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Country of Origin Information Report Iran COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAN 26 JANUARY 2010 UK Border Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE 26 JANUARY 2010 IRAN Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN IRAN FROM 9 DECEMBER 2009 TO 26 JANUARY 2010 REPORTS ON IRAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 9 DECEMBER 2009 AND 26 JANUARY 2010 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ....................................................................................... 1.01 Maps ............................................................................................ 1.04 Iran........................................................................................... 1.04 Tehran ..................................................................................... 1.05 Calendar ...................................................................................... 1.06 Public holidays ........................................................................... 1.07 2. ECONOMY ........................................................................................... 2.01 3. HISTORY ............................................................................................. 3.01 Pre 1979....................................................................................... 3.01 From 1979 to 1999 ...................................................................... 3.04 From 2000 to 2008 ...................................................................... 3.10 Student unrest.......................................................................... 3.15 Parliamentary elections – February 2004 ................................. 3.28 Presidential elections – June 2005........................................... 3.30 Assembly of Experts, local and parliamentary elections – 2006 3.36 Parliamentary elections – 2008 ................................................ 3.38 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (J ANUARY TO NOVEMBER 2009)..................... 4.01 Nuclear programme and international diplomacy .................... 4.01 Presidential election – 12 June 2009......................................... 4.04 Demonstrations and aftermath of the election ........................ 4.11 Detention of British Embassy Staff ........................................... 4.24 5. CONSTITUTION .................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM .............................................................................. 6.01 Political parties ........................................................................... 6.04 Human Rights 7. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 7.01 8. CRIME ................................................................................................. 8.01 Illegal drugs situation................................................................. 8.01 Arazel va obash .......................................................................... 8.07 9. SECURITY FORCES ............................................................................... 9.01 Overview ..................................................................................... 9.01 Law Enforcement Forces (including the police)....................... 9.06 Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (‘Pasdaran’) ................... 9.08 Qods / Quds Force................................................................... 9.15 Basij......................................................................................... 9.18 Ansar-e Hezbollah.................................................................... 9.20 Armed forces .............................................................................. 9.23 ii The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 8 December 2009. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 26 January 2010 26 JANUARY 2010 IRAN Other organisations.................................................................... 9.25 Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and Vezarat-e Ettela’at va Aminat-e Keshvar (VEVAK) aka Ettela’at ........ 9.25 Human rights violations by the security forces........................ 9.27 Arbitrary arrest and detention................................................... 9.27 Torture ..................................................................................... 9.32 Extra judicial killings ................................................................. 9.40 10. MILITARY SERVICE ............................................................................. 10.01 11. JUDICIARY ......................................................................................... 11.01 Organisation ............................................................................... 11.01 Complaints............................................................................... 11.10 Independence ............................................................................. 11.11 Fair trial ....................................................................................... 11.18 Trial in absentia........................................................................ 11.22 Bail........................................................................................... 11.24 Enforcement of Judgements..................................................... 11.25 Penal code................................................................................... 11.26 Qisas (retribution)..................................................................... 11.33 Knowledge of the judge............................................................ 11.35 Court documentation.................................................................. 11.40 Summonses............................................................................. 11.40 Arrest warrants......................................................................... 11.47 Reporting ................................................................................. 11.51 Amputation.................................................................................. 11.52 12. ARREST AND DETENTION – LEGAL RIGHTS ........................................... 12.01 13. PRISON CONDITIONS .......................................................................... 13.01 14. DEATH PENALTY ................................................................................ 14.01 Stoning ........................................................................................ 14.17 15. POLITICAL AFFILIATION ...................................................................... 15.01 Freedom of political expression ................................................ 15.01 Presidential elections of June 2009.......................................... 15.04 Political dissidents outside Iran ............................................... 15.09 Political prisoners..................................................................... 15.12 Freedom of association and assembly ..................................... 15.14 Opposition groups and political activists................................. 15.20 Mojahedin-e Khalq Organisation (MEK/MKO) or People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) .................................... 15.21 Rastakhiz Party and Monarchists ............................................. 15.30 Savak....................................................................................... 15.35 Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI, also DPIK) ................ 15.36 Komala..................................................................................... 15.41 Partiya Jiyana Azada Kurdistan (PJAK) - Kurdistan Free Life Party.................................................................................. 15.46 16. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEDIA ....................................................... 16.01 Print media.................................................................................. 16.08 TV/radio ....................................................................................... 16.10 Internet ........................................................................................ 16.12 Academic freedom...................................................................... 16.18 Treatment of journalists ............................................................. 16.19 Treatment of bloggers .............................................................. 16.28 17. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS , ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVISTS ............ 17.01 18. CORRUPTION ..................................................................................... 18.01 19. FREEDOM OF RELIGION ...................................................................... 19.01 Overview ..................................................................................... 19.01 Religious demography.............................................................. 19.09 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 8 December 2009. iii Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 26 January 2010 26 JANUARY 2010 IRAN Legal framework ......................................................................... 19.10 Apostasy (conversion from Islam) ............................................ 19.13 Law on apostasy ...................................................................... 19.16 Prosecution of apostates.........................................................
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