DOCSLIB.ORG

NAVAL AVIATION STRIKE WEAPONS New Frontiers in Warfighting

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
NAVAL AVIATION STRIKE WEAPONS New Frontiers in Warfighting NAVAL AVIATION STRIKE WEAPONS New Frontiers in Warfighting Presented To: Air Armament Symposium RADM T. Heely Program Executive Officer Strike Weapons and Unmanned Aviation 12-13 October 2004 Navair Networking For Sea Trial And Sea Enterprise F/A-18 AWL ACETEF IBAR MBC INTEGRATION BOEING - SEATTLE LABS PATUXE NAS FALLON ABERDEEN CHINA LAKE EDWARDS AFB JNTF - COLORADO BOEING - ST. LOUIS E-2C ESTEL SPRINGS NT RI LAND RANGE FORT IRWIN NTC MCB - QUANTICO MCB - 29 PALMS JFCOM CHARLESTON VER RAYTHEON - TUCSON LOCKHEED - FORT WORTH MBC EGLIN AFB INTEGRATION LAB TRAINING SYSTEMS P-3C DIVISION - ORLANDO F-14 WSIC SEA RANGE CURRENT DNET NODES POTENTIAL DNET NODES TRAINING SYSTEMS MARITIME BATTLE CENTER INTEGRATION LABS POINT MUGU ATR SEA POWER 21 Naval Aviation Capabilities SEA STRIKE SEA SHIELD SEA BASING • TIME SENSITIVE STRIKE • THEATER AIR & MISSILE • ACCELERATED DEPLOYMENT & • PERSISTENT ISR DEFENSE EMPLOYMENT TIME • ELECTRONIC WARFARE / • LITTORAL SEA CONTROL • ENHANCED SEA-BORNE INFORMATION OPERATIONS • HOMELAND DEFENSE POSITIONING OF JOINT ASSETS • SHIP-TO-OBJECTIVE MANEUVER • FORCE ENTRY ENABLING • OFFENSIVE & DEFENSIVE POWER •COVERT STRIKE PROJECTION • INTEGRATED JOINT LOGISTICS • COMMAND AND CONTROL NAVALNAVAL AVIATIONAVIATION CAPABILITIESCAPABILITIES WARFIGHTER InInforformattiion & Knowleddgge Advantage SEA SHIELD DECISION AIDS WEAPONS Homellaanndd DefDefense SPACE COCONUSNUS Effecctts-s-Basseed Opereratiionsns SENSORS Persiisstent IInnttelllligigenencece NETWORKS AIR SuSurvrveillllanccee & FORCENETNET Reconnaissanance FORCE SEA STRIKE Seea-a-Based Operatiions TTiime CCrititicicaall TTarargetts SEA SHORE AAsssurreded AAccess SEABED SEA BASING FORCENET Miine CCountterrmeaseasuurreses ACQUISITION & LIFE CYCLE SUPPORT SENSORS NETWORKS WEAPONS PLATFORMS •ATFLIR AESA • SH-60R • WIDE BAND •CDL-N • JASSM • AIM-120 • CVN 21 • E-2C PHASE II MMRS NETWORK •JMPS •JSOW, AMRAAM •AEA ADV. HAWK. •SHARP P3I (SAR/PD) •LINK 16 •CEC / JCTN AARGM/QB P3I • F/A-18C/D/E/F •E-6B • AEA DIGITAL SYS •RMP P3I •JSIP-N •TBMCS •JDAM/HART •AIM-9X •JSF •MMA •MMA •AQS-22 FOLLOW-ON • JC-2, IT-21, •DAGR/LOGIR • TOMAHAWK •UCAV-N • MH-60R & S •JMOD II NMCI •JCM PF27804a Sea Strike Weapons Roadmap N78 1Q 2004 (POM 06) TODAY FYDP 2012 2020 LR TACTOM SLAM ER Standoff SLAM ER (HSW) SLAM ER TLAM Blk III / TACTOM TLAM Blk III / TACTOM JSOW MR JSOW “A” JSOW “A” and “C” JSOW Standoff AARGM AARGM HARM BLK V HARM BLK V and AARGM SDB II SDB II Maverick JDAM Maverick JDAM Direct LGB JDAM JDAM 82, 83, 84 JCM, APKWS Attack LGB, GBU-24 GBU 24, LGB GP Bombs JCM, APKWS GP Bombs 2.75”/5.00” ROCKET, GP Bombs APKWS, GP Bombs DA Moving/ GP Bombs, LGB JCM JCM MobileTarget JCM SDB II SDB II HELLFIRE TOW / HELLFIRE Sea Strike Weapons Roadmap Major Roles & Responsibilities CNO MAJCOMS SYSCOMS Tech. Base (N702,N75,N76/77/78,APW) (NSWAC, MAWTS,CFFC, (NAVAIR,NAVSEA) (Labs, Industry, Acad.) MCCDC,NWDC,COCOMS) Capability Materiel RFI Gaps Sea Strike Requirements Materiel Options NCDP Capability SP21 Roadmap IRAD POM CRAD Sea Trial SnT P3I NCDP COTS Sea Strike Sea Strike Weapons Capability Roadmap Roadmap Proposed Materiel Prioritized Materiel Opportunities Solutions Solutions PF27804a Time Sensitive Targeting • Weapons bodies are robust and effective – Exception is HSW • Existing weapons need forcenet enablers – WDL – Dual-mode Programs – MIDEF TST – ATR • Kill Chain needs work – Almost all the tools are there ¾CID is weak – COAC is choke point Kill Chain ¾JEFX04 TSTTST isis NOTNOT justjust aa weapon,weapon, itit isis aa KILLKILL CHAINCHAIN PF27804a Mission Flow THIS IS FORCENET FIND FIX TRACK TARGET ENGAGE ASSESS PRE-PLANNED FIXED JIPTL DPSS JDAM National THROUGH WX SOF PSS-OFF SOF SOF JDAM SOF THIRD PARTY Predator DPSS Predator GCCS JDAM ATARS MOBILE Global Global THROUGH WX Raindrop DCGS HSW TARPS Hawk Hawk SELF TGT MOVING AESA/GMTI AESA/GMTI AESA/GMTI AESA/GMTI JCM National THROUGH WX CAOC: Self tgt STILL CID BDA cited by COCOMS as Bugsplat involves Chain of not effective during CID CAOC custody OIF/OEF Information was Clearance to analysis / collected but CAOC was Engage clearance to not capable of analyzing fire 700 combat sorties / day THESE ARE PROGRAMS FORCENETFORCENET isis thethe linklink thatthat codifiescodifies thethe killkill chainchain PF27804a Mission Planning And Targeting: PGM Support & FORCEnet Roadmap TODAY: FY03-04: FY06-10: ENTERPRISE PROGRAM SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS CONSOLIDATED SYSTEMS FORCEnet ARCHITECTURE TES-N TIS COMMON S/W APPS GROUND S/W APPS ISRISR TCS OS STATION S/W APPS MANAGEMEMANAGEMENTNT BGHPES SRMT GCCS-M COP S/W APPS SINGLE S/W APPS INTELINTEL TES COP COP S/W APPS EXEXPLOPLOIITTAATTIIOONN S/W APPS JASSM PTM OS PTW DPSS COMMCOMMANDANDEERR’’SS JOINT PRECISION S/W APPS DECDECIISIONSION // FORCEFORCE DIWS TARGETING TOOLS S/W APPS NETWORKING ASSIGNMEASSIGNMENTNT S/W APPS TAMPS TEAMS MMIISSIONSSION JOINT MISSION S/W APPS S/W APPS OS PLPLAANNNNIINNGG PFPS PLANNER AANNDD TARGETARGETTINGING S/W APPS TOMAHAWK TPS S/W APPS PLANNER LPMP PF27804a Tomahawk Weapons System First to the Fight since 1991 Event Date Total Desert Storm Jan-91 288 Southern Watch (Zaafaraniyah) Jan-93 45 Bushwacker (Intel Center) Jan-93 23 Deliberate Force (Bosnia) Sep-95 13 Desert Strike Sep-96 31 Desert Fox Dec-98 330 Allied Force (thru 5/5/99) Mar-May 99 218 Enduring Freedom Oct 01-Pres 82 Operation Iraqi Freedom Mar 03-Pres 803 • 1900 missiles launched in combat since 1991 (160/year) • OIF and OEF – 898 missiles launched in OIF/OEF (US and UK) – Loaded 1525 Tomahawks on 49 platforms in support of 7 Strike Groups Deploying to OIF – Cross-decked 110 missiles in theater during OIF – First time Tomahawk employed as tactical vice strategic weapon due to reduction in mission planning timelines • Timeline reduced by a factor of 9 from Tomahawk IOC to present • Thru-put increased by factor of 5 from Tomahawk IOC to present – 300% improvement in Submarine System Reliability from Desert Strike to OIF PF27804a Operation Iraqi Freedom • Block III Missile increasingly versatile, accessible & employable • 803 TLAM’s launched (US/UK) in 3 weeks • 381 TLAMs launched in 48 hour period (21/22 Mar) – 288 TLAMs launched in Desert Storm, 230 TLAMs in Allied Force – 37 ships & subs • Increased weapons responsiveness - ~90% reliable – 36% of all missions launched < 24 hours from mission tasking • Increased planning forward deployed – 7 APS Dets planned 267 of 802 missions • Efficient planning – Federated targeting plan – GPS accuracy was good enough – FOR TODAY – Rapid execution – Missiles spun up, ready for launch – Shorter ranges, frequently routes planned direct to target – Net-Meeting used as rapid planning, status and execution decision aid 1 Month – IOC/1986 Moving1 week in – righDesertt Stdirectionorm/1991 ; Block IV 1/will2 da yg –eItr auqis Fr theeedom/ rest200 o3 f the way 5 minutes – TACTOM/2004 PF27804a JW1 TacticalTactical TomahawkTomahawk WeaponWeapon SystemSystem OverviewOverview External UHF GPS AUR IOC: May 2004 Communications SATCOM Global Information Strike Planning, Inflight Retargeting Grid (GIG) Coordination, Missile H&S, Position COE Execution, and BDI, BDII Information Operational Reporting. TCI MILSATCOM Command Distribution Tasking, Coordination, TTWCS and (Tactical Tomahawk Weapon TC2S Control System) Reporting (Tomahawk Command and Control System) qom SYRI A IRAQ Baghdad JORDAN AFGHA NISTAN Esf aha n IRAN Yaz d Ahr a z 30 Kerman Raf ha KU WAIT Shiraz Ki ng Khalid Bushire Military City PAKISTAN Tayma Ling eh Dhahran BAHRAIN AUR Ja sk 25 Du bai Huf of Ad-Da wha h Medina QATAR Abu Dha bi Riyadh EM IR A T ES Matra Masqat qom SYRI A Sur IRAQ Baghdad SAU DI AR ABIA Ji d da h Mecca JORDAN AFGHA NISTAN OM AN Esf aha n I RAN 20 Yaz d Ahr a z 30 Kerman 40 45 50 55 60 65 Raf ha KU WAIT Shiraz Ki ng Khalid Bushire Military City PAKISTAN (All-Up-Round) Tayma Ling eh Dhahran BAHRAIN Ja sk 25 Du bai Huf of Ad-Da wha h Medina QATAR Abu Dha bi Riyadh EM IR A T ES Matra Ma sq at 53 Sur SAU DI AR ABIA Ji d da h Mecca OM AN 20 40 45 50 55 60 65 PTW APS MDS TMPC Imagery Tactical Tomahawk Weapon System Tactical Picture, Imagery Tactical Threat Data Threat and Mapping, Imagery Charting & qom SYRI A IRAQ Baghdad JORDAN IRAN AFGHA NISTAN Target Esf aha n Yaz d Ahr a z 30 Kerman Raf ha KU WAIT Shiraz Ki ng Khalid Bushire Military City PAKISTAN Tayma Ling eh Dhahran BAHRAIN Ja sk 25 Du bai Huf of Ad-Da wha h Me di n a QATAR Abu Dha bi Geodesy Riyadh EM IR A T ES Ma tra Sources Ma sq at Sur SAU DI AR ABIA Ji d da h Me cca OM AN qom 20 Data SYRI A IRAQ Baghdad JORDAN AFGHA NISTAN 40 45 50 55 60 Esf aha n IRAN 65 Yaz d Ahr a z GCCS-M 30 Kerman Raf ha KU WAIT Shiraz Ki ng Khalid Bushire Military City PAKISTAN Tayma Ling eh Dhahran BAHRAIN Ja sk 25 Du bai Huf of Ad-Da wha h Medina QATAR Abu Dha bi Riyadh EM IR A T ES Matra Masqat Sur SAU DI AR ABIA Ji d da h Mecca OM AN National 20 40 45 50 55 60 65 JIC (Shipboard) Imagery Sources NGA PF27804a Slide 11 JW1 TTWS uses COE and and GCCS/M for its C4I sources and has completed all appropriate interoperability tests while connected to the current generation networks. With the exception of TSN, all external communications are through the existing data links on whatever platform the system is installed. Jeff Winston, 3/15/2004 Tactical Tomahawk Mission Profile Tasking New Capabilities with Block IV Tactical Picture GPS Data Targeting Data Ashore Planning Anti-jam BDI Platform GPS Health and Tasking Planning Status Image Imagery Preplanned Inflight Retargeting Defenses Missions Loiter Mission Map Data TERCOM Tactics Weapon Control Backup Tailored Alternate Missions Target
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Cruise Missiles Post World War II
    Cruise missiles milestones MILE post STONES World War II Dr Carlo Kopp THE BASIC TECHNOLOGY AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF MODERN CRUISE MISSILES EMERGED DURING THE LATE 1960S, at the peak of the Cold War era. This type of weapon was exemplified by the RGM-109 Tomahawk series, the AGM-86C/D CALCM, the AGM-158 JASSM, and the Russian Kh-55SM Granat. Much less known is the generation of cruise missile technology that supplanted the 1940s era FZG-76/V-1 and its Russian and American clone variants. A good number of the former Soviet weapons of this generation remain in use, some still in production. The aim of all cruise missile designs is to provide a weapon that can strike at a target while not exposing the launch platform to attack by enemy defences, whether the launch platform is an aircraft, surface warship, submarine or ground vehicle. Key parameters in the design of any cruise missile are its standoff range, its accuracy and its survivability against target defences. Increasing standoff range reduces risk to the launch platform while increasing accuracy and survivability reduces the number of launches required to achieve desired effect. The economics of bombardment are simple: the more expensive the weapon employed, the smaller the war stock available for combat at any time, and the longer it takes to replenish this war stock once expended. Northrop SM-62 Snark strategic cruise missile. This enormous 50,000 lb plus GLCM was built to directly attack the Soviet Union from US basing. It introduced the fi rst stellar-inertial guidance system in a cruise missile.
    [Show full text]
  • GAO WEAPONS ACQUISITION Precision Guided Munitions In
    United States General Accounting Office GAO Report to Congressional Committees June 1995 WEAPONS ACQUISITION Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development GAO/NSIAD-95-95 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-260458 June 23, 1995 Congressional Committees The military services are spending billions of dollars to acquire new and improved munitions whose technical sophistication allows guidance corrections during their flight to the target. These weapons are referred to as precision guided munitions (PGM). We reviewed Air Force, Navy, and Army munitions programs in inventory, production, and development that could be defined as using precision guidance to attack surface targets.1 Our objectives were to determine (1) the costs and quantities planned for the PGMs, (2) the services rationale for initiating PGM development programs, (3) options available to the services to attack surface targets with PGMs, and (4) the extent to which the services are jointly developing and procuring PGMs. We conducted this work under our basic legislative responsibilities and plan to use this baseline report in planning future work on Defense-wide issues affecting the acquisition and effectiveness of PGMs. We are addressing the report to you because we believe it will be of interest to your committees. PGMs employ various guidance methods to enhance the probability of Background hitting the target. These include target location information from a human designator, global positioning system (GPS) satellites, an inertial navigation system, a terminal seeker on the munition, or a combination of these sources. Since PGMs can correct errors in flight, the services expect to need fewer rounds to achieve the same or higher probabilities of kill as unguided weapons.
    [Show full text]
  • Aircraft Collection
    A, AIR & SPA ID SE CE MU REP SEU INT M AIRCRAFT COLLECTION From the Avenger torpedo bomber, a stalwart from Intrepid’s World War II service, to the A-12, the spy plane from the Cold War, this collection reflects some of the GREATEST ACHIEVEMENTS IN MILITARY AVIATION. Photo: Liam Marshall TABLE OF CONTENTS Bombers / Attack Fighters Multirole Helicopters Reconnaissance / Surveillance Trainers OV-101 Enterprise Concorde Aircraft Restoration Hangar Photo: Liam Marshall BOMBERS/ATTACK The basic mission of the aircraft carrier is to project the U.S. Navy’s military strength far beyond our shores. These warships are primarily deployed to deter aggression and protect American strategic interests. Should deterrence fail, the carrier’s bombers and attack aircraft engage in vital operations to support other forces. The collection includes the 1940-designed Grumman TBM Avenger of World War II. Also on display is the Douglas A-1 Skyraider, a true workhorse of the 1950s and ‘60s, as well as the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk and Grumman A-6 Intruder, stalwarts of the Vietnam War. Photo: Collection of the Intrepid Sea, Air & Space Museum GRUMMAN / EASTERNGRUMMAN AIRCRAFT AVENGER TBM-3E GRUMMAN/EASTERN AIRCRAFT TBM-3E AVENGER TORPEDO BOMBER First flown in 1941 and introduced operationally in June 1942, the Avenger became the U.S. Navy’s standard torpedo bomber throughout World War II, with more than 9,836 constructed. Originally built as the TBF by Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, they were affectionately nicknamed “Turkeys” for their somewhat ungainly appearance. Bomber Torpedo In 1943 Grumman was tasked to build the F6F Hellcat fighter for the Navy.
    [Show full text]
  • NSIAD-95-95 Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions
    United States General Accounting Offhe -GAO Report to Congressional Committees June 1996 GAO/NSL4D-95-96 .-- _.-- United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-260458 June 23,1995 Congressional Committees The military services are spending billions of dollars to acquire new and improved munitions whose technical sophistication allows guidance corrections during their flight to the target. These weapons are referred to as precision guided munitions (PGM). We reviewed Air Force, Navy, and Army munitions programs in inventory, production, and development that could be defined as using precision guidance to attack surface targets.’ Our objectives were to determine (1) the costs and quantities planned for the PGMS, (2) the services rationale for initiating PGM development programs, (3) options available to the services to attack surface targets with PGMs, and (4) the extent to which the services are jointly developing and procuring PGMS. We conducted this work under our basic legislative responsibilities and plan to use this baseline report in planning future work on Defense-wide issues affecting the acquisition and effectiveness of PGMS. We are addressing the report to you because we believe it will be of interest to your committees. -ll.._-~ PGMS employ various guidance methods to enhance the probability of Background hitting the target. These include target location information from a human designator, global positioning system (GPS) satellites, an inertial navigation system, a terminal seeker on the munition, or a combination of these sources. Since PGMs can correct errors in flight, the services expect to need fewer rounds to achieve the same or higher probabilities of kill as unguided weapons, Additionally, the services expect PGM accuracy and lethality to reduce the number of launch platforms and soldiers required to counter specific targets.
    [Show full text]
  • = X51 = Modern Air Combat Introduction Manual
    = X51 = Modern Air Combat Introduction Manual =X51= WAZZERBOSH Version 1.1 – 2020.05.10 DO NOT REDISTRIBUTE Table of Contents Introduction...........................................................................................................................................2 Comms Brevity and Glossary.................................................................................................................4 Systems..................................................................................................................................................8 Radar.................................................................................................................................................8 Radar Warning Receiver..................................................................................................................11 Radar Jamming................................................................................................................................11 Countermeasures............................................................................................................................11 ELINT................................................................................................................................................12 IFF....................................................................................................................................................12 Air to Air Weapons..............................................................................................................................13
    [Show full text]
  • Optimizing Selection of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles
    Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1998-03 Optimizing selection of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles Kuykendall, Scott D. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32721 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS OPTIMIZING SELECTION OF TOMAHAWK CRmSE MISSILES by Scott D. Kuykendall March, 1998 Thesis Advisor: Richard E. Rosenthal Second Reader: George W. Conner r • Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED--- a REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED March 1998 Master's Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS OPTIMIZING SELECTION OF TOMAHAWK CRUISE MISSILES 6. AUTHOR(S) Kuykendall, Scott D. 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) ANDADDRESS(ES) REPORT NUMBER Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons
    CHILD POLICY This PDF document was made available CIVIL JUSTICE from www.rand.org as a public service of EDUCATION the RAND Corporation. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE Jump down to document6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit POPULATION AND AGING research organization providing PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY objective analysis and effective SUBSTANCE ABUSE solutions that address the challenges TERRORISM AND facing the public and private sectors HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND around the world. INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Project AIR FORCE View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Test and Evaluation Trends and Costs for Aircraft and Guided Weapons Bernard Fox, Michael Boito, John C.Graser, Obaid Younossi Prepared for the United States Air Force Approved for public release, distribution unlimited The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-01-C-0003.
    [Show full text]
  • Tomahawk Deconfliction: an Exercise in System Engineering
    TOMAHAWK DECONFLICTION Tomahawk Deconfliction: An Exercise in System Engineering Ann F. Pollack, Robert C. Ferguson, and Andreas K. Chrysostomou I mprovements to the navigational and timing accuracy of the Tomahawk Block III missile resulted in the need to deconflict missiles, that is, to prevent missile-to-missile interference during flight. The Applied Physics Laboratory identified the potential risks resulting from the missile’s increased accuracy, quantified the resulting probability of collision, and identified a deconfliction solution. This effort required a broad system knowledge of Tomahawk and its supporting systems. Because so many different factors influence deconfliction—from Global Positioning System accuracy to overall engine performance—the solution must continue to be evaluated as the weapon system evolves. The Laboratory continues to educate users about deconfliction, to monitor its effective use, and to analyze the potential effects on deconfliction of weapon system developments. This ongoing system engineering effort assures the continued effective- ness of the Tomahawk deconfliction solution. (Keywords: Deconfliction, Fratricide, Tomahawk.) INTRODUCTION The Tomahawk Block III missile was first used op- understanding of all Tomahawk system components, erationally in Bosnia on 10 September 1995. The from mission planning to the weapon control system to onboard software automatically determined a small the missile itself. As the Tomahawk system evolves, route offset for each missile. These offsets deconflicted APL continues to evaluate the deconfliction solution the missiles, preventing missile-to-missile interference against new developments to assure that it continues during flight. Without automatic deconfliction, some of to protect against missile interference. these missiles probably would not have reached their The question of missile deconfliction was raised targets.
    [Show full text]
  • ASROC with Systems
    Naval Nuclear Weapons Chapter Eight Naval Nuclear Weapons The current program to modernize and expand U.S. deployed within the Navy (see Table 8.1) include anti- Naval forces includes a wide variety of nuclear weapons submarine warfare rockets (both surface (ASROC with systems. The build-up, according to the Department of W44) and subsurface launched (SUBROC with W55)), Defense, seeks "increased and more diversified offensive anti-air missiles (TERRIER with W45), and bombs and striking power.. increased attention to air defense . depth charges (B43, B57, and B61) used by a variety of [and] improvements in anti-submarine warfare."' The aircraft and helicopters, both carrier and land based (see plan is to build-up to a "600-ship Navy" concentrating Chapters Four and Se~en).~ on "deployable battle forces." Numerous new ships will The various nuclear weapons systems that are under be built, centered around aircraft carrier battle groups, development or are being considered for tactical naval surface groups, and attack submarines. New, more capa- nuclear warfare include: ble anti-air warfare ships, such as the TICONDEROGA (CG-47) class cruiser and BURKE (DDG-51) class  A new surface-to-air missile nuclear war- destroyers, will be deployed. New nuclear weapons and head (W81) for the STANDARD-2 missile, launching systems, as well as nuclear capable aircraft soon to enter production, carrier based forces, form a major part of the program. A long-range, land-attack nuclear armed As of March 1983, the nuclear armed ships of the U.S. Sea-Launched
    [Show full text]
  • Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, July-October 1995
    Missile Developments BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, JULY-OCTOBER 1995 CONTENTS OVERVIEW, 158 BRAZIL CROATIA Saudi Arabia, 167 Internal Developments, 162 Internal Developments, 165 Taiwan, 167 AFGHANISTAN with with Internal Developments, 160 GERMANY Argentina, 160 Russia, 165 with Internal Developments, 167 France, Germany, Italy, United States, 165 Pakistan, 160 with Russia, and U.S., 163 CZECH REPUBLIC Australia and U.S., 160 ARGENTINA Germany, 164 with Brazil, 163, 164 with India, Israel, and PRC, 164 Belarus, NATO, Russia, and Canada, Netherlands, Spain, Brazil, 160 MTCR, 181 Ukraine, 161 and U.S., 164 Russia, 164 AUSTRALIA France, Italy, and United Ukraine, 164 ECUADOR Internal Developments, 160 Kingdom, 166 United States, 164 with with France, Italy, and U.S., 166 Azores and Slovakia, 161 Germany and U.S., 160 BRUNEI India, 167 Russia, 160 Internal Developments, 164 EGYPT Iraq, 168 Russia and Sweden, 161 with Japan and U.S., 168 CANADA Kuwait, 166 MTCR, 181 AZORES with PRC, 166 Netherlands and NATO, 168 with Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Spain, 166 Netherlands, NATO, and Ecuador and Slovakia, 161 and U.S., 164 United States, 166 U.S., 168 BAHRAIN CHILE Netherlands and U.S., 168 EUROPEAN UNION Internal Developments, 161 with Russia, 168 Internal Developments, 166 Mauritius, 164 Syria, 168 BELARUS United Kingdom, 165 FRANCE United States, 168 with with Czech Republic, NATO, COMMONWEALTH OF HUNGARY Brazil, 163 Russia, and Ukraine, 161 INDEPENDENT STATES with CIS, South Africa,
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I 3 Stockpile
    3 Stockpile Chapter Three USNuclear Stockpile This section describes the 24 types of warheads cur- enriched uranium (oralloy) as its nuclear fissile material rently in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. As of 1983, the total and is considered volatile and unsafe. As a result, its number of warheads was an estimated 26,000. They are nuclear materials and fuzes are kept separately from the made in a wide variety of configurations with over 50 artillery projectile. The W33 can be used in two differ- different modifications and yields. The smallest war- ent yield configurations and requires the assembly and head is the man-portable nuclear land mine, known as insertion of distinct "pits" (nuclear materials cores) with the "Special Atomic Demolition Munition" (SADM). the amount of materials determining a "low" or '4high'' The SADM weighs only 58.5 pounds and has an explo- yield. sive yield (W54) equivalent to as little as 10 tons of TNT, In contrast, the newest of the nuclear warheads is the The largest yield is found in the 165 ton TITAN I1 mis- W80,5 a thermonuclear warhead built for the long-range sile, which carries a four ton nuclear warhead (W53) Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and first deployed equal in explosive capability to 9 million tons of TNT, in late 1981. The W80 warhead has a yield equivalent to The nuclear weapons stockpile officially includes 200 kilotons of TNT (more than 20 times greater than the only those nuclear missile reentry vehicles, bombs, artil- W33), weighs about the same as the W33, utilizes the lery projectiles, and atomic demolition munitions that same material (oralloy), and, through improvements in are in "active service."l Active service means those electronics such as fuzing and miniaturization, repre- which are in the custody of the Department of Defense sents close to the limits of technology in building a high and considered "war reserve weapons." Excluded are yield, safe, small warhead.
    [Show full text]
  • Long-Range Precision-Strike Cruise Missiles in Nato Operations
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2014-03 Long-range precision-strike cruise missiles inNATO operations Jones, Antonio T. Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/41399 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS LONG-RANGE PRECISION-STRIKE CRUISE MISSILES IN NATO OPERATIONS by Antonio T. Jones March 2014 Thesis Advisor: David S. Yost Second Reader: Mikhail Tsypkin Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED March 2014 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS LONG-RANGE PRECISION-STRIKE CRUISE MISSILES IN NATO OPERATIONS 6. AUTHOR(S) Antonio T. Jones 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943–5000 9.
    [Show full text]