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Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1 269/2014

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Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1 269/2014 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 1 269/2014... Document Generated: 2020-12-14 Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072, ANNEX. (See end of Document for details) ANNEX List of entities referred to in Article 1: Name Identifying Reasons Date of Listing information ‘42. AO “Institute Address: AO “Institute 31.7.2018 Giprostroymost —7 Yablochkova Giprostroymost — Saint- street, Saint- Petersburg” St. Petersburg, Petersburg” АО Институт 197198 Russia participated in Гипростроймост Website: http:// the construction – Санкт- gpsm.ru of the Kerch Петербург Email: Bridge through [email protected] its design of the Bridge, connecting Russia to the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula. Therefore it is supporting the consolidation of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, which in turn further undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 43. PJSC Mostotrest Address: PJSC Mostotrest 31.7.2018 ПАО 6 Barklaya actively Мостотрест street, participated in Bld. 5 Moscow, the construction 121087 Russia of the Kerch Bridge through its state contract for the maintenance of the bridge, connecting Russia to the illegally annexed Crimean 2 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014... Document Generated: 2020-12-14 Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072, ANNEX. (See end of Document for details) peninsula. Furthermore it is owned by an individual (Arkady Rotenberg) that is already designated for his actions undermining Ukrainian sovereignty (person No 92 in this Annex). Therefore the company is supporting the consolidation of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, which in turn further undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 44. JSC Zaliv Address: JSC Zaliv 31.7.2018 Shipyard 4 Tankistov Shipyard Судостроительныstreet,й actively завод “Залив” 298310 Kerch, participated in Crimea the construction Website: http:// of new railway zalivkerch.com to the Kerch Bridge, connecting Russia to the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula. Therefore it is supporting the consolidation of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 3 269/2014... Document Generated: 2020-12-14 Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072, ANNEX. (See end of Document for details) the Russian Federation, which in turn further undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 45. Stroygazmontazh Address: Stroygazmontazh 31.7.2018 Corporation Prospect Corporation (SGM Group) Vernadskogo 53 (SGM Group) ООО Moscow, actively Стройгазмонтаж 119415 Russia participated in (груп СГМ) Website: the construction www.ooosgm.comof the Kerch Bridge through its state contract for the construction of the bridge connecting Russia to the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula. Furthermore it is owned by an individual (Arkady Rotenberg) that is already designated for his actions undermining Ukrainian sovereignty (person No 92 in this Annex). Therefore the company is supporting the consolidation of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, which in turn further 4 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014... Document Generated: 2020-12-14 Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072, ANNEX. (See end of Document for details) undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 46. Stroygazmontazh Address: Stroygazmontazh 31.7.2018 Most OOO Barklaya street Most OOO is OOO 6, building 7 a subsidiary of Стройгазмонтаж-Moscow, lead contractor Мост 121087 Russia Stroygazmontazh Registration ID: that manages 1157746088170 the construction Tax ID No: project of the 7730018980 bridge over the Website: http:// Kerch Strait. kerch-most.ru/ Furthermore tag/sgam-most it is owned by Email: kerch- an individual [email protected] (Arkady Rotenberg) that is already designated for his actions undermining Ukrainian sovereignty (person No 92 in this Annex). Therefore the company is supporting the consolidation of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, which in turn further undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 47. CJSC VAD Address: CJSC VAD 31.7.2018’ AKTSIONERNOE133 is the main OBSHCHESTVO Chernyshevskogo contractor for VAD street, Vologda, the construction АО «ВАД» Vologodskaya of the Tavrida Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 5 269/2014... Document Generated: 2020-12-14 Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072, ANNEX. (See end of Document for details) Oblast, 160019 Highway in Russia Crimea, the 122, road over the Grazhdanskiy Kerch Bridge Prospect, suite and the access 5, Liter A, St. roads to it. Petersburg, Tavrida Highway 195267 Russia will provide Registration ID: transportation 1037804006811 access to Crimea (Russia) through a Tax ID No: system of newly 7802059185 constructed Website: roadways www.zaovad.com that serve as Email: a primary [email protected] to the Kerch Bridge. Therefore CJSC VAD is supporting the consolidation of the illegally annexed Crimean peninsula into the Russian Federation, which in turn further undermines the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. 6 Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072 of 30 July 2018 implementing Regulation (EU) No 269/2014... Document Generated: 2020-12-14 Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1072, ANNEX..
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