Kurdistandoff

iHenri J. Barkey

orthern has rep- thereby facilitating any future bid for resented the one success of independence. Renewed confrontations N the U.S. occupation of Iraq. with the pkk in with concomitant It is quiet and prosperous, and American increases in casualties have further soured troops are welcomed by the population the Turkish mood and have contributed there. This can all crumble in the next to the rise of xenophobic nationalism and six to nine months if Washington is not political instability in that country. careful. Neighboring Turkey, alarmed The Turks blame the for at the emergence of a Kurdish state in creating the conditions that have given northern Iraq and the presence of the rise to a potential independent Kurdish Kurdistan Workers Party (pkk) there, state. They also accuse the may throw caution to the wind by engag- of ignoring Turkish red lines on ing in a cross-border military operation. and federalism, and demands to take ac- Such an event is likely to pit , a tion against the pkk. In fact, Turks are nato ally, against both the U.S. military convinced that the United States pre- and its Kurdish allies. Fighting between fers its newfound Kurdish allies to its old Turks and in Iraq could spread to nato ally. A deputy leader in the main Turkey itself and, in the end, lead to a opposition party, Ali Topuz, went so far severe rupture in U.S.-Turkish relations. as to accuse the United States of using An unstable and violent northern Iraq the pkk as a weapon against Turkey. As would deal a fatal blow to the United a result, only 12 percent of the Turkish States’s Iraq project by accelerating, wid- public, according to a recent Pew poll, ening and deepening the current inter- holds a positive view of the United States. communal carnage. Widespread disaffection with the United Turkey, which has a sizeable and res- States—exacerbated by politicians, pun- tive Kurdish minority of its own, is fearful dits and generals—has translated into of the demonstration effect of the gains increasing public pressure for a unilateral achieved by Iraqi Kurds. It has tried to Turkish move into Iraq. resist not only Kurdish independence but Since the end of major combat opera- also Kurdish attempts at incorporating tions, the United States has been distract- the oil-rich city of Kirkuk into their area, ed by the rising insurgency in the rest of Iraq. With too few troops to protect Henri J. Barkey is the Cohen Professor of Inter- the entirety of the territory, the United national Relations at Lehigh University and a States has been thankful for the relative public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson tranquility in the north, where the Kurds Center in Washington, dc. have established a functioning adminis-

The National Interest—Jul./Aug. 2007 51 trative government. In fact, security in Kirkuk into the Kurdistan Regional Gov- the north is almost completely in Kurdish ernment (krg) through a referendum hands. Although the United States con- mandated by the Iraqi constitution to siders the pkk a terrorist organization, take place by the end of 2007. centcom, the U.S. military command In August 2006, with Turkish patience in charge of Iraq, has demurred in fight- waning, a Turkish move into northern ing the widely dispersed pkk camps along Iraq was averted by last-minute diplo- the Turkish border and in its mountain- macy and the appointment of a special ous hideouts in Qandil, deep inside Iraqi- U.S. negotiator, retired General Joseph Kurdish territory. The United States and Ralston, to work with the Turks on the Turkey have not succeeded in persuading pkk. Although both the United States Iraqi Kurds to take on the pkk. A half- and Turkey are well-aware of the stakes hearted attempt at dislodging the pkk involved, the fact remains that the con- risks the possibility of wider conflict with tinued stalemate is hostage to a flare-up the group at a time when centcom feels of violence, a miscalculation or even an it already has its share of local enemies. accident, especially now that Turkey will Residual bad blood, arising when, in be beset with uncertainty as it struggles March 2003, the Turkish parliament de- with its constitutional crisis following the clined permission to the United States to failed May presidential election. send a mechanized division from the north Washington is reportedly taking a to , has not helped matters much. more serious look at the pkk problem. Even more damaging, on July 4, 2003, There is, however, a serious risk of all the U.S. troops arrested a number of Turk- different dynamics converging to fun- ish Special Forces troops on suspicion of damentally alter the conditions in Iraq planning to assassinate the governor of and the region. Is there a strategic ap- Kirkuk province. The arrested Turks were proach that the United States can adopt then hooded and transported to Bagh- to generate a more energetic and effec- dad. The image of Turkish troops being tive way of managing this problem? The subjected to the Al-Qaeda treatment was United States should take a proactive a humiliating blow seared into the Turk- role in shaping on-the-ground events: ish psyche, and this event became em- Instead of waiting for the situation to get blematic of Turkish-American relations. out of hand, it should construct a “grand Paradoxically, few in Turkey noticed that bargain” that encompasses Turks, , the Turkish General Staff quietly retired Iraqi Kurds and the United States. or dismissed the three generals in com- mand of special forces in Iraq, perhaps urkey and the United in an indirect admission that theirs was a States share the same basic rogue operation not sanctioned by higher T medium- and long-term goals echelons in Ankara. More than three years on Iraq. They both would like to see the later, this event continues to cast its long re-emergence of a strong and secular Iraqi shadow over Turkish-American relations. state capable of holding the center and Ankara has also stepped up its attacks balancing . They differ on the internal on the approach of Iraqi Kurds to Kirkuk, arrangements that would underpin this accusing Iraqi Kurds of forcibly changing new Iraqi state. The Americans have con- the demographics of the city and mis- cluded that only a federal state can keep treating the Turkmen population, with all the different nationalities and sectarian whom Turkey has cultivated ties. It wants groups together, while Ankara still believes the United States to use its influence to and hopes that the Iraqi state should be as prevent Iraqi Kurds from incorporating centralized as before, ending the expecta-

52 The National Interest—Jul./Aug. 2007 tion of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy. But if ties and deepen the integration between current trends hold, Iraq’s future will be the two economies. There are some 1,200 determined by the separation of its three Turkish companies operating in northern communities—whether this is within a Iraq, mostly engaged in construction, but loose federation or through three inde- also in oil exploration and other services, pendent states. No amount of threats will which have generated some $2 billion alter a final outcome that may not be to in business. Some Turkish businessmen the liking of either Washington or Ankara. even expect that they will get as much as Ankara’s options are quite limited. $10 billion of a total of $15 billion worth Turkey can actively align itself with Iran of contracts the krg will issue in the next and , two other neighboring coun- three years. tries with sizable and restless Kurdish Turkey, as a hedge against Kurdish populations of their own, to prevent the ambitions in Kirkuk, has developed its Kurds from achieving their goals. Such Turkmen card. It not only championed an alignment, however, would seriously Turkmen rights but created and actively undermine Iraq’s already tenuous future supported the (itf). and run afoul of the United States and The itf has not succeeded in making the Europeans. A large anti-pkk cross- itself the voice of the Turkish-speaking border military intervention risks em- Iraqi Turkmen; it failed miserably in the broiling the Turks in a guerrilla campaign 2005 elections as the Turkmen cast their with Iraqi Kurds which, as the Americans votes for the dominant Shi‘a coalition in have discovered, they cannot win. Such Baghdad, and many even chose the Kurd- an action would have extremely serious ish alliance (50 percent of the Turkmen ramifications for Ankara’s standing with are Shi‘a and tend to vote along sectar- the United States and the eu. Moreover, ian lines). The itf proved completely Turkey’s Kurdish regions would erupt incompetent and incapable of distancing in violence were the Turks to intervene itself from its Turkish military patrons. It against their Iraqi brethren. Finally, An- polled a meager 0.87 percent of the votes, kara has also closed the door on prospec- leading to a serious re-evaluation of pol- tive amnesty for pkk fighters, other than icy by the Turkish ministry of foreign the leadership cadres, for fear of appear- affairs. Turkey, having exaggerated its ing irresolute. alarm regarding the fate of the Turkmen On the other hand, Ankara has much population, finds itself not only without to gain from a grand bargain with Iraq, an effective card to play—except perhaps Iraqi Kurds and the United States that rhetorically—but also in a bind because aims to peacefully and cooperatively the itf has become a cause célèbre of sorts resolve outstanding issues. Turkey can back home in Turkish nationalist circles. achieve many of its goals with minimum As such, it is a source of domestic po- interference in Iraq through the use of its litical pressure that opponents can wield natural assets: its buoyant economy, ac- against the government. cess to Western markets, membership in Turks in general are far more san- nato and existing oil pipeline networks. guine about the Turkmen. On a recent Turkey can offer, even if implicitly, pro- trip I took to Turkey, I asked almost ev- tection to Kurds who are fearful for their eryone I met with what their preferences future, especially given their landlocked would be for the Turkmen in the event geography. Since 2003, Kurds have had of a three-way split in Iraq along sectar- privileged investments from Turkish ian and ethnic lines. Invariably—with companies—even at the expense of Turk- very few exceptions—Turks answered ish Kurdish ones—in an effort to improve that they saw the future of the Turkmen

iKurdistandoff 53 in an . The Kurds and the Barzani, son of the legendary Kurdish Turkmen, especially with partial access to leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani, has a the local oil riches of northern Iraq, are great deal of influence over some Turk- likely to be an attractive commercial part- ish Kurds by virtue of language affinities, ner for Turkey. It is far better for Ankara conservative political outlook and history. to have a prosperous partner in northern Despite this affinity, it is not clear that Iraq than an economically poor append- Turkish Kurds also would seek indepen- age, much like today’s . dence or would fall for possible, though Oil revenues can help further consolidate improbable, irredentist games. Turkey is this relationship. Turkey’s concerns with far more prosperous, and the eu acces- respect to the Turkmen can better be ad- sion process promises to satisfy most of dressed through an arrangement with the the Turkish Kurds’ cultural and represen- Kurds because a separate Turkmen entity tational needs. For many Kurds outside is not in the cards. The krg constitu- northern Iraq, the emerging federation tion already calls for respecting minor- there represents something akin to what ity rights and languages, and Turkey can Israel means to Jews around the world. make sure that Kurds live up to these Similarly, not all Kurds desire to live in promises. northern Iraq or become part of a greater Iraqi Kurds have much to give in re- Kurdistan, but as a traumatized popula- turn: They are secular, anti-Shi‘i or Sunni tion, it is important to know that such fundamentalism, most interested in rela- a place exists where not only Kurds are tions with Turkey—and beyond it with genuinely free—but as with the Jews—it the West—and are anxious to find a pa- could be a place to flee to if necessary. tron in Ankara. Their future is very much It is in Iraqi Kurds’ interest to see the dependent on how well they connect with pkk disbanded, not just removed from Turkey. Iraqi Kurdistan can serve as a their territory. It is clear that the pkk— secular buffer zone for Turkey. As a land- or for that matter any armed rebellion— locked territory surrounded by potential- will not and cannot improve conditions ly hostile powers, such as the rump state for Turkish Kurds, and worse, it could of Iraq, Iran and Syria, Turkey will have a prevent Iraqi Kurds from consolidating great deal of leverage over the Kurds. Oil their quasi-independence—at least the pipelines from northern Iraq already flow most they have achieved to date. Dur- into Turkish ports on the Mediterranean ing the last years of his presidency in the and will continue to do so as their capac- early 1990s, Turgut Özal had succeeded ity expands, benefiting the impoverished in earning the confidence of many Turk- southeastern Turkish provinces that have ish Kurds with his overtures to the Iraqi historically been the source of the Kurd- Kurdish leadership. Iraqi Kurds were in- ish insurrections. strumental in getting the pkk, which was Moreover, a grand bargain with Iraqi near the peak of its power, for the first Kurds would have a salutary impact on time to unilaterally declare a ceasefire. Turkey’s domestic Kurdish problem. In the early 1990s, the Turks asked Turkish Kurds have always been sensitive and received the collaboration of the to developments in northern Iraq and are two Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. likely to moderate their militancy if Tur- With the Turks, they fought the pkk in key emerged as a protector of a Kurdish large and small engagements and suffered state—even an autonomous one within a serious casualties in the process. They federal Iraq. were then beholden to Turkey, which The krg, especially the Kurdistan hosted the American-led Operation Pro- Democratic Party (kdp) led by Masoud vide Comfort that prevented Saddam’s

54 The National Interest—Jul./Aug. 2007 forces from re-entering the Kurdish en- grand bargain could be a clave. Today, domestic-nationalist con- win-win proposition for all, siderations drive a war of words between A but the obstacles along the way Ankara and Iraq’s Kurds—especially Bar- could be daunting. For reasons discussed zani—over Kirkuk. The accusations and below, its realization will require extensive acrimony have served only to increase behind-the-scenes diplomacy, preparation tensions further and prevent dialogue. of the respective publics in both Turkey Nonetheless, the Iraqi Kurds are the and northern Iraq and a commitment by only ones who have any chance of pre- the United States to see it through. Both vailing on the pkk and its support base the Turks and Kurds will have to make to abandon both the armed struggle and some substantial commitments and sacri- Iraq. The success of the Kurdish experi- fices of their own in the negotiations. ment in northern Iraq is far too important At the beginning of the Iraq War, the to Turkish Kurds to jeopardize. Barzani Turks had made it clear that a robust fed- and Iraqi President , also a eral Kurdish autonomous region in the veteran Kurdish leader, can exercise their north was unacceptable to them. With considerable influence to whittle away at changes on the ground and the introduc- the pkk and isolate its leadership. They tion of the new Iraqi constitution, which are unlikely to let the pkk stand in their delineated the Kurdish region, they were way of concluding a genuine deal with obliged to soften their stand. Ankara, even if this means engaging in Nevertheless, their fear of their own military action against pkk fighters who Kurdish minority—estimated at 20 per- refuse to quit. cent of their population—is as neuralgic as What is in it for the United States? it is existential. Since the inception of the An agreement between Iraqi Kurds and Turkish republic in 1923, Turkish Kurds, Turkey would help defuse a deteriorating in one form of upheaval or another, have situation and prevent northern Iraq from agitated for greater rights and recogni- resembling the rest of that country. Simi- tion. These efforts at times assumed a larly, as the most corrosive dimension violent character, as with the pkk-led in- of the U.S.-Turkish relationship, such surgency in the 1980s and 1990s, or more a deal would halt the slide in relations often than not have followed a path of with Turkey, arguably the United States’s increased political mobilization. Either single most important strategic ally in form of activity has been seen as danger- the region. Such an accord would also ous by the state, which until a little more strengthen Washington’s hand in dealing than a decade ago had refused to acknowl- with Iraq’s other meddlesome neighbors edge the Kurds’ existence. by denying them Turkey’s possible al- The fear of further Kurdish mobiliza- legiance or cooperation. In other words, tion in Turkey has hampered Ankara’s co- Turkey would help anchor stability in operation with the krg. Ankara has tried Iraq. The more the United States can its best to ignore the krg’s existence on negotiate accords designed to enhance the grounds that the Iraqi constitution local stability, the easier it will be to dis- has yet to assume its final and definite entangle itself from Iraq in the future. shape. The outgoing Turkish President For both the Iraqi government and the Ahmet Necdet Sezer, despite the Turk- United States, a deal with Turkey is more ish government’s entreaties, has obsti- likely to satisfy the Kurds’ long-term nately refused to invite Iraqi President needs and reduce the risk of separation in Talabani to Ankara simply because the the context of a loose federation. latter is a Kurd from northern Iraq. The Turkish Chief of the General Staff, Yasar

iKurdistandoff 55 Büyükanıt, forced the cancellation of an Although Turkish officials do not seem to unofficial meeting between the Turk- contemplate alternative outcomes to a uni- ish foreign minister and the krg Prime fied Iraq, almost no one in Turkey believes Minister Nechrivan Barzani by publicly that the United States will be able to halt admonishing his government for meeting the country’s spiraling deterioration. with people who he claimed were “sup- The second is the increasing civil- porting the pkk militarily.” military tensions, pitting Prime Minister A compromise over Kirkuk lies at the Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s moderate Islamist heart of any solution. A first step over Justice and Development Party (akp) the sharing of existing oil revenues has against a secular military-civilian coali- been taken between the Kurds and the tion determined to prevent him and his Iraqi government. There remain differ- party from controlling the presidency. In ences over future oil finds that will have fact, this coalition has already succeeded to be worked out. In view of some Turk- in preventing the election of Abdullah Gül mens’ anxieties and Ankara’s objections to the presidency and forced new parlia- to the manner in which the incorporation mentary elections in July with the help of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan is planned, of a midnight military memorandum. It the Kurds have to expend some energy is quite possible that this may turn into a providing ironclad assurances to the Turk- “rolling coup” of sorts as the military and men and other non-Kurdish minorities. civilian elites accelerate their insurgent This may require special constitutional ar- tactics in the event the akp emerges victo- rangements for the city itself—as opposed rious from the upcoming polls. to the province—that include cultural and For the civilian and military establish- political rights for all minorities. In this ment and its allies, the akp and the Kurds context, the referendum should be post- represent the most pressing dangers facing poned. It is unrealistic to expect that all the republic—Islamic fundamentalism and the prerequisites for holding it, such as the separatism. These domestic tensions are normalization of Kirkuk—which includes being played out against the backdrop of a the redrawing of provincial boundaries to nationalist revival, increasing xenophobia correct for Saddam’s ethnic manipulation and anti-Western feelings. Turks are being and the conducting of a census—can be fed a daily barrage of news that not only accomplished in an orderly manner before accentuates these sentiments, but recounts the end of the year. Here, it is important and warns of massacres of Turkmen in that the Kurds agree to its postponement Iraq, whether in Kirkuk or . for technical reasons, not because of for- While uncomfortable with both the eign or domestic threats, and without con- presence of the pkk in Iraq and the con- ceding the constitutional principle under- tinuing threat to the country’s political lying the reason for the referendum. stability and economic well-being that The confluence of two sets of devel- the domestic pkk cadres signify, the akp’s opments has the potential to accelerate approach to the totality of the Kurdish the derailment of U.S.-Turkish relations problem is more nuanced than that of the in Iraq and beyond. The first is the un- armed forces and the hard-line civilian certainty over future U.S. intentions in opposition. The akp is far more will- Iraq, the outcome of the surge and the ing to experiment with a broadening of possibility of U.S. troop withdrawal or re- Kurdish participation than is the military. deployment to Iraq’s borders. The surge is For all these reasons, the Iraq dos- viewed in Turkey as increasing the Kurds’ sier has come to represent the govern- influence, since Baghdad relies on them to ment’s Achilles heel. It is vulnerable to provide extra forces to secure the capital. accusations of being soft on Iraqi Kurds,

56 The National Interest—Jul./Aug. 2007 the United States and the pkk presence impact on the Turkish domestic political in Iraq. Unable to undermine its over- scene, and the United States has to not whelming parliamentary majority, the only impress upon the Kurds the pre- anti-akp establishment has tried to force cariousness of their current situation but the government’s hand to initiate some also make use of its considerable influ- kind of cross-border military operation ence with the krg to change its tactics. against the express will of the U.S. mili- The krg’s strategic imperative requires tary in Iraq and Iraqi Kurds. The govern- it to get along with Ankara, and it is in ment—especially the prime minister—has serious need of a “charm offensive” there. contributed to these tensions by adopting To be fair to Barzani and Iraqi Kurds, a combative stance of its own. Erdogan, the Turkish discussion of them is equally in order to protect his nationalist flank, provocative and unhelpful. While this is has publicly said that Turkey would not something both the Iraqi and the U.S. remain a spectator to events in Kirkuk, governments recognize, it is only likely to thereby raising the specter of an interven- change with increased cooperation. tion and outpacing the military. It is the Turks who have to execute American efforts at handling the intri- the most important and, admittedly, con- cate problem of northern Iraq have been ceptually difficult somersault. In a year stepped up with the appointment of Gen- of elections—and with the public riled up eral Ralston. He and his Turkish coun- about the division of Iraq and the emer- terpart—retired General Edip Baser who gence of an independent Kurdish state— was recently fired—have sought ways to to argue almost the opposite takes a leap improve dialogue and intelligence coop- of faith. Working with Iraqi Kurds is not a eration between the Turkish and Ameri- new idea, and while Özal was perhaps the can bureaucracies. Ralston has managed first to experiment with it, others, most to raise the issue’s salience with the White notably Turkish National Intelligence Or- House, and as one former senior U.S. ganization Chief Emre Taner, undertook diplomat commented, “his real job is to such an initiative in 2006 that the military convince centcom of this issue’s im- rebuffed. Clearly, Turkey is in need of portance.” Ralston’s appointment bought building a broad societal consensus, which Washington some time and dissuaded must include its powerful military estab- the Turks from militarily intervening in lishment. The latter has to be convinced northern Iraq against the pkk in 2006. that with the end of the pkk, Turkish It is in this context that a new American Kurds will not seek federal arrangements promise of action was delivered recently or independence. This is a tall order, but to Ankara. The Turks, especially the Turk- all parties need to start somewhere. ish army, would very much prefer if the The gain for the United States not- United States, with the help of its Kurdish withstanding, there still is the construc- allies, were to deal with the pkk by force, tion of such a bargain. Given its sensi- either by decapitating the organization’s tivity and urgency, Washington has to leadership or eliminating it altogether. approach this problem on multiple fronts Failing that, they would like the right to by engaging ngos as well as officials begin a sustained cross-border operation from either side. At the official level, the of their own. Ralston mission can be one of the spokes, The Kurds have assumed erroneously but it needs to be supplemented by paral- that their privileged position in Iraq pro- lel efforts that feed ideas and solutions tects them from the vagaries of both U.S. into the process. With the rapidly chang- and Turkish policies. krg President Bar- ing situation in Iraq, Washington cannot zani’s discourse has had an inflammatory afford to waste time and opportunities. n

iKurdistandoff 57