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Fduimun 2012 FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012 fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet FUTUREfduimun JOINT First Update 2012 CRISIS CABINETS IRAN CABINET SPECIALSYSTEM fduimun BE THE CHANGE. 2012 fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012 WHAT’S INSIDE A. Licensing B. Welcome Letter from the Director C. Welcome Letter from the Cabinet D. Joint Crisis Cabinets: What, why and how E. The Story: Iranian Nuclear Crisis F. Iranian Nuclear Developments G. Diplomatic Concerns H. National Security and Military I. Extended Readings J. Role Application K. Assignments L. Cabinet: Rules and Procedure M. Bibliography fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012 A Licensing FDUIMUN takes intellectual property protection very seriously. Before you continue read- ing, please review FDUIMUN’s licensing agreement and copyright notice below. I License This conference update, either in PDF or in print, was created for Fudan University In- ternational Model United Nations 2012 and the editorial contents herein remain the intellectual property of FDUIMUN. Delegates and their advisers may reproduce them, in whole or in part, in limited quantities for conference preparation use only but may not mass distribute the materials, electronically or otherwise for any purpose whatsoever. This permission does not apply to any third-party copyrights contained herein. These ma- terials and any copies made of them may not be resold, and the copyright notices must be retained as they appear here. II Disclaimer 1. Certain links are provided in this update that may lead to Web sites maintained by third parties over which we have no control. FDUIMUN takes no responsibility for the accuracy, content, or any aspect of that material. 2. All third party materials in this update do not necessarily represent the views, opinions or statements of FDUIMUN. In other words, FDUIMUN is merely a distributor, not a pub- lisher of such content and does not exercise editorial control of such contents. III More information If you have any further questions regarding this licensing information, please email [email protected] for more support. fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012 2012年复旦大学国际中学生模拟联合国大会 Fudan University International Model United Nations 2012 学术委员会 Board of Directors 委员长 Director-General 学术指导 Director 常安 Chang An【综合】 肖千里 Xiao Qianli【联动危机内阁】 Emory University Bates College 原 华中师范大学第一附属中学Gavel模拟 华师一附中Gavel模拟联合国协会创始人 联合国协会主席 [email protected] [email protected] 学术指导 Director 副委员长 Vice Director-General 魏强 Wei Qiang【独立会场】 陈天娇 Chen Tianjiao【综合、独立会场】 北京大学 New York University 原 厦门外国语学校模拟联合国协会主席 原 哈尔滨市第三中学模拟联合国协会主 [email protected][email protected] 学术指导 Director 潘天一 Pan Tianyi【独立会场】 副委员长 Vice Director-General Yale University 刘诗尧 Liu Shiyao【综合、联合国系统】 原 复旦大学附属中学模拟联合国社主席 北京大学 [email protected] [email protected] 学术指导 Director 学术指导 Director 郑羽桐 Zheng Yutong【联合国系统】 杨思羽 Yang Siyu【联合国系统】 University of Virginia Cornell University 北京一零一中学模拟联合国社团社长 原 太原市第五中学模拟联合国协会主席 [email protected] [email protected] fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012 B Welcome Letter from the Director Dear delegates, Welcome to the Future Joint Crisis Cabinets at FDUIMUN 2012. My name is Qianli Xiao and I will be assuming the academic director of this year’s FJCC. In 2012, the Joint-crisis system decides to shift its focus to the imminent future and plot the story in one of the most war-prone zones in the world: The Middle East. The Future Joint Crisis Cabinets will operate under “Future Security Council—Cabinets” model and divide delegates into five subcommittees: the Future Security Council, US Cabinet, Israel Cabinet, Iran Cabinet, and the Risk Management Corporation, a third party think-tank institute. The cabinets will focus mostly on evaluating current situation, prepare for military, designating domestic and foreign policies, and respond to various incidents and developments on the Iranian nuclear program. The Future Security Council, on the other hand, will operate as a diplomatic intermediary and respond to the development of the crisis. The Risk Management Corporation, a fictitious think-tank agency, will provide third-party intelligence service based on its “undisclosed yet genuine” information sources. The three-day, seven-session long conference endeavors to avoid the seemingly inevitable war- fare in the Middle East, and the ultimate goal of a successful conference shall witness the pres- ence of a peaceful agreement from all parties involved in the crisis. During the fast-paced and work-intensive conference, you are expected to deal with disputable information, make decisions with a mature political vision, and respond to ever-changing situation with poised and reason- able judgments. Finally, as the academic director of the Future Joint Crisis Cabinets, I would like to deliver my warmest welcome and gratitude to all of you for choosing FJCC at FDUIMUN 2012. Look forward to see you in Shanghai. Sincerely, 肖千里 Qianli “Robinson” Xiao Bates College ’13 Director--FJCC, FDUIMUN 2012 fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012 C Welcome Letter from the Cabinet Dear delegates, It’s our distinct pleasure to welcome you to the Iranian Cabinet at FDUIMUN 2012 FJCC. We ex- tend our greatest honor to be your dais in the coming sessions, in which you will be challenged on your wisdom, responsiveness, capability and cooperation. During the thrilling sessions of the Iranian nuclear crisis, you will, as well, enjoy the process of confrontation, negotiation, and pos- sibly concession. The dais will collaborate with all delegates to the common goal of achieving a feasible method to avoid the possible war on nuclear. Besides, your excellent skill of diplomacy is always highlighted, basing on a thorough understanding of the topic, given references and what can be collected apart from the given updates. FJCC indicates that more research and excellent role playing, especially when facing a sudden update of the crisis, are extremely necessary. In the conference, you’ll face considerable amount of known and unknown issues, reports from certain agencies, intelligence from seemingly cred- ible sources, spontaneous information from the Security Council, and so on. Your capability of processing information will be vital for any information given, be it domestic, regional, or interna- tional. A thorough preparation is vital for your success at this year’s FJCC. You are required to look into depth on the nuclear program of Iran, diplomatic concerns and military condition of the coun- try. We hope you can enjoy this conference and harvest friendship and academic skills in FDUI- MUN2012. Sincerely, 杨文玥 Wenyue “Christy” Yang 南京外国语学校, 清华大学 曹炀 Yang “Angie” Cao 上海外国语大学 阮中煊 Zhongxuan Ruan 华东师大二附中 Iran Cabinet—FJCC FDUIMUN 2012 fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012 Future Joint Crisis Cabinets--Iran Cabinet 主席团联系方式表 本联系表为方便各位代表直接联系对应主席团而提供。 若非直接联系特定成员,请通过本邮箱地址与我们交流: [email protected] 姓名 Name 学校 职位 性别 电话 电子邮箱地址 杨文玥 Wenyue Yang 清华大学 女 13776679804 [email protected] Chair 曹炀 Yang Cao 上海外国语大学 女 18817331854 [email protected] 阮中煊 Zhongxuan Ruan 华东师大二附中 Crisis Staff 男 13482575722 [email protected] fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012 D Joint Crisis Cabinets: What, Why and How Joint-Crisis Cabinets, often referred to as Preamble in Draft Resolutions or meditate JCC, is one of the unconventional commit- every time the tricky situation strikes— tees in Model United Nations, aiming at your enemy won’t wait. It is not only a chess simulating real-world experience through game: you make moves and your rival re- collaborations, conspiracies, and confron- act, but more than chess: If you fail to react tations within the system of cabinets. instantly, your rival can take another move. Why is JCC exciting? Conciseness You may have represented a country in reg- Your mind-set, your plan, your speech, ev- ular committee in UN or other governmen- erything has to be concise. Rather than tal organizations but ended up failing to sticking to the stringent and redundant fulfill your initial expectations only because provisional rules set by the United Nations, there was P5 vetoing in Security Council, the JCC allows for a higher degree of flex- IAEA unable to impose coercive actions ibility. No one would bother to dig out your on Iran, or simply a DR with seemingly- key points in a political propaganda like re- pleasing solutions but no-further feedback port in NPC. Get to the point; make your- anymore—these are all unimaginable in self understood by colleagues; and make JCC. Always present is your counter-parts decisions immediately with clear mind and in other cabinets ready to grab every pos- poised judgment. sible interest for his country at any time. In FDUIMUN09, Nikita Khrushchev and John Authenticity of Simulation F. Kennedy targeted hundreds of nuclear warheads at Moscow and Washington from Real-world politics is interest-oriented, bru- Turkey and Cuba; last year in FDUIMUN11, tal, and ruthless—an anarchy in its essence. Hitlers and Churchills dispatched forces to In peaceful times, there might arise notions the border, across English Channel, to take like soft power, idealism, harmonious coex- hold of every acre of land in Europe in the istence, but when it comes to national se- twilight of WWII. curity, as a leader of the country, you have to be realistic, both cautious to plan and What is JCC looking for? courageous to risk for the country. Efficiency Future Joint Crisis Cabinets: Background There is no time for you to waste on the This year’s Joint-Crisis Cabinet will be set fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012 in the near future of 2012’s fall when Ira- the cabinets. All five subcommittees in the nian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad FJCC carry their own distinctive goals and declared that Iran’s project of “civil use of benefits, and some of them might be at nuclear power” will be put into use in the odds with the overarching goal of main- near future while various sources confirm taining regional peace.
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