,” who are reliable “experts,” and who are untrustworthy “elites.” These emotional, affective cues and stances often end up being far more determinative than any dispassionate weighing of evidence. 288 regimens.316 Hence, we saw that the “freedom” espoused in Canada’s family values debates was not a singular universal essence but a contest between two more parochial visions, rival cognitive and affective repertoires bundled into the term “freedom.” Depending on the given speaker and listener, this repertoire may include aspirations of individual autonomy and freedom from religious imposition or, alternatively, conjure sentiments of religious freedom and of following appropriate masters rather than false ones. Socialization can equally influence the cognitive and affective repertoires associated with other critical terms like morality, rights, family, or diversity. None of this makes reasoning irrelevant but merely contextual, thus emphasizing the social norms that shape that context, including how rights are defined, what family forms are legally recognized and even celebrated, and how diversity is understood and taught in schools. The lobbies and their opponents hope, via state bodies, to mould this social web, fostering the cognitive associations, gut reactions, and bodily habits that favour certain forms of living over others. The end goal, to cite Warner, is to poetically remake the world – i.e. to change which narratives, symbols, and voices feel authoritative and sensible, thus determining “common sense” and establishing what is simply reasonable. Further, the social web shapes our feelings of what to value, what to feel pride in, what defines national identify, and therefore what constitutes “us,” and “them.” Of course, such socialization is never total – the state is not omnipotent, and the struggle occurs in other arenas (media, entertainment, etc.) but state power is too great to ignore. This perspective illuminates the disjuncture between the prominence of reasoning in democratic theorizing and the actions of the lobbies and their opponents. For these activists seek not only technical changes in law, but also the

316 My argument in this section draws significantly on Craig Martin's observation that liberal political theory over- emphasizes reason and that social theory offers a corrective in thinking about democratic politics (2010:8). 289 affective excess from prominent court rulings, from prime ministers’ speeches, from politicians’ participation in (or abstention from) pride parades, and from control of the education system. Such elements offer no new reasons but alter the emotional context in which all reasoning occurs. The activists seem to realize that shaping the social is pivotal to having one’s reasons judged persuasive, implicitly understanding that thinking is often an

“emergent” activity “constituted in social action” (Caton 2006).317 Hence, the fight to control these socializing levers cautions us, when examining democratic politics, to give too much priority to the independent reasoning capacities of the subject.

The second pillar is the freedom of the individual, considered here not legally but anthropologically. The autonomy of the human subject is foundational to Western society including its politics (i.e. democracy), economics (i.e. free markets), erotic lives (i.e. emphasising consent and choice in sex, marriage, and divorce), moral tradition (e.g. Kant), and legal system (e.g. rights and attributing responsibility). Individual freedom is equally important to Western Protestantism and to most evangelical soteriology as well.318 Political scientist

Elizabeth Shakman Hurd even boldly describes the “arguably nonexistent freely volitional subject” as a Protestant and Western trope (2015:48). As with my discussion of reason, I do

317 Caton draws on the work of psychologist Lev Vygotsky. For an excellent ethnographic study demonstrating how family values politics can be a secondary effect of socialization, see Munson’s research on pro-life activists (2009). Munson, assuming that activism expressed already-held beliefs, launched his study to discern what separated regular pro-life supporters from those who became engaged activists. His findings surprised him. It turned out that participation in activism often arose from social invitations and contacts and that such engagement preceded the development of strong pro-life commitments – i.e. engagement fostered beliefs rather than the other way around. This effect was so prominent that fully half of his subjects, all committed activists for the pro-life movement, were not pro-life prior to their engagement and about one quarter were actually pro-choice before social contact with pro-life activism switched their perspectives (ibid.:33, 43). Munson’s study is not about government levers but reminds us how reasoning can be an effect rather than a cause whereby social influences establish even one’s most deeply held commitments and resultant patterns of thinking and feeling. 318 Most evangelicals espouse the Arminian theology, described earlier, which assumes individuals freely choose to follow Christ or not. This decision is vital to one's eternal destiny. 290 not aim to dismiss completely the subject’s autonomy, but to highlight instances where this notion may overreach. In studying the activists in these debates, what emerges is how often they seem to feel compelled rather than free. A telling example comes from EFC lawyer Faye

Sonier who, upon first joining the EFC, revealed in an EFC video that her pro-life commitments were quite personal, since she owes her life to her mother’s decision to ignore medical advice to abort (her mother faced some health risks stemming from the pregnancy) (EFC 2010b). A few years later, Sonier wrote an unusually personal blog post on the EFC’s website revealing that, being pregnant at the time, she had broken down crying while working on abortion issues owing to the juxtaposition of the child in her womb and those being aborted (2014). Political actors’ personal histories are not always this accessible but, in this case, it reveals Sonier’s relationship to pro-life as intensely visceral and core to her identity – she literally owes her existence to pro-life sentiments. Given this background, it is questionable how much actual freedom Sonier has on pro-life issues. Further reinforcing this lack of moral freedom is her firmly held evangelical identity which depends significantly on espousing a pro-life stance. That religion does not always provide moral options is noted by religious and legal scholar

Winnifred Sullivan who showed, in an American court case, how defendants described their religious practices not as choices, but as obligations (2005:103, 156).319 Hence Sullivan’s earlier description that religious commitment entails reducing one’s own freedom. Other scholars echo her claims, describing religion as submitting to a discipline (Mahmood 2005) or by

319 Some evangelical discourses do prioritize agency – i.e. choosing to follow Jesus – but this may reflect evangelizing motives and soteriological theology more than descriptive accuracy. Interestingly, even the process of conversion, which seems to better embody active choosing, often divulges a certain passivity in testimonies, whereby the convert recalls being overwhelmed by sensations interpreted as the love of Jesus or the presence of the Holy Spirit. The edited volume by Rambo and Farhadian (2014) brings together some of the literature on the many factors beyond agency that affect religious conversion. 291 declaring “what religion is not is freedom” (Lambek 2015:298).320 Legal theorist Richard Moon adds that these ideas have some purchase in Canadian law, which treats religion as having a

“dual character,” being neither a “fixed attribute” like race nor a simple “choice or preference”

(2011:337).321 Hence, despite the Western emphasis on the will’s freedom to choose, for many, religious identity and its implications are felt like compulsions and obligations, not mere accoutrements to pick up or set aside. As Talal Asad summarizes Martin Luther’s alleged statement, “Here I stand, I can do no other,” having logical options is very different from having moral ones (2012:43-4).

Paralleling religious identity is sexual identity. Social conservatives’ greatest fight in recent decades has been against LGBTQ advocates, whose efforts benefitted from the growing awareness that sexual desire is not reducible to choice.322 Thus, with both religion and sexual

320 My questioning the religious subject’s freedom here may seem to contradict my earlier argument in this chapter that evangelicals value freedom but conceive of it differently (i.e. less of an autonomy model). However, the two arguments are separate. The earlier discussion addressed evangelical and liberal conceptions of freedom and their differences. Here, I am questioning whether both views overstate the subject’s freedom, especially on matters that invoke identity or deeply held moral stances. The former also focussed on what we might term external freedom – that is, the presence or absence of external restrictions on what an agent wants to do. The current discussion addresses interior freedom and constraints stemming from identity, visceral emotions, and a sense of compulsion. 321 For a good argument against seeing religion as identity, see Sherwood’s criticism that religion has “exceptionally and anomalously” been socially constructed as something deep and “not, in a sense, chosen,” a view she opines is not equally applied to being a feminist or a Marxist (2015:35). She also highlights that portraying religion as a deep constant in one’s life does not seem to empirically line up with the ways people find religion, lose religion, attend intermittently or adhere for very mundane reasons (community, social ties, parental influence, etc.). I think she plausibly illustrates that people’s relationship to religion is varied although I think the lobbyists are a particularly committed set of activists whose commitments are interwoven with their very identity. On her other point – that religion is treated anomalously – I again find merit in her claim but whereas she reconciles the anomaly by arguing for the chosen-ness of all positions, I lean towards thinking that committed activists opposing the lobbies may, like the lobbyists, experience little moral freedom on issues germane to their deepest held values. 322 The best example of how LGBTQs do not find their sexual desire subject to their wills is, ironically, Christian ex- gay ministries. Such ministries illustrate our “non-sovereign bodies” as they poignantly show how compelling such drives can be even for those desperately wishing them away (Schaefer 2015:24). In 2013, Exodus International, American’s leading evangelical ex-gay organization, ceased operations, acknowledging in the end that gay desire could not be undone by choosing its therapeutic techniques. The organization apologized for the harm it had caused. 292 identity, we find a polemic of freedom but narratives of compulsion. Interestingly, Canadian law treats both religion and sexual orientation as invisible yet protected grounds of discrimination, likely because each is recognized as a formative aspect of identity and not just a choice. Same-sex marriage then, features not merely conflicting choices, but clashing identities.

The debate’s intensity reflects that people are fighting for aspects of themselves where they feel their very being is at stake. Indeed, many of Canada’s family values debates feature participants who feel morally compelled to act: to stop the murder of unborn children; to protect one’s child from a homosexual life that may condemn their everlasting soul; to save young women from horrible black-market abortions or from having their futures eclipsed by becoming a teenage mother; or to demand the basic right to marry one’s soulmate regardless of gender. These issues are so heated because they invoke intense feelings, somatic responses, and even our very identities in ways that testify more to compulsion than to freedom of choice.

Emphasizing social actors’ agency may be motivated partly by political and ethical implications, as evident during LGBTQ rights debates in Canada. Philosopher Judith Butler posits that understanding agency’s limits is hindered by our need to assign moral responsibility

(2005). She contends self-knowledge and self-mastery are limited, but that our desire to hold people morally and legally accountable requires putting such realizations aside for an anthropology that emphasizes actors’ freedom to choose (see also Asad 2006:239).

Interestingly, her perspective helps explain why the lobbies and their rivals emphasize their opponents’ agency. Parties on both sides insisted their opponents were free to choose, a claim which justifies demanding one’s opponents change course (alternatively, demanding one’s

293 opponents alter something they are unable to modify might seem unjust). Thus, the lobbies, particularly CFAC and Focus, sought to justify their opposition to gay rights by claiming LGBTQs were making sinful lifestyle choices, and could – for their own benefit – opt for so-called reparative therapies or for voluntary lifelong celibacy. Similarly, LGBTQ supporters’ demand that evangelicals drop their opposition to alternative sexualities, feels to some Christians akin to demanding they jettison the Bible or their God.323 So, whereas evangelicals likely empathize with Sonier’s story of compulsion – her own version of “Here I stand, I can do no other” – they often see gays as making poor and sinful choices. Liberals are prone to making reverse assumptions. Hence, political considerations, and perhaps self-justification, encourages depicting one’s opponents as making poor and unnecessary choices; but, as we have documented, family values debates often involve visceral attachments to such pivotal issues as romantic love, sexual desire, babies, family, womanhood, and inclusivity, that opponents in these debate are often clashing on matters where they feel compelled rather than free.

If we combine recognizing what Schaefer calls actors’ “diluted sovereignty” with the earlier analysis on how densely contextual reasoning actually is, what emerges is a different understanding of democratic politics (2015:107). We find activists proceeding from a kind of conviction to protect what they believe – indeed, what they know – is good and true.

Goodness and truth are not choices, but more like knowledge, experienced as undeniable facts of the world, and a knowledge that is felt as much as thought. Grounded in this fundamental

323 The EFC made this very point as part of the Interfaith Marriage Coalition on Marriage and the Family’s (2004) submission to the Supreme Court on same-sex marriage. The section on evangelical Protestantism (the EFC was the coalition’s evangelical Protestant part) declares the traditional view of marriage is “not an ‘optional’ belief,” for adherents. The EFC here professes too much by claiming to speak for all evangelicals but I think their claim holds true for themselves and many other evangelicals. 294

“knowing,” activists feel driven, an urgency to work towards adjusting the state’s levers to align with their perspectives, where such alignment produces the affective excess I alluded to earlier. That excess helps define terms, imbues certain notions of freedom, diversity, or sexuality with an aura of legitimacy or sanctity, and thus alters the social environment in ways that will, in turn, help define goodness and truth for others. Defining freedom is not always about giving people options. Gay-friendly curriculum for children, for example, does not encourage students to make their own decisions on how same-sex relationships relate to freedom – i.e. contrasting liberal, evangelical and other conceptions of freedom – but rather tries to inculcate one viewpoint. The goal is not freedom of choice but establishing in young minds that only one path is the freedom-promoting choice. Indeed, such education is successful precisely insofar as there seems to be no real choice at all. The lobbies act similarly, wishing to shape views rather than to encourage choice amongst options. The overall process therefore is less about reasoning out logical arguments to convince free thinking agents to opt for different selections, and more about “transforming the way the world feels,” so that specific perspectives are seamlessly absorbed and naturally inhabited, fostering the contours of identity both personal and national (Schaefer 2015:67). This, I posit, is at the heart of democratic politics, namely the struggle to control state levers in order to shape selves, to alter our most fundamental conceptions of the good and the true and thus what one feels compelled to do. In the end, evangelicals and liberals value freedom – specifically, their particular view of freedom – so much that they fight intensely to control those socializing levers, an effort that ironically betrays an understanding not of the subject’s freedom but of her malleability.

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Chapter 7 – The Reach of Sovereignty

In this final chapter, I want to follow up some implications from the conclusion of chapter six. My goal in this endeavour is to clarify the stakes and significant ambitions of the lobbies and their opponents. Indeed, I argue that these ambitions should remind us to think expansively of what the ultimate goal may be for truly successful political movements. Second,

I will recap the rival rhetorical approaches discussed throughout this thesis. These approaches

– detailed in chapters three, four, and six – are worth placing side by side to provide a broader cumulative portrait. Third, I want to look at how family values debates have impacted its various participants. In producing so many discourses, organizations and lines of reasoning, these debates have not left their various parties unaffected. On this front, we will consider the debates’ effects on the lobbies, on evangelical and liberal identity in Canada, and on what all this means for the evangelical community’s future prospects as it faces the danger of being overrun by secularizing forces. In so doing, I hope that analyzing Canada’s evangelical community might provide a fresh perspective for thinking about secularization and the enduring debate between American versus European exceptionalism.

The Goal of Expansive Sovereignty

As important as the political fights are over euthanasia, abortion, or transgender rights,

I posit they are ultimately proximate to the broader struggle for sovereignty. Evangelicalism and liberal secularism are not just a religion and form of government accommodating religion, but ambitious rival ideologies. Naomi Goldenberg explains this contest for sovereignty by proposing that we should understand religions as being akin to vestigial states (2013). She

297 describes them as “once and future states,” aspiring to full sovereignty, but limited by a powerful rival, the modern secular state. Religions, she claims, aim to influence as much of life as possible and eagerly assume whatever powers they can. Liberal democracies, conversely, strive to contain religions, partly by confining them to family matters as discussed in chapter five. Goldenberg’s claims are supported by two legal scholars we discussed earlier: Benjamin

Berger and Winnifred Sullivan.324 In chapter three, we saw Berger argue that secular law is a rival of sorts to religion. Recall that he contends that conceiving of law as a neutral arbiter of social conflicts misses that law is actually a cultural participant with its own values and moral commitments, where such commitments often directly conflict with those of religious communities (2008:246-7). Sullivan’s work aligns with both Berger and Goldenberg. She asserts that religion “competes with law” for “comprehensive explanation and control” (2005:157).

She claims that religion “challenges the rule of law,” by positing an authority “outside of oneself and one’s government” (ibid.:157). One nuance I would add to these claims is that the challenge religion poses varies according to the form a given religion takes. More liberal religious communities typically pose less challenge to secular governments and seem well accommodated to existing within liberal democracy. Such communities are often “minimalist” in believing religion should stay in its lanes – e.g. metaphysics, personal ethics, etc. (Lincoln

2006).325 But when religions tend towards “maximalist” outlooks whereby religiosity should

324 Sullivan is a joint religion and legal scholar, with appointments in both fields and degrees in both fields. Berger is a legal scholar whose work often focuses on religion. The former is American and the latter Canadian, lending a generalizability to their statements about the interaction of Western law and religion. 325 These “lanes” are defined by secular liberalism and its privatizing of religiosity. Where liberal religions more often do conflict with the state is with the excesses of capitalism and related notions of social justice. However, the level of organization and political conflict generated by these disputes do not match the tension generated by conservative religious groups over family values issues. The latter groups’ activism is likely bolstered by the sense that they are fighting for survival and to protect their own children. 298 inform all of life, conflict with secular law grows (ibid.). The three scholars above thus paint a consistent picture of the liberal secular state and religion struggling for sovereignty, where sovereignty, I suggest, means control of the state levers, but also for the affective excess that inevitably comes from deeming certain paths as legal, and/or bound in with nationalism, and/or tied to the society’s fundamental values and principles. To be able to set those laws, to establish which values will define “us,” and to teach them in the nation’s educational facilities

– that is the kind of sovereignty sought by both secular liberalism and maximalist forms of religion.326

Indeed, I suggest we take our understanding one step further, making it even more expansive, by thinking of it as a sovereignty over selves and their formation. Political fights over same-sex marriage or sex education curriculum, important as they are in their own right, also establish norms around concepts like freedom and family, thus aiming to shape individual dispositions and instinctual reactions. Thinking of sovereignty this way challenges the boundaries of the public/private divide. Social theorist and religious studies professor Craig

Martin argues liberal political theory posits too clear a division between public and private

(2010). Tracing back to Locke, and continuing up to figures like Habermas, Martin finds a conceptually clean division between a public arena for debating matters of common concern relevant to social order, and a private realm of personal decision-making irrelevant to social order. However, he disputes this perspective, claiming that what counts as public interest

326 Secular liberalism is not, of course, an agent with actual “ambitions” but it contains ambitious logics suggesting how an entire society should be organized. I hesitate to identify individuals (i.e. secular liberals) instead of the “ism” since many people comfortable with the ideology of secular liberalism and supportive of these views, might nonetheless not adopt the label for themselves. 299 depends heavily on the socialization enacted in the private realm.327 Hence, the kitchen table, the house of worship, and the pious body all become politically formative sites, a claim supported by the work of theorists cited earlier (e.g. Ault 2004; Mahmood 2005). Hence, the private realm is not irrelevant to public issues but their very foundation, since power circulates between deeply imbricated private and public spheres. He contends that when liberal theorists categorize religion as private – perhaps hoping to marginalize its political influence – they overlook how significantly the private realm shapes public values.328 Instead, Martin suggests that social theorists like Gramsci and Bourdieu better illuminate how religious and domestic life shape dominant social expectations, political narratives, economic practices, and legal codes (ibid.:8).329

I think Martin is correct that liberal theorists often fail to account for the private sphere’s massive influence on politics, but liberal activists in Canadian family values debates appear quite savvy about this dynamic and attend diligently to the private sphere’s importance. LGBTQ causes, for example, gained immensely from people openly announcing their sexual orientation to their personal relations including colleagues, friends and family.

LGBTQ advocates have shown a keen awareness of the role of visceral emotional reactions and have pushed for the education system to inculcate even the very young to accept LGBTQs in a

327 Martin nicely uses Locke himself as an example, showing how Locke’s belief that atheists could not be trusted – and therefore not publicly tolerated – derives from religious convictions Locke acquired in the so-called private realms of church and family (ibid.:88-90). 328 Martin notes designating religion as private protects religion from public scrutiny (i.e. it is a private matter) which ignores how religion in the so-called private sphere informs public values. He advocates religion be neither privatized (i.e. marginalized) nor private (i.e. free from public critique) but rather legitimate public speech open to critique (ibid.:11, 108). 329 A political theorist who addresses some of Martin’s issues is Jeffrey Stout (2005). Stout describes democracy as a set of social practices that inculcate values and norms, and is thus a tradition rather than a mere set of procedural rules. Stout does not focus on the circulation between the public and private spheres and addresses democratic theory rather than liberalism per se but his attention to practices incorporates social theories about subject formation. 300 bid to shift affective responses and normalize gay life. There is no thought here of leaving the private self unaffected. The evangelical lobbies, too, grasp how public and private are linked and dismiss assertions that same-sex marriages would not affect them (which assumes private lives continue unaffected by shifts in public laws and norms).330 Both the lobbies and their opponents seem very aware that changing laws around gay sex or euthanasia affects not just a particular couple or a terminally ill person, but also alters what is allowable and thinkable, changing the framework for evaluating all relationships, bodily desires, and even who owns a life and determines whether it continues. The lobbies and their opponents thus clamour over private inclinations as much as over public laws. Indeed, a key takeaway from family values debates may be this – that while we often think of politics as passing laws and altering legislation, perhaps the most critical goal for a truly ambitious movement is gaining the capacity to influence subject formation. Changing laws is the mechanism; changing selves is the objective.

The cumulative portrait thus challenges some of liberal democracy’s most foundational binaries. Separating religion and politics becomes not an impartial move to ensure fairness between rival comprehensive doctrines but a power struggle between competing ideologies over which view will dominate. The separation of public and private falls away in light of

Martin’s argument about how private sphere socialization shapes public norms and vice-versa,

330 In rejecting the idea that same-sex marriage would only affect same-sex couples, the lobbies frequently cited the liberalizing of divorce laws. They claimed divorce laws were liberalized in 1968 to ease the process for the (relatively) few divorces then occurring but that the law altered public norms, causing a surge in divorces no one anticipated. Hence, changing the law had spill over consequences into many more private arrangements than expected as effects circulated between public and private spheres, changing social norms and remaking households. The lobbies similarly argued that legalizing same-sex marriage would affect marriage generally and spill over into more private lives than advocates claimed. For examples of this argument, see Focus 2001, Sugrue 2006. 301 and from the inescapable fact that public arguments about state laws commonly deal with some of the most intimate matters including sex, marriage, and mortality. Separating reason from emotion is complicated by seeing the public sphere as defined not by cool and reasoned deliberation, but by visceralness, poetic display, and attempts to shift how we feel about an argument. And freedom and compulsion are altered when we move away from an autonomy model to think about how agency is shaped and propelled by strong, almost irresistible currents and aspects of identity. For ideologies as pervasive and far-reaching as liberalism and conservative Christianity, the ambitious goal of having others agree with our vision of the true and the good means trying to influence both public norms and private sentiments, cultivating reasoning habits and instinctual affective responses, and nurturing identities that encourage us towards the free choices we increasingly feel compelled to make.

Recapping the Rhetorical Approaches Taken

In fighting for sovereignty, the lobbies and their opponents have employed an array of rhetorical tools and strategies to weaken their opponents and claim higher ground. Although detailed in earlier chapters, I want to gather these approaches here to recount the cumulative strategies used to define powerful concepts like “moral” and “freedom” that help make worlds. I will first recap the marginalizing strategies and then how the lobbies responded to try to gain a credible hearing.

Three major strategies of marginalizing rhetorics have been outlined. The first strategy is the freedom versus morals binary. Liberal organizations and politicians use these frames to paint evangelicals as violating-freedom by imposing-morals. These two portraits work together, whereby evangelicals are said to violate a supposedly impartial public sphere by 302 invading it with their own parochial morals and infringing on others’ liberty. This framing depicts liberals as uniquely fair-minded for not imposing their own morals and instead upholding liberty for all. This skillful approach allows liberals to condemn evangelicals for moralizing while ironically granting themselves the high moral ground of being even-handed.

For their part, evangelicals accuse liberals of frequently abandoning morals altogether.

Liberals’ deep commitments to autonomy are dismissed as licence and moral vacuity. This perspective lets evangelicals depict themselves as not simply a rival moral voice but really as the only moral voice left in a society that has lost its way. A second set of marginalizing strategies rhetorically employs public and private. In chapter six, we saw these terms employed in three ways: i) to code autonomy by pitting privacy rights, which protect individual liberties, against public intrusion; ii) to preserve existing social norms by using privacy to insulate practices from public scrutiny; or iii) as explicit assertions of which norms will dominate by claiming public-ness for one’s own values – deemed merely reasonable – while relegating rival notions to mere opinions to be tolerated-if-closeted. Finally, the third major rhetorical strategy has been liberals’ use of tolerance and related discourses of diversity and multiculturalism (explored in chapter three). This approach leverages liberals’ claim to impartiality and neutrality while hiding its de facto hegemony. Liberal diversity has a dual function, granting a certain openness on one hand, while simultaneously cordoning off a diversity that might challenge liberalism itself (Berger 2008; Brown 2008). Indeed, the openness on one front is precisely what cloaks the discourse’s managing aspect on the other.

The diversity discourse has primarily been the preserve of liberal advocates, with evangelicals often struggling against the intolerance accusation although, occasionally, evangelicals have employed diversity language themselves in order to accuse liberals of intolerance. Liberals and 303 evangelicals have thus both sought to marginalize their opponents using formally similar but substantively incompatible discourses. As we have seen, liberals have been far more successful on this front. The cleaner arguments liberals have on freedom, the easier connection to the

Charter mantra on rights, and the congruous fit with pluralism, has allowed them to often establish the terms of the debate and put evangelicals on the defensive.

From their defensive position, evangelicals have responded by attempting to increase their credibility as speakers. As outlined in chapter three and in reference to Ardener’s theory, this has often meant muting themselves, especially on four values integral to Canadian identity: i) secularity; ii) moderation; iii) pluralism; and iv) being un-American. The lobbies have taken varied approaches to these muting imperatives. The EFC has been the least conflictual, aligning easily on some of these core values and making nuanced distinctions on others. The

EFC’s tendency towards fitting into the dominant Canadian culture may have fostered greater alignment over time, especially on pluralism – e.g. becoming very active in interfaith initiatives

– and on same-sex marriage, where they have gradually adopted more liberal positions. At the other extreme, CFAC rejects these cultural norms, often harshly, despite some calculated exceptions such as tapping into pluralism motifs during the same-sex marriage debate. Focus has been the most tactical, bifurcating their insider versus outsider messages more than the other two. Such bifurcations are rationalized by natural law principles which align secular arguments with Christian theology by suggesting secular research upholds a Christian worldview. This has allowed the lobbies, and Focus in particular, to make public arguments based on socially beneficial outcomes without feeling like they are compromising on their

Christian commitments. Focus added the most unusual move, forming an entire public face, the IMFC, that hid all connections to Focus or Christianity. The IMFC is the apex of evangelical 304 muting tactics, but it also shows how the lobbies can coop mutedness by adopting dominant language for their own ends. The IMFC’s secular face helped it garner substantial media exposure for many years, while the EFC employed pluralism especially in courts where they may have influenced a key judgment that defined secular law inclusively (i.e. so as to not exclude religion).

In the end, however, many family values debates have not gone the lobbies’ way. They have scored a few victories including the definition of secular law just noted and they likely influenced the following policy developments by the Harper Conservatives: toughening pedophilia laws; replacing national daycare plans with money sent straight to parents; and pruning or closing government bodies the lobbies despised including the federal human rights commission, the Status of Women office, and the Court Challenges program. On many fronts, however, the lobbies were defeated including most significantly on the same-sex marriage issue, the impacts of which continue to reverberate on everything from school curriculums to commercial enterprises. In addition, the lobbies were initially bolstered financially by LGBTQ rights controversies but have since seemed to struggle to be able to fund the same level of political activism. Focus now rarely engages in politics and pared back the IMFC before transferring it to another organization where it has a reduced visibility. CFAC has shrunk markedly and seems endangered as do its closest peers. And while the EFC remains strong, it is now firmly involved in interfaith outreach and has reduced its legal resources. In some ways, one can see how these debates affected the lobbies – having lost on many of these issues, they now seem to have a reduced fighting capacity – more than how the lobbies altered the outcome of these pivotal debates.

305

Contesting Identities

If the lobbies have been weakened in the course of their challenges to the liberal state, what impact have these debates had on Canadian identities, both evangelical and liberal? On evangelical identity, one useful approach is Michael Warner's work on “counter-publics”

(2002). Warner distinguishes a public from a community or group in being broader, addressing

"infinite strangers” (ibid.:120). He adds that a counter-public is both subordinate and aware of this subordination, actively defining itself in opposition to the dominant group. Warner’s description fits Canada’s evangelicals well, as they comprise roughly 10% of the population, are subordinate in their capacity to influence legal and cultural norms, and find the dominant liberal culture threatening to their worldview and practices. Warner's theory implies Canadian evangelicals are partly defined or constituted by Canadian liberalism and their opposition to it.

Sociologist Craig Calhoun has noted that liberalism may unintentionally promote religious counter-publics since its "overly sharp distinction between religious and public reasoning" forces religious reasoning into alternative arenas (2011:81). For evangelicals, alternative arenas include congregations and parachurch organizations such as religious colleges, media organizations, and of course the lobbies themselves. Warner’s counter-public arguments also resonates with the work of sociologist Christian Smith. Smith, in his widely cited work, claims

American evangelicalism thrives off the productive tension that arises from interacting with others unlike themselves (1998). He contends that evangelicalism uses cultural and religious diversity to its advantage by framing other groups as "negative reference groups," i.e., as

306 examples of what one is not (ibid.:105).331 Contact with rival systems is used to reinforce uniqueness (and surely superiority) to such an extent that evangelicalism “thrives on distinction, engagement, tension, conflict and threat” (ibid.:89, italics in original).332

Evangelicalism is particularly well suited for the role of being a counter-public that feeds off the tension, as the Christian tradition is quite rich with victim and martyr tropes depicting the community as a persecuted church in a hostile world.333 The lobbies significantly buttress this view by frequently painting Christians as targets of a hostile state and an uncompromising dominant culture. The lobbies function as vigorous boundary builders that constantly draw contrasts with the broader culture (especially via the binaries around ontology, ethics and anthropology). As such, family values politics contributes to identity formation and boundary maintenance per the work of Warner, Calhoun and Smith. These political struggles help craft

Canadian evangelicalism as a counter-public standing against the moral laxity of liberal secularism. In this way, even though evangelicals have lost many family values debates, and run the risk of assimilation by engaging in interfaith work or liberalizing on same-sex marriage, these struggles have also paradoxically helped bolster Canadian evangelical identity by drawing

331 James Bielo (2009:137) makes similar observations in his fieldwork of evangelical Bible study groups, where he draws on David Hess's (1993) suggestion that identity is dialogical and constituted relative to the other. Bielo posits evangelicals show skill in making distinctions with rival communities. 332 Smith pointedly distinguishes evangelicalism from fundamentalism and liberal Christianity. Fundamentalists, he contends, try insulating themselves from the culture which survey data suggests is not working as well (weaker commitment and less orthodoxy relative to evangelicals). Liberal Protestants, he offers, adopted the culture without maintaining tension and hence are being subsumed. He sees evangelicalism as unique in mingling engagement with tension, thus creating more confidence with a greater sense of mission and a distinctive calling (1998:20-66). 333 This victim language is so rich, American evangelicals regularly employ it even though their economic, political, and social power – most notably to help select American presidents who depend on their support – gives them a global impact that is perhaps unmatched by any similarly-sized faith community. 307 firm boundaries, mobilizing resources, and fostering institution building.334 The lobbies themselves demonstrate such institution building which, in turn, reinforces evangelical identity and uniqueness by providing language and leaders that champion this outlook.

These conflicts may also be productive for liberal secular identity. While studying

American fundamentalist Christians, anthropologist Susan Harding was surprised how her liberal university colleagues were quick to essentialize and dismiss her subjects (1991). Her colleagues were experienced in using careful cultural criticism and regularly applied these tools when considering social groups defined by other criteria – race, gender, class, most notably – but tended to drop nuanced or neutral descriptions, she averred, when considering conservative American Christians. Harding's experience led her to call her subjects “The

Repugnant Cultural Other” (ibid.:373). Religion scholars Noah Salomon and Jeremy Walton suggest Harding’s experience is not uncommon as they posit religion is "the placeholder for many of the anxieties native to contemporary liberalism" (2012:420). This perspective is relevant to the Canadian scene. Journalist Marci McDonald's book, mentioned earlier, provides just one example of framing evangelicals as everything liberal Canadians think they're not: intolerant, overly religious, and quasi-American (2010). During elections, the religious beliefs of

Conservative leaders such as Preston Manning, Stockwell Day, and Andrew Scheer have been employed to paint Conservatives as a threat to Canadian identity, liberally conceived. Hence,

Canadian liberalism and Canadian evangelicalism live in symbiotic tension, antagonistic and yet co-productive of each other. For evangelicals, Canadian liberalism is the public defining their

334 Another indicator of strengthening identity has been evangelical’s rightward shift in voting as outlined by Grenville 2006 (see also Malloy 2010; Todd 2016). The community now displays a consistent and distinct voting pattern different from the larger public. 308 counter-public, the dominant group threatening their faith, adherence to God, and even everyday moral decency. The sense of being “under siege” spurs evangelicals to engage in rigorous identity work and boundary maintenance. For liberals, Canadian evangelicals are an ever-present Trojan horse – by seeming to challenge the values around pluralism, secularism and Charter-rights that liberals see as quintessential Canadian, evangelicals appear as a kind of internal threat. This perceived threat is only heightened by the fact that evangelicals remind liberal Canadians of the overbearing neighbour to the south, the ostensible foil to all things supposedly Canadian. Hence, insofar as Canadian evangelicals sometimes promote positions aligned with the American Religious Right, such moves actually motivate liberal Canadians to vigilantly maintain difference vis-à-vis the United States.335 Indeed, what makes Canadian liberals proud of their country are a series of “progressive” changes perceived as correctives to its Christian past: greater secularity by ending Christian school prayers and Sunday shopping laws; abortion legalized by privileging women's rights over patriarchal religious teachings; liberalizing divorce to erase Christian mores from law codes; LGBTQ rights won despite discriminatory conservative religionist opposition; multiculturalism displacing Christian dominance; and the Charter and the newly empowered courts enabling pluralism under a

335 Muslims can also be perceived as overreaching religionists, particularly in Québec where evangelicals have very little presence and the culture’s anti-clerical version of secularism, laicité, spawns many debates over the veil and legislation to limit it. In Anglophone Canada, fear of Islam can also motivate secular and liberal politics: two examples I discussed are the 2007 Ontario provincial election, where Conservative candidate John Tory's proposal to fund all private schools doomed his campaign (partly because of the spectre of funding religious schools, including Islamic schools) and, second, Ontario Premier McGuinty’s decision to outlaw religious tribunals for family law once the idea of including Islamic sharia courts was broached. However, Anglo liberals' multicultural commitments can soften anti-Islamic tendencies (Québec's moves to ban religious apparel in public spaces, for example, have been widely condemned in English Canada). Evangelicals, however, are not so easily admitted into the multicultural basket due to the historical baggage mentioned earlier and the preponderance of evangelical leaders of white European ancestry. In short, if Muslims are the other of Québec's secularists, I think evangelicals remain the principal other for Anglo-Canadian liberals. 309 strictly secular law.336 The fight for dominance between liberals and evangelicals is thus a galvanizing force for both sides, producing rhetoric, perceived threats, and activism that helps forge and solidify identity. Canada's evangelicals and liberals help constitute one another.

Swimming Against a Secular Tide: The Future of Canadian Evangelicalism

In chapter three, I described how evangelical political leaders fear social and cultural changes will undermine their ability to pass their faith on to their children, an observation supported by theorists, such as Echo Fields and Michael Warner, American activists like Gary

Bauer, and prominent Canadian lobbyists including Jim Sclater and Charles McVety. A pivotal question then is whether Canadian evangelicals’ political losses are weakening the community’s Christian identity? Differently put, are evangelicals being secularized?

Secularization theory has lost some favour after early proponents ensconced it in a moral narrative implying inevitability and universality. However, freed of the baggage around morality, universality and inevitability, the theory still best elucidates the massive drop in

Western piety over the past half century.337 Canada's evangelical community offers an instructive case for thinking about secularization. As I mentioned in the introduction, secularization debates focus mostly on Europe and the United States.338 However, Canada

336 For liberals then, Canadian evangelicals often represent both the identities that liberals most firmly reject – that of the formerly Christian dominated Canada and the current seemingly-evangelical-dominated United States. Both identities are associated with intolerance. 337 Well known examples of this argument can be found in Norris and Inglehart (2011) and in works by Steve Bruce (2002, 2012). These works show multi-decade declines in religious attendance, religious belief, and respondents’ claims about the salience of religion in their lives. These declines occur across a wide spectrum of Western countries despite differences in their dominant religious culture (Catholic, Protestant or mixed), and in the relationship between religion and the state (ranging from state support to complete separation of state and church). 338 A central debate is whether secularization is a European phenomenon not relevant elsewhere (European exceptionalism) or a broad first world phenomenon the USA has resisted (American exceptionalism). 310 offers an interesting interim case since it sits between Europe and the United States on several areas relevant to secularization theory. On religious attendance, Canadians attend more than most Europeans but less than Americans. On political ideology, Canada leans right of many

European countries but left of the United States. And on the relative size of its evangelical community, the Canadian community is a larger share of the population than in European nations but smaller than that of the United States. Evangelicals are salient because they have shown unusual resilience in resisting secularizing trends. Indeed, American exceptionalism on secularization hinges almost entirely on America's large evangelical community.339 Canada thus offers an opportunity to examine evangelical resilience where the community lacks the numerical and cultural dominance enjoyed in the United States and also faces a more secularized and hegemonically liberal culture. The question of whether evangelicals are being secularized is also pivotal to the Canadian scene as evangelical weakening would end the last bastion of Protestant strength in the country and somewhat cripple social conservatism politically, socially, and intellectually.

339 A key source for statistics on American religiosity is the General Social Survey, from which some data is publicly available (https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/). Researchers often draw on this survey but, with their access to the raw data, sometimes make adjustments to account for weighting of segments of the population or because they want to define categories in a different manner. In addition, researchers often show the data in chart form with some (but not all) the relevant numbers cited in the accompanying text. Despite these encumbrances, a basic story does emerge. Political scientist Ryan Burge, a widely cited expert in this area, shows Catholics declining slightly from 27% in 1972 to 23% in 2018, despite significant bolstering of Catholic numbers stemming from Latino immigration. Burge shows that Mainline Protestantism falls precipitously from 28% to 11%. White evangelicals climb during the 1970s from 18% to about 23%, then have a well-known surge into the high 20’s in the Reagan era, before settling back down in the low 20’s around 1990 where they have remained mostly steady for the past three decades (Smith 2019). Sociologists Landon Schnabel and Sean Bock have also written multiple detailed papers where they argue that the decline in American religiosity stems solely from people of moderate religious intensity leaving the faith, while high intensity religionists show stability (2017, 2018). This stability of the more intensely religious, they argue, differentiates America from other Western countries, making American religiosity “exceptional.” They chart this impact denominationally such that post the Reagan-era surge, they show White evangelical religiosity as a flat line representing about 27% of the population. In comparison, they group all other religiosity in one data series that drops from about 64% in 1990 to 52% in 2018, while the percentage of “nones” grows dramatically from about 8% in 1990 to perhaps 21% in 2018 (2017:692). In short, Schnabel and Bock agree with Burge that evangelicals are an outlier in resisting the secularizing forces weakening other Christian churches. 311

Secularization theory's foremost proponent today is sociologist Steve Bruce. Bruce argues Western modernity erodes religious commitment through familiar mechanisms ranging from urbanization to growing individualism (2002; 2012).340 Most importantly, Bruce disputes the premise of American exceptionalism, contending that secularization is still gaining there, just more slowly because American Christians enjoy unique advantages that allow them to create a world semi-insulated against secularizing tendencies (2002:219-227). These advantages include: the political power to shape laws; decentralized local control of education curriculum and public broadcasting; and the financial and numerical strength to build a self- contained subculture (e.g. Bible camps, charitable organizations, youth organizations, colleges). In addition, Bruce believes influxes of Christian immigrants help offset and mask domestic attrition. Despite these advantages, he suggests Christianity in the USA is not only losing power, but also faces internal secularization in its own goals and speech (ibid.:204).341

Where Bruce treats American Christianity as a single entity, other theorists emphasize that secularization impacts different forms of religion unequally. Charles Taylor and Christian

Smith contend that religious movements can thrive in modern contexts, especially by valorizing agency (Taylor 2007:143, 450-1, 507, 833f19; Smith 1998:102-4). For each scholar, evangelicalism almost epitomizes a faith predicated on choice – the tradition stresses the importance of making a decision to follow Christ – thus tapping into the modern championing

340 Bruce has written numerous articles and chapters on secularization. My citations here are his two monographs which best encapsulate his arguments. 341 By “internal” secularization, Bruce means that American Christianity is shifting to more this-worldly goals and becoming more therapeutic in orientation, the latter indicating a focus on self-help and self-esteem tropes over traditional Christian concerns (ibid.:204). He declares this secularizing because religion becomes more about emotional health, productivity at work, acquiring wealth, an improved marriage, etc. and less directed at otherworldly goals like salvation. He could be challenged on this front since religion has often been directed at this-worldly goals while retaining strong other-worldly aspirations. 312 of individual agency. An identity arising from personal choice gains added authenticity and legitimacy for moderns, making the faith even more firmly held. Empirical evidence supports

Taylor's and Smith's argument that a religion’s particularities matter, as declines in American

Christianity vary immensely by denomination with evangelicals mostly holding steady as witnessed earlier. To be sure, immigration might be stabilizing evangelical numbers to some extent (hiding what might otherwise be a gentle decline) but, even so, evangelicalism is far more resilient than most Christian branches.

Why, then, does evangelicalism fare better than other Western Christian denominations in resisting secularization? Bruce and Smith give almost opposite answers. As noted, Bruce points to American Christians’ ability to insulate themselves from secularizing forces by maintaining strong influence over local school boards, creating their own institutions

(media, colleges, etc.), and because their numerical strength, especially in the American South, makes them a powerful cultural force (2002:219-227).342 So, for Bruce, a protective insularity is key. Smith rejects Bruce’s argument – which he calls the "sheltered enclave theory" – by providing data that shows American evangelicals are not sheltered, whether in education, urbanization, or paid employment, all factors commonly cited for insularity (1998:75-82). He also provides data showing that evangelicals are not sheltered in their social circles relative to other groups (ibid.:82). Hence, as noted above, Smith believes American evangelicalism thrives not by hiding from pluralism but by actively engaging with it, using difference to highlight distinctiveness versus negative reference groups. Counter to Peter Berger’s (1990) theory that

342 Bruce emphasizes homogenous subcultures in contrast to the competitive markets theory that suggests religion thrives through diversity. The competitive markets theory has been largely discredited (Chaves and Gorski 2001) and Bruce (ibid.:221-2) adds that claims of America's religious diversity consider the nation as a whole whereas specific counties often are dominated by just one or two traditions. Hence, he says emphasizing America's religious diversity hides the degree of homogeneity most Americans actually experience. 313 religion flourishes best under a “sacred canopy” or communally shared religious worldview,

Smith posits that evangelicalism fashions sacred umbrellas the individual can bear alone and carry while venturing amidst a diverse public sphere. Contact with rival systems, for evangelicals, does not as often corrode commitment as it does for other religious communities and Smith argues it can even serve to invigorate faith.

Although Smith directly challenges Bruce's ideas, the two theorists' approaches contain a mix of similarities and differences relevant to the Canadian scene. Both theorists agree that a religious community needs to create a separate moral world but whereas Bruce explains how this is achieved (institution building fostering cultural insulation and encapsulation through media, parachurch organizations and school curriculum), Smith says little about how this distinct moral world is socially created. He focuses instead on fostering moral distinction while engaging with society via education, urban living, and employment.343 Combining the two portraits creates an image of evangelicals as living in urban centers, pursuing a wide range of vocations, but also consuming Christian media, attending Christian colleges, and spending much of their free time engaged in congregational or parachurch activities – in short, tacking between engagement and subcultural encapsulation. A key difference between the two scholars is Smith's attention to denominational traits. Smith believes evangelicalism uniquely resists secularization, whereas Bruce treats American Christianity generically. Although Bruce surely knows of evangelicalism's relative strength, he glosses over the issue. Here, empirical evidence emphatically supports Smith’s attention to denominations, since evangelicals fare so

343 Smith credits institution-building in aiding neo-evangelicalism's emergence in the 1940s, but when evaluating evangelicalism's contemporary success, he only briefly gestures towards the importance of institutional resources. He does this most clearly when, on page 91, he describes forming "concrete social groups, actual relational networks, and particular subcultures" (ibid.:9-13). 314 well comparatively. Bruce and Smith also disagree on prognosis. Bruce sees American

Christians following Western Christians generally (though more slowly) while Smith believes

American evangelicalism has a bright future. And lastly they disagree on whether evangelicalism is compromising on orthodoxy in ways that threaten the tradition’s identity.

Bruce posits that even while remaining nominally Christian, American Christians are becoming more secular by adopting therapeutic language and this-worldly goals (2002:207-13). Smith counters that Bruce and likeminded theorists (e.g. Hunter 1987) erroneously view orthodoxy as a basket of fixed goods wherein every change incorporating cultural norms marks a loss to the tradition. Smith finds this simplistic for ignoring how traditions innovate and adapt.

Christianity, he reminds us, adapted beyond Judea to a Greco-Roman culture mere decades after Jesus' death; in the second and succeeding centuries, it adapted to Greek philosophy and then to Rome’s demise; and later adaptations permeate the work of everyone from Aquinas to

Billy Graham (ibid.:100-101). Smith acknowledges shifts can indicate decay, but each shift requires careful evaluation to sift erosion from evolution.

Concerning the significant academic debate about secularization, Canada's evangelical community provides a particularly interesting test case on whether this specific form of religion can withstand secularizing trends operative elsewhere in advanced capitalistic societies. Since Canada’s evangelicals lack the power and resources of their American counterparts (e.g. control of school boards, fewer parachurch organizations, and being too numerically small to insulate themselves to the same degree), they actually offer a superior test of Smith's thesis. For, if evangelicals can hold their own in the less hospitable Canadian climate, this really bolsters the idea of evangelical exceptionalism. Conversely, if Canadian evangelicalism withers, this would strengthen Bruce's case that American evangelical resilience 315 and vibrancy relies on creating an insulated world beneath a potent sacred canopy, and might also support Bruce's long term prognosis that Western secularization can be slowed, but likely not halted by any denomination. So, what does the Canadian evidence show?

The storylines are less clear than we would prefer, but important glimmers of information are discernable. First and foremost, evangelicals unquestionably show greater resiliency against secularizing forces than other major Christian denominations. Research shows that evangelicals have historically remained at roughly 8-10% of the Canadian population for many decades as other denominations experienced dramatic declines.344, 345

Pace Bruce, the Canadian community has held its own without the exceptional benefits he highlights that the American evangelical community enjoys – i.e. a quasi-sacred canopy made possible by a large enough community that creates insularity, as well as encapsulation via control of school boards and an extensive broadcasting empire. This historic stability in the less hospitable Canadian environment supports Smith’s umbrella thesis, whereby the tradition has maintained a morally distinct universe without numerical superiority, relying instead on the subcommunity’s own tools and habits, including congregational life, parachurch organizations

(such as the lobbies), and media consumption. For several decades, Canadian evangelical

344 Reimer and Wilkinson summarize the work of several researchers, concluding that evangelical demographics seem mostly stable as a percentage of the Canadian population through the first decade of this century (2010). A very recent poll, discussed below, does suggest this picture may be changing post 2010. Note that an important work by Clarke and McDonald subsequent to Reimer and Wilkinson’s meta-analysis showed quite different numbers for evangelicals, estimating they numbered in the 4-7% range from 1961 to 2011 (2017). Reimer, who was very appreciative of the work, nonetheless felt that it relied too heavily on census data where changing categories can reek some havoc (2018a). If true – Reimer provided evidence of massive peaks and valleys for Pentecostals in the census data that could not reflect reality – this may account for the different results. Regardless, Clarke and McDonald still gave a similar narrative of comparative strength and stability from 1961- 2011, though they saw more growth through 1991 and some softening thereafter. 345 The Pew Forum showed that from 1971 to 2011, Catholics in Canada declined as a percentage of the population from 47% to 39%, while Protestants declined from 41% to 27% (2013). Given that evangelicals are a subset of Protestants and held steady at around 10% during this period, Mainline Protestants experienced an even more dramatic decline from roughly 31% to 17%. 316 stability has therefore bolstered Smith’s sacred umbrella theory, granting it relevance even where evangelicals have been a small minority lacking the financial, social and political power of their American cousins.

However, there are two significant caveats. To see the first caveat, we must dig beneath the topline stability of evangelical numbers to see the dynamism underneath. For example, evangelicals have real retention issues and lose a significant portion of adherents. An

EFC study on this issue, showed evangelicals retaining 63% of their children as members of the faith which, while better than some other Protestant churches, still reveals a troubling attrition rate (Penner et al. 2011). A second study suggested attrition might be even greater.346 But these losses are offset by several factors. The first such factor is that evangelicals win converts, which fits nicely with Smith’s theory since it emphasizes the inherent strength or attractiveness of the tradition.347 A second factor is that evangelicals appear to have higher birth rates. Data on birth rates is not plentiful but data from 1975, 2001, and 2005 show Canadian evangelicals with a substantially higher birth rate than the national average.348 Other research shows

346 The study asked 45,000 adult Canadians about their childhood religion and their current one (if any). The results showed only 53% of those raised as evangelicals had remained in the tradition. Notably, it found that despite these losses, evangelicals had grown 3% in their sample – i.e. the number of adults identifying as evangelicals was slightly greater than those who had belonged as children – which points to gains from other factors we will shortly discuss (Reimer and Hiemstra 2018:338-9). 347 Sociologist Reginald Bibby, who has compiled statistics on Canadian religious behaviour for decades, suggests 10% of evangelical church attendees are converts (2003). The more recent study by Reimer and Hiemstra in the previous footnote suggests conversions could be much higher although an exact number was not discernable due to the data being mingled with numbers from immigration (2018). A third source showed that in a survey of evangelical congregations, over 20% of their net growth in a year came from conversions (Reimer and Wilkinson 2015:70-71). This number may even understate conversions since the survey showed other unaccounted for growth which might be immigrants but might be “switching,” meaning Christians leaving other churches to join evangelical congregations. Pastors might not record them as converts in their reporting since they were already Christian. 348 Data from 1975 showed evangelicals with a fertility rate of 2.4 versus 2.2 for the country as a whole (Reimer 2010:13n8,n9). Bibby, using 2005 data, showed Canadian evangelicals had a fertility rate of 2.0 per couple versus 1.76 for other Canadians. The third data point, in 2001, is not as precise – it uses a category in the Canadian census of “other Christian” which likely contains a lot of conservative Protestants according to Reimer and Hiemstra – but it shows a fertility rate of 1.8 versus a national average of 1.57. All three numbers, some decades 317

American evangelicals also have more children than their compatriots (Hout et al 2001). The higher fertility rate across time and borders is therefore almost surely not a random factor, but intrinsic to the tradition, and indeed, likely connected to the family values emphasis we have been examining. In short, part of the tradition’s strength is not only the retention factors Smith highlights, but natalism stemming from its familial focus. So far then, retention losses are being offset by strengths internal to the tradition: conversions and natalism. A third factor, however, that bolsters evangelical adherents is our first caveat – the significant gains Canada’s evangelical community receives from immigration. In 2011, Hiemstra and Stiller showed that immigrants made up 25% of evangelicals in Canada, slightly higher than the 20.6% number for the country as a whole (2016; Statistics Canada 2016). A more recent study suggests immigration continues to boost evangelical numbers as it shows 13% of those arriving from

2001-2011 were evangelical, a number higher than any estimate of evangelical representation in the country as a whole (Reimer and Hiemstra 2018:332). This then, is the caveat, since it appears that despite evangelicals’ greater resilience relative to other Christian churches (as per

Smith), stability ultimately relies on gains from immigration to stem what would otherwise be net losses. In addition, evangelicals may gain more than these numbers show since immigrant

Christians from mainline traditions often hold more conservative orthodox theologies that may lead them to find evangelical congregations in Canada (Reimer, 2020). If true, this would mean evangelical congregations may gain more than the 13% of immigrants who self-identify as evangelicals. In addition, immigrants attend more often which benefits congregations since

apart, cumulatively suggest evangelicals’ may have enjoyed a fertility advantage for decades. The most recent rate of 2.0 is below the replacement rate of 2.1 but on a percentage basis, the smaller contraction from the birth rate relative to the national average would yield a smaller absolute number of evangelicals who would nonetheless form a larger share of the population. 318 attendees donate more volunteer hours and money.349 Finally, whereas younger Canadians are less religious than older cohorts, work by Bibby and pollster Angus Reid suggests that among immigrants, the opposite is true. They show half of immigrants aged 18 to 34 reported attending a service at least once in the last month, compared to only 27% of immigrants older than 55 (Hutchins 2015). Hence, immigration not only grows evangelical numbers, it increases the crucial younger demographic, making churches younger and increasing the potential for children to be born in the tradition (a similar point is made in Hiemstra and Stiller 2016). These immigration gains are offsetting evangelicalism’s natural attrition. In doing so, the immigration story weakens Smith’s thesis by revealing that evangelical resilience relies partly on the influx from abroad.

If immigration is the first caveat to evangelical resilience, the second caveat is that this historic resiliency may be softening. The attrition rates mentioned above are quite high and disturbing. In addition, evangelical converts have historically come from other Christian churches but these churches are much smaller now, meaning a smaller pool to draw from.350

Most interesting is that some recent studies have started to point at decline. In their 2015 book, Reimer and Wilkinson combine data from multiple sources – statistical data on congregations, survey data on individuals, and their conversations with denominational leaders

– and relate that the cumulative evidence shows that no evangelical denominations are

349 The General Social Survey data shows that in terms of attending services at least monthly, immigrants attend at twice the rate of Canadians born in the country (Pew Forum 2013). Reimer and Hiemstra provide supportive data for two evangelical denominations showing that 55% of immigrant Baptists attend weekly versus 36% for native born Baptists and that the comparable numbers for Pentecostals are 73% versus 51% (2018:336). 350 The Reimer and Hiemstra study showed evangelical converts come mostly from other churches (2018). In my phone conversations with Reimer and Hiemstra, they each raised this point independently. Reimer also highlighted that the Mainline Protestant churches are not only much smaller, but much older, populated by many senior citizens who are unlikely to switch (2020). 319 growing and that the overall pictures suggests “future decline is probable” (2015:75). In 2017,

Reimer showed that the percent of “evangelically aligned” individuals had also started to decline by 2013 both overall and generationally (2017:197).351 These indications were further solidified by a very recent survey released in 2020 that showed evangelicals make up just 6.4% of Canadians, a notable outlier versus any earlier results and outside the historic 8-12% band

(Hiemstra 2020a, 2020b).352 I spoke with the article’s author (a researcher at the EFC) and separately phoned sociologist Sam Reimer, the two researchers as knowledgeable as anyone about Canadian evangelical numbers and who also benefit from extensive personal contacts with Canadian evangelical leaders. When I asked whether they saw the poll as a likely outlier or whether the weakening is genuine, both unhesitatingly favoured the latter interpretation. The magnitude of the drop surprised them and both felt the real number might be higher (i.e. 7% rather than 6%), but that the decline was real.353 Both also emphasized immigration’s importance, declaring that evangelical Caucasian churches are shrinking, with growth found only in immigrant churches (see also Reimer and Wilkinson 2015:74). Overall then, the

351 One measure of counting evangelicals is “evangelically aligned,” which asks individuals questions related to Bebbington’s four-point definition. This approach captures theologically conservative Protestants (even if they attend Mainline Protestant denominations) and even some evangelically-oriented Catholics. Reimer’s data showed that the number of individuals within a cohort that scored high on the metric declined from 1996 to 2013. For example, of those born in 1925-1945, fewer of them scored high in 2013 than had seventeen years earlier. In addition, there were generation effects so that across four age brackets, each younger bracket had a smaller percentage that crossed the threshold. Thus, in 2013, 16% of those in the 1925-1945 bracket scored high versus just 10% of those born from 1982-1996. 352 Hiemstra’s article published a 6% number but in my phone call with him, he related that the number was 6.4%. I highlight the decimal point only because at 6.5%, he would have reported the number as 7%. 353 When I asked Hiemstra why we have never seen a number like this in any other study, he reminded me that Canada’s evangelicals are not counted very often. If numbers had softened in the past 6-8 years, there would have been no polls to capture the drop. From his conversation with evangelical leaders, he does believe the decline is recent. As for reasons, he speculated in his article and in our phone conversation that cell phones and technology may have tipped the balance. He averred that just as cell phones have coincided with a decline in other activities (e.g. sports, piano playing), they may also pull people away from church. Hiemstra also reiterated the point raised earlier, that evangelicals’ historic conversion gains from pulling in other Christians might be weakening because there are simply far fewer other Christians to draw from (Hiemstra 2020a, 2020b). 320 community’s future is uncertain. It exhibits a noteworthy resilience but is clearly swimming upstream against powerful societal currents. There is little doubt that the community will be less White, which could eventually have interesting political ramifications.354

Returning to Smith and Bruce, this analysis suggests that both canopies and umbrellas matter. Canopies bring significant protection and a greenhouse environment that nurtures faith, and losing this environment in Western societies has decimated faith communities. But equally clearly, without the canopy, a tradition’s specifics matter immensely and can foster portable umbrellas that build resiliency amidst a harsher environment. Despite the effectiveness of evangelical umbrellas, it appears they fall short on their own, so that the boundary strengthening aspects Smith focuses on need to be paired with natalistic values and especially immigration gains, to offset the inevitable retention losses. Thus, whereas secularization decimates liberal or Mainline Protestantism, evangelicalism has an uncertain future, balanced between the possibility of slower decline and the hope that immigration will be enough to help them maintain their present strength.

This conclusion is relevant to the larger secularization debate. It suggests that the ongoing argument between American versus European exceptionalism misses the point – the most important driver appears to be evangelical exceptionalism. It is evangelicalism’s uniqueness that has allowed it to withstand decades of erosion amongst the wider Christian community, and to do so on both sides of the border. This last point is key, since it suggests the

American evangelical community’s resilience is driven less by its American environment and

354 As noted in this dissertation, evangelicals are the minority that is rarely seen as such by the majority liberal culture in Canada, saddled as they are by Christianity’s past hegemony in the country. As the evangelical community becomes far more diverse and if this leads to more diverse leaders and public faces, it may change the dynamic of how the community is perceived. 321 more by denominational distinctives. The most recent Canadian data does indicate that even this exceptionalism may finally be facing too many obstacles in Canada to withstand some erosion. It will be interesting to see if Canadian evangelicalism does indeed decline and, if so, whether American evangelicalism experiences any corresponding decline. The current

American picture may be more stable. There is far more regular data produced on American evangelicals and of the three major surveys, two show slight declines in the past decade for

White evangelicals, while the third shows stability.355 As for evangelicals as a whole (i.e. including African American and Hispanic evangelicals), the Gallup organization shows complete stability for American evangelicals for the past four decades (Newport 2018).356

To sum up, there is no doubt that what has distinguished America from Europe has been its evangelical community. The Canadian case study just further demonstrates that this community can achieve unusual levels of resilience even in far less favourable settings.

European countries have no such comparably sized evangelical community and hence their

Christian communities – essentially Catholics and Mainline Protestants – are fading much like their North American denominational peers.357 While it is unclear how newer non-Christian

355 I spoke at some length via text with political science professor Ryan Burge, a tremendous source on polling American religion and especially evangelicals. In short, the General Social Surveys and Pew Forum data sets both show some declines for White evangelicals while the Cooperative Congressional Election Study shows stability. Burge believes there is not clear evidence for decline at this point though he acknowledges it is a possibility (Burge 2020). In a long Twitter thread, the Pew Forum’s Associate Director of Research indicated that he does believe White evangelicals are declining (Smith 2018). Note these are only measures of White evangelicals. 356 Hispanic immigration is a key factor here. At risk of taking readers too deep into the details, I suspect the other element in America is income inequality and precarious living. Norris and Inglehart show quite conclusively that what they term “existential insecurity” is a key driver of religiosity. The high levels of income inequality in the United States and the lack of a social safety net (such as universal health care) are believed to foster greater insecurity (2011:107-110). If so, this factor may boost American numbers enough to prevent the erosion possibly beginning in Canada. In short, evangelical exceptionalism clearly exists but its sacred umbrellas are not impenetrable and can only offset so many factors. 357 Evangelicals are far less numerous in Europe. Exact numbers are hard to find but a 2007 study counted evangelicals as 3% of the United Kingdom’s population (Ashworth and Farthing 2007). Renowned sociologist Peter Berger claimed there were about 1.3MM evangelicals in Germany which works out to 1.6% (Berger 2015). A third source estimated evangelicals at less than 2% of the total European population as of 2009 (Voice of America 322 religious communities in Canada will fare, to date, evangelicals have been the most notable obstacle in resisting the tide of Western secularization.358

Lastly, survival requires not just numerical retention but also retaining distinctiveness, which raises the question of orthodoxy. Even if evangelicals have generally maintained their numbers, is orthodoxy weakening, thus eroding distinctiveness which may cause numerical decline once a decisive level of cultural accommodation is reached?359 This study has shown

Canada's evangelicals often face marginalization due to the power of the state and the dominant liberal culture. Facing such challenges can create pressures to compromise in order to be accepted, to be heard, or to seem relevant enough to keep one’s children in the faith despite the pull of cultural trends. I have described evangelicals' mutedness, their need to create a secular looking organization like the IMFC to be heard, and the “colonizing of their lifeworld” through legislation, mass media, and the liberal education of their own children in public schools (Fields 1991). Are these factors weakening the tradition as Bruce alleges, or can evangelicals harmlessly adapt, incorporate some elements, and smoothly evolve as Smith posits?

2009), while an academic paper used statistics from the World Christian Database that suggested 4% of Europeans, including Russians, were evangelical as of 2005 (Kaufmann, n.d.). All these sources show evangelicals as a small part of the landscape. Interestingly, most of them also emphasized evangelicals’ strong growth, including citing academics supporting this observation. If true, this would further substantiate that evangelicalism has been a unique force in withstanding Western secularization since the 1960s and that the denomination matters more than national culture. 358 The other Christian denomination that gives evidence of showing a similar resilience is the Mormons but they are much smaller and therefore have far less impact on the national portrait. Among the non-Christian communities which are a growing presence in Canada, research to date suggests that immigrants, and especially the second generation, tend to adopt levels of religiosity similar to other Canadians with the exception of Muslims, who show greater levels of adherence (Beyer 2013; Environics Institute 2016; Reimer and Hiemstra 2018). 359 Liberal Protestant churches went from strength to decline almost overnight from the 1950s to the 1960s. From 1951 to 1961, the combined data for the United and Anglican churches, by far Canada’s two largest denominations at the time, showed membership growth of 24%. But by 1971, the two denominations experienced a cumulative decline of 12%, most of it in the latter half of the decade (Bibby 2002:11,22). This 12% decline is even more dramatic for having occurred in a period where the national population rose by 20%. 323

As some of Canada’s most prominent evangelical voices, the lobbies provide an interesting test case. Smith rightly insists we closely evaluate whether changes indicate assimilation or evolution, and here the lobbies provide useful material. Some of the lobbies' adaptations to, or alignments with, Canadian culture are surely neutral to Christian commitment. Other factors are less clear. Recall the EFC learned to omit or mask religious justifications in their public documents, while their leaders, Clemenger and Hutchinson, even mimicked Rawls in stating secular discourse is required for public law-making (Haskell

2011:314). Might this weaken traditional biblical reliance? I am inclined to believe this is not pivotal. Although it does reinforce secular sources of authority and may weaken specific teachings that directly counter such secular forms of knowledge (such as young earth creationism), such pruning and sprouting of teachings falls within Smith’s evolution framework.

A second threat is the EFC’s ever increasing interfaith cooperation owing to the political benefits of aligning with minority religions.360 This practice is not shared by the EFC's American counterpart, the NAE, but forced by Canadian evangelicals’ numerical weakness and by the national ideology around diversity. President Bruce Clemenger acknowledges this engagement has changed his perception of these groups and I have witnessed EFC leaders develop strong personal ties to leaders of other religious communities (2008d).361 The longer term impact of these efforts is unclear – perhaps engaging with other faith communities will not affect

360 By “minority religions,” I mean non-Christian communities such as Muslims, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus, etc. These communities, by virtue of often having many immigrants and many non-White members, fit into liberals’ image of a Canada that values diversity and welcomes newcomers. Jewish communities are mostly White and have fewer immigrants but their history of suffering persecution still means that ensuring an inclusive environment for Jews fits the liberal notion of what Canada should be about. For evangelicals, aligning with these communities can yield some of the credibility benefits of speaking as part of a diverse coalition. 361 I have witnessed this at interfaith events and organizations including the Canadian Interfaith Conversation and the organizing of the 2018 Parliament of World Religions in Toronto. 324 orthodox beliefs but such practices could, over time, weaken conviction around doctrines on the exclusivity of Christian salvation. Finally, there is one example where orthodoxy has demonstrably weakened: homosexuality. The EFC has displayed softening attitudes on this subject since the 1980s and yet polling data suggests the lobby likely trails the growing acceptance of homosexuality amongst evangelical youth.362 This is a startling change since the

Bible seems to clearly condemn homosexuality and, until recently, the issue served as a very firm boundary marker between evangelicals and most non-evangelicals. Today, LGBTQ issues are not so much a dividing line with liberal Canada but are instead the site of an ongoing intra- communal debate between evangelicals themselves.

This rapid shift on homosexuality shows evangelicals cannot elude the power of liberal society. Tellingly, this shift happened on an issue where state power has been especially intense. On abortion, state actions removed prohibitions and made abortion legal but there was no corresponding effort to change individuals' personal feelings about abortion. One can still oppose abortion; the state merely ensures others can disagree and act accordingly.363 But on homosexuality, the state is more ambitious, not only eliminating restrictions but trying to change individuals’ attitudes. This includes amending foundational social institutions, such as

362 I have not found data on how Canadian evangelical youth view same sex marriage. However, a 2018 study of American evangelicals, found that 53% – a majority – of those aged 18-29 favoured same sex marriage compared to just 25% of American evangelicals over age 65 (Vandermaas-Peeler et al 2018). The study also showed that American evangelical views were shifting rapidly as the overall community’s opposition to same sex marriage had dropped 13 points in just four years, going from 71 per cent in 2013 to 58 per cent by 2017. Given that same sex marriage came to Canada a decade earlier and that Canadian evangelicals tend to be more politically liberal than American evangelicals, including in their overall views of LGBTQs, it is highly probable that a majority of Canadian evangelical youth also support same-sex marriage (Reimer 2003, 2011). With respect to the EFC’s softening stance on homosexuality that I reference above, I outlined the components of this stance in chapter four as including: replacing condemnatory language with a more moderate tone; accepting the validity of legal benefits for same- sex couples; and shifting from opposition to neutrality on same-sex civil unions. 363 This may be starting to change as evidenced by the Liberal government denying Canada Summer Jobs grants to organizations that would not declare their support for abortion rights. 325 the redefinition of marriage, and ensuring alignment in the public sphere, most notably in workplace environments. The altering of the education system to reform views and even emotional responses towards LGBTQs is doubtless the most direct and potent example of the state trying to form the very instinctual reactions of its citizens.364 Although the state grants selected legal exemptions for religion – a religious community can denounce homosexuality and discriminate when hiring for a house of worship365 – the state clearly aims, particularly through the education system, to shift views towards acceptance and inclusion. On LGBTQ rights the state seeks changed subjects and, in the evangelical community, these efforts appear to be working.

As evangelical orthodoxy on homosexuality softens, does this threaten the faith? I think this shift is serious, diminishing a previously significant and potent evangelical boundary. That said, I think evangelicalism can weather the loss. Defining evangelicalism is a fraught exercise, but a common method cited in the introduction emphasizes a personal relationship with Jesus, a focus on the Cross, an activist faith, and a commitment to the Bible. Of these elements, accepting homosexuality may only have tension with the last and, additionally, we have seen that biblical adherence can be malleable in application (see chapter 5). Biblical devotion can be largely declarative (i.e. claiming loyalty to the text366) and even regular Bible readers have wide latitude in choosing what to read, what to emphasize, and how to interpret. Since the

364 Of course, private actors also play a vital role by taking up advocacy or by LGBTQs coming out to loved ones. My point is merely that changes in work environments and school curriculum are powerful in establishing new moral norms. 365 Even religious organizations may not always be able to exclude active homosexuals. Recall the Christian Horizons case where the court ruled the Christian charity (which provides care to the disabled) could not enforce its behavioural code by firing an employee who entered a lesbian relationship. 366 Brian Malley, for example, argues biblical literalism operates mostly to signify identity (2004). Not all evangelicals are literalists but in the same way, claiming biblical adherence can be more about establishing membership in a community and its particular filtering of the Bible than about careful tracing of biblical teachings. 326 nineteenth century, for example, American evangelicals ceased supporting slavery despite significant biblical support, but no one today sees this as rejecting the Bible.367 Indeed, some evangelicals already claim biblical passages purportedly condemning homosexuality have been misunderstood, thus realigning the Bible with new and more liberal ethical stances. Other elements of evangelical identity, such as the personal relationship with Jesus, can accommodate new interpretations of what Jesus wants. Smith is surely right that evangelical identity requires that the community see a moral distinction between itself and the broader culture, and as opposition to homosexuality weakens, one moral barrier is certainly being lost; but many others remain that tap into the underlying distinctions I highlighted in chapter five on ontology, ethics and anthropology – most notably, abortion.368 Today's Canadian evangelical leaders are watching their tradition change, which may feel catastrophic to the most vigilant of the lobbyists (e.g. CFAC). Just as evangelical leaders from the 1960s might be dismayed that today’s evangelicals broadly accept women's full time employment, or at the prevalence of evangelical divorces, today's leaders may despair as members of their community, especially among the younger cohorts, develop views on homosexuality they find aberrant. As Smith indicates, religion always changes and, given liberalism’s strength, evangelicals in Canada and elsewhere in the West cannot help but be affected. But at least for the foreseeable future, Canadian evangelicalism will surely maintain its existence – aided by

367 Anthropologists studying conservative Protestant Bible reading practices note how readers "harmonize...discrepancies" (Harding 2000:88) and use "textual ideologies" (Bielo 2004:54) that deflect any challenges to the text. All of this grants considerable flexibility to the meaning of being a Bible follower. 368 Recall that young evangelicals strongly oppose abortion and that the issue lines up well with evangelical ontology, ethics and anthropology. Pew Forum’s 2014 data showed that 66% of evangelicals between 18 and 29 years old believed abortion should be illegal in all or most cases. That number was 2-3% higher than for the three older cohorts, showing that young evangelicals are at least as firmly pro-life as their older peers (Pew Forum 2015). 327 immigration – and continue to cultivate personal relationships with Christ while advocating for different moral views on everything from pre-marital sex to pornography and abortion.

In sum, Canada’s evangelical community has impacted Canadian politics and continues to shape the Conservative Party’s policy stances. On the most contentious family values issues, however, the lobbies have not withstood the liberal tide and those most unwilling to adapt may soon be swept away. They have contributed – and will continue to contribute – to evangelicals’ identity as a counter-public defined by distinctions in ontology, ethics and anthropology. These distinctions still allow latitude and it is clear Canada’s evangelicals are absorbing powerful cultural influences, especially on same-sex marriage and the pervasive

Canadian commitment to pluralism. The key question is whether Canada’s evangelicals can resist liberal sovereignty over their very selves. The answer for the community is disturbingly uncertain. Some evangelicals will surely leave and the community overall will indeed likely experience a liberal drift. At the same time, the continuing strong cultural institutions, aided by immigration, may allow Canada’s evangelicals to continue to impact Canadian politics and provide a counter-public with a noticeably diverse voice within the pluralist nation.

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