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Iraq: Security Update IRAQ: SECURITY UPDATE Cordesman Discusses June 3-12 Visit to Iraq; Security, Force Development June 24, 2005 The Center for Strategic and International Studies Anthony Cordesman CSIS Arleigh Burke Chair in Strategy Moderator: Patrick Cronin CSIS Director of Studies Patrick Cronin: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. My name is Patrick Cronin. I'm the Director of Studies here at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. We're in a relatively small space this morning and I hope people will be able to find room, and I know they're setting up some more chairs. This meeting is obviously on the record. It's meant to be an opportunity to hear an updated assessment on the security situation in Iraq from one of the foremost experts not just on Iraq but somebody who has spent decades understanding U.S. military and security policy, Middle East policy, and who has now just returned from yet another important field trip where he's been able to talk to combat commanders in the field; he's been able to talk to soldiers, to Iraqis, and get a fresh, first-hand update. We are all eager to hear this assessment from Dr. Anthony Cordesman who is our Arleigh Burke Chair for Strategy. He's held many senior positions inside the government in Defense and Energy and he is a man who's written prolifically on some of these issues. His latest report is maybe in draft form, but it has I think been distributed this morning, an update on the evolving insurgency in Iraq. So without further ado it's a great pleasure to introduce Tony Cordesman. Anthony Cordesman: Thank you very much Patrick, and ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for coming. What I'd like to do is make some brief remarks about Iraq and open things up to your questions. I also during this trip had to deal with a number of energy problems and with issues relating to Iranian proliferation, so if you wish to expand the range of questions afterwards, I'm happy to do so, but the real focus that I would like to have this morning is on Iraq. Let me begin with the fact that we face as a nation an extraordinarily difficult set of choices. The real issue is in a war where there are very high risks of failure, is it worth going on? Is it worth staying the course and paying the costs of what it will take to at least have a reasonable chance at success? I have been going to Iraq since 1971. I have been going to the Middle East since the early '60s. My personal answer would be yes. In human terms we are talking about some 27 million people, and they have suffered under one repressive regime after another since at least the fall of the monarchy. They are a people who saw Saddam Hussein basically bankrupt -- investment in the civil side of the Iraqi society in 1983 -- long before the Gulf War and long before sanctions; and who have suffered from repression and from an economic crisis ever since. The fact is that whatever we might or might not have done, we did it, and in the course we unleashed forces in Iraq which have been suppressed since the Ottoman Empire. There were ethnic and sectarian differences in the country that could tear it apart when I first visited Iraq in 1971. I know there are many Iraqis who sincerely believe that these differences were minor, but frankly, to an outside observer they were apparent within a matter of days of visiting the country. Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, a war that tended to push Iraqis together, no one could go into the field without seeing the discrimination against Kurds and Shiites in Iraqi military units, even at a time when the government was seeking to preserve unity. That discrimination was far, far more apparent in the field in Shiite areas and certainly in Kurdish areas. Once we broke the system, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia, we created the structure that could lead to civil war, and that civil war would be bloody, costly and prevent progress. We imposed a war without planning stability operations and we were slow to make them work and we were much slower to make them effective. Many of Iraq's failures are the result of our strategic failure to go from effective war planning to having any meaningful plan for nationbuilding once Saddam fell, and with that comes moral and ethical responsibility. If you visit Iraq today, while there are many areas, many provinces where there is considerable stability, at least ten, and in four more the level of insurgency is limited, the fact is that there is crime and insecurity on both a personal and economic level throughout all of Iraq, and much of that is a result of our actions. And if you can ignore these factors, let me also remind you that Iraq is centered in an area with 60 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 40 percent of its gas, and in very narrow, selfish strategic terms, what happens in Iraq will affect the global economy, our economy, and every job in this country for years to come. More than that, there is the real issue of what is going to happen in a region if we see this devolve into a conflict between Sunni and Shiite, if we see effectively Islamists extremists appear to have defeated the United States in Iraq. And any sudden withdrawal could, in fact must have that impact. It will be seen as a major victory for precisely the kind of extremism which has caused a clash within a civilization and one which is probably far more dangerous than fantasies of clashes between civilizations. Having said that, I do not want to minimize the risks. People in Iraq, whether they are Americans or Iraqis, do not talk about the certainty of victory. No one talks about the insurgency being over, being defeated, or in some period of crisis. I did not meet any American, any other member of the Coalition or any member of the Iraqi government which did not see this insurgency as going on for at least two to three more years, and probably in some form lasting much longer. The fact is that this is a country with no proven political experience, whose leaders are learning on the job to be politicians, to govern, to deal with the divisions in their society. Iraq is five to ten years of instability, regardless of the military outcome. It is a country which will require some $5 to $7 billion dollars in U.S. expenditures per month for at least several more years. In the best possible case thousands more Americans and Coalition partners are going to be killed and wounded, and tens of thousands of Iraqis. And if you ask me to assign odds I would say 50/50 under the best circumstances, simply because none of us have any basis for assigning odds. No one is an expert on Iraq. It is changing far too quickly for the people there, for Iraqis to say that they can predict the future. But I did see real progress, and that is one of the messages that I would really give this morning. Part of that was progress at the political level. I found Iraq's new political leaders to be generally very impressive, more capable than their predecessors in critical areas like the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, addressing the issues they need to face and understanding the need to be inclusive and the very real risk of civil conflict. In visiting Iraqi military, security and police units I saw the core of a structure which over a year or a year and a half can become effective, can achieve very serious mission capabilities, and while it will probably not eliminate the need for coalition support in that time, could given full support and time, allow steady and significant reductions in our presence. I saw also, however, two other problems. I did not see progress in aid and I did not see progress in economics. This has tended to be the forgotten dimension of the war in Iraq. But the fact is that while there were many people in individual project areas in Iraq making a truly major contribution and often at considerable personal risk, I saw no picture that the United States has a meaningful plan for using the aid money it is providing in Iraq, that the system has improved or become more efficient, that it has become more secure and less corrupt, and that we have any idea of what as a nation we are doing to solve the economic and security problems of Iraqis. Furthermore, in talking to Iraqis, again and again I was struck by the fact that the kind of messages we give as a nation have never addressed the fundamental issue of whether we really are going to leave Iraq. The conspiracy theories about taking Iraqi oil or dominating the Iraqi economy; the conspiracy theories about American bases. We have said many things about Iraq, but they have largely been addressed to American audiences, not to Iraqis. We have not as a nation, and the President has not as a leader, addressed the concerns that the Iraqi people have and that divide Iraqis and Americans and still lead to so many concerns. Let me make just a few further points about each of these areas.
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