1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Email: [email protected] Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports Study on a Possible Israeli Strike on Iran’s Nuclear Development Facilities Abdullah Toukan, Senior Associate Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy March 14, 2009 Page Introduction 3 Israeli Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles 5 Iran Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles Program 19 • Timeline when Iran produces it’s first Nuclear Weapon 26 • Options to deal with Iran’s Nuclear Program within the Time Frame 33 Iran Nuclear Targets 34 • Mission Planning Payloads 37 • Israeli Strike Force Required 45 • Iran Missile Sites 46 Israeli Air Force: Aircraft Mission Capabilities 51 Scenario I: Israeli Air Force Strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities and Ballistic Missile Sites 59 • Strike Mission Route Profile 69 • Mission Force Allocation 70 • Mission Analysis 71 Scenario II: An Israeli Ballistic Missile Attack against Iranian Nuclear Facilities 72 Iranian Ground and Airborne Defense Means against an Israeli Strike 76 • Iran Ground Based Air Defense Systems 79 The Environmental Damages of an Israeli Attack on the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. 89 Israeli Air Defense and Ballistic Missile Defense System Vs An Iranian Retaliatory Ballistic Missile Attack using the Shehab -3 93 Military and Political Consequences of an Israeli Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Facilities 99 • Suggested Steps Towards Iran 102 Appendix 104 2 Introduction: • It is always difficult to evaluate a nuclear weapons program without access to concrete intelligence information. This study is based on open sources and we do not claim to be one hundred percent accurate and complete. The aim of the study is to try and get some insight into the level the Iranian Nuclear Program has progressed, and if the intent of the leadership is to produce nuclear weapons then what would the possible timeline be. •Based on these estimates the study then addresses the possibility of an Israeli strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities, with the objective of either destroying the program or delaying it for some years. The success of the Strike Mission will be measured by how much of the Enrichment program it has destroyed, or the number of years it has delayed Iranian acquisition of enough Uranium, or Plutonium produced from the Arak reactor, to build a nuclear bomb. •It is not known whether Iran has some secret facilities where it is conducting uranium enrichment and a nuclear weapons program. So far no concrete intelligence information points to this being likely. However, this study refers back to the vast literature on Iran‘s nuclear program, and on some interviews of the Iranian leadership, such as the VOA of August 29, 2008 ―Iran claims to have 4,000 working nuclear centrifuges‖ and the April 8, 2008, (Time on Line), ―Iran: now we have 6,000 nuclear centrifuges‖, and ―Iran‘s Nuclear Chief Explains Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Comments on US Concerns‖. (Source: Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network C2 in Persian-state run television) •This study does not claim that if Iran might have accumulated over 1000 kg of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), which is sufficient to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), that it has done so, and now possess nuclear weapons. •The Israeli time frame as to when Iran will have a Nuclear Weapon is between 2009 and 2012, whereas the U.S. time frame is after 2013. Israel states that Iran should not be allowed to obtain any nuclear capabilities that could eventually allow it to produce nuclear weapons. Israel views Iran as an Existential Threat and must be dealt with in the immediate future. • New US policy, under Obama Administration, is to leave all options on the table, and presently favors diplomacy against any military strikes. Containment could be the future course of U.S. Policy if Diplomatic Engagement does not work, and after all other options have been exhausted. 3 •A military strike by Israel against Iranian Nuclear Facilities is possible and the optimum route would be along the Syrian-Turkish border then over a small portion of Iraq then into Iran, and back the same route. However, the number of aircraft required, refueling along the way and getting to the targets without being detected or intercepted would be complex and high risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate. With regard to the Arab States, they have become extremely frustrated with the U.S. and the West double standard when addressing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. Most probably they will not condone any attack on Iran under the pretext that Iran poses an existential threat to Israel and a security threat to the whole region, whilst Israel has some 200 to 300 nuclear weapons, and the delivery means using the Jericho missiles, in addition to Israel still occupying the West Bank and the Syrian Golan Heights. • The more there is an Israeli threat to the survival of the regime in Iran, the more Iran will be determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Iran would withdraw from the NPT based on the argument that it needs to acquire nuclear weapons to protect its sovereignty and any further aggression by Israel and the U.S. • A strike by Israel on Iran will give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism. • Iran should be engaged directly by the U.S. with an agenda open to all areas of military and non-military issues that both are in agreement or disagreement. Any realistic resolution to the Iranian nuclear program will require an approach that encompasses Military, Economic, Political interests and differences of the U.S vs Iran. • The U.S. will have to try to make Comprehensive Verification of Iran‘s Nuclear Development Program as one of the priorities in any diplomatic dialogue, while trying at the same time to persuade Iran to stop its enrichment program. However, in this area the U.S. will have to walk and negotiate along a very fine line between Israel‘s WMD and Ballistic Missiles capabilities and the Iranian Nuclear development program. The U.S. must recognize that both are very closely inter-related and are fueling each other. So the U.S. should be prepared to address both issues simultaneously while trying not to be perceived as though it has double standards when it comes to Israel. 4 Israeli Nuclear and Ballistic Missiles Weapons 5 . Israel‘s National Security Doctrine: This is based on the perception that Arab countries are determined to destroy Israel; that Israel has no reliable international allies and must take care of itself; there is an asymmetrical balance of resources versus the Arab Countries in Demography, Geography, Economic Resources, Structure of Armed Forces in terms of man power. Israel‘s Operational Military Doctrine: That Israel must have the capability to deter any possible Arab attack, and if deterrence fails then Israel must strive for an early war termination if war breaks out. That any war with the Arab countries would have to be short and decisive. That the war must quickly be carried into and fought on Arab territory giving rise to a rapid offensive and high degree of mobility to sustain continuous forward movement. Israel‘s Nuclear Policy: A nuclear capability is needed to deter threats to Israel‘s existence. The possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by any Arab or non-Arab Muslim State in the region is considered as a direct existential threat to Israel. Israel should prevent all States in the Middle East Region from developing a nuclear program that it sees as a threat, or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel has deliberately maintained a nuclear policy ambiguity about it‘s own nuclear weapons program. The purpose of the nuclear ambiguity policy was based on the belief that it had introduced an effective ―deterrence through uncertainty‖. Arab states were never sure that Israel would use a nuclear weapon in retaliation to it‘s survival in the event of a major war, or if any of the Arab states try to acquire a nuclear capability. Israel‘s nuclear ambiguity policy has been stated by a number of Israeli leaders in such statements as: ― Israel will not be the first to use nuclear weapons‖ and ― Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East‖ • The Arab States‘ view is that such nuclear doctrines can never be considered binding in case of war. • Israel has never officially admitted that it possesses Nuclear Weapons, and is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many see the present status of Israel as an ―Undeclared Nuclear Weapon State‖, at the same time it has become to be recognized as possessing a very sophisticated arsenal of nuclear weapons. 6 Israel: Nuclear Facilities Yodefat: Eilabun: Possible assembly and Possible Storage Facility dismantling Haifa: Rafael-Israel Armament Development Authority. Reported Nuclear Dimona Design and Assembly. Negar Nuclear Research Center (KAMAG): Houses a Reactor, Soreq: Enrichment and Nahal Soreq Nuclear Reprocessing Facilities. Research Center (MAMAG) 5 MW safeguarded pool type reactor; possible Mishor Rotern: weapon design and Negar Phosphates Research Facility. Chemical Company. Uranium Mining from Phosphate Deposits. Tirosh: Possible Storage Facility (Source: Anthony Cordesman. Israeli Weapons 7 of Mass Destruction‖ CSIS June 2, 2008) • Uranium exploration began in Negev as early as 1949; Israeli Atomic Energy Commission began to discuss nuclear option in 1952. Cooperation with France in nuclear reactor design and technology began in 1950s. French-Israeli construction of a reactor in Dimona – whose actual capacity was much larger than its announced capacity, began in 1957.