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SRMN—005 U. S. NAVY OP—20—G FILE OF MEMORANDA AND REPORTS RELATING TO THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY Z3S!FED per ‘rt 3, . 0. 12$.G cj rector, NSA/Cf, —-—. • CSS U 0 REVIEWER’S NOTE: The first review of this document as conducted by personneL of the U. S. Navy. The original cLass ified versions were retained by then and have been pLaced in the NSG Repository, Crane, Indiana —1— • O CONTENT S OP-20-GI MEMORANDUM FOR OP—2O—G WATCH; subject: References in RI Summary to AF and K Campaigns, and CinC 5th Fleet; dtd May 20, 1942; s/C. W. Daisley, Lt.Cmdr., USNR COMINCH Message to CINCPAC DTG 251735 May 1942. Memorandum from Assistant Chief of Staff (P) to Commander in Chief, United States Fleet; subject: Deductions Concerning Enemy Intentions in the Pacific Ocean; dtd May 29, 1942; s/R. K. Turner Summaries of U. S. Navy Messages transmitted concerning the Battle of Midway, 3 May to 13 May 1942 Combat Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District MEMORANDUM FOR FLEET INTELLIGENCE OFFICER; subject: Battle of Midway, Enemy dispatches regarding; dtd October 15, 1942; s/J. J. Rochefort Translations of Japanese Dispatches regarding the Battle of Midway, 5 June to 17 June 1942 Report titled “Potential Value of Radio Intelligence in Naval Battles as Illustrated in Battle of Midway”; dtd November 9, 1942; prepared by John V. Connorton, Ensign, U.S.N.R [I Excerpt from BOMBER AND FIGHTER TACTICS IN COMBAT, 7 December 1941 to 30 June 1943. From Asst. Chief of Air Syaff, Intell. RS 19511; no date; no signature NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY; prepared in June 194b —11— ‘5 e - NAVY DEPARTMENT OPTI OF TE 1F OF NATAL OPEBATIONS WASHINGTON - p-2O-GI May 20, 1942. _‘ 0RNM FOR OP -20 -GI WATC H: Subject: References in RI Strrmry to A! and K Campaigns, and CinC 5th Fleet. 1. Admiral Turner says that we have been erroneously associating the A! Campaign with the 2nd K Campaign. In his opin ion, these will be independent operations, the AF Campaign in volving a relatively heavy striking force, while the 2rxi K Cam paign will use subs ax1 aircraft. 2. Until we have more definite infDrmation oonoerning these two campaigns, the GI Watch Officers will refrain from making comments in the RI Siary which indicate that the A! Cam- paign is a phase or part of the 2nd K Campaign. In the meantime, each Watch Section will make an estimate of the relation, it any, between these two campaigns and put same in my basket. 3. A4zniral Turner also says that CinC 5th FLEEI’ is being erroneously associated with certain units in TI reports, particular- ly from Corn 14. According to Admiral Turner, CinC 5th FLEET cor .responds to a Sea Frontier Coinzander, end as such merely receives reports from all units passing through his area. These reports do not mean that the reporting units are under his coand other wise associated with him. 4. Until sufficient information is available to justify a contrary conclusion (and it may already be in the tiles), we are not to comment in such a way as to indicate that CinC 5th FLEET is to command any force now ooncentratlng in Northern pire Waters, but are to assume that Admiral Turner’s view is correct. If it clearly appears that he is correct, Corn 14 and Belconnen should be 80 advised. It Admiral Turner’s view is erroneous, he will be given the pertinent information by Commander Red.man. 5. Let me have the views of each section on this latter point also. Lt.Comdr., tS ( 01 - ‘.-.. -—-— .—- — — -‘ - — --..---.- • Reproduced. Goernnien expense. 41 •.ll4 . ‘1 C\.4 CD C-. • ‘:4’ . 5/212. —- MORANDUM FOR LT. • COMDR. DAIET: Subject: References in RI Summary to A! and K Campaigns, e.xxi CinC 5th Fleet. 1. Admiral Turners’ bell-at that the “A!”,’ or #2 Operations, and the 2nd “K” Campaign are independent operations is not entirely shared by SECTION 1. The chronology of first occurrence of these operations in translations is not entirely lacking in significance, as it indicates that preparations for both are being carried out simulta neously, and there are various indications that them may be coordinated actions between the long range bombing planes of the 4Th AIR ATTACK FORCE end aunarines of the SUBFORCE, and the OCPATION FORCE and other FORCES being assembled at Saipan wider CinC SECOND FLEET; there are also indications that this latter group will, to some extent, also work in cooperation with the SUBFORCE. Some of the translated despatchea, which imply a definite - - coordination of the two FORCES in carrying out different phases of a single Campaign are: 1. SECOND FLEET S #618 of 11 May; This despatch associates the #2 OCCVFATI ON FORCE with the SEC OND FLEET. 2. #1+ AIR AT].ACK FORCE SMS #422 of 13 May; This deepatch, in a sense, associates the #4 AIR ATTACK FORCE with thi DCCt3PATIO’ FORCE. Note Pare. 2 particularly. 3. CinC FIRST AIR FLEET SMS #385 of 16 May; This despatch indicates that there will be cooperation between the JBFORCE J and the FIRST AIR FLEET (CARRIERS) when this FLEET attacks A!. 4. AIRON 14 S #277 of 17 May; This despetch (from a unit of the 4TH AIR ATTACK YORCE() is sound indication of the tie-up between this unit and the A! operation. If SECTION 4 may be permitted the luxury of expressing opinion and indulging in a bit of amateur strategy, we would like to advance our belief that the function of the 4TH AIR ATTkCK FORCE end the aTBFORCE, in the “2nd K-A!” operation, is that of Scoutin, Prelimi nary attack, and possibly Diversion. We believe that theirs is the first phase of the operation, and the result of their part of the opera tion will determine whether the major Task Force will carry out the remaining phases of the operation. 5/20/42 Evidence that CinC 5th Fleet is more than a frontier commander: Corn 14 181906—DI— “Since the #5 RAKU —— rnaru of the 2nd Patrol Boat Group is to be used for patrol of the base area in the A0 area, request you arrange to have ( gun for use against subs, and depth charge equip ment installed ) as soon as possible.” E— (RTEYPED FOR PURPOSE OF CLARITY) c03 -2- 1MO, Cont’d 2. If Admiral Turner, in suggesting that CinC 5th rT is being erroneously associated with certain units, means that he does not believe CinC 5th FLEET is OTC of the forces involved in the Aleutian Operations, then SECTION . again disagrees. There are several indica tions that CinC 5TH FLEET will bethe OTC in this operation end none, so far as we can recall, which indicates that any other officer will be. One the best ani most positive indications that CinC 5TH FLEET will be the OTC in the Aleutian Operation is supplied by CinC 5TH FLEET S #577 ot 14 May. Respectfully, Lieut., USNI C05 4f. 5/21/2. Memo for Lieut., Comr. Daisley; Further confirmation of the status of CINC 5TH FLT as OTC of the Northern Operations is provided by GZ-#1612 of 16 May. Respectf11y Freemen. [ 008 ‘S • (;. 22 Kay, 1912 MORAN1JM FOR LT. COMDP. G. W. DAISIY: Subject: “AF” and 2nd K” Cañpaign. 1. The 2nd Cnpaign is not oox3l:lected with the camign.“K” “ÀY” (a) The forces involved in the 2nd “K” are 4th Air Attack Force and Subs. This fce will attack OAEU with the subs acting as lookouts, etc. as before. After the attack the subs will move on eastward to be used as advare lookouts for the “ÀY” Cam paign. They should be one week to 10 days apart. (b) The Forces involved in the “Ar’ Campaign are : Cinc 2nd Fleet plus his carriers (4 or 5), his BB’s (2. Div.) plus 1 or 2 Crudivs and 1 or 2 Des rona plus 4th Air Attack Force. NOTE: That when Cino 2nd departs Truk and Saipan Area d advances to A! the 4th Air Attack Force based at Wake and Karshaile can sear oh 600 miles radius and give him recon naissance to within 300 miles of Wake. The oirriers do not have to use their planes and own frequencies to give away anything other than daily patrols from Wake and Marshalla. The overniat run of the tast 300 mile a will bring a complete surprise of the carrier craft on the morning of the attack. 2. Gino 5th may, or may not be the head man in the”A0”Cam- paign. The only connection we have is that the forces will assemble at Ominato and that one of Gino 5th’s patrol ships will be usei to patrol “A0” Area. NOTE here that this same ship ór another is probably patroling within 700 miles of “A0” now, so all he has to do is move out a couple days steaming and he is on station. Eere again the sane ship and se trequenoy is used which will not attaot attation by a change. Whether he retains the old boss of Cino 5th or gets a zw one is unowzi. J.”S. LHMkN, Lt4jg) 007 _____ ______ /23/42. MORANDUM FOR LT.COMDR. DAIEY: Please add the following to SECTION 4 memo dated 5/21/42, mrs the “AF—2nd K”” Campaigns: paragraph 1: 5. Jaluit Radio SMS #661 of 18 May; This despatch directly indicates that the operationi of all FORCES involved in the attack on Midway (whTE clearly includes the 4TH AIR ATTACK FORCE - “2nd K” Campaign) has been covered in one directive; also included in the same aTective are the instructions for the “AC” FORCE, which indicates that the “AF-2nd K”, “AO”, etc., Campaigns are to be coordinated operati ons.