FJCC- Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet FUTUREfduimun JOINT First Update 2012 CRISIS CABINETS IRAN CABINET

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fduimun BE THE CHANGE. 2012 fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012

WHAT’S INSIDE

A. Licensing B. Welcome Letter from the Director C. Welcome Letter from the Cabinet D. Joint Crisis Cabinets: What, why and how E. The Story: Iranian Nuclear Crisis F. Iranian Nuclear Developments G. Diplomatic Concerns H. National Security and Military I. Extended Readings J. Role Application K. Assignments L. Cabinet: Rules and Procedure M. Bibliography

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012

A Licensing

FDUIMUN takes intellectual property protection very seriously. Before you continue read- ing, please review FDUIMUN’s licensing agreement and copyright notice below.

I License

This conference update, either in PDF or in print, was created for Fudan University In- ternational Model United Nations 2012 and the editorial contents herein remain the intellectual property of FDUIMUN. Delegates and their advisers may reproduce them, in whole or in part, in limited quantities for conference preparation use only but may not mass distribute the materials, electronically or otherwise for any purpose whatsoever.

This permission does not apply to any third-party copyrights contained herein. These ma- terials and any copies made of them may not be resold, and the copyright notices must be retained as they appear here.

II Disclaimer

1. Certain links are provided in this update that may lead to Web sites maintained by third parties over which we have no control. FDUIMUN takes no responsibility for the accuracy, content, or any aspect of that material.

2. All third party materials in this update do not necessarily represent the views, opinions or statements of FDUIMUN. In other words, FDUIMUN is merely a distributor, not a pub- lisher of such content and does not exercise editorial control of such contents.

III More information

If you have any further questions regarding this licensing information, please email [email protected] for more support.

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012

2012年复旦大学国际中学生模拟联合国大会 Fudan University International Model United Nations 2012

学术委员会 Board of Directors

委员长 Director-General 学术指导 Director 常安 Chang An【综合】 肖千里 Xiao Qianli【联动危机内阁】 Emory University Bates College 原 华中师范大学第一附属中学Gavel模拟 华师一附中Gavel模拟联合国协会创始人 联合国协会主席 [email protected] [email protected] 学术指导 Director 副委员长 Vice Director-General 魏强 Wei Qiang【独立会场】 陈天娇 Chen Tianjiao【综合、独立会场】 北京大学 New York University 原 厦门外国语学校模拟联合国协会主席 原 哈尔滨市第三中学模拟联合国协会主 [email protected] 席 [email protected] 学术指导 Director 潘天一 Pan Tianyi【独立会场】 副委员长 Vice Director-General Yale University 刘诗尧 Liu Shiyao【综合、联合国系统】 原 复旦大学附属中学模拟联合国社主席 北京大学 [email protected] [email protected] 学术指导 Director 学术指导 Director 郑羽桐 Zheng Yutong【联合国系统】 杨思羽 Yang Siyu【联合国系统】 University of Virginia Cornell University 北京一零一中学模拟联合国社团社长 原 太原市第五中学模拟联合国协会主席 [email protected] [email protected]

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012

B Welcome Letter from the Director

Dear delegates,

Welcome to the Future Joint Crisis Cabinets at FDUIMUN 2012. My name is Qianli Xiao and I will be assuming the academic director of this year’s FJCC. In 2012, the Joint-crisis system decides to shift its focus to the imminent future and plot the story in one of the most war-prone zones in the world: The Middle East.

The Future Joint Crisis Cabinets will operate under “Future Security Council—Cabinets” model and divide delegates into five subcommittees: the Future Security Council, US Cabinet, Israel Cabinet, Iran Cabinet, and the Risk Management Corporation, a third party think-tank institute. The cabinets will focus mostly on evaluating current situation, prepare for military, designating domestic and foreign policies, and respond to various incidents and developments on the Iranian nuclear program. The Future Security Council, on the other hand, will operate as a diplomatic intermediary and respond to the development of the crisis. The Risk Management Corporation, a fictitious think-tank agency, will provide third-party intelligence service based on its “undisclosed yet genuine” information sources.

The three-day, seven-session long conference endeavors to avoid the seemingly inevitable war- fare in the Middle East, and the ultimate goal of a successful conference shall witness the pres- ence of a peaceful agreement from all parties involved in the crisis. During the fast-paced and work-intensive conference, you are expected to deal with disputable information, make decisions with a mature political vision, and respond to ever-changing situation with poised and reason- able judgments.

Finally, as the academic director of the Future Joint Crisis Cabinets, I would like to deliver my warmest welcome and gratitude to all of you for choosing FJCC at FDUIMUN 2012.

Look forward to see you in Shanghai.

Sincerely, 肖千里 Qianli “Robinson” Xiao Bates College ’13 Director--FJCC, FDUIMUN 2012

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012

C Welcome Letter from the Cabinet

Dear delegates,

It’s our distinct pleasure to welcome you to the Iranian Cabinet at FDUIMUN 2012 FJCC. We ex- tend our greatest honor to be your dais in the coming sessions, in which you will be challenged on your wisdom, responsiveness, capability and cooperation. During the thrilling sessions of the Iranian nuclear crisis, you will, as well, enjoy the process of confrontation, negotiation, and pos- sibly concession.

The dais will collaborate with all delegates to the common goal of achieving a feasible method to avoid the possible war on nuclear. Besides, your excellent skill of diplomacy is always highlighted, basing on a thorough understanding of the topic, given references and what can be collected apart from the given updates.

FJCC indicates that more research and excellent role playing, especially when facing a sudden update of the crisis, are extremely necessary. In the conference, you’ll face considerable amount of known and unknown issues, reports from certain agencies, intelligence from seemingly cred- ible sources, spontaneous information from the Security Council, and so on. Your capability of processing information will be vital for any information given, be it domestic, regional, or interna- tional.

A thorough preparation is vital for your success at this year’s FJCC. You are required to look into depth on the , diplomatic concerns and military condition of the coun- try. We hope you can enjoy this conference and harvest friendship and academic skills in FDUI- MUN2012.

Sincerely,

杨文玥 Wenyue “Christy” Yang 南京外国语学校, 清华大学 曹炀 Yang “Angie” Cao 上海外国语大学 阮中煊 Zhongxuan Ruan 华东师大二附中 Iran Cabinet—FJCC FDUIMUN 2012

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012

Future Joint Crisis Cabinets--Iran Cabinet 主席团联系方式表

本联系表为方便各位代表直接联系对应主席团而提供。 若非直接联系特定成员，请通过本邮箱地址与我们交流： [email protected]

姓名 Name 学校 职位 性别 电话 电子邮箱地址

杨文玥 Wenyue Yang 清华大学

女 13776679804 [email protected] Chair 曹炀 Yang Cao 上海外国语大学

女 18817331854 [email protected]

阮中煊 Zhongxuan Ruan 华东师大二附中 Crisis Staff 男 13482575722 [email protected]

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D Joint Crisis Cabinets: What, Why and How

Joint-Crisis Cabinets, often referred to as Preamble in Draft Resolutions or meditate JCC, is one of the unconventional commit- every time the tricky situation strikes— tees in Model United Nations, aiming at your enemy won’t wait. It is not only a chess simulating real-world experience through game: you make moves and your rival re- collaborations, conspiracies, and confron- act, but more than chess: If you fail to react tations within the system of cabinets. instantly, your rival can take another move.

Why is JCC exciting? Conciseness

You may have represented a country in reg- Your mind-set, your plan, your speech, ev- ular committee in UN or other governmen- erything has to be concise. Rather than tal organizations but ended up failing to sticking to the stringent and redundant fulfill your initial expectations only because provisional rules set by the United Nations, there was P5 vetoing in Security Council, the JCC allows for a higher degree of flex- IAEA unable to impose coercive actions ibility. No one would bother to dig out your on Iran, or simply a DR with seemingly- key points in a political propaganda like re- pleasing solutions but no-further feedback port in NPC. Get to the point; make your- anymore—these are all unimaginable in self understood by colleagues; and make JCC. Always present is your counter-parts decisions immediately with clear mind and in other cabinets ready to grab every pos- poised judgment. sible interest for his country at any time. In FDUIMUN09, Nikita Khrushchev and John Authenticity of Simulation F. Kennedy targeted hundreds of nuclear warheads at Moscow and Washington from Real-world politics is interest-oriented, bru- Turkey and Cuba; last year in FDUIMUN11, tal, and ruthless—an anarchy in its essence. Hitlers and Churchills dispatched forces to In peaceful times, there might arise notions the border, across English Channel, to take like soft power, idealism, harmonious coex- hold of every acre of land in Europe in the istence, but when it comes to national se- twilight of WWII. curity, as a leader of the country, you have to be realistic, both cautious to plan and What is JCC looking for? courageous to risk for the country.

Efficiency Future Joint Crisis Cabinets: Background

There is no time for you to waste on the This year’s Joint-Crisis Cabinet will be set

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012

in the near future of 2012’s fall when Ira- the cabinets. All five subcommittees in the nian President FJCC carry their own distinctive goals and declared that Iran’s project of “civil use of benefits, and some of them might be at nuclear power” will be put into use in the odds with the overarching goal of main- near future while various sources confirm taining regional peace. Sacrificing a cabi- that Ahmadinejad’s Iran is positive that the net’s own benefit should never be treated project could be soon applied for military as the “success” of a cabinet member. use. Committee Briefing System 1. Working Language: English (For formal Delegates will be assigned to three cabi- debates and conference documents)/ nets, namely United States, Iran, and Israel 中文 (供非正式辩论及workshop小型 and United Nations Security Council as 研讨会中使用) an arbiter, representative of international 2. Cabinets: United States, Israel and Iran. community, or one of the major battlefields 16 delegates for each cabinet. for three countries to lobby for alliance. 3. Special Committees: The RISCOM (Risk The crisis center will be coordinating “the Management Corporation), the Future real-world”: all the diplomatic negotiations, Security Council. 22 countries in atten- draft directives, actions taken by cabinets dance for the FSC, and 25 delegates in and results will be decided within the small attendance for the RISCOM. dark room. Also, there exists a think tank 4. Goal of Cabinets: Deter and avoid the named Risk Management Corporation, imminent war while benefit for the abbreviated as RISCOM, providing intel- country (or the corporation of RISCOM). ligence reports, analysis, and suggestions Outbreak of the war will be deemed a respectively for each cabinet. failure of the conference unless a cease- fire agreement is reached. But the result, in its essence, is in you del- 5. Role Application: Please find the at- egates’ hands, your decisions, your speech- tached Role Application form for fur- es, and your strategies. You shall write the ther information. history. 6. Convention Mode: The time of this con- ference will divided up into Sessions Goal and Workshops. Each session and work- shop will incur advancement in time. “Avoiding the war” is the conference’s ul- Detailed information regarding to the timate goal that should always be kept in timeline of this conference will be re- mind. Yet, the success of avoiding (or wag- leased in the subsequent updates. ing) wars does not equal to the success of 7. Online Information Distribution: This

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year’s FDUIMUN will witness the incor- 8. Dual Mode: This year’s FJCC will be poration of online information distribu- switching between diplomatic mode tion. All crisis updates, committee doc- and war mode. The diplomatic mode uments, and other forms of documents will follow all instructions listed in the will be released via an online platform. ensuing updates. The war mode will in- This environmental-friendly policy aims herit from last year’s Grand Game Con- at fostering a paper-reduced environ- ference model in cases of war. Details of ment and boosting the efficiency of -in this year’s GGC will be released in the formation transmission. ensuing updates.

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E The Story: The Iranian Nuclear Crisis On October 3rd, 2012, Barack Obama, the iran-attack/ incumbent president of the United States, 3. http://www.israelnationalnews.com/ will face his first real challenge on his way News/News.aspx/152480#.T7TPY-vLyyU to the second presidential tenure. The first presidential debate will be held at Univer- The night before President Obama headed sity of Denver, where Obama faces off the to Denver for his first presidential debate, attacks from Governor Mitt Romney of the President Ahmadinejad of Iran addressed, Republican Party. in public, to the world that Iranian nuclear program is “very close to its completion”. Earlier in 2012, President Binyamin Netan- Although it may seem odd for this hardline yahu of Israel visited the United States and Iranian administration to reveal its nucle- reached a tentative agreement that Israel ar ambition and raise angst of its Jewish will not take any military actions against neighbor (and the world as well), President Palestine—or, of course, their bedside ri- Ahmadinejad realized that it might be of valry, Iran. Although such an agreement a second-to-none vital moment to release might seem to be determinative for the such a disheartening update on Iran’s long- United States and Israel, a pair of recipro- accused nuclear energy program. cal “sidekicks”, the possibility for Israel to take Preemptive Actions against Iran never His declaration stirred turmoil in Iran’s adja- diminished. During his visit to Washington, cent neighbors. Arab countries immediate- Netanyahu reiterated his unyielding insis- ly issued reports that advocate for Iran to tence on mastering the fate of the Israel re-contemplate and weigh its options. The state, and pleaded that the United States most vehement response came from Israel. should assure the security of the Israel na- President Netanyahu issued his warning tion. Iran that the country would face “imminent surgical intervention” and removal of its nu- President Netanyahu’s Visit to the United clear reactors from the Israeli armed forces, States should Iran continues its development of 1. http://www.rawstory.com/ nuclear weapons. rs/2012/03/06/netanyahu-warns-iran- on-high-profile-u-s-visit/ The reason for Israel to respond with such 2. http://blogs.voanews.com/breaking- voracity was obvious. Confidence has gath- news/2012/02/05/israels-netanyahu-to- ered as the Iranian military claimed to have visit-us-as-concern-grows-over-possible- believed its capacity of turning civilian nu-

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clear programs to serve military purposes. P5+1, a war may seem to be unavoidable Once Iran develops its own nuclear-weap- in the imminent future. The very possibility on technology, Israel’s state security would of Iran to extend the war to other areas in be shaken loose. The Ahmadinejad govern- the Middle East is undoubtedly a powerful ment, in particular, has the very intention threat to the region security. of confronting Israel and “Wipe off” the “puppet state” in the Middle East. The window of diplomacy was almost closed when, in the afternoon of October Tensions and Confrontations between Iran 3rd, Iran issued a note of indefinite with- and Israel drawal from the P5+1 negotiations, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ warned Israel that Iran would not return to Iran%E2%80%93Israel_relations the negotiation tables unless Israel prom- ises not to attack Iran’s nuclear bases. Oth- Iran voiced back with its consistent stub- erwise, the war against Israel may seem to bornness, confronting Israel that the Israeli be in order. forces will face “all-out” revenge, should the Israelis dare to take military actions. This is the pivot spot of our story. After hear- President Ahmadinejad asserted that, as ing Iran’s warning, President Obama flew he always did, the Israel state was “nothing back to Washington and called together his more than a mosquito” to Iran, and that Iran cabinet to convene and discuss on United would be capable of wiping Israel off the States’ position on the escalating Iran-Israel map, should the revenge be undertaken. tension, with grave concern over Israel’s national security and the possible spillover The hardline Iranian President: Mahmoud of military actions to adjacent nations like Ahmadinejad Syria. Meanwhile, the Security Council also 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mah- called on an emergency session to discuss moud_Ahmadinejad on the situation, in which Iran and Israel at- 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mah- tended as observers. moud_Ahmadinejad_and_Israel 3. http://rt.com/news/iran-war-ahma- A critical moment for the peace of Middle dinejad-israel-142/ East is here before all the delegates at this 4. http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-12/ year’s FJCC. It’s your turn to decide whether middleeast/world_meast_iran-ahma- this area will suffer in the flames of war, or dinejad-israel_1_catherine-ashton- surrender to the call of peace. nuclear-program-eu-foreign-policy?_ s=PM:MIDDLEEAST

While the window for diplomacy remained open, as either side had decided to throw the other off the table of negotiation at the

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F Iranian Nuclear Developments

I. Timeline of Iranian Nuclear Problem Agreement, Iran voluntarily signs and im- plements the Additional Protocol to the 1957, The United States and Iran signed a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. civil nuclear co-operation agreement as part of the U.S. Atoms for Peace program. June 2004: Kamal Kharrazi, Iran’s foreign minister, responding to demands that July 1968: Iran signs the Nuclear Non-Pro- Iran halt its nuclear program, asserts: “We liferation Treaty and ratifies it. It goes into won’t accept any new obligations. Iran effect on March 5, 1970. has a high technical capability and has to be recognized by the international com- 1979: Iran’s Islamic Revolution puts a freeze munity as a member of the nuclear club. on the existing nuclear program and the This is an irreversible path.” Bushehr contract with Siemens AG is ter- minated as the German firm leaves. November 15, 2004: Talks between Iran and three European Union members, the 1990: Iran begins negotiations with the So- United Kingdom, France, and Germany, viet Union regarding the re-construction result in a compromise. Iran agrees to of the Bushehr power plant. temporarily suspend its active uranium enrichment program for the duration of 1996: China and Iran inform the IAEA of a second round of talks, during which at- plans to construct a nuclear enrichment tempts will be made at arriving at a per- facility in Iran, but China withdraws from manent, mutually-beneficial solution. the contract under U.S. pressure. Iran ad- vises the IAEA that it plans to pursue the November 22, 2004: Iran declares that it construction anyway. will voluntarily suspend its uranium en- richment program to enter negotiations December 2002: The United States ac- with the EU. Iran will review its decision cuses Iran of attempting to make nuclear in three months. The EU seeks to have weapons. The International Atomic Ener- the suspension made permanent and is gy Agency does not, at this time, decide willing to provide economic and political to declare Iran in non-compliance with incentives. its safeguards agreement under the Non- Proliferation Treaty. January 31, 2006: The IAEA reports that “Iran has continued to facilitate access December 18, 2003: As agreed in the Paris under its Safeguards Agreement as re-

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quested by the Agency ... including by Tehran. providing in a timely manner the requi- site declarations and access to locations” March 4, 2008: The UN Security Council and lists outstanding issues. adopts Resolution 1803 - the third sanc- tion resolution on Iran with a 14-0 vote March 2006: The U.S. National Security (Indonesia abstained). Strategy decries Iran, stating that “Iran has violated its Non-Proliferation Treaty February 17, 2009: In Paris, International safeguards obligations and refuses to Atomic Energy Agency Director-General provide objective guarantees that its nu- Mohamed ElBaradei said that Iran is still clear program is solely for peaceful pur- not helping United Nations nuclear in- poses.” The term “objective guarantees” spectors find out whether it worked on is understood to mean permanent aban- developing an atom bomb in the past donment of enrichment. He reiterated but Tehran has slowed its expansion of a that the enrichment was performed for key nuclear facility. purely civil power purposes and not for weapons purposes. July 8–10, 2009: On the 35th G8 summit, US president Obama said Iran will have to September 16, 2006: (Havana, Cuba) All of September (at the G20 meeting) to show the 118 Non-Aligned Movement member some improvements on the negotiations countries declare their support for Iran’s about Iran’s nuclear program, or else nuclear program for civilian purposes “face consequences”. French president in their final written statement. That is a Nicolas Sarkozy said G8 are united on clear majority of the 192 countries com- the issue with Iran, stating that patience prising the entire United Nations. with Iran was running thin: “For the past 6 years we have extended our hand saying December 3, 2007: The U.S. Intelligence stop your nuclear armament program... Community released a National Intel- Do they want discussions or don’t they ligence Estimate concluding that Iran want them? If they don’t, there will be “halted its nuclear weapons program” in sanctions.” 2003, but “is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.” August 7, 2009: US Air Force General Charles Wald said that a devastating US December 11, 2007: British spy chiefs have military strike against Iran’s nuclear and grave doubts that Iran has mothballed its military facilities “is a technically feasible nuclear weapons program, as a US intel- and credible option”. ligence report claimed last week, and believe the CIA has been hoodwinked by Jan. 19, 2010: Iran rejects key parts of the

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deal to send abroad for processing most of its enrichment material. June 9, 2010: U.N. Security Council votes to expand sanctions against Iran to un- Feb. 9, 2010: Iran begins making higher dermine its banking and other industries. grade nuclear fuel, enriched to a level of 20 percent, at the Natanz plant. June 24, 2010: U.S. Congress approves tough new unilateral sanctions aimed at squeezing Iran’s energy and banking sec- tors.

July 26, 2010: The EU imposes tighter sanctions on Iran.

Dec. 5, 2010: Iran’s nuclear energy chief says Iran will use domesti- cally produced uranium concentrates, known as yellowcake, for the first time at a nuclear facility, cutting reliance on im- ports of the ingredient for nuclear fuel.

Dec. 6, 2010: Talks begin in Geneva be- tween Iranian nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and EU Foreign Policy Chief Cath- erine Ashton, who leads the discussions on behalf of big powers. Feb. 18, 2010: An IAEA report suggests for the first time Iran might be actively chas- Jan. 21, 2011: World powers fail to manage ing nuclear weapons capability rather any change from Iran in talks, with the EU than merely having done so in the past. and U.S. calling the discussions disap- pointing and saying no further meetings May 17, 2010: Iran, Brazil and Turkey sign are planned. a nuclear fuel swap deal. Iran says it has agreed to transfer low:enriched uranium June 9, 2011: Russia and China join West- to Turkey within a month in return for ern powers in telling Iran its “consistent higher:enriched nuclear fuel for a medi- failure” to comply with U.N. resolutions cal research reactor. The deal is not im- “deepened concerns” about possible mil- plemented due to lack of U.S., French and itary dimensions to its nuclear program. Russian involvement.

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lamic state will not surrender its nuclear rights “even under the most difficult pres- sure.”

April 14, 2012: Talks between Iran and the United States, France, Germany, China, Russia and Britain resume in Istanbul. A diplomat describes the atmosphere at the opening session as “completely dif- Jan. 9, 2012: IAEA confirms Iran began re- ferent” from that of previous meetings. fining uranium to a fissile purity of 20 per- cent at Fordow. FURTHER READINGS: Elaborate timeline Feb. 20-21, 2012: Senior U.N. inspectors http://futures.stockstar.com/ end a second round of talks in Tehran, SS2012041000005539.shtml without success and without inspecting a military site at Parchin. NPT and additional protocol http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_ March 5, 2012: Iran has tripled its monthly proliferation#Additional_Protocol production of higher:grade enriched ura- nium and the IAEA has “serious concerns” UNSC resolution 1696 about possible military dimensions to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Na- Tehran’s activities, IAEA head Yukiya tions_Security_Council_Resolu- Amano says. tion_1696

March 6, 2012: EU foreign policy chief UNSC resolution 1737 Catherine Ashton accepts Iran’s offer of http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Na- new talks, after a year’s standstill. U.S. tions_Security_Council_Resolu- President Barack Obama says the an- tion_1737 nouncement offers a diplomatic chance to defuse the crisis and quiet the “drums UNSC resolution 1929 of war”. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Na- tions_Security_Council_Resolu- April 10, 2012: Iran cuts oil exports to tion_1929 Spain and may halt sales to Germany and Italy, state television reports, in an ap- UNSC resolution 1984 parent move to strengthen its position http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Na- ahead of crucial talks. tions_Security_Council_Resolu- tion_1984 April 12, 2012: Ahmadinejad says the Is-

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II. Nuclear Facilities in Iran

There are about 17 nuclear facilities in Iran; a few of them are listed here:

1. The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant

The Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is locat- ed 17 kilometers south-east of the city of Bushehr. Construction started in 1975 by Kraftwerk Union AG, but was halted in July 1979 following the Iranian Revolution. The ing Bushehr I building contains a 915 MWe reactor was damaged by Iraqi air strikes VVER-1000 pressurized water reactor. In during the Iran-Iraq war in the mid-1980s. December 2007 Russia started delivering Construction resumed in 1995, when Iran nuclear fuel to the Bushehr nuclear power signed a contract with Russian company plant.The construction was completed in Atomstroiexport to install into the exist- March 2009.

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program, it was equipped with 5-mega- 2. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant watt pool-type nuclear research reactor, named the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which became operational in 1967 fueled by highly enriched uranium.

After the Iranian Revolution the United States cut off the supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the TRR, which forced the reactor to be shut down for a number of years. In 1987–88 Iran signed agreements with Argentina’s National Atomic Energy Commission to convert the TRR from highly enriched uranium fuel to 19.75% low-enriched uranium, and to sup- ply the low-enriched uranium to Iran.

Located near the city of Qom, the site is an underground uranium enrichment facility at a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps base. Existence of the then-unfin- ished Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) was disclosed to the IAEA by Iran on 21 September 2009, only after the site became known to Western intelligence services. Western officials strongly condemned Iran for not disclosing the site earlier; U.S. Presi- dent Barack Obama said that Fordow had been under U.S. surveillance.

3. Tehran Nuclear Research Center

The Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) was established in 1967, managed by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI).

Under the United States Atoms for Peace

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G Diplomatic Concerns Introduction tion is becoming evident. In February 2011, the regime security forces quashed dem- In early August 2005, Ahmadinejad became onstrations organized by opposition forces Iran’s new President. Immediately after his to express solidarity with political upris- assumption of the president seat, he direct- ings in Egypt and Tunisia. Following what ed the Iranian government to adopt tough the international society put “the dubious stance on nuclear issues, and rejected the outcome” of presidential elections in June solutions provided by the EU. Iran resusci- 2009, our security forces and allied militia tated their nuclear ambitions and claimed harshly clamped down on pro-opposition that the next step is to ignite the Natanz protests in Tehran and elsewhere across the nuclear program (enrichment taking the country.Unfortunately, a number of people majority), which as a matter of fact inten- protesting the election results were killed. sified the diplomatic relationship with USA Some killed at rallies by gunfire, and some and European countries. in prisons following their arrest.

On January 8, 2006, the nuclear negotia- Besides, Iran’s regime is considered by the tions between the European Union and Iran international society a source of extrem- were interrupted when Iran restarted its re- ism and destabilization in the region and search on nuclear fuel. Facing the interven- around the globe. Iran is condemned a tion of IAEA and international pressure, Ah- state sponsor of terrorism, providing finan- madinejad restored uranium enrichment cial support and training for organizations activities, resulting in an unprecedent- such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad edly sharp US-Iraq confrontation. The ten- and others, and is believed to be behind sions over Iran nuclear program therefore many Shiite insurgents in Iraq. Iran is criti- climbed to a climax. cized of being responsible for the bomb- ings of the Israeli Embassy (1992) and the Since 2004, Iran conservatives took control Jewish community center (1994) in Buenos of the Parliament, Central and local govern- Aires, Argentina, which killed over 200 peo- ments. Ahmadinejad has also been made ple and wounded hundreds more. to the Ministry of Iran the largest turnover in the history of the Republic, in which he “Nuclear weapon is the ultimate veto power replaced almost all of the former reformist in world politics, particularly for the weak.” Government (Government of Khatami) am- --Khatami, Former bassadors and diplomatic officials. As a matter of fact, the regime’s repressing public manifestations of political opposi-

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Important Parties and Issues cal and reckless Iranian regime will have severe repercussions for American security The IAEA and the security of our allies. That is to say, On November 8, 2011, the IAEA released once possess nuclear weapons, Iran will be- their most comprehensive report to date come a top threat to American Interests.” on Iran’s nuclear program. The report is based on intelligence received from more A nuclear-armed Iran would embolden than 10 different countries; interviews with Iran’s aggressive foreign policy, resulting foreign scientists who helped Iran develop in greater confrontations with the interna- their program, and the IAEA’s own investi- tional community. Iran already has conven- gations and analyses. tional weapons capability to hit U.S. and al- lied troops stationed in the Middle East and In unambiguous terms, the report states parts of Europe. Iran is one of the world’s that Iran is engaged in “activities relevant leading state sponsors of terrorism through to the development of a nuclear device.” its financial and operational support for These activities include: groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and oth- ers. Iran could potentially share its nuclear * Research on uranium cores and detona- technology and know-how with extremist tors for nuclear weapons groups hostile to the United States and the * Acquiring nuclear weapons development West. information and documentation from a clandestine supply network While Iranian missiles can’t yet reach Amer- * Developing an indigenous nuclear weap- ica, Iran having a nuclear weapons capa- ons design and testing of the components bility can potentially directly threaten the * Computer modeling of nuclear explo- United States and its inhabitants. The U.S. sions and logistics for nuclear testing Department of Defense National Air and * Engineering studies to adapt missiles for Space Intelligence Center reported in April nuclear warheads 2009: “With sufficient foreign assistance, Iran could develop and test an ICBM [in- This latest report unequivocally confirms tercontinental ballistic missile] capable of Iran’s intentions to develop the capacity to reaching the United States by 2015. Many build nuclear weapons and notes that Iran analysts are also concerned about the pos- currently has enough low-enriched ura- sibility of a nuclear weapon arriving in a nium to produce weapons-grade uranium cargo container at a major US port. Further- for at least four nuclear bombs. more, a federally mandated commission to study electromagnetic pulse (EMP) at- The USA tacks noted the vast damage that could be “Nuclear weapons in the hands of the radi- wrought by a single missile with a nuclear

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warhead, launched from a ship off the US Moreover, U.S. officials have been quoted coast, and detonated a couple of hundred as confirming that the 2010 U.S. National miles in the air, high above America. Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran makes clear that Iran has never stopped develop- The Middle East remains an essential source ing nuclear weapons. This NIE has not been of energy for the United States and the made public. world. Iran’s military posture has led to in- creases in arms purchases by its neighbors. The Security Council A nuclear-armed Iran would likely spark a The United Nations Security Council unani- nuclear arms race in the Middle East that mously adopted four resolutions imposing would further destabilize this volatile and sanctions on Iran for its nuclear prolifera- vital region. Interrupted access to essential tion activities. (For more, see the links listed energy supplies could threaten the viability in part A) of the American and world economies. Russian Federation, China, France, Germany, A nuclear-armed Iran poses a threat to and UK America’s closest allies in the Middle East. For several years, the United States, China, Israel is most at risk as Iran’s leaders have France, Germany, Russia, and the United repeatedly declared that Israel should “be Kingdom (the “P5+1”) have offered to ne- wiped from the map”. America’s moder- gotiate with Iran and at the same time have ate Arab allies, such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, been incrementally increasing pressure on Bahrain, and others are already alarmed at Iran through sanctions. Iran has met with Iran’s aggressive regional policy and would P5+1 negotiator on several occasions, but feel increasingly threatened by a nuclear- the Iranians have never engaged in serious armed Iran. discussions.

The U.S. has had sanctions in place for An advantageous situation for Iran is that many years against companies that invest Russia and China have reiterated their op- in Iran’s energy sector. More recent U.S. position to additional sanctions by the U.N. sanctions include the Comprehensive Iran Security Council or by others. Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act (CISADA) of 2010, which sanctions The European Union companies that provide refined petroleum The European Union enacted sanctions in or energy-sector technology to Iran. The October 2010 to prevent EU-based com- U.S. Treasury has also “blacklisted” Iranian panies from investing in Iran’s energy sec- companies involved in proliferation or ter- tor or providing energy-sector technology rorism to make banking transactions more to Iran, and on November 21, 2011, the difficult for them globally. United Kingdom became the first country

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Israel The supreme leader, Ahmadinejad repeat- edly demonizes the state of Israel and openly calls for its destruction at every op- portunity. Most notoriously, he described Israel as a “fake regime” that “must be wiped off the map.”

He put Zionists as “the most detested peo- ple in all humanity” and called the extermi- nation of six million Jews during World War II “a myth,” claiming that Jews have played to ban all transactions with Iran’s Central up Nazi atrocities during the Holocaust in a Bank. Major European leaders have also bid to extort sympathy for Israel from Euro- expressed support for additional European pean governments. Union sanctions on Iran due to its demon-

strated recalcitrance in meetings to discuss Ahmadinejad’s anti-Israel and anti-Semitic its nuclear program. rhetoric and Holocaust denial are often

matched by other Iranian leaders, and the The regime governing Iran Iranian regime itself has continued to spon- Since the revolution which overthrew the sor anti-Zionism conferences and pseudo- monarchy in 1979, Iran has been run by a academic lectures and exhibits question- Shia Islamist regime which has violently ing the fact of the Holocaust. suppressed internal dissent. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country’s powerful Supreme On the Israeli side, Israel has stuck to its well- Leader, and President Mahmoud Ahma- worn line that no option should be ruled dinejad, are uncompromising hardliners. out. But well-placed leaks suggest that the There have been periods when it appeared prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, and that the Iranian leadership was opting for his defense minister, Ehud Barak, are ex- greater moderation and reform. This oc- ploring the possibility of a pre-emptive at- curred with the election of Mohamed Khat- tack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Their cabinet ami, considered the “reformist candidate” colleagues seem less persuaded and Israel’s to the presidency in 1997. While the Khat- powerful military and intelligence estab- ami reign (through 2005) was marked by lishment is against a strike. Polls show that some moderation in Iran’s public stance to- Israelis are split on the issue. But Netanyahu wards the West, the Supreme Leader, Aya- is determined not to go down in history as tollah Khamenei tightly controlled most of the prime minister who allowed Israel to the state apparatus. Iran’s nuclear weapons become threatened by a hostile, regional program also intensified during this period.

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nuclear power. “Israel is nothing more than a mosquito which cannot see the broad horizon of the However, President Barack Obama should Iranian nation,” he said Saturday in north- make it very clear to Netanyahu that he eastern Iran’s Khorassan province, accord- would not do that. At the same time, he ing to the semi-official Fars news agency. should pursue two courses: pushing sanc- Ahmadinejad said “regional states” were be- tions, on the one hand, and preparing for a ing duped into buying billions in arms from nuclear-armed Iran on the other. “arrogant and imperial powers,” driven in part by all the talk surrounding a potential Another interesting issue is that, ahead of war involving Iran and Israel, the state-run upcoming nuclear talks, Iranian President Islamic Republic News Agency reported. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad downplayed the Such military purchases, he said, are un- threat Israel poses to Iran, comparing it to necessary because there is no war on the an annoying bug. horizon between those two nations.

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012

H National Security and Military Introduction baijan and Kurdistan; and preventing the incursions of religious ethnic insurgents Iran is a constitutional Islamic republic with into Iran from Iran’s neighboring states. a theocratic system of government where Such incursions could originate especially ultimate political authority is vested in a from those states in the process of decom- religious scholar, the Supreme Leader. Shia position such as Iraq and Afghanistan or in Islam is the official religion of Iran, and -Is conflict like Azerbaijan and nearby Tajiki- lamic law is the basis of the authority of the stan. state. The mission of Iran’s Armed forces is to as- Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution sure the territorial integrity of the country. there have been two views within the gov- Subsequent to the end of the eight-year ernment of the Islamic Republic. The first Iran-Iraqi conflict that decimated Iran’s mili- view is a radical, conservative, and funda- tary capability, Iran has been in a gradual ar- mentalist view which has had a stronger mament and military infrastructure rebuild- role in directing the government and peo- ing process. Given the political isolation Iran ple of Iran. In foreign policy it sees a conflict faces and the multitude of its threats from in the policies of Iran’s Islamic regime and a US presence in the region, a hostile Iraq that of the “aggressive regimes” (as the gov- to the west and uncertain ethnic tensions ernment calls them) headed by America. within the states to its north and east, Iran The second viewpoint believes in Islam and has embarked on a substantial rearmament the Revolution but at the same time it is a program. The immediacy of Iran’s concerns moderate viewpoint. for its internal security posed by threats on all its flanks will preoccupy its military to Iran’s primary national security concerns concentrate on diminishing the likelihood are predominantly “local” relating to main- that the stability inherent in those regions taining the internal security of the country. does not spread to Iran. This translates to maintaining the security of the Islamic revolution that began with Accordingly, Iran has concentrated its mili- the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. Iranian tary strategies on two primary goals: security has three focal points: securing the country against opposition elements • Maintain the internal security of Iran to like Iraqi sponsored Mujahedin operating prevent the rise of nationalistic upris- along Iran’s border with Iraq; maintaining ings among its ethnic-religious minori- territorial integrity against long standing ties. The potential for these uprisings is potential secessionist movements in Azer- fueled by conflicts in countries to the

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north of Iran as well as in Afghanistan pendent formations. These included sev- to the east. eral small armor units, an infantry brigade, • Confine the access of the United States an airborne brigade, two or three Special to the Persian Gulf. Iran’s deployment of Forces brigades, and five artillery brigades/ anti-ship missiles such as the Chinese regiments. There were also coastal defense Silkworm system at the Strait of Hor- units, a growing number of air defense muz and the purchase of submarines groups, between four and six army aviation with mine-laying capabilities support units, and a growing number of logistics this objective. and supply formations.

I. Army / Islamic Iranian Ground Forces The land forces had six major garrisons and (IIGF) 13 major casernes. There was a military academy at Tehran, and a signal training Force structure, order of battle, and unit center in Shiraz. The airborne and special identifications for Iranian forces differforces also trained at a facility in Shiraz. greatly among different sources. It was un- clear which identifications were accurate. The army’s aviation unit, whose main op- The evolution of Iranian units over time erational facilities were located at Esfahan, was somewhat opaque, and rather dated was largely equipped with United States wartime designations have often been aircraft, although some helicopters were published, sometimes confusing brigades of Italian manufacture. In 1986 army avia- with division-sized units. During the Iran- tion operated some 65 light fixed-wing Iraq war some Brigades formed the nuclei aircraft, but its strength lay in its estimated of new divisions, and presumably reverted 320 combat helicopters, down from 720 in with the end of the war. 1980.

The regular army also had a number of in- There were a variety of other reports of dependent brigades and groups, though doubtful veracity. Some sources claimed there was almost no reliable data on the that small light formations in the regular size and number of these smaller inde- army included an Airmobile Forces Group IRANIAN GROUND FORCES

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created after the Iran-Iraq War. This forma- Iran’s most important military service. The tion was said to include the 29th Special Persian Gulf must remain open for Iranian Forces Division, which was formed in 1993- commerce since the Gulf is the primary 1994, and the 55th Paratroop Division. route for all of Iran’s oil exports and most of Other sources claim that the commando its trade. However, Iran’s current navy struc- forces of the regular army and IRGC were ture is outdated and in need of substantial integrated into a Corps of about 30,000 sol- modernization, an effort that Iran is gradu- diers, with integrated helicopter lifts and ally attempting to accomplish. For the pres- air assault capabilities. These airborne and ent, Iran’s naval capacity remains limited special forces troops were said to train to- and barely supports its status as essentially gether at Shiraz. a coastal defense force. Iran’s economic dependence on the free and interrupted By 2004 the Army was organized in four use of the Persian Gulf for its commercial corps, with four armored divisions, six in- shipping combined with its past lessons in fantry divisions, two commando brigades, confrontations with the United States Navy an airborne brigade and other smaller in- in the 1987-88 time frame have reinforced dependent formations. Each Iranian divi- Iran’s determination to rebuild its naval sion had a different organization. Only the forces. 92nd Division had enough equipment to be a true armored division, and two of the Iranian naval operations are organized into armored divisions were much larger than five major zones, three on the Persian Gulf the others. The 28th and 84th infantry divi- (Bandar Abbas, Bushehr and Khark), one on sions were much more heavily mechanized the Caspian Sea (Bandar Anzali), and one than the others. Smaller formations in the on the Indian Ocean (Chah Bahar). Bandar army included the 23rd Special Forces Di- Abbas is the main Iranian naval base, pro- vision, established in 1993-1994, and the viding a home for the main components of 55th Paratroop Division. One source report- Iran’s navy (its frigates and destroyers), as ed that the 23rd Special Forces Division was well as functioning as the navy’s main ship the most professional unit in the Iranian repair yard. Bandar Anzali has become in- Army, with 5,000 regulars’ soldiers and no creasingly important, having minesweep- conscripts. ing and full coastal water defense capa- bilities. Nou Shahr, also on the Caspian, is II. Navy increasingly important, housing the Iranian naval academy. The Iranian navy has always been the smallest of its three principal services, hav- Iran’s navy as of 2000 had 20,000 men, but ing about 14,500 personnel in 1986, down they were young and inexperienced, and from 30,000 in 1979. The navy is perhaps most of them were riflemen and marines

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012

based on Persian Gulf islands. At higher lev- cause trouble for shipping in the Persian els, there had been a fierce rivalry between Gulf and disrupt the flow of oil in the wa- the IRGC and regular navies for scarce re- terway through which 40% of the world’s sources. Due to these shortcomings, Iran’s traded oil flows. three Kilo-class submarines would be vul- nerable, and they were limited to laying Despite having a submarine capability, in mines in undefended waters. Mines, how- the 1990s Iran’s navy is neither the best ever, are one area in which Iran had made equipped nor the strongest in the region. advances. It can produce non-magnetic, Upon the acquisition of the Kilo-class sub- free-floating, and remote-controlled mines. marines by the Iranian Navy, Saudi Arabia It may have taken delivery of pressure, arranged for delivery of three upgraded La acoustic, and magnetic mines from Russia. Fayette-type frigates (armed with anti-ship Also, Iran was negotiating with China for and anti- aircraft missiles, torpedo tubes rocket-propelled rising mines. and anti- submarine warfare helicopters) and one new Sandown-class coastal mine- Iran’s navy had held more than a week of sweeper. Iran’s Navy, one of the region’s war games in the Persian Gulf using tacti- most capable, can temporarily disrupt mar- cal submarines and small vessels carrying itime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz missile launchers. The March 2007 exercis- using a layered force of KILO Class diesel es were the latest in a series of maneuvers submarines, ship- and shore-based anti- staged by Iran’s military in the Persian Gulf, ship cruise missiles and naval mines. where the United States had deployed two aircraft carriers in recent months, a move III. Air Force / Islamic Iranian Air Forces widely seen as a warning to Tehran over (IIAF) its nuclear ambitions. Though Iran cannot come close to matching US forces, it could Iran’s air and air defense forces are the IRANIAN AIR FORCES

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weakest link in the overall defense posture weight to the regular armed forces. of the country. This situation will remain so until the modernization of Iran’s aircraft oc- It has since become a major military, politi- curs, the numbers of such aircraft increase cal and economic force in Iran, with close and the training of its pilots and depth of ties to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali its repair parts inventory improve. The ma- Khamenei, and President Mahmoud Ahma- jority of the inventory of the replacements dinejad, a former member. to its aging U.S. manufactured fighters and fighter-bombers are a mix of Russian and The force is estimated to have 125,000 ac- Chinese aircraft. Despite serious problems tive troops, boasts its own ground forces, that are currently being addressed through navy and air force, and oversees Iran’s stra- foreign arms acquisitions and the indig- tegic weapons. enous development and production of Az- arakhsh and Tandar military trainer aircraft, It also controls the paramilitary Basij Resis- Iran’s air force has a modest offensive capa- tance Force and the powerful bonyads, or bility. However, Iran remains vulnerable to charitable foundations, which run a consid- attack from the air due to the poor state of erable part of the Iranian economy. its air defenses. The Revolutionary Guards’ power and influ- IV. Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps ence are such that the US government has designated it “a proliferator of weapons of Iran’s Islamic Revolution Guards Corps mass destruction” and its elite overseas op- (IRGC) was set up shortly after the 1979 erations arm, the Quds Force, a “supporter Iranian revolution to defend the country’s of terrorism”. Islamic system, and to provide a counter-

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-iran Cabinet fduimun First Update 2012

I Extended Readings Hannah Arendt, the Origins of Totalitarianism A female German American political theorist of Jewish origin, Hannah Arendt inspected the origins of totalitarianism in Nazi Germany and Stalin Russia through the introduction of Anti-Semitism as a perfect example. The book comprised of three editions with the first named Antisemitism discussing different movements, the Jewish population, and a case study of the famous Dreyfus Affair. Chinese version of this book is available.

Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (1993), Foreign Affairs First published as a paper on Foreign Affairs in 1993, the widespread controversy led Huntington to develop his clash of civilization into a 1996 book: The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. The theory has been harshly criticized by the academ- ics, especially here in our country due to its potential reference of China’s threatening to the western world. But you cannot deny the unbelievable coincidence of 9/11 attack in 2001 as direct contact between two totally different civilizations. Though not necessarily related to our topic of Israel, Iran, and US, the norm put forward by Huntington can be well utilized to analyze the cause and effect and even predict the actions of different par- ties. Chinese version of this book is available.

To further your knowledge base on Iran’s role in Iranian nuclear issue, we have enclosed a number of reading materials, organized in a zipped file attached to this update. These readings include:

Kayhan Barzegar, Balance Of Power In The Persian Gulf: An Iranian View 丁工. “从伊朗核问题看伊朗的地区大国意识” 覃辉银. “伊朗在核问题上与美国的抗争解析” 王恩学, 张金平. “伊朗的强硬核外交政策” 王京烈.“全球安全视角下的伊朗核问题” 段亚波. “空袭伊朗核设施：可能与现实” 顾国良. “美国对伊政策——伊朗核与导弹问题”

fduimun | BE THE CHANGE. FJCC-Iran Cabinet First Update fduimun 2012

J Role Application Every committee has different roles for each delegate. Some of these roles possess larg- er power than the rest, and some of them focus on specific field of expertise. the dais will represent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei throughout conference and host the debate.

It is true that everyone wants to be Benjamin Netanyahu, Barack Obama, or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, the dais suggest that all delegates should only apply for the po- sition you’re interested in or familiar with instead of for the name or title you fancy. Also to avoid one delegate obtaining too much power and to promote in-cabinet collabora- tion.

Including an ambassador to UN (who is able to travel between the cabinet and UNSC), the Iran Cabinet member will consist of:

Mohammad-Reza Rahimi First Vice President, Speaker of the Assembly of Experts Rahim Mashaei Chief of Staff Hamid Baquai Head of Presidential Center Minister of Defense Seyed Hassan Firuzabadi Head, Armed Forces General Command Headquarters Mohammad Hejazi Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Minister of Finance Minister of Energy Ali Akbar Salehi Minister of Foreign Affairs Heyder Moslehi Minister of Intelligence Mostafa Mohammad Najjar Minister of Interior Minister of Petroleum Head, Atomic Energy Parviz Davoodi Head, National Strategic Head, Martyrs and Veterans Affairs Mohammad Khazaee Ambassador of Iran to the United Nations*

*He is allowed to shuttle between the Security Council and the Cabinet room.

Each delegate can apply for THREE roles that you put most appropriate for you. The dais will decide whether to approve your application via evaluating the assignment, both in punctuality and quality.

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K Assignments I. Critical Thinking Questions

Please consider the following questions. These questions will receive further analysis in the ensuing updates, but the dais would like to evaluate the responses from all delegates and decide the length, focus and depth of the second update, which will be vital in the process of preparation.

You can either answer each one separately or write a full analysis based on your answers to each question. The minimum length of such a response should reach 700 words (In other words, each question should receive an answer of at least 100 words in length)

1. (An overall review) What are the positions of different cabinets involved? 2. Provide an analysis on Iran’s military conditions, and consider possible ways to improve Iran’s national defense capabilities and strategies in the face of possible air strikes from Israel. 3. What’s the strategic meaning of the Strait of Hormuz? What’s possible consequence for Iran to block the strait? Is it militarily and politically feasible? 4. How should Iran take full advantage of its petroleum resources? 5. How should Iran utilize its diplomatic connections in Arab countries, China, Russia and Pakistan to restrain Israel (and United States) from taking military actions? 6. It was known in early April that President Netanyahu of Israel had promised the United States to refrain from military actions before 2013. How should Iran weigh its options and undertake appropriate actions to avoid wars? 7. Is it necessary for Iran to strive for its “legal” use of nuclear researches (“legal” under the framework of current international organizations and diplomatic controversies)? Please quote two of past Iranian declarations, speeches or other diplomatic outreach- es, and analyze their underlying connections to international background.

II. Role Application

Please fill out the Role Application Form and complete the short essay question at http:// www.fduimun.org/register/fjcc-assignment-1

The deadline of the first assignment is tentatively set onJune 9th.

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Please notice that names should be manifested in Chinese, unless you are currently studying in a non-PRC school. In that case please use the language of the country you are currently studying in.

In the scenario that you cannot meet the deadline for this assignment, one should con- tact any of the dais members and get their permission before the deadline: an extension up to 4 days is eligible under solid reasons. However, contacts made after the deadline will not be acknowledged and this piece of assignment will be recognized as a late as- signment. Please notice that late assignments do negatively affect delegates’ perfor- mances and our evaluations.

Should delegates have any academic difficulties or disabilities, please do not hesitate to contact dais member. Assistance would be gladly offered. Please direct any email inqui- ries to [email protected]

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L Cabinets: Rules and Procedure I. 总则 Fundaments and Principles

1. （适用范围 Compatibility）下列所述的议事流程，适用于未来危机联动内阁 (Future Joint Crisis Cabinets, 以下简述为“内阁”；FJCC，sic passim) 各内阁会 场由主席所主持的正式会议（Session）。此议事流程不适用于各内阁于正式会议 时间之外所安排的任何其他小型磋商（Workshop）。 2. （独立性 Independent Mandate）各内阁应独立于其他内阁采取行动。内阁成 员应独立履行其内阁职责。 3. （工作语言 Working Language）会议采用英文/中文为工作语言。具体适用范 围及限制条件，请参见语言使用规则。 4. （一致性 Consistency）此中文流程中涉及到的任何名词均进行英文对照，以便 于会场中施行。 5. （最终解释权 Explanatory Rights）主席团拥有对此规则流程的最终解释权。凡 此规程未尽事宜，由主席团参照一般模联规程斟酌施行。

II. 危机中心构成及职责 Bodies and Duties of Crisis Center

6. （组成 Composition）危机中心由四名危机指导（Crisis Director）及分散于各 会场的危机专员（Crisis Staff）组成。 7. （危机指导职责 Duties of Crisis Director）危机指导应于会前负责设计大体危 机事件主线和会议方向，通过该主线设计推动议程，并预设大致时间轴。会上负责 主持每小时一次的短会，收集所有危机专员提供信息并整合，设计并发布下一轮危 机。 8. （危机发布 Crisis Update）危机中心在非战争时期采取危机定时发布模式 (Round Mode) 。危机将于每次会议开始时，及之后的每半小时或者更短时间定时 发布。危机中心在非战争时期采取自由模式 (Incidental Mode)，即危机随时可能 爆发并即时更新。 9. （内阁反馈 Response from Cabinet）代表应在下一轮危机发出之前草拟并通过 指令（Directive），作为对危机的反应。若内阁在限定时间内未能成功通过一份指

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令，即默认为静观事态发展（Standby）。 10. （危机专员职责 Duties of Crisis Staff）各内阁将设置一名危机专员（crisis staff），进行信息传递。所有的内阁指令，包括与其他内阁的会面请求全部交由危 机专员进行处理或传递。危机专员将对每个内阁的表现向危机中心通报，危机中心 将根据通报情况进行下一轮危机发布。 11. （特殊职责 Special Duties） 除前述职责外，危机中心成员均可按会场之需求 扮演其他相关角色并履行其相应义务。

III. 内阁委员会构成及职责 Bodies and Duties of Cabinet Bureau

12. （组成 Composition）主席团由一名（或两名）主席（Director）及一名危机 专员（Crisis Staff）组成。 13. （权力及职责 Rights and Duties）宣布每场内阁会议开始与闭会，于会上发 言、宣布决定、仲裁与议事规程有关的任何事宜、确保议事规程施行有效，在必要 情况下调整议事规程、并在恰当的时候行使其主席权力，包括最终解释权、主席否 决权及特殊权利总则中所解释的权力。其他在此规则流程中明确指出的主席权力也 一并适用。 14. （缺席和替补 Absence and Substitution）若内阁主席团两位主席有一人缺 会，内阁委员会将仍然照常进行。缺会主席视作放弃其作为主席在此节会议中的一 切权力。若两位主席均缺席，则此内阁将执行无主持核心磋商直至一名主席出现并 宣布会议开始为止。

IV. 内阁构成及职责 Bodies and Duties of the Cabinet

15. （组成 Composition）内阁（Cabinet）由16名现任内阁成员及内阁委员会组 成。其中包括15名各司其职的政府成员和军队官员，及一名常驻联合国大使，及两 名（或三名）隶属内阁委员会的成员。 16. （权力及职责 Rights and Duties）除常驻联合国大使外，内阁成员均应全程参 与会议讨论、于会上发言、起草并提交文件、负责处理其职权范围之内的事物并作 出决定、参与指令及决议的表决、并在恰当时候行使其作为内阁成员的特殊权力。 17. （最低有效人数 Quorum）出席人数为全员四分之一以上，主席团即有权宣布 会议开始。

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18.（缺席 Absence） 当出席人数超过最低有效人数时，内阁会议将仍然照常进 行。缺会内阁成员视作放弃其在此节会议中的一切权力。 19. （解散和重组 Dissolution and Reformation）当包含解散内阁条款的不信任案 获得通过时，内阁将自动解散，内阁成员应离开会议现场。主席应与提出与签署该 不信任案的内阁成员试图重组政府。重组的政府经危机中心处理后于下一节会议恢 复议程。

V. 正式辩论规程 Rules of Formal Debate

20. （点名 Roll-call） 参照通用模联规程施行。 21.（致辞 Briefing）在致辞环节，主席团将简要阐述收到的事件发展，国家现况， 国际事件与所有可能的危机消息。国内报表（Domestic Briefing）和新闻（Press Release）将同时向内阁成员散发。 22. （提问 Inquiry） 致辞结束后，每位内阁成员将获得最长5分钟时间向主席团提 出任何关于致辞环节或收到的文件中的问题。随后，内阁成员可以通过意向条或任 何可能的其他方式咨询主席团。 23. （主发言名单 General Speakers List）内阁会议不设主发言名单。 24. （动议 Motion）内阁会议可用的动议包括但不限于下述。主席团对于提出的动 议具有裁决权。 1) (有主持核心磋商 Moderated Caucus) 由动议者规定总时长及讨论主题， 而每人发言时长不作限定。主席团在每次发言结束后，将随机指定下一位发 言者。未尽事宜，参照一般模联规程施行。 2) (无主持核心磋商 Un-moderated Caucus) 默认时长为5分钟，不含主题。 未尽事宜，参照一般模联规程施行。 3) (单独发言 Single Speech) 默认时长为2分钟，由某一内阁成员（或主席） 向内阁进行限时演讲。需简单多数通过。 4) (新闻发布会 Press Conference) 新闻发布会以向全会场公开发布新闻的形 式，表明该内阁立场，并接受媒体团记者以及其他人士的采访和质询 (Ques- tions and Inquiries) 。提出该动议的代表需表明该发布会的目的 (Purpose) 、担纲发言人 (Deputy Speaker) 及发布内容。默认时间为10分钟。每场会议 最多允许2次新闻发布会，间隔需大于90分钟。新闻发布会需要内阁三分之 二多数通过。

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5) (全国电视演说 Nationally Televised Speech) 全国电视演说以向全会场公 开发布演说的形式，表明内阁立场。全国电视演说需由内阁主席执行，可由 内阁主席自行提出，也可由内阁成员提出。提出者需同时表明该电视演说的 目的（Purpose）及内容。默认时间为10分钟。每场会议最多允许1次电视演 说。全国电视演说需要内阁三分之二多数通过。 6) (暂停会议 Suspension) 需要三分之二多数通过。 7) (实质性表决 Substantive Voting) 开启表决需要简单多数通过，参照一般 模联规程施行。 a. （内阁指令 Directive） 任何一般性内政、外交或军事指令文需要 简单多数通过。 b. （内阁决议 Resolution） 任何关乎和平或战争，动员与解除动 员，以及任何主席团认为的重要决议，需要三分之二多数通过。 c. （静观事态发展 Standby）任何主动提出静观事态发展的决议须内 阁全体通过。 8) (不信任动议 No Confidence) 具体实行范围请参见特殊权限中涉及不信任 的相关条目。所有不信任动议提出者需指出其不信任对象并发表时长为2分钟 的演讲。不信任动议需执行不信任投票 (Vote of No-Confidence) 。需要三 分之二多数通过（主席否决权需全体在场内阁成员同意才可推翻） 9) (规则性变更 Modification of Rules and Procedure) 按照一般模联规则施 行。 10) (特殊权限 Special Rights) 请参见特殊权限之相关条目。 25. （继续议程 Resumption）议程将在实质性表决结束后继续。

VI. 特殊权限 Special Rights

26. （总则 Governing Rule）特殊权限需以动议形式提出。主席有权力直接拒绝特 殊权限的提出。此权力不受主席否决权条目条款的限制。 27. （信息保密权 Secrecy of Information）内阁成员对其职权相关的国内情报可自 行决定是否保密。全体内阁可向主席请求将某项内阁指令或决议之具体内容保密。 内阁无法对已在新闻发布会发布的信息或内阁人事变动（包括内阁解散和政府重 组）行使信息保密权。 28. （有限发布权 Limited Release） 任何国家有权访问的国际情报，以及来自第三

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方智囊机构（Intelligence Services）的政策参考，将首先递交予负责情报事务的 主席和内阁成员。主席与该内阁成员将于有权决定是否向内阁会议披露情报。国际 发生的重大事宜不在此列。 29. （免表决权Voting Waiver） 免表决权可且仅可在国家处于战争状态时行使。 此时，军事官员有权签署军事命令，毋须内阁会议表决。命令需要陆海空军司令， 国防部长或总参谋长共同签署后生效。然而任何内阁成员有权暂时冻结命令并提交 内阁会议进行不信任表决（Vote of No-Confidence），以简单多数否决命令。 30. （批判性质询权 Critical Inquiry）任何内阁成员将有权利向包括主席在内的其 他内阁成员提出质询。提出质询的内阁成员需明确指出被质询者之姓名。质询将以 有主题核心磋商（Moderated Caucus）的形式呈现，其发言名单将限制于提出质 询者和接受质询者范围内。批判性质询权不可在其他有主题核心磋商进行过程之中 提出。 31. （自行裁量否决权 Self-Discretionary Veto) 内阁成员对于职权相关的内阁指令 或决议具自行裁量否决权。此类否决权的提出者应以单独发言（Single Speech） 的形式明确其职权与该指令或决议的关系，并陈述推翻该指令或决议的理由。然而 在特殊情况下，内阁会议可以不信任表决形式采用三分之二多数推翻 (Overrule) 此 否决权，强行通过此决议。 32. （主席否决权 Presidential Veto）主席（通常为内阁总统及最高领袖）对于内 阁所作出的决定具有最终否决权。其否决权一般情况下具有不可推翻性(Irrefutabil- ity)，但内阁成员可视情况向主席提出推翻其否决权的理由，以单独发言（Single Speech）的形式于继续议程（Resumption）前提出。推翻主席否决权的动议需 执行不信任投票（Vote of No-Confidence），并需全体在场内阁成员同意方可通 过。 33. （不信任案 No-Confidence Proposal）任何内阁成员将有权力向主席提交不 信任案。不信任案既可针对一名内阁成员，也可针对内阁整体。 1）(针对内阁成员的不信任案Individual No-confidence Proposal) 可缘起 于失职（Negligence (of duty, sic passim)）、渎职（Misconduct）、滥用 职权（Abuse）、无能（Ineptitude）、不忠（Disloyalty），或其他任何适 用之理由。针对内阁成员的不信任案可由一名或多名内阁成员联署，但只可针 对一名内阁成员。针对内阁成员的不信任案应以书面形式提交主席，陈述此不 信任案之缘起，并提名另一名内阁成员接管其职权并承担其责任。由主席向内 阁宣读后，被指控的内阁成员需以单独发言形式反驳 (Defense)，并自动开启

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时长为4分钟的正反辩论(For-Against Debate，具体操作方法请参见一般模联 规则流程)。不信任案需执行不信任投票（Vote of No-Confidence）。一旦通 过，其针对的内阁成员需离开会场，直到下一节会议才可返回内阁。每一节会 议只可有一份不信任案被通过。 2）（针对内阁整体的不信任案 Cabinet No-Confidence Proposal）此类 不信任案可导致内阁解散（Dissolution of Cabinet）和新政府的重组（Refor- mation），但也可能仅仅用于对主席及内阁的效率和公平进行质疑并使现政府 难堪（Embarrassment）。需有四分之一内阁成员签字同意才可提出，经由主 席向全场宣读后，需要一名提出者发表时长为2分钟的演讲。此后即进行不信 任投票。一旦解散内阁的不信任案通过，则自动进入内阁的解散状态，并应由 主席和签署该不信任案的内阁成员进行内阁的重组（Reformation）。

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M Bibliography 1. Wikipedia: Nuclear program of Iran 2. Wikipedia: Timeline of nuclear program of Iran, 3. The Reuters :TIMELINE-Iranian nuclear dispute, 4. http://cn.reuters.com/article/companyNewsEng/idCNL6E8FC40720120414?pa geNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0 5. http://news.163.com/12/0409/03/7UKA96MG00014AED.html#from=relevant 6. http://news.sohu.com/1/0704/62/subject220936247.shtml 7. http://news.sohu.com/20060905/n245179295.shtml 8. Wikipedia :Nuclear facilities in Iran, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_facili- ties_in_Iran 9. Global security.org: Nuclear facilities, weapons of mass destruction, 10. CCTV english :Iran’s nuclear facilities immune to cyber attacks: official, 11. CNTV.cn :Iran: Fordo nuclear facility operational soon, 12. http://news.sohu.com/s2006/ylhegongchang/index.shtml 13. http://news.sohu.com/20060306/n242142616.shtml 14. Wikipedia, Iran–Israel relations 15. L. S. Stavrianos, A Global History: From Prehistory to the 21st Century (7th Edi- tion) 16. The ADL: U.N. Agency ‘Incapable Of Acting Responsibly’ On Iranian Nuclear Threat 17. The ADL: The Iranian Nuclear Threat: Why it Matters 18. The CNN news: Iran condemns EU for delisting terror group 19. Yahoo.com:Iran executes ‘Israel spy, nuclear scientist’ killer 20. Military Technology; 2011, Vol. 35 Issue 2, p153-153, 1/8p 21. Iranian Air Force to Manufacture Third Generation QASED Missiles 22. Government State, Iranian military force, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_ tw/cis/cis_1142.html 23. Wikipedia, equipment of Iranian army, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equip- ment_of_the_Iranian_Army 24. Globalsecurity, Islamic Iranian Ground Forces, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/iran/army.htm 25. 丁工. “从伊朗核问题看伊朗的地区大国意识”阿拉伯世界研究 2010.4 (2010): 44-52. 26. 覃辉银. “伊朗在核问题上与美国的抗争解析”西亚非洲 2010.2 (2010): 48-

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54. 27. 王恩学, 张金平. “伊朗的强硬核外交政策”现代国际关系 2006.4 (2006): 12-16. 28. 王京烈.“全球安全视角下的伊朗核问题”当代世界 2010.2(2006): 27-29. 29. 段亚波. “空袭伊朗核设施：可能与现实”海陆空天惯性世界 50-59. 30. 顾国良. “美国对伊政策——伊朗核与导弹问题”美国研究 2006.1(2006): 6-27.

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